Congressional Hearing
Armed Services
Senate
82nd Congress

Contents

1. Military Situation in the Far East.

2. Part Four. (of #1)

3. Part Five - Appendix and Index.

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MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

AND THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

TO

CONDUCT AN INQUIRY INTO THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST AND THE FACTS SURROUNDING THE RELIEF OF GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MACARTHUR FROM HIS ASSIGNMENTS IN THAT AREA

PART 3

JUNE 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, AND 13, 1951

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
and the Committee on Foreign Relations

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MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

FRIDAY, JUNE 1, 1951

Committee on Armed Services and
the Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:06 a. m. in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), Wiley, George, Smith (New Jersey), Hickenlooper, McMahon, Lodge, Fulbright, Tobey, Sparkman, Gillette, Brewster, Bridges, Byrd, Saltonstall, Johnson (Texas), Morse, Fefauver, Knowland, Hunt, Cain, and Stennis.

Also present: Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge of the committee staff of the Armed Services Committee; William H. Darden, clerk, Committee on Armed Services; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff, and Carl M. Marcy, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman Russell. The committee will come to order.

Gentlemen of the committee, our witness today is Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson. Mr. Acheson has headed the State Department during one of the most trying periods in the history of the United States. He has grappled with problems of a colossal magnitude, some of which had never been encountered in our country's prior history.

As Secretary of State he has participated in all of the decisions of recent years which have determined America's global policies. It is fair to say that he is one of the principal architects of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He is probably in as good a position as any man to answer many of the questions this committee has on international relations, particularly in regard to the Far East.

Mr. Secretary, the committee has directed me to administer the oath to all witnesses. Will you please rise and raise your right hand?

The evidence which you will give this committee upon all matters asked of you on this inquiry will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Secretary Acheson. So help me God.

Chairman Russell. Do you have a prepared statement, Mr. Secretary?

PROCEDURAL MATTER OF RELEASING STATE DEPARTMENT INSTRUCTIONS

Senator Knowland. Mr. Chairman, a procedural matter. My understanding was that the first order of business when the Secretary appeared was going to be the procedural matter of to release or not to release to the public the document of December 23, 1949, and I merely suggest that under that order, that rather than having the Secretary proceed to a general statement, unless he was going to speak on this specific issue, we should take up the procedural matter first.

Chairman **Russell**. That is a matter that addresses itself to the committee. The Secretary advised me he had a statement about 18 minutes in length. I did not know whether it related to the procedural matter or to a general statement.

Senator **Knowland**. Well, I understood if the record will be checked that we had a unanimous consent agreement that the first order of business would be the procedural matter, and I consented to the vote going over until today with that understanding.

Chairman **Russell**. I think the Senator is essentially correct.

Senator **McMahon**. Mr. Chairman, I would like to be heard on this matter.

Senator **Johnson**. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say, if I may be recognized, that Senator Knowland correctly states the modified motion the other day, and I want to read from the Senator's own statement:

> As far as I am concerned, if the committee will agree to take it up at the—when the Secretary of State appears as the first order of business so that we can get it out of the way when the Secretary is before us and not at the end of some questioning, I would be willing to consent so far as I have any control over the situation to postpone the matter until the Secretary appears, provided it is the first order of business.

And the committee accepted that unanimously.

Chairman **Russell**. Senator McMahon.

HEARING ACHESON FIRST

Senator **McMahon**. Mr. Chairman, you appointed me a member of the subcommittee along with the senior Senator from California to consider the matter of the declassification of documents that were to be produced here, and one of them is this document.

The Senator from California has been seeking the declassification of this document as I understand it for about a year and a half.

There have been parts of it that have been released by the United Press out of Tokyo. The release came——

Senator **Brewster**. We do not hear very well.

Senator **McMahon**. The release came from Tokyo of this document.

I proceeded to examine the document, and after examining it, I told the Senator from California, in my opinion, that the Secretary or some one of the subordinates ought to be heard on that matter before it was put in the record. The Senator from California, as I recollect it, did not either disagree or agree at that point.

I left it with him on Tuesday, about noon, as I recall it, at that point; and I had to leave the city to go to a speaking engagement which had been made many weeks before.

The next day was Memorial Day.

I had no notice from the Senator from California that he was going to bring this matter to an issue in my absence. I would have appreciated being advised that he intended to bring it before the committee.

The committee decided to sit, with which I do not disagree, but I would have appreciated the courtesy of having the matter brought up in my presence.

Senator KNOWLAND. Would the Senator yield?

Senator MCMAHON. No; I will not yield at this point.

We have here a question, a procedural matter regarding one of probably a thousand documents that may well be considered in the course of this investigation.

We have the Secretary of State here, I presume, to make a general statement on the general scope of his testimony; and then, to be submitted to the questioning of the committee.

I just wish to register my protest at taking up this matter, at this time, before the Secretary has a chance to make his general statement.

If the Senator from California wishes to bring it up after he has finished with it, I have no objection at all; but I do think the orderly way to proceed about it, and certainly the way I would have urged and insisted, if I had been here, and if I had known this was coming up, should be followed.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland.

Senator KNOWLAND. Since the Senator has mentioned my name, I think that the record ought to be very clear on the situation. I did take the matter up with my colleague from Connecticut, who is a member of the subcommittee. We discussed it; I asked him to consult with the Department of State. This was several days ago, the exact date of which I do not recollect.

He did, I understand, consult with the State Department, because on the following day, which I think was the day before Memorial Day, I again talked to him and told him I was anxious to get this document made available before Admiral Sherman was finished and before the Secretary came on the stand.

I understood him to say that the State Department still felt that the matter should not be declassified and that they wanted to be heard on the matter. I have always agreed that on any of these cases the department concerned should be heard.

The night before, and I think before the Senator left for Connecticut, I did again in the record ask that somebody, some representative from the State Department, be present and on Memorial Day, which was a hardship on all Senators who had to meet on that day—and I have canceled out many engagements in my own State and elsewhere in order to attend these meetings—Mr. Fisher, the counsel, as I understand, of the State Department, was here, presented his views. The record is very clear that I wanted and I insisted that the State Department be heard before the committee take any action.

Several motions were then made. I moved, after hearing Mr. Fisher, that the document be made a part of the public record. Senator Johnson of Texas quite properly moved that the matter go over until today. That was defeated, this substitute motion, by a vote of 7 to 7.

At that point I suggested that as a compromise and due to the fact that the Senator from Connecticut was away, that if the committee would agree that this would be taken up as the first order of business, I thought it would be perfectly agreeable to me, and I would not press a vote at that time for the several reasons that we have indicated.

DISPOSING OF PROCEDURAL MATTER FIRST

Now, I think this is a very important matter to be settled. I think we have a gentleman's agreement, as well as a unanimous agreement, that it will be disposed of first. I think it is entirely proper that before a vote is taken, if the Secretary of State himself desires to express reasons why the document should not be made available, that in the general discussion on this matter he be heard to that point; but I do not believe the committee, under the unanimous consent agreement and under the gentlemen's understanding, should proceed to a general statement of the Secretary until we have disposed of this procedural matter.

Senator WILEY. What is the document?

Senator KNOWLAND. The document is the Department of State Special Guidance No. 28, dated December 23, 1949, policy information paper, relating to Formosa, in which the Department of State advised certain of its representatives overseas that the island of Formosa had no strategic value.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator from California is undoubtedly correct. The committee did agree to take this matter up this morning. As I understood his request, it was before any questions were asked, but I shall not haggle over that point. If he desires to insist that we proceed with this before the Secretary makes his brief statement, why, it is my judgment that is certainly covered within the intent of the agreement of the committee on Wednesday.

Senator MCMAHON. Mr. Chairman, does the record show that it is before questions or before a statement is made?

Chairman RUSSELL. The literal statement, as I believe was—well, I shall read it again:

> In view of the statements that have been made of the situation and because I feel that this is a matter in which as large a membership of the committee as possible should be present, so far as I am concerned, if the committee will agree to take it up when the Secretary of State appears as the first order of business, so that we can get it out of the way when the Secretary is before us and not at the end of some questioning, I will be willing to consent, as far as I have any control over the situation, to postpone the matter until the Secretary appears, providing it is the first order of business.

The Chair then stated:

> I think that is a very reasonable position on the part of the Senator from California, and I hope no one will except to it.

That is the pertinent record with respect to this matter.

In view of that record, and the Senator from California insists upon taking this matter up, the matter of the declassification of the document prior to hearing the statement of the Secretary of State. I shall sustain his position so far as the Chair is concerned with a ruling.

If the Secretary of State deals with the declassification of this matter, however, if he thinks it is wise, I feel he should be permitted to make a statement, and proceed as to the declassification of the document involved.

Mr. Secretary, do you desire to make any statement with respect to the classification imposed by the State Department on this document?

TESTIMONY OF HON. DEAN G. ACHESON, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY ADRIAN S. FISHER, LEGAL ADVISER

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir; I should like to do that.

Chairman Russell. Very well.

Secretary Acheson. I will have to postpone my prepared statement because that statement does not deal with the classification of the document in question. I trust at some proper time I shall be permitted to make that general statement.

TEXT OF DOCUMENT AT ISSUE

Senator Saltonstall. Mr. Chairman, if it is in order and I may ask it, would either the Secretary or yourself describe as accurately as it is possible or proper to describe what the statement is, and what is allegedly in it, and what the issue before this committee is.

Senator Knowland. Mr. Chairman, might I suggest as a procedural matter, because these documents are not—except in the yellow bound books are not—available, might I suggest that one of the clerks of the committee—it will not take long—read the document so that all members will have the information.

Chairman Russell. If there is no objection, the document at issue will be read.

Mr. Darden (reading):

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PUBLIC AFFAIRS AREA—POLICY ADVISORY STAFF

(Special guidance No. 28, December 23, 1949)

POLICY INFORMATION PAPER—FORMOSA

I. Problem

To formulate information policy which will minimize damage to United States prestige and others' morale by the possible fall of Formosa to the Chinese Communist forces.

II. Background

A. Comment on Formosa is on the increase as the Communist advances on the Chinese mainland leave the island as the last substantial part of China under Nationalist control. Attention is focused by three principal elements:

1. Communists, world-wide, who charge the United States with conspiring to build the island into a fortress to be taken over by the United States (if it does not already control it), thereby trying to brand the United States with the mark of aggressive imperialism, and also hoping to get us involved in a risky and unpromising venture;

2. Pro-Nationalists (principally in the United States) who consider Formosa a redoubt in which the Government could survive, and who tend to create an impression the United States is delinquent if it fails to "save Formosa";

3. Groups in the United States who are inclined to be critical of the United States for failure to act to prevent loss of the island to the Communists, largely because of mistaken popular conception of its strategic importance to United States defense in the Pacific.

B. Loss of the island is widely anticipated, and the matter in which civil and military conditions there have deteriorated under the Nationalists adds weight to the expectation. Its fall would threaten:

1. Loss of United States prestige at home and abroad to the extent we have become committed in the public mind to hold it;

2. Damage to the morale of other nations, particularly in the Far East, which are disturbed by the Communist gains and fear its possible further advances.

C. Formosa, politically, geographically, and strategically, is part of China in no way especially distinguished or important. Although ruled by the Japanese (as "Taiwan") for 50 years, historically it has been Chinese. Politically and militarily it is a strictly Chinese responsibility.

It is true that the technical status of the island remains to be determined by the Japanese peace settlement, but the Cairo agreement and Potsdam declaration and the surrender terms of September 2, 1945, looked to its return to China and the United States facilitated its take over by Chinese troops shortly after VJ-day.

Even the small United States military advisory group sent there at Chinese Government request was completely withdrawn a year ago. Merely a handful of military attaché personnel with diplomatic status remains. The United States never has had military bases there, and never has sought any special concessions there.

ECA work done on the island, particularly through the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, has been of purely economic and technical nature for assistance in improvement of conditions, and no quid pro quo has been sought.

D. United States public opinion has concerned itself primarily with the question of the island's strategic importance; there has been insistent demand from a few sources for military action by the United States, but it has not assumed significant proportions. Rather public opinion obviously is divided and uncertain, and there is no apparent consensus for a particular course of active intervention.

III. Treatment

A. If rising public interest warrants it, gradually increasing attention may be paid Formosa, to establish, publicly the facts indicated below. Overseas use should be made of unofficial materials in public analysis and comment appearing both at home and abroad, as well as official statements as they may appear. Label conflicting public statements properly as "individual expressions of opinion," as "unofficial," etc.

B. All material should be used best to counter the false impressions that:

1. Formosa's retention would save the Chinese Government;

2. The United States has a special interest in or "designs on" the island or any military bases on Formosa;

3. Its loss would seriously damage the interests of either the United States or of other countries opposing communism;

4. The United States is responsible for or committed in any way to act to save Formosa.

C. Without evidencing undue preoccupation with the subject, emphasize as appropriate any of the following main points:

1. Formosa is exclusively the responsibility of the Chinese Government:

(*a*) Historically and geographically a part of China;

(*b*) The national government has run the island's affairs since the take-over and is responsible for present conditions there;

(*c*) The United States has assumed no responsibilities or obligations, actual or moral.

2. Formosa has no special military significance:

(*a*) It is only approximately 100 miles off the China coast;

(*b*) Other potential objects of Communist aggression are closer to points on the Chinese mainland than to Formosa;

(*c*) China has never been a sea power and the island is of no special strategic advantage to the Chinese Communist armed forces.

3. Economic assistance in Formosa has been for economic and social purposes, has been consistent with demonstrated United States concern for the welfare of the Chinese generally, and has involved no thought of special concessions for the United States.

4. In areas of insistent demand for United States action, particularly in the United States itself, we should occasionally make clear that seeking United States bases on Formosa, sending in troops, supplying arms, dispatching naval units, or taking any similar action would:

(*a*) Accomplish no material good for China or its Nationalist regime;

(*b*) Involve the United States in a long-term venture producing at best a new area of bristling stalemate, and at worst possible involvement in open warfare;

(*c*) Subject the United States to a violent propaganda barrage and to reaction against our "militarism, imperialism, and interference" even from friendly peoples, and particularly from Chinese, who would be turned against us anew;

(*d*) Eminently suit purposes of the U. S. S. R., which would like to see us "substantiate" its propaganda, dissipate our energies and weaken effectiveness of our policies generally by such action.

5. In reflecting United States unofficial demands for action of various kinds in Formosa, avoid giving them prominence unwarranted by their limited (usually individual) source, and make clear that the total of such demands evidences concern and frustration in some quarters but does not add up to a consensus on any particular position different from that officially taken.

D. Avoid:

1. Speculation which would show undue concern with whether Nationalists can hold the island or when Communists may take it;

2. References which would indicate important strategic significance, or that the island is a political entity;

3. In output to China, any emphasis on bad conditions in Formosa under the Nationalists, although to other areas reference can be made among reasons why Nationalists are vulnerable there as elsewhere;

4. Statements that Formosa's final status still is to be determined by the Japanese peace treaty;

5. Name "Taiwan"; use "Formosa."

TEXT OF LETTERS OF TRANSMITTAL

There is also the letter of transmittal.

Would you like for me to read it?

Chairman RUSSELL. I don't think that is necessary, unless some of the committee members desire it.

However, I think it will be well to read it.

Mr. DARDEN. April 26, 1951.

My Dear Senator Knowland——

Chairman RUSSELL. I mean the one transmitting the document, with respect to classification.

Mr. DARDEN. Here is a letter from the Secretary of Defense, dated May 22, 1951:

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Enclosed herewith are documents which I have received today from the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of State's letter which accompanies them.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LOVETT.

Senator McMAHON. Who signed that?

Mr. DARDEN. Robert Lovett, Under Secretary of Defense.

Chairman RUSSELL. I want the letter from the State Department, transmitting it to the Defense Department.

Mr. DARDEN. All right, sir. [Reading:]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D. C., May 22, 1951.

Hon. GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
Secretary of Defense.

MY DEAR SECRETARY MARSHALL: I have your letter forwarding a letter of Senator Russell, dated May 7, 1951, requesting that certain documents specified by Senator Knowland be furnished for use in the investigation now being conducted by the Committee on Armed Services and the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate.

Senator Knowland, in his letter of April 17, 1951, made six requests; replies to the first four requests follow:

1. "The Wedemeyer report on Korea submitted to the President under date of September 19, 1947, along with the report on China which has been published in the so-called China White Paper."

The Wedemeyer report has already been made available to the committees.

2. "The memorandum issued by the State Department on December 23, 1949, circulated among United States diplomatic missions abroad stating among other things that 'Formosa has no special military significance.' Also please furnish the names of the group or committee in the State Department who participated

in the formulation of this document as I shall desire some, or all of them to be called before the combined committee."

Attached is a copy of Special Guidance No. 28 issued on December 23, 1949, by the Policy Advisory Staff of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Department of State. This copy is transmitted with the understanding that, as a classified document, it will not be made a part of the public record of the hearings now going on before the Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. The series of information policy papers, of which No. 28 is one item, is designed primarily for the purpose of providing the necessary background and guidance to assist United States Government information media and United States missions abroad in interpreting major developments affecting United States foreign policy. Such guidance is necessary in order that the Government's information media may contribute effectively to the achievement of United States foreign policy objectives. Making information policy guidance public would adversely affect the conduct of the foreign relations of the United States. Revelation of the detailed methods by which the United States conducts its foreign information program would be of assistance to the Soviets not so much in advising them of what our techniques are, but more in permitting them to take an information directive and use it for extensive counter-propaganda. By its very nature an information policy guidance paper has to include descriptions of the various attitudes on questions and instructions on emphasis and the attitude to take in answering questions. If a copy should be made public, the U. S. S. R. could use it to discredit the information program of the United States by arguing that the Voice of America is not interested in portraying truth, but rather thinks up its arguments (and by implication, its facts) as they may be necessary to support a preconceived foreign policy.

For the foregoing reasons, the Department of State cannot authorize the declassification for inclusion in the public record of the document in question.

In this general connection I invite your attention to my reply of April 26, 1951, to Senator Knowland's original letter, a copy of which is attached. The following paragraph in my letter of April 26 constitutes the response to the second portion of Senator Knowland's second request:

"As to its preparation, you will recall that I stated to the Appropriations Committee that I considered it unwise and contrary to the public interest to indicate which officers in the Department participated, other than to state that 10 different officers in four offices within the Department participated in the drafting and clearing of this document. It must be recognized that papers of this kind are always the result of a give-and-take of views among the various persons on the working levels. If the names of the people who participated in drafting documents were to be made public, the inevitable tendency would be for each to keep a careful record of his precise contribution or attitude on any controversial subject. A department in which officers on the working level are busily engaged in making records against one another would, of course, not function as efficiently as one in which the principle of effective responsibility of the top officials is recognized."

In December 1949, Mr. Rowland H. Sargeant was Acting Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs.

3. "Confidential document No. 84 dated November 27, 1950, from the American Minister at Taiwan (Formosa) to the State Department relative to the visit of the undersigned to Formosa."

Attached is confidential dispatch No. 84 of November 27, 1950, from Taipei, which is transmitted with the understanding that, as a classified document, it will not be made a part of the public record of the present hearings. Because of the special circumstances surrounding these hearings, the Department is, in this one instance, submitting a confidential document concerning prominent personalities, but this action is not to be considered a precedent to be followed in normal circumstances.

4. "Directive issued to the commander of the United Nations forces in Korea relative to United Nations policy regarding Republic of Korea officials being restricted from going north of the thirty-eighth parallel."

On October 12, 1950, the Interim Committee of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, established in accordance with the General Assembly Resolution of November 7, 1950, passed a resolution advising the unified command to take over temporarily "all responsibilities for the Government and civil responsibilities of these parts of Korea which had not been recognized by the United Nations as being under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Korea at the outbreak of hostilities and which may now come under occupation by United Nations forces, pending consideration by the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea of the readministration of those territories." Following consultation between the Departments of State and Defense, and with General MacArthur, there was transmitted to General MacArthur on October 29, 1950, a directive for the occupation of Korea north of the thirty-eighth parallel. This directive was approved by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the President. A copy of that directive is attached.

Following discussions between representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on November 2, 1950, transmitted a telegram to General MacArthur which had the full concurrence of the Department of State, to the effect that it was the understanding in Washington that he was prohibiting, for all practical purposes, the utilization of South Korean personnel in civil affairs matters in North Korea. The telegram informed General MacArthur that it was not intended so to restrict him; rather it should be emphasized that he should make use of South Korean personnel in the administration of North Korea.

With respect to paragraphs 5 and 6 of Senator Knowland's letter, a further examination of the files is required to determine what material is available on the two points and what reply should be made to Senator Russell. These two points will be covered in a subsequent communication.

The Department of State appreciates Senator Russell's assurance that the classified documents forwarded herewith will be "subject to the same security provisions that controlled the classified documents which the Department of Defense has previously provided for examination by members of the committee."

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON.

The letter bears the classification of confidential.

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, if you desire to make any statement now we will be glad to hear from you.

Secretary ACHESON. Mr. Chairman, I should like to address myself to the question of this document. It deals with information to be given out over the Voice of America to minimize the damaging effects to the United States of the possible fall of Formosa.

Senator WILEY. We do not hear you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary ACHESON. I was just describing, Senator, what the document was about.

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD FORMOSA, OCTOBER 1948 TO JUNE 1950

In discussing the document which, obviously, relates to the policy of the United States, I have, first, to state what the policy of the United States Government was in regard to Formosa, and I should like to deal with the period from October 1948 to January 25, 1950.

Throughout that period there was one policy, and one policy only, which was adopted by the Government, and with the exception of one point in that policy, which I shall describe later on, a point which arose on the 27th, 28th, and 29th of December 1949, this policy was unanimously recommended to the President of the United States by all the departments concerned, and was approved by him.

You see, therefore, that it originated during the administration of the State Department by my predecessor, and was carried on by me, so far as the State Department participation is concerned.

That policy was as follows: First of all, it was understood and agreed that Formosa had strategic importance so far as the United States was concerned.

The second point was that that strategic importance related to keeping Formosa out of the hands of a power which would be hostile to the United States, and did not concern occupying or using Formosa by the United States.

The third element of the policy, which never varied from October 1948 to January 25, 1950, was that, in the existing condition, and strength of the Armed Forces of the United States, it was not possible to commit or promise to commit any forces whatever, Armed Forces of the United States, to the defense of Formosa.

The next element of the policy was that the State Department should, to the best of its ability, by diplomatic and economic means try to keep Formosa from falling into hands which would be hostile to us.

Those are the main outlines of the policy.

I, in August 1949, as Secretary of State, reported that I could no longer guarantee that economic and diplomatic means would be successful in keeping Formosa out of the hands of a power which might be hostile to us, and I may say that this policy was reviewed very frequently during the whole time that I was there.

Senator SMITH. Pardon me; what was that, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary ACHESON. I was saying that this policy was reviewed frequently during the period.

Senator SMITH. I thought you gave a date.

Secretary ACHESON. I gave the wrong date, I am sorry to say. The period was October 1948 to June 25, 1950, when I reported that what I have just stated, that it was reviewed again.

BACKGROUND OF PREPARATION OF INSTRUCTIONS OF DECEMBER 1949

While we were in this condition which I have just described, the Department of the Army, which was represented on the interdepartmental group which coordinated the information policies, suggested to the Department of State, the suggestion coming from General Wedemeyer, who was Assistant Chief of Staff, to Assistant Secretary Allen, who is in charge of our Voice of America, that it might be very important to use the Voice of America and our international techniques to minimize any damage which might occur to us in event of the fall of Formosa.

The State Department said it was grateful for that suggestion and would go to work on the matter.

The Department did go to work on the matter.

First of all, there were two studies made, in September and October, as to the imminence and danger of this fall.

Those studies unanimously reported that the fall would occur, and would occur probably in the year 1950.

It was also unanimously understood in these policies, and reported, that, without American military support, support by our own Armed Forces, the island could not be held by those on it against serious attack from the mainland.

In the light of those studies, and those conclusions of probable fact, this document which you have before you was prepared, and, as the heading indicates, the purpose of the document was to solve the problem, if possible, of formulating policy which would minimize damage to the United States prestige and others' morale by the possible fall of Formosa to the Chinese Communist forces.

MEANING OF VARIOUS PARTS OF THE DOCUMENT

Now, I should like to explain to you the document which you have heard read.

The document falls into three parts, the first part being entitled "Background."

That is information solely for those men who are preparing any broadcasts or public information which is to be put out through our Voice of America. All that part of the document has nothing to do with what that person has to say.

This part of the document which begins with "Background," and goes up to the subheading "Treatment," tells the officer working on this matter what is the importance of this question, and why do we want something said about it.

It also tells him what others are saying about this subject, so that he will know the information environment into which he is about to enter.

That covers all that part of the document.

Under the heading "Background," up to the point where we come to "Treatment," that is covered, and this, as I say, is solely for the information of the officers operating the Voice of America, or its various subdivisions, and is so understood.

When we come to "Treatment," the purpose of that section is to tell him the attitude that he should take and the things that he should stress.

The final section of the paper is headed "Avoid," and that tells him things that he should not say.

Now under the heading of "Treatment," I will not bore the committee by reading that all over again.

There is very little, I think, that anyone would find to quarrel with in that part of the document, with one exception, and that is—in two places it says, "All material should be used to counter the false impressions that" and one of them is that "Its loss would seriously damage the interests of either the United States or other countries opposing communism."

Another place in the document is headed, under "Treatment," "The attitude shall be 'Formosa has no special military significance'," and it gives the reason why.

Now, it may be argued—and undoubtedly will be argued—that the policy of the United States, as I have described it, is not as stated in the parts that I have referred to.

MINIMIZING IMPORTANCE WHEN IN ADVERSITY

The answer to that, the reason that we adopt this attitude, is that it is the only attitude which will have the desired effect, which is to minimize the damage to the prestige of the United States and to the morale of others should Formosa fall.

It is a very common attitude in dealing with all matters of information, whether in the public or foreign information field, or in any other field. It is familiar to members of this committee that if a captain in command of a company finds that the companies on either side of him are falling back and taking punishment, what he says to his men is, "Don't give it a thought. It doesn't matter at all. You are doing fine. Dig in. Hold it. It is all right."

You are all familiar with Mr. Churchill's great statement in 1940 that the British would fight on the beaches, fight in the streets, and fight in the hills. I don't think any of you thought that that was a scientific report on the military programs of the British General Staff.

This was an attitude and statement which had great effect.

In the field of politics we are quite familiar with statements which are made about the Gallup poll's report that this or that candidate or party is behind, that candidate or party says, "Why, it doesn't mean anything; I haven't started my campaign yet; wait until I get going."

Those are common attitudes. I don't know any other attitude which would be sounder to take if you believed, as we did believe—and rightly believed—that an event was going to happen which would be damaging to our prestige, than to say, "Keep your chin up; it doesn't matter; this isn't important; we will go ahead and deal with it in some other way."

That is what is behind this whole document.

QUESTION OF CLASSIFICATION

I come now to the question of classification.

It is classified as confidential; it has been ever since it was written. In the letter to Senator Russell I told him that we could not agree to declassify it. It would have a very damaging effect, I hope you will agree, to take a document of the sort which I have described, which is a confidential instruction to your own officers as to how they shall deal with a situation which may develop, which fortunately did not develop, and make this public.

All those who are hostile to the United States will use it for purposes which are very obvious, and which I described in the letter to Senator Russell.

Making it public has no bearing on any issue before these two committees, and I hope that you will not make it public.

There is one matter in fairness, having mentioned it, I think I should say to the committee, which has no bearing on this question at all, but you must know the whole question of Formosa policy.

DISAGREEMENT ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO FORMOSA IN DECEMBER 1949

I stated that at the closing days of December 1949 there was a point at which recommendations were not unanimous, and that point had to do with a proposal put forward by the Defense Establishment, that a mission, military mission, should be sent to Formosa, and that some military assistance in addition to the $125,000,000 program, which was in the Appropriations Act of 1948, should be different. That proposal was made by the Defense Department. It was disagreed with by the State Department. We took the attitude that since the very statement of our problem indicated that this could not be successful and that only the interposition of armed forces of the United States could save the island, what we would be doing would be making an effort here which was by hypothesis ineffective, and we would involve ourselves with further damage to our prestige and to our whole position in the Far East.

Those conflicting views—and this was not a matter of bitter or heated controversy—those views were laid before the President and the President decided to continue the policy as I have stated it before.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Just one moment. In the early part of your remarks you said January 25, 1950.

Secretary ACHESON. I meant June 25, 1950.

Chairman RUSSELL. 1948 through——

Secretary ACHESON. October 1948 until June 25, 1950. That is the period that I am covering.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland.

UNITED PRESS STORY ON THE INSTRUCTIONS

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I think in order that the committee may have the full background of this situation, I should give some background to it. On January 3, 1950, there was carried by the United Press with a Tokyo date line the following article, and I read:

> The United States State Department has notified its attachès that the loss of Formosa, island redoubt of the Chinese Nationalists, to the Communists was to be anticipated.
>
> The Department said the public must be sold on the idea that the island is of no strategic value in order to prevent the loss of prestige at home and abroad.
>
> A document containing the Department's instructions on how to erase the "false impressions" of those pro-Nationalists interested in a "save Formosa" drive has been circulated here, it can be disclosed today.
>
> The document was prepared by the State Department's public affairs area policy advisory staff, and was dated December 23. The word was sent to members of the Department and of some other Government offices.
>
> The document said there are "pro-Nationalists" (principally in the United States) who consider Formosa a redoubt in which the Government could survive, and who tend to create an impression that the United States is delinquent if it fails to 'save Formosa.'"
>
> It said there are groups in the United States "who are inclined to be critical of the United States for failure to act to prevent the loss of the island to the Communists." This is "largely because of a mistaken popular conception of its strategic importance to the United States defense in the Pacific," the document added.
>
> "The loss of the island is widely anticipated, and the manner in which civil and military conditions there have deteriorated under the Nationalists adds weight to the expectation," it said.
>
> The fall of Formosa, it continued, would threaten a loss of prestige by the United States at home and abroad "to the extent that we have become committed in the public mind to hold it."
>
> The fall, it continued, also would threaten damage to the morale of other nations, "particularly in the Far East, which are disturbed by Communist gains and fear its possible further advances."
>
> The document said Formosa, politically, geographically, and strategically, is a part of China and "in no way especially distinguished or important."
>
> "Politically and militarily it is a strictly Chinese responsibility," the document said. "It is true that the technical status of the island remains to be determined by the Japanese peace settlement, but the Cairo agreement and Potsdam declaration and [Japanese] surrender terms of September 2, 1945, looked to its return to China, and the United States facilitated its take-over by Chinese troops shortly after VJ-day.
>
> "United States opinion has concerned itself primarily with the question of the island's strategic importance; there has been an insistent demand from a few sources for military action by the United States, but it has not assumed significant proportions."

The document said all available material should be used "to counter false impressions" that the retention of Formosa would save the Chinese Government, and that its loss would damage seriously the interest of either the United States or of other countries opposing communism.

"Without evidencing undue preoccupation with the subject," it continued, "emphasize as appropriate any of the following main points.

"Formosa is exclusively the responsibility of the Chinese Government. Formosa has no special military significance."

CORRESPONDENCE WITH STATE DEPARTMENT ON DOCUMENT

Mr. Chairman, when that item appeared on the printer in the outside room to the Senate, I immediately went to my office and under date of January 3 addressed the following letter to the Secretary of State:

> Dear Mr. Secretary: I understand that under date of December 23 or thereabouts the State Department issued a memorandum to various military attachés and others, indicating that Formosa could not be held for long and to do everything possible to prepare the public for the loss of the island and to stress the fact it was not needed for the strategic defense of the United States.
>
> As a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Appropriations Committee, I desire to have a copy of this memorandum at the earliest possible date.
>
> With best personal regards, I remain
>
> Sincerely yours,
>
> William F. Knowland.

On January 7, 1950, I addressed the following letter to the Secretary of State:

> Dear Mr. Secretary: I called the State Department this morning to request the names of the committee which had been responsible for drafting the December 23 memorandum advising the State Department personnel that Formosa had no strategic value.
>
> I first attempted to get Mr. Peurifoy in the Personnel Division, but he was out of the city and I talked with Mr. Bryan and made the request of him. He said he had to take it up with higher authority. At about 11:15 this morning, I received a call from Mr. George Kennan who stated both Secretary Acheson and Under Secretary Webb were out of the city. However, he stated that the State Department itself assumed responsibility for any such information sent out and that he felt that he must decline to give me the names of the persons constituting the committee which drafted the document.
>
> I emphasized to him that I felt that as a Member of the Senate of the United States I was entitled to this information and that while there might be some basis for the Department's position to decline to release a document which they themselves had classified, I could see no excuse for not furnishing a Member of Congress the names of such committee.
>
> Sincerely yours,
>
> William F. Knowland.

In reply to that on January 17 I received a letter from the Secretary of State reading as follows:

> My Dear Senator Knowland: I have your letter of January 7 in which you refer to your effort to obtain the names of those responsible for drafting the December 23, 1949, memorandum, and to your conversation with Mr. George F. Kennan who advised you that he felt he could not furnish you with the information.
>
> I fully agree with the position taken by Mr. Kennan that it would be inappropriate to release the names of the officials who participated in the drafting of this paper. I feel that I, as Secretary of State, have responsibility for this particular document, in my opinion, rests with me and secondary responsibility rests with Mr. Howland Sargeant, Acting Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Public Affairs.
>
> I hope you will agree with the position I have taken in this matter. The responsibility is mine and I fully accept it.

IMPORTANCE OF DOCUMENT IN UNITED STATES POLICY

Now, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I place an entirely different aspect on this document than the Secretary of State does. I think it is a key document of the foreign policy of this country, which led up to the situation, the statement of the President on January 5, that the United States would give no further military aid to Formosa, and which many of us, at least, believe led up to the situation where the United States Government was prepared, both to recognize the Communist regime of China and ultimately to turn Formosa over to them.

I call your attention to the fact that in the background information they tried, I believe, to undermine and to cast reflection upon those who may disagree with the policy, which would have led to the fall of Formosa, by saying in subparagraph 2:

> Nationalists, principally in the United States, who consider Formosa a redoubt in which the Government would survive, and tend to create an impression that the United States is delinquent if it fails to save Formosa.

Mr. Chairman, I have felt that way for a number of years. I have stated it publicly on the floor of the Senate of the United States; I am pleased to say that in the hearings before this committee, the Secretary of National Defense, Mr. Marshall, General Marshall; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Bradley; each member of the Joint Chiefs, General Collins, General Vandenberg, and Admiral Sherman, all testified to the fact that in their military judgment it would be detrimental to the interests of this Nation to let Formosa fall into enemy hands.

I call the attention of the committee to the fact that General MacArthur, in his testimony before this committee, and in his statement before the two Houses of Congress, feels precisely the same way about it.

At no time did General MacArthur nor did any other person who felt that way, so far as I know, advocate that the United States seize Formosa or that we ask for bases on Formosa, but we have felt for a long time that it would not be to our national interest to permit Formosa to fall into unfriendly hands.

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENT

Now in the second section, B, which is more or less for the guidance and, I think, to be put out at proper places by the representatives of the State Department, they have this to say:

> The loss of the island is widely anticipated and the manner in which civil and military conditions there have deteriorated under the Nationalists adds weight to the expectation. It's fall would threaten—

Now, first of all, I wish to say that I think there were representatives on Formosa at that time who were following a studied course to undermine the position of the Government of the Republic of China and had consistently sent back reports that the island could not hold out for a period of 90 days, perhaps. I believe that that was misinformation being sent to the Government of the United States, and I think in the Army we would call it false official reports.

Now you go on to paragraph 3, subsection 3, under "Treatment" and here is what it says:

> All materials should be used best to counter the false impressions.

Now let me read you this. This is what they were to do, to put out to counter what the State Department says was false impressions:

> 1. Formosa's retention to save the Chinese Government.

Mr. Chairman, I say that is a false statement, because the last stronghold of the Republic of China has been on Formosa and, if the island fell, obviously the Government of the Republic of China would fall at that point.

> 2. The United States has a special interest in or design on the island or any military bases on Formosa.

I admit we have no design on the island or desire no military bases, but I do submit that the evidence before this committee is clear that our responsible military people in the Defense Establishment believe that it would not be in the national interests of this country to have Formosa fall into enemy hands.

In paragraph 3 it says:

> Its loss would seriously damage the interests of either the United States or other countries opposing Communism.

Mr. Chairman, the information before this Committee is clear that it most seriously would damage the interests of the United States if the island should fall, and if this defeatist attitude of the Department of State had finally prevailed.

Now in subsection 3 it says:

> Without evidencing undue preoccupation with the subject, emphasize as appropriate any of the following main points.

Then subparagraph 2:

> Formosa has no military significance.

Mr. Chairman, this is contrary not only to the advice that we have received since then but, in my judgment, it can be shown that it was contrary to the judgment of the competent military opinion prior to the time the December 23 document was put out.

I call your attention further on that it says:

> In areas of insistent demand for United States action, particularly in the United States itself, we should occasionally make clear that seeking United States bases on Formosa, sending in troops, supplying arms, dispatching naval units, or taking any similar action would, (*a*) accomplish no material good for China or its national regime.

I admit it would accomplish no material good for Communist China; I deny that it would accomplish no good for the National Government of the Republic of China, which we then recognized, which we now recognize, and which is a permanent member of the United Nations.

In subparagraph E it had this to say:

> In reflecting United States unofficial demands for action of various kinds in Formosa avoid giving them prominence unwarranted by their limited, usually individual, source and make clear that the total of such demands evidence concern and frustration in some quarters, but does not add up to a consensus on any particular position different from that officially taken.

In other words, anyone who questioned this fatal policy, which I believe the State Department had clearly outlined in this document, was frustrated and was not speaking for any considerable body of American public opinion.

Now, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, this is not only contrary to the best military advice in this Nation, but I want to read to you from a State Department official bulletin put out on June 3, 1945, the following language from page 1019, United States Department of State bulletin. It reads as follows:

> ### STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS
>
> Strategic factors greatly influence the problem of Formosa. With the exception of Singapore no location in the Far East occupies such a controlling position.
>
> Formosa is separated from the continent of Asia by 100 miles, from the main island of the Philippines by 200 miles, and from Kyushu, the nearest home island of Japan, by 700 miles. Flying distance from military airports in Formosa is 559 miles to Canton, 428 miles to Shanghai, 1,290 miles to Tokyo.
>
> Formosa, larger than the State of Maryland, stands in a strategic relation to the China coast comparable for the United States to an imaginary island of such size 100 miles off the coast of North Carolina, 400 miles from New York City. Every point of the entire coast of China falls within a radius of 1,100 miles. A radius of 2,000 miles includes Burma, Singapore, Borneo, Guam, and Japan, including Hokkaido.

IMPORTANCE OF DOCUMENT AND ITS DECLASSIFICATION

Now, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I submit that here in the face of the State Department's own document saying that with the single exception of Singapore the island was the most strategic location in the Far East, in face of the testimony before this committee that the island has great strategic value and under no conditions should be allowed to fall into Communist hands, I submit that this is a basic document, not merely a guidance of those overseas, but a basic revelation of the defeatist attitude of the Department of State in being prepared to let Formosa fall into unfriendly hands.

I do not believe that the Secretary has made a case that this in any sense violates the security of our troops operating in Korea today, largely because, I believe, of this misguided policy. It does not in any sense threaten or undermine the cryptographic security of this Nation. I again submit, Mr. Chairman, the document should be made a part of our public record so that the Congress and the Nation may have a better understanding of the events which led up to the war in Korea.

I think it is far better if the State Department would frankly acknowledge they made a serious mistake in the document and start out fresh, as Mr. Rusk has indicated in his speech the other night. But if that is not to be done, I think that now is the time and here is the place for us to get a clear understanding of just what policies have led to the Korean war.

Senator Wiley. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Knowland. Yes; I yield.

Senator Wiley. Would you tell me what the date of that newspaper release was?

Senator Knowland. January 3, 1950, which was 2 weeks after the December 23 document of 1949.

Senator Wiley. And does not that release itself substantially tell the contents of the document?

Senator **Knowland**. I think that it does, except that I think there is more information in the document itself, and I think it is better, in fairness to the Department and otherwise, to have the full document made available rather than merely extracts from it. Otherwise a person might think that the extracts were taken out of context.

I think that the extracts fairly represented at least the spirit of the document, but I think that it woud be better to have the entire background made available.

PRESS REPORTS OF DOCUMENTS

Senator **Wiley**. Was that release published generally in the American papers—what services?

Senator **Knowland**. Yes.

Senator **Wiley**. Under whose authority was it published?

Senator **Knowland**. I do not know. There were many articles run through the country based on that, and subsequent articles which have been published.

Senator **Wiley**. You got it out of a Washington paper?

Senator **Knowland**. I have gotten clippings out of the Washington papers. That particular thing I read from was the original dispatch which came in over the ticker. You know we have a United Press and Associated Press report right off the Senate floor, and as soon as it came in I tore it off, and went over to my office and wrote this first letter of January 3, which was the same date that the dispatch came off the printer.

Senator **Wiley**. That was my question—it came over the UP and AP?

Senator **Knowland**. That is right; that is my recollection.

Senator **Wiley**. Thank you.

Secretary **Acheson**. Mr. Chairman, may I make a comment?

Chairman **Russell**. Certainly.

Secretary **Acheson**. I would like to make three points.

AVAILABILITY OF DOCUMENT BEFORE NOW

I would not want the committee to believe, and I am sure Senator Knowland did not wish the committee to believe, that the State Department had ever attempted to keep this document from Senator Knowland. If my recollection is right, I believe I showed Senator Knowland the entire document and he read it in my office.

Senator **Knowland**. Mr. Chairman, would you mind? I had not seen this document before. I understand that you did submit it to some committees but I have no recollection of ever having read the entire document.

Secretary **Acheson**. My recollection is different. I thought you and Senator Smith, or you alone, called on me in my office and I showed you the document. However, I may be wrong about that.

The next point that I should like to make is that the State Department——

Senator **Smith**. Mr. Chairman, I might say there, I do not ever recall seeing this document. Senator Knowland did ask to see it when we were there, but I am sure we did not see it.

Secretary **Acheson**. My recollection is quite possibly wrong about it.

NO STATE DEPARTMENT LEAK

The next point that I should like to make is that the State Department had nothing whatever to do with the leaking of this guidance paper to the press. This paper, in addition to being sent to State Department officers who run the Voice of America, is furnished to people in the military service who have the same sort of service in Germany and in Japan. That is one of the reasons why there is a group representing the services which coordinate information.

In due course it was sent in, among other places, to Tokyo, and the leak occurred there, and the people in Tokyo are not under the jurisdiction of the State Department.

EXTENT OF DIFFERENCES ON FORMOSA POLICY BEFORE JUNE 1950

The last point that I should like to make is that you might have gotten the impression from what Senator Knowland said that during the period I have been discussing, which is October 1948 to June 1950, that there was some difference in this regard between State Department policy and that of our military services.

With the exception which I have already mentioned to you, that is not the case. It was the clear unequivocal recommendations of the military services that we could not employ any of our forces for the defense of Formosa.

That policy was unanimously changed at the meetings which occurred on the 25th, 26th, and 27th of June 1950, following the attack in Korea.

During the time we are discussing here, there was absolutely no difference on that point.

Senator KNOWLAND. Would the Secretary mind a question? Wasn't that our same policy in regard to Korea prior to June 25 also, that we would not become involved? Did we not feel that was no place to become involved in war?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't think there was any formulation of policy. We had withdrawn our forces from it. Our attitude toward Korea was fundamentally based on the charter of the United Nations, and in my speech on the 15th of January 1950 I pointed out that while there was no American commitment outside of the areas that I have discussed in that speech, there were United Nations obligations and that those had not proved in the past to be weak reeds for countries who wanted to so defend themselves.

But in connection with the appraisal of the situation, I mentioned sometime ago that there was a joint study made by all the departments concerned as to what the fact was going to be, or was likely to be; what the conclusion was likely to be, regarding the fall of Formosa, and that conclusion was that it was estimated that no amount of United States aid, short of military occupation and control, would insure Taiwan's indefinite survival as a non-Communist area.

It was concluded, therefore, that even with extensive United States support, short of major armed intervention, involving the use of United States combat forces, none of the non-Communist regimes in China could survive beyond 1950, except on Communist sufferance. Without United States military occupation and control, Taiwan, like the rest of China, probably would be under the Communist Chinese control by the end of 1950.

Senator HUNT. May I ask the Secretary a question?

Secretary ACHESON. May I just finish my statement?

Senator HUNT. I should like to ask the Secretary, he speaks of the fact that this was the policy of all interested departments as of that date. Do you include the military department in that statement?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary ACHESON. I was just ending up by saying that, therefore, this paper that you have before you is not a paper at which you can look to prove that the State Department attitude or policy was different from that of the other branches of the Government; it was not.

This paper here was an information paper; a paper taking an attitude in the event of a contingency, which was to occur.

It must be judged, I submit, on that ground. Now, it may be that if you were in my place, you would not have attempted to try to minimize the effect of the fall of Formosa by such information as we have been discussing; maybe that, in your judgment, wasn't the right thing to do; maybe if you had tried to do it you would have done it differently.

But the paper relates to the wisdom and the propriety of what was attempted to be done, which was to minimize the fall, which everyone had agreed was inevitable, rather than as an exposition of United States policy or State Department policy. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, the Senator from Wisconsin has a question.

EFFECT OF DECLASSIFICATION IN VIEW OF PREVIOUS PRESS REPORTS

Senator WILEY. Mr. Secretary, there is one question that occurs to me—rather, two questions that relate to this controversy.

The first is, now that the AP and UP have given out this rather formidable text, what is the difference between that and the harm that is going to be done—if there is any harm—by declassifying it?

Secretary ACHESON. Senator Wiley, some harm has been done by this leak in the stories which grew out of it, but there is a vast difference between a story which rests on what some reporter says and an official statement by the Government of the United States that this is an official document.

Senator WILEY. Let me get that, Mr. Secretary. Don't I understand that the gist of this document is simply this: At that time the evaluation of your Department, and, as I understand you to say, the other departments, of the situation in the Far East, was that Formosa was liable to fall, and in order to minimize the fall, you thought it advisable to put out these statements. Now, isn't that the sum and substance of the purpose and the objective, and would have been the result if Formosa had fallen?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, it is not what I have said, Senator, that we thought it advisable to print this document. We thought it advisable that that statement should be made along the line, as described, under treatment in the document to minimize the effects of the fall.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR FORMULATING DOCUMENT

Senator WILEY. Now, the second question is that, in the request for the names of those who formulated it, is there some special reason why their names should not be given?

Would it damage the public interest, or would it be in the nature of a state secret? It seems to me that the very withholding of those names lends some suspicion that they might not even be there.

I just wondered what the reason for that was?

Secretary ACHESON. I stated the reason, Senator Wiley, in the letter to Senator Russell.

There is no state secret involved in the matter at all.

I think there is an important matter of sound administration. If, every time there is a dispute about some action which was taken, instead of putting the responsibility on the responsible officers who are in charge, and that is myself and my senior assistants, we bring out the names of every individual, no matter how unimportant to the Department, who had anything to do with it, you will very easily destroy the morale of the Department and people will be building records to defend themselves, rather than throwing themselves into the work of the Department.

These people involved are not senior officers. They are not people who can defend themselves in matters of public controversy.

There has already developed in the Department a most unfortunate reluctance of many people to work in those areas of the Department which are highly controversial, because they believe, and I am afraid, rightly believe, that even though they serve the best interests of the United States, and do their work faithfully, they are apt to be accused, and have a great deal of trouble made for them.

Therefore, it seems to me that since I am the officer responsible, and do not, in any way attempt to duck that responsibility; and since Mr. Sargeant, who is the senior officer under me, is responsible and does not attempt to duck his responsibility, that whatever you want to know, you can get from us.

There is no name here, which, in and of itself, I would not be quite willing to give you; no one is involved here that you are suspicious of; but just as a matter of sound administration, I think it is a matter that should not be pressed.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. I ask to be heard——

Senator MCMAHON. Louder, please.

Senator MORSE. I wish to be heard for just a minute on a legal problem that concerns me, in regard to this particular issue.

WISDOM OF DECLASSIFYING DOCUMENT

May I say, as I indicated the other day before the committee, Mr. Chairman, that I think this is somewhat of a tempest in a teapot, in that I see no reason why this document should not have been declassified by the State Department, in view of the fact that its contents are pretty well known anyway, as a result of the leak from Tokyo; and furthermore, I think the State Department can make clear, if it is a fact, that the document does not represent State Department policy, on the issues that are raised in the document, but what the document really is, in fact, is a rationalization of America's position in the field of world diplomacy, as a result of the contemplated loss of Formosa, which did not come to pass.

But, be that as it may, Mr. Chairman, let us assume, hypothetically, that the State Department wishes to hold to its view that the document should not be declassified, for whatever reasons it wishes to lay down in support of the view, I call the committee's attention to these facts which I think—these are the facts:

COMMITTEE PROCEDURE FOR OBTAINING DOCUMENTS

That when this committee organized itself for this investigation, and it agreed upon a policy that the chairman, upon written request of the members of the committee, should request of the various departments the submission of certain secret documents for the inspection of the committee, or committee members.

The Chairman, as far as I know, without exception, has cooperated with each member of the committee, as he has received our letters, by writing a letter to the department concerned, whether it was the Defense Department, State Department, or any other department, for the submission to this committee, for its inspection, of secret documents.

Chairman Russell. Pardon me, Senator.

I have forwarded every request, undoubtedly; but I have handled them, as a matter of procedure, through the Defense Establishment.

If any material from the State Department were requested, for example, I have requested the Department of Defense to obtain it for us.

With the exception of that portion of the statement, you are correct.

Senator Morse. I am glad to have the chairman's explanation of the procedure he has followed.

My conclusion is, however, still accurate, namely, that the chairman has seen to it that the request of any member of this committee for inspection of the secret documents has been properly transmitted to the officials concerned through, as the chairman now explains, the Secretary of Defense.

And, as far as I know, and there may be exceptions to this, but as far as I know, the committee has received from the departments concerned, their fullest cooperation, including, in this instance, for example, the submission to this committee of a document of the State Department which has it classified, apparently, as "Confidential."

Now, I would like to raise two or three legal questions, Mr. President.

I have not changed my view, or my feeling that this ought to be declassified, but I think the committee has to give very careful consideration to the precedent that it establishes, by way of procedure, at this point in our hearing.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DECLASSIFICATION BY COMMITTEE VOTE

Let us assume now that when we get through with the discussion of this issue this committee votes to release this document to the public over the protestations of the State Department.

It seems to me that if we do that, we are then likely to find ourselves in a position where the State Department in the future may wish to fall back upon whatever legal rights it may have in the premises in respect to future documents and take the position that when we request a secret document for the inspection of the members of the committee, the State Department runs the risk if it supplies the document of having it not only submitted to the committee for the executive hearings and inspection of the individual members of the committee, but runs the risk by a majority vote of the committee of its being inspected by the world, and therefore the State Department would have to make a decision under those circumstances as to whether or not it wants to rely upon whatever powers it has as an arm of the executive branch of the Government to deny to this committee future documents.

I think that is a rather serious procedural controversy for us to get into, if we can work out an arrangement short of it, because I am still of the opinion, Mr. Chairman, that this committee would not have the power to subpena from the State Department a document which in the opinion of the State Department is a highly secretive document.

Therefore, if we proceed just because we have physical possession of a document to release it, as we would be able to do if we wanted to exercise that power, we ought to consider at this time what our future relationship is going to be with the State Department in getting other documents for our secret inspection, with the State Department in turn running the risk of having those documents released by a majority vote of this committee.

In my opinion, there is a fundamental legal question raised by this controversy about which constitutional lawyers could debate ad infinitum, and I only express my present legal conclusion—namely, we do not have the power to subpena such documents in the first instance if the executive branch of the Government doesn't want to release them to us.

In the second place, the chairman called my attention yesterday—and he can raise it in greater detail, but I think it ought to be mentioned—the chairman called to my attention yesterday a section of the Espionage Act, which I think ought to be very carefully considered by the members of this committee, before they declassify this document, if they decide to declassify it, as to whether or not at least the chairman of this committee and I am not so sure, Mr. Chairman, but every member of the committee that might vote for the declassification of this document and its release to the public, might be guilty of a crime under the Espionage Act if the State Department does not give consent to its declassification.

In other words, I think now is the time to raise the flag of legal caution, Mr. Chairman, in this controversy. I think we ought to be certain that we are on absolutely sound ground legally before we vote here to overrule the State Department—and that is what our vote to declassify will constitute—because I think, as a lawyer, all of our colleagues ought to be forewarned that you are dealing here with a very serious matter when you move to declassify a secret document in view of the language of the Espionage Act.

PLEA TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO DECLASSIFY DOCUMENT

Therefore, I close, Mr. Chairman, with the plea to the State Department that I think under the circumstances that have developed, the contents of this document pretty well known the world around right now, and under those circumstances we had better consider the bowl of milk has been spilled, the Humpty Dumpty is off the wall, you can neither get the milk back in the bowl or Humpty Dumpty put together again; so you had better declassify this and move on to the next issue.

I do think, Mr. Chairman, that we ought to also make clear to these departments that if we are going to ask for secret documents, it ought to be upon the gentleman's understanding that we are not going to get those documents into our physical possession and then publicize them, because if I were Secretary of Defense or Secretary of State under those circumstances, with the obligations that those men have under the separation-of-powers doctrine to the executive branch of the Government, I wouldn't release a document in the first instance, if I couldn't rely upon the committee not to release it to the public without the approval of the department concerned.

Senator **Knowland**. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Knowland.

OTHER LEAKS AND DECLASSIFICATIONS

Senator **Knowland**. Apropos of the remarks made by the Senator from Oregon, in the first place it seems to me that in view of the fact that the State Department itself, at its own discretion, in order for what many people honestly believe was an effort to undermine the Government of the Republic of China, declassified large numbers of documents in the so-called China white paper, but many of us believed did not declassify all the documents relating to the situation and particularly some which might have thrown a different light upon the subject; in view of the fact that the question of the Espionage Act has been raised—and I shall not be personally intimidated on that situation—I call your attention to the fact that there is a prima facie violation of the espionage laws by the release of the Wake Island document to the New York Times when it was still classified, not confidential, but top secret, and when the information released not only includes the material which finally was declassified and made available, but includes some of the material which is still in the document in its classified state in our security room.

So that if there are to be any prosecutions under the Espionage Act, the No. 1 business of the executive branch of this Government should find out who of the 44 or 50 people who have a copy of the Wake Island notes released a copy of those notes while still classified as top secret, and why was it done, Mr. Chairman? Because it was felt that that would bolster the case of the people who had removed General MacArthur.

Now I hope that out of these hearings there will come an area of agreement in which we can get a substantial number of the members of this committee, regardless of their partisan affiliation, to finally unite on a report, but I say that that will not be augmented in my judgment if in a document which some of us feel does have material value in these hearings and is a part of the examination that we want to make of numerous witnesses that will come before us, if that is still held under these circumstances.

Now I think the Deparment would be well advised as suggested by the Senator from Oregon, I would much prefer not to have this situation forced to be done over their protests, but I think that we are entitled to some cooperation from the Department and the executive branch of the Government in this regard.

EFFECTIVENESS OF CENSORSHIP ARRANGEMENTS

I think this committee has been outstanding in that with the censorship which we ourselves set up, the subcommittee and the committee itself has been in complete agreement with the amount deleted by the censor, with I think only three exceptions.

On one of those, after discussing the matter with Admiral Davis, the subcommittee and the full committee fully agreed with the admiral in the deletion. On the other one, it was only a question of possibly endangering the cryptographic code.

On that the admiral fully agreed that if it could be put into a paraphrase, there was no reason why that should not be released, and it was released.

And the third dealt with the town of Rashin, and on that the committee was in disagreement with the admiral, but finally the admiral took the matter up with the Defense Establishment and they agreed finally that it would be advantageous and better at least for the name of that city to be released.

NO HARM IN DECLASSIFICATION

Now with the thousands of words of testimony, we have worked in such complete harmony and understanding that we have not had a major issue arise that has not been amicably settled, and in view of the fact that this is a year and a half old, there is no charge that in any slightest degree it involves crypotographic code. It does not involve our fighting troops in Korea.

A substantial part of it has been published, and published a year and a half ago. I would think, Mr. Chairman, that the Department, of its own motion in this case and without setting a precedent to the future, because each case would have to stand upon its own, they themselves would say that under all those circumstances the document should be made a part of our public record with such explanation as they might want to make giving their point of view.

Senator HUNT. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hunt.

LEGAL SITUATION ANALYZED

Senator HUNT. The position taken by the Senator from Oregon is substantially the same position that I took on Wednesday, I believe it was, the result of which was postponing until today the final settlement of this particular point.

I still am in hearty agreement with the position we took at that time. Here we are a joint committee, 26 Members of the Senate, a big group. We could possibly direct that this paper be made available to all of the people.

I say to you, however, a lone committee taking the same action, it could be a forerunner of simply the subcommittee taking a similar action. The only possible way we could force the Secretary of State in case he did not care to comply with our request, would be to cite him for contempt before the Senate. That would be the ultimate result of this situation.

It can't be circumvented. I think we are establishing, if we demand of the State Department that they declassify a secret state paper, that we are doing something that is ill-advised, doing something that is not for the good of our country, and something that each and every one of us possibly we would see the day that we would regret the action taken.

I am heartily in accord with the legal position taken by the Senator from Oregon.

Senator **Bridges**. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Bridges.

PREVIOUS RELEASES AND LEAKS OF CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS

Senator **Bridges**. Senator Knowland, I think, has outlined the crux of this thing when he goes back to the Wake Island conference which was not as confidential as this document was, but a top-secret document which was released by someone.

If there has been any violation of any law against our country, it was that release of a top-secret document. In questions of the Defense Department, officials who testified here that even if it was top secret, that is the highest secret you can get in our country, that they have made no endeavor yet to find out who released it.

Now if we are going to get into these things, then we ought to find out who released it, who violated the laws of our country on a thing of that kind, and I think you might find it was people rather high up in our country, and it would present a very serious problem for our committee and for the Department of Justice as to what they propose to do on the violation of a top-secret document.

This is merely a confidential document which has had general publicity.

INTERPRETATION OF PREVIOUS STATE DEPARTMENT WITNESS ON CLASSIFICATION OF THE DOCUMENT

Now as I understand the issue made by Mr. Fisher the other day, the legal adviser to the State Department, was that he did not object to the body of the thing, but what he objected to was the introductory sentence or two, the paragraph where it said that it was giving a direct slant to the information given out by the Voice of America on this thing, and he pointed out that Russia would give then formal acknowledgment that we were slanting our news.

Of course I think we would be foolish if we do not slant our information on this thing, and I haven't any doubt but what the Russians know that, but could this matter be settled and will the Secretary agree to releasing this if the few top sentences objected to by Mr. Fisher be eliminated?

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Chairman, I did not understand Mr. Fisher to make——

Chairman RUSSELL. I did not understand Mr. Fisher to take that position.

Senator BRIDGES. I would like to have his testimony read then. I have got two ears and I listened very carefully. He went all over the lot but that was his conclusion.

Chairman RUSSELL. I did not understand that that was his position.

Senator KEFAUVER. I thought, Mr. Chairman, he very definitely said if we took out the top sentences, then the rest of it would be not correctly stating the position of the State Department and it might be interpreted that way.

Senator BRIDGES. He did that when he objected to that, but the first part of his argument was only on the slant it would give.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, do you want to read that?

Chairman RUSSELL. No; I am not going to read the record. If the Senator wishes to, he may.

EFFECT OF DECLASSIFYING DOCUMENT ON THE VOICE OF AMERICA

Senator BREWSTER. I more or less agree with the Senator from Oregon this is sort of a tempest in a teapot, having read the document before, but as I understand it the Secretary contends that this was simply an example of whistling to keep our courage up.

Wasn't that the essence of your idea, that this document was put out for that reason, a well-recognized practice that people, if they think they are going to get in trouble, they whistle a little to keep their courage up?

Secretary ACHESON. It is a question of whose courage. It wasn't our courage but it was to minimize the effect of this in other areas.

Senator BREWSTER. And the disclosure of your action in that regard it seems to me can surprise no one including the Russians.

That is the only aspect of the matter that surprises me a little, is that you think the Russians or anybody else would be surprised to find that you were trying to put the best face we could on the situation. That is all the publication of this document will reveal.

I would subscribe very earnestly to the others who hope that you might see it in that light and release it to avoid any difficulty. We have crossed every bridge so far, and I hope we get over this one.

Secretary ACHESON. Senator, it is not that this would surprise the Russians, it is that it gives them an official document——

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON. Which they will use to the best of their ability to discredit the Voice of America in the areas in which it is effective.

Senator BREWSTER. Do you think there is anybody in the world doubts that?

Secretary ACHESON. Doubts what?

Senator BREWSTER. Doubts that we are using the Voice of America in the most effective way we can to maintain our case. What else does anyone suppose we are doing with it?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, as I say, it would be very harmful to the Voice to have this official document of the Government put in the hands of those who will use it in the most destructive way against us.

Senator **Brewster**. That is very difficult for me to understand. Socrates said that the penalty of being a liar was not to be believed when you told the truth, and that is the wisdom of trying to make all your statements conform to the facts and so forth. But if in the diplomatic field a different practice prevails, I am sure it is not peculiar to America.

Senator **Stennis**. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Stennis.

Senator **Stennis**. What is the matter before the committee? Is there a motion to release this?

Chairman **Russell**. Yes, sir; a motion from Senator Knowland, as I understand it, that this matter be declassified by the committee action.

Senator **Knowland**. Be made a part of the public record.

Chairman **Russell**. Mr. Secretary, I have a question or two I want to ask. I wish to make a prefatory statement.

STATE DEPARTMENT UNDERSTANDNG IN SUPPLYING DOCUMENT TO COMMITTEE

When this letter from Mr. Lovett, conveying the letter from the Secretary of State to me, reached me, it was handed me here in the committee room. I did not read it carefully, I glanced through it very hurriedly, and then either handed it to Senator Knowland myself or requested that whoever, whichever member of the staff handed it to me, hand it to Senator Knowland. I mean he is the man who requested the matter, and he would primarily interested.

I wish to read this letter that I forwarded Secretary Marshall.

> Hon. George C. Marshall,
> *Secretary of Defense, Washington, D. C.*
>
> Dear Mr. Secretary: I am enclosing a copy of a letter I have received from Senator Knowland requesting that certain documents be furnished the committee by the Secretary of State. I shall thank you to transmit this letter to the Secretary of State with the request that he furnish this material subject to the same security provisions that control the classified documents which the Department of Defense has previously provided for examination by members of the committee.

I notice you quote part of that statement in the last paragraph of your letter. I shall read that to complete the record:

> The Department of State appreciates Senator Russell's assurance that the classified documents forwarded herewith will be "subject to the same security provisions that control the classified documents which the Department of Defense has previously provided for examination by members of the committee."

I would like to ask you, Mr. Secretary, what you understood by that language.

Secretary **Acheson**. I understood, Mr. Chairman, that I was furnishing the document under the security provisions which you have set up; that is, that the documents are kept under custody; that they are available to be read by the members of the committee, but that they are not to be put into the public record, since this was a classified document. That is the basis under which I furnished it.

Chairman **Russell**. Were you wholly without knowledge that the committee has assumed the power in the event a majority decided to do so, to declassify any of the documents?

Secretary **Acheson**. I assumed that the committee could do that if it wished to do it; yes, sir.

Chairman **Russell**. You assumed that it could?

PERSONAL ATTITUDE OF WITNESS

Secretary **Acheson**. Now, there has been a statement about my attitude, and I think, perhaps, I should make it clear, I believe that the classification of this document as confidential is correct, and it is necessary to maintain it.

I have believed that ever since the document was first talked about, and since parts of it, quotations—alleged quotations—were made from it. That is my belief.

The duty is mine, the responsibility is mine. I have to deal with it individually in accordance with my own conscience and my own oath. I cannot, to be agreeable, do something which I think is wrong and not in accordance with my duty. So far as the power of the committee is concerned, I am not challenging the power of the committee, and I will not do anything to thwart it.

If, despite what I have said, the committee votes to release it, or votes that it wishes to release this, so far as the State Department censor is concerned, I shall direct him not to try to thwart the will of this committee; but I cannot change my own conviction, and I must perform my duty in accordance with it.

Senator **Bridges**. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Bridges.

Senator **Bridges**. Mr. Fisher, in his testimony——

Senator **Knowland**. What page?

Senator **Bridges**. I am reading from 4100 first:

PREVIOUS STATE DEPARTMENT WITNESS STATEMENT ON CLASSIFICATION

> The document in question is a document designed to inform the information or propaganda people of the Department of State as to the line that should be taken in certain circumstances. I will give you the best evaluation of its purpose by reading from its first paragraph:
>
> " 'Problem: To formulate information policy which will minimize damage to United States prestige and others' morale by the possible fall of Formosa to the Chinese Communist forces.'
>
> "In other words, the purpose of this document is, to put it crudely, give the Voice of America people the line they should follow because of an anticipated development.
>
> "Now, it is probably known to the Soviets that we do give them—give the people the lines to follow on various possibilities. They undoubtedly suspect it.
>
> "The question is can they prove it, and if this document were to be released, what propaganda use would they make of it, not as a leak but as an official United States document in which we tell our broadcasters, 'Play up this; play down that.'
>
> "Now, I don't believe that that is an improper thing to do. Anyone who knows the problems of a propaganda war realizes there has to be some central direction, but for counterpropaganda use, the exposure of that type of central direction gives the Soviets something that I think they would very much like to have for the purpose of destroying the credibility of the Voice of America, which we have all been working so hard to build up. That is, I think, a brief statement of the reasons, Mr. Chairman."

Now, later, on page 4115, Senator George says:

> As I understand you, Mr. Fisher, it is not a question whether these statements here are true or untrue, whether the Secretary of State will come along and admit that they were facts or unrealistic; it is that if this document is now made public, that then the Russian propagandists will be able to trace it right back to

your directive and say, "Here. This is the source of it" and everything they say is simply put out over there in this way. Is that your position?

Mr. FISHER. That is the position on the classification issue, Senator.

Then, down at the bottom of that page:

Senator KEFAUVER. As I understand Mr. Fisher, you, I don't believe, were even counsel for the State Department when this was written, and you are not trying to pass on whether it is a good directive, whether it should have been put out, or anything else about that. You are just talking about the damage that the publication of it right now might do to the program of the Voice of America; is that correct?

Mr. FISHER. That is correct. I was with the State Department when it was written. I was up in Ottawa trying to settle the Colonial Air Lines matter at the time and did not know of it myself. But the subsequent issue that you state is entirely correct.

Then, over here, on page 4118, I asked the same question, after all this build-up along this line, I asked him—

Senator BRIDGES. I want to make one question.

Mr. Fisher, your whole argument is on the first two or three sentences there. Supposing we should agree to eliminate those two or three sentences and release the rest, would that remove your objection?

Mr. FISHER. No, sir; I don't believe so.

Senator BRIDGES. That is your argument.

Mr. FISHER. That would put the rest in entirely different context without those first sentences. If they were not made public, the remainder would appear as a statement of United States policy, not as a statement of background and general attitudes to be taken.

The point I make is that Mr. Fisher, coming up here the day before yesterday, argued along one line, and one line only; and that when he was asked that question of eliminating the thing that he pointed out was the danger, he did not agree with it.

All I was doing was repeating the same question to the Secretary which, based upon the argument made by Mr. Fisher the other day, whether or not he would be willing to release the document, if the first two or three sentences were eliminated—which seemed to be the thing that Mr. Fisher was objecting to, then——

Chairman RUSSELL. I did not intend to offend my friend from New Hampshire when I said I did not get the impression from Mr. Fisher's testimony that he would be willing for it all to be released if those three lines were taken out, but I did not get that impression, and my understanding is sustained. It is just a difference of opinion, sustained by what the Senator has read.

Senator BRIDGES. He built up his whole case on that, and when the question is put to him, then he takes the other position. I want to point out from my questioning, and that of Senator George, from his own statements, that he had reason to believe that.

Senator GEORGE. Mr. Chairman, may I make just a very brief statement?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir, Senator; you may just make any statement you desire.

GERMANENESS OF DOCUMENT TO INQUIRY

Senator GEORGE. I would be most reluctant to vote to relieve a confidential entry made on this paper supplied by the State Department if I did not think it was material in this whole inquiry. I think it is material, and its materiality may depend entirely upon what is subsequently shown or what is subsequently presented to the committee.

But, at this stage of it, it does seem to me to be material, because while I have never been quite certain about the scope of this inquiry, what we were expected to find here by this committee, among other things, of course, there was the relief of General MacArthur out in the Far East, and to put it in a way that I do not think it need make any controversy, the question of whether or not there was any very definite and certain far eastern policy which we were pursuing is involved in this case; and this strikes me as having a material bearing upon that, subject to the explanation, of course, that accompanies this document that the State Department puts down; and, I, therefore, would have to vote, if it is going to be forced to a vote, to relieve the ban of secrecy upon this document.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I could not understand you. Did you say "relieve" or "leave"?

Senator GEORGE. Relieve the ban.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator from Washington is recognized.

THE UNITED PRESS STORY ON THE DOCUMENT

Senator CAIN. I should like, Mr. Secretary, to pose three brief questions. Does the Secretary of State agree that the United Press release of January 3, 1950, which was read by the Senator from California, Mr. Knowland, accurately represents the substance of the State Department policy guidance directive which was written and released some time in December of 1949?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't think I have it sufficiently in mind.

Senator CAIN. It presumes to be, sir, an accurate series of quotes from that document, and I should like to know if you agree.

Senator WILEY. Is that the same as Senator Knowland read?

Senator CAIN. Precisely.

If you wish to check that a little further, Mr. Secretary, I would ask my second question. Does the Secretary of State agree that the United Press release is a public document and therefore can be used in any way which anyone wishes without any legitimate criticism of any kind from the Department of State?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, of course, the UP story that you have is a public document. There is no doubt about that.

Senator CAIN. Then in a minute we will establish through your study as to whether or not it is an accurate résumé of what the State Department put out.

My third question, Mr. Secretary: Did the State Department institute an investigation to discover by what means a State Department confidential directive was released without authorization? And if that investigation was conducted by the State Department, what were the results of it, sir?

Secretary ACHESON. In answer to your first question, Senator Cain, I have here a copy of the Special Guidance 28, which indicates, various parts of which were quoted and various parts of which were not—the ones underlined were not.

Senator CAIN. I would imagine, Mr. Secretary, that some member of your staff many months ago examined that United Press statement minutely in order to determine to what extent it was a literal recitation of portions of your policy guidance statement.

Secretary Acheson. The paper which I have here, showing the portions not used, is somewhat different from the one you have given me, but roughly speaking, not very different.

As far as I can see from this, perhaps a third of the paper has been used in the story.

Senator Cain. I raised the question, Mr. Secretary——

Chairman Russell. Just a minute.

Secretary Acheson. I do not believe that the story gives an accurate résumé of the paper for two reasons. One of them is that it makes it appear that what is being told in the story is the State Department policy, whereas that is not what the document is. The document is a statement of what the broadcasters, the attitudes which they should take. So in that most important respect the story is not accurate.

So far as the content of the paper is concerned, quoting a third of the paper and picking out certain items, I think gives it a somewhat distorted view.

Senator Cain. I raise the question, Mr. Secretary, because I have sat here as one who is relatively uninformed on this question and listened very carefully. What I am getting at is this: If that United Press statement does not say anything which your policy guidance statement did not say, or said only those things which were said in that policy guidance statement, then I should think we could release the United Press statement to the public as a pretty accurate and fair evaluation of your State Department policy statement.

Senator Saltonstall. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

Chairman Russell. Yes.

Senator Saltonstall. I would like to ask Secretary Acheson—this is material given to the Voice of America. How often does this confidential type of material go out to the Voice of America?

Secretary Acheson. It goes out quite often.

Senator Saltonstall. And is this the first time that the question has come up as to whether or not this should be released to the public?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

WISDOM OF DECLASSIFICATION

Senator Saltonstall. Mr. Chairman, might I make this comment, and I say it most respectfully to the Secretary because it seems to me he is directly involved in this question and his attitude of mind.

The harm that will come from this, as I see it, it will give the Russians, on what Secretary Acheson said, propaganda material. Now they have it now substantially, unofficially.

Now the good it will do in its release is to give a background to the whole public on which this committee may make the decision on the question of the far-eastern policy.

Now great harm will be done if this is voted out over the objection of the State Department, and there is almost as much publicity that will be given to it if it is refused because of the State Department's objection, and they can go back to the UP press item.

Now the Secretary stated a minute ago that he felt that under his oath he could not release this statement. Now it seems to me that the trouble has come, if you want to call it the trouble, that the State

Department ever showed this to any members of this committee or to the Members of Congress if they felt it was of such top secret importance, and now having shown it to Congress, it seems to me that is water over the dam; that if these memoranda are to be sent out as top secret, the issue may well then come between the departments of the Government as to whether the Executive should turn over these papers. But now having turned these papers over, it seems to me, Mr. Secretary, that under your oath—and I most respectfully say this to you because you have put it on a personal basis of your oath—that what is for the most good of the country, and under the circumstances, the most good of the country is to let this propaganda article out, if you will, without the objection of the State Department, or if you will refuse it, have it refused by this committee and have the public think there is some sort of a document being concealed here on which the good of the Far Eastern policy may be based.

Therefore, I say to you most respectfully, on your oath it seems to me what is best for the country should be considered by you, and it seems to me the best for the country is to let this out with the approval of the committee and with the approval of the State Department.

I say that to you most respectfully because I know you value your oath as we value ours.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator from Oregon.

Senator MORSE. Before I ask a couple of questions of the Secretary, I would like to base those questions on a reply to my good friend from Massachusetts, because I think he has raised a very fundamental issue involved in this controversy.

LEGAL OBJECTIONS TO DECLASSIFICATION

If I understood his argument right, it was that in view of the fact that the Departemnt of State has made this document available to this committee, it ought to consider itself now legally estopped from any objections to its release to the public; if it wanted to object to its release to the public, it should not have released the document to the committee in the first instance.

I think what the Senator's argument really boils itself down to is really the setting up of an insurmountable barrier between these committees and the various departments in regard to an inspection on an executive basis of secret documents. Because if we followed the Senator's argument, then I respectfully say that he is the one who is estopping the Department, by his argument, from ever making available for executive inspection of any congressional committee secret documents, because the departments would then release those documents for secret inspection at the departments' risk. I think what we have to keep in mind here is the basic right of these departments not to make available to us for secret inspection secret documents.

What we are trying to work out is a relationship of cooperation between two equal, coordinated independent branches of the Government.

Then, each department has to respect the constitutional rights of the other, and I think you simply create an impossible situation, I say most respectfully, if you are going to place these department Secretaries at the risk of disclosing secret information within their purview, to a congressional committee, and have that secret information released to the public.

EFFECT OF DECLASSIFICATION ON EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS

So, I wanted to ask the question of the Secretary of State, rather, these two questions:

First, Mr. Secretary, when you sent this document to Secretary Marshall for transmittal to this committee, did you contemplate that this committee would publicize to the public that document?

Secretary Acheson. Senator, I did not think that the committee would; but I knew that it might.

Senator Morse. Mr. Secretary, if the committee does, in effect, declassify this particular document, will that act on the part of the committee necessarily be given careful consideration by you in answering future requests of this committee as to whether or not you shall make available in the future other secret documents to this committee?

Secretary Acheson. I shall do my best in the future, as in the past, to cooperate fully with the committee.

I had not thought about the factors which you raised, and when you raised them; but I shall try to cooperate to the fullest of my ability.

Senator Morse. One further question, Mr. Secretary:

If, on the basis of any precedent established by this committee, in respect to the instant document, whereby the committee releases it, you, in respect to a future request, are fearful that the committee might release a particular document then being requested for the committee, would you not consider it your duty, if you are to keep faith with your obligation under your oath, in regard to which you have already testified, to deny to the committee what you considered to be a highly secret document, in view of the proven risk of releasing it to the committee?

Secretary Acheson. That is hard to answer, Senator Morse.

If I were convinced that in all probability the committee would release a document of a highly secret nature, which I felt would be very damaging to the country, I think I should have to take the attitude you state.

Senator Morse. That is all, thank you.

Senator Lodge. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Russell. Senator Lodge.

STATE DEPARTMENT ATTITUDE ON CENSORSHIP AND COMMITTEE POWERS

Senator Lodge. I understood you to say, Mr. Secretary, that while you did not feel this document should be released, that nevertheless, if the committee had voted to do so, you would interpose no objection toward it being released, is that correct?

Secretary Acheson. Would I direct the State Department censor not to try and cut it out?

Senator Lodge. Yes.

Secretary Acheson. In other words, here are two coordinate branches of the Government. You have your powers and duties, and I should not attempt to prevent you from exercising them.

Senator Lodge. My second question is that if you felt that the release of this document would seriously endanger the security and welfare of the United States, you would not relieve the State Department censor of the obligation to censor that document, would you?

Secretary Acheson. I think I should probably take the same attitude, because to tell the censor to cut out something which the committee believed and voted should be given out, would only get us into fruitless wrangling. The committee has other ways of putting it out.

I don't think that reflects much on my attitude.

Senator Lodge. Well, following up the question from Senator Morse, if you had felt that the release of this document was going to seriously endanger the security of the United States, you probably never would have sent it up here in the first place, would you?

Secretary Acheson. It is not at all that I think this endangers the security of the United States. It endangers the effectiveness of the Voice of America. That is why it is confidential.

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Russell. Senator Cain.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR LEAK OF DOCUMENT IN TOKYO

Senator Cain. Mr. Secretary, you were prevented by an interruption—I think it was mine—from answering my third question posed to you a few minutes ago.

I asked whether or not the State Department had conducted an investigation to determine how your confidential document was leaked or illegitimately or unwarrantedly released to the press and what the results of that investigation have been.

Secretary Acheson. We did not conduct the investigation. We asked the Defense Department to look into it, since this occurred in Tokyo. They did look into it, and as I recall the report, it was that this came out by inadvertence. It was not intended by the officer who let it out to let it out, but he did it by accident.

Senator Cain. Does that mean you know who the officer was who inadvertently let it out?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir.

Senator Cain. The investigation only said one of your employees inadvertently let it out?

Secretary Acheson. No; this occurred in Tokyo.

Senator Cain. Yes, sir.

Secretary Acheson. In the Department of the Army. It had nothing to do with the State Department.

Senator Cain. A military man inadvertently released a State Department confidential document?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Cain. I thank you.

Secretary Acheson. He did not release it. He allowed it to be seen by mistake.

RECESS FOR CONFERENCE REPORT ON MANPOWER BILL

Chairman Russell. The conference report on the universal military training and military manpower bill is up on the floor of the Senate. My presence there has just been requested. It therefore will be necessary for me to go to the Senate, and I ask Senator Connally to take over.

Senator McMahon. Mr. Chairman, I think that I shall have to go to the floor of the Senate if this bill is under consideration. This is a most important bill and I think we all have got to go over there.

Chairman Russell. Senator, I certainly would not quarrel with you about the importance of the bill. It is a bill of tremendous importance.

However, I thing that the conference report, I might say that while it is important in the legislative process, that the report be adopted, I do not think that any of the issues that are raised by the conference report are as greatly different from the bill as it passed the Senate to justify on my own motion recessing this committee, but a number of questions have arisen with respect to the bill. I did not expect to be on the floor more than 30 minutes yesterday afternoon. I was there for the better part of 3 hours.

Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Russell. Senator Johnson, who was chairman of the subcommittee that wrote the bill, and is also one of the conferees, also should be over in the Senate.

Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, I think a conference report on the bill involves the drafting up to 5,000,000 young Americans is of such great importance to the Senate of the United States that it would be a great mistake for this Committee to remain in session while that conference report is being adopted, and therefore I move you that we recess until 2:30.

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Chairman, would the Senator withhold his motion for just a moment? I do not care to pursue any questions if the committee desires to adjourn. I have some questions I want to pursue on this matter.

Chairman Russell. The motion to recess is not debatable.

Senator Hickenlooper. I understand.

Senator Hunt. I should like to amend the motion of the Senator from Oregon by saying that we recess until such time as the conference committee report is disposed of.

Senator Morse. Well, if it is disposed of before 2:30, we would not come back until 2:30. If it is not disposed of until after 2:30, we come back at a reasonable time after its disposition. I think it will be disposed of by 2:30.

Chairman Russell. The motion is not debatable.

Senator Morse. Stand on the wording.

Chairman Russell. Those who favor the motion will say "aye."

(Chorus of "ayes.")

Chairman Russell. Those opposed will say "no."

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. The "ayes" have it. We will stand in recess until 2:30.

(Whereupon at 12:15 p. m. the hearing was recessed to reconvene at 2:30 p. m. this same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Present: Senators Russell, Connally, Wiley, George, Smith (New Jersey), Hickenlooper, McMahon, Lodge, Fulbright, Sparkman, Gillette, Brewster, Bridges, Byrd, Saltonstall, Johnson (Texas), Morse, Knowland, Hunt, Cain, and Stennis.

Chairman RUSSELL. When the committee recessed this morning the question was on the motion of Senator Knowland that the committee release to the public the instructions from the State Department of December 1949 with which you are all familiar.

Mr. Secretary, as a rule to spare mutual embarrassment, the witness is not in the room. If you will be kind enough to go out to the security room, unless you have some further statement——

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; I would be delighted to do whatever you say.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I have some questions I wanted to ask to clear up this.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am sorry, if they have a bearing on this point, Senator Hickenlooper; yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I had asked Mr. Fisher to get some information during the noon hour.

Chairman RUSSELL. I had no knowledge of that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I thought I made clear just before the motion to recess was made that I had some questions which I would not attempt to ask at that time, but I would when we reconvened after lunch.

Chairman RUSSELL. I did not understand that. I knew you sought recognition, but I thought you wanted to make a statement of some kind.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I said I would not attempt to ask the questions at that time if it was the desire of the committee to recess.

Chairman RUSSELL. Very well.

STATE DEPARTMENT CLASSIFICATION REGULATIONS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, the question of classification is interesting to me in this matter. I asked Mr. Fisher during the noon hour to get the classification regulations, that is, what constitutes "confidenial," what constitutes "secret," and "top secret" information in the State Department's classification. As I understand it, the Armed Forces classification may be slightly different, or the reasons for it.

I wonder if you can tell me what the various degrees of classification of important documents are in the State Department regulations; that is, the military has "top secret," "secret," "confidential," and so on.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, Senator Hickenlooper. The categories of classified material are at the top "top secret," then there is "secret," then there is "confidential," then there is "restricted," and finally, unclassified.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Now, does the State Department recognize such a classification over "top secret" as "for eyes only," for instance, or "destroy upon reading"; that is the officer to whom it is directed shall destroy upon reading?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, that——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I say that because I understand in some departs there are those two classifications on top of "top secret."

Secretary ACHESON. We have "eyes only" messages. I think that is not a degree of classification but is a procedure that "eyes only" messages go only to those people.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It was my understanding that an "eyes only" message was a message that under no circumstances could be reproduced for files or anything else by the officer to whom it was directed, and who was reading it.

Secretary ACHESON. I just cannot answer that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It may be immaterial. It is another classification.

Now, do you have a definition of what constitutes confidential——

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER (continuing). Material in the State Department classification?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. That is under the regulation, the security regulations, of the Department of State, section 191.23:

> Confidential: Classification confidential shall apply to information or material which, if disclosed, without authorization, would prejudice the national interest or the work of any Government agency by hampering development and carrying out of an important policy and negotiations in progress or might result in unwarranted injury to an individual. A majority of material should be classified no higher than confidential.

PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO CLASSIFY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, Mr. Secretary, who has the authority to place a confidential classification on a document of the State Department, that is below the Secretary of State, who can classify any degree he wants to—in other words, the lowest officer in the State Department who can classify confidential?

Secretary ACHESON. That is regulation 191.3, "Determining the classification of documents."

> General provisions: The originator of a document shall be responsible for determining its proper security classification. Only one security classification shall be assigned to a single document or device.

Well, I think you have the answer.

It goes on——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I may suggest—what I am trying to get at—in the Military Classification Manual, it says that: "Confidential and restricted documents——

Secretary ACHESON. Let me give you——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. "Can be classified by authority of any commissioned officer in the Army."

I wondered what the degree of authority must be, in the State Department, or what the level of authority must be, the lowest level of authority for classification of "Confidential"?

Secretary ACHESON. In regard to "Confidential," regulation 191.42 says:

> Any originator of official material may classify material "Confidential" or "Restricted," as warranted by the contents.

DISTRIBUTION OF DOCUMENT IN QUESTION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How many copies of this confidential document of December 23, 1949, under discussion were promulgated by the Department?

Secretary ACHESON. I think I have that here. To missions abroad there were 234. In the Department of State, 150. To other agencies, 72.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What in general would be the nature of the other agencies? Would that include the military?

Secretary ACHESON. National Defense, 42; this interdepartmental committee the initials of which are IFIS, which coordinates information, 8; the CIA, 20, the ECA, 2.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That would be something in excess of 350.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Four hundred and fixty-six.

Secretary ACHESON. I think the total is 456.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Four hundred and fifty-six. Now, did copies go to all of our missions abroad?

Secretary ACHESON. I cannot say. I have got Scuth America, 40; Europe, 90; the Far East, 40; Germany, 4; the Near East 60—Near East and Africa.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, isn't it reasonable to believe that with that dissemination or promulgation of that number of copies of these documents, that this document has fallen long since into the hands of the Soviet?

Secretary ACHESON. I would not know. I should hope not.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think, with the apparent thoroughness with which the Soviet operates, that it might well be argued that it possibly might have dropped into their hands long since and that they have a complete copy of the document and a full knowledge of it.

But did copies go to our diplomatic people in Tokyo?

Secretary ACHESON. The only diplomatic person we have in Tokyo is an officer who is on the staff of SCAP, his political advisor. There is no indication here that it went to him.

EFFECT OF RELEASING DOCUMENT IN QUESTION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Have you or does the Department or the Voice of America have knowledge that the Soviet used this document or referred to it or the article published in the newspapers in January with reference to this document, that is January 1950? Have they used it as propaganda in any way so far as any knowledge you or the Department or information that you or the Department received?

Secretary ACHESON. We can ascertain that. I don't know it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understood you to say just before we adjourned that the publication of this document would not effect the security of the United States or the security of our troops or forces in Korea, but that it would cause embarrassment to one of our departments, namely the Voice of America. Am I correct in my understanding of that statement?

Secretary ACHESON. I think the first part of your statement is correct. I do not think I said it would cause any embarrassment, I think it would impair the effectiveness.

ABUSE OF POWER TO CLASSIFY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Impair the effectiveness. May I ask your view on this one proposition, and that is if the theory that has been argued to some extent or advanced here this morning, that simply because a department or an officer of a department sees fit to classify a document, does it necessarily follow that the document is in fact a document that should be so classified?

In other words, the power to classify in my judgment in whatever experience I have had in the past has on occasions been used to prevent publicity for embarrassing situations or embarassing decisions.

I do not mean to say this is done very frequently. I do not mean that at all. But to follow that argument to a logical conclusion and to say because per se or because a document was actually classified by some employee of a department, there is no power here to be exercised—to exercise judgment as to whether or not it was in fact a document that should be classified—do you think the mere fact of classification should put the veil of secrecy on all documents that are so classified unless the particular department involved approved its declassification?

Secretary ACHESON. Senator, I do not think I ever suggested that the committee did not have power to take the step which it is considering. If a document is classified, then it means that under the regulations, based upon an act of Congress, it is that sort of a document.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON. Now we are quite aware that very often documents are overclassified, and in fact our regulations caution officers against doing that. These particular directives to the Voice of America clearly must be classified as confidential because we cannot have those documents printed in the newspapers.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If I may just illustrate——

Chairman RUSSELL. Just a moment, on a procedural question. Gentlemen, under the rules we adopted the limitation of 30 minutes applying to the examination of the Secretary of State. I assume that the committee intended that to apply to collateral matters such as now is under consideration. The Senator from Iowa has now been a little longer than 15.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I did not understand it applied to discussions on procedural matters. I understood this is a procedural matter, but I will be willing to abide if that is the will of the chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. I merely made the statement so there will be no confusion about it, sir. I am assuming this 30-minute rule applies to these procedural matters also. You have exhausted 15 minutes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What I am trying to get at, Mr. Secretary, is to give you an illustration of a letter which I have in my file in reply to a letter that I wrote to a department asking for certain information. I got back this kind of a letter, and it had no more information in it than this. It said:

> DEAR SENATOR HICKENLOOPER: Your letter addressed to so and so of such and such a date has been received in this office. The information which you seek will be investigated, and such information as we can give you will be sent to you in due course.
>
> Very truly yours—

and it was signed by the head of the department.

That was stamped "Confidential." It did not even refer to the subject matter that I had inquired about. It was purely a letter of acknowledgment, and it was marked "Confidential," under the theory, I suppose, I would be prevented from releasing the letter if I had occasion to release it. I have not, because somebody had used a red stamp on it; and that was what I meant by the question of good judgment and common sense in connection with the seriousness of the degree of classification, and which, I should think, should be open to some probing from time to time.

That is all I have to ask, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, if you will retire I think you winll find a chair in that room.

Chairman CONNALLY. Mr. Chairman, I want to say a word.

Chairman RUSSELL. You will have an opportunity to make a statement, Senator. Do you want to ask any questions?

Chairman CONNALLY. No.

(Secretary Acheson and Mr. Fisher retired from the committee room.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Connally is recognized.

DANGERS IN PRECEDENT TO DECLASSIFY

Chairman CONNALLY. Mr. Chairman, I want to state, briefly, I am very much opposed to this motion. I doubt very seriously, and challenge the authority of this committee to declassify this paper.

If that is possible, if that is the law, I see nothing to prevent us from bringing up anything we want to, out of the departments, and declassifying it and publishing it to the world.

These are executive documents. They don't belong to us. It is true we are part of the Government, but these are executive documents and I don't think that we have any authority to do it.

In the second place, you are cutting off your nose to spite your face. If you adopt this sort of a provision, the departments will quit sending you documents on request. I would, if I were a Secretary, and they demanded something I thought they were going to put in the paper and publish, I wouldn't send it.

Now, those are very serious considerations, it seems to me, and you are not helping yourself a bit on earth.

This matter has already largely been published, and there is no reason why you should make a great precedent of this affair, when it has already been leaked and scattered all around over the Pacific Ocean, as well as in the United States; and I think it is a very serious blunder for us to take action declassifying this material.

And, I hope that the committee won't vote for any such revolutionary procedure.

That is all.

Senator KNOWLAND. May I ask for a roll call, Mr. Chairman?

Senator WILEY. I would like to be heard, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley is recognized.

Senator WILEY. I think there is a lot to be said on both sides of this matter, at this time of the proceedings.

ADVANTAGES FROM DECLASSIFICATION

I hate to see a step taken that would result in the Department taking the attitude that this committee is not entitled to documents;

but I listened very carefully and intently when the Senator from Oregon inquired of the Secretary what his position was.

I rather got the idea that he would not commit himself to the answer that was sought, which was that he would not send these papers, if we wanted them.

I feel that this is a matter for the committee.

In fact, the Secretary has said so twice on direct questions—the power is here.

Now, for the life of me, I have been trying to understand from all the facts as they have developed why the Department should not declassify this in order that the people could get the facts, get the truth about this very thing.

It is contended and will be contended undoubtedly by many folks that there was some other purpose, gotten out by people who had some other objectives than what the Secretary said.

Now, he has given his explanation, which in substance is that it was a direction to the Voice of America how to proceed at that time when there was thought that we might lose Formosa.

Now, the news release that has gone out from his viewpoint doesn't give that impression. I should think he would want the whole instrument to go out so that the people themselves could weigh which is correct.

Now, I don't consider this as a precedent, Mr. Chairman. I think that every instance that comes before this committee where it is a question of whether we should disagree with the Department as to whether or not it should be released is a matter that we must determine on the facts with our responsibility as Members of this great body.

I do not think that we should be dictated to by the other branch of government; neither should we try to dictate to it.

I feel, as Senator George intimated he felt, that in view of all the facts that have been developed, we should take the appropriate action and declassify it, if that is the word, ourselves.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator from Oregon.

Senator MORSE. I want to take a half minute to correct an impression my good friend from Wisconsin left in the record that I asked a question this morning seeking some particular answer. I asked the question this morning seeking whatever answer the Secretary of State wished to give to the question.

I want to assure the Senator from Wisconsin that I did not ask any question in order to elicit an answer from the Secretary of State favorable to any private point of view the Senator from Oregon might have.

The record will speak for itself as to the fairness of the question.

Senator WILEY. I agree the record will speak for itself.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator from Arkansas.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to take any time, but simply to say my position has been well stated by the Senator from Texas and the Senator from Oregon this morning, and I associate myself with those remarks, and I will not take the time of the committee to reiterate them.

NATIONAL SECURITY NOT INVOLVED

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I asked some questions a moment ago of the Secretary of State. My experience in the Senate has not been as long as a great many Members, but I have never served on a committee in the Senate where the question of national security was involved in a document where the committee did not respect the presentation of the reasons why national security was involved and preserve that document so far as the committee was concerned in secrecy.

I know of no committee, none that I have served on has ever arbitrarily violated that rule. This committee has gone down the line respecting censorship where national security is involved. We have not overridden a single line of censorship where the national security is considered to be involved in the testimony.

Now by the Secretary's own testimony here before lunch and his testimony or his confirmation of that testimony since lunch, he says that the release of this information will not affect the national security, either the general national security or the security of our situation in Korea, so that national security is not involved in this operation.

What is involved? I understood him to say just before lunch—and I stand to be corrected in my understanding, not having looked up the record—I understood him to say it would be embarrassing to the Voice of America if this were released.

He said that I had misunderstood, that was not what he said. That it would hamper the Voice of America in his opinion in its operations.

Now I want to call attention to the statement that the chairman has made at the outset of these hearings, and I think on one or perhaps two occasions during these hearings, that censorship, the policy of censorship as he understood the committee's intent was not to save anyone embarrassment but to protect the national interest or the national security.

Chairman RUSSELL. If the Senator will pardon me, I have used that expression twice, not to prevent any individual from being embarrassed, any individual. I remember that very well.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I take it that the Department is no stronger than an individual. I do not care to dispute that point, but the key to secrecy here is the national security, and that has been taken out of the picture by the Secretary's own testimony.

In addition, this matter has been given widespread publicity for almost 2 years, a year and a half anyway. The curiosity is great about it. I think it has been promulgated, 456 copies sent all over the world of this document.

Now I do not mean to say that we have a great sieve of leaky information all over the world, but past events that have been proved in the last 2 or 3 years indicate to me that without any doubt the Soviet has one copy or maybe a dozen copies of this surreptitiously obtained on one way or another checked up on if it is a matter of any interest to them.

That news story published in January in 1950 alone would certainly whet their appetites for it if it were an important thing for them. I think that other nations know it. I think the Soviet knows it and everybody but the American people know what the actual contents of this document are.

National security is not involved, and I think that we are thoroughly justified in this case in voting this matter as a public document.

In any document where national security is involved, if there is any scintilla of evidence on the national security phase, I will stand up just as much as anybody to keep it secret and preserve it. I have not asked that a single other document that in any way involves national security in this hearing or in any other committee that I have ever sat on be released to the public.

But with national security out, then only embarrassment remains, and I submit that this might embarrass the Voice of America a little bit, but the Voice of America, as various committees have shown time and again on their public releases has embarrassed the American people on a good many occasions because of their proven distortion of messages which they have sent out over that network.

Senator McMahon. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Russell. I will recognize the Senator from Connecticut.

Senator McMahon. There is an old saying in the law that hard cases make bad law.

I personally feel that, after weighing all of the factors with regard to this particular document, if I were in the Secretary's place, after weighing all the factors, I think I would have declassified it.

Senator Brewster. What was it you said?

Senator McMahon. I would have declassified it.

DANGER OF ESTABLISHING A PRINCIPLE

I am troubled by this situation: We are faced today with the obligation, nay, the necessity of operating a government under circumstances that we have never had to engage in before. The committees of Congress can only function in collaboration with the executive departments as we are able to be told of matters of vital significance to the operation of the Government.

I have been impressed with this time and time again, when I have seen leaks out of committees, and I have felt that the Senators were operating against the exercise of their own powers when they leaked information which came to them in excutive session, and we all know that has happened time and time again.

Now, it seems to me that if we take the step of declassifying a document which the Secretary, whose responsibility it is, has said would prejudice the operation of the Voice of America, we will have been substitutiong our judgment for that of the executive officer who is charged with the operation of that Department.

The fact that I, as Secretary, would act differently than he has in this particular case, if I were Secretary, does not change the fundamental principle involved, which is the right of this committee to make that adjudication.

I think, along with the Senator from Oregon, that we would be establishing a very dangerous principle.

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Chairman, will the Senator yield?

Senator McMahon. Not at this point; just a minute.

If the information is furnished—let us assume it was a top-secret document, and we were to substitute our judgment for the release of the information in that document, as the Senator from Texas has pointed out, we would mitigate against the committees of Congress getting that kind of information.

It is a very troublesome question. Undoubtedly, I do not think there is a man that will disagree with the statement that the Secretary or his subordinates had the right to classify this document when it was sent out, and should have classified it as confidential.

The leak in Tokyo, by whomever it was made, was not right. The fact that that leak has occurred, and that the document has been published in an abbreviated form does not give to that document the air of authority that it will get if it is given out now as the formal release of a document of this Government.

Just one more point. The Senator has said that the security of our Government is not involved in this paper. Well, that is a question of relativeness. Anything that impairs the operation of the Voice of America and lessens its value and its use, would seem to me to be striking a blow at the security and the country, because obviously that is one of the ways that we have of telling the people of the world what our program is, and what we stand for.

That other things have occurred, according to the Senator from Iowa, which have lessened the value of the Voice, I presume that is so.

We are never going to get in the operation of any institution, human institution, perfection. But the Secretary has appeared, and he has stated in his opinion and in the opinion of his Department this would lessen the value of the Voice of America, if it is given out. I would have come to a different conclusion; but I cannot say that I would substitute my judgment for his judgment in this matter.

Senator Hickenlooper. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Senator McMahon. I will yield.

SUBSTITUTING LEGISLATIVE JUDGMENT FOR EXECUTIVE

Senator Hickenlooper. I would like to hear the Senator discuss this: The Senator says we should not substitute our judgment when the Secretary says that the operation of some department would be impaired.

I submit to the Senator, for whatever observation he wants to make, this suggestion, that in practically every committee of the Congress, in every appropriation bill, in almost every action, you will find repeated instances where department heads—they may be military, they may be otherwise—frequently come before the committees and say, "If I don't get certain things done, if I don't get certain operations, it will impair the effectiveness of my department," and yet the Congress has been elected to exercise judgment on those matters.

We are the fountainhead of authority on these operations, and we do exercise in the committees and on the floor of Congress not daily, but repeatedly, every session, we exercise discretion where the heads of the departments say they will be impaired unless thus and so happens; and Congress in its judgment and the committees in their judgment very often say, "In our opinion, you can't have it."

Senator McMahon. Mr. Chairman, my answer to that is that if the Senator doesn't see the difference between what he has suggested and this question, there is nothing I can say that can explain it to him. I yield to the Senator from Texas.

Chairman **Connally**. If we act simply because this thing has been published surreptitiously and illegitimately, doesn't that offer a reward in the future that if anybody can smuggle out a statement, why, then, we will come along and O. K. it and give it official standing by publishing the original document? It seems to me that is a very practical situation.

Senator **McMahon**. That occurs every day. There are statements in magazines that the United States has so many atomic weapons. Well, nobody denies it, nobody confirms it in authority. So it is left in the air for them to guess at.

Of course, if there is a release from you or from me or from Senator Hickenlooper, that has a note of authority, and of course, would be accepted; and, of course, that is true.

Senator **Brewster**. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Brewster.

SECURITY IN COMMITTEES

Senator **Brewster**. I always have been concerned about this matter of confidences in the committees, and I do not like an attitude, which is more or less popularly accepted, that Senators can never keep a secret.

As the most conspicuous and most successful illustration of that there is probably the most significant secret that was ever possessed here in Washington during the war under the jurisdiction of the Senator from Connecticut, and that was the development of the atomic bomb, which was known to at least 20 Senators, if not more, and was one of the best kept secrets of the war.

Senator **McMahon**. And known to the Politburo.

Senator **Brewster**. As a result of treason, not as a result of Senators.

Senator **McMahon**. That is right.

Senator **Brewster**. I always like to emphasize that in our own self-respect.

Now, there is a matter which has not been mentioned here at all, but in the previous difficulties of this character which have been faced in committees of which I have been a member we generally recognize that if this gets to the highest level of security, and peculiarly in this field, it is possible by resort to the President to solve it.

President Roosevelt repeatedly did that in conspicuous cases. He would impound a document, and the members of commissions—they weren't even members of departments—who had formulated the document would simply say, "It is in the hands of the President"—period. And that was an answer to the thing.

So that if, in this instance, we elect to act, as I hope we may, in releasing the document, as seems to me wise, under these circumstances it doesn't mean at all that the State Department or any other departments are deprived of security. I recognize that it is the twilight zone of the powers of the President in this field, which are evolving and will continue, but nobody has ever been able to subpena the President successfully, and to get documents out of him, and that is one of the practical answers to this. I hope this will be censored and taken out, because I don't want to suggest to these executive departments how they can get away from us.

The whole decision is political, as to whether or not the President in office abuses the powers of that office, and if he does, I think that the American people will rebuke him eventually, if he is going beyond what seems essential, in the popular mind, in the exercise of essential security measures for the security of our country, and our government.

That is one reason I fairly wanted to see this matter go forward. I think, particularly after what Secretary Acheson has said, that it is entirely wise not to establish a precedent that will necessarily wreck our Government.

Chairman **Russell**. Gentlemen, this issue has troubled me very greatly, and I desire to make a brief statement with respect to it, before the vote is had.

PENAL CODE PROVISION ON HANDLING CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS

The Senator from Oregon referred this morning to a section of the Penal Code.

It was called to my attention by General Mudge, and is found on page 1281 of the Military Laws of the United States, which purports to come from volume 18, United States Code, section 793.

Inasmuch as the Senator from Oregon mentioned it, I think I should read it to the committee. I shall not read all of it, just the two last paragraphs:

> Whoever, lawfully or unlawfully having possession of, access to, control over, or being entrusted with any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, willfully communicates or transmits or attempts to communicate or transmit the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it on demand to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it; or
>
> Whoever, being entrusted with or having lawful possession or control of any document, writing, code book—

I shall not read all of that descriptive matter—

> relating to the national defense, through gross negligence permits the same to be removed from the proper place of custody or delivered to anyone in violation of his trust, or to be lost, stolen, abstracted, or destroyed * * *
>
> Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

Inasmuch as the Sentor from Oregon had mentioned that, I thought I would read it to the committee. I would be less than frank if I did not say that I do not believe that section of the law applies to Members of the Congress, for under the Constitution we are not responsible for anything said on the floor of the Senate and I think that the same privilege very clearly applies to a member of the committee.

I do read it to the members of the committee to refresh their recollection as to the vigor with which we have legislatively approached the handling of classified documents on the part of employees of the Government.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Chairman **Russell**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Do you interpret under the language you read that applies to this document which the Secretary of State says in no way impairs national defense?

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I am not going to get into debate as to whether or not this involves the defense of the United States. I know this: If any person employed by the State Department were to take this identical document here and go out and deliver it to any unauthorized person, that they would certainly be subject to prosecution.

WISDOM OF DECLASSIFICATION

I am not going into the degree of this document, if the Senator will excuse me. I am not concerned as to the contents of this document. I think it ought to be declassified. It seems to me it would help the Department of State greatly in its operations to have this document released, because the portion that was released in the newspaper article was, if I understand the newspaper article from the reading of it by the Senator from California, announced this paper as being the policy of the Government of the United States. We are told here now that it was never the policy of the Government of the United States, but it was merely an instruction to those who seek to influence public opinion all over the world to leave the impression that we did not care whether or not Formosa was lost; in other words, to minimize its importance, if I understand the testimony that has been given us here.

I am not impressed with the argument that if it is published we should release it, because frequently we see matters that are published in the magazines and newspapers that we know from our own relationship with the Government are true, but they are not attributed to any official source, so no one will know as to whether or not that is official.

Sometimes there is great conflict there and that would cause confusion.

I hope, I might say, that because there are 456 copies of this publication, it does not necessarily mean that the Soviet have control of it because I am confident there have been innumerable instances where more than 456 copies of highly vital information have been in circulation, and I would dislike very much to think that because there were that number that the Soviet had them all in their control.

Now, of course, this committee has probably had more highly classified material than any committee that has ever operated here in Washington. I doubt very much whether any committee has ever had access to as many of the highly secret and private papers of the executive department of the Government as this one has.

I am very loath to vote as I expect to, to declassify this document, because I am very sure that it is going to dry up a source of information not only for this committee but for committees in the future, but there has been so much discussion about this particular document, there has been so much speculation on it, the people feel that it is something that involves great issues here in Washington that to me are not involved, that I feel that the declassification of this document, despite all of the handicaps that it will impose on this committee and committees in the future, is in the public interest, and while I am very reluctant to do so, because there are not only questions of law but questions of ethics involved in it, when the roll is called I expect to vote to declassify this document.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DOCUMENT

Senator **Knowland**. Mr. Chairman, I just very briefly want to say this in regard to the matter. It is true that the Secretary of State indicated in his testimony that from his point of view he did not feel that this was a policy statement. I merely do not want the record to stand that that is necessarily so.

Chairman **Russell**. I did not state it as a fact, Senator.

Senator **Knowland**. No, no, the Secretary of State said that, but I do not want the record to stand that that is necessarily so because I believe that this document clearly outlined the policy that was followed by the Government of the United States from at least late in 1948 if not mid-1948 clear through to the 25th day of June after the outbreak of hostilities in Formosa.

I think it is a most significant revealing document as to our policy, and I think that the President's statement on January 5 wherein he said that no further aid would go to Formosa was based fundamentally upon the policy which the Department already had in hand.

Now the Department sent Dr. Jessup out to the Far East in late 1949, presumably to develop a policy when the fact of the matter is that they had already determined that no further help would be given to Formosa and in their judgment Formosa had no strategic value.

EXECUTIVE HANDLING OF OTHER DOCUMENTS

I do not want to argue the point any longer except to say that we did have the situation with the Wake Island document where someone high in the executive branch of the Government purposely leaked that document to one newspaper and the story was later picked up by others at a time when it was still classified as a top-secret document, without even going through the process of first declassifying it.

For a period of 4 years the Wedemeyer document on Korea was withheld despite votes of committees of the Congress and appeals by members of the Congress.

Now I think that we have a Government in which the legislative branch also has a responsibility. I submit that the State Department was apparently laying the groundwork for Formosa being passed into other hands, and passing out that information to 456 people abroad without taking the trouble to discuss that as a basic American policy with the Congress of the United States.

Chairman **Russell**. I want to make just a brief statement here with respect to that. Of course we have our very definite legislative responsibility under the Constitution, but I should like very much to find in the Constitution power which would enable us to bring documents of this kind before the committee if the executive branch does not desire to give it.

While the Wake Island document has been discussed and the Wedemeyer report has been discussed—I think that I had some little part to play with the declassification of the Wedemeyer report—I would not have this record leave even the most vague idea that I had voted to declassify this document because other documents had been handled improperly in the executive branch of the Government.

I cannot think of a poorer reason which would motivate a Member of the Congress to do something that he might not be persuaded was in the national interest than to fall back on some error of the executive branch of the Government. If we did, it would destroy our Government because if you had an executive branch of the Government that did improper things, then of all times the Congress should arise to the fullest of its responsibilities, and in the discharge of its duties, and not use the errors or dereliction of the executive branch of the Government as an excuse for our failure to discharge our own responsibilities.

Senator LODGE. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator from Massachusetts.

PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF SITUATION

Senator LODGE. It seems to me it would be well to make the observation that the legal and Constitutional aspect of this question is not the central one. The area of doubt as between the powers of the executive and the legislative branch in this field has existed for 150 years, and it is going to go on as long as this Government goes on.

We are not going to settle it here today. Moreover, I do not think what we are doing here today, means that we are establishing a binding precedent, because each of these cases is different.

The case of General Bradley was, for example, an entirely distinct one from this case; and if it comes up again, it will probably be in another form.

I feel very much as the Chairman does. This is a document which does not endanger the national security, and we have that on the definite and formal declaration by the Secretary of State himself, which he volunteered without being really required or put under any pressure to make. That is the first point, which I think, is a very big point because I cannot imagine that I would have voted to make public a document which did jeopardize the national security.

Then, I think, it is clear from what has been said, that the releasing of this document to the press is not going to dry up the gathering of information in the future. That is something which we always have to consider, and if I thought that for us to release this document would mean that the executive department would no longer send us up any more documents, that would have some weight with me. But it seems obvious that if the Secretary of State or if any Cabinet officer thought that the release of a certain document jeopardized the national security he would never send it up here, in the first place.

So, I do not think this is going to seriously affect our ability to get information in the future.

I am always sorry when these questions come up because they raise, they introduce, a legalistic atmosphere into something which is much better settled on the basis of comity; but as it has been raised, I should vote to make this document public.

Chairman RUSSELL. The clerk will call the roll.

The CLERK. Mr. George?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George asked me to vote him in the affirmative.

The CLERK. Mr. Green?

Chairman CONNALLY. No. I have a proxy; Senator Green gave me a general proxy. He did not specify this particular matter, but he said to vote him like I did on all these matters. I want the committee to understand that.

The CLERK. Mr. McMahon?

Senator MCMAHON. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Fulbright?

Senator FULBRIGHT. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Sparkman?

Senator SPARKMAN. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Gillette?

Senator GILLETTE. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Wiley?

Senator WILEY. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Smith?

Senator SMITH. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Hickenlooper?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Lodge?

Senator LODGE. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Tobey?

(No response.)

The CLERK. Mr. Brewster?

Senator BREWSTER. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman Connally?

Chairman CONNALLY. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Byrd?

Senator BYRD. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Johnson?

Senator JOHNSON. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Kefauver?

Senator HUNT. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Hunt?

Senator HUNT. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Stennis?

Senator STENNIS. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Long?

(No response.)

The CLERK. Mr. Bridges?

Senator BRIDGES. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Saltonstall?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Morse?

Senator MORSE. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Knowland?

Senator KNOWLAND. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Cain?

Senator CAIN. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Flanders?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Senator Flanders' office authorized me to vote his proxy. Senator Flanders is away and did not give it to me himself, but his office gave me his proxy. I want to make that clear. I vote Senator Flanders "aye," if I am permitted to vote that way.

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Aye.

The CLERK. Senators recorded in the affirmative are Messrs. George, Wiley, Smith, Hickenlooper, Lodge, Brewster, Byrd, Johnson, Stennis, Bridges, Saltonstall, Knowland, Cain, Flanders, the Chairman.

Senators recorded in the negative are Messrs. Green, McMahon, Fulbright, Sparkman, Gillette, Chairman Connally, Kefauver, Hunt, and Morse.

Chairman RUSSELL. The ayes are 15 an the nays are 9. The motion, therefore, prevails.

Now, gentlemen, I assume we are ready to start the hearing now. Will someone please request the Secretary of State to come in the room?

Senator BREWSTER. Is all the discussion declassified?

Chairman RUSSELL. It is every bit declassified.

(Secretary Acheson and Mr. Fisher entered the room at this point.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, on occasion in this committee we have procedural delays. We had one item that took up almost 3 days, so you were really not kept waiting as long as other witnesses have while we solved a procedural problem.

I believe you stated this morning you had a brief statement you desired to make.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I have a general statement.

Chairman RUSSELL. You may proceed to make that.

Chairman CONNALLY. We should tell the Secretary what happened in his absence.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, yes. The committee, by a vote of 15 to 9, voted in their opinion the material contained in the document at issue should be released.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

PEACE OR WAR

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, the real issues in the discussion before us are peace or war, and the survival of human freedom.

It is not just a difference as to method which is now under examination. What is challenged is the bedrock purpose of our foreign policy, and of what we have been trying to do. That is the place I would like to start in this brief statement.

The foreign policy of the United States has a central and dominant objective—to protect the Nation and to safeguard the future of its people. We stand ready to defend our future by force of arms if that necessity is forced upon us. But we seek to deter war if we can.

Another world war would be destructive beyond experience; it would not solve problems, but multiply them. Therefore, it is part of our fundamental purpose to prevent, by all honorable means, the outbreak of another general war.

Even before the last World War was over, while our young men were storming the beaches at Normandy and Saipan and dozens of other places now engraved in our memories, the resolution was forming among our people that future wars must be prevented.

IDEAL OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Their conviction grew that the best way to protect the security of our Nation and of our people was to prevent war, and that the way to go about it was through an international system of collective security.

The Four Freedoms, the Atlantic Charter, the United Nations—these were not cynical slogans. They represented the idea which our people felt in their hearts was worth fighting for.

It has been the purpose of our foreign policy to keep faith with that idea.

The attempt to build a collective-security system on the basis of the cooperation of all the great powers broke down because of the policies of the Soviet Union. But Soviet ambitions have not been able to obstruct our determined efforts.

Within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations we have been building a collective-security system based on the cooperation of those nations who are dedicated to peace.

The united and determined effort of our people to build effective instruments for keeping the peace is recorded in a series of vigorous and farsighted actions: the United Nations Charter itself, the Rio Treaty, the Greek-Turkish aid program, the Marshall plan, the North Atlantic Treaty, and the mutual defense assistance program.

We have been building our strength, together with our allies. We must be strong enough to keep the peace.

Side by side with these programs there is another basic element in our foreign policy—to assist the hundreds of millions of people who were acquiring their independence after the war, so that they might be free to develop in their own way, and to join in an international system for preserving the peace.

Our hopes for peace required us to understand the changes which were in motion among vast populations of the Middle East and Asia, and to help peoples who had just gained their independence from losing it again to the new imperialism of the Soviet Union.

Those are the big central ideas that express what we have been trying to do in the world.

CHALLENGE OF KOREA = collective security

The attack on Korea was a blow at the foundation of this whole program. It was a challenge to the whole system of collective security, not only in the Far East, but everywhere in the world. It was a threat to all nations newly arrived at independence. This dagger thrust pinned a warning notice to the wall which said: "Give up or be conquered."

This was a test which would decide whether our collective-security system would survive or would crumble. It would determine whether other nations would be intimidated by this show of force.

The decision to meet force with force in Korea was essential. It was the unanimous view of the political and military advisers of the President that this was the right thing to do. This decision had the full support of the American people because it accorded with the principles by which Americans live.

As a people we condemn aggression of any kind. We reject appeasement of any kind. If we stood with our arms folded while Korea was swallowed up, it would have meant abandoning our principles, and it would have meant the defeat of the collective security system on which our own safety ultimately depends.

What I want to stress here is that it was not only a crucial decision whether or not to meet this aggression; it was no less important how this aggression was to be dealt with.

WAYS IN WHICH AGGRESSION WAS MET

In the first place, the attack on Korea has been met by collective action. The United States brought the aggression in Korea before the United Nations, not only because the Charter requires it, but also because the authority and even the survival ~~of that organization~~ was directly involved.

The response of some members of the United Nations, in terms of their capacities and their other security responsibilities, has been generous and wholehearted.

The total action is admittedly an imperfect one, as might be expected of beginning steps in a collective-security system. But the development of this system requires us to take into consideration the dangers and interests of those associated with us, just as we want them to take into consideration our dangers and interests.

In the second place, our response to the aggression against Korea required a careful estimate of the risks involved in the light of the total world situation.

There was the risk that the conflict might spread into a general war in Asia, a risk that the Chinese Communists might intervene, a risk that the Soviet Union might declare itself in.

We take it for granted that risk of some sort is implicit in any positive policy, and that there is also a risk in doing nothing.

The elements of risk and the means of reducing that risk to us and to the rest of the free world quite properly influenced our policy in Korea.

It has been our purpose to turn back this Communist thrust, and to do it in such a way as to prevent a third world war if we can. This is in accord with one of the most fundamental tenets of our policy—to prevent, insofar as we can do so, another world war.

It is against this basic purpose that the operation in Korea, and the plans for carrying it to a conclusion, need to be considered.

WHAT THE DEFENSE OF KOREA HAS ACCOMPLISHED

The operation in Korea has been a success. Both the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists declared it to be their purpose to drive the United Nations forces out of Korea and impose Communist rule throughout the entire peninsula. They have been prevented from accomplishing their objective.

It has been charged that the American and allied forces fighting in Korea are engaged in a pointless and inconclusive struggle.

Nothing could be further from the fact. They have been magnificent. Their gallant, determined, and successful fight has checked the Communist advance and turned it into a retreat. They have administered terrible defeats to the Communist forces. In so doing, they have scored a powerful victory.

Their victory has dealt Communist imperialist aims in Asia a severe set-back.

The alluring prospect for the Communist conspiracy in June 1950—the prospect of a quick and easy success which would not only win Korea for the Kremlin but shake the free nations of Asia and paralyze the defense of Europe—all this has evaporated.

Instead of weakening the rest of the world, they have solidified it. They have given a powerful impetus to the military preparations of this country and its associates in and out of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

We have doubled the number of our men under arms, and the production of matériel has been boosted to a point where it can begin to have a profound effect on the maintenance of the peace.

The idea of collective security has been put to the test, and has been sustained. The nations who believe in collective security have shown that they can stick together and fight together.

New urgency has been given to the negotiation of a peace treaty with Japan, and of initial security arrangements to build strength in the Pacific area.

These are some of the results of the attack on Korea, unexpected by—and I am sure most unwelcome to—the Kremlin.

HOW THE FIGHTING CAN BE BROUGHT TO AN END

The objective of our military operation in Korea is to end the aggression, to safeguard against its renewal, and to restore peace. There is wide agreement on this objective in the domestic discussions of this issue.

Both the administration and its critics have said that the object of the courses they propose is to end the aggression and restore peace. Both are willing—indeed desire—to end the fighting by an honorable settlement which will end the aggression, provide against its renewal and restore peace.

Neither will purchase a settlement by allowing the aggressors to profit by their wrong. Neither believes that the destruction or unconditional surrender of the aggressor is necessary to attain the goal.

General Marshall, General Bradley, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have given you, in detail, the reasons why they believe that the Chinese Communists will be defeated in Korea and must abandon their purpose.

They report that our forces are in excellent shape, that their morale is high and that they are in a good supply position.

They report not only that the mass attacks launched by the enemy have failed to break through the firepower of United Nations forces, but that the offensives of the enemy have been broken and thrown back with enormous enemy casualties.

These defeats in Korea, together with other consequences of this campaign, present grave problems for the Communist authorities in China.

While the manpower resources of China are vast, its supply of trained men is limited. They cannot cover up their casualties. They cannot gloss over the draft of more and more men for military service.

The Chinese Red leaders have betrayed their long-standing pledge of demobilization and the military demand for manpower has, instead, been increased.

Peiping has also broken its promises of social and economic improvement. In the great cities, dependent on imported materials, unemployment increases. The regime has not lightened the burdens of the people. It has made them heavier.

All of this is reflected in a sharp increase in repressive measures, and in propaganda to whip up the flagging zeal of their own people.

In the light of all these factors, I believe that the aggression can best be brought to an end with a minimum risk and a minimum loss, by continuing the punishing defeat of the Chinese in Korea. This is being done.

No one can predict when the fighting will stop and when the aggression will end. It is also true that no one could have foretold exactly what would happen when we undertook action to end the Berlin blockade, but we did what we thought was right and the blockade was ended.

No one could have foretold how the aggression in Greece would be terminated, but again we took those measures which our best judgment and sense indicated were the right ones and the aggression ceased.

While the outcome of every course of action in the foreign-policy field cannot be predicted with certainty in advance, it is our responsibility in taking action to apply our best judgment on the basis of the best information at hand.

I think it is fair to say that all of the President's advisers believe the course we are now following gives us the best chance of stopping hostilities and ending the aggression in Korea.

THE ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL

I should like briefly to address myself to the alternative course which was placed before this committee. This course would seek to bring the conflict in Korea to an end by enlarging the sphere of hostilities.

I will not try to review the military considerations involved in this proposed course, since these have been thoroughly discussed by the previous witnesses before your committees.

It is enough to say that it is the judgment of the President's military advisers that the proposed enlargement of our military action would not exercise a prompt and decisive effect in bringing the hostilities to an end. To this judgment there must be added a recognition of the grave risks and other disadvantages of this alternative course.

Against the dubious advantages of spreading the war in an initially limited manner to the mainland of China, there must be measured the risk of a general war with China, the risk of Soviet intervention, and of world war III, as well as the probable effects upon the solidarity of the free world coalition.

The advocate of this program make two assumptions which require careful examination. They assume that the Soviet Union will not necessarily respond to any action on our part. They also assume that in the build-up of strength relative to the Soviet Union and the Communist sphere, time is not necessarily on our side.

As to Soviet reactions, no one can be sure he is forecasting accurately what they would be, but there are certain facts at hand that bear on this question.

We know of Soviet influence in North Korea, of Soviet assistance to the North Koreans and to Communist China, and we know that understandings must have accompanied this assistance. We also know that there is a treaty between the Soviets and the Chinese Communists.

But even if the treaty did not exist, China is the Soviet Union's largest and most important satellite. Russian self-interest in the Far East and the necessity of maintaining prestige in the Communist sphere make it difficult to see how the Soviet Union could ignore a direct attack upon the Chinese mainland.

I cannot accept the assumption that the Soviet Union will go its way regardless of what we do. I do not think that Russian policy is formed that way any more than our own policy is formed that way. This view is certainly not well enough grounded to justify a gamble with the essential security of our Nation.

POSSIBLE SOVIET COUNTERMOVES

In response to the proposed course of action, there are a number of courses of counteraction open to the Soviets.

They could turn over to the Chinese large numbers of planes with "volunteer" crews for retaliatory action in Korea and outside. They might participate with the Soviet Air Force and the submarine fleet.

The Kremlin could elect to parallel the action taken by Peiping and intervene with a half million or more ground-force "volunteers"; or it could go the whole way and launch an all-out war.

Singly, or in combination, these reactions contain explosive possibilities, not only for the Far East, but for the rest of the world as well.

EFFECT ON ALLIES

We should also analyze the effect on our allies of our taking steps to initiate the spread of war beyond Korea. It would severely weaken their ties with us and in some instances it might sever them.

They are understandably reluctant to be drawn into a general war in the Far East—one which holds the possibilities of becoming a world war—particularly if it developed out of an American impatience with the progress of the effort to repel aggresson, an effort which in their belief offers an honorable and far less catastrophic solution.

If we followed the course proposed, we would be increasing our risks and commitments at the same time that we diminished our strength by reducing the strength and determination of our coalition.

We cannot expect that our collective-security system will long survive if we take steps which unnecessarily and dangerously expose the people who are in the system with us. They would understandably hesitate to be tied to a partner who leads them to a highly dangerous short cut across a difficult crevasse.

In relation to the total world threat, our safety requires that we strengthen, not weaken, the bonds of our collective-security system.

The power of our coalition to deter an attack depends in part upon the will and the mutual confidence of our partners. If we, by the measures proposed, were to weaken that effect, particularly in the North Atlantic area, we would be jeopardizing the security of an area which is vital to our own national security.

What this adds up to, it seems to me, is that we are being asked to undertake a large risk of general war with China, risk of war with the Soviet Union, and a demonstrable weakening of our collective-security system—all this in return for what?

In return for measures whose effectiveness in bringing the conflict to an early conclusion are judged doubtful by our responsible military authorities.

ELEMENT OF TIME AND PREPAREDNESS

Before concluding, I should like to deal briefly with the related proposition that we may need to take extreme risks now because time may not be on our side. I believe this is wrong.

The basic premise of our foreign policy is that time is on our side if we make good use of it. That does not necessarily mean that time must bring us to a point where we can match the Soviet Union man for man and tank for tank.

What it does mean is that we need to use the time we have to build an effective deterrent force. This requires us to create sufficient force-in-being, both in the United States and among our allies, to shield our great potential against the possibility of a quick and easy onslaught, and to ensure that our allies will not suffer occupation and destruction. And back of this shield we need to have the potential that would enable us to win a war.

This is the measure of the force we need; as we approach it, we approach our objective of preventing war.

Can we do this? I believe we can. We and our allies have the capacity to outproduce the Soviet bloc by a staggering margin. There is no doubt about that. Our capacity to produce has been set in motion and is rapidly getting to the point where its output will be vast and its effect significant.

There is also the critical factor of our will. The future belongs to freedom if free men have the will to make time work on their side. I believe the American people and their allies do have the will, the will to work together when their freedom is threatened. This is the ultimate source of our faith and our confidence. A free society can call upon profound resources among its people in behalf of a righteous cause.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS OF JUNE 25 AND 27

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, the military activities in Korea in the effort to drive the aggressors from Korea and to retsore peace there, are being carried on under the authority of the United Nations, I believe?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; the United Nations resolutions of——

Chairman RUSSELL. The first resolution of the United Nations Security Council was adopted on June 25, and it called upon the aggressors to cease their aggression and withdraw above the thirty-eighth parallel, I believe?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. The operative portions of that resolution are as follows, after the introductory paragraphs:

> The Security Council determines that this action constitutes a breach of the peace.

That is the attack on Korea.

> 1. Calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities and calls upon the authorities in North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel.
>
> 2. Requests the United Nations Commission on Korea—
>
> (*a*) To communicate its fully considered recommendations on the situation with the least possible delay;
>
> (*b*) To observe the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the thirty-eighth parallel; and
>
> (*c*) To keep the Security Council informed on the execution of this resolution.
>
> 3. Calls upon all members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.

That was the one of the 25th of June.

Chairman RUSSELL. That was followed by another resolution which was adopted on June 27?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. I have that before me if you would like me to read it.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, the pertinent findings.

Secretary ACHESON. There are again paragraphs which set forth their findings, which are chiefly that the North Koreans continue a breach of the peace, and are not withdrawn as required by the Security Council, and they have noted the appeal of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security; and recommends that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in that area.

Chairman RUSSELL. Both of those resolutions were adopted during the time that the Soviet delegate—Soviet Russia was boycotting the United Nations, were they not?

Secretary ACHESON. That is true, sir. The Soviet delegate did not return to the Council until the first of August.

There was also a resolution on the 7th of July.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF JULY 7

Chairman RUSSELL. The 7th of July? Well, to complete the record you might give the pertinent findings of that resolution. I believe that was the one requesting the United States to—you had better read it. There are so many of them I get them confused.

Secretary ACHESON. They recite that they have determined that the armed attack was a breach of the peace. They recommend to the members of the United Nations that they furnish assistance to the Republic of Korea, and so forth; and then there are statements as follows:

> Welcomes the prompt and vigorous support which governments and peoples of the United Nations have given to its resolutions of the 25th and 27th of June 1950 to assist the Republic of Korea in defending itself against armed attack and thus to restore international peace and security in the area.
>
> 2. Notes that members of the United Nations have transmitted to the United Nations offers of assistance for the Republic of Korea.
>
> 3. Recommends that all members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions, make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States.
>
> 4. Requests the United States to designate the commander of such forces.
>
> 5. Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations

7.) UN res.

flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating.

6. Requests the United States to provide the Security Council with reports as appropriate on the course of action taken under the unified command.

Chairman RUSSELL. All of those actions were taken in the Security Council?

Secretary ACHESON. That is right, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. At a time when the Russian representative was not there.

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

Chairman RUSSELL. Since then the Russian representative has returned, I believe, to the Security Council.

Secretary ACHESON. That is right, Senator.

UNITED NATIONS ACTION SINCE RETURN OF SOVIET UNION TO SECURITY COUNCIL

Chairman RUSSELL. One of the witnesses before this committee, who is a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressed some concern that we were involved in a war, whatever you desire to call it—certainly, it is a war to those who are in Korea—which was brought about by action of the Security Council during the absence of the Russian delegate and that now that the Russian delegate had returned, he might veto any subsequent action looking to the negotiation of a peace.

I wish you would give this committee and the country your views on that.

Secretary ACHESON. Since the return of the Russian delegate——

Senator WILEY. Please talk louder, both of you. You are talking to each other.

Secretary ACHESON. Since the return of the Russian member of the Security Council, Mr. Malik, he has on occasion used the veto to prevent action by the Security Council.

It was with that difficulty in mind that there was introduced in the General Assembly a series of resolutions, one of which is the uniting for peace resolution, others are resolutions having to do directly with Korea, and one of them set up the Good Offices Committee, which was charged by the General Assembly with undertaking to see whether a peaceful settlement could be brought about.

We believe that that takes care of the situation, so that the United Nations, through the action of the General Assembly, is enabled to act,

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, we had testimony here from some of the military officials with respect to advices given and decisions made on the part of our Government, which did not appeal to our collaborators in the United Nations.

RECOMMENDATION ON HOT PURSUIT

Are you familiar with the details of the so-called hot pursuit finding by the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff where they recommended that our planes be permitted to pursue the planes of the Communist aggressors over the Manchurian border?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I am familiar with that.

Chairman **Russell.** Well, that recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was approved by the Department of State and by the President; is that a correct statement?

Secretary **Acheson.** Some days prior to the 13th of November 1950, there were discussions between the Department of Defense and the Department of State, as the result of which the Department of State transmitted to our embassies in certain countries——

Senator **Brewster.** Did you say "embassies"?

Secretary **Acheson.** Beg pardon.

Chairman **Russell.** Yes.

Senator **Brewster.** To the embassies?

HOT PURSUIT DISCUSSED WITH OTHER COUNTRIES

Secretary **Acheson.** To our embassies in certain countries we transmitted a message saying that at an early date we might permit United States aircraft to defend themselves in the airspace over the Yalu River, to the extent of permitting hot pursuit of enemy aircraft up to 2 or 3 minutes flying time over enemy territory.

That is the recommendation that was discussed before you, of the hot pursuit recommendation made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I do not recollect that that went to the President, but I am not sure about that.

Those telegrams resulted in our Embassies taking up with the governments of those countries, this question.

We did not ask them to get any expression of views, but informed them that they might, in a short time, have to ask these governments about this matter.

They discussed the question with those governments, and in all cases they got strongly negative responses from the governments, saying they thought it was dangerous, and not desirable.

The governments, which were mentioned, there were five, and I think, later, six governments with whom this discussion took place.

Shortly after that some of these governments in their turn came to our Embassies and again stated that if we were thinking about this, they wanted to register their view that it was unwise and undesirable.

I transmitted the views of these governments to the Secretary of Defense in a letter, one letter dated November 23, 1950 and in another letter which I believe was dated November 24, 1950.

After considering these responses, it was determined between the Department of State and the Department of Defense that it was not desirable to go further with this suggestion.

Chairman **Russell.** Well, just how, now, did the matter arise? You state that you do not think it was ever approved by the President, or you don't know that it was ever approved by the President. Did the Defense Department present to to you?

Secretary **Acheson.** It was presented in discussions between us by the Defense Department to the Department of State representatives.

Chairman **Russell.** Did you as the responsible head of the Department of State approve or disapprove it, or did you merely transmit it to the Embassies overseas?

Secretary **Acheson.** We did not disapprove it. We were quite ready to approve it. Both Departments thought it was highly desirable to get the reaction of our partners in Korea on this matter. We undertook to get that for the Defense Department.

Chairman RUSSELL. So the Defense Department approached the Department of State to use you as the agency to get the reaction of those associated with us in this Korean venture?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

Chairman RUSSELL. You stated you took it up with six countries. I will not ask which they were. But I had understood there were some 13 nations who had contributed troops to the United Nations forces in Korea. Why was it confined to six nations rather than to consult with all of them?

Secretary ACHESON. I have tried to refresh my memory on that, and I do not know. The six countries which were picked out were prominent and representative, and I think it was probably a view of not spreading the security too widely. It may also have been that this was discussed orally with some of the Ambassadors of those powers in this country, but we have no record of that.

REASONS FOR NOT DISCUSSING HOT PURSUIT WITH SECURITY COUNCIL

Chairman RUSSELL. You did not then take it up with the Security Council of the United Nations who had voted this resolution, approved this resolution, to move into Korea and stop aggression, but you took it up with individual powers?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

Chairman RUSSELL. Why was it not taken up with the United Nations Council?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I think that the one initial impediment to that would be the presence of the Soviet Union on that Council, which would have made it quite impossible to do that.

Chairman RUSSELL. In other words, it had a highly secret security rating at that time?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; this would be a military operation which you would not wish to inform the enemy about.

DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES ECONOMIC BLOCKADE OF CHINA

Chairman RUSSELL. Now what steps have been taken by this Government or by the United Nations to impose an effective blockade on the Communist aggressors in China. I do not know whether I said it; but I mean economic.

Secretary ACHESON. The answer to your question, I think, begins in 1949. It was in 1949 that the Communist Chine regime first gained control of a port through which it could begin trade with the rest of the world.

The Government of the United States applied immediately an embargo upon shipments to that regime of munitions and industrial supplies having very high strategic value. That is in '49. However, this was a selective embargo and normal trade in some volume continued between the United States and ports of the China mainland which one by one came under Communist control during the latter half of '49.

During the 12 months from June '49 to June '50 our exports were some $30 million worth of goods to Communist China, and our imports from the country were goods valued at $110 million. The trade during that period moving from the United States consisted of such items as raw cotton, chemicals, machinery, petroleum products and metals. We received from them bristles, silk, tung oil, tin and tungsten. The greater part of our exports were raw cotton.

Senator SALTONSTALL. What was the balance, please? What was the balance either way of the figures you gave?

Secretary ACHESON. Exports from the United States of $30 million worth of goods; imports from China of $110 million.

Chairman RUSSELL. What were those dates?

Secretary ACHESON. That was from June '49 to June '50.

Chairman RUSSELL. Now——

Secretary ACHESON. Then I go on further to answer your question about the steps if you would like me to.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON. Perhaps I am going into too much detail here.

Chairman RUSSELL. I was interested in hearing that but I had more particular reference to the time since the Communist Chinese came into Korea. But proceed in such order as you desire.

Secretary ACHESON. In June 1950 we recognized, after the Korean aggression, that Communist China was likely to be used as a transshipment point, and we immediately put on an absolute ban of all petroleum shipments from the United States to Communist China. We obtained the cooperation of the major American oil companies in placing the same ban on shipments of petroleum from the Middle East, Latin America, and other points outside of our own jurisdiction.

We placed a complete embargo on shipments from the United States to Communist China of all items of strategic value.

Then in December of 1950, after the Chinese intervened in the aggression in Korea, we put a complete embargo on all shipments from the United States, the halting of all American ships to Chinese ports, and we froze all funds.

That is what the United States did.

DEVELOPMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH ALLIES ON TRADE WITH SOVIET BLOC

Now, so far as our allies are concerned—and again I must go back to the fall of 1948 when we undertook to discuss with our allies putting restrictions on the export of arms and ammunitions and implements of war, atomic energy materials, to the Soviet bloc.

Those discussions worked along and the various lists were gotten up and put into effect. In 1949 these discussions were carried on further and the lists were expanded.

By the end of 1949 the European nations participating in the efforts had embargoed shipments to the Soviet bloc of about two-thirds of the industrial items which our own experts then regarded as of primarily strategic importance.

In early 1950 this was taken up again, and this list was still further expanded.

In early 1951 agreement was reached to increase the number of categories of goods subject to embargo by about 50 percent and to increase by three times the total number of items being restricted or closely watched to prevent excessive shipments.

I have got a lot of illustrations here. As a result of these last discussions, about 90 percent of the items which we regard as being of primary strategic significance have been put on these lists for embargo.

Chairman RUSSELL. That applies, I understand, to all the Communist bloc, or just to China?

Secretary ACHESON. All of them.

EMBARGOING OF PETROLEUM TO CHINA

Then in regard to China, some further steps have been taken and I should like to go into the petroleum one, because there has been quite a lot of misunderstanding about that.

Specialized petroleum products, such as aviation gasoline, special lubricants, have been embargoed to Communist China and all other Communist destinations since late 1949 by the United States, the United Kingdom, and other governments which have been cooperating in the control of trade with the Soviet bloc.

Major petroleum companies shipping from offshore sources have cooperated in this embargo.

In addition, although it has not been generally known, it is a fact that ever since the Chinese Communists consolidated their hold on the mainland, for many months prior to the Korean hostilities, the Government of the United Kingdom had cooperated with us and with the principal American and British oil companies in restricting shipments of petroleum products to those types and quantities which are clearly intended for civilian use.

Immediately following the Communist aggression in Korea, the British Admiralty took over all British oil stocks in the Far East and secured agreements by British companies to follow a sales policy parallel to that of the United States companies. This policy has been further reinforced by the action of the Hong Kong Government in supervising closely the bunkering of vessels in Hong Kong and in rationing shipments to Macao to prevent leakage to the Chinese Communists.

Moreover, strict enforcement measures have been taken as evidenced by the action of the Hong Kong Government on numerous occasions in seizing illicit shipments and confiscating vessels involved, and levying severe fines on smugglers.

It is possible that despite these measures small amounts of petroleum products may have been smuggled into the mainland. It can be stated flatly, however, that nothing significant—no significant shipments of petroleum products of military usefulness have been exported to Communist China from or through any place in the free world.

These facts show there already exists on the part of the major industrial countries of the free world an economic embargo with respect to materials of primary strategic significance.

I will finish this. So far as UN action is concerned, on May 18, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted by a vote of 45 to 4, eight abstentions, and the Soviet bloc not participating, a resolution calling for an embargo on strategic exports to Communist China. Many countries were already doing this, as I have pointed out; others were not.

DIFFERENCES ON STRATEGIC VALUE OF RUBBER

In regard to the situation which existed in the past, and exists now, in regard to rubber, in the past we have had some difference in respect to the classification of rubber, as to whether that was strategic or not. We thought it was; others thought it was not.

The difference in our appraisal of the rubber problem and the appraisal of certain other countries, including the British, was largely a question of judgment of its strategic value, and a question of the effectiveness of the controls if they were imposed—and not by the British—considering the volume of rubber in the world which would not be under effective control.

We regard rubber as a strategic commodity. We were concerned with the size of the shipments being made, and we sought their reduction.

We welcomed, therefore, the British decision on May 10, to embargo rubber from British colonies to China, even though they, like we, know that this may not completely cut off the supply of rubber to China or to the Soviet bloc.

I think that gives you what you asked me.

Chairman RUSSELL. That was interesting; but I wanted the broad outlines of a policy, rather than the details.

RELATIONSHIP OF ECONOMIC BLOCKADE TO POSSIBLE NAVAL BLOCKADE

The question I really wished to get to was this:

Almost simultaneously with our decision to intervene militarily in Korea, and to attempt to stem the tide of aggression, a naval blockade on all of North Korea was invoked and put into effect.

Was that unilaterally undertaken by the United States, or was that blockade imposed through the United Nations?

Secretary ACHESON. That was under the United Nations resolution.

Chairman RUSSELL. Under a United Nations resolution which imposed a naval blockade on Korea?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; that is right.

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, that was one of the sanction that was being applied to aggressor forces?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. When the Chinese Communists intervened in great strength, in North Korea, was any effort made to get the United Nations to vote a similar naval blockade on Communist China?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir. We have not taken up in the United Nations the imposition of a naval blockade.

It has been the view of all elements in our Government that the first effort we should make was in connection with the economic blockade. We have made those efforts and I think have had considerable success.

I think it is clear that we cannot get nations to go further in regard to a naval blockade than they are willing to go on an economic blockade, since it is a more drastic sanction.

We have always felt that if we can get a very effective economic blockade, a naval blockade becomes much less important.

Chairman **Russell**. Well, I can conceive, of course, of an economic blockade being very effective, if all of the United Nations were to agree to it.

The thing that has disturbed me about it, Mr. Secretary, as one who has had very high hopes for the efficacy of the United Nations for preserving peace, seems to be the degree of enthusiasm with which the United Nations meets aggression from a small power, as compared with their lack of enthusiasm when there is a considerable power involved.

Secretary **Acheson**. We have been pressing, Mr. Chairman, as you know, to extend this economic blockade, and I think we have had considerable success.

Some of our associates have problems which are, for them, serious problems, and ones which we do not have in the same degree. We have some of the problems to a lesser degree, in Japan, and those problems made them hesitate to take complete and drastic measures.

Chairman **Russell**. Well, have you used every means at our command, in the United Nations, to encourage the other members to approve formal action on an economic blockade, and the necessary steps which are to be taken, to make it effective?

Secretary **Acheson**. I believe we have, sir, and are continuing to do it, and I expect it will be increasing in effectiveness.

UNITED STATES POLICY ON SEATING CHINA IN THE UN

Chairman **Russell**. Mr. Secretary, what is the official position of our Government as voiced through the State Department on the admission of Red China or the Peoples Republic, whatever the name the Peiping government has, into the United Nations?

Secretary **Acheson**. We have opposed that, Mr. Chairman, and opposed it very vigorously and very successfully. I should like, if it is proper, to review a little bit what we have done. I don't want to impose on your time.

Chairman **Russell**. Well, my time is about to expire, and if you will conclude with our position with respect to Formosa, why you may go ahead and make your statement. My time has expired but that doesn't cut you off.

Secretary **Acheson**. In regard to the first question you asked me, about our attitude toward the admission of the Chinese Communists to the United Nations, I said that we have opposed that and opposed it very effectively.

Senator **Wiley**. Can't hear you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary **Acheson**. I said that we had opposed the entrance of the Chinese Communists into the United Nations, and we had opposed it, I thought, very successfully. The attitude of the Government, it has been, I think, clear, was expressed by General Marshall that we cannot allow governments that want to get in the United Nations to shoot their way in. That is a very dramatic way of expressing it.

There are 46 organizations of the United Nations and its affiliated special agencies to which the Chinese might be admitted if that action was taken by these bodies. The question has come up 77 times in these various 46 bodies. The vote has been against the admission 76 times out of the 77.

In the case of the Universal Postal Union in the year 1950 the Chinese Communists, the United States dissenting, were seated for the purpose of that meeting, but that vote was reversed in the meeting in the year 1951.

Therefore, they have tried, or it has been tried by someone 77 times to have this take place, and that has been unsuccessful 76 times, and the important thing is that in regard to one case where the other action was taken, that was reversed at the last moment, so at the present time the Chinese Communists are not in any of the organs of the United Nations, and the Chinese Nationalist authorities represent China in all of them.

POLICY ON FORMOSA

The policy on Formosa as announced by the President on the 27th of June was that the Seventh Fleet was to see that there should be no attack on Formosa, or vice versa, there should be no attack by Formosa on the mainland, and that the fleet would see that both of those things were done.

The President has stated that we are not prejudicing the future of Formosa. That is a matter which should be decided, he said, either in connection with the Japanese peace treaty or by the United Nations, and the view which has been taken more recently is that the United Nations is the appropriate place where it should ultimately be decided.

It has been our clear view that the attack on Korea makes it quite impossible to discuss this matter, and therefore we have put it to one side in the United Nations, carrying the great body of support with us, and therefore the matter is not discussed in any way at the present time.

Chairman Russell. Senator Connally.

OBJECTIVES IN KOREA

Chairman **Connally.** Mr. Secretary, our objective, I believe you stated, in Korea is to defeat the aggressors and to establish peace.

Secretary **Acheson.** Yes, sir.

Chairman **Connally.** And ultimately a government in Korea, a civil free government; is that right?

Secretary **Acheson.** We have a government in Korea, the Government of the Republic of Korea.

Chairman **Connally.** South Korea.

Secretary **Acheson.** Our objective is to stop the attack, end the aggression on that Government, restore peace, providing against the renewal of the aggression.

Those are the military purposes for which, as we understand it, the United Nations troops are fighting.

The United Nations has since 1947 and the United States has since 1943 or 1944 stood for a unified, free, and democratic Korea. That is still our purpose, and is still the purpose of the United Nations.

I do not understand it to be a war aim. In other words, that is not sought to be achieved by fighting, but it is sought to be achieved by peaceful means, just as was being attempted before this aggression.

Chairman **Connally.** After the fight—by peaceful means after the fighting is over.

[illegible]

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. Mr. Secretary, do you regard an all-out war with Russia as being inevitable?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

RISKS IN EXPANDING WAR BEYOND KOREA

Chairman CONNALLY. Have not our policies been designed to prevent or to obviate an all-out war with Russia? Have not our policies been designed to prevent any such eventuality?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct, Senator.

Chairman CONNALLY. If there was an expansion of the war in the Far East, would that or not involve us in risks of an all-out war either with the Chinese Communists on the mainland of China or possibly with Russia itself?

Secretary ACHESON. I think it would involve us in those risks, Senator.

Chairman CONNALLY. Would those risks be serious?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir, in my judgment, they would.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Could you repeat that, please?

Secretary ACHESON. I said, "Yes, in my judgment, they would be serious."

Chairman CONNALLY. Now, of course, you are acquainted with the treaty between Red China and Russia, are you not?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, I am, Senator Connally.

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, just how far do you regard that as being operative? I mean by that: when would that treaty call Russia into a war if we should have one with Red China?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I should not like to undertake to interpret the treaty or make statements as to when it would be called into effect.

I think it is significant that increasingly, both Soviet and Chinese propaganda is making charges that Japan is being used in connection with the fight with the Chinese, and sometimes that Japanese are being used. It is quite untrue that Japanese are being used.

Of course, Japan is the place where our military headquarters are. That propaganda seems to me to be calculated to lay a foundation in case it is wanted to be used, to invoke this treaty.

Chairman CONNALLY. We have no way, of course, of being assured or being sure as to what the intentions of either the Red Chinese or the Russians are with regard to ourselves, have we?

Secretary ACHESON. No; we have no way.

Chairman CONNALLY. It is purely speculation and guesswork.

Do you have any definite ideas about the ability of Chiang Kai-shek's army on Formosa being of any service to the allies or the United States?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I think that has been covered by the military authorities who were in a much better position than I am to do it.

POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT

Chairman CONNALLY. That is true. The General Assembly resolution of October 7, 1950, sets forth the objectives of freeing, unifying, and rehabilitating Korea. Are there any negotiations now going on to modify unilaterally them or revise these objectives, that you know of, or make any new attempt to negotiate with the Red Chinese?

Secretary ACHESON. I believe that the Good Offices Committee set up by the resolutions of the General Assembly has made repeated efforts, sent messages to the Communist authorities to bring about a cease-fire, and a settlement of the fighting in Korea. So far as I know, they have had no success of any sort.

Chairman CONNALLY. Heretofore Red China has insisted that in any discussion or conversations regarding a peace settlement that they would want the question of Formosa and the seating of Red China in the United Nations considered; is that true?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, that is true, Senator Connally, and in many cases they have gone much further than that and they have said not only that it must be considered, but it must be agreed to.

Chairman CONNALLY. Must be agreed to.

Are there any indications that Red China has receded from a part of that position or modified it in any way—its demand in that regard?

Secretary ACHESON. I know of no evidence to that effect.

Chairman CONNALLY. I had a note here about the veto on the seating of Red China in the United Nations, but I will not ask you that question.

Have you any definite views on public opinion at the present moment in regard to the winning of the war?

Secretary ACHESON. Public opinion in the United States?

Chairman CONNALLY. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; I have no other views than a reader of the press.

UNITED STATES SENTIMENT AT OUTBREAK OF KOREAN WAR

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, it is my recollection that when we first went into Korea, everybody threw up their hats and hollered "Hurray," and then when the tide of war went a little against us, they began to cool off, and so on.

I remember a statement in the paper, of Senator Taft himself, saying that he thought it ought to have been submitted to Congress; it ought not to have been done without submitting it to Congress, but that if it had come to a vote he would have voted to go into Korea. Does anybody dispute that? I pause.

Senator BREWSTER. If you will amend that to say that he assumed that proper military appraisals had been made, which we now find were utterly lacking.

Chairman CONNALLY. That is not what I read in the paper.

Senator BREWSTER. That is what anybody assumed who had any intelligence. We discovered to our amazement that it was not the fact.

Chairman CONNALLY. I am sorry I have not got any intelligence.

Senator LODGE. Does the Senator from Texas doubt the advisability of having put this up to the Congress?

Chairman CONNALLY. I would not have objected; I would have voted readily for it.

Senator LODGE. Don't you think it was a good idea?

Chairman CONNALLY. But it was an emergency matter. We could not have waited for all the debate.

Senator LODGE. I think the Senator from Texas has taken more time in the course of the sessions here, and Congress can act very quickly on a matter of that kind.

Chairman CONNALLY. You what?

Senator LODGE. I say, Congress can act very quickly in a matter of this kind, and the Senator from Massachusetts has never taken as much time as the Senator from Texas, so far as time is concerned.

Chairman CONNALLY. I am sorry, but the Senator from Texas has not taken very much time.

Senator LODGE. I have not taken much time either; but the Senator asked about the question of bringing it up before Congress, and then he paused, and it seemed to me he paused for the purpose of getting an answer. It seems to me it would have been better to bring it up before the Congress.

Chairman CONNALLY. I paused to find out if anybody disputed the statement made by Senator Taft.

Senator LODGE. I do not know anything about Senator Taft's statement, but I do have an opinion about the advisability of bringing that up before Congress.

Chairman CONNALLY. I would not have objected myself; I would have voted for it.

Senator LODGE. So would I.

Senator BREWSTER. In Germany and Japan we acted very quickly, inside of an hour.

Chairman CONNALLY. Of course, we acted very quickly because they already had attacked us. We did not wait and we did resist.

QUESTIONS RELATING TO OUR ALLIES IN KOREA

Suppose we undertook to extend the hostilities beyond Korea, to spread the war. Our allies have not agreed to such course of action, have they?

Secretary ACHESON. No, Senator Connally; they have not.

Chairman CONNALLY. So far they have opposed it, is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. The best way of expressing their attitude is that they believe that would incur grave risks of enlarging the war, and involving Europe in it, which would put them in a most exposed and dangerous position.

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, we have got the help out there now of the Dutch and the French and the Canadians and Greeks and Turks and Belgians and some of the rest, probably. Would we not jeopardize our whole position in the Far East if we disregard the wishes of our allies that have been expressed?

Secretary ACHESON. I think we would gravely endanger the whole coalition if we insisted on taking unilateral action which seemed to disregard their very grave dangers.

Chairman CONNALLY. A good deal of criticism has been made to the effect that our allies have not contributed their fair share of the fighting forces in Korea.

Has the State Department undertaken to stimulate such cooperation and to get them to increase their aid?

Secretary ACHESON. We have been constantly at work with all the members of the United Nations, and we believe that it would be possible to have them contribute troops to bring that about. Many of them have, in the light of their own responsibilities and dangers, taken very effective action.

We are now in the course of discussions with other members of the United Nations and we have hopes that we will get further contributions of troops.

PREPAREDNESS OF NATIONALISTS ON FORMOSA

Chairman CONNALLY. The Nationalists entertain the hopes of going back on the mainland of China. Do you think that they would have any success against Red Communists without our intervention and our military aid?

Secretary ACHESON. I think it has been stated by the Joint Chiefs and General Bradley and General Marshall that they could not carry out such an operation at the present time on account of the state of their preparations, and they could not carry it out at any time without the water lift and air support of the United States Navy and Air Force.

Chairman CONNALLY. Mr. Secretary, with regard to the recall, I will call it for lack of a better word, from his command in the Far East, were you present at any of these conferences that the Chiefs of Staff had with each other or otherwise about the matter?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; I was not present at any conferences of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

POSSIBLE PRESSURE OF ALLIES FOR RECALL

Chairman CONNALLY. It has been charged also or intimated that General MacArthur's recall might have been influenced by pressure from some of our allies on this Government. Do you know anything about such a charge?

Secretary ACHESON. That is not correct, sir. There was no pressure, representation, or request of any sort by any of our allies.

Chairman CONNALLY. I believe that is all, Mr. Chairman, for the present. I will reserve the right to interrogate the Secretary later.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bridges.

INITIATION OF MAC ARTHUR RECALL

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Secretary, did you originate the idea or plan of firing General MacArthur?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

Senator BRIDGES. Who first approached you relative to the firing of General MacArthur?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, if I may state my participation in the events which led to his recall, I will be glad to do that. I was telephoned to on the afternoon of the 5th of April, which as I recall it was a Thursday afternoon, late in the afternoon, by the President who directed me to attend a meeting to be held at his office on the following morning, a meeting arising out of the situation created by the letter to Congressman Martin, and I went to that meeting. Do you wish me to go on?

Senator WILEY. I am listening here but it is difficult.

Secretary ACHESON. Sorry.

Senator BRIDGES. General Bradley testified that someone made a telephone call to him which caused him to bring about the meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and he could not remember who called him up on this matter, but he did remember that he called a few minutes afterwards the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider it. Did you make the telephone call to him?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

ESTIMATION OF MAC ARTHUR

Senator BRIDGES. Do you know General MacArthur personally, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; I have never had the pleasure of meeting him.

Senator BRIDGES. Do you share the opinions of General Marshall, General Bradley, and others of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when they testified here under oath they considered him the greatest military authority in the Far East?

Secretary ACHESON. I have read their testimony and they are in a position to know about these matters, and I should share their opinion, based on their opinion. It isn't based on any of my own because I know nothing about those things.

Senator BRIDGES. Do you share their opinion that insofar as they knew, he probably had a greater knowledge of the political situation in the Far East than anyone?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I should think that that statement is rather too broad.

I should think that General MacArthur had a very fine knowledge of the situation in the areas where he had served, and with which he is familiar.

As I recall his own testimony, I don't think he claimed to have any knowledge of areas with which he was not familiar.

MILITARY MISSION AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES IN KOREA

Senator BRIDGES. What was the original military mission of the United Nations troops when they went to Korea?

Secretary ACHESON. The mission was stated in the resolution of the 25th and the 27th,—Well, the 25th, try to bring about peace; and the 27th recommends that the members of the United Nations

> furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.

Senator BRIDGES. And what was the political mission of the United Nations in Korea? Was it the same?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, the political objective of the United Nations, in regard to Korea, ever since 1947,—has been to bring about a unified, free and democratic Korea.

Senator BRIDGES. Well, now, you testified earlier about our President, and I quote from the statement of the President of the United States, made on November 16, 1950, in which he said:

> * * * which reaffirms that it is the policy of the United Nations to hold the Chinese frontier with Korea inviolate; to protect fully legitimate Chinese

and Korean interests in the frontier zone; the withdrawal of United Nations forces from Korea as soon as stability has been restored; and a unified, independent democratic government established throughout Korea.

Now, that was the President's statement on November 16, 1950.

Now, that isn't what you testified to a short time ago, is it, Mr. Secretary, in the remarks which you gave here?

How do you justify them in consideration of the President's statement on November 16, 1950?

Secretary Acheson. I think that they are quite consistent, Senator Bridges. As I say, the military mission which was given to the United Nations forces was to repel the armed attack and to establish international peace and security in the area.

The United Nations, as I said before, has always since 1947 had the political objective of unifying Korea under free and democratic institutions.

The resolution of the General Assembly of October 7 reaffirmed that long-term objective. short-term

In the period from shortly after the Inchon landings until the intervention of the Chinese Communists, it looked as though both of these objectives could be attained. That is, that as the forces of the North Koreans, who had been attacking South Korea, were rounded up, destroyed, or surrendered, that then the country could be put together; and if that could have been done, both objectives would have been realized and the United Nations forces would have been withdrawn as the President said, as soon as stability had been achieved in that area.

Unhappily, the intervention of the Chinese Communists threw our forces back and made it militarily difficult, if not impossible, to achieve the political objective.

Senator Bridges. What was the date when the Chinese Communists came in?

Secretary Acheson. They actually attacked, I believe, on the 26th of November. They had been known to be in Korea, I think, since perhaps the 24th of October, certainly in the early days of November, we began to get reports from the commander in chief, Far East, that units were in North Korea.

TAKING UP DEFENSE DEPARTMENT RECOMMENDATIONS WITH ALLIES

Senator Bridges. Do you intend to correlate or carry out the general military advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense in your negotiations with other countries?

Secretary Acheson. I am afraid I don't understand.

Senator Bridges. Let me quote from the record. I quote a question addressed to Secretary Marshall by Chairman Russell:

> Chairman Russell. Do you know whether or not the United Nations Organization made any specific recommendation as to the imposition of a naval blockade on China and the bombing of Manchurian bases, or did that originate within the Security Council in attempting to comply with the original directive of the United Nations?
>
> Secretary Marshall. If I understand your question correctly, Mr. Chairman, there was initiated in the Joint Chiefs of Staff a proposal of about December 7 or 8 to authorize General MacArthur to institute a procedure in the air called hot pursuit, which means that our planes could follow theirs for a stated distance over the Yalu River into Manchuria.

That was considered, concurred in by me. As a matter of fact, I urgently recommended it. It was concurred in by the Secretary of State and approved by the President, and the Secretary of State was directed to take that up with the 13 nations involved with us in the fighting in Korea. They voted solidly against it. So for the time being, we had to drop that.

What are your comments on that, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Acheson. Well, I think I have been over that before, Senator Bridges. General Marshall's recollection was it had been approved by the President. I did not recall that, but he is undoubtedly right.

It was my duty to take it up with these various countries, and, as I told you, we took it up with six countries.

The first time I think that General Marshall testified about this matter he said that I was to take it up with several countries and that these countries took the attitude which I have described.

In several later questionings he referred to all of them. My own recollection differs from his as to the number with whom this matter was discussed. But it was my duty to take it up with them, and I did, and I got their attitudes and reported those back.

Senator Bridges. Yesterday or the day before, Admiral Sherman testified that he favored a United Nations naval blockade of China, Red China, and he said in questioning that he had stressed this regularly, and he was satisfied that he had stressed it with such regularity and such vigor that the Secretary of State Acheson had pursued the matter in consultations with other United Nations members.

NAVAL BLOCKADE NOT DISCUSSED WITH ALLIES

Now, I have before me a paper of this morning, and an article headed "State Department chills China blockade bid." It says:

> Despite repeated recommendations by the United States Navy for United Nations approval of a naval blockade of Communist China, the American State Department has never asked other UN members to support such action, it was learned today.

Then I go on further:

> UN delegates, familiar with all consultations concerning the conduct of the Korean War, disclosed today that Acheson and his subordinates not only have not pursued the blockade proposal with "vigor" but have not even mentioned it in talks with representatives of other UN members.

What is your comment on that, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Acheson. You are reading from the Times Herald?

Senator Bridges. I am; from a report which is listed from a wire service, whatever it is—CTPS.

Secretary Acheson. Well, I think my comment would be, Senator Bridges, that I have given my testimony before in answer to questions, I think, by the chairman on this subject.

I have before me the record on pages 4315 and 4316 of Admiral Sherman's testimony, in which he said:

> And I want to make clear that I have not advocated establishing a blockade and been overruled. I have discussed the problem here in relation to the recommendations of General MacArthur to go ahead with it, to show what the problems are, what the possibilities are, and to try to make an objective analysis of it.
>
> In my opinion the time has not arrived for such an undertaking, because I still believe that the best way to stop this traffic is by mutual agreement between the United Nations. I think, beginning with the action of some of our own

oil companies fairly early in the game, following the things that are now being done through the United Nations and through cooperation, we can make a great deal of headway. It may be that we can make enough. But if we ever resort to a blockade by force, it must be a United Nations operation unless we are going to get involved in a unilateral war between the United States and China, which in my own opinion is extremely undesirable.

That states the situation as I recall it and I think it is, and I agree with it.

Senator BRIDGES. It was gone over at some length with Admiral Sherman by different individuals at different times and he made, I think, one of the statements you have quoted, but I think he stated it even more forcefully in other places.

MANNER OF DISCUSSIONS WITH ALLIES ON HOT PURSUIT

Now, did the State Department urge our allies in the United Nations to join with us on the hot-pursuit doctrine?

Secretary ACHESON. We took it up with them and got their point of view. I presume they urged them to do it. It was done by our embassies abroad. I don't know how it was done.

Senator BRIDGES. Is there not a far difference between asking it up and urging it, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary ACHESON. You are asking me to testify to things which were done in a foreign country where I was not present. The telegrams we sent out indicated that our Chiefs of Staff thought it was important and that we agreed with it, and we would like to do it. We got back the responses that the other countries did not want to do it.

Senator BRIDGES. But as far as you know, as Secretary, in sending out the orders you urged that it be done, or didn't you? I mean you said you did not know the action there, but you know what you told them.

Secretary ACHESON. I knew that I was anxious that the views of the Joint Chiefs should be agreed to, and I presume I did everything proper in the telegram to bring that about.

INTERNAL SITUATION IN CHINA

Senator BRIDGES. I quote to you from a statement here:

> Independence of China is gravely threatened. In a Communist world there is room for only one master, a jealous, implacable master, whose price of friendship is complete submission. How many Chinese in one community after another are now being destroyed because they love China more than Soviet Russia?

Do you agree with that statement?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, it is hardly a statement. I think that a great many Chinese are being destroyed for that reason. It indicates what I have said several times—that this regime has not put the interests of China first. If that is what you are driving at.

Senator BRIDGES. I quote:

> The freedoms of the Chinese people are disappearing. Trial by mob, mass slaughter, banishment to forced labor into Manchuria, Siberia, the arbitrary seizure of properties, the destruction of loyalty within the family, and the expressions of free speech, these are the facts behind the parades, celebrations, and empty promises.

Do you agree with that?

Secretary Acheson. I think that is true.

Senator Bridges. And continuing further:

> The continued inroads of Soviet power into Manchuria under the cloak of the Korean aggression means, in fact, that China is losing its great northern areas to the European empire which has stretched out its greedy hands for them for at least a century.

Do you agree with that?

Secretary Acheson. I have pointed that out myself several times.

Senator Bridges. And I quote further:

> The peace and security of China are being sacrificed by the ambitions of the Communist conspiracy. China has been driven by foreign masters into an adventure of foreign aggression which cuts across the most fundamental national interests of the Chinese people. This action stands condemned by the great world community in which the Chinese people have always aspired to play a worthy role.

Is that your viewpoint?

Secretary Acheson. I think broadly speaking that is right. The expression "foreign masters" may be open to a little question. The Chinese Communists who are in control of the government are Moscow-trained people and are faithful to Moscow. I assume, and I believe, that they go along quite willingly with the Moscow line.

Senator Bridges. And I quote further:

> But one thing we can say: If the Chinese people move to assert their freedom, to work out their destiny in accordance with their own historical purposes, they can count upon tremendous support from free peoples in other parts of the world.

Secretary Acheson. I have been asked about that before, and I have said that I was sure that they would have a hearty welcome.

Senator Bridges. Continuing further:

> We can tell our friends in China that the United States will not acquiesce in what is being forced upon them. We do not recognize the authorities of Peiping for what they pretend to be. It is not the government of China. It does not pass the first test. It is not Chinese. It is not entitled to speak for China in the community of nations. It is entitled only to the fruits of its own conduct, the fruits of aggression upon which it is now willfully, openly, and senselessly involved.

Do you agree with that?

Secretary Acheson. I have stated publicly in regard to that sentence that we do not recognize the Chinese Communist government and we don't propose to recognize it, and that is I believe what they are saying in that statement.

Senator Bridges (reading):

> We recognize the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China, even though the territory under its control is severely restricted. We believe it more authentically represents the views of the great body of the people of China, particularly their historic demand for independence from foreign control. That Government will continue to receive important aid and assistance from the United States. Under the circumstances, however, such aid in itself cannot be decisive to the future of China. The decision and the effort are for the Chinese people, pooling their efforts, wherever they are, in behalf of China.

Do you agree to that?

Secretary Acheson. We do recognize the Nationalist Government. We are giving them substantial help. We are going to continue to do that, and I believe it is quite true that the ultimate success, if there is going to be any success in China in freeing itself from this foreign domination, has got to come basically from the Chinese.

COMMENTS ON SPEECH BY DEAN RUSK

Senator BRIDGES. Those quotes I quoted were from the speech made in New York by your Assistant Secretary of State, Dean Rusk. The reason for asking it or one of the reasons for asking is my own doubt in the past over our policy on China, and secondly an article that appeared in the Washington Post on May 22, 1951, following the speech made by Mr. Rusk in New York entitled, the headline is "Policy change on China war is denied here," and then it goes on:

> Dean Rusk, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, spoke on his own when he said in New York Friday that the Communist regime in Peiping is not Chinese. He did not consult in advance with his own Department or with others or with the allied governments before saying the Nationalist Government more authentically represents the views of the great body of the people of China. The Assistant Secretary of State did not seek the advice of the State Department's own policy-planning staff which usually discusses and approves important policy pronouncements, nor did he consult high parties in the Pentagon on the theory that one of his colleagues in his New York speech did not have military assistance.

Then this goes on further, and I quote from that:

> Rather than disavow his subordinate on the eve of the Senate hearings, Acheson is supposed or expected to poo-poo any idea that American policy is changed or that the Rusk speech has any importance as a policy statement.

Then he went on. Now Mr. Rusk made the speech. This article was written by one of the outstanding reporters who rather specializes in foreign affairs, and it sort of took the ground out from under the effect of Mr. Rusk's speech, and I would like to have you comment if you will on this article and its accuracy.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, Senator, I really can't comment on the accuracy of newspaper articles. I can comment on the facts, which I have done in regard to this speech.

Mr. Rusk did not believe that he was stating any change in any particular in any policy established by the President followed by the Department.

I do not believe he intended to or did. I have said that at press conferences and private conversations and I say it again. I have been through this speech. Press conferences picked out each one of the actual statements of policy and have pointed out that they have been followed for a long time and are still being followed and we will still continue to follow them.

ALLEGED STATEMENT BY UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO KOREA

Senator BRIDGES. Was our American Ambassador to Korea actually in accord with State Department policy when he expressed, or was he expressing views which were the policy of the Department, when he advised Congressman Hugh D. Scott, Jr., that it was not our purpose to fight communism in Korea, and when he justified the arming of the North Koreans by the Soviet Union?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't know anything about that, sir. I don't know that he made such a statement.

I will try to find it and read it and answer your question later.

Senator BRIDGES. I mean, if he did—my point is, if he made it, and I have here a photostatic copy of a letter written by Congressman Scott, setting forth these facts dated October 14, 1950, and referring to his previous conversation.

I wondered, if we have got an Ambassador there, if it is true that he stated it was not our purpose to fight communism in Korea, and then he proceeded to justify the arming of the North Koreans by the Soviet Union, how you could keep him in office, if those were his actual statements.

Secretary ACHESON. If you would care to give me the letter, I will have it investigated. I am quite certain that whoever thought that Ambassador Muccio said anything like that is quite mistaken, as Ambassador Muccio's entire effort, since he has been over there, has been to build up the Government in South Korea against communism.

He has given everything he had to that, and displayed great gallantry in holding the Korean Government together at a time when it was quite panic-stricken.

He has risked his life many times in the course of this campaign.

He has been decorated by the Persident for loyalty and devotion, and I am just sure that he did not say what is attributed to him.

EXPLANATION OF PRESS CLUB SPEECH OF JANUARY 12, 1950, AND REFERENCES TO DEFENSE PERIMETER

Senator BRIDGES. When you addressed the National Press Club January 12, 1950, you described what you called the defensive perimeter of the United States. You included Japan and the Ryukyu Islands and the Philippine Islands.

Why did you exclude Korea, Formosa, and, for instance, the mainland of Asia?

Why did you make that specific statement?

My point in asking it, Mr. Secretary, was that you were Secretary of State of our country then, and when you made that statement, that that was the perimeter of our defense, if it wasn't sort of an invitation to the Russians to—the Communists—that they were free to attack in Korea, by eliminating those points as part of our defensive perimeter?

Secretary ACHESON. In my speech at the Press Club January 12, 1950, in the part to which you refer, I was speaking of those defensive areas, those defense points in the Pacific at which United States troops are stationed, and which United States troops must defend.

I said the defense perimeter runs from—this defense perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan, and then goes to the Ryukyus—that is Okinawa—we hold important defenses in the Ryukyu Islands and those we will continue to hold. In the interests of the population of the Ryukyu Islands, we will at an appropriate time offer to hold these islands under a trusteeship of the United Nations. They are an essential part of the defense perimeter of the Pacific, and they must and will be held.

All of these places are places where American troops are stationed and which are to be held in order to defend the perimeter.

Then I go on in my speech to say the defensive perimeter runs from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands. Again we have troops stationed there. Our relations, our defensive relations with the Philippines are contained in agreements between us. Those agreements will be loyally carried out. Both peoples have learned from bitter experience the vital connection between our mutual defense requirements. We are in no doubt about it. And it is hardly necessary for me to say an attack on the Philippines could not and would not be tolerated by the United States.

But I hasten to add that no one perceives the imminence of any such attack.

I then went on to talk about other areas in the Pacific and said so far as the military security of the other areas of the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can quarantee these areas against military attack. But it must also be clear that such a guaranty is hardly sensible or necessary within the realm of practical relationships.

Should an attack occur, one hesitates to say where such an armed attack would come from. The initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it, and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression.

Now, I think I said what I tried to say very clearly, that the United States had certain points which were a defensive perimeter. At those points United States troops were stationed; there they would stay and there they would fight.

In regard to other areas, I said nobody can guarantee that; but what we can say is that if people will stand up and fight for their own independence, their own country, the guaranties under the United Nations have never proved a weak reed before, and they won't in the future. I think that is a fairly accurate statement of what has happened.

Chairman **Russell.** Senator Bridges, your time has expired. Senator Wiley?

Senator **Wiley.** I think Senator George is ahead of me.

Senator **George.** No.

Secretary **Acheson.** Could I just add to my answer?

Chairman **Russell.** Yes, sir.

Secretary **Acheson.** What I said here is almost exactly what Mr. Dulles was saying in Korea in June 1950.

Chairman **Russell.** Senator George, of course, has seniority, but under the set-up from table to table, why it so happens that you were next under the seating arrangement that we had.

Senator **Wiley.** I was hoping to go over until tomorrow. I have been penciling down some questions here.

Senator **Brewster.** How long do you expect to hold the hearing?

Chairman **Russell.** Of course, the committee is at liberty to recess any time that it sees fit to do so. I had tentatively planned to recess by between 5:45 and 6 o'clock, somewhere in there. If the committee wishes to recess now I have no substantial objection.

PROPOSAL TO RECESS

Senator **Brewster.** I would like to see us recess now. I do not know whether it makes any difference to anybody else, but I think we have had quite a day of it. I have an engagement.

Chairman RUSSELL. Of course, I am here to put into effect the decision of this committee. If the committee wishes to recess now, I am perfectly willing to do so. I am apprehensive, gentlemen, about the condition in which the legislative work of these two committees finds itself. Not only that, but other committees on which many members of this committee are members, I am apprehensive of their work, too. I have no objection to recessing now, but I do hope that we will be able to press along in these hearings.

We have a number of witnesses. I do not desire to curtail any Senator. Let me reiterate that, and I have done so every time this matter comes up, on any questions he has to propound, I do not desire to curtail anybody. But I think we have a very distinct obligation to the Senate and to the country to work at all possible hours and all times that are available to us in order that we may endeavor to bring these hearings to a conclusion.

Senator WILEY. I will carry on.

Chairman RUSSELL. As early as possible, and consistent with a full and thorough hearing, we should endeavor to bring these hearings to a conclusion.

Senator LODGE. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

ORDER OF WITNESSES

Senator LODGE. I understood the Senator to say that he had a long list of witnesses. I did not know that any decision had been made about witnesses subsequent to Secretary Acheson.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, the committee has adopted a resolution, in the absence of the Senator from Massachusetts, which instructed the Chair to invite Gen. Albert Wedemeyer as a witness to succeed Secretary Acheson; former Secretary Louis Johnson, of the Defense Department, to succeed Mr. Wedemeyer; and Mr. Averill Harriman to succeed Mr. Johnson; so we do have that many witnesses, and, in addition, a large number of witnesses have been suggested by various members of the committee to be heard.

I want to hear everyone that can cast any light on the questions involved here. I do hope we do not get into the field, altogether, of cumulative evidence, where we will depend upon the largest number of witnesses to sustain any position; and I am not endeavoring to curtail the hearing of any witnesses. I am insisting that the committee ought to stick to this task until its conclusion.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator from California.

CONSIDERATION TO STAFF

Senator KNOWLAND. I would respectfully suggest, however, that the hour is now 5:20; that we recess until tomorrow morning; No. 1, our stenotypists have had a long day on the situation; after we finish our work, the censors and the others who have their jobs, carry on for quite a considerable period of time; and it would seem to me that under the circumstances, in view of the half-hour rounds, that this might be a good breaking point to recess until tomorrow morning. I am not insisting upon it. I will stay here, if the committee wants to stay, but it just seems to me there are valid reasons for recessing at this time.

Chairman **Russell.** Well, it does not require any valid reasons. Whenever the majority of this committee desires, they may recess, I have undertaken to be considerate of our reporters. I realize the pressure that they have been under, but this has been a comparatively easy day for the reporters when we consider it and compare it with the testimony that was taken of General MacArthur, when he was here, or with General Marshall; those were full-day sessions. This has been a picnic for them, because we recessed at 12 o'clock and allowed them 2½ hours, and though I have been considerate of their welfare, as much as I could be, I think this is a very poor day to bring in the reporters.

Senator **Knowland.** I am not in favor of spoiling the reporters, but I still think it has been a substantial day.

Chairman **Russell.** Here we have been in session all day, and, of course, we had procedural matters we had to settle, and they were entitled to full discussion. Only three Senators have examined the witness to date out the 26.

Senator **Brewster.** Can I inquire what your schedule is for tomorrow?

Chairman **Russell.** I intend for this committee to meet at 10 o'clock unless the majority of the committee votes to postpone the time.

Senator **Brewster.** And then run through the afternoon?

Chairman **Russell.** Indeed.

Senator **Brewster.** I think it is an excellent idea, and I am highly in accord, but I think if you do that you allow the Senators a little time within reasonable hours, and that is why I would suggest that we do recess now until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning, and put in a full day tomorrow.

PROCEDURE OF HEARINGS

Chairman **Russell.** Well, gentlemen, I am going to put the motion now, and I assume from the attitude of the committee they desire to recess; but I hope that the members of the committee will so arrange their affairs that we can press forward as vigorously as possible to a conclusion of these hearings.

I do not mean to say at this day or that day that we should conclude these hearings, but to buckle down to this task until we have examined the witnesses that have the evidence that is necessary to us to enable us to arrive at a fair decision.

I was hopeful that next week, if we can prevail upon the witnesses to stay with us, that we might have some evening sessions of this committee.

I think that the importance of these two committees to the functioning of the Senate would completely justify our meeting in the evening to examine the witnesses.

Now, the motion is that we recess.

Senator **Knowland.** Mr. Chairman, before you put the motion, if the Senator would just withhold a moment, there is one minor procedural matter.

REPARAPHRASING OF A DOCUMENT

Calling your attention, Mr. Chairman, to page 80 of the document furnished us by the Joint Chiefs, paragraph 37, I requested the Defense Establishment to send over the message itself, because I questioned whether the paraphrase which shows there in paragraph 37, was quite complete.

Chairman RUSSELL. What page, Senator?

Senator KNOWLAND. That is page 80 of the document, paragraph 37. I have read the message they sent over this morning. I have read it, and I have requested that Admiral Davis requests of the Defense Establishment a new paragraph or a new paraphrase, which I think more accurately would reflect the message of December 29, which shows at that point, and merely for our record, I think that that should be noted, and Admiral Davis, I understand, is making that request, and a further paraphrase be furnished.

Senator SMITH. Might I ask the Senator just what that was, because I asked for a December 29, probably the same one you did. I assume it is the same one.

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes, it is the same message.

POSSIBLE EVENING SESSIONS

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, might I say this: I am very happy, as one member of the committee, to sit evenings next week.

I hope if the chairman plans evening sessions that he either notifies us on Monday morning, or perhaps tomorrow morning, as to what evenings he intends to sit.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I shall undertake to confer with the witnesses and find—of course the witness, he is——

Senator SALTONSTALL. He is entitled to some privileges.

Chairman RUSSELL. He is sparring with 26 Senators, and we have to take into consideration his wishes in the matter, but if we have witnesses who feel that they can make themselves available in the evenings, I hope that we can arrange evening sessions next week.

Gentlemen, we have got to get down to this work here, because while this is a matter of tremendous importance, there is certain routine business that is essential to the operation of our Government, such as your appropriation bills, and things of that sort.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I am heartily in favor of it. All I brought the subject up for was for you to name a few days in advance, and then go to it.

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, I don't think the committee would look with much favor on meeting in the evenings if they won't stay here until 6 o'clock.

At this rate, we are going to take 6 or 7 days with one witness. Only three Senators have questioned him today. I can't understand how we could ever come to the point of having night sessions if we won't stay until sundown, in the daytime.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committee has either got to put its heart into this investigation, as I see it, or else we have to interrupt it for a few weeks to enable us to do our legislative work.

I think one or the other will be absolutely necessary.

Senator CAIN. I want to state that I will stay with you and any other members of this committee, day or night or any other time, as the record indicates we have been closely associated; but the question has been raised about recessing at this time. I would support it, because in looking around the room, the only ones, with several exceptions, who would be given an opportunity to ask questions are all from one of our two great parties. I don't know where the others have gone.

NEED FOR PUSHING HEARINGS VIGOROUSLY

Chairman RUSSELL. I am not undertaking to defend any absentee, whether Democrat or Republican, and I have been sitting here all the way through, not as a Democrat or Republican. I have stated I was endeavoring to sit here as an American.

Senator CAIN. I appreciate that.

Chairman RUSSELL. I refuse to assume any responsibility for absences of members of the Democratic Party simply because I am a member of the Democratic Party.

I commend the Republicans who are here and I hope they will show a willingness to go ahead even if there is only one Democrat sitting here with them next week and carry on this these hearings.

I am not interested in the partisan aspects of it; I am interested in endeavoring to bring these hearings to a conclusion without disrupting all of the work of the Senate.

Senator BREWSTER. I want to say a word in defense of your Democratic colleagues, that I do assume their absence indicates they did have other responsibilities they felt compelled to carry out, and I do think that our presence here doesn't necessarily mean that we haven't got a lot, also.

I do think if you could arrange a schedule of hours—today we were told we weren't going to have any session this afternoon. I didn't know until quite late that there had been a change in the program.

Chairman RUSSELL. I made no such statement at any time.

Senator BREWSTER. I was told this morning there wasn't going to be——

Chairman RUSSELL. I didn't make that statement to the Senator from Maine or to anyone else.

Senator BREWSTER. There did seem to be a good deal of vagueness as to the plan for the afternoon meetings. I think if you can arrange a schedule—forenoon, afternoon, and night—and work it out—perhaps if you had a consultation with some of those concerned, I am sure we would all try to cooperate. We appreciate your problem. I think you have done very well in trying to carry this on.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am sure the absentee members of the Democratic Party will appreciate the spirited defense of the Senator from Maine. I do not undertake to defend them or any member of this committee—Democrat or Republican—who does not attend these hearings.

I am not stating they should attend or not, but I don't think that we can afford to conduct hearings of this length and of this importance in accordance with the whims of those who might be absent. If they are absent, they have good reason, I assume—I am perfectly willing to make the assumption that the Senator from Maine did—

but I don't think that is any reason why the committee should not press these hearings.

I am perfectly willing to say for the record for the benefit of the Senator from Maine that for the last several days the attendance of the Republican members of the committee has been better than that of the Democrats; but if the Democrats aren't here, I assume it means they don't want to ask any questions. But those who do wish to ask questions I think should cooperate with the Chair in endeavoring to press these hearings as vigorously as possible, whether they are Republicans or Democrats.

I am not interested in any partisan phases of this inquiry.

The motion is that we stand in recess until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

All those in favor of that motion will say "Aye."

(There was a chorus of ayes.)

Chairman Russell. Opposed, "No."

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. The ayes have it, and the committee stands in recess until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 5:30 p. m. the committees recessed to reconvene at 10:02 a. m. Saturday, June 2, 1951.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

SATURDAY, JUNE 2, 1951

Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:02 a. m. in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), presiding.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), Wiley, George, Smith of New Jersey, Hickenlooper, McMahon, Sparkman, Gillette, Brewster, Saltonstall, Johnson of Texas, Morse, Kefauver, Knowland, Hunt, Cain, and Stennis.

Also present: Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge of the committee staff of the Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; Carl M. Marcy, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman Russell. The committee will come to order.

Senator Wiley. I believe you are next.

Senator Wiley. Have we been called to order, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Russell. Yes, I have called upon the Senator from Wisconsin.

TESTIMONY OF HON. DEAN G. ACHESON, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY ADRIAN S. FISHER, LEGAL ADVISER—Resumed

Senator Wiley. Mr. Secretary, I find in the ticker this morning this statement from London:

> Britain is in touch with United States, the Commonwealth countries and other interested governments on the possibility of a truce in Korea, authoritative quarters said today. These sources said that the Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, has made a new approach to interested governments with a view to ending the Korean War by negotiation.

What do you know about that?

Secretary Acheson. I don't know anything about that, sir.

MILITARY POLICY AND SITUATION IN KOREA

Senator Wiley. Here is another dispatch:

> Tokyo.—Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet said today that the United States Eighth Army has quit chasing Reds in North Korea but will continue to block Communist aggression.

Do you know anything about that?

Secretary Acheson. No. That is a statement of military operations which I am not competent to comment on.

Senator WILEY. Well, what I am getting at, does it comply with our political policy that we should quit chasing the Reds and just must block Communist aggression? Is that our policy?

Secretary ACHESON. I think that's a statement of the military situation. He is just describing what has happened in this particular tactical advance.

Senator WILEY. I realize that is what it purports to be. Now I am asking what our political policy is. Does it coincide with this "quit chasing the Reds and just block Communist aggression"? What is our policy there now?

Secretary ACHESON. Senator, I think we are talking about two slightly different things. I think what General Van Fleet is doing is describing his military operations, and I think, as I understand his statement, it is that in the present state of that operation he has stopped his advance. Now he may go on to say because the other fellows are stopping their advance, or whatever the military reason is. At any rate he has done that.

Now, as far as our purpose in Korea is concerned, we were discussing that yesterday, and I tried to point out that it was to repel this armed attack and to restore peace and security in the area.

PRESIDENT'S PRIVILEGE TO WITHHOLD INFORMATION

Senator WILEY. Mr. Secretary, a few days ago I had a little difference with my colleagues on the committee over a question asked General Bradley. I want to read into the record at this time a little statement from a wonderful article in the Yale Law Review under title of "Government Immunity From Discovery," whitten by two very prominent lawyers. I read as follows:

> Historically the claim of Executive immunity founders upon the ruling of Chief Justice Marshall in the Burr case; harks back to a royal prerogative which found scant favor on our soil and even in the field of sovereign immunity is regarded in increasing disfavor. In a state that rests upon the consent of the governed, the claim of the government to greater privileges than accorded citizens must rest not on administrative conveniences, not on archaic notions or prerogatives alien to our institutions, but on genuine necessity. Our Nation has again and again risen above partisan strife because of general confidence in the fairness of the Government. That confidence is indispensable to continuance of our domestic institutions. It can only be impaired by governmental claims of special privilege against the citizenry.

I repeat:

> It can only be impaired by governmental claims of special privilege against the citizenry.

On page 1458 is this statement:

> It was on this state of facts that Chief Justice Marshall ruled. He said, "That the President of the United States may be subpenaed as a witness and required to produce any paper in his possession is not controverted."

Now, in the Burr case, the President was not a party. To me, at least, investigating the reasons for the recall of General MacArthur, the President is in the position voluntarily of justifying his act, and thus, to all intents and purposes, he is a party.

He apparently voluntarily submits his Secretary of State, his Chief of Staff and other advisers to establish his position before the bar of public opinion; and at the present time he has given no reason for not permitting the Chiefs of Staff and others to tell what was said in the various meetings between the 5th and 11th of April.

With this preface, I shall pursue a few questions.

Mr. Secretary, your appearance is without subpena, and voluntary on your part, is it not?

Secretary ACHESON. I am appearing here at the request of the committee.

Senator WILEY. You have been subpenaed?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND ADVISERS

Senator WILEY. If I were to ask you what was said in the conversations that took place between you and the President and others in relation to the MacArthur matter, between the 5th and 11th of April, would you claim such conversations were privileged; would you say they were confidential; or make the claim of both privileged and confidential?

Secretary ACHESON. If you were to ask me what was said, I should have to say that I could not answer that question, because I am under direct instruction of the President of the United States not to repeat what was said at these meetings at his office.

If you wish me to say what matters were taken up, what the outcome of each particular meeting was, what conclusions were reached, what action was agreed upon and taken, I shall be very glad to go into that.

If you wish me to answer questions in regard to my own attitude on the relief of General MacArthur, I shall be glad to answer those questions, though I cannot say what I said at any one of these meetings.

RIGHT OF PRESIDENT TO INSTRUCT SUBORDINATES

Senator WILEY. I want to thank you, Mr. Secretary. I think that statement you just made clarifies everything. You say you are under instructions from the President. I presume, as a lawyer, you claim the President's privilege then or that they were confidential, and of such a nature that, within certain decisions, you are not privileged to repeat the conversations; is that right?

Secretary ACHESON. I think that is what I said; yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Would you claim that what was said in those conversations would be against the public interest to disclose or against the President's interests to disclose?

Secretary ACHESON. I wouldn't say either. I would just say that the President has the right to instruct his subordinates as to what they should say or not say in regard to conversations in his presence of an official nature, and when he gives that instruction, so far as I am concerned, that instruction has to be obeyed.

Senator WILEY. Well, do you claim it is the privilege of the Government or the privilege of the President?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I am not trying to analyze the matter, Senator.

Senator WILEY. No, no; I know you are not.

Secretary ACHESON. It seems to me that the whole structure of our Government means that in carrying out its highest functions the three coordinate branches cannot interfere with one another, and require the disclosure of confidential material.

I should think that it would be very clear, indeed, for instance, that neither the executive nor the legislative branch could require the members of the Supreme Court to disclose what was said by any of them in their conferences when they decide cases.

Senator WILEY. Do you claim it constitutes a state secret, these discussions, in relation to the planning and the execution of the recall of General MacArthur?

Secretary ACHESON. I think that it—I don't know whether you would call it a state secret—it is a confidential matter that took place with the President among his advisers.

COMMITTEE PROCEEDINGS AS COMPARED TO COURT PROCEEDINGS

Senator WILEY. I wonder if you see any similarity between these proceedings and any proceedings in court?

Secretary ACHESON. I have not thought about that, sir.

Senator WILEY. Do you think the same rule should apply in Senate investigations in relation to discovery as in a trial in court?

Secretary ACHESON. I should think the same rule would apply in court in regard to the conversation about which you are asking me, and if I were examined in court on this subject I should make the same reply.

Senator WILEY. Well, now, my question was more or less a legal question, whether or not the rules of discovery, the Federal rules, which have the effect of law, would apply in an investigation by the Senate the same as they apply in civil cases in Federal court. What is your judgment on them?

Secretary ACHESON. I should think they would not apply to this situation at all.

Senator WILEY. Is not one of the issues in this investigation, was the President justified by the fact even though he had the arbitrary power to recall MacArthur?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't think I am competent to say just exactly what the issues are in this investigation.

Senator WILEY. In your opinion should the Government or the President in a case like this, when he has exposed part of his hand with the facts, be obliged to expose all?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; I think the President is the sole judge of what he should disclose in regard to confidential private discussions with his own Cabinet.

Senator WILEY. Are you acquainted with the *Cotton Valley Suppliers case* (239 U. S. 940)?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

Senator WILEY. Do you think that the law of waiver has any application in a case like this where Presidential advisers come in and are willing to tell conclusions to the committee, that the law of waiver might apply in a case like this?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

Senator WILEY. In civil actions where the Government is a party, the courts have held that rules I and 81 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedures apply to the Government. They are, as you know, rules of discovery. I think you have answered this question. Do you see any analogy between civil actions and a proceeding by the committee, joint committee of the Senate?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

Senator WILEY. Do you claim executive immunity for discovery rests on separation of power—is that what you claim?

Secretary ACHESON. It seems to me to be a basis for it.

Senator WILEY. Would not that immunize executive suits altogether?

Secretary ACHESON. Immunize what, sir?

Senator WILEY. Executive suits. Suits against any executive department.

Secretary ACHESON. I should think not.

Senator WILEY. It is undebatable, isn't it, the Congress could authorize suits against executive agencies and subpenas could be issued to compel documents and testimony, is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. I think the Congress has authorized suits against executive agencies.

MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT ON DISMISSAL

Senator WILEY. Now, Mr. Secretary, on the fifth you said yesterday that you got a telephone call from the President, and the call was the result of the Martin letter. Am I right about that?

Secretary ACHESON. I said yesterday, sir; that on the late afternoon of the fifth, the President called me on the telephone and directed me to be at his office the following morning to take part in a meeting, the subject matter of the meeting being the Martin letter, letter from General MacArthur to Congressman Martin, and what action should or should not be taken in regard to it.

Senator WILEY. You went to that meeting the following morning, did you?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Who was present?

Secretary ACHESON. The President was present, General Marshall, General Bradley, Mr. Harriman, and myself.

Senator WILEY. Was the letter in question discussed?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; the letter was discussed. The whole situation was discussed.

Senator WILEY. What do you mean by "whole situation"?

Secretary ACHESON. The various situations which had been created by this letter which situation of course was that General MacArthur had taken open difference with the President regarding a most vital matter. That situation was discussed for some time.

Then the President directed that those who were there present should meet in the afternoon and consider the matter further, and that we should meet with him again on Saturday morning. We did meet on the afternoon of Friday.

Senator WILEY. The same group?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; the same group.

Senator WILEY. Anybody else present?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; and we discussed the matter further. We then met with the President on Saturday morning. At the Saturday morning meeting it was decided that the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be asked for.

It was also decided that the matter should not be, that no conclusion on the matter should be reached by any person concerned or by the President until over the week end because it required a great deal of thought in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

We met again at the President's call on Monday morning.

At that time General Bradley gave the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The President then asked each one of us in turn for his opinion or his recommendation as to whether or not General MacArthur should be relieved, and each one of us gave his opinion and each opinion was that he should be relieved.

The President then directed that the necessary orders and papers should be prepared for his consideration and that that should be done, should be in the charge of General Marshall, the Secretary of Defense, and that the rest of us should put ourselves at General Marshall's disposal for such consultation as was necessary.

The orders were prepared. They were brought to the President on the afternoon of Tuesday, at which time they were gone over and approved by the President.

Senator WILEY. Was the opinion unanimous at first?

Secretary ACHESON. The opinions were not expressed until the afternoon—until the morning of Monday. There was discussion of the subject, but it was clearly understood that nobody was expected to or should reach any conclusion on the matter.

FIRST DISCUSSIONS ON MAC ARTHUR

Senator WILEY. Was the 5th the first time that the President had spoken to you about recalling MacArthur?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Had never spoken to you before on that subject?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't recall any discussion. I will not say that the whole matter of the President's satisfaction or lack of satisfaction with General MacArthur had not been referred to.

I had another meeting with the President in connection with the MacArthur statement of the 24th and at that time——

Senator SALTONSTALL. 24th of March?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes. At that time we laid before the President certain steps which we thought should be taken for his consideration and approval. He considered and approved those.

Now, one of those steps was to send a message to General MacArthur, which you have had before you several times.

The other step was that I asked to be given the authority to say to the ambassadors of the countries with whom we had been working on the statement that General MacArthur's statement was unexpected and unauthorized and steps had been taken to prevent a repetition.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Secretary, the time flies so that I am going to ask you some of these questions hurriedly.

EFFECT OF MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL ON JAPAN

Can you tell us what the effect of recalling MacArthur has had on the situation in the Far East, particularly in relation to Japan and the Japanese people?

Secretary ACHESON. The effect of the relief of General MacArthur in Japan was one of very considerable shock when it was announced. In order to deal with that situation the best way we thought possible, Mr. Dulles went out and had a great many conferences with the Japanese, made a speech to them, talked to the various party members, and their Parliament, and made it clear to them that the matter of the Japanese peace treaty still remained one of the most urgent and of primary importance with us, and we were going forward with it.

Fortunately, while he was there the President directed further arrangements in connection with the treaty to be negotiated with New Zealand and Australia. We were making arrangements for the Philippines. All of that helped very much to restore the view that we would not change in any way our policy.

Senator WILEY. Do you think it is restored now?

Do you think the condition is restored in Japan now?

What is the latest news on that?

Secretary ACHESON. I think that it is very largely restored. I am told that the various reports which have come out of this investigation here cause some uneasiness in Japan.

Senator WILEY. Can General Van Fleet negotiate a Korean armistice now, if an opportunity presents itself?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What was that question?

POWER OF THEATER COMMANDER TO NEGOTIATE ARMISTICE

Senator WILEY. Can Van Fleet negotiate a Korean armistice now, if opportunity presents itself?

Secretary ACHESON. If any approach was made to General Van Fleet, he would immediately report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and be instructed by the Government.

Senator WILEY. In other words, the general in the field if there was opportunity to negotiate an armistice, wouldn't have any authority until he had come back to the Chiefs of Staff; is that your idea?

Secretary ACHESON. He would be required to report to the Chiefs of Staff if any overtures were made to him.

Senator WILEY. This statement I read to you out of the paper seems to differ with what Van Fleet said recently. He said the thirty-eighth parallel means nothing to him.

Do you agree, it means nothing to the State Department, either?

Secretary ACHESON. From the military point of view, Senator, the thirty-eighth parallel has no significance. The troops have to move, and do move freely back and forth across it.

NO CHANGE OF POLICY IN RUSK SPEECH

Senator WILEY. From your remarks yesterday, I understood you to interpret the Rusk speech in New York, not as a change in policy, or hardening of policy against the Communists; it was not necessary, I understood you to say.

Do you interpret it as a turn in the direction of Chiang Kai-shek?

Secretary ACHESON. I regard it, sir, as I said yesterday, and I have said several times, as a restatement of policy which has been in existence for some time.

It is a restatement. I think there is nothing new in that speech.

Senator WILEY. Well, let's take the last part of my question. Do you think it indicates a little turn in the direction of Chiang Kai-shek and his forces?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't think it indicates anything different from what occurred before the speech was made.

POSITION OF HONG KONG

Senator WILEY. What effect would a blockade of Hong Kong have on the general situation? I see there is a considerable difference on that. I think it is only fair if you could very briefly tell us you own views.

Secretary ACHESON. Of the blockade of Hong Kong by whom?

Senator WILEY. Well, general blockade. It would have to be by all parties concerned, I presume, the allies and ourselves.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I was wondering whether you were talking about a blockade of Hong Kong by the Chinese or by the British or by us.

Senator WILEY. By the United Nations.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I can hardly imagine a blockade of a British port by Great Britain and/or by the allies. The British are a part of the United Nations effort in Korea. They are cooperating in that. I do not quite see the United Nations blockading one of the British ports.

Senator WILEY. Well, my objective, and I will not stress it, was that I have seen recently that it is claimed that maintaining the open port of Hong Kong is more in favor of the allies and ourselves than closing it, which would have been an unfavorable effect. I wondered whether you had any reaction on that or not.

Secretary ACHESON. Oh, yes; I do have a reaction to that. To have Hong Kong fall, to have to go over, fall into the hands of the Chinese Communists, would, I think, have a very adverse influence on the United Nations interests and on ours in the Far East.

It is an important point for observation and other important matters in the Far East. It is a point from which a great deal of important work can be done in China. It would be very serious to have that lost to us.

Senator WILEY. What have you to say as to the importance of the forthcoming bill for military and economic aid? This fits into this general picture.

Secretary ACHESON. I should just add, in connection with that, that Hong Kong is not a free port. Very strict controls have been imposed by the Hong Kong authorities and the trade which goes on between Hong Kong and the mainland is now under very important and very drastic controls. We hope in due course that those controls can be tightened. There are certain limits to what can be done there, because Hong Kong acquires its food and water and a great many things of that sort from the mainland, and in order to get that, a certain amount of trade has to go on.

SITUATION IN EUROPE

Senator WILEY. Mr. Secretary, where is the greater danger of the third world war breaking out—Europe or Asia, in your judgment?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't think I am able to answer that. I don't think anyone can say. In a situation which is tense one never knows where the spark may come from that might ignite the whole thing.

Senator WILEY. Are the economic prospects of Western Europe improving or vice versa?

Secretary ACHESON. I think the economic situation has been steadily improving in Western Europe; and in the last year or so, Western Europe has taken on an increased burden in regard to the rearmament program. I think that is being handled well, and I believe it can be carried on without dangerous results.

Senator WILEY. How are we getting along with the North Atlantic Treaty partners?

Secretary ACHESON. I think very well, Senator.

Senator WILEY. Is the Schuman plan going to be adopted, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary ACHESON. I hope it will be. It has been signed by the participants and will be referred to their legislatures.

Senator WILEY. Is our Government making any preparation for the blockade of the Chinese mainland?

Secretary ACHESON. The matter is under constant planning in the Government.

FORMOSA AND SEATING OF CHINESE REDS

Senator WILEY. Does our policy in the Far East now mean we will not surrender Formosa to the Reds, and will not stand for Communist China getting a seat in the UN?

Secretary ACHESON. I think I answered both of those questions yesterday, Senator.

Senator WILEY. In the affirmative?

Secretary ACHESON. We have, in regard to Formosa—the President has made our policy very clear on numerous occasions, that we are not going to allow it to be taken by force.

In regard—and, of course, it is now in the hands of the Chinese Nationalist Government, and will remain there.

In regard to the matter of seating, I think I went into that in great detail. We are bidding for 77 votes on that, and we have won 76 out of 77.

Senator WILEY. Do I understand from your answer that our policy definitely is that we will not consider any form of surrender of Formosa to the Reds, and will not stand for Communist China getting a seat in the UN?

Secretary ACHESON. I think on the first one, I have said that that is correct.

In regard to saying we will not stand for their getting a seat in the UN, I just don't understand the words you use. I have told you that we have opposed the matter, and we have opposed it successfully; that we will continue to oppose it, and that, I believe, since we have a just cause and persuasive advocates, we will continue to have the great majority of the nations with us.

Senator WILEY. Well, of course, out my way, when we say we won't stand for a thing, we understand just what that means, sir.

POSSIBLE CEASE FIRE IN KOREA

There is talk of a possible agreement with the Reds. What is the present situation?

Secretary **Acheson**. Are you talking about a cease fire in Korea?

Senator **Wiley**. Yes; any kind of agreement with the Red Chinese.

Secretary **Acheson**. I know of no such agreement being in——

Senator **Wiley**. Do you think any agreement with Red China——

Senator **Brewster**. Would he finish that answer? He said he knew of no such agreement.

Secretary **Acheson**. I would be glad to do so. I know of no such agreement being under negotiation or of any proposals having been made by the Red Chinese.

Senator **Wiley**. Just one question.

Secretary **Acheson**. There are continuous proposals made by the Good Offices Committee, and none of those have been responded to by the Chinese.

Senator **Wiley**. Do you think any agreement with Red China or the Kremlin would worth the paper on which it is written unless you had force to back it up?

Secretary **Acheson**. I should not want to rely on an agreement as an agreement. I think an agreement which recognized and ratified an existing state of facts would have some importance. I think force, as you say, is very important in bringing that about.

Chairman **Russell**. Your time has expired, Senator Wiley.

CORRECTION OF RECORD

Senator **Knowland**. Mr. Chairman, I have a procedural matter that will not take half a minute, but it is a correction in the record that I think should be made.

On page 4427, where I read from the State Department Bulletin of June 3, 1945, it shows in the second paragraph as being the bulletin of January 3, 1950. That was undoubtedly a mistake on the part of the reporter, who, perhaps, because June and January are so similar, put them that way; or I may have misspoken, but in any event——

Chairman **Russell**. Without objection, the word "January" will be changed to "June."

Senator **Knowland**. And the date changed to 1945 instead of 1950.

Chairman **Russell**. 1945.

FUTURE WITNESSSES

Senator **Wiley**. Mr. Chairman, there was also a procedural matter that I wanted to take up, and I might as well make it a matter of record.

I saw in the paper when I was home the other day that there was some talk of 100 witnesses; and I, as the ranking minority member of the Foreign Relations Committee, ought to have a copy or a list of these 100 witnesses so that you and I might get together, or some one of us get together, to see if we can sift out some of them, and so forth. It seems to me that that is a very important procedural matter to follow.

Chairman RUSSELL. It is, Senator. We discussed that at some length during your absence here, as to the order of witnesses. There have not been formal requests, I might say, for a hundred witnesses. Some of the representatives of the press spoke to me and asked me how many witnesses had been suggested, and I said, "Well, those that have been suggested one way or another would run over a hundred"; but I do not think that the ones that have been requested will run to a hundred. I speak of a request in the sense of a letter having been written. I am sure that they will not run to a hundred.

It was my purpose when we had cleared away what might be called the principal witnesses, the ones who had knowledge of a great many of the facts, whose testimony would be rather lengthy, to appoint a subcommittee composed of two Democrats and two Republicans, to go through the formal requests and make suggestions to the entire committee as to the witnesses who should be heard.

We have an agenda of witnesses now that I am quite confident will run for a week or 10 days. So we have ample time to do that.

In the Senator's absence, we arranged to call General Wedemeyer and former Secretary of Defense Johnson and Mr. Averell Harriman in that order after the Secretary of State shall have concluded his testimony.

Senator HUNT. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hunt.

CORRECTION IN RECORD ON ATTENDANCE AT HEARINGS

Senator HUNT. I have a procedural matter I should like to mention. Nationally known magazines are publishing these hearings in complete detail, giving the roll call. I have noticed on two occasions that when I was present my name was not mentioned as present.

Now, I should like to suggest that whether we are here when the committee meeting opens or whether we come in a few minutes later, that we be marked present.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hunt, that matter has also been discussed. The question was raised by Senator Saltonstall who likewise came in late and we now have instructed the staff to see that any Member who is here during any portion of the hearings of that day, will have his name appear.

We are not issuing the frontispiece of the beginning of the testimony until after the conclusion of the day. So I don't think there will be a recurrence of the incidents of which you speak.

Senator SPARKMAN. In that same connection, I wonder if in the printed hearings, which I understand are partially in galley type now, those corrections can be made. I have noted three different occasions when I was present when I was not listed as having been present, back in the earlier part of the hearings.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator, I didn't know we had had any difficulty about that during the time that General MacArthur and Secretary Marshall were here.

Senator SPARKMAN. There was one time when General MacArthur was here and I believe two times when General Marshall was here, in which I noticed I was not listed.

Chairman RUSSELL. If the Senator from Alabama will look at the galley proof—I might say I also called this to the attention of the committee and brought the galley proof into the committee hearing room one morning and told Senators it was available—if the Senator from Alabama will look into the galley proof and discover the dates on which these errors were made, I am sure the committee will grant unanimous consent that they be corrected, if it is possible.

I am sorry to advise the Senator from Alabama that General Mudge of our committee staff says that the MacArthur and Marshall testimony is now being printed as one volume. It may be too late.

Senator SPARKMAN. I don't make a great point of it.

I have one other thing, Mr. Chairman. Of course, there is no editing, I assume, but I have noted on two different occasions when a grammatical error was made in that a singular verb was used where it should have been a plural verb. One was in my own case, one was somebody else. I have forgotten who it was.

Is it edited to the extent of correcting apparent errors such as that?

Chairman RUSSELL. I understand that it is, but only as to grammatical errors. The Chair might say he hasn't read the galley proof as closely as he should. I have found several words when I did look it over I know I did not use, since they were completely out of context with anything I was thinking in the examination; but that has already gone to the printer and nothing can be done about that.

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, Senator Byrd?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Secretary, as I get it, the purpose of this inquiry is taking three general lines:

One, whether General MacArthur was properly dismissed, and how, and whether he should have been;

Second, the question of our policies in the Far East; and

Third, perhaps, the relation of those policies in the Far East to our general foreign policy, from the point of view of security all over the world.

ORIGINAL SUGGESTION FOR MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

Now, with relation to the dismissal of General MacArthur, you have testified, to Senator Wiley, of your part.

I would like to ask just one question.

The original suggestion for General MacArthur's dismissal came from the President to you; it did not, at any time, come from you to him, is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I want to be quite clear about that, Senator.

Senator WILEY. Louder, please.

Secretary ACHESON. I said I wanted to be quite clear about that, in answering Senator Saltonstall.

On the 5th of April, the President telephoned me and directed me to come to a meeting at which the situation arising out of his, General MacArthur's letter to Congressman Martin would be discussed.

When we got to the meeting and discussed the situation, it was clear that the matter of the relief, or some other action, was what we were discussing.

Now, the topic was laid before us by the President, and everyone else discussed it.

Senator SALTONSTALL. That I bring up because apparently the suggestion did not come from the JCS, or originate in any way from the JCS, and I was interested to know whether it originated from you; and I gathered from your testimony to Senator Wiley that it did not; and what you say now would confirm that point of view.

AGREEMENT ON CERTAIN MAC ARTHUR RECOMMENDATIONS

Now, as I see it, General MacArthur made either four or five points. As I see it, you agreed with General MacArthur on at least three of those points.

You agree with him on the necessity of preventing Formosa from falling into hostile hands.

Secretary ACHESON. That is the policy of the Government, with which I heartily concur.

Senator SALTONSTALL. You agree with him that the Chinese Communists should not be allowed to shoot their way into the United Nations.

Secretary ACHESON. That is our view——

Senator SALTONSTALL. That is my language, not his.

Secretary ACHESON. That has been our view, and that is the one that we have maintained 76 times.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And you agree with him that there should be an economic blockade of China, and that has now been put into effect by all United Nations countries involved?

Secretary ACHESON. By the resolution of the 18th, the United Nations has established economic controls which do not amount to a complete cessation of all trade. They go a very considerable distance, and we are very glad that they have taken that step. We will continue to extend the area of the restrictions.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now you disagree——

Senator Cain asked the 18th of what.

Secretary ACHESON. The 18th of May.

Senator SALTONSTALL. 18th of May.

Secretary ACHESON. And I should point out that, long before that action was taken many of the nations had put into effect quite stringent restrictions.

DISAGREEMENT ON NAVAL BLOCKADE AND BOMBING OF MANCHURIA

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now you disagree, do you, with General MacArthur, as I listen to your testimony, about the bombing of Manchuria?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So that the State Department as well as the military departments would feel that that was an unwise procedure for the military to take?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

[Deleted.]

Senator SALTONSTALL. And what is the position of the State Department with relation to the imposition of a naval blockade against the Chinese coast?

Secretary ACHESON. We discussed that at some length yesterday, Senator Saltonstall. Do you wish me to repeat it?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Well, if you could very briefly so as to have it right here.

Secretary ACHESON. We pointed out yesterday that a naval blockade requires the nations participating in it to go further than imposing economic restrictions. We have not been able to get the nations to impose complete economic restrictions.

Therefore it seems almost self-evident that they would not impose naval blockade. I think it is the unanimous agreement of the military authorities and ourselves that the wise and most profitable course to pursue is to strengthen the economic restrictions rather than attempt to get something which could not be done.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So that broadly speaking you agree with General MacArthur on at least three of the points he made, and you disagree probably on three of the other points that he made. That would be a fair statement, would it not?

Secretary ACHESON. Insofar as you brought out from my answers agreement, I agree; yes.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Well, have I brought out anything that you feel is incorrect in any way or have you any additions to make?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

STATE DEPARTMENT AGREEMENT WITH DEFENSE DEPARTMENT ON DIRECTIVES

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, have there been any differences between the Defense Department and the State Department with relation to proceedings in Korea?

Secretary ACHESON. I know of none.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Have there been any differences——

Secretary ACHESON. Perhaps I should not make as broad a statement as that. I know of one difference which I will state, and there may have been others, but I do not recall any others, and that had to do with the first bombing of the port of Racin, which the State Department thought was a very dangerous action and should not be taken, and it was taken. From then on out I think we have had none.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Have any directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Secretary of Defense dealing with the conduct of the war in Korea been changed before transmission to the authorities in the Far East by the State Department or by the President on the advice of the State Department that you know of?

Secretary ACHESON. We have no authority of course to change any directives and would not do that, and I do not know of any that the President has changed in any respect.

Many of the important directives have been discussed before they were written before the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Marshall, myself, and some of my assistants, and the directives have grown out of a meeting of minds between all of us.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So that you agree with the previous witnesses, General Marshall and the JCS, that there has been very substantial unanimity between the policy-making department of our Government, the State Department and the military department, with relation to Korea?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. It has been a very satisfactory relationship throughout.

EFFECT OF A POSSIBLE STALEMATE IN KOREA

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now one thing that is very difficult for me to understand as to how it is going to be worked out. You have stated to Senator Wiley this morning our policy in Korea to prevent aggression and to get peace there. Now assume that the Chinese Communists merely stayed in Korea with a very substantial force and did not take aggressive action.

[Deleted.]

Now wouldn't a stalemate, might not a stalemate result under our present policy? In other words, the Chinese Communists have enough troops to prevent us taking an aggressive action against them, but do not take an aggressive action against us. What is going to happen then? Have you thought that out?

Secretary ACHESON. We have of course given a great deal of thought to all possibilities here, and that is a possibility. I should not think that it is the most likely possibility.

If the time comes when the Chinese have thoroughly convinced themselves by the repeated failures that they cannot accomplish their purpose of driving the United Nations troops out of Korea, then it seems to me that the way is open for some sort of a settlement in Korea which can be accepted on the basis of mutually known strengths.

Senator SALTONSTALL. In other words, if that time came there might be some settlement worked out where there would be a military stalemate, that would stimulate a diplomatic settlement.

Secretary ACHESON. I should think it would; yes, sir. The word "stalemate" I think is an unpleasant word. What I am talking about I would rather characterize in a different way.

What I am talking about is the defeat of the Chinese effort, and when the Chinese know that they are defeated and have suffered as they have suffered in the last two attacks, then I think their purpose changes and, as their purpose changes, you get a possibility of a settlement.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And that purpose you assume would change when they stop coming forward as they have come forward now to be slaughtered on two different occasions?

Secretary ACHESON. I think that would be the indication of it.

NEW MILITARY OR DIPLOMATIC POLICY TOWARD KOREA

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, General Collins stated that a new course of action was being worked out with respect to Korea. He did not go into details as to what that course was.

Would it be a proper question to ask, is this course of action that is being considered a purely military one or is that being worked out on the diplomatic level, if you care to say. If you do not care to say, I would not push it.

Secretary ACHESON. I assume that he is talking about military operations.

Senator SALTONSTALL. In other words, there has been no new policy discussed with the State Department that you know of?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

EXTENT OF AGREEMENT WITH BRITAIN AND FRANCE ON KOREA

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, are there any differences of opinion with relation to Korea at the present time between our Government and the British?

Secretary ACHESON. Have there been any what?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Are there any differences of opinion at the present time—I won't go back, but at the present time are there any differences of opinion—with relation to the problems in Korea between our Government and the British or are they right along with us?

Secretary ACHESON. I think so far as the Korean operation is concerned, they are in full accord with us. If you are now speaking about the degree of economic sanctions to be imposed on China, we would wish to go further than they are prepared to go at the present time.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Is there any difference of opinion with relation to taking the Chinese Communists into the United Nations?

Secretary ACHESON. There has been as you know in the past, and that was very frankly stated in the communiqué that President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee put out. I hope that we are working closer to an understanding on that point.

Senator SALTONSTALL. You are hoping that you can shake that difference out?

Secretary ACHESON. We are continually discussing it.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now may I ask the same questions with relation to France. Are there any differences of opinion between our Government and the French Government with relation to the actions in Korea and generally in the Far East on the policy level?

Secretary ACHESON. I think, with the exception of the economic sanction where again we are prepared to go further than the French, although I think the French are prepared to go further than the British, I do not know of any.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And the French Government is generally satisfied now with what we are trying to do to help them in Indochina?

[Deleted.]

Secretary ACHESON. We are doing all that we can, and I think the French Government understands that we have made a very great, earnest effort to help them in every way possible.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now you listened and took part in the discussions, the procedural discussion in this committee yesterday with relation to the declassification of your memorandum of December 23, 1949.

DEVELOPMENT OF POLICY ON FORMOSA

Is it a fair assumption of your testimony with relation to that, that the position of the State Department has always been that Formosa should not fall into hostile hands, and that that memorandum was issued in case it might fall into hostile hands, or has the policy of the State Department gradually stiffened with relation to preventing Formosa from falling into hostile hands?

Secretary ACHESON. The position of the State Department, as I pointed out yesterday, from the time this question first arose and policy decisions were made upon it, which was in October 1948, has always been that it should not fall into hostile hands. In that it was in complete agreement with all other branches of the Government.

When you say "has it stiffened," one very important change took place in the entire policy of the Government. Up until the 25th of June 1950, the Government decided unanimously, with the unanimous recommendation of all departments, that it could not under the existing strength of our forces employ any United States Armed Forces in the defense of Formosa. On the 26th or 27th of June, that decision was changed and the Seventh Fleet was put in there.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So it has always been the policy of the State Department, at least from 1948 on, that Formosa should not be permitted to fall into hostile hands?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, with the——

Senator SALTONSTALL. With your qualification?

Secretary ACHESON. With the qualifications that I put.

STATE DEPARTMENT ROLE REJECTING NATIONALIST TROOPS

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, did the State Department have any part in making the decision that Chinese Nationalist troops should not be used in Korea?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; we recommended against it.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And would you be willing to elaborate on that very specifically?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I would.

Senator SALTONSTALL. For what reason?

Secretary ACHESON. We took that action for two reasons.

The first reason has to do with the defense of Formosa.

We are committed to see that that island does not fall into hostile hands and to use military force to bring about that result. We cannot, therefore, believe that it is wise in any way to weaken or diminish the forces on Formosa. It is not altogether an easy operation to assure that Formosa will not fall merely by the use of the fleet. It is altogether possible that despite the efforts of the fleet landings can be made. Those might have very serious results on Formosa.

To remove troops to fight in Korea would mean removing the best troops and the best armed troops, otherwise they would be no good in Korea; and we think it would be a very disadvantageous thing for the United States to do.

The second reason that we objected to it is that it raises very serious complications with other nations who are fighting in Korea and who do not recognize the Nationalist Government, and believe that that would increase the opposition to them of the Chinese Communists.

Senator SALTONSTALL. What representation now, Mr. Acheson, has the State Department in Korea, and what is its function there?

Secretary ACHESON. We have an Embassy in Korea, and its function is the regular function of a regular embassy.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And is that Embassy operating from Pusan?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

RELATIONSHIP OF FAR EAST SITUATION TO WORLD SECURITY

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now could you speak very briefly to the point, to give your opinion as to how necessary it is for us to collaborate in our policies in the Far East with the British and the French particularly, in connection with our world-wide security? In other words, how closely tied in today are the policies in the Far East with our policies in Europe with relation to the security of our own country?

Secretary ACHESON. They are very closely related to the security of our own country. The basis upon which we are building our security, in addition to the strength of our own Armed Forces, is collective security, which is based on arrangements such as the North Atlantic Treaty and the Rio Treaty.

Those are essential to us. They are the most fundamental forces in the security of the United States.

Therefore, it is of transcendent importance that in our policies in all parts of the world, where danger of war may be created, we work absolutely hand in hand with our allies.

If they get the feeling that we are exposing them to unnecessary risks or doing anything without full consideration of their interests, then this whole basic partnership on which collective security is founded is weakened and threatened.

UNITED STATES AND ALLIES' VIEWS ON RISK OF WAR IN BOMBING MANCHURIA

Senator SALTONSTALL. So the basis of your opposing bombing, we will say, of Manchuria is the fact that our allies would not go along with us and that it might create a general war throughout the world where we would not have the full collaboration of our allies; is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I should like to state it a little differently.

Senator SALTONSTALL. That is not well stated, but do you get my point?

Secretary ACHESON. I get your point and I shall be glad to state it in my way, if I may.

My reason for not believing that the bombing of Manchuria is a sound thing——

Senator SMITH. Can you talk louder? I am very much interested in this and I can't quite hear.

Secretary ACHESON. I am sorry Senator; I shall do my best.

The reasons that we are opposed to the bombing of Manchuria, in accordance with recommendations which have been made to this committee by others, is that to do so would, we believe, increase—and materially increase—the risk of general war in the Far East and general war throughout the world.

Now, that is the first basic reason. The whole effort of our policy is to prevent war and not have it occur. We think that this risk is not at all balanced by any gain from this operation.

Now, so far as our allies are concerned, they believe this just as much as we believe it, and their immediate danger is much greater than ours, because if general war broke out, they would be in a most exposed and dangerous position.

Therefore, we believe also that their views, which are our views, and which are strongly held, are most important in this matter.

I think they are quite willing, if war is forced upon all of us, despite the very best efforts of all of us to prevent it, to take all the suffering that that brings on them. But they don't want that terrible catastrophe to fall on them unnecessarily or by reason of some provocation on our part. It is for that reason that we believe this is so unwise.

UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS IN IRAN

Senator SALTONSTALL. And for the same reasons, it would be a fair statement that we are doing diplomatically, as now evidenced by President Truman's letter, trying to work out the situation in Iran and not let steps be taken there that, we believe, would lead to a general war; is that a proper statement?

Secretary ACHESON. We believe that the situation in Iran is one of the greatest possible seriousness, and might easily deteriorate into a situation out of which war could grow.

We also believe that the basic interests of both the Iranian people and the British people are really quite compatible here and can be worked out.

Senator BREWSTER. It is very difficult to hear you down here.

Secretary ACHESON. What we are trying to do is to be as helpful as we possibly can to both Governments, because we are loyal and stanch friends of both parties, and hope they can work out a solution which will reflect the interests of both people.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Acheson, I state this question, I hope, very pleasantly, and I would like to have the answer given in the same spirit.

STATEMENT ON LETTING "DUST SETTLE IN CHINA"

A comment has been made—a common statement—with relation to the policy of the State Department and China, that for a long time it was to let the dust settle. Would you care to elaborate on that, and when that policy was changed to a more aggressive policy against the Chinese Communists?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. I should be glad to comment on that; at some time in these hearings I should like to make a very extended statement on China policy.

I don't know whether this is the opportune time——

Chairman RUSSELL. Pardon me for interrupting.

You may do it any time you think it pertinent to any question asked you.

Senator BREWSTER. What did the chairman say?

Chairman RUSSELL. I said that the witness is not restrained in any answer to any questions asked, if he thinks any statement he desires to make, in answer to a question propounded to him, is pertinent.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Let me phrase it this way, rather than the way I did phrase it:

In 1945 General Marshall tried to work out some arrangement between the Chinese Communists and Nationalists. At that time we did have the feeling that we should try to get them together.

I would like to know when that feeling stopped, and I bring into that same question—when did we decide that the dust had settled and that we had to do something about it?

Secretary ACHESON. First of all, let me dispose of this "dust" business.

That phrase is a phrase which I believe I used at a private meeting with some members of the House of Representatives in 1949.

Senator BREWSTER. What was that?

Secretary ACHESON. I said that phrase, "the dust settling," I thought was a phrase which I had used at a private meeting of some Members of the House of Representatives in 1949.

Senator BREWSTER. Were there about 40 present there?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't remember how many.

It was a meeting I think we had in the Ways and Means Committee room.

As I recall, what I was trying to say, at that time, was that I could not see clearly as to what the outcome in China was going to be until, as my phrase was, "until the dust settled," that is, until the situation had become more clear.

And, it was not a policy which I was advocating, it was a phrase which I used to describe my own inability to see very far in this situation.

OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE FULL STATEMENT ON CHINA POLICY

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Chairman, if I may interject, I think it would be very helpful to all of us if the Secretary would make his full statement about the China policy, as soon as possible, because we might as well have the full statement.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you yield for that statement, Senator Saltonstall?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Yes, sir.

Secretary ACHESON. I would rather do it Monday, if I could, because I would like to get——

Chairman RUSSELL. I meant, not would Senator Saltonstall yield to the statement, but yield to Senator Kefauver.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Certainly.

Senator BREWSTER. Would it be possible to do that without taking it out of Senator Saltonstall's time?

I coincide with the——

Senator WILEY. He said he would do it Monday.

Chairman RUSSELL. I wish to make it clear, as to the Chair's position when he made that statement.

The Chair feels that a witness here has some rights, just like a member of this committee has.

Senator BREWSTER. Sure.

Chairman RUSSELL. And for that reason I have made myself rather obnoxious to some of my colleagues from time to time, by stating, "Let the witness conclude his answer," because, before the witness would conclude whatever statement he desired to make in response to a question, he would have another question asked him.

I think that the witnesses here have a right to make any statement they see fit, that is pertinent and germane and responsive to any question that is propounded to them.

Every Senator is protected; if the witness takes up too much of his time, he will be inconvenienced to the extent that he will have to sit here through another round, but he will get to ask all the questions he may desire, and I am not urging that the statement be made now, or that it be made Monday; but I did wish to tell the witness that he was entitled to make any statement he saw fit that was explanatory of any answer he desired to make to any question propounded to him, just so long as that statement is responsive to the question.

I think that that is only fair to the witness, and also helpful to the committee. I am sure that it will contribute to a more complete and accurate record of these proceedings.

It was not asking that the Secretary make any statement now, or that he make it Monday; but I was merely telling him, advising him as to his rights as a witness here before this committee.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, might I respectfully say that I am perfectly willing to wait for the answers to those questions until Monday.

I have been trying, through my questions, to bring out to be what I believe from the point of view of the State Department, were all the facts we could get on this situation.

Now, if the Secretary cares to answer it now, I would be very interested to hear it; if he cares to wait until Monday, I will be perfectly willing to wait until Monday for it.

I have one other question I would like to ask the Secretary, whether he cares to answer those two questions about General Marshall and the Communists, and getting together, and the dust settling now, because it seems to me they are pertinent to this inquiry and whether he cares to answer them now, or wait until Monday.

Secretary ACHESON. They are very pertinent to the inquiry.

I think I have answered the one about the dust settling.

I am perfectly willing, if the committee wishes me to take a cut at telling you the whole history of China policy over 5 years, I will do my best now.

If I look the papers over, over Sunday, I will have a chance of being rather more accurate than I would be at this moment.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, I would think that the Secretary, if he wants to be more accurate, and if he feels he would be more accurate Monday than he would be today, I, for one, would be perfectly willing to wait.

I have one more question I would like to ask at this time, assuming that the Secretary makes that answer on Monday.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

PRESIDENT'S POWER TO SEND TROOPS ABROAD

Senator SALTONSTALL. The President did not ask Congress for a declaration of war when we went into Korea.

I would like to ask you, so far as the State Department is concerned, why it wasn't necessary under our Constitution; and the second part of the question is—would it not have been better, had he done so?

Secretary ACHESON. Senator, we prepared, at the request of the House of Representatives, a review of the President's powers and precedents in this regard, which I have here.

I should like to furnish that as an appendix to the report.

The memorandum in question is already printed, in a pamphlet called Background Information on Korea, Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs pursuant to House Resolution 206, Eighty-first Congress, second session, House Report No. 2495.

That goes through, at some length, various precedents and powers of the President, and I think it adequately and fully explains that.

There is one part, and I must do this briefly, that I should like to draw particularly to your attention, and that is the very striking complete resemblance between the situation here, and the situation in the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900.

The difference here, of course, is that this is on a larger scale than the Boxer enterprise, but in going over this, I was struck by the statement of Secretary of State, at that time, Mr. John Hay.

You will recall that the President, during the Boxer Rebellion, sent 5,000 troops to join with British, Russian, German, French, and Japanese troops to relieve the siege of the foreign quarters in Peking, and reestablish the treaty status to which we were entitled.

This was done without express congressional authority.

In defining United States policy at that time, Secretary of State John Hay said, and I can read from this copy here, better, because I can see it better:

> * * * The purpose of the President is, as it has been heretofore, to act concurrently with the other powers; first, in opening up communication with Peking and rescuing the American officials, missionaries, and other Americans who are in danger; secondly, in affording all possible protection everywhere in China to American life and property; thirdly, in guarding and protecting all legitimate American interests; and, fourthly, in aiding to prevent a spread of the disorders to the other provinces of the Empire and a recurrence of such disasters.
>
> It is, of course, too early to forecast the means of attaining this last result, but the policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendy powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.

Now, in many respects, that is quite similar to the purposes by which President Truman acted in June of 1950, which was to preserve the guaranties of collective security, which were set up in the United Nations Charter, and which are really the basis of the security of the United States.

The legal reasons, the powers of the President as Commander in Chief, the powers under the Constitution and foreign policies are all reviewed at some length in this memorandum, and I shall not go into them and take your time now.

CONSULTATION WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS IN JUNE 1950

If you ask me whether it would have been better, all I can say is to recite the facts of the situation. I doubt whether it would have made any difference.

The facts were that action had to be taken with the utmost speed and action was taken, beginning on a Sunday and going through until the latter part of that week.

On the Tuesday of the week the President did call together a considerable group of Members of Congress, reported to them what had happened, what action he had taken, and what the situation was.

I was present at that meeting and I can't recall anybody then raising the question that what he did was wrong or should have been done differently or that it ought to be taken up in Congress. Perhaps someone did. I don't recall it at the time.

But, at any rate, it seemed to me that he was acting wisely and properly, and I did not get the feeling that there was any different view in the Congress. If there had been a lot of time here, then it might possibly have been desirable to take it to Congress.

But certainly I do not believe the President would have gone to Congress for the purpose of asking for a declaration of war against anybody, because this was an action of the United Nations to repel an aggression and was not a question of a war between the United States and some other country.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you, Mr. Acheson.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George?

Senator GEORGE. Mr. Chairman, I did not have the opportunity to hear the Secretary yesterday afternoon on account of other official business, and I will content myself with asking two questions, Mr. Secretary.

PREPARATION ON WHITE PAPER ON CHINA

First, I think it may relate to your fuller statement regarding China when you make it, but I would like to ask you who authorized the white paper, the so-called China white paper? Whose responsibility was that?

Secretary ACHESON. I recommended to the President that such a paper be prepared and made public, and the President approved my recommendation.

Senator GEORGE. It was prepared in the State Department?

Secretary ACHESON. It was prepared in the State Department, a great number of people working on it.

Senator GEORGE. I understand. But someone had to take the final authority to——

Secretary ACHESON. I think, as I recall it—and I will check my memory on this—that the chief work of getting the whole thing together was in charge of Mr. Butterworth, who was then Assistant Secretary of State in charge of far eastern matters.

When it was all put together, the final work of going over the thing and checking it and doing all of that, I put in charge of Dr. Jessup. I wanted somebody other than the people who were immediately concerned with that to go over the paper and give it its final review and check.

Senator GEORGE. But it was prepared in the State Department.

What was, if you recall, the date of its issue? Do you recall it at this time?

Secretary ACHESON. It was in 1949, I think in the fall. It was issued in the fall of 1949, I believe. I should like to say——

Senator BREWSTER. The letter of transmittal is dated July 30, 1949.

Secretary ACHESON. Is it? July 30? Well, that is correct; I thought it was later.

I would like to say this about the reason for doing that. One of the very great and perplexing questions in the conduct of foreign affairs is the conflict that goes on in your mind between the harm you will do to some foreign nation in carrying out its policy by making a lot of material public, and the great harm that happens if the people of the United States do not understand the facts of the situation. That was very clear in this particular case.

I think General Marshall was continually in the very perplexing situation of knowing that if he put out some full information it would make the course of the Nationalist Government in China much more difficult.

If he did not put it out, the American people would not understand the situation, and then if a disaster occurred, it would occur as a great shock to them, they wouldn't have known anything about this.

This was a problem. At the time this was finally put out, it seemed to me we were in the position where the American people had to know what had gone on, and I tried to have a document prepared which was as complete as possible to give the story of the preceding years.

At the time the Nationalist Government had been driven out of all of China, and I think it was at that point in Canton, which was just about to fall and which did fall not long after that. So it seemed to me that I resolved that question in favor of giving as full a picture of events as possible because it seemed that the disasters had already overtaken the Nationalist Government.

Senator GEORGE. I had no purpose to go into discussion of it now. I thought in connection with your general statement that matter would arise. Some angles of it certainly will.

ANTICIPATED FALL OF FORMOSA IN 1950

Now only one question, Mr. Secretary, and that is regarding the document over which we had the procedural controversy of yesterday. That is the policy on Formosa paper dated December 23, 1949. I assume that is approximately the correct date or is the correct date of the paper.

Secretary ACHESON. I believe that the paper was issued to most of the recipients under date of December 18 or 19 and that it was issued to Tokyo and a few other places under date of December 23.

Senator GEORGE. Obviously, Mr. Secretary, the paper speaks for itself, but my single question is this: The possibility or even probability of the actual fall of Formose to the Red Chinese was a matter of concern at the time you issued this paper?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; this was a matter which had received very considerable study.

Senator GEORGE. It had received considerable study, and it was in anticipation of the probable passing of Formosa into the hands of Red China that you thought it necessary and proper, advisable at least, to issue this statement?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes. This was not a statement issued, you understand that; it was an instruction given to people as to the line that they should take in their discussions of Formosa.

Senator GEORGE. But it came from the State Department, from the Secretary of State?

Secretary ACHESON. Oh, of course; yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON. The appraisal of the probability of the fall and the date of the fall had received very great study in the Government, and there was a complete agreement in a discussion of that, which was concluded on the 12th of October, and it was thought by all hands that it would occur in 1950.

Senator GEORGE. Had the Chiefs of Staff been consulted at that time on that question before this instruction was issued?

Secretary ACHESON. On this question of the probability and the date?

Senator GEORGE. Yes, sir.

Secretary ACHESON. The interdepartmental agreement which had been reached on that matter had been reached with the Army, Navy, Air Force, State Department, and all agencies which are concerned with this, and it was their unanimous conclusion that I am reporting to you.

Later on, at the end of December, the military branches thought that that was too pessimistic, that it would not and might not be in 1950, it might be later. Later on, I believe, they again changed back to the other view.

Senator GEORGE. But at that time, the time this policy declaration or information paper went out in December of 1949——

Secretary ACHESON. At the time it went out it was the unanimous opinion that it would occur in 1950.

Senator GEORGE. And that included the military?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Thank you, sir. I have no further questions.

ACHESON STATEMENT ON CHINA SCHEDULED FOR JUNE 4

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, may I raise a procedural motion?

Chairman RUSSELL. Procedural matter, yes, sir; or make a motion.

Senator SALTONSTALL. As it happened to come while I was questioning Secretary Acheson, I would like to make this as a motion: That when the committee meets on Monday its first order of business be a statement by Secretary Acheson concerning our policy toward China, as he has worked it out over the week end, and that that statement not be taken out of anyone's time but be given to the committee when the meeting opens on Monday so that we may all have the opportunity of understanding it before further questioning. I make that, sir, as a motion.

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, you have heard the motion of the Senator from Massachusetts. Those in favor will say "aye."

Those opposed will say "no."

The "ayes" have it, and the motion unanimously carries.

Senator Johnson?

Senator JOHNSON. Would you, if you are in a position to, give to the committee a little background on the contributions that our allies are making to containing communism in other areas of the world other than their contribution in Korea? I am thinking of the French in Indochina and so on and so forth.

EFFORTS OF OUR ALLIES IN KOREA

We have heard much about the inadequate contribution they are making to the Korean operation, and I should like to know what contribution they are actually making to the general cause in other areas.

Secretary ACHESON. First of all, if I just might say one thing about the Korean effort. I feel badly when I hear these discussions of the inadequate effort of our allies in Korea.

I think all of them are painfully aware that they are not able to do as much as they would like to do, and I think that they are trying hard to do the very best they can. I will come to their other efforts in a minute.

In view of the extraordinary gallantry of the action of their troops in Korea which is up to the very highest standards and I think is regarded by our own troops as something to be very proud of, it seems a little bit unfortunate to be talking about the inadequacy of their effort.

I think the latest example of it is the fight that the battalion of the Gloucestershire troops put on in the recent offensive which is one of the great stories in military history. A battalion of 622 men came out with 5 officers and 34 people.

Those fellows fought, there are no two ways about that, and they held up the entire advance of the Chinese in the western sector, the First Corps sector, until the rest of the troops could get themselves into position. It was very gallant. It was a superb thing.

And the French have put on their show in the same way, and the Turks, and the others have just been very fine, and I think our troops recognize that these are comrades that they are very glad to have.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF OUR ALLIES ELSEWHERE

Now so far as the effort of these countries in other areas, the effort which the British are making in Malaya and the French are making in Indochina if put together is roughly equivalent to the effort which we are making in Korea, that is the United States contribution.

Senator Johnson. On that point, pardon the interruption, Mr. Secretary. I heard a broadcast on NBC a couple of nights ago by one of the leaders of the British Government, and at that time that is what raised the question in my mind. At that time he contended, the British governmental authority speaking—I forget his name at the moment—that the French and the British together had employed in Malaya and French Indochina together approximately a half million men.

Secretary Acheson. I should think that figure is a little high, but they have employed a great many men, and also this struggle of theirs in these two places has been going on for a long time.

They have had this fight pretty much ever since the end of World War II. Then there is the struggle against this Communist force going on in other places in the Far East. The Philippine Government has a tremendous problem with the Huks.

These Huks are Communist inspired, Communist led, and probably Communist supplied by smuggling from the mainland to the island. They draw off a very considerable amount of the military power of the Philippines and put a great drain upon the Philippine Treasury and the Philippine economy, so that there is an actual physical struggle going on.

In other areas it is not a physical struggle but it is one where there is a good deal of undermining going on by Communist groups.

Now if you move out of the Far East into Europe, I think you are familiar with the problem there.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF ALLIES FIGHTING IN KOREA

Senator Johnson. Mr. Secretary, have any of our allies told you that they would be disposed to withdraw their troops from Korea if General MacArthur's recommendations were put in effect?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir.

Senator Johnson. Do you believe they would?

Secretary Acheson. I do not think that anybody would pull out and quit.

I think we all might be in such—well, I would rather not discuss the military results of this. I think it might be very serious for all of us.

Senator Johnson. Are there any negotiations now under way to persuade our allies to make a greater contribution in Korea?

Secretary Acheson. We are talking with several nations now who have not yet made a contribution, asking that they do so.

We also are having discussions with those who have made a contribution to see whether it is advisable in the over-all picture for them to send troops from other areas to Korea.

Senator Johnson. But we are not presently insisting that the allies that have troops there increase their contribution?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir; we would not insist on it. If we thought that it was a wise thing and they could do it, we would urge very strongly that they did. We are continually reviewing this with them, and I do not think there is any difference in desire on their part and our part.

It is a question of where is the wise place for these troops to be.

EFFECT OF UNILATERAL ADOPTION OF MAC ARTHUR RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator Johnson. Have the commanders of our allies fighting in Korea ever recommended, so far as you know, to the United Nations that General MacArthur's program be put into effect?

Secretary Acheson. I don't think they have made any recommendations at all to the United Nations. All their recommendations would go through the UN commander.

Senator Johnson. In your opinion, what would be the effect upon our allies in the United Nations if we should unilaterally conclude to go it alone and put in a naval blockade on the Chinese coast?

Secretary Acheson. I think it would be very bad, sir.

Senator Johnson. Would you care to elaborate on that?

Secretary Acheson. Well, what it would amount to, as I think Admiral Sherman pointed out, is that the United States then would be undertaking itself to stop ships of its allies and of all other people without any agreement at all that this was a wise course, and in fact, with the belief on their part that it was an unwise course.

I am afraid that would create very great friction indeed.

Senator Johnson. To the extent of losing our allies?

Secretary Acheson. I just can't answer that question, Senator, because I don't know the answer.

Senator Johnson. You touched on this question when Senator Saltonstall had the floor, but I want to ask it.

CHANGES IN OFFICIAL FORMOSA POLICY SINCE YALTA

Mr. Secretary, from the time of the Yalta Conference have there been any changes in this country's official attitude on Formosa, and if there have been, would you describe them?

Secretary ACHESON. We have, I think, since the Yalta conference—I don't and can't recall when we have made any pronouncements in regard to that.

I think that the President's statement that the future of Formosa was a matter which should be taken up and decided by the United Nations, may indicate that there is some change. In other words, the statement which was made at Cairo was that Formosa should be returned to the Republic of China. That now creates some problems, and the President said that the future of the island should be considered in the United Nations.

I do not know that there is any change in our attitude as to what the proper disposition of it should be.

RECOGNITION OF COMMUNIST CHINA

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Secretary, has the State Department or any significant part of the State Department, to your knowledge, favored the Communist regime in China as opposed to the Nationalists?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. Has the State Department ever advised England if it should recognize Communist China that the United States would probably follow suit later on?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; that is a complete misapprehension.

PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF MARCH ~~1950~~ 1951

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Secretary, we have been told that a planned cease-fire proposal in the Korean War broke down as a result of General MacArthur's March 24 ultimatum to the North Koreans and Chinese Communists.

Would you tell us in some detail from your viewpoint precisely what happened?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. We were working—we had been working with the Defense Department on a proposal which we both were considering that, as the head of the state, of the Government, which had been asked by the UN to be the command, the UN command, the President might make a statement laying down what he proposed as an ending of the aggression and the stopping of fighting in Korea.

That matter had been discussed by me with the President sufficiently to get his authority to go ahead with it, although no final paper had been laid before him.

The matter had reached the point where a draft of a proposed statement was made, and had been circulated to the governments who had troops with us in Korea.

The replies of most of those governments had come in, although not all of them had come in on the date in question.

Some of the governments approved the statement without any suggested changes; others suggested some editing changes in it and, as I say, I think two—perhaps more—had not replied on that date.

General MacArthur was informed, as you have been repeatedly told in this hearing, that a statement was being planned, and his views were requested as to what freedom he required as to military purposes to carry on his campaign without embarrassment during that period.

He said he had sufficient freedom, but he just did not want any restrictions put on it.

In that situation he made his statement. It seemed to all of us, and to the governments concerned, that it was quite impossible for the President to make a statement after that one had been made; in other words, the field had been occupied, a statement had been made, and if the President had made one, then everybody puts together the statement of General MacArthur, which he made, and compares it with the President's statement, and asks is this the policy or, in the case of differences, it is not, and who is speaking for the United States?

So, it was decided that that matter had to be held in abeyance. I think that is the story, Senator.

WHO CAN WE NEGOTIATE WITH IN KOREA

Senator **JOHNSON**. Mr. Secretary, with whom is the United States to negotiate in settling this conflict in Korea, that is, the North Koreans, the Chinese Communists, or the Russians, or all three?

Secretary **ACHESON**. Well, that is a perplexing question, Senator Johnson. The immediate situation is that the fight is being carried on against the United Nations forces by the Communist Chinese authorities. Therefore, if anybody is going to discuss stopping the fighting, the immediate people concerned are the UN forces, either through the Good Offices Committee or through the United States, which is the unified command or in some other way, and the Chinese.

Senator **JOHNSON**. And the North Koreans?

Secretary **ACHESON**. Probably the North Koreans would claim to have some voice in the matter.

It might be that the Soviet Government would feel that it should play a part, although, as these things have happened in the past, the generall attitude taken by the Soviet Government in regard to its satellites is that they are free and independent nations, and one must discuss questions with them.

Senator **BREWSTER**. I cannot hear you.

Secretary **ACHESON**. And that one must discuss questions with them, that is, with the satellite rather than with——

Senator **BREWSTER**. They have nothing to do with it?

Secretary **ACHESON**. That is the attitude they usually take; yes. Senator Brewster.

EXTENT OF SOVIET DOMINATION OF RED CHINA

Senator **JOHNSON**. Mr. Secretary, to what extent, in your opinion, is the Chinese Government dominated and controlled by the Soviet Union?

Secretary **ACHESON**. Well, as I said yesterday, Senator Johnson, the people who are in the position of authority in the Chinese Government are Moscow-trained Communists. This is the situation with which we are rather familiar in some of the eastern European countries.

The control—it was also true in North Korea—is exercised by having people in authority in the satellite who want to do the same thing that Moscow wants them to do, so it is somewhat difficult to say that orders are issued and orders are obeyed; suggestions are made, and those suggestions appeal at once to the person to whom they are made.

Senator JOHNSON. Then, it is your belief that they are controlled and dominated, at least to a large extent?

Secretary ACHESON. As I have described it, Senator.

Senator JOHNSON. Is it your opinion that there is any likelihood that they will break loose from that control and that domination any time in the foreseeable future?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, as I said in the past, I believe that if circumstances were such that these forces were allowed to operate, there is a basic conflict between Chinese interests and Soviet interests; and if that will develop, then there will be a fissure between them.

At the present time I see no immediate possibility of that happening.

Senator JOHNSON. But our State Department policy is based on that possibility?

Secretary ACHESON. That is one of the things we take into consideration.

CAUTION COUNSELED IN MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Secretary, earlier in these hearings, the committee was informed, at least it was intimated, that in the conversations leading to the recall of General MacArthur——

Senator SMITH. Senator, I regret I cannot hear your question.

Senator JOHNSON. Earlier in the committee hearings, the committee was informed—at least it was intimated—on several occasions that in the conversations that led to the recall of General MacArthur, you counseled a policy of caution. Would you care to elaborate on that some?

Secretary ACHESON. The President has stated that, sir, and that is correct. The issues involved seemed to me to be issues of the greatest importance.

They had to do with the whole conduct of the Government under the Constitution; they involved the power of the President, both as the President of the United States and as the Commander in Chief of our forces, and as the Chief of State of the United Nations command.

The issues involved had to do with questions of war or peace, general war or peace; they had to do in the most serious possible way with the security of our country.

They had to do with the relations between the President and the officer in the field who was the theater commander.

They involved the situation in Japan, which was one of very great importance; they involved possible reactions behind the iron curtain and in other countries; they involved the possibility of very considerable public controversy in the United States.

It was these considerations which led me to suggest that this was a matter which deserved the most careful possible thought on the part of everybody.

I don't think that was a novel suggestion on my part or one which had not already occurred to the other participants in these meetings.

It happens to be the fact, as the President said, that I expressed those ideas.

Senator **Brewster**. What was it you said?

Secretary **Acheson**. It happened to be the fact that I expressed those ideas.

ROLE IN PROCEDURE OF RELIEF OF MAC ARTHUR

Senator **Johnson**. Did you make any suggestions or contribute in any way to the procedure that was employed in notifying General MacArthur of his release?

Secretary **Acheson**. I didn't contribute to originating the procedure at all. That was entirely a matter, in my judgment, to be worked out through military channels.

When it was suggested, I was present and went over the papers which were prepared; and, as far as I was concerned, they were satisfactory, and I approved insofar as I had a right to approve—I agreed.

Senator **Johnson**. As I understand it, it was first determined Secretary Pace would notify General MacArthur. You were aware of that plan?

Secretary **Acheson**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Johnson**. Later it was stated that some newspaper had gotten hold of the plan and made inquiries, and a leak had occurred, and it was determined to take the course that was finally followed. Were you familiar with that before it was taken?

Secretary **Acheson**. I was familiar with the plan of having Secretary Pace receive the President's orders and take them personally to General MacArthur. It seemed to me that was a perfectly good way of doing this and was a courteous way of doing this, and I approved of it. The change later on I was informed about, but I was not present or involved in making a change in the earlier decision.

FOREIGN POLICY AS DETERMINED BY ARMED STRENGTH

Senator **Johnson**. I assume that the policy of the State Department is determined largely by the strength of our services and what it can do if it should be called upon to do it.

Now, this committee has been told by the representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff something about the state of our defenses now, and something about the state of those defenses in the immediate past.

General Collins says that, in order to carry out the recommendations made by General MacArthur, he would feel that he would need additional divisions.

General Vandenberg says, that in order to carry out the air part of that program, that he would feel it necessary to double the strategic air force, double the strength of the strategic air, at the present time.

The Navy seems to be reasonably well satisfied with its strength in its Reserves.

I assume that you have been aware of the increased requirements of the services in the event our course was changed?

Secretary **Acheson**. Yes, sir; that has been the subject of discussion at our various meetings.

Senator JOHNSON. Are you convinced that the course we are now following in Korea is a course that is calculated to bring us victory for our objectives with the least loss of life and the least danger of world war III?

Secretary ACHESON. I am, Senator; yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Secretary, before I go to my questions, there are just one or two little questions in light of your recent testimony that I would like to ask you.

INTELLIGENCE ON POSSIBLE FALL OF FORMOSA

You said that the Government's intelligence was that Formosa would fall during 1949——

Secretary ACHESON. I don't think I said that. I said it would fall in 1950.

Senator SMITH. Yes, 1950; that is right; and that turned out to be faulty. Now, can you give us any idea of what was the difficulty with our intelligence on that matter at that time? It is a very important point.

Secretary ACHESON. I don't think that the intelligence turned out to be false. What greatly changed the situation was that the attack on Korea occurred and the United States did interpose its own military forces to prevent the fall of Korea—Formosa, I mean. If that had not been done, I believe Formosa would have fallen.

TALKS WITH BRITISH ON RECOGNIZING RED CHINA

Senator SMITH. Now, Mr. Secretary, is it or is it not a fact that at the time this document of December 23, 1949, was sent to our different people in the Far East, negotiations or conversations, at least, were pending with the British Government with regard to the recognition of Communist China. Were we considering seriously at that time the recognition of Communist China?

Secretary ACHESON. We were not considering the recognition of Communist China. It is true that for some time we had been talking with the British Government about their attitude on the matter. We had expressed our views, and our views did not change. We were hopeful that they could find it possible to continue to recognize the Nationalist Government. They did not find that that was in accord with their best decisions of policy.

Senator SMITH. You may recall I went to the Far East about that time, in September. I had hardly gotten back before I contacted some of our State Department people. Since I was very much concerned about the possibility of the recognition of Communist China and also the fall of Formosa. I think I spoke to you on the subject at that time, expressing my views, and I was advised then that under date of November 1 the British Embassy had submitted to you their reasons why they contemplated the recognition of Communist China.

[Deleted.]

Secretary ACHESON. As I stated before, we had been in discussions with the British Government as to the attitude of the two Governments in regard to the Communist Chinese. The British thought for various reasons that there were strong considerations motivating them toward recognition.

We did not share that view and continued to point out reasons why it could not be done, why we were not going to do it, and why we hoped that the British would not do it, and that situation continued until the British let us know that, having given most careful thought to all that we had said to them, they had to take a different course.

Senator SMITH. Then you think they had no justification—I want to get this clear—they had no justification then for feeling that we would go along if they recognized Communist China?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; I don't believe those who knew about the conversation had such a feeling.

WHITE HOUSE MEETINGS WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS IN JUNE 1950

Senator SMITH. Well, now, Mr. Secretary, I recall you referred a minute ago to the meeting of the President at the White House on June 27, I think it was, at which some of us were present representing the Congress. In the first statement by the President on that date, which he read to us and which was released to the press, this language appears:

> Under these circumstances, I have ordered the United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support.

That we all understood, and I think everybody there approved heartily of that procedure.

We had the problem of getting our nationals out of Korea, and we had the problem of giving support to the South Koreans, who, in a sense, were the protégés of the United Nations. In fact, I think it is fair to say they were the protégés of the United Nations.

Now I cannot find any minutes were kept of that meeting. As I recall it, the question was raised at that meeting on June 27 as to whether or not ground forces would be needed and whether we would send ground forces. My recollection is that at that meeting of June 27 we were advised that no ground forces would be needed.

It so happens, however, that on June 30 the meeting was followed up by another meeting at the White House, I think with the same group. I know I was present. And at that meeting the statement was made:

> General MacArthur has been authorized to use certain supporting ground units.

It was explained to us briefly that there would be need for some ground units, probably to support a beachhead at Pusan in case we were forced back to that area in this first attack by the North Koreans.

Now, am I correct in my recollection of that discussion of the ground units?

Secretary ACHESON. I am sure that you are correct about the meeting of the 30th, Senator Smith. I have no recollection of discussion of that particular point in the meeting of the 27th. However, I have no recollection that it was not discussed either.

Senator SMITH. I just wanted to know your recollection. My own recollection was it was discussed and it was said in the beginning we wouldn't need them, and everybody agreed. At the meeting of June 30, the explanation was made that certain ground units would be thrown into Korea; although at that point I, at least, did not understand we were going into a big aggressive advance with those ground units.

ADVISABILITY OF CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF USE OF TROOPS FOR UN POLICE ACTION

Now, the other point that came up—I think I am right in this—was whether or not this would require a declaration of war. I recall, if my recollection is correct, that you stated, as you have stated today, that the United Nations action which was contemplated wouldn't require a formal declaration of war by the United States.

Then the question was raised whether it would not be wise to have a resolution of the Congress. I remember I thought about it. Maybe not then but certainly around that time I was in favor of action by the Congress by joint resolution or otherwise, irrespective of a declaration of war, of approval of this action by the President in the Korean enterprise.

Do you recall any discussion of that question—the question of having a joint resolution or something to back up the President? I was prepared to go along with it, and I thought it was the thing that ought to be done. I do not know whether we discussed it. It seems to me we did discuss it there, and it was going to be taken under consideration.

Secretary Acheson. I am sorry, Senator; I just haven't got any clear recollection of that. My only recollection is that there was nothing we were supposed to do when we got through with that meeting in that area.

Senator Smith. I think you made it clear it was not an ordinary case of declaration of war by the United States; it was going to be United Nations action, and I think we all approved that.

That brings up this question which I want to ask you as follow-through. Congressional approval was not sought before American troops were committed to action in Korea. We know that is true. Now, suppose the UN should decide—and I have to cite the UN again—that a police action might be necessary, say, in Iran or some other part of the world. Would you, under those conditions, recommend that the President seek congressional approval before committing American troops under such conditions?

If we did not do that, how would we know whether or not we had the support of the American people?

It raises the same question that was up in the troops-to-Europe discussion a month or so ago in regard to troops to General Eisenhower. I want to get, if I can, your judgment as to whether, irrespective of the powers of the President, it is not a wise policy for us all to consider, that where troops are to be committed under UN or the other plan, the North Atlantic plan, there should be congressional action to approve the action, or to authorize the action.

We get away from discussion of jurisdiction then, we just get the action. I have no question the action could be obtained from the Congress.

Secretary Acheson. Well, I think that there may well be situations where it would be wise to do it. I can see where there are situations where you have got to act so quickly that you cannot do it. Whether the one in Iran, which way that hypothetical case would fall, I don't know.

It might be that danger there would be so close to the danger of a world conflagration that it would be wise to do what you suggest. I find it hard to give you a clear answer.

Senator SMITH. I am agreed with you that if a case arose under article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, where there was an actual attack on one or all principals involved, the President would have to act before the Congress could take action. I think we are all agreed on that. But this is a case where it might not be quite at that point. My point is that it would be wise to get away from a lot of congressional differences and friction as we had in the troops-to-Europe question, if we just took the position, wherever it was possible to do it, that action would be taken by joint resolution or otherwise.

Secretary ACHESON. I am sure that the President would consult with the leaders in the Congress and the proper procedure would be worked out between them.

Senator SMITH. I feel if that had been done before, we would have had less difficulty about the troops-to-Europe movement.

WITNESS' CAREER IN GOVERNMENT

Just briefly, Mr. Secretary, I want to get my mind clear on what period you have been in the Government service. I have got a memorandum here. If this is correct, we will not burden the matter with questions and answers; I will just ask you if this is correct.

From May 19, 1933, to November 15, 1933, you had the post of Under Secretary of the Treasury; is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. I take it that you got the correct days of the month. The month and the year are right in both cases.

Senator SMITH. Then from February 1, 1941, that is before Pearl Harbor, to August 27, 1945, you were Assistant Secretary of State?

Secretary ACHESON. That is right, sir.

Senator SMITH. And that was the period during which the Yalta Conference was held?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; that is right.

Senator SMITH. I am mentioning that because later in our discussions with you I am going to ask some questions about Yalta, but not now.

Then from August 27, 1945, to July 1, 1947, you were Under Secretary of State, and in July 1, 1947, you resigned and returned to private practice of law?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. And since January 1949 you have been Secretary of State?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. That was the period that I think I had a number of discussions with you. We had some very friendly differences of opinion on various matters.

Secretary ACHESON. I was also employed by the Government from September 1919 to June 1921. I was employed by the Department of Justice and was assigned as law clerk to Mr. Justice Brandeis.

Senator SMITH. I am glad you added that. I had that on here, but that was prior to your association with the Treasury or the State Department?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Smith. Yes. Thank you very much.

DIFFERENCE IN MILITARY AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES IN KOREA

Now, I am not quite clear in my mind yet from the testimony, Mr. Secretary, as to our present objectives in Korea. Let me put the question this way:

Do we consider the objective of the United Nations in Korea the restoration of the preaggression status of Korea or the unification of the entire country?

Secretary Acheson. Well, I tried to make that clear yesterday, Senator. I am glad to go over it again.

Senator Smith. I think it is so important that it is well to reiterate it, because I am not quite clear yet what we are driving at there.

Secretary Acheson. What I said yesterday was that the military objectives of the United Nations forces in Korea are to repel the armed attack which took place against the Republic of Korea and to restore peace and security in the area.

That is what they are trying to do with military force.

Senator Smith. Could I ask you right there—when you say "the area," do you mean the area below the thirty-eighth parallel, which is the South Korean part of it, or the entire Korean area?

Secretary Acheson. If you are going to restore peace and security, you have got to restore it in the area. You have not restored peace and security if there are people on the other side coming over and fighting you. You have to try and stop that condition of fighting and war that is going on.

Now, the long-term political objective of the United Nations in Korea has been to establish a free, independent, and democratic Korea.

That they have been trying to do since 1948. The United States has been in favor of that result since 1945. The forces were not put into Korea to do that when they went in in June. In other words, if the North Koreans had obeyed the instructions of the Security Council of the United Nations and withdrawn to their own part of Korea and ceased their attack, then that situation would have been resolved.

POSSIBILITY OF A STABLE SETTLEMENT AT THIRTY-EIGHTH PARALLEL

Senator Smith. Well, does that suggest the possibility of a cease-fire at or near the thirty-eighth parallel?

Secretary Acheson. If you could have a real settlement, that would accomplish the military purposes in Korea. That is if the aggression would end and you had reliable assurances that it would not be resumed, then you could return to a peacetime status, and we would hope gradually to remove the troops from Korea, both Chinese troops and United Nations troops.

It would take some little time to do that because it is a very disturbed condition now, but that would be the objective.

Senator Smith. How would you prevent the same thing happening over again that happened when the North Koreans attacked the South Koreans, if we stop somewhere in the neighborhood of where we are again?

Secretary Acheson. You would have to make the best arrangements that could be made, and I think that if, as a result of this fighting in Korea, it was determined that the Chinese could not succeed in this, then the desire to start this up again probably wouldn't recur.

If it did, of course, the most serious consequences would ensue for everybody including China. Therefore, if you once get the conviction on the part of the Chinese that they cannot, they just haven't got the strength to do what they want from the military point of view, I think you have a real possibility of working out a stable situation.

Senator Smith. Whom would we deal with in working out a cease-fire with the Chinese Communists?

Secretary Acheson. We would have to deal with the Chinese Communist authorities.

Senator Smith. I suppose that would be a difficult problem since we are recognizing the Nationalists as the Government of China. You deal with the Chinese Communists as sort of a rump government that is making all this trouble as distinguished from the Nationalists that we recognize. That is a difficult question. I don't know the answer to it.

Secretary Acheson. Well, you would deal with them as the authority which is fighting your troops, and if they desire to stop fighting your trops, I don't think there is any problem about dealing with them.

Senator Smith. Do you see any distinction between a cease-fire armistice arrangement and the terms for an ultimate settlement of the Korean problem and a more definitive peace?

Secretary Acheson. Oh, yes, I very clearly see a difference. There would be various stages in this if it were possible to do it. A cease-fire is merely the technical arrangements which are made to stop the shooting.

Those were worked out and have been worked out by our Joint Chiefs of Staff and the UN people understand what they are. That merely stops the actual fighting.

What that should be a part of is the next stage, which would be the negotiation of a settlement in Korea, which would lead to a real stabilization of the problem and the removal of the troops on both sides.

CIRCUMSTANCE BEHIND THE UN CEASE-FIRE PROPOSAL OF JANUARY

Senator Smith. Can you explain what troubles a great many people, and that is the authority we apparently gave to our representatives in the Assembly 2 or 3 months ago to agree to a cease-fire proposal which included the question of the seating of the Communist Chinese in the Security Council and also the question of Formosa?

Secretary Acheson. I don't think it did include those, Senator. I think what those five principles were was that after you got this thing stopped and got the Korean business settled, then you go back to the position that you were in before, that is that the discussion of seating the Chinese Communists and of the future of Formosa would revert to the condition in which it was before these attacks, and that is in the United Nations. That is where the discussion of both points was going on.

That is where it would have to go on, and this was merely to say that, "if you people stop your defiance of the United Nations, then you will have the chance to discuss, as you had a chance before this defiance, these questions in which you are interested."

It didn't say that was part of the settlement or was a condition we accepted that any disposition had to be made of any one of those questions.

We did not accept that, but obviously if the defiance of the UN is removed and if the attack on the UN forces ceases and if the Korean business is settled, then these other questions go back where they were before the whole trouble started.

Senator SMITH. Well, does that imply that if we got a cease-fire and went into negotiations on a final settlement of the Korean problem, that we would include the discussion of all those questions? Or do we take the position that under no conditions would we consider the admission of Communist China to the United Nations or turning Formosa over to the Red Chinese?

Secretary ACHESON. We take the position that those questions are not a part of the settlement of the Korean difficulty. We cannot prevent other people from talking about them. If they do, we will state our point of view, which we have stated many times very strongly.

If, as and when the war in Korea is stopped and the defiance of the UN is stopped, then these two questions can be discussed in UN channels. We will continue to take our point of view and put it forward as persuasively and strongly as we can. Others may take other points of view, but it is a matter which can be discussed. It can't be discussed as long as you fight.

EXTENT OF ENCOURAGING ALLIES TO CONTRIBUTE

Senator SMITH. Well, of course I agree with that. Now, Mr. Secretary, as you look back to last June and July, are you satisfied that the United States did all it could to capitalize on the unity of the free world then to resist aggression in Korea? Did we do all we could to encourage free nations to give help or did we discourage small contributions in men?

I am trying to get clear in by own mind whether we gave them the full chance they should have had. We kept saying we want others to cooperate with us, but we were put in responsibility for the whole military picture, and I am just wondering whether we gave them adequate opportunity to make their contribution.

I am thinking, of course, of the Nationalists on Formosa. You and the Joint Chiefs have given a good reason why we could not use the Nationalists on Formosa, but weren't there other offers of troops that we did not incorporate in the joint defense?

Secretary ACHESON. I think that we did all that any of us could think of to encourage the contribution of troops. The Joint Chiefs have pointed out that contributions below a certain number were not regarded as practicable. You just couldn't work with units that were as small as some of them might have been.

Therefore they put some limit, I have forgotten at the moment what it was, but it was to get a unit which could be an operating unit.

Senator SMITH. Well, are we at the present time endeavoring to get more volunteers into the Korean picture?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. We are trying to get more contributions from members of the United Nations.

AUSTIN STATEMENT ON UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTION TO UN POLICE FORCE

Senator SMITH. Can I follow that up with the next question. I saw recently, that Ambassador Austin announced that we are prepared to offer our share of the United Nations over-all police force for any outbreaks all over the world.

Is that growing out of our experience in Korea, and would you feel that if we did that, we are going to be expected by the other nations to take the initiative and so to speak hold the bag for all the nations in the world in the United Nations responsibilities?

Secretary ACHESON. I do not have with me Ambassador Austin's report to the General Assembly on this matter. I can furnish it for you. It carries no such implication as you fear.

Senator SMITH. I assumed that it did not, but I was wondering how we were looking at that and whether we are taking the initiative now in building up the United Nations police force. I am very much in favor of it, let me say.

I think we can't talk in terms of disarmament until we begin to move toward some kind of United Nations set-up to maintain the peace in spite of all the disappointments in Korea.

I am wondering whether we are moving in that direction now and whether this announcement by Ambassador Austin means that the United States is taking the initiative to get the quotas from the different countries to set up a police force for this purpose.

Secretary ACHESON. The United States did take that initiative at the last meeting of the General Assembly. The resolution which I put forward is the heart of this whole matter. It was our report under that resolution that you are referring to now.

EFFECT OF KOREAN ACTION ON SOUTHEAST ASIA

Senator SMITH. What do you feel has been the effect on the free peoples in south Asia of American leadership in Korea? Do you think they are enthusiastically supporting us or looking askance at us? What is the attitude? In other words, when you say we are making more friends than enemies by this action of ours, you mean in such places as Indonesia, Thailand, and that whole area of southeast Asia.

Secretary ACHESON. At one time you said south Asia and then you said southeast Asia.

Senator SMITH. I am speaking of Indonesia, Thailand, and countries outside the immediate involvement of this controversy.

Secretary ACHESON. I think the effect in those countries has been very important and very good. In other words, if the action had not been taken in Korea, I think most disastrous consequences would have occurred in those areas.

Now that it has been taken and a firm position and a successful military position has been taken by the United Nations, I think it has had a very good effect indeed.

STRENGTHENING THE UN THROUGH THE KOREAN ACTION

Senator SMITH. Do you think our action in Korea has strengthened the United Nations or to the contrary?

Secretary Acheson. I think it has strengthened the United Nations.

Senator Smith. You probably will agree that we are faced with definance of the United Nations by Communist China and that we have to resolve that defiance if the United Nations is really going to continue to succeed at all in its international obligations.

Secretary Acheson. I am aware of that, sir.

Senator Smith. That is the reason I am trying to get clearly in my head just what we are driving at. I admit I am still a little bit confused that we are thinking possibly in terms of stopping where we began. If we stop where we began, say on the Thirty-eighth or near the line across there, and leave it where it was when the outbreak began last June, I have great difficulty in justifying the casualties, which as was brought out here, are some 141,000, counting combat and other casualties, in this operation.

Secretary Acheson. Senator, if you accomplish what you started out to do, I don't think that is synonymous with saying you stopped where you began.

We started out to do two things. One is repel the armed attack and the other is to restore peace and security in the area.

Now, if we do those two things, we have done what we started out to do, and I should think that is success.

Senator Smith. Well, that is what I wanted to get clear in my own mind.

You think that if we stopped them at the Thirty-eighth and pushed them back to where they began and if we restored peace and security in South Korea, that is all we are expected to do in order to assert the prestige of the United Nations?

Secretary Acheson. That is the military objective of the United Nations, as laid down by the United Nations itself.

There is also the political objective of the United Nations, which is creating a free, independent and democratic Korea, and the United Nations will continue to do that, and I hope it will be able to do that.

Senator Smith. But you don't suggest, do you, that by force of arms we stop the fighting at the Thirty-eighth, and the political dispute will go on, back and forth, with Russia and the Communists just as before?

That is what is confusing me.

Secretary Acheson. Well, I think that what you are referring to, Senator, are the inherent difficulties of the situation; but those difficulties existed before the United Nations acted, and we hope they may be less after it is successful in obtaining its objectives.

Chairman Russell. Senator Smith, your time has expired.

Senator Smith. Thank you, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman Russell. Senator Morse.

MESSAGES TO AND FROM MAC ARTHUR

Senator Morse. Mr. Secretary, I hold in my hand a secret exhibit in these hearings entitled "Joint Chiefs of Staff Report for Senate Committees on Korean Operations," and I ask you if you are familiar with it?

Secretary Acheson. Pretty much so, sir.

I have read through the exhibit. Many of them I was intimately familiar with when they were originally prepared.

Senator MORSE. Is it true that all communications of the State Department to General MacArthur went through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as the channel of transmission?

Secretary ACHESON. I think that is true, in regard to all official communications.

General MacArthur and I have written letters to one another, which would go through the ordinary processes, sometimes through the mails.

Senator MORSE. But the exhibit before us——

Secretary ACHESON. Then, I should add, that there are occasions when we would send a message to our State Department man who is on General MacArthur's Staff, Sebald; but I understand those go through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator MORSE. It is your understanding that the exhibit before us, which I have already identified for the record, is an exhibit, however, that contains the official messages and directives that were sent by our Government to MacArthur, in the period of June 25, 1950, to April 11, 1951?

Secretary ACHESON. That is what I understand it purports to be, yes, sir.

EFFECT OF MAC ARTHUR'S POLICY DISAGREEMENTS ON HIS DISMISSAL

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, on the basis of the documents contained in these exhibits, and whatever other communications you are familiar with that passed between General MacArthur and his Government during the period of June 25, 1950, to April 11, 1951, is it your opinion that the documents show that although General MacArthur meticulously carried out instructions and directives that were sent to him, he nevertheless, during that period of time, demonstrated an increasing resistance to the policies of his Government in respect to the Korea War?

Secretary ACHESON. In certain respects I think that is correct, sir.

Senator MORSE. Is it your opinion that his manifested opposition to various restrictions that were placed upon him as the theater commander tended, as the months passed, to create difficulties of cooperation on the part of officials in the Government here in the United States with General MacArthur, as commander in the field?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, from my point of view—I don't know about that from a military point of view.

From my point of view, I think it is the public differences which caused the problems, rather than any private differences.

I mean, it is quite within the legitimate area of a theater commander to report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff wherein he believes certain instructions are inadequate or erroneous.

Senator MORSE. Did the feeling develop, on the part of our Government officials here at home——

Secretary ACHESON. I couldn't hear the first part.

Senator Morse. Did the feeling develop, on the part of our Government officials here at home, in both State and Joint Chiefs of Staff and White House, that in developing the policy of our country in respect to the Korean war, it was always necessary to give consideration to the fact that the commander in the field, General MacArthur, had, time and again, demonstrated a desire to extend the military operations in Korea beyond the limits that had been previously laid down by Government policy?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I can only speak for myself; that, as I said a moment ago, was a problem which arose from the point of view of my participation in all these matters—it was the public difference with that aspect of the policy which caused trouble.

I should say, I think, in complete fairness, here, that General MacArthur's cooperation with the State Department, and ours with him, in connection with the Japanese treaty which was a very important item of our policy, has been complete and thorough throughout.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I didn't understand the answer.

Chairman RUSSELL. He stated that the cooperation of General MacArthur with the State Department in the very difficult matter of arranging the details of the Chinese treaty——

Secretary ACHESON. Japanese.

Chairman RUSSELL. Japanese treaty had been——

Senator BREWSTER. Completely——

Secretary ACHESON. Complete and thorough.

Senator BREWSTER. Complete and thorough.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. We have had complete cooperation from General MacArthur on that point, and I believe we have given him complete cooperation.

Senator BREWSTER. I think we have to get you mad before we will understand you.

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Angry.

Senator ACHESON. No, sir.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, do you make your comment in regard to General MacArthur's cooperation in respect to the Japanese treaty, in contrast to the relationship that developed between General MacArthur and Government officials in respect to the prosecution of the Korean war?

Secretary ACHESON. No sir. I was not trying to make any contrast. I wanted to be completely clear and fair about the matter.

Senator MORSE. But I want to find out from you as to the relationship that developed between the State Department and General MacArthur, which, I assume, formed, in part, the basis for your final concurrence in a program to remove him from command.

EXTENT OF COOPERATION AND UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND TOKYO

Would I be fair in drawing the conclusion that the relationships that developed from June 25 to April 11, as shown by the communications contained in the secret exhibit previously identified, demonstrate that the officials of our Government in the military and State Department and in the White House, came to deal with MacArthur at arms' length, as I have said in questioning other witnesses, because of a lack of that complete teamwork cooperation that is desirable if a commander in the field and officials at home are to carry out in complete cooperation a national policy.

Secretary ACHESON. I don't think that I would describe it as far as I am concerned as being at arms' length.

The point which you brought out a few moments ago, I think, is correct, that as the military operations in Korea moved north, there was increasing danger of involvement along the frontiers with the Chinese and with the Soviet Union; the policy of the Government was very clear not to have that involvement take place because of the danger of World War III, and the danger of our own relations with our partners in the North Atlantic Treaty organization and the Korean operation; I think that General MacArthur's view was different from that of the Government; he thought it was desirable and necessary to take some measures outside of Korea. I think that has been quite clear throughout his communications. He continually refers to the restrictions put on him in a way which makes it quite clear to the public and the other nations that he finds those very harassing and wishes they were not there.

Then, in connection with other matters, he tended to step in and make such negotiations as the one we were conducting on the 20th of March impossible to go through with and finally the letter to Mr. Martin, I think, made very clear that he disagreed with the whole policy.

POSSIBLE ABUSE OF THEATER COMMANDER'S DISCRETION

Senator MORSE. I am going to come to those public statements and communications in a minute, but I have one other question along the line I have been asking you: In view of the testimony you have just given, would it be fair for me to conclude that because it was felt in the State Department and by other Government officials here at home that General MacArthur was not in sympathy with the restrictions that were being placed upon him as commander to conduct a limited war in Korea, that you, as Secretary of State, became fearful that there was a constant risk that General MacArthur, in exercising his field powers as commander, might initiate some action that would involve us in a war less limited than the policies of our country desired?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes; I think that that would be fair for you to conclude. I would not wish you to think that I am in any way saying that I think General MacArthur would do something that he had been ordered not to do in a military field or not do what he had been ordered to do in a military field. That is not what I meant to imply.

It is, of course, true that a theater commander must have very considerable latitude. He cannot be directed in meticulous detail; in exercising his discretion and authority I think there was worry on my part that he would exercise it in the direction of enlarging rather than confining the conflict.

Senator MORSE. I might say, Mr. Secretary, that I did not mean to imply by my question that——

Secretary ACHESON. I am sure you did not.

Senator MORSE (continuing). Anyone thought that there was danger that General MacArthur would intentionally violate any directive that was given him. But I am seeking to find out, and your answer has given me the information, as to whether or not there was not the fear among our officials here in the United States, that because of his demonstrated lack of sympathy with some of the restrictions that were placed upon him, there was that constant danger that in exercising the legitimate discretion that any commander in the field has, there might develop an incident that would spread the war beyond the limited nature that was then Government policy.

Therefore, because of what you have said as to the feeling that you had, and which apparently was shared by other officials here at home, there was this constant risk; and that growing out of the differences in viewpoint as to what our policy should be in prosecuting the war, between the commander in the field and the officials here at home, you reached the conclusion that the President of the United States was entitled to have a commander in the field who was in sympathy with the objectives of the Korean War.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. Now——

Senator WILEY. May I ask, did I understand that you claim the testimony of the witness so far is that he testified that there was risk—you are testifying here.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I cannot hear the statement.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I am going to let my questions speak on the record for what they say, and the witness' answers speak for what he says, and then the Senator from Wisconsin, in his time, may ask whatever additional questions he cares to. I think my questions are very clear, and I think the Secretary's answers are likewise very clear.

Now, Mr. Secretary, I want to come to this statement that General MacArthur issued to the Communist military leaders.

MAC ARTHUR'S MARCH 24 STATEMENT AND PRESIDENT'S PROPOSED ANNOUNCEMENT

Am I correct in my understanding that at the very time that General MacArthur issued what has come to be referred to as this ultimatum of terms of surrender to the Chinese Communist military leaders, the President of the United States had authorized you, as Secretary of State, to carry on conversations or diplomatic negotiations with the heads of other governments in regard to their views as to the possible terms of an armistice or a settlement of the Korean War?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I think that is true.

Senator MORSE. Am I correct in my understanding that those negotiations had gone to such a point that a draft of a tentative proposal as to the terms of settlement was being circulated among the officials of other governments by you as Secretary of State?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I would not—in general the answer is "Yes" to your question. I would not want to give the impression that the proposed statement went into detailed terms but it laid down the broad basis of a settlement in Korea.

I think that the committee has before it a paraphrase of the main parts of that statement in the document to which you referred some few minutes ago.

Senator MORSE. Did that portion of General MacArthur's ultimatum to the Chinese Communist military leaders, which indicated that if they didn't surrender, extended military action would be taken against them beyond Korea, disagree with the principles that were set forth in the draft of a proposed basis for settlement of hostilities in Korea, which the President of the United States had authorized you to circulate among the heads of our Allied Governments?

Secretary ACHESON. The statement of General MacArthur contained in it what might very well be interpreted by some as being an implied threat to extend the war. There was no such expression in any way in the proposed statement of the President, nor was it the policy to make such a threat.

Senator MORSE. Is it your understanding that some of our Allied Governments made such an interpretation of General MacArthur's ultimatum—that it did contain a threat to extend the war?

Secretary ACHESON. I believe that we were asked at the very next meeting of the group of ambassadors who represent the powers with us, whether this represented the policy of our Government.

As I said earlier in my testimony, we were authorized to say to them that it was unauthorized and unexpected and steps had been taken to prevent a repetition of such statements.

NOTIFICATION, BUT NOT TEXT, OF ANNOUNCEMENT SENT TO MAC ARTHUR

Senator MORSE. Is it true that a copy of the draft setting forth the general principles being proposed by the United States Government for the settlement of hostilities in Korea was not sent to General MacArthur?

Secretary ACHESON. It is correct that it was not sent; yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. Is it true that it is your understanding that General MacArthur was definitely notified that the President of the United States had authorized negotiations for the settlement of hostilities in Korea by way of directing that a document be prepared for purposes of negotiating a settlement and that such negotiations were under way?

Secretary ACHESON. I think the message of March 20 is a clear notification to that effect.

Senator MORSE. Is it your opinion as Secretary of State that the message of March 20 to General MacArthur was ample notice to him that his Government was at work through the Secretary of State and the President of the United States on the problem of trying to negotiate an agreement with our allies for making proposals to the enemy for the settlement of hostilities in Korea?

The question is, Is it your opinion that that notice was ample notice to him that such negotiations were under way?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I think that was ample notice.

EMBARRASSMENT RESULTING FROM FAILURE TO CLEAR MARCH 24 ULTIMATUM

Senator MORSE. Is it your opinion as Secretary of State that, having received that notice, it was the clear obligation of General MacArthur to clear with his Government any proposal for surrender that he might wish to make to the Communist Chinese leaders before he issued his proposal?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I should think that was very clear.

Senator Morse. Is it your opinion that his failure to obtain a clearance before he issued his ultimatum of terms of surrender greatly embarrassed the President of the United States in his relationships with our allies?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir; I think it did.

Senator Morse. Is it your opinion, in view of the statement that General MacArthur and the other the President of the United States? we have been discussing that the impression was created that the United States was speaking with two voices on Asiatic policy—one General MacArthur and the other the Presdent of the United States?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Morse. Is it your opinion that with that impression created among our allies it became the duty of the President of the United States under our Constitution, as not only Commander in Chief but as the one charged with the responsibility of initiating foreign policy, to remove General MacArthur from command?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir; I do not think it became the President's duty to remove him on account of the statement of March 24. I think he might have reached that conclusion, but I would not say it was his duty to reach that conclusion.

Senator Morse. Are you of the opinion that the President of the United States, having been embarrassed in carrying out his duties in the field of foreign policy under the Constitution of the United States, as he was then trying to carry them out, was justified in removing General MacArthur as a result of the statement he made to the Chinese Communist leaders?

Secretary Acheson. I think he would have been justified; yes, sir.

Senator Morse. Is it your understanding that one of the reasons that caused the President of the United States to remove General MacArthur was the fact that he issued an ultimatum to the Chinese Communist leaders that went beyond the then policy of the Government of the United States and that created difficulties for the President in his negotiations with foreign countries who were allies?

Secretary Acheson. I believe the President has stated that this letter was one of the reasons which led him to his conclusion.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE MARTIN LETTER

Senator Morse. Now, Mr. Secretary, let us turn to the MacArthur letter to Representative Martin. Is it your opinion that the letter of General MacArthur to Representative Martin in spirit and content was inconsistent with the directive of December 6, 1950, which was issued by this Government to all military personnel, that they should exercise caution in public utterances, in public speeches and communications?

Secretary Acheson. I believe that it was; yes, sir.

Senator Morse. Is it your opinion that the letter to Representative Martin upon its release constituted a statement by General MacArthur that showed clearly that he was not in sympathy with, or in support of, some of the policies of his Government in respect to the prosecution of the Korean War?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir; I do.

Senator Morse. Is it your opinion that as commander in the field General MacArthur owed an obligation to the President of the United

States to refrain from making statements such as those contained in Representative Martin's letter, which showed a lack of support on his part of the military and foreign policy of this Government?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. Is it your understanding that the letter of General MacArthur to Representative Martin was one of the reasons that caused the President of the United States to reach the decision that his commander in the field had demonstrated such a lack of cooperation in respect to the foreign and military policy of the United States that it became necessary to remove him from command?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, do you see a difference between a high military official testifying before a congressional committee conducting hearings on any issue, at which hearings he is asked for his personal opinion, and a high military official volunteering, in answer to a letter sent to him by a Member of Congress, an opinion which shows him to be out of sympathy with and in conflict with the military and foreign policies of the United States?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I think there is a difference.

Senator MORSE. Is it your opinion that in the latter case, where he volunteers information showing his conflict with his Government's administration in the field of military and foreign policy to the degree that General MacArthur did in his letter to Representative Martin, such circumstances justify some disciplinary action being taken against him?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I would not want to put it on a basis of disciplinary action. I think it does justify the action which was taken, which was the relief from his command.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse, your time has expired. Gentlemen, it is now 12 minutes until 1. For the convenience of the committee and one or two Senators, who mentioned it to me, I think now we should take a recess until 2:15.

Senator WILEY. How much time has Senator Moorse got left?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse's time has expired. We will recess until 2:15. Please note the change in time—2:15 this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 12:50 p. m., the committees recessed, to reconvene at 2:15 p. m. the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Present: Senators Russell, Connally, Wiley, Smith, Hickenlooper, Sparkman, Gillette, Brewster, Saltonstall, Johnson, Morse, Knowland, and Stennis.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committees will be in order.

Senator Green?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, I would like to clear up one or two details about the events around April 5. I do not care to go into details you have already testified to, but as I understand it you testified, Mr. Secretary, that the President communicated with you on April 5 asking you to come to his office for talking to you about the MacArthur situation at that time.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

ATTENDANCE AT APRIL 5 MEETING AND BASIS FOR IT

Senator Hickenlooper. And as I have it here written down, there were present at that meeting on the 5th the President, Secretary Marshall, General Bradley, Ambassador Harriman, and yourself.

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Hickenlooper. Did you call General Bradley to alert him on this matter?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir.

Senator Hickenlooper. Did anyone in your office to your knowledge call General Bradley?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir.

Senator Hickenlooper. I am referring to the communication that General Bradley had about the matter where he could not remember the source. I am merely attempting to get it down to some limitations.

I believe you said that you had not affirmatively originated the suggestion to the President that General MacArthur be relieved of his command; is that correct?

Secretary Acheson. That is correct.

Senator Hickenlooper. Up to the time of April 5 was there any dissatisfaction or friction between the State Department and General MacAruthur or his subordinates under his jurisdiction with respect to his operation as the governor or whatever title he may have had, the administrator of the country of Japan? By friction I mean any unresolved difficulties.

Secretary Acheson. No, sir.

Senator Hickenlooper. I anticipate there might have been occasions where different views were expressed, but those situations had been completely satisfactory mutually so far as you know of up to the 5th of April?

Secretary Acheson. That is right.

Senator Hickenlooper. So far as Japan is concerned?

Secretary Acheson. That is correct.

Senator Hickenlooper. To what would you ascribe then the reason for the inclusion of yourself and Ambassador Harriman from the diplomatic or State Department end in the matter of decision on whether General MacArthur should be relieved inasmuch as apparently the irritation was completely a military matter?

I want to be careful. I am not going to insist on your giving conversations. I don't mean that. But I am asking you as to your conclusion why you should be included in a matter that was strictly a military decision, that is, that was a military decision outside the State Department or diplomatic situation.

Secretary Acheson. Of course, you are asking me to speculate about why the President called me in.

Senator Hickenlooper. Yes. I don't expect you to go into the President's mind necessarily. But then you are one of the highest Cabinet officials, and if you have any speculation that you care to give on that point, I would be glad to have it.

Secretary Acheson. I think I can give reasons why it would be sound to include the Secretary of State in his discussion.

Senator Hickenlooper. That is what I want.

Secretary Acheson. Although I do not know that is his reason.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is your view that I want.

Secretary ACHESON. That is, the reasons in the President's mind.

Senator Hickenlooper, you have referred to one of General MacArthur's positions, which is known as SCAP, which is Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that is an international position, and therefore raises an international question. Also, another one of the offices which he held was the field commander for the Unified Command under the United Nations, and therefore that would raise international questions also.

The whole bearing of whatever action might be taken in regard to General MacArthur on Japan would be something which would have a good deal to do with the work of my Department, particularly the very important work which is going forward on the Japanese Peace Treaty and various other peace arrangments in the Pacific. I think all of those would be sound reasons for including the Secretary of State in a conference of this sort.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, were any of the civilian secretaries of the Armed Forces, that is, Secretary Pace, Secretary Finletter, and Secretary Matthews—were any of those gentlemen included in these conferences that generated on the 5th of April, so far as you know? Were they in attendance at any of the conferences which you attended?

Secretary ACHESON. They were not in attendance at any conference at which I was in attendance; and that covered the one on Friday, the one on Saturday, the one on Monday, and the one on Tuesday.

EFFECT ON JAPANESE PEACE TREATY CONSIDERED

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, in the consideration of the relief of General MacArthur, I believe you testified that the matter of the effect on the Japanese people and the possibility of a Japanese peace treaty or settlement that might be mutually satisfactory was considered.

Secretary ACHESON. I think I was testifying about myself, Senator, and I said that I considered that very carefully, and this I believe I stated among the reasons the President has referred to—rather, let me put it this way: The President has referred to my statement that this matter required deep and careful thought.

One of the reasons that led me to say that was the Japanese part of it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And hasn't it been recognized for a considerable period of time that General MacArthur had succeeded in building an extraordinary amount of confidence in and cooperation with the Japanese people during his tenure of office there?

Secretary ACHESON. That is true.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And hadn't General MacArthur been very deeply involved in the delicate arrangements and negotiations looking toward the accomplishment of a Japanese peace treaty with their enemies?

Secretary ACHESON. He had, sir, insofar as the Japanese people were concerned.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON. That is, he had not had negotiation with foreign nations, but he had played a very prominent part in all our consideration and conferences in Japan and in connection with the Japanese side of it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And it was recognized that the Japanese, by and large, so far as their officialdom was concerned, had come to the conclusion that General MacArthur was genuinely working in cooperation with the United States toward getting what they believed to be as equitable and equable a treaty as could reasonably be expected; in other words, they were confident that he was working for ends which would not be unduly oppressive on them. Wasn't that generally the opinion of the Japanese people or at least the officialdom or those in public life?

Secretary ACHESON. I think it is fair to say that the Japanese believed that General MacArthur represented, as we did in the State Department, the view that we should have a treaty of reconciliation and not a punitive treaty.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

DULLES' ROLE IN PEACE TREATY AND MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

Now, Ambassador Dulles had been to Japan and had been put in general charge of arrangements in connection with the development of the Japanese treaty by our Government, which means the State Department and the President. For that purpose Ambassador Dulles had been given general over-all supervision, subject, of course, to any policy which might overrule him in the State Department or by the President?

Secretary ACHESON. Ambassador Dulles was made a personal representative of the President for the purpose of carrying on these discussions.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And he had been in Japan once or twice, perhaps, prior to that time, in connection with the peace-treaty developments, had he not?

Secretary ACHESON. I believe he had been there twice.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Twice is my recollection, but I couldn't be sure.

Mr. Secretary, when was the first time, to your knowledge, that Ambassador Dulles was notified that General MacArthur was to be relieved of all his commands and assignments in Japan and in the Far East?

Secretary ACHESON. I telephoned Ambassador Dulles around 1 o'clock, between half-past 12 and 1 o'clock on Wednesday morning, I have forgotten the exact date, but it was released on a Wednesday morning.

At 1 o'clock in the morning, at approximately that time, it may have been a few minutes before or a few minutes after, I telephoned Mr. Dulles, who had gone to bed, and asked him if he would be good enough to come over to see me, and he came over to my house and I told him what action had been taken, and asked him if he would go to Japan and take all the steps he possibly could to reassure the Japanese people that this meant we were not in any way changing our policy in regard to the treaty, and that we were going to pursue exactly the same objectives with exactly the same vigor.

Mr. Dulles said he would like to consider it, and he did consider it; and I believe it was later that day, Wednesday, of the next day, he said he would take the assignment, and he went off within 24 hours of that time.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And so, during these negotiations of the consideration of the relief or recall of General MacArthur, beginning on the 5th of April, up until the approximate time that the relief of General MacArthur had been given to the radio and the public, Ambassador Dulles had not been consulted with respect to his views or opinions as to the probable effect which is might have on the peace of mind or the attitude of the Japanese people, or the peace-treaty negotiations; is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. I have told you the exact moment when he was informed.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So far as you know.

And, I assume that if he knew nothing about it until 1 o'clock in the morning it was released, he had not been consulted about the matter prior to that.

Isn't it a practical fact, Mr. Secretary, in connection with the active development of the Japanese Peace Treaty, so far as we are concerned, that there are only two men of stature and substantial position who have had any substantial amount to do with direct contact and discussion with the Japanese people, one being General MacArthur, and the other Ambassador Dulles? That is, they have been the two persons having top assignments in connection with that activity?

Secretary ACHESON. They are the two persons who had most to do with that in Japan. Always eliminating, of course, the State Department's interest in it back home, and other negotiations.

Secretary ACHESON. The political adviser to General MacArthur, Ambassador Sebald, has had a great deal to do with it; of course he is not as well known as either Mr. Dulles or General MacArthur.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand. Excuse me. Had you finished?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand. The point I am attempting to lead up to is simply this. Now General MacArthur has been recalled and relieved, creating a matter of concern without any doubt, if we can trust any substantial portion of the reports that come out of Japan, creating concern and wonder in the minds of the Japanese people. This leaves today Ambassador Dulles as the other one alone of the two men who had physically been the top authorized officials of our Government to conduct these negotiations, isn't that correct, Ambassador Dulles of those two remained?

Secretary ACHESON. He remained, sir. General MacArthur has been recalled.

NATURE OF JAPANESE PEACE TREATY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So far as the Japanese people and a treaty of peace is concerned, would you say that it is our object to negotiate a treaty of peace with Japan in concert with our allies if possible that returns Japan to a state of a sovereign nation with as few inhibitions upon Japan's future activities as possible?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir, I should say that. We have made that very clear in our recent answer to the Russian note. I made it quite clear in a speech which I made in April, I believe. Mr. Dulles made it very clear in a speech which he made in Tokyo—on two occasions.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, how many nations are participants eligible under former or existing agreements or understandings, eligible to participate in the final settlement of a Japanese peace treaty? Is it 13 nations runs in my mind?

Secretary ACHESON. In the view of the United States, the arrangements or the discussion of a proposed treaty should take place first of all with what is called the FEC nations, that is the Far Eastern Commission nations. That started out as 12 and it may be either 13 or 14 at the present time. It is in that neighborhood.

Of course, after a treaty has taken form, there might be a great many other nations who would participate in the matter.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. At the present time in connection with peace treaties, is it our expressed policies to the Japanese or to participating nations that there be no economic restrictions on Japan, such as restrictions on their ability to build ships and their ability to go into textiles and matters of that kind?

Is it our policy to not restrict them in that field?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; we have taken a very strong position against restrictions of the sort you mentioned.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And have we communicated to the Japanese and other participating nations that we do not want to include the question of military alliances or military bases in Japan in a peace treaty?

Secretary ACHESON. I think in the outline of the treaty which has been made public, it provides that the matter of the security of Japan should be the subject of a separate treaty between the United States, Japan and, possibly, some other countries.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes; but that treaty or that statement would connote the negotiation of such a treaty by Japan as a sovereign nation, would it not, and not as a conquered nation not yet readmitted to the full sovereignty of an independent nation?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, both Mr. Dulles and I have made it very clear that this is a matter which is not thought of in any way as being imposed upon the Japanese; but in which they will have a perfectly free choice.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How do the Japanese feel about restrictions placed in a peace treaty of the kind we have been discussing, that is restrictions on their economic development or restrictions in connection with the surrender of base rights or obligations for alliances or something of that kind? How do the Japanese people feel about that?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I think that all people, whether they are Japanese or otherwise, would feel adverse to having put in treaties restrictions upon their economic activities.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON. I hope and believe that the Japanese people and Government look with favor upon security arrangements which they and the United States will work out together as equal partners, which would be mutually beneficial to the security interests of both countries and to the entire Pacific area.

ALLIES' ATTITUDE ON RESTRICTIONS IN FUTURE TREATY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes. Now, are our allies, the occupying powers in Japan—that is, those who compose the FEC—are they all agreed that we should not place economic restrictions on construction of business in Japan, the building of ships and the textile field, and other things of that kind?

Secretary ACHESON. Final agreement on those matters has not yet been worked out. We have had a great many preliminary talks and I think we have made excellent progress, and I see no difficulties in the way of working out the accord with most of the countries concerned.

Publication of the Soviet note to us and our reply to them indicates that there may be difficulty in that area.

But these are matters that are now all under discussion. In fact, Mr. Dulles is leaving today to go to London and Paris to discuss them; and I should not like to anticipate his discussions.

Senator HICHENLOOPER. Well, I don't want to anticipate his discussions at this time myself. But I would like to secure your views on this particular situation.

Suppose that we and some of our associates in SCAP, such as the British, perhaps the French—are the French in SCAP?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And the other nations that are involved there.

Secretary ACHESON. They are in the Far Eastern Commission.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Suppose we should force upon the Japanese—and we have the power to force upon the Japanese any terms that we want so far as force is concerned—suppose we forced upon the Japanese a treaty which restricted their industrial operations. I am not talking about the war industries or the making of war. But suppose we forced upon them restrictions in the extent to which they could develop a world-wide textile business if they wanted to, and matters of that kind, and compelled them to take it. It is my feeling that they would not like it; they might have to take it, but they would not like it. But if Russia, for instance, stayed out of that treaty and then came along at a later date and said to Japan, "Look. We will negotiate a peace treaty with you without any restrictions on it whatsoever, industrially or otherwise. We will permit you to develop all the industries you want. We will join with Red China and we will give you access to all of the raw materials you want." Is it not possible that the Japanese, if they had been forced to accept a peace treaty which put what they believe to be burdensome limitations on them by us and other allies, would have a great tendency to orient themselves toward Russia and Red China because of an unlimited and uninhibited peace treaty, together with the customary promises of raw materials and full cooperation in manufacturing and sales and all of those things?

Secretary ACHESON. I think, Senator, that both Mr. Dulles and I have made very clear the reasons why we think such a treaty would be most unwise, and I think it would have adverse effects. I think that is enough for me to say about the situation at the present time.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Would you care to comment on this question—I shall not insist on your answer to this question, except that I would like very much to have it—that the British thus far have been quite adamant in their demands that economic restrictions be put on Japan in any peace treaty that is developed?

Secretary ACHESON. I think I should limit myself to saying that I don't think that is a correct statement of the British position.

IMPLEMENTING OUR OBJECTIVES IN KOREA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, I have asked repeatedly witnesses, the military ones who have been on the stand here, what is our program for victory in Korea. I have been unable up till now to get any clear understanding of what our program for victory in Korea is. I understand that it is our policy to have a victory in Korea; it's our policy to have peace in Korea. I am aware of that so-called policy, which is, of course, a policy. But it is the implementation, what we expect to do to accomplish it, that bewilders me. We may hope that the Chinese will get tired of fighting and quit and then we will have an indeterminate period of unrest. Where do we go?

Now, for instance, General Ridgway is quoted today in the paper as saying we have quit chasing the Reds. Now I don't know what that means. Does it mean that we have established a line in Korea that we are not going beyond? Can you shed some light on that?

Secretary ACHESON. I have tried to, in answers to other questions which have been asked me. I think I should not try to go into what I think the military campaign is going to be because that is a matter that the military authorities are much better qualified than I am to speak on.

What I have tried to make clear was that the military purpose is to repel this armed attack; that is, to throw it back, stop it, and then to create peace and security in that area.

The program has been to confine the hostilities to Korea as the least dangerous and most effective way of coming to a situation where both the attack stops and the desire to renew it stops.

We think that if the campaign is continued in that way, we have the best chance that we have in any way we know of the Chinese being brought to the conclusion that they cannot achieve their purpose, which is to drive the United Nations forces out of Korea; that they will suffer very disastrous losses to themselves, and a great many harmful results will happen to them in the way of the losses of their trained manpower, and the absorption of the resources of China in a fight which is of no real profit to China; and that the war will then stop, and a settlement will be made, which will have accomplished the military purposes of the UN.

We hope then that it will be possible to go forward with the political purposes of the UN, and achieve those through discussion and agreement.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Kefauver?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland?

DATES OF OFFICE IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Secretary, did I understand from your prior testimony that you first came into the State Department on or about February 1, 1941; is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. It was on that day, I think.

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes, and you continued as Assistant Secretary of State and Under Secretary of State down to about July 1, 1947, when you were Under Secretary, to return to your law firm?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

Senator KNOWLAND. You had a continuous service during those intervening years and then on January 21 up to the present time you have been Secretary of State of the United States.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. That would have placed you in the State Department during perhaps some of the most important years in our history, certainly in our recent years including the World War II period, the period of the World War II conferences leading up to the final peace settlements, would it not?

In other words, you held a responsible position in the State Department at the time of the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam Conferences?

Secretary ACHESON. I was in the Department during those periods.

Senator KNOWLAND. My question was whether you had held a responsible position, and I assume being Assistant Secretary of State is a responsible position in the State Department, is it not?

Secretary ACHESON. I always regarded it that way, Senator.

NATURE OF CONTINGENCY GUIDANCE PAPER

Senator KNOWLAND. If I understand you correctly, in discussing special guidance paper No. 28 dated December 23, 1949, it was to prepare world opinion that the loss of Formosa was not really a serious blow.

At the same time, if I understand you correctly, you do maintain that Formosa is and was of strategic importance and should not be allowed to fall into unfriendly hands; is that a fair résumé of your testimony in that regard?

Secretary ACHESON. With a qualification on the latter, the very last thing you said, where you said it should not be allowed to fall into hostile hands.

The desire was that it should not fall, but until the 25th of June 1950 the Government had decided that it could not employ the Armed Forces of the United States to prevent that from happening, and that makes a very grave qualification.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Secretary, how do the people out in the field, these 458 who received this so-called public relations memo know when the State Department is giving them policy or propaganda? In short, if this paper is for propaganda purposes only, where are the policy papers which back up the statement that they were fully acquainted with the fact that you considered even on December 23, 1949, that Formosa was strategically important to this country?

Secretary ACHESON. Now, you have asked me two questions there at the same time, and it is a little difficult to answer them both.

The people in the field are told by the heading here that this is what is known as a contingency guidance paper. That is, it is to deal with a contingency. It is quite clear to them that the contingency is not one desired, but a contingency that may occur, and where you may have to deal with it.

You asked me where the papers are which indicated the attitude of the State Department. Those are not sent out to these people in the field. Those are papers in the Department itself.

STATEMENTS FROM THE WEDEMEYER REPORT

Senator Knowland. Mr. Secretary, General Wedemeyer was sent out at a time when I think you were not in the Department to make a report on China and Korea. That was in 1947. You are familiar with the Wedemeyer report, are you?

Secretary Acheson. I have read it; yes, sir. I don't carry it all in my mind now.

Senator Knowland. Are you familiar with this part of the Wedemeyer report, reading as follows:

> Unlike other powers, since VJ-day China has never been free to devote full attention to internal problems that were greatly confounded by 8 years of war. The current civil war has imposed an overwhelming financial and economic burden at a time when resources and energies have been dissipated and when in any event they would have been strained to the utmost to meet the problems of recovery. The National Government has consistently since 1927 opposed communism. Today the same political leaders and the same civil and military officials are determined to prevent their country from becoming a Communist-dominated state or Soviet satellite. Although the Japanese offered increasingly favorable surrender terms during the course of the war, China elected to remain steadfast with her allies. If China had accepted surrender terms approximately a million Japanese would have been released for employment against American forces in the Pacific.

Are you familiar with that part of his report?

Secretary Acheson. I don't remember it, sir.

I listened to you read it.

Senator Knowland. Do you agree that had the Government of the Republic of China negotiated a side deal with the Japanese during World War II, it would have freed approximately a million of their troops to be used against the Allies elsewhere?

Secretary Acheson. I agree that it would have been most disadvantageous. Whether it would have released those troops or not, I am not in position to say.

Senator Knowland. The paragraph I read to you was from page 768 of the so-called China white paper, which gave the Wedemeyer report on China, although the report on Korea was not released until quite recently.

Reading from page 773 of the China white paper, also from the Wedemeyer report, is this:

> A China dominated by Chinese Communists would be inimical to the interests of the United States, in view of their openly expressed hostility and active opposition to those principles which the United States regards as vital to the peace of the world.

Were you familiar with that part of General Wedemeyer's statement?

Secretary Acheson. I have listened to you read it, sir; yes.

Senator Knowland. He ends up his report on China with certain specific—what I assume he believed to be—constructive recommendations.

I read, on page 774:

> That China inform the United Nations promptly of her request to the United States for increased material and advisory assistance.
>
> That China make effective use of her own resources in a program for economic reconstruction and initiate sound fiscal policies leading to reduction of budgetary deficits.
>
> That China give continuing evidence that the urgently required political and military reforms are being implemented.
>
> That China accept American advisers as responsible representatives of the United States Government in specified military and economic fields to assist China in utilizing United States aid in the manner for which it is intended.

That report, Mr. Secretary, was made in September of 1947. The report was not approved by the State Department, was it?

Secretary Acheson. The report was made to the President.

Senator Knowland. It was made to the President.

Secretary Acheson. I think General Marshall has testified that he did not agree with certain recommendations in it; and I think that he had particular reference to the recommendation that they should request a trusteeship for Manchuria.

Senator Knowland. You were back in the State Department, you testified this morning, at the time the China white paper was issued, were you not?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

SUFFICIENCY OF PAST AID TO NATIONALISTS

Senator Knowland. Calling your attention to Roman numeral XVI, page Roman numeral XVI, in the letter of transmittal from yourself to the President of the United States, I would like to read that paragraph to you:

> It must be admitted frankly that the American policy of assisting the Chinese people in resisting domination by any foreign power or powers is now confronted with the gravest difficulties. The heart of China is in Communist hands. The Communist leaders have foresworn their Chinese heritage and have publicly announced their subservience to a foreign power, Russia, which during the last 50 years, under czars and Communists alike, has been most assiduous in its efforts to extend its control in the Far East. In the recent past, attempts at foreign domination have appeared quite clearly to the Chinese people as external aggression and as such have been bitterly and in the long run successfully resisted. Our aid and encouragement have helped them to resist. In this case, however, the foreign domination has been masked behind the façade of a vast crusading movement which apparently has seemed to many Chinese to be wholly indigenous and national.
>
> Under these circumstances our aid has been unavailing. The unfortunate, but inescapable fact is, that the ominous result of a civil war in China was beyond the control of the Government of the United States. Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities would have changed that result. Nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to it. It was the product of internal Chinese forces, forces which this country tried to influence but could not. A decision was arrived at within China, if only a decision by default.

Do you remember that part of your letter of transmittal?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir, Senator.

Senator Knowland. Do you not feel, Mr. Secretary, that that is more of a defeatist approach to the problem of China than this Government took on the situation in Greece, as an example, where the country was confronted with civil war, and where all the officials in the Government, at least have not been beyond criticism in either their administrative capacity or perhaps other reasons, as in the case of China, and yet they were not washed out or washed off at that time, were they, in the Turkish program?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't think that it is more defeatist an attitude than was taken in the other case. The circumstances were entirely different, and I think this is an accurate statement of the situation.

Senator KNOWLAND. You believe there was nothing that the country could have done that could have possibly changed the result?

Secretary ACHESON. I think what we said there was, "within the reasonable limits of its capabilities." I think with that qualification what was said in this letter is correct.

Senator KNOWLAND. I see. You feel that nothing we could have done within the reasonable limits of our capabilities could have possibly changed the result in China?

Secretary ACHESON. That is what I believe, and I think we did do a very great deal within the reasonable limits of our capabilities.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, let us turn to the policy memo of December 23, which I think quite adequately reflects the policy of the Department, as ennunciated in the white paper; and let us go over a few of the paragraphs.

On the background information, it states:

> DEGREE OF STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF FORMOSA
>
> Comment on Formosa is on the increase as the Communist advances on the Chinese mainland leave the island as the last substantial part of China under Nationalist control.

I think that is substantially a statement of fact; that that was the last substantial part of China under Nationalist control as of that date.

Then, turning to subparagraph 3, you state;

> Groups in the United States who are inclined to be critical of the United States for failure to act to prevent loss of the island to the Communists, largely because of a mistaken popular conception of its strategic importance to United States defense in the Pacific.

Now, Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask you specifically at what time and by whom was the Department of State ever advised that the island was not of a strategic importance to the United States?

Secretary ACHESON. May I, first of all, say that this is a policy information paper; this is not a statement of the United States policy toward the Far East.

Senator KNOWLAND. You were advising 552 official American representatives abroad.

Secretary ACHESON. I just wanted to correct the title.

Senator KNOWLAND. I see.

Secretary ACHESON. You did not state it in just that way.

In answer to your question, the State Department was not advised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or by anyone that Formosa was of no strategic importance to the United States. That I do not think is what this paragraph says.

I think this paragraph talks about mistaken conceptions of its strategic importance to the United States in defense of the Pacific.

There had been a great deal of talk, both before and after this paper was issued, that the loss of Formosa would be catastrophic to the defense of the United States; indeed, there have been statements to the effect that if it were lost, the defense of the United States would be thrown back to our western coast. That, I think, is not a view which has been held within the Government.

Senator KNOWLAND. The Supreme Commander in the Far East, General MacArthur, felt rather strongly on that subject; did he not?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. When I said "within the Government," I meant within the Washington branches of the Government.

Senator KNOWLAND. You are familiar with the fact, are you not, Mr. Secretary, from reading the testimony before this committee, that Secretary Marshall, General Bradley, General Collins, General Vandenberg, and Admiral Sherman have all stated that the island was of strategic importance and that it should not be allowed to fall into unfriendly hands?

Secretary ACHESON. I never had the slightest doubt about the fact that it was of strategic importance and that our Chiefs of Staff thought so, and that means should be taken, if they could be taken short of employing our forces, to prevent it from falling into hostile hands.

That restriction as to the use of our forces was changed as of June 25, 1950.

Senator KNOWLAND. Calling your attention, Mr. Secretary, to page 4397 of the record of yesterday, June 1, let me read you the following:

> Without evidencing undue preoccupation with the subject, emphasize as appropriate any of the following main points:

And then point No. 2:

> Formosa has no special military significance.

From whom in the Military Establishment did the State Department get any advice, and the dates, if any, advising them that Formosa had no special military significance?

Secretary ACHESON. No one has advised the State Department that Formosa has no military significance. As I said yesterday and today, Senator, this is a directive as to the line to be taken in the event that Formosa falls, in order to minimize the damage to us.

If it falls, therefore it is not in the hands of people friendly to the United States; this indicates that they should minimize that damage by saying that it has no special military significance.

As I said yesterday, this is a common attitude in dealing with things which are disadvantageous to us.

MILITARY AID TO FORMOSA BEFORE KOREAN CONFLICT

Senator KNOWLAND. I call your attention to page 4398 of yesterday's record, paragraph 4:

> In areas of insistent demand for United States action, particularly in the United States itself—

I might say parenthetically I assume this was to build up public opinion in this country—

> we should occasionally make clear that seeking United States bases on Formosa, sending in troops—

and, so far as I know, General MacArthur has never advocated doing either one of these two—

> supplying arms, dispatching naval units, or taking any similar action would (*a*) accomplish no material good for China or its Nationalist regime.

Now, in the light of the first statement I read this afternoon that this was the last substantial part under Nationalist control, how do you square that with the fact that if they were furnished some arms, or if, as we ultimately did, we dispatched naval units in the form of the Seventh Fleet, that would accomplish no material good for China or its Nationalist regime?

Secretary ACHESON. Now, may I say, Senator, that in reading from the record you are still reading from the information paper?

IMPORTANCE OF THE INFORMATION PAPER OF DECEMBER 23, 1950

Senator KNOWLAND. I am reading from the information paper, but I believe that the information paper clearly fits in with the attitude expressed by the Department in the China white paper, which was prior to this document, and clearly fits in with the statement of the President of the United States on January 5, 1950, in which it was publicly announced then as a matter of the same policy which underlines this document—No. 28, I have been reading from—in which the President says:

> Similarly the United States Government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa.

I am merely trying to point out that I believe that, far from being a mere guidance paper in the event that certain things should happen, by the attitude which the Department took in its China white paper on or about August 1 of that same year, and by the ultimate statement of the President on January 5 of the following year, this paper clearly enunciated the policy which we were following in regard to Formosa.

MINIMIZING POSSIBLE LOSS OF FORMOSA

Secretary ACHESON. The object of my observation was to make it clear in the record that you are reading from the information paper. Now, you argue that the information paper in some respects does state policies agreed upon within the Government.

If you ask me, as I think you started out by asking me, why this paper says that in areas of insistent demand for United States action, particularly in the United States itself, we should occasionally make clear that seeking United States bases on Formosa, sending in troops, supplying arms, dispatching naval units, or taking any similar action would accomplish no material good for China or its Nationalist regime—why is that said? That again is part of this information paper which tells people how to deal with minimizing the damage from a possible fall of Formosa.

Since we were precluded by the decisions of our own Government from sending in any troops or dispatching naval units, the line that is recommended here, which people are told to take, is that that would not accomplish any good, since you could not do it under the decision, and since the whole paper is based on the assumption that you are minimizing the effects of the fall of Formosa, you say that since you couldn't do it, it wouldn't have done any good to do it anyway.

NATURE OF THE INFORMATION PAPER

Senator Knowland. Calling your attention to page 4396, now, you have assumed full responsibility for this paper. I just can't frankly believe that you feel that the manner in which this paper is worded has no significance, except as a direction of propaganda effort, because if you read at the bottom on paragraph B, it says this—this is the State Department speaking to 450 of its representatives abroad, and I quote:

> All material should be used best—to do what?
> to counter the false impressions that—

Now, you are not certainly trying to kid your own representatives abroad, and what are these things which the State Department says to 450 representatives abroad are false impressions?

> 1. Formosa's retention would save the Chinese Government.

Well, surely, the paper itself having said that Formosa was practically the last area possessed by the Chinese Republic, its loss and the loss of the 500,000 non-Communist troops on the island would certainly be damaging to the cause of the Republic of China, and yet in this document you say that that is a false impression.

Now, I can see how in a policy statement you might indicate to try and discount the loss of the island, but it wouldn't be a false statement.

Further on you say also as a false statement:

> Its loss would seriously damage the interests of either the United States or other countries opposing communism.

It has been testified to here by Admiral Sherman and others, even though he didn't quite agree eye to eye that it would be as damaging as General MacArthur believed—General MacArthur's testimony, as I recall, was it might force our defenses back on the Pacific Coast States of Oregon, Washington, and California—Admiral Sherman didn't go that far, but he did maintain that it would seriously damage the sea and air communications between the Philippines and Japan.

Now, you yourself have testified and in your speech on January 12, 1950, before the National Press Club drew our line of defense and included both Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines.

Admiral Sherman has testified that the loss of Formosa would seriously damage our communications, even in that part of the area. So on what basis do you say that it would be a false impression that its loss would seriously damage the interests of either the United States or of other countries opposing communism?

INTENT OF THE POLICY INFORMATION PAPER

Secretary Acheson. Again, Senator, I must point out, as I have over and over again, that this paper is a direction to people making broadcasts how they should deal with these problems in the event that Formosa falls.

They were to minimize the effect of it and the paper, therefore, says that you should counter certain impressions, because if those impressions stay in people's minds, then the consequences of the fall are maximized rather than minimized.

So it tells them what are the impressions to counter. That is the attitude which was to be taken in the event of a fall or imminent fall.

Senator KNOWLAND. But, Mr. Secretary, they were not false impressions, because subsequent to that time, by putting the Seventh Fleet in the Formosa Channel you yourself have testified that, in your judgment, that is what prevented Formosa from falling. So it certainly was not a false impression that the use of naval forces could not help sustain the Government of the Republic of China.

Secretary ACHESON. There is nothing in here which says that it would be a false impression to believe that the use of the fleet would not save Formosa. That isn't in this paragraph that you are reading at all. You are reading paragraph B and the whole part of paragraph B, where the words "false impressions" are used relates to four points, and I was saying what this paper says is that you must try to counter those impressions. If you do counter them, then the damage done by the fall of Formosa is minimized.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO FORMOSA

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Secretary, you were not, were you, in favor of giving arms and assistance to the Republic of China at the time this paper was drafted?

Secretary ACHESON. At the time this paper was drafted we were giving arms to the Republic of China on Formosa. We were giving it out of the $125 million appropriation.

On the 27th of December, which is after this paper went out, the proposition was made that we should give more help than that, and send a mission. I was not in favor of that proposal, because it seemed to me that by the very hypothesis of the proposal, it was a useless one and could not accomplish what was desired.

The only thing I thought it would accomplish would be to involve the prestige of the United States in an event which everybody had agreed seemed to be impossible to prevent.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired. Senator McMahon.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Lodge.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Fulbright.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Tobey.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Sparkman.

INSTANCES WHEN RED CHINA WAS KEPT OUT OF UN AGENCIES

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, this morning you testified, if I recall correctly, that the matter of seating Communist China in the United Nations or one of its specialized agencies or associated bodies had been tried 77 times; is that right?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. And the United States had led the fight each time in opposition to it?

Secretary **Acheson**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Sparkman**. And had succeeded 76 times?

Secretary **Acheson**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Sparkman**. And even the one time that had gone against us had been reversed at the very next meeting; is that right?

Secretary **Acheson**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Sparkman**. Mr. Secretary, I wonder would it be very much trouble to compile those instances and have them added in the appendix?

Secretary **Acheson**. I have them compiled and will furnish them immediately, right now.

Senator **Sparkman**. Mr. Chairman, I would like for that to be made an exhibit, if we may.

Chairman **Russell**. The compilation referred to by Senator Sparkman to the Secretary of State will be printed in the appendix of the record.

(The document above referred to will be found in the appendix of this record.)

Senator **Sparkman**. Mr. Secretary, I suppose it is not broken down by showing the votes of the individual countries, is it?

Secretary **Acheson**. No, sir; it is not. Just the number of votes.

Senator **Sparkman**. The result each time?

Secretary **Acheson**. The result each time and where the United States voted each time.

Chairman **Connally**. And the question each time.

Secretary **Acheson**. And the question each time; yes, sir.

Senator **Wiley**. Is the vote ruled by majority vote?

Secretary **Acheson**. In all instances except the Security Council it is by majority vote. Sometimes the majority requires two-thirds, sometimes a simple majority.

Senator **Sparkman**. Mr. Secretary, one other thing I want to see if I can get straight now. You testified about it this morning.

FORMOSA POLICY, OCTOBER 1948 TO JUNE 1950

I am not asking you to repeat, but I want to be certain that I understood correctly. Back in 1948 I think it was you said that the military department, our Defense Department or our departments at that time I suppose it was, our military forces anyhow, informed you that with our weakened military strength we could not use our forces to defend Formosa.

Secretary **Acheson**. May I just get straight that I was not in the Government in 1948, Senator Sparkman?

Senator **Sparkman**. You made the statement as I understood it that from 1948 until June 25, 1950——

Secretary **Acheson**. That is correct.

Senator **Sparkman**. The policy had been so-and-so.

Secretary **Acheson**. That is correct, and all I want to point out is that this had been the policy under my predecessor and under me.

Senator **Sparkman**. Was your predecessor General Marshall?

Secretary **Acheson**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Sparkman**. All right.

Secretary **Acheson**. Therefore from the time of October 1948 until June 25, 1950, it was the unanimously agreed upon policy of all the departments of the Government approved by the President that we could not and should not use our forces for the defense of Formosa.

Senator SPARKMAN. And that remained true until June 25, 1950?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

STATE DEPARTMENT CAREER OF WITNESS

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, Mr. Secretary, when did you come into the State Department first?

Secretary ACHESON. I came in on the 1st of February 1941.

Senator SPARKMAN. Who was then Secretary of State?

Secretary ACHESON. Cordell Hull.

Senator SPARKMAN. And then how long did you remain?

Secretary ACHESON. I remained there, changing my office duties——

Senator SPARKMAN. I wonder, if you haven't already done that, if you might detail that for us. If that is already in the record, I do not ask you to repeat it.

Senator BREWSTER. It is in the record.

Senator SPARKMAN. Go ahead.

Secretary ACHESON. The specific duties that I had are not in the record, but the fact is that I was Assistant Secretary from February 1941 to sometime in August 1945, and then became Under Secretary. I had various different duties as Assistant Secretary, but perhaps that isn't important.

Senator SPARKMAN. And then you remained Under Secretary from sometime in 1947 until what time?

Secretary ACHESON. From sometime in 1945, August 1945, I was made Under Secretary, and I resigned effective the last day of June 1947.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now was Mr. Hull still Secretary when you became Under Secretary?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir. Mr. Hull retired as Secretary in 1944 and Mr. Stettinius became Secretary. He retired in 1945 and Mr. Byrnes became Secretary. He retired in January 1947 and General Marshall became Secretary.

Senator SPARKMAN. And then you left the Department in 1947 and then went back in 1949?

Secretary ACHESON. The 21st of January 1949 I went back as Secretary.

Senator SPARKMAN. And you went back as Secretary?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. And you have been there continuously since that time. But it was a military decision with reference to our inability to defend Formosa?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; that was the view and recommendation of the Military Establishment. The policy was unanimously concurred in by all the departments having concern with this matter.

Senator SPARKMAN. Were you in the State Department when our forces were withdrawn from Korea?

WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED STATES FORCES FROM KOREA

Secretary ACHESON. I think I was. I think they were withdrawn in June 1949, but may I look that up? Yes, sir; the withdrawal of

United States forces was begun on September 15, 1948. At that time I was not in the State Department.

In November 1948 the withdrawal was halted at the request of the State Department, and a regimental combat team of 7,500 men was retained. The withdrawal of the regimental combat team was begun in the spring of 1949 and completed June 29, 1949.

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you know whether or not the withdrawal of our forces from Korea was a military decision?

Secretary ACHESON. It was both, sir. The withdrawal was undertaken as a result of decisions of the United Nations, and the recommendation that both the Russian forces in the north and our forces in the south should be withdrawn.

The Russians withdrew theirs, or said they withdrew theirs, somewhat before we did. I think theirs were said to be withdrawn at the end of 1948.

It was our view that the South Koreans were not at that time in a sufficient state of preparation to really maintain internal order and, therefore, working with the South Korean Government, we kept a group of troops, a regimental combat team, there until June 29, 1949.

Senator SPARKMAN. In the meantime had the United Nations Commission on Korea been sent over——

Secretary ACHESON. To finish my answer on that, Senator——

Senator SPARKMAN. I am sorry.

Secretary ACHESON. This was the State Department aspect of it; and this matter was not only concurred in, but recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who thought that the troops were badly needed elsewhere.

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you remember the circumstances under which the marines were withdrawn from China?

Secretary ACHESON. I think I can find out; I have not got it in mind.

Senator SPARKMAN. If you will cover that Monday in your statement—I do not ask you to look it up now.

Secretary ACHESON. I can probably find it in just a moment.

Senator SPARKMAN. All right.

Secretary ACHESON. I cannot lay my hands on it right now. I will try to cover that Monday.

Senator SPARKMAN. We will return to it later.

PRESS CLUB SPEECH ON DEFENSE LINE IN PACIFIC AND RESPONSIBILITIES BEYOND IT

Mr. Secretary, there was some discussion this morning and also this afternoon of your speech before the National Press Club. I have a copy of it here and I think I should like to read two or three paragraphs at this time and ask you just what your meaning was. I quote:

> What is the situation in regard to the military security of the Pacific area and what is our policy in regard to it?
>
> In the first place, the defeat and the disarmament of Japan has placed upon the United States the necessity of assuming the military defense of Japan so long as that is required, both in the interest of our security and in the interests of the security of the entire Pacific area and in all honor in the interest of Japanese security. We have American and there are Australian troops in Japan. I am not in a position to speak for the Australians but I can assure you that there is no intention of any sort of abandoning or weakening the defenses of

Japan and that whatever arrangements are to be made, either through permanent settlement or otherwise, that defense must and shall be maintained.

This defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus. We hold important defense positions in the Ryukyu Islands and these we will continue to hold. In the interest of the population of the Ryukyu Islands, we will at an appropriate time offer to hold these islands under trusteeship of the United Nations. But they are essential parts of the defensive perimeter of the Pacific and they must and will be held.

The defensive perimeter runs from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands. Our relations, our defensive relations with the Philippines, are contained in agreements between us. Those agreements are being loyally carried out and will be loyally carried out. Both peoples have learned by bitter experience the vital connections between our mutual defense requirements. We are in no doubt about that and it is hardly necessary for me to say an attack on the Philippines could not and would not be tolerated by the United States. But I hasten to add that no one perceives the imminence of any such attack.

So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack. But it must also be clear that such a guaranty is hardly sensible or necessary within the realm of practical relationship.

Should such an attack occur—one hesitates to say where such an armed attack could come from—the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression.

That is correctly quoted, is it not?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Sparkman. Now, as I understand, there were two things covered in that: First, our responsibility, that is, the United States responsibility, to defend Japan, the Ryukyu Islands—Okinawa is in the Ryukyus, is it not?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Sparkman. And the Philippines; is that correct?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Sparkman. Down through the Aleutians and down that ring?

Secretary Acheson. That is where we had our troops, at those places you just mentioned.

Senator Sparkman. Yes. And you were saying that it is the individual responsibility of the United States to defend those areas?

Secretary Acheson. That is correct, Senator.

Senator Sparkman. Now, there has been a great deal said about this statement omitting Korea, Formosa, and other areas. Now, am I you intended, and to me it seems to be clear in the statement that you correct in my understanding that in a second part of your statement made that the defense of those areas was not the individual responsibility of the United States, but of the United Nations?

Secretary Acheson. It depended in the first instance on the people themselves.

Senator Sparkman. Yes; the will of the people themselves to put up such defense as they could.

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir; and then upon the Charter of the United Nations and the responsibility of its members under that Charter.

Senator Sparkman. Well, now, were you intending in any way to say that we had no concern with Korea or Formosa or any of the other areas?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. But that our concern was to us by reason of being a member of the United Nations; is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, following that, in your speech you went on and discussed some of the essentials of United States assistance to these various areas; and I noticed this statement with reference to Korea:

ECONOMIC AID TO KOREA

> In Korea we have taken great steps which have ended our military occupation, and in cooperation with the United Nations have established an independent and sovereign country, recognized by nearly all the rest of the world.
>
> We have given that nation great help in getting itself established. We are asking the Congress to continue that help until it is firmly established, and that legislation is now pending before the Congress.

Now, that was in the beginning of the year before the aggression took place, the calendar year, was it not?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. That was in January 1950, and the aggression took place about 6 months later.

Senator SPARKMAN. Did Congress vote the assistance that you asked for there?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes; I believe it did.

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you remember the date?

Secretary ACHESON. The dates are not clear in my mind.

I believe that the first thing that happened was that the bill was defeated in the House, by a narrow margin——

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you have the date of that first vote in the House?

Secretary ACHESON. I will furnish it.

Senator SPARKMAN. Will you supply it, please?

Secretary ACHESON. I do not have it here.

And then, the bill was passed in the Senate, and on reconsideration in the House, it was passed as an Act.

Senator SPARKMAN. And it became an Act on what date? Do you know; and if not, will you supply that date?

Secretary ACHESON. I will supply that. I just don't have it before me.

ARMS AID TO NATIONALISTS

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, Mr. Secretary, did I understand you to say that we were giving arms aid to the Nationalists on Formosa in 1949 and 1950?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; under the $125 million program which was in the Act of 1948, actually passed in 1949.

Senator SPARKMAN. Did General MacArthur ever urge or recommend additional aid to the Nationalists on Formosa, prior to the outbreak of trouble June 25, 1950?

Secretary ACHESON. I really don't know the answer to that question. I don't recall. He may have done it.

Senator SPARKMAN. Of course that might have gone through the military channels, anyhow, rather than through your Department, might it not?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. If he recommended it, it would have gone to them. I don't remember any recommendation, but I will again try to look that up.

Senator WILEY. That was outside of his scope, anyway, wasn't it, at that time?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. I didn't mean that he was required to do it, but I wanted to know if he did.

IMPRESSIONS THAT THE INFORMATION PAPER SOUGHT TO DISPEL

Now, Mr. Secretary, going back to this December 23 bulletin or information paper, I want to get something clear in my mind, and that is—under part 3, headed "Treatment," paragraph B, "All material should be used best to counter the false impressions that:"

Now, if I understood correctly, Senator Knowland was transferring that "false impressions" to some of the things that you said it did not apply to.

Secretary ACHESON. I don't think Senator Knowland meant to do that.

Senator SPARKMAN. I will change that.

You did say that the question of false impression applied only to items 1, 2, 3, and 4, which immediately followed that?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. And those false impressions are given as follows:

> 1. Formosa's retention could save the Chinese Government;
> 2. The United States has a special interest in or "design on" the island or any military bases on Formosa;
> 3. Its loss would seriously damage the interests of either the United States or of other countries opposing communism;
> 4. The United States is responsible for or committed in any way to act to save Formosa.

Now, those are the only four things in this paper, covered by that term "false impressions," is that right?

Secretary ACHESON. That is right, sir.

I think, in the first one, the one numbered 1 you read the word "would" as "could."

Senator SPARKMAN. That letter is missing.

It should be "would"?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. I will write it in, "would save the Chinese Government."

Therefore, the paper did not intend to say that any of the other things in it—or, I will put it this way: Did not intend to say, by the statement under paragraph B, that any things other than those four were false, or were false impressions?

Secretary ACHESON. No, it did not say that.

Senator SPARKMAN. And this paper was issued primarily for the purpose of directing or giving direction to those of our people scattered all over the world who were in charge of what we might call propaganda?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct, sir; yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. And was limited to that?

Secretary ACHESON. That was the sole purpose.

Senator SPARKMAN. And at the very time that was issued, we were actually supplying arms aid to the Nationalists on Formosa?

Secretary ACHESON. Arms, aid, yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. I believe that is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hunt?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Flanders?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Long?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Gillette?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Brewster?

PROCEDURAL MATTER

Senator BREWSTER. Before I ask a question, I would like to present a procedural question. It will not be deducted, I trust, from my time.

Chairman RUSSELL. Pardon?

Senator BREWSTER. Before I start questioning, I want to raise a procedural question.

Chairman RUSSELL. That does not count against your time.

Senator BREWSTER. Yesterday, the Senator from Texas brought into the discussion the views of a Senator not a member of this committee, and, in a rather challenging air, asked if anybody would dissent from the statement which he had made, regarding the views of that Senator.

Chairman CONNALLY. What was that?

I don't understand what you are talking about.

Senator SPARKMAN. The other Senator from Texas?

Senator BREWSTER. The senior Senator from Texas, the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Chairman CONNALLY. Who did I bring in?

Senator BREWSTER. A gentleman by the name of Taft.

Chairman CONNALLY. I recall him; I have heard of him.

Chairman RUSSELL. This is not a procedural matter, up to now.

Senator BREWSTER. I will bring it to a procedural matter, because I did make a brief reply, and I wanted to determine the accuracy of it; and Senator Lodge also participated in it.

I am now going to ask the unanimous consent of this committee that there be incorporated in the appendix of this record, as this is the second or third time that the name of Senator Taft has been brought in, the precise statement which he made on this matter on the floor of the Senate, covering in detail his position, which seems to be a matter of interest and I think in justice to him, that should be clarified in the record.

Chairman CONNALLY. I did not refer to anything he said on the floor. I read a newspaper account of the statement that he made:

that his complaint was that Congress had not been consulted about going into Korea; but that if it had been consulted he would have voted favorably; that is all I said.

Senator BREWSTER. That is all you said, but there is a great deal more to it than that. I think if the views of a Senator are going to be incorporated in the record he is certainly entitled to have an accurate statement of those views, and I am sure the Senator from Texas would be the last one who would desire to misrepresent his position.

Chairman CONNALLY. I am not. I simply represented what I saw in the paper. I do not know what he said on the floor.

Chairman RUSSELL. Without objection the remarks will be incorporated in the appendix.

(Speech of Hon. Robert A. Taft, June 28, 1950, will be found in the appendix.)

Chairman CONNALLY. All right.

Senator BREWSTER. Thank you.

Chairman CONNALLY. The remarks incorporate nearly everything that is printed nowadays.

UNITED STATES DEFENSE PERIMETER AND AREAS BEYOND IT

Senator BREWSTER. I was interested, Mr. Secretary, in your distinguishing of the position on Formosa and Korea, as I understood it, as to the United States' sphere of interest and responsibility and the United Nations'. I think, possibly, that is the first time, under the questioning of the Senator from Alabama, that that distinction has been brought out here. I think it is a very interesting and valuable one.

You did contemplate, I understand then, that the United Nations might be interested in Formosa and Korea to a greater extent than the United States especial security interests require?

Secretary ACHESON. Senator, let me try to make this position quite clear. In the first part of the remarks which Senator Sparkman read, he referred to my description of what I called the defense perimeter of the United States.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON. And in all the places mentioned by me there were United States troops stationed there, as of right.

Those troops are there; they must defend themselves; that is where our troops defend the interests of the United States. Therefore, it is the United States special defense perimeter; that is what I was trying to say.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON. Then, in order not to create the impression that we had no interest anywhere else, I pointed out what Senator Sparkman also read, and that in regard to other areas of the Far East, I said so far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack; that is, no person can say that an attack will not occur, obviously. But it must also be clear that such a guaranty is hardly sensible or necessary within the realm of practical relationship.

Should such an attack occur, one hesitates to say where such an armed attack could come from. The initial reliance must be on the respect to the Korean war, it was always necessary to give considera-entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations, which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean upon by any people who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression.

I think what I said is very clear, indeed.

NATURE OF OUR DEFENSE PERIMETER

Senator Brewster. Yes. I was trying to phrase it accurately, as accurately as I could, and I hope that I did. The areas outside the ones you had mentioned now in the occupation of American troops at that time, that was in January 1950——

Secretary Acheson. That was January 12, 1950.

Senator Brewster. 1950—that those other areas were primarily the responsibility of the local inhabitants, plus the obligations under the United Nations Charter.

Secretary Acheson. That is correct, sir.

Senator Brewster. It was true that at that time we had within the preceding year withdrawn our troops from Korea?

Secretary Acheson. We had withdrawn them—I spoke on January 12, 1950, and the troops, the last troops, had been withdrawn on June 29, I believe the date was, 1949.

Senator Brewster. So that 6 months earlier we had completed the withdrawal of our troops from Korea?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. And to that extent if they had been in Korea at that time, then would your statement regarding our defense perimeter have included that, do I understand?

Secretary Acheson. Well, I don't know, Senator, what I would have said in the speech if the circumstances had been different.

Senator Brewster. I say that because you apparently were rather meticulous in saying that it happened our troops were occupying these areas as a matter of right and therefore they were the areas we would defend.

I think you must discriminate between whether you base it on occupation or whether you base it on our defense perimeter.

Secretary Acheson. What I was speaking about here was our defense perimeter.

Senator Brewster. Yes.

Secretary Acheson. And these are places where we have troops, these are places from a military point of view which are essential to the defense of the United States.

Senator Brewster. Then you were speaking of these areas which you have named where our troops were as a part of the defense perimeter of the United States essential to our security?

Secretary Acheson. It happened that the two things coincide.

Senator Brewster. Therefore, you did not at that time include either Korea or Formosa within the so-called defense perimeter?

Secretary Acheson. That is correct, sir.

Senator Brewster. Or as essential to the security of the United States to keep out of hostile hands?

Secretary Acheson. Well, I did not include them as places where in order to defend the United States we would commit troops, and I have already pointed out that that was the policy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in regard to Formosa.

DISTINCTION WHERE WE ARE WILLING TO USE TROOPS AND WHERE NOT

Senator **Brewster**. Let's stick to Formosa for a minute. Do you distinguish between what is essential to our security to keep out of hostile hands and what we would be prepared to commit troops to defend?

Secretary **Acheson**. You mean is there a distinction in my own mind?

Senator **Brewster**. Yes; do you distinguish?

Secretary **Acheson**. Yes, sir; very clearly so. One is those places where it is our governmental policy to use our troops, and the other where it is not our governmental policy to use our troops.

Senator **Brewster**. Although it may be essential to our security or very desirable for our national security that they be kept out of hostile hands?

Secretary **Acheson**. There are many, many places where it is very desirable that they should be kept out of hostile hands where we do not have a policy to commit troops. Of course, the whole United Nations business is something different again.

Senator **Brewster**. Were the orders to the Navy regarding Formosa predicated on the Korean action or on the hazard?

Secretary **Acheson**. What?

Senator **Brewster**. I am glad you are having difficulty in hearing?

Secretary **Acheson**. Is this your revenge?

Senator **Brewster**. I shall speak lower than ever. [Laughter.] Was the direction to the Seventh Fleet to defend Formosa an incident of our action in Korea?

Secretary **Acheson**. It grew out of the attack in Korea; yes, sir.

KOREA'S IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED NATIONS

Senator **Brewster**. And do you now consider that Korea is of great strategic importance to the United States?

Secretary **Acheson**. I do not think that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have ever determined, or rather I think that they have not determined, that Korea is of strategic importance to the United States.

Korea is of very great importance to the United States and to the United Nations because it is there that the first great effort of collective security is being made to repel an armed attack.

Senator **Brewster**. And in that respect Korea is distinct from Formosa, which is regarded as of very considerable strategic significance that it shall not fall into hostile hands?

Secretary **Acheson**. Well, it is different in the strategic aspect. Now, I do not want to get put in the position of saying that our interest in carrying on the Korean War is any different or less than our interest in anything else. Somebody may misinterpret my answers to your questions, and I am most anxious that that shall not be done.

Senator **Brewster**. And the action in Korea then is primarily not with regard to the defense perimeter of the United States or its security but primarily with regard to Communist aggression and its sinister significance to the peace of the world and to the United Nations?

Secretary **Acheson**. It is motivated by the security of the United States, because this whole question of collective security is one of the bases of our own security; and, therefore, when this attack occurred in Korea and Korea appealed to the United Nations for assistance against an unprovoked armed attack, it was of the greatest importance that the collective-security system should work, the United Nations should come to the assistance of Korea, and that this attack should be repelled, because, if that is not done, then I think the whole system of collective security will begin to disintegrate.

Senator Brewster. My vast respect for your intellectual agility leads me to think, to hope at any rate, that you did understand my question.

I thought I phrased it quite candidly that our action in Korea was not because Korea was a part of our defense perimeter or vital to our security, but because of our interest in collective security along with the United Nations. That was my question, and I gather that your answer to that is "Yes."

Secretary Acheson. I think your first question was a little different from your second one. I think I have answered your second one quite clearly.

Senator Brewster. But that is the point I intended at any rate to make, so that the interest in the Korean situation is one common to the United Nations in the varying degree in which the United Nations are concerned with repelling the menace of communism.

Secretary Acheson. It is the menace of communism and it is perhaps even more particularly the menace of the armed attack put on by the Communist conspiracy and the Communist group.

Senator Brewster. Yes, and the fact that we had contributed approximately 90 percent of the outside aid to South Korea is not a measure necessarily of our interest but rather of the fact that we happen to be in a position to do that, while I think you have said the other countries have considerable responsibilities in other areas.

Secretary Acheson. Our forces were very close to the scene and close to it in considerable numbers, and the other reasons that you have given; yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. But, subject only to the relative contributions which these various countries are able to make, they all have an equal interest with us as far as the principle of collective security is concerned.

Secretary Acheson. I think it is just as vital to them as it is to us.

RECOGNITION AND SEATING OF RED CHINA

Senator Brewster. This morning you indicated that our position had been resolute against the recognition of Red China, I believe.

Secretary Acheson. I think this morning we were talking about the entry of Chinese Communists into the United Nations.

Senator Brewster. That is right; that is what I referred to.

Secretary Acheson. Or are you talking now about recognition? That is what you said.

Senator Brewster. Yes. Well, I will change—do you distinguish between the two?

Secretary Acheson. Of course, Senator. One is the question of the recognition by this Government of some government as the government of the particular country.

The other one has to do with the admission into the United Nations of a government. In one we can determine whom we recognize. We are part of a larger organization which determines what government can represent a country in the United Nations.

Senator Brewster. Is it conceivable that we could recognize Communist China without admitting them to the United Nations?

Secretary Acheson. We certainly could, but——

Senator Brewster. Well, I mean without favoring their admission.

Secretary Acheson. We are not recognizing the Communist authorities in China. We are not contemplating doing it. We are opposed to it.

Senator Brewster. You have never contemplated it?

Secretary Acheson. No. We are not contemplating it; haven't contemplated it. We have been against it. We have taken that attitude with other countries, and we have opposed the entry of these people into the various organs of the United Nations.

Senator Brewster. You have never indicated any of the conditions under which Communist China might be recognized?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir. We have always recognized the Nationalist government.

Senator Brewster. I would like to quote from a statement to the Foreign Relations Committee by Secretary Acheson. This appears in the New York Herald Tribune.

Secretary Acheson. This is what? Would you tell me what you are now quoting, Senator?

Senator Brewster. This is quoting Secretary Acheson. I was going to read you the question, and I think it speaks for itself as to its source.

Secretary Acheson. I mean the date.

Senator Brewster. No; I cannot give you the date. It appears in this document which I have just had included in the record; so you will find it there. I have secured the discussion. I think it was on either January 10 or January 13, 1950.

ACHESON TESTIMONY TO FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE ON FAR EAST, JANUARY 1950

I went to the Foreign Relations Committee, and I went over as much of the records as I could during the noon hour, and I have one of the volumes here. I think, however, from its contents, you may be able to identify it.

> Secretary Acheson was quoted as making the suggestion to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations yesterday. According to the Senator from Texas, Mr. Connally, the Secretary said Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines were the American line of security in the Western Pacific, and that with bases on this line the position would be impregnable. He said he would not speak for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although he gave the impression that he knew something of their views. He strongly reaffirmed President Truman's stand against sending military forces or military advice to the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa.

It was on January 5, 1950, I believe that the President announced that he would not send any more aid, military aid; was that not right?

Secretary Acheson. That he would not send additional military aid.

Senator Brewster. Additional military aid.

Secretary Acheson. Outside of the $125 million.

Senator BREWSTER (reading):

> He said he alone was responsible for the State Department's confidential guidance message of December 23, telling its officials abroad to prepare for the loss of Formosa to the Communists. Acheson said that several important problems had come to a head since Congress adjourned 3 months ago. One of them was possible American recognition of Communist China. On this point he reminded Senators that the Communists now control all of China, except a few isolated areas, which the administration saw no need for haste in recognizing. He said American recognition would depend on future events, including assurances that Chinese Communists would protect the safety of American citizens and obey international law. He distinctly stated that beyond the line laid down the United States could not assure the rest of the Far East against attack.

That refers to your statement. But that at least would imply clearly that the discussion of recognition was at least having consideration. Do you recall that?

Chairman CONNALLY. May I interrupt? What were you quoting me there about? You said somethng about the Senator from Texas said so-and-so.

Senator BREWSTER. That is right. You were purporting to quote Secretary Acheson.

Chairman CONNALLY. In that whole statement?

Senator BREWSTER. Most of it.

Chairman CONNALLY. I don't agree to that.

Senator BREWSTER. In my going over the record——

Chairman CONNALLY. I thought you were quoting something verbatim. You are telling what somebody else said.

Senator BREWSTER. Since you used that against Senator Taft, I am sure you won't take exception to the same tactics being used against you.

Chairman CONNALLY. If you will tell the truth like I did, I won't.

Senator BREWSTER. I was quite clear that I could not designate the source of this. I understood it came from——

Chairman CONNALLY. I can't tell from your reading——

Senator BREWSTER. It is a newspaper report.

Chairman CONNALLY. What I am supposed to have said.

Senator BREWSTER. This is from a newspaper report, which is all the identification the Senator from Texas gave me of the Taft quotation.

Chairman CONNALLY. You have had your come-back on Senator Taft and put his speech in the record; so, you ought to be satisfied.

[Deleted.]

Senator BREWSTER. I cannot believe that the newspaper reporter or Senator Connally, from that one statement alone, gave the interview which appears here, but I have not been able to go through the record of January 13, when the clerk advised me the matter was further discussed.

Secretary ACHESON. I think what you have read from the transcript of the committee is a correct report. I have no recollection of this newspaper article or of what is reported here.

CONDITIONS OF RECOGNITION DISCUSSED

Senator BREWSTER. You do not think that you ever stated that American recognition would depend on future events, including assurances that Chinese Communists would protect the safety of American citizens and obey international law?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I think that in many discussions which have been had about the recognition of various governments we have always pointed out that the conditions of recognition are that the governments seeking recognition have to undertake certain responsibilities, and have to be in certain positions, and doubtless we have discussed that in the committee many, many times.

I remember very clearly that on several occasions the committee and I have agreed that no action of any sort of recognizing the Chinese Communists would be taken without the most thorough discussion in the committee.

Senator BREWSTER. I think the record further can be explored to see whether this report was warranted or not. I do not say that myself.

SITUATION IN IRAN

Since you are to discuss the Chinese situation on Monday morning, I think I will not go farther with that now. But I should like in the time remaining to me to take a somewhat broader look at your overall problem, and particularly in Iran, which, I take it, has a very intimate relationship to our general foreign policy. There have been two notes sent to the Iranian Government within recent days, as I understand.

Secretary ACHESON. I think at the present moment, Senator, the situation in Iran is so delicate that I should ask to be excused from making any comments on it at all at this time.

Senator BREWSTER. Have you at any time within the past 3 weeks discussed the Iranian situation with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations?

Secretary ACHESON. I think Mr. McGhee, the Assistant Secretary in charge, has discussed it with the subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

Senator BREWSTER. And when was that?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't remember, sir, but I am sure it is quite recently.

Senator BREWSTER. And is that prior to the sending of the first note which you sent in the matter?

Secretary ACHESON. I say I just don't want to discuss sending of notes or anything of that sort. We have been, as it has been well known, in close touch with the Iranian Government and with the British Government. We have been endeavoring to prevent the situation from becoming any more critical than it is and have been working in the hope that, since the real interests of both the British and the Iranians are very close, some solution of this most important question can be worked out by agreement.

Senator BREWSTER. During the interregnum of your departure from the State Department and your return did you represent Iran at that time or your law firm?

Secretary ACHESON. I have never represented Iran. The firm of which I was a member I know represented Iran at the proceedings in the Security Council in the winter of '45–'46. I am not able to answer the rest of your question because I don't know.

Senator BREWSTER. My record here indicates that.

Secretary ACHESON. The proceedings that I have in mind are the ones that took place when Secretary Byrnes was bringing about the withdrawal of the Russian forces, by action of the Security Council, from Azerbaijan.

LAW FIRM CONNECTIONS WITH IRAN

Senator Brewster. You were a member of the firm of Covington, Burling, Rublee, Acheson & Shorb on April 16, 1948, were you not?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir; I was.

Senator Brewster. And at that time the Iranian Ambassador filed a report that your firm was representing them in the current matters in this country, is that correct?

Secretary Acheson. If he filed that report, that report is correct.

Senator Brewster. But you were not familiar with it?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir. I am not familiar with it. It was not anything with which I personally had anything to do.

Senator Brewster. Do you know what the fees were that your firm has received while you were a member of it from the Iranian Government?

Secretary Acheson. I believe that all of those matters were inquired into by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations at the time of the hearing on my confirmation, and I believe you will find in the files the statements in regard to all of that.

POSSIBLE M'GHEE CONNECTIONS WITH OIL INTERESTS

Senator Brewster. Do you know of any connection that Mr. McGhee has with oil interests?

Secretary Acheson. No; I know of no interests that he has with oil interests.

Senator Brewster. You know as to the parentage of his wife?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir; I know his wife very well.

Senator Brewster. What was her name?

Secretary Acheson. She was Miss DeGolyer.

Senator Brewster. Is Mr. DeGolyer one of the oil authorities of the world?

Secretary Acheson. I think he is one of the most prominent oil geologists in the world.

Senator Brewster. Yes; and very familiar with this entire situation in the Middle East through his studies.

Secretary Acheson. I cannot answer that; I don't know of his knowledge of the Middle East.

Senator Brewster. Well, he is one of the great oil authorities, widely recognized.

EXPORT-IMPORT BANK LOAN TO IRAN

Were you Secretary of State when the proposal was made, I believe, to allot $25 million to Iran, 1 or 2 years ago?

Secretary Acheson. If you are referring to the Export-Import Bank loan which was very recent, the answer is "Yes"; I was.

Senator Brewster. Is that a matter that they take up with the State Department?

Secretary Acheson. The State Department has a member on the board of the Export-Import Bank. The State Department was fully familiar with the matter, and very much in favor of the granting of this loan by the Export-Import Bank.

Senator **Brewster**. Was it $25 million that was the amount involved?

Secretary **Acheson**. Yes, sir; $25 million was the amount involved; and that, unfortunately, has not gone through on account of legal difficulties arising in Iran.

Senator **Brewster**. What were the circumstances under which the advance was not made?

Secretary **Acheson**. The Export-Import Bank and the Iranian authorities could not agree upon the legal steps which the Export-Import Bank thought were necessary, and which the Iranians could not or would not do; and finally when that matter was, I think, close to settlement, other difficulties, which I don't remember now, occurred, so that the loan has not been made, much to my regret.

Senator **Brewster**. Are you familiar with the stories which have been rather widely published in the press that it was intimated—at least apparently some Iranians understood—that it was incidental to pressure from British sources affecting their arrangements with the Iranian Government?

Secretary **Acheson**. You mean it was due to British pressure that the loan was not made?

Senator **Brewster**. That, I think, is the way they put it; that it was serving British interests to withhold the loan, with the hope that the Iranians would not precipitate the tragic situation which we now face.

Secretary **Acheson**. That is quite untrue; whoever started such a rumor just does not know the facts.

Senator **Brewster**. There was no relationship between the two; they were merely coincidental?

Secretary **Acheson**. I don't think they were even coincidental. The difficulties about the loan have been going on for quite some time; we are still working on the effort to overcome them.

Senator **Brewster**. Well, hasn't the difficulty regarding the British-Iranian relations been going on for some time also?

Secretary **Acheson**. The acute stage of it is recent. There have been disputes about the oil concession for some time; yes. But any impression that anybody has that there is any connection between the difficulties about the Export-Import Bank loan and British difficulties with Iran is quite unjustified; it is not true.

ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL SITUATION

Senator **Brewster**. Are you familiar with the revenues derived from the Anglo-Iranian operation by the British Government?

Secretary **Acheson**. No, I am not.

Senator **Brewster**. Would you be surprised that they drew $150 million from that operation last year?

Secretary **Acheson**. I wouldn't have any idea; it would not surprise me, but I wouldn't know whether it was true or not.

Senator **Brewster**. Are you familiar with the arrangement between the British Government and the Anglo-Iranian oil as to supplies of oil for their Navy?

Secretary **Acheson**. I am not familiar with the relations. I believe that I have heard it said that the oil for the British Navy is supplied from the Iranian concession.

Senator BREWSTER. In large part; and the British Government does control approximately 54 percent of the Anglo-Iranian Corp.

Secretary ACHESON. It controls a considerable amount which I believe is over a majority, but whether it is 54 or not, I don't know.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes; 54 percent.

Would you deem it proper or prudent that the United States Government should invest either $25 million or $100 million in stabilizing conditions in Iran to enable the British to continue their very profitable operation?

Secretary ACHESON. The American contributions, by grant or loan, to Iran have nothing to do whatever with the enabling the British to continue anything.

Our interest in the economics of Iran is direct; and is on the account of the Iranians. We have tried for some time in a great many ways to help the Iranians in developing that country.

We believe that it is possible to be done; and it would greatly raise the whole standard of living in Iran, and would greatly increase the social and political stability of the country. We have been working with them because of out interest in them and our friendship with them.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Brewster, I am sorry, your time is up.

Senator BREWSTER. I thought I had two more minutes.

Chairman RUSSELL. I was advised by Doctor Wilcox that you had not. He was keeping the time. I might say that my own time conforms to Doctor Wilcox's statement.

Senator BREWSTER. What is that?

Chairman RUSSELL. My own time, which I do not rely on completely, but do undertake to keep, agreed with his. However, I have no objection to asking unanimous consent that you have two more minutes. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and you can make your statement, and you are allowed two more minutes.

LAW FIRM CONNECTIONS WITH IRAN CONTINUED

Secretary ACHESON. I have before me now my own testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations at the time of my confirmation, and I should like to read from page 14, the following in regard to some of the questions raised by Senator Brewster:

> During my 18 months there have been, so far as I know, the following connections—

Now, the 18 months is the period which I spent in the law firm after leaving as Under Secretary and before coming back.

> Long prior to my return, to be specific in March 1946, Mr. John Lord O'Brian and Mr. John Laylin were retained by the Government of Iran to represent them or to help the Government of Iran in proceedings which were then going on before the Security Council growing out of a complaint filed before the Council by Iran against the Soviet Union. My partners, who were not then my partners, but who are now, Mr. O'Brian and Mr. Laylin, continued that work until early in 1948. They filed proper documents, whatever they were, under this act to which Senator Vandenberg has referred. If anybody is interested in what they were paid, I have it here and shall be glad to tell you. Perhaps I had better do it, so that nobody will suppose they were made unduly rich.
>
> For some 2½ years' work of a rather responsible nature, they were paid $25.000.
>
> The CHAIRMAN. For representing Iran?

Mr. ACHESON. That was for assisting the Iranian Ambassador in matters which came before the Security Council growing out of their troubles with the Soviet Union.

Senator TYDINGS. When you say "the Security Council," you mean the United Nations?

Mr. ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator VANDENBERG. That was not an operation which involved any direct interest of the Government of the United States, as I understand it?

Mr. ACHESON. No. Mr. Byrnes, as Secretary of State, was attending that meeting, taking a position on behalf of the Government of the United States. That position was wholly consistent with the one that my present partners then took in supporting Iran.

Now, that is the end of the Iranian question.

Senator BREWSTER. Do I still have my 2 minutes?

Chairman RUSSELL. Go ahead.

Senator BREWSTER. I shall not press the matter.

Chairman RUSSELL. It is all right.

Senator BREWSTER. I did want to finish up.

EXPORT-IMPORT BANK LOANS TO SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN

Are you familiar with the grant which we made to Saudi Arabia during the war between Great Britain and the United States, which amounted to approximately $100 million?

Secretary ACHESON. I, at one time, knew about our part in the financing of Saudi Arabia. I don't recall it now.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, I will simply say that I do want to call your attention to that situation, as we went into it very extensively in the war investigating committee at the time; and it seemed obvious that Ameircan money had gone into maintain the concession which was very profitable to the operators. I do not quarrel with that now, but I do feel that for us to put money into Iran to assist in the reconstruction of the British concession, should be very carefully explored, and I do hope that before any action is taken which may in any way commit the Congress or the country, it may seem warranted to discuss it with the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Secretary ACHESON. Senator, may I say again we have not put any money into Iran to assit the British in any way. Whatever we have done in Iran has been on account of our interest in the Iranians, as such, and in their country and our relations solely with them.

Senator BREWSTER. Of course, there are 54 nations which we are interested in in varying degrees.

Secretary ACHESON. I don't know why you picked that number.

Senator BREWSTER. That is the United Nations.

Secretary ACHESON. There are a good many.

Senator BREWSTER. United Nations.

Secretary ACHESON. I think, though, there are 60 in the United Nations.

Senator BREWSTER. I think six of them—I will not refer to the Polish situation, but that, too, has been a matter of comment. That is all.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, may I raise a procedural question as to how long you are going to continue, or are you going to take up a second round of questions?

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, it has been my purpose to run on to about 5 o'clock. That is 40 minutes. I have a few questions. I do not know whether Senators Connally or Wiley or Hickenlooper have. I know Mr. Knowland has some. Senator Johnson has some.

Senator SALTONSTALL. You intend to run to about 5 o'clock?

Chairman RUSSELL. It has been my purpose to.

Senator WILEY. I have some questions I might as well finish up with that I did not get to this morning. The Secretary is not tired. How about it, Mr. Secretary?

Senator SPARKMAN. I do not know about the Secretary, but I can testify as to being tired.

Secretary ACHESON. Mr. Chairman, may the record show that that statement which I read, there I was speaking as of the date shown on it, as of January 13, 1949?

Senator WILEY. For whom?

Secretary ACHESON. For myself. I say this because in the statement it says my partners, who were not then my partners but who are now, Mr. O'Brian and Mr. Laylin. I want to be clear that was true as of January 1, 1949; but I have no connection with a firm any more.

Senator WILEY. You have no law partner any more?

Secretary ACHESON. I have no law partner now.

WEDEMEYER'S CONNECTION WITH INFORMATION PAPER

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, on yesterday you made some statement that I did not get clearly as to some connection that General Wedemeyer had with this information paper of December 1949. I did not get clearly just what connection General Wedemeyer had with that paper. Would you mind making a statement on that?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I would be very glad to clarify that.

What I pointed out was that General Wedemeyer, who was then the Assistant Chief of Staff and had under him the people who were working with the State Department on this matter of foreign information and the coordination of what we did through the Voice of America with what the Army did in Germany and Japan, suggested to Assistant Secretary Allen that in view of the situation regarding Formosa, which I have described, it might be possible through the use of the Voice of America and information procedures to minimize the damage which the fall of Formosa would cause to the prestige of the United States and to the morale of other people. That suggestion was acknowledged as a good one, and we went to work on the problem. That was the only connection that I referred to.

Chairman RUSSELL. So the thought then of issuing this document to mitigate the damage to the United States in case Formosa was overrun by the Chinese Reds originated with General Wedemeyer?

Secretary ACHESON. The suggestion that information on the Voice could be used for that purpose came from General Wedemeyer. I do not wish to attach to him the responsibility for this paper. It was our responsibility. We went ahead then and worked it out.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, would you yield for a question which you might ask the Secretary, whether this paper of December 23 was ever submitted to General Wedemeyer, and whether he ever had knowledge of its contents before issuance?

Chairman RUSSELL. I would be glad to ask him that question.

Do you have any knowledge of whether General Wedemeyer ever saw the paper?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir, I have no knowledge that he did, and I do not want in any way to suggest that he saw the paper. There were representatives of the other departments who were on the coordinating committee to whom drafts of these papers go, and to whom in this case they went in the usual course. But I have no reason whatever to say that General Wedemeyer saw the paper, and I do not want to attribute to him any responsibility for its contents.

Chairman RUSSELL. What other departments did see it? You said there were other departments to whom it was submitted.

PREPARATION OF INFORMATION PAPERS

Secretary ACHESON. There is a coordinating committee. At the time in question there was something called the Interdepartmental Coordinating Staff. It is now known as the Interdepartmental Foreign Information Staff, and on that staff I believe there are representatives of the Department of the Army, I think the other two service departments, I think the CIA, and I think the ECA. I think that is the composition of the committee.

Chairman RUSSELL. The CIA and the various armed services have representatives?

Secretary ACHESON. They have representatives on this thing which was then called the Interdepartmental Coordinating Staff and is now known as the Interdepartmental Foreign Information Staff.

Now their function is to coordinate the various efforts which are made in the Foreign Information field, for which we have the great burden of responsibility but which are in some respects carried on by the Army in Germany and Japan.

It is our responsibility to prepare the papers and to do all the work. They are there to have a look at them to see whether they have any comments they wish to make about it, to make any suggestions as to things that ought to be taken up.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do they look at it and make these suggestions before you circulate them or after?

Secretary ACHESON. They are given to them before, sir, in the drafting stage. But they are not responsible for the work, we are responsible for the work; and the fact that they don't make any comments doesn't place any responsibiilty on them.

Chairman RUSSELL. They do have the right to make suggestions?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you know whether or not they made any suggestions that this document be revised or rewritten?

Secretary ACHESON. There were no suggestions made on this document at all.

Chairman RUSSELL. Was General Wedemeyer in Washington at that time?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir, he was Assistant Chief of Staff of the Army.

CHAIRMAN. Did he make this suggestion—I believe you said he made it to Mr. Allen?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir, George Allen, who was then Assistant Secretary of State.

Chairman Russell. Did he make it orally or in writing?

Secretary Acheson. In a memorandum.

Chairman. He sent over a memorandum?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

MILITARY AID TO NATIONALISTS

Chairman Russell. Now there is another thing I did not get exactly here. During the course of the interrogation you were asked if any military aid was sent to Formosa in January 1950, or as to whether or not the Nationalist Government was receiving any military aid at that time. I understood you to say something about outside of the $125,000,000 they were not, but your answer was somewhat vague to me.

Were we or were we not giving any aid whatever to the Nationalist Government on Formosa in January 1950?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir. Congress passed an act called The Act of 1948—I think it was actually passed in 1949—which provided that there should be economic assistance to the Nationalist Government of China of $338,000,000, I believe, in economic assistance and $125,000,000 in military assistance. The act provided that the money was to be spent by the Chinese Government as though it were its money. In other words, we were not buying things with it and giving them to the Chinese, they bought what they wished to buy. Some of the materials they bought, they bought directly from manufacturers; sometimes they bought from the surplus of the Army. That act was still in operation in January 1950.

Chairman Russell. All of the money had not been expended?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir.

Chairman Russell. Was it cut off at that time, the unexpended balance?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir, the money was not cut off. I think they have gone on spending it. I believe at this very moment there is some unexpended balance which comes from various amounts of being allocated for orders which are placed and then either they are changed or the manufacturer can not produce, and that money is free again. I think there is some of it available now.

Chairman Russell. It is still available to the Nationalist Government?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, there is a small balance, or it may now be used up; I don't know.

Chairman Russell. The point is it never was impounded by official action of this Government, was it?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir, not that I remember.

Chairman Russell. Now I am afraid I am being a little repetitious, but I was so impressed by Admiral Sherman's testimony on the value of a blockade of Red China, that at the risk of repetition I will ask you one or two questions on that.

EFFECTIVENESS OF ECONOMIC BLOCKADE

I understand you to say that your efforts or the efforts of our representatives in the United States up until now have been devoted exclusively to securing agreement by the member nations to enforce economic sanctions by way of restrictions on shipping to Communist China?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Chairman Russell. And a resolution has been adopted by the United Nations within the past few weeks?

Secretary Acheson. On the 18th of May.

Chairman Russell. Have you received any official notice or has the United Nations been notified of any action taken by member nations to implement that resolution?

Secretary Acheson. The resolution calls for reports. There have not any reports been filed, so far as I know, yet.

Chairman Russell. What is your belief as to how effective this blockade will be? Do you care to express an opinion on that or is it too speculative?

Secretary Acheson. It is hard to express an opinion. It depends a good deal on what some of the nations, who have not taken the action that some of our allies have taken, do under this.

We believe and hope that they will take effective action. I think it will be a most useful extension of the controls which now exist.

Chairman Russell. Did you read Admiral Sherman's testimony as to the effect of an effective blockade on Communist China?

Secretary Acheson. I have read it, yes, sir. I do not have it all very clearly in mind.

Chairman Russell. Do you have it clear enough to express an opinion as to whether you agree with him or not?

Secretary Acheson. I read the other day a statement of Admiral Sherman's with which I said I did agree. I think that in part Admiral Sherman's testimony was given under certain misapprehension of fact. He did not know that the British Government and some others who are closely working with us had taken for a considerable period of time some rather extensive steps here.

Chairman Russell. I seem to recall that he testified that the British had turned back a ship that had gone from Singapore up there with some of these contraband materials.

Secretary Acheson. I think so.

Chairman Russell. Some witness testified, and I think it was Admiral Sherman.

Secretary Acheson. I think that is correct, sir. What I was getting at is I don't think it was known the extent to which the action such as the petroleum action had been taken and for the length of time it had been taken.

Therefore, when you ask me do I think it would be effective, it is a very difficult question to answer, because, as I pointed out, the imposition—to get nations to impose an international blockade is a much more difficult step than to get them to impose economic restrictions.

NECESSITY OR EFFECT OF A NAVAL BLOCKADE

We have had some success, but not complete success, in getting the economic restrictions imposed, and therefore it seems to me rather academic to talk about effectiveness of a naval blockade when you know that you are probably not going to be able to get anything like that at the present time.

I think we can be more effective by going forward with the economic measures, getting those that have already been voted fully implemented, and then extending the thing further.

As I read the other day, what he said, perhaps I had better mention it again. He said on page 4316, I believe—15 or 16—that:

> In my opinion, the time has not arrived for such an undertaking—

that is, United Nations naval blockade—

> because I still believe that the best way to stop this traffic is by mutual agreement between the United Nations. I think, beginning with the action of some of our own oil companies fairly early in the game, following the things that are now being done through the United Nations and through cooperation, we can make a great deal of headway. It may be that we can make enough, but if we ever resort to a blockade by force, it must be a United Nations operation, unless we are going to get involved in a unilateral war between the United States and China, which in my opinion, is extremely undesirable.

That is the thing which I said represented my views.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NAVAL BLOCKADE OF CHINA AND KOREA

Chairman Russell. We are all prayerfully hoping, Mr. Secretary, that the United Nations will succeed as a great cooperative action between peoples of the earth to enforce peace. Of course, the action in Korea was the first real test that was made of the United Nations.

However, we imposed a naval blockade on Korea almost simultaneously with the aggression on South Korea; whereas, we didn't even ask for a naval blockade on Red China, who is committing acts of aggression each moment in Korea.

Is that due to the fact that the member nations of the United Nations did not have considerable trade with North Korea and therefore there were no real economic losses to be sustained by imposing a naval blockade of North Korea, or is it because of military fear of Red China, the fear of being involved in war with them?

Secretary Acheson. I think it was due to a difference in the security considerations involved. The imposition of a naval blockade on North Korea was not a step which involved extension of the hostilities or possible prejudicing of other security interests, whereas to impose one on China would raise much more difficult and dangerous questions for the United Nations.

Chairman Russell. I don't think I have any other questions now. Senator Connally.

STATEMENT BY SENATOR TAFT

Senator Connally. I do not care to ask the Secretary a question, but I do want to advert just a moment to what Senator Brewster, who has gone out—I tried to get him to stay, but he left—claims were quotations made from the Secretary's statement before the Foreign Relations Committee and a statement that I made.

I said that I had read in the press a statement by Senator Taft to the effect that the President ought to have consulted Congress before sending troops into Korea:

> but that if the matter had been submitted to the Congress, he would have voted in favor of it.

And I quote from an address that the Senator made on June 28, 1950—it has been printed as a circular and I suppose been widely circulated—page 5:

> I shall discuss—

quoting Senator Taft—

> later the question of whether the President is usurping his powers as Commander in Chief. It is my own opinion that he is doing so, that there is no legal authority for what he has done, but I may say that if a joint resolution were introduced asking for approval of the use of our armed forces already sent to Korea and full support of them in their present venture, I would vote in favor of it.

I do not believe I care to ask the Secretary any other questions. I want to compliment him on his endurance in going through all these sessions. I waive my other rights.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bridges.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall.

INTELLIGENCE ON AGGRESSION IN KOREA

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Secretary, I have just one question that appeals to me as I have listened here this afternoon and other days. It seemed to me that one of our troubles there in Korea was the lack of accurate intelligence.

How did the State Department get its intelligence, insofar as you can properly tell us, on which to base its action?

Secretary ACHESON. The State Department has only one direct way of getting intelligence, and that is through its own missions abroad.

However, through the CIA the intelligence which comes to the other branches of the Government is put together and that is made available to all branches of the Government so that there is a pool of information and intelligence on various subjects which is made up of some that comes to the State Department, some that comes to the various armed services or to any other branch of the Government; that is put together and made available to us.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Well, was it your feeling that we were getting reasonably accurate advance intelligence of the Chinese Communists?

Secretary ACHESON. I thought you were talking about the situation in Korea, in June.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I was talking about that, and—well, I was talking about the situation generally.

Secretary ACHESON. The general state of information which came to us, I think I can describe this way: That if the period from the 25th of June to the 23d of September, the general intelligence estimates which were put together regarded intervention as improbable, barring Soviet decision to precipitate global war.

That was the conclusion which was drawn from all the bits of information that came in.

From September 23 to 26, it seemed that the same result was probably true.

Now, I have to caution about all of these things, that one should not suppose that when you make a conclusion of that sort, that then turns into fact.

This is one's best guess as to someone's intentions.

You also have information as to the capability of the other people, and the capability of intervention always existed and you have to make a decision as to whether you think it is possible or probable; and the general view was that it was improbable and everyone continued to express the idea that you couldn't dismiss the possibility.

INTELLIGENCE RE CHINESE INTERVENTION

At the end of September, there were reports which were sent out through the Government of India that statements had been made to their representatives by Chinese officials that if we crossed the thirty-eighth parallel they would intervene.

Those were important matters to be considered, and they were considered; and on the 3d of October, for instance, the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister informed the Indian Ambassador, at Peiping, that if the United States forces, or UN forces crossed the thirty-eighth parallel, China would send troops to the Korean frontier to defend North Korea.

That was a cryptic statement made by him. He said that this action would not be taken if only South Korean troops crossed the parallel.

That was a matter which had to be given very considerable attention, and information to that effect was sent to General MacArthur.

At the time this statement was made, the United Nations was preparing to vote on its resolution, finally adopted by the General Assembly on October 7. It was acted on by Committee One, on October 4, so that you also have to keep in mind that perhaps this statement was put out to have some effect on that vote.

It went on in October. Other officials of other nations reported similar statements coming out of Peiping, by Chinese officials.

On October 10, this was put out on the radio from Peiping as a statement of their intentions.

The general view still remained, on October 12, that while it was a possibility, and you have to keep it in mind, they did not think it was a probability.

At the time of the Wake Island meeting, there was consideration of this, and it was considered unlikely.

On the 19th of October, the State Department came to the conclusion that it was unlikely, but said they could not be dismissed—these threats could not be dismissed as mere bluff.

On the 26th of October, the first Chinese prisoner was captured, so that you began to know, at that point, that something was happening.

On November 4, the Commander in Chief, Far East, in an intelligence appreciation, stated that while Chinese Communist intervention was a distinct possibility, sufficient evidence was not at hand to warrant immediate acceptance.

On November 5, General MacArthur, in a special report to the United Nations, reported that UN forces were "in hostile contact with Chinese Communist military units," so the thing begins to be more and more known.

On November 6, supplementing his report, General MacArthur, in his communication of November 6, reported the destruction of the North Korean armies, but that UN forces were now faced with a new and fresh army, "backed up by a possibility of large enemy reserves and adequate supply."

That was on the 6th of November.

On the 7th of November, the Commander in Chief, Far East, in an intelligence appreciation stated that if immediate enemy build-up continued, that might prevent any further advance and might even force a retrograde movement.

On November 8, the general view here in Washington stated the Communist objective—

> was to halt the advance of the UN forces in Korea and to keep a Communist regime in being on Korean soil.

From November 8 onward, the United Nations Security Council members took immediate cognizance of that intervention as a military and political fact of grave importance and talked about it a great deal.

On November 24, we concluded here in Washington that the Chinese objective was to obtain United Nations withdrawal by intimidation and diplomatic means, but in case of failure of these means there would be increasing intervention, and it was said that there was not available evidence sufficient for a conclusion as to whether the Chinese Communists were committed to a full-scale offensive effort.

On November 24, General MacArthur's special communiqué to the UN said:

> The giant UN pincer moved according to schedule today. The air forces, in full strength, completely interdicted the rear areas and an air reconnaissance behind the enemy line, and along the entire length of the Yalu River border, showed little sign of hostile military activity. The left wing of the envelopment advanced against stubborn and failing resistance. The right wing, gallantly supported by naval air and surface action, continued to exploit its commanding position.
>
> Our losses were extraordinarily light. The logistic situation is fully geared to sustain offensive operations. The justice of our course and promise of early completion of our mission is reflected in the morale of troops and commanders alike.

On November 28, General MacArthur's special communiqué to the United Nations said:

> Enemy reactions developed in the course of our assault operations of the past 4 days disclose that a major segment of the Chinese continental armed forces in army, corps, and divisional organization of an aggregate strength of over 200,000 men is now arrayed against the United Nations forces in North Korea * * *
>
> Consequently, we face an entirely new war.

That was a development of the intelligence. There is one part of it that I think ought to be pointed out.

You have two problems here, in the intelligence field. One to what they could do, if they came in, and in what numbers, and how serious that would be.

The estimates of intention turned out to be wrong, although from October onward, there was increasing evidence that they could——

Senator SALTONSTALL. As of November 24, the determination here was that the Chinese would probably not come in; is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. No. On November 24 the view here was that the Chinese objective was to obtain UN withdrawal by intimidation and diplomatic means, but in case of failure of these means there would be increasing intervention. Available evidence was not considered conclusive as to whether the Chinese Communists ware committed to a full-scale offensive effort.

They were in there, all right, but whether they were committed to a full-scale offensive effort was not known.

The other thing that in intelligence was important was what would happen, what were the possibilities, if the Chinese came in; and the report of the Wake Island meeting, and General MacArthur's estimates follow:

> Had they interfered in the first or second months—

this is the Korean operation—

> it would have been decisive. We are no longer fearful of their intervention. We no longer stand hat in hand. The Chinese have 300,000 men in Manchuria. Of these probably not more than 100,000 to 125,000 are distributed along the Yalu River. Only 50,000 to 60,000 could be gotten across the Yalu River. They have no air force. Now that we have bases for our Air Force in Korea, if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang, there would be the greatest slaughter.

That turned out to be an error—that they could only get fifty to sixty thousand across the river, and if they tried to get down to the south, there would be great slaughter. They did and in considerably larger numbers.

Senator SALTONSTALL. They really fooled us when it comes right down to it; didn't they?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I have no further questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentleman, I have announced that we would recess around 5 o'clock this afternoon; it is 7 minutes until 5 now, and if there is no objection, we will stand in recess until Monday morning at 10 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 4:53 p.m., the committees recessed, to reconvene at 10:03 a. m. Monday, June 4, 1951.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

MONDAY, JUNE 4, 1951

United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services and
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:03 a. m., in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), George, McMahon, Sparkman, Gillette, Wiley, Smith of New Jersey, Hickenlooper, Brewster, Byrd, Johnson of Texas, Hunt, Stennis, Long, Saltonstall, Morse, Knowland, Cain, and Flanders.

Also present: Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge, of the committee staff of the Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman Russell. The committees will be in order.

Under motion made and passed at the last sitting of the committees, the Secretary of State was to make a statement to the committees this morning on China policy.

Mr. Secretary, you may proceed in your own way.

TESTIMONY OF HON. DEAN G. ACHESON, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY ADRIAN S. FISHER, LEGAL ADVISER—Resumed

Secretary Acheson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I should like to put in the record before beginning the statement, which may take a little time, on the policy of this Government toward China, the answer to a question asked me by Senator Sparkman on Saturday. He requested that I furnish for the record the relevant dates having to do with the Korean aid bill of 1949.

The dates for which he asked are as follows:

On October 12, 1949, S. 2319, providing for aid to the Republic of Korea, passed the Senate. On January 19, 1950, a similar bill failed to pass the House. The vote was 193 to 191.

On January 20, 1950, S. 2319 was referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. On January 30, 1950, I appeared before the House Committee to urge passage of the Senate bill without amendments, which was extending aid to certain Korean countries, including Korea.

2,

On February 9 the bill passed the House. On February 10 it was again passed by the Senate. The Senate accepted some amendments. And on February 14 it was signed by the President.

That is the history, Senator Sparkman, of the Korean bill you asked me about.

Now gentlemen, I will take advantage of the kindness of the committee in permitting me to make a somewhat extended statement on United States policy in regard to China.

I should like to state at the outset what I am going to try to do, and that is I want to present to the committee the problem which confronted the United States and China in 1945, and in doing that I shall have to give some of its roots in history.

I should like to point out what the times of decision were. There were moments in this period from 1945 on, moments of decision, and I should like to point out those moments. I should like to point out the considerations which were taken under advisement when decisions were made, and I should like to say what the decisions were and how they were made.

One further preliminary observation I think is important, and that is that American aid cannot in itself insure the survival of a recipient government or the survival of a people that this Government is trying to help against aggression.

What our aid must do and can do is to supplement the efforts of that recipient government and of that people itself. It cannot be a substitute for those efforts. It can only be an aid and a supplement to them.

The United States Government, in aiding another government, does not have power of decision within that country or within that government. That power of decision remains with the government, the people in it. Those are thoughts I think we should should have in mind.

With those preliminary statements, we come to the problem which faced the Chinese and American Governments in 1945.

PROBLEM OF CREATING UNIFIED CHINA

The Japanese had been defeated. The Chinese Government was in the extreme southwestern part of China. The task which had to be solved by the Chinese Government was, in effect, how to create a nation, and how to have the authority of the Chinese Government exercised throughout that nation.

Now, I do not say re-create a nation; I say, advisedly, create a nation; because for almost an indefinite period in the past there had not been in our sense a nation in the territory which we call China, and I will come to and explain to you why that is so, a nation in the sense of a government in control throughout that area.

Therefore, the question which had to be faced was how to create that nation and how to create the authority of the nation in that area.

Senator Wiley. Who was Secretary of State then at that time?

Secretary Acheson. The Secretary of State at that time was Mr. Byrnes. Mr. Stettinius was Secretary until the middle of—until the spring of 1945, and Mr. Byrnes became Secretary then.

The Chinese Government that we are talking about—the Nationalist Government—had not had authority—indeed, no Chinese government had had authority, by which I mean substantial authority—throughout China since the period of the Manchus.

Here is the picture which confronted everybody at the time I am talking about. The great northern area of China, Manchuria, was occupied by the Soviet Union, with its own armed forces. In the second place, the north central and southeast parts of China were in the control of the Communists and the Japanese.

I say both the Communists and the Japanese because the Japanese held the cities and the major lines of communication; whereas, the surrounding areas were occupied by the Communists.

That part of China included what we call North China, swinging down through central China, on to the southeast and coming quite far south and southeast in China.

The south central and southern part of China was occupied by the Japanese, who had troops along the coast and for considerable areas inland and the government itself was, as I said before, in the extreme southwestern part of China.

SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN CHINA

Another important fact, which must never be lost sight in our consideration, is that in addition to these facts as to who actually occupied and exercised authority in certain parts of China, all of China was in the grip of a very profound social revolution.

Senator **Smith**. Might I ask just one question, to get my dates right?

I wanted to ask the Secretary whether this was prior to the Yalta conference, or afterward?

Yalta was in February 1945, and this period you are speaking of was subsequent?

Secretary **Acheson**. I am talking about VJ-day, about the problem which faced us at the end of the war.

Senator **Smith**. Thank you.

Secretary **Acheson**. General MacArthur has spoken to you about the depth and strength of this social revolution.

It grew out of a similar experience in almost all wars, that as the governments concerned have to make tremendous efforts, as, in some areas, the controls of government become weakened, and promises are made, people move forward in social economic ways, at least they move forward in acquiring new social and economic rights, and this was going on in China, in the age-long battle between the peasants and the landlords.

The peasants had made advances and there was a new idea of profound importance.

AREA OF COMMUNIST CONTROL IN 1945 IN CHINA

If I may speak briefly, on the general area of Communist control:

The Communists controlled an area containing 116,000,000 people, which was one-fourth of the population of China. The geographical area was 15 percent of the country we call China, exclusive of Manchuria.

This area included in it some of the most heavily populated areas of China, the area which had most of the railway communications, important industrial developments, and important cities.

Now, let us take a look at Manchuria.

Manchuria, except in a wholly nominal way, and then only for a period of 2 or 3 years, part of 1928, 1929, 1930 and part of 1931, had never been in any way under the control of the present Nationalist government of China; and, until his death in 1927 or 1928, the old marshal had been the war lord of Manchuria, and controlled it absolutely.

Upon his death, the young marshal took over his authority, and in 1928 after Chiang Kai-shek had taken Peking and defeated the Communists and the northern war lords, the young marshal announced his adherence to the National Government. That was a pretty nominal adherence.

It meant that he recognized the government of Chiang Kai-shek as the National Government of China, but the administration in Manchuria did not change, and he continued to exercise the authority.

However, that authority continued for a very short period of time, and in 1931 the Japanese invaded Manchuria and set up their puppet state, and all Chinese authority disappeared from Manchuria. I mention this to point out to you that the National Government had no roots of any sort in Manchuria, a very important thing for us to remember.

When we come to north China, we find that in 1927 the struggle between the left wing of the Kuomintang Party, which was established at Hangkow, and the right wing of the party under Chiang Kai-shek came to a head. The Chiang Kai-shek forces won; the Russian, Borodin, who was then advising the government, had to flee from China, and in 1928 Chiang Kai-shek moved into Peking and there announced the official unification of China. That was in 1928.

The battle with the Communists which began in 1927 in open warfare continued until 1936, and in the period of 1934 and 1935 the Communists were forced to make their long march from the southeastern portion of China to the northwestern portion of China. There they established themselves in the period 1934–35.

In the meantime, however, the Japanese who were in Manchuria were moving into north China, and in 1935 the Japanese undertook to set up another puppet state in north China which would comprise the five northern provinces of China; and at that time they had sufficient physical control of the area to do that.

I point all of this out to make clear to you again that in north China the authority of Chiang Kai-shek's government which was established in 1928, had been in very large part eliminated by 1935, and instead of his government having power in north China, that was in part controlled through Japanese puppets, Japanese, and in part was controlled by the Communists in the northwest.

With this review then, let us just mention once more the principal problems which confronted the Chinese Government and confronted the American Government in its efforts to help the Chinese Government.

These were: The Soviets in Manchuria, the Japanese and the Communists struggling against one another to control a vast area in northwest, north central, and southeast China—the Communists I have already mentioned—and at the same time this great problem of the revolution in thought and in social relationships which was going on throughout all China.

So the first period of decision, the first time after the war when important decisions were made and had to be made, was the period 1945 and 1946. Now, I do not mean for a moment that important decisions were not made before and after, but that was the first great moment of decision.

WEDEMEYER'S 1945 REPORT ON PROBLEM OF CHINESE UNIFICATION

The situation was stated in a nutshell by General Wedemeyer in November 1945 very shortly after VJ-day, and I should like to read, not very much, but I should like to read from General Wedemeyer's report in November 1945.

He says:

> Chinese Communist guerrillas and saboteurs can, and probably will, if present activities are a reliable indication, restrict and harass the movements of National Government forces to such an extent that the result will be a costly and extended campaign. Logistical support for the National Government forces, and measures for their security in the heart of Manchuria have not been fully appreciated by the Generalissimo or his Chinese staff. These facts, plus the lack of appropriate forces and transport, have caused me to advise the Generalissimo that he should concentrate his efforts on the recovery of north China and the consolidation of his military and political position there, prior to any attempt to occupy Manchuria. I received the impression that he agreed with this concept.

Now, General Wedemeyer has five conclusions to this report of 1945:

First, that the Generalissimo will be able to stabilize the situation in south China, provided he accepts the assistance of foreign administrators and technicians, and engages in political, economic, and social reforms through honest, competent civilian officials.

Second. He will be unable to stabilize the situation in north China for months, and perhaps, even years, unless a satisfactory settlement with the Chinese Communists is achieved, and followed up realistically by the kind of action suggested in paragraph 1—that is the paragraph which has just been talked about, the political, economic, and social reforms.

Third. He will be unable to occupy Manchuria for many years unless satisfactory agreements are reached with Russia and the Chinese Communists.

Fourth. Russia is in effect creating favorable conditions for the realization of Chinese Communists and possibly their own plans in north China and Manchuria. These activities are violations of the recent Sino-Soviet Treaty and related agreements.

Fifth. It appears remote that a satisfactory understanding will be reached between Chinese Communists and the Nationalist Government.

Now, in short, what General Wedemeyer reported and advised was, first of all, that the Generalissimo must consolidate his own position in south China and to do that he must take into consideration this revolution that I have been talking about. And General Wedemeyer stressed then—and you will see over and over again he stresses—the same point, that there must be political, economic, and social reforms in order that the Chinese Government might put itself at the head of this great demand for improvement, which was existing in China, and not allow the Communists or anybody else to take that advantage away from them.

In the second place, he points out that to establish himself in north China he must come to agreement with the Communists.

In the third place, he points out the only way to establish himself in Manchuria is through agreement with the Russians.

He ends up by saying that the outlook on all of these fronts is dark, and he points out that force is not available to accomplish these efforts, partly because force cannot accomplish some of them, and secondly, because there is not enough force available to take on the problems which I have already mentioned.

UNITED STATES CHOICES IN CHINA IN 1945

Now, in that situation the United States Government had three choices open to it.

One choice was to pull out of China and say, "We have defeated the Japanese. The Chinese from now on must paddle their own canoe, and we have to wash our hands of it." That was an impossible choice to take because with the presence of 1,235,000 armed Japanese troops in China, exclusive of Manchuria, and of another 1,700,000 Japanese civilians—Government officials, economic people, clerks, and businessmen, one thing or another—there was a Japanese force and a Japanese influence so great in China that by throwing its weight to either side in this civil war it could have taken over the administration of the country, and Japan in defeat would have found itself in actual control of China, a result which we could not, of course, help to bring about.

The second choice was that the United States Government might have put into China unlimited resources and all the necessary military power to try and defeat the Communists, remove the Japanese, and remove the Russians from Manchuria.

That was a task so great and so repugnant to the American people that the Government could not undertake it, and it was one which was not in accord with American interests.

The third choice, and the one which was chosen, was to give important assistance of all sorts to the Chinese Government and to assist in every way in the preservation of peace in China and the working out of the agreements which were so necessary to enable the Chinese Government to reestablish itself in those parts of China where it had been before and to get, for the first time, into areas of China where it never had been.

Now, I should like briefly to talk about the Chinese Communist situation and the background of that as it existed in 1945 and then I will take up each of the other elements of this problem.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE NATIONALISTS AND COMMUNISTS

The relations between the Nationalist Government and the Communists have had a long history in China. I shall not take time to go through it all.

Prior to 1927, there was a period of collaboration. From 1927 to 1937 there was a period of war. From 1937 onward there was again a period in which the official attitude of both the Government and the Communists was that the differences between them were political in nature, had to be settled by political means; and beginning in 1937 they worked our arrangements for collaboration in fighting the Japanese, which never were very effective, but were agreements between them.

Later on, as you will see, they began working very vigorously at arrangements to bring about a settlement by negotiation in China. This official view was stated by the Generalissimo on September 13, 1943, where he said—and, this is one of many times when he said this from 1937 on—"I am of the opinion that first of all we should clearly recognize that the Chinese Communist problem is a purely political problem and should be solved by political means."

As I said, there was an agreement reached between them in 1937 for their joint efforts against the Japanese. That agreement did not work, and reports were made over and over again that a very large part of the Communist armed forces and a very large part of the Nationalist armed forces were immobilized so far as the war against Japan was concerned because they stood facing one another and maneuvering against one another.

UNITED STATES EFFORTS DURING WAR FOR RECONCILIATION

It was the effort of our Government throughout the war period to try and reach some kind of an arrangement so that these two forces instead of watching one another would both fight the Japanese. If they did that, there was a very important contribution to the war.

I will not go into all the efforts that were made by General Stilwell and others in the early period.

In the spring of 1944 Vice President Wallace went on a mission for President Roosevelt. Among other places, he went to China, and there he had talks with the Generalissimo, and they talked about two of the great important problems that I have been discussing One was Manchuria and the other was the Communists.

The Generalissimo was most anxious to get help of the United States in improving relations, as he stated it, between the United States and the Soviet Union because without that improvement the prospects for China were very difficult, indeed. They discussed what could be done along that line.

They also discussed the Communist problem, and the Generalissimo pointed out vigorously that the Communists were, as he stated it, not people of good faith, claimed that they were not Chinese, that they had their interests with an alien power. But, nevertheless, he said, "This is a political problem and we have got to settle it by political means."

He stated that he would not regard any help from the United States, in attempting that, to be meddling into the internal affairs of China, and he would be grateful for help.

And finally, before Vice President Wallace left China, he reversed the position which he had taken earlier in which he had opposed any American military people having any relations with the Communists, and withdrew his objection to that.

Now, in the fall of 1944, and after these discussions, the President sent another personal representative to China, and that was General Hurley. General Hurley was not then Ambassador. He became

Ambassador in the early part of 1945, but he went out as the personal representative of the President in order to try and unify this military effort, and there, with the consent and approval of the Generalissimo and of his Cabinet, he undertook to act as mediator between the Yenan Communist authorities and the Chungking Nationalist authorities, and they had meetings, some in Yenan at which General Hurley was present, some in Chungking in which they worked out a series of agreements.

Some of these agreements had to do with the conduct of the war, and then some of them went beyond that, and a very important and basic agreement was worked out.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN NATIONALISTS AND COMMUNISTS IN 1945

The beginning of it was under the mediation of General Hurley. It was announced on October 11, 1945, and that was the agreement on the general principles of a peaceful settlement of the differences between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalists.

It was announced after General Hurley's departure from China and was made public, as I said, on October 11. This called for the convening of the National Assembly and for a political consultative conference of all party and nonparty leaders.

It called for the inauguration of a constitutional government for all of China; for the formation of a committee of government and Communist representatives to discuss the reorganization of the armies and the reduction of all the armed forces in China.

Now, these agreements were of the greatest possible importance, and they established the basis for the efforts which General Marshall later took on.

May I just pause again for a moment to point out that the problem between the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communists differed in one important respect from the relations between—from the problems of governments, say, in Europe after the war with Communists in their country, because in China the Communists were not scattered through the population as an element of the population. They were people who had a defined area, with a large population subject to their control, 116 million.

They had a government of their own; they had an army of their own; and, in effect, they had a separate country within China, and the task was to put these two things together so that there would be one country and one government. Now, that was what they were working on.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Secretary, I hate to interrupt, but you said October 11, 1945.

Secretary ACHESON. 1945.

Senator SALTONSTALL. You meant that? That was a year after Hurley was there, then?

Secretary ACHESON. No; Mr. Hurley left in 1945; he left just before this.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Oh.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Who signed those agreements—those agreements? You said they worked out agreements. Who signed them?

Secretary **Acheson**. They were agreements between the Chinese Government, the Nationalist Government, and the Communist authorities at Yenan.

Senator **Wiley**. They both signed it?

Secretary **Acheson**. Yes, sir.

Now, I have dealt with the background of this Communist business, and I am coming back to that, when we get to the mission of General Marshall.

I now want to go back and deal with a problem that has to do with another important aspect of this thing, and that is, Manchuria.

I want to talk about Yalta.

THE YALTA AGREEMENTS AND MANCHURIA

The Yalta agreements were made in the very early part of 1945. Later on, in August of 1945, treaties were signed between the Chinese Nationalist Government and the Soviet Union, which grew out of and were based upon these Yalta agreements.

Now, first of all, the Yalta agreements, from the point of view of the wartime effort, and the interest of the United States and its major fighting allies—I think this has been referred to many times, and I shall make it brief—at the time these agreements were entered into at Yalta, we did not know whether we had an atomic bomb or not. That was not proved until some months later, that we had one, and it was not used until considerably later.

It was the then military opinion, concurred in by everyone, that the reduction of Japan would have to be brought about by a large scale landing on the islands of Japan, and the forecast of that fighting, which came from the fighting on the other islands in the Pacific, indicated that it would be a very bloody and terrible battle.

It was of the utmost importance that the Russians should come into the war in the Far East, in time.

Now, there was very little doubt that they would come in, but the grave danger was that they would really wait until the war was over, and until we had expended our effort and blood to win the war, and they would come in and do what they wished.

It was very important, in the view of the military people, and the others, too, present, that they should come in in time, so that none of the 700,000 Japanese troops in Manchuria, and none, if possible, of the 1,235,000 Japanese troops in China, would come back to strengthen the troops on the main islands of Japan; but that they would be occupied with the Russian effort on the mainland.

That was the purpose, and in making the agreements, the price which was paid for the agreements was that 3 months after the end of European war, the Russians would enter the Far East war; that they should have the southern half of Sakhalin, the Kuriles; that their former rights in Port Arthur and Dairen should be returned to them; and their former interest in the two railways in Manchuria.

The Russians took the same attitude toward these rights that the Chinese took toward their rights in Formosa.

The Russians had lost theirs to the Japanese by war in 1904; the Chinese had lost theirs to the Japanese by war in 1895.

Russia made its claim for those rights, and the claims were granted at this meeting at Yalta.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Would the Secretary mind an interruption at this point?

Chairman RUSSELL. He stated that he preferred not to be——

Secretary ACHESON. If I could get through, first.

Chairman RUSSELL. What is your preference in the matter, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary ACHESON. I would very much appreciate it if I could make my statement first, because I might get badly off, if I got into side discussions.

It is hard to keep so much material in one's mind.

One of the other things that I should like to point out about Yalta was that unquestionably the Russians had it in their power not only to take what was conceded to them, but much more, besides.

There was very little likelihood that anybody would have the will, and few people could have the power, to throw them out of any area on the mainland which they might occupy, and where they might wish to remain, so that this agreement gave them the basis for a legal claim to something considerably less than they might have taken without a legal claim.

I should also like to point out that at the time the Chinese entered into this treaty with the Russians, a few months after Yalta, that is, in August 1945, they regarded the arrangements which they had made with the Russians on the basis of Yalta, as very satisfactory.

Such statements were expressed by the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, and by the Chinese foreign minister. In fact, in 1947 the Chinese foreign minister expressed grave apprehension that the Soviet Union might cancel the treaty with China of 1945, in which China had conferred these rights to the bases in Port Arthur, the interests in Dairen, and the interest in the railway.

They regarded that as a very valuable treaty because it also carried with it the obligation of the Russians to evacuate Manchuria, to recognize the Chinese Nationalist Government, and to aid in the reestablishment of Chinese soverignty in Manchuria.

Now these agreements, as I shall point out later on, did have a very important effect and bearing when it came to the question of the reoccupation of Manchuria by the Chinese, because it was on the basis of these agreements that both the Chinese Communists and the Russians agreed to occupation by the National Government's forces.

PROBLEM OF DISARMING THE JAPANESE IN CHINA

Now may I speak briefly about the problem of the Japanese, and here I shall have to get a little bit out of the chronological thing and perhaps run this Japanese part through to its end.

I have pointed out to you the very great importance of the presence of the Japanese in China, the 1,235,000 troops, 1,700,000 civilians. It was decided very early in the game, between the Chinese Government, the Nationalist Government and ourselves, that one of our major efforts must be to get these people out of China and back into Japan.

That wouldn't have been too hard a job to do if they were all just marching on to ships. The great difficulty about it was that these armed soldiers controlled most of the important cities in central China, in southeast China, and east China, and also the main lines of communication.

If they had been told to drop their guns on the ground and march to the coast at once, those areas would have been occupied by the Communists, and the Nationalist Government forces would never have gotten in there without fighting.

Therefore, the task was to have the Japanese evacuate the areas which they held at the time when the Government forces could be moved and were moved by us into those areas. That was the task to perform.

In order to do that we landed 50,000 marines in China. The function of these marines was to occupy the principal seaports, to guard the principal rail lines close to those seaports, and later to take over the areas along the eastern coast where coal was produced and guard the lines along which the coal came to the principal consuming centers. That was to allow the industrial life of China to continue, and those coal areas and the coal railroads were being constantly raided by the Communists.

So the marines had to go in there, hold coal, which was the heart of the industrial life of China, hold the seaports so that they would not be captured by Communists, and then receive the Japanese as they were marched to the railheads and down their railroads, and put them on ships and take them back to Japan.

At the same time our Armed Forces airlifted Chinese armies, whole armies, from south China into the areas to be evacuated and which were being evacuated by the Japanese. Now that was a tremendous undertaking most skillfully carried out, and it was that undertaking which permitted the Chinese Government to really get back into areas of China which it would have had the utmost difficulty in even getting into without that colossal effort.

By the end of 1946 we had removed 3,000,000 Japanese, just a few thousand under 3,000,00, from China to Japan—one of the great mass movements of people.

ARMED CLASHES IN 1945 AND EFFECT ON JAPANESE EVACUATION

After the agreements between the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists that I have spoken of in 1945, October 11, 1945, armed clashes broke out again between the two parties; and both the Government authorities, the Chinese Government authorities, and the American Government authorities, were gravely disturbed that civil war would break out.

If that happened, then the whole chance of dealing with any of the problems which you and I have been discussing this morning would disappear.

If there was civil war going on in China, fighting between the Government forces and the Communists forces, all possibility of removing the Japanese either disappeared or was gravely diminished.

The possibility of occupying North China became much dimmer; the possibility of moving into Manchuria became nonexistent; and the possibility of really getting any reforms in south China or any other part of China would be greatly diminished. So, the peace became a major objective of both the Chinese Government and the United States Government in its efforts to help the Chinese Government.

It was in that situation that General Marshall was asked by the President to go to China at the end of 1945.

Senator WILEY. 1945?

Secretary ACHESON. At the end of 1945. He went in December, arriving there early in January, I believe, 1946.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE MARSHALL MISSION TO CHINA

At the outset I will go into a matter of detail which really is quite out of place in the broad picture which I am trying to paint for you here; but, since it has been talked about a great deal, I think it is important to clear it up, and that is the preparation of the instructions which were issued to General Marshall.

I think he was questioned about that, and there have been various charges and countercharges having to do with the preparation of those instructions. The story is very simple.

At the end of November 1945, Secretary Byrnes and General Marshall met. This was after General Marshall had been asked to go to China.

Secretary Byrnes read him a memorandum suggesting the outline of instructions for him. General Marshall did not approve of it.

General Marshall said that he would wish to try his own hand, assisted by some of his associates, in drafting the instructions.

This he did; and a draft was prepared by him, in conjunction with four generals who were working very closely with General Marshall. This was submitted to Secretary Byrnes.

On the 8th of December Secretary Byrnes made his suggestions to General Marshall—that is, suggestions of changes or alterations or additions to the draft prepared by General Marshall.

General Marshall's draft, with Secretary Byrnes' suggestions, was discussed at a meeting in Secretary Byrnes' office on Sunday morning, December 9, 1945, by Secretary Byrnes, General Marshall, Mr. John Carter Vincent, General Hull, and myself. I was then Under Secretary of State.

Those of us went over the instructions. General Marshall approved the suggestions made by Secretary Byrnes, and we then had a completely agreed draft.

In the course of that meeting the outline of a letter from the President to General Marshall was discussed, and directions were given for its preparation.

There was also approved at the meeting a memorandum from Secretary Byrnes to the Secretary of War, requesting certain help in connection with the removal of the Japanese and the movement of Chinese armies into the north and laying down certain restrictions on those movements.

There was also agreed upon the form of a press release, I believe—it was agreed that day or a few days later—but the important papers were agreed at that meeting.

They were taken up by Secretary Byrnes with the President, who went over them; and they were put in final shape, unchanged from the agreements of December 9.

The President then had a meeting with General Marshall, at which I was present—there were three of us at that meeting, the President, General Marshall, and myself—and at that point the signed letter and the enclosure were handed to General Marshall.

It was ascertained by the President at that meeting that these papers were unanimously approved and agreeable to all concerned, and to himself.

Now, that is the account of the preparation of these instructions.

All the papers concerned are printed in the white book, with one exception. The press release, which I mentioned a moment ago, which was given out on the 15th of December—everything in the press release was in General Marshall's instructions. In other words, the press release was a verbatim statement of what was in the instructions to General Marshall, except that certain paragraphs in the instructions were omitted from the press release.

One of those omissions had to do with what is printed in the white paper and in the memorandum from Secretary Byrnes to the Secretary of War. That was the discretion and authority given to General Marshall in not moving Nationalist Government troops into areas in which there was fighting until he thought that that was a wise thing to do.

That was not to be stated and released because, obviously, it wouldn't work if it were.

Two other omissions had to do with things which we would do if the Chinese Government asked us to do it. Obviously, you do not print in the newspapers that you will do something if somebody else asks you to. You leave it to the other person to ask you to do that if they wish. That is the story of the instructions.

AGREEMENTS BETWEEN NATIONALISTS AND COMMUNISTS IN 1946

General Marshall arrived in China at the very end of December 1945. By February 1946 three major agreements had been reached between the Chinese Government and the Communists. These agreements grew out of the earlier agreements of October 11, 1945, which discussed the general principles for working out peacefully the differences between the Communists and the Government.

The agreements of January and February 1946 carried into considerable detail how this should be done. In regard to these three agreements which I shall describe, General Marshall had a part only in one, and that was in the first one.

The first agreement was for the cessation of hostilities. It provided that all fighting should cease, and it provided for the setting up of an executive headquarters in which there would be American chairmanship and Nationalist and Communist representation, the purpose of this executive headquarters being to bring the fighting to an end, and these tripartite teams were set up which went to every area where there was any clashing between the troops, and together they brought that fighting to an end and tried to have that truce develop into a more substantial truce.

General Marshall played a very considerable part in working this out. The executive headquarters was the really great instrumentality which set up and worked very well until the two parties fell apart—then nothing worked.

The second agreement was an agreement for governmental reorganization and for a constitutional government, and the third agreement was for a military reorganization and the integration of the Communist forces into the National Government.

As I said, General Marshall participated in the negotiations for the cessation of hostilities, but he did not participate in working out the second or the third agreement.

The second agreement for working out a constitutional government recognized the preponderant strength of the Kuomintang position in the National Government. It provided that there was to be an interim state council, sort of a provisional government, which would govern until the new constitution was established and elections were held throughout China and a constitutional government was set up in which all the people of China would have their representatives, and which would function on a two-party or multiparty system.

The interim state council was to function in this interim period as the supreme organ of the state. The Kuomintang Party was given 20 of the 40 seats in this national council. The other 20 seats were distributed among the Communists and the other parties and to some nonparty people. It was provided that the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, as the President of China, should select all the members of the council, that is, he would select those from his own party and those from all the other parties. However, he would have to appoint a certain number from these other minority parties. That would leave him with 20 people whom he had selected from his own party, with 20 people whom he had selected from the other parties, including the Communists, and it would also leave him with a veto over any action of this council which could only be overridden by a three-fifths vote, which could not be done if his own party stayed with him.

Now, that, I say, was the temporary government, That was to continue until the constitution was to be agreed upon on May 4, through the National Assembly, May 4, 1946, and it was hoped that at an early date, sometime in 1946 or 1947, I believe it was, there could be an election, and they would then set up a regular constitutional government with legislative, judicial, and executive branches, in which all parts of China would be represented, so that this country would have a government extending over all of the area.

The third agreement had to do with the amalgamation of the forces, and that was the most important one. It provided that there should be a great reduction in forces on both sides, because China could not support the tremendous military establishment which existed on the Nationalist side and on the Communist side together.

The army was to consist of 60 divisions. Of those 60 divisions, 50 were to be National Government divisions and 10 were to be Communist divisions. These divisions were to be grouped together in armies, armies which would contain three divisions or whatever the Chinese military order of battle is. There would be several divisions in each army.

The divisions were to be stationed in certain numerical strengths in various parts of China.

The important thing here about the agreement, as we look back on it, was that, so far as Manchuria was concerned, the agreement provided that in Manchuria there should be 15 divisions of the new government's troops. Of those 15 divisions, 14 should be national government divisions and one should be a Communist division. That was of the greatest possible importance. If that could have been carried out, the whole situation might have been very different.

DETERIORATION OF CHINESE SITUATION LATER IN 1946

In 1946 the situation of comparative peace which had been brought about as a result of the agreements in the early part of the year began to deteriorate. Fighting broke out in various places.

General Marshall, in trying to stop this fighting, through the executive headquarters, got drawn into greater detail in some of the political negotiations between the two parties, because this fighting rapidly took on political aspects.

One side or the other would believe that it could gain an advantage by capturing this or that city or area, and believed it could strengthen itself in the negotiations; and then would start an attack. Either the Communists would attack the Nationalists or the Nationalists would attack the Communists, and in that way this situation became worse and worse; and General Marshall's efforts were unable to deal with it.

Therefore, the whole discussions between the Communists and the Nationalists in the attempt to work out the interim government, and the long-term constitutional government, got into more and more and more confusion and trouble.

The Prime Minister of China, Dr. Sun Fo, has an interesting comment on this period. In a New Year's message which he delivered on January 1, 1949, speaking of the period which I have been discussing, he said:

> The Government had decided to call this conference because it was generally realized that the country and the people needed recuperation and peace, so that rehabilitation work could be started. Had these measures been carried out at that time, all of us would have seen more prosperity and happiness in our midst. Unfortunately, all the parties concerned could not completely abandon their own selfish ends, and the people in general did not exert sufficient influence in promoting this peace movement.

CONCLUSION OF MEDIATION EFFORT EARLY IN 1947

The result of the breakdown was that the situation developed into one of very considerable fighting by the end of 1946, and when General Marshall left China in January 1947, to return to Washington, the American effort to mediate in this struggle between the Government and the Communists ended.

General Marshall issued a long statement, which I shall not bother to read to you now, but it sums up very clearly his understanding of the difficulties which brought failure to his mission, and his understanding of the difficulties in the Chinese Government which could not really permit it to function unless they were removed.

These difficulties, in some respects, had their roots in the fact that the liberal elements in the Kuomintang Party were the ones which were dealt with much more severely by the war and the inflation. Inflation and war tend to eliminate the middle class, and that is where the liberal elements came into the Kuomintang; and, as the inflation and the war went forward, the power in the party shifted more to the extreme right wing; and General Marshall, in his farewell message, spoke of the importance of more liberal leadership in the Kuomintang Party itself.

But as I say, the effort to mediate came to an end with with his departure. From then on we go into the military period of the struggle between the two Governments.

MILITARY GAINS BY NATIONALISTS IN 1946 AND 1947

The Nationalist Government reached a peak of its military holdings toward the end of 1946. In the middle of 1946 it had approximately 3,000,000 men under arms. These were opposed by something over 1,000,000 Communist troops of whom about 400,000 were not regulars but were guerrilla troops.

Until the end of 1946 and the early part of 1947, the gains, the military gains made by the Nationalist Government appeared to be impressive, but in fact they were not, and General Marshall repeatedly pointed out to the Government that what it was doing was overextending itself militarily and politically, since it neither had sufficient troops to garrison this whole area nor did it have sufficient administrators to administer the areas that it was taking over.

Therefore, what it was doing by this military advance was weakening itself both militarily and through administrative ineptitude, because it didn't have the necessary administrators; it was not giving the people of the occupied areas what they had been led to expect when the National Government came in, so politically it was doing itself harm, and militarily it was doing itself harm.

General Barr points out it was during this period that what he calls the war psychology took possession of the Chinese Nationalist Army. He had pointed out over and over again that in modern warfare the most disastrous of all things to do is to retreat into a city behind walls and take a defensive position. Modern warfare must be a war of maneuver.

Therefore, time and time and time again these Nationalist lines got pushed way forward; finally, the troops at the end take up defensive positions behind some kind of walls, a long line of communication has to be guarded, which eventually is cut, and over and over again the troops at the end of the line either go over to the side of the enemy without firing a shot, or sufficient of them do so that those who want to fight can't fight.

That was the story of the war from 1946 on. At first, it looked very successful—lots of areas occupied, important cities taken—but the armies all go to garrison, they become immobilized, and maneuver and initiative is left with the Communists.

At the end of 1946 the Government had 2,600,000 men under arms and the Communists had about 1,100,000 of regulars.

However, in firepower, in rifle firepower, the Government still enjoyed a superiority of three or four to one over the Communists.

In 1946, when this fighting started, General Marshall was acting as mediator. He called on both sides to stop the fighting. Both professed to want to do it, but did not do it.

Therefore, General Marshall asked for and obtained from this Government an embargo on the shipment of combat matériel into China. That embargo lasted from the time it was imposed in 1946, the exact date I do not have with me——

Senator **Brewster**. You don't have that date?

Secretary **Acheson**. I have it here. We will look it up and put it in in a minute—until May 1947. During that time the Nationalists were winning the battles, they won the fights they had, they occupied the cities, but they immobilized themselves.

NECESSITY FOR REFORM IN NATIONALIST CHINA

We have talked from time to time here about the great necessity for reform in China. General Marshall, during his mission to China, stressed that over and over again with the Generalissimo, pointing out that the whole possibility of any kind of armed action against the Communists must at last rest upon a belief in the country and their own belief that they had something which was worth fighting for, and was progressive and good, and that if we did not have reform in China, we were never going to get this spirit which was necessary to fight and defeat the Communists.

WEDEMEYER MISSION AND REPORT

After General Marshall returned in the summer of 1947, the President, on the recommendation of General Marshall, sent General Wedemeyer to China on a fact-finding mission. General Wedemeyer, before he left, stressed again, as he had in 1945, the great importance and the necessity for reform.

He said before he left the United States:

> To regain and maintain the confidence of the people, the Central Government will have to effect immediately drastic and far-reaching political and economic reforms. Promises will no longer suffice. Performance is absolutely necessary. It should be accepted that military force in itself will not eliminate communism.

General Wedemeyer went to China and returned. He made recommendations, which are printed in the white paper, in which he recommended assistance of economic and military equipment for a 5-year period, which would require congressional authorization. Although his actual recommendations do not call for a grant of military aid, it is possible to read that in. He does talk about the desirability of that.

However, General Wedemeyer recognized the desirability and importance of avoiding direct United States involvement in the civil war in China by stating:

> Although advice indicated above—

that is, technical military advice—

> does provide advice indirectly to tactical force, it should be carried on outside operational areas to prevent the criticism that American personnel are actively engaged in fratricidal warfare.

ECONOMIC AID TO CHINA

There are other recommendations in the Wedemeyer report which I shall not dwell upon at the present time. We are now directing our attention to the aid part of it.

The Secretary of State, General Marshall, then had prepared, and with the approval of the President, sent to Congress a recommendation for aid to China. He made before the Foreign Relations Committee a very frank statement of the problems facing the United States Government in considering aid to China.

He made it clear that there were steps which had to be taken and could only be taken by the Chinese Government, which were essential to meet the Communist threat.

And, he took the position strongly, that the United States Government had to be extremely careful that it did not commit itself to a policy involving the absorption of its resources to an unpredictable extent by assuming a direct responsibility for the civil war in China, and for the Chinese economy.

He also pointed out that we must be prepared to face the possibility that the Chinese Government might not be able to maintain itself against the Chinese Communist forces.

That was stated quite clearly by General Marshall. In fact, he said:

> An attempt to underwrite the Chinese economy and the Chinese Government's military efforts will result in a burden on the United States economy and a military responsibility which I cannot recommend as a course of action for this Government.

Now, the program of aid which General Marshall presented was a program of $570 million in economic assistance over a 15-month period. He pointed out that the experience gained in the program would throw light on the possibilities of future programs.

The program was sufficient in size, it was thought, to free the major portion of the Chinese Government's own foreign exchange assets for the purchase of such military supplies, from foreign sources, as it might need.

It was not recommended that we should have military advisers in combat areas.

It was not recommended that we should take measures of military aid which would lead to United States military intervention in China, or direct involvement in the civil war.

Now, this question was very carefully considered in the executive branch, at a meeting in June 1948, attended by Secretary Marshall, Secretary of the Army Royall, General Bradley, and General Wedemeyer, and the decision which I have just spoken of was taken.

MILITARY AID TO CHINA

There was already a United States military advisory group in China that had been established in 1946, and in 1947 the commanding officer of this group had been authorized to give advice on a confidential basis to the Generalissimo, advice of a strategic nature, but the United States was not willing to assume responsibility for the strategic direction of the war.

General Marshall in a message to General Barr pointed out one reason why. He said:

> I think you will agree that implications of our accepting that responsibility would be very far-reaching and grave, and that such responsibility is in logic inseparable from the authority to make it effective. Whatever the Generalissimo may feel moved to say with respect to his willingness to delegate necessary powers to Americans, I know from my own experience that advice is always listened to very politely but not infrequently ignored when deemed unpalatable.

Therefore we did not take responsibility for the strategic direction of the war, nor did we recommend that American officers should be with troops in combat areas.

This recommendation was considered by the Eightieth Congress. The Eightieth Congress—and I shall not go through a whole long story—the Senate bill reduced the period of time from 15 months to 12 months. It reduced, split the appropriations and recommended $338,000,000 for economic aid and $125,000,000 as a special grant to be used at the discretion of the Chinese Government.

The debate indicates that the Chinese Government would probably use this 125 for military aid. In the course of the legislative history the House put in a provision authorizing military advice on the so-called Greek model, that is, having officers with troops in combat areas and strategic advice. That was stricken out by the Senate, and in speaking about it Senator Vandenberg said:

> As in the case of Greece and Turkey, your committee recognizes that military aid is necessary in order to make economic aid effective. It proposes to make military supplies available at China's option. Your committee believes that as a matter of elementary prudence that this process must be completely clear of any implication that we are underwriting the military campaign of the Nationalist Government.

And, as I say, the House provision was stricken out.

That was agreed to in conference, and the bill was passed chiefly as written by the Senate.

I said that the bill authorized $338,000,000 for economic aid. However, when it came to the appropriation process, Congress only appropriated $275,000,000 for economic aid and $125,000,000 for military aid. So a total was actually made available by the Congress of $400,000,000 as against $570,000,000 requested.

DETERIORATION OF NATIONALIST MILITARY SITUATION, 1947–49

I shall not go in detail through the campaigns of 1947 more than I have already done. The real collapse of the Government in a military way began in the latter part of 1948. The first large-scale defection and collapse occurred in September 1948 with the fall of Tsinan, where Government forces without any effort at all went over to the other side and surrendered with all their matériel.

The United States Army Intelligence Review of Military Developments in 1948, in January 1949, sums it up this way:

> The Nationalists entered 1948 with an estimated strength of 2,723,000 troops. Recruitment and replacement of combat losses kept this figure constant through mid-September. By February 1, 1949, however, heavy losses had reduced Nationalist strength to a million and a half, of which approximately 500,000 are service troops. This represents a reduction of 45 percent of the Nationalist Government's total strength in a 4½-month period.
>
> Communist strength, estimated at 1,150,000 a year ago, has mounted to 1,622, virtually all combat effectives. Whereas the Nationalists began 1948 with almost a 3-to-1 numerical superiority, the Communist forces now outnumber the total Nationalist strength and have achieved better than a 1½-to-1 superiority in combat effectives.
>
> The events of the last year, and more specifically those of the last 4½ months, have resulted in such overwhelming losses to the National Government that, actingalone, its military position has declined beyond possible recoupment.
>
> On the other hand, these same events have so enhanced the position and capabilities of the Communists that they are now capable of achieving a complete military victory over the Communist forces.

Chairman RUSSELL. Nationalist forces.

Secretary ACHESON. I mean Nationalist forces.

In mid-November, 1948, General Barr, who was the head of the military mission to China, reported to the Department of the Army:

> I am convinced that the military situation has deteriorated to the point where only the active participation of United States troops could effect a remedy. No battle has been lost since my arrival due to lack of ammunition or equipment. Their military debacles, in my opinion, can all be attributed to the world's worst leadership and many other morale-destroying factors that led to a complete loss of the will to fight.

In another report early in 1949, he explained some of the causes for the National Government defeats. He says:

> The Government committed its first politico-military blunder by concentrating on the purely military reoccupation of former Japanese-held areas. It gave very little realization to the regional areas or the creation of efficient local administrations. Its strategy was burdened by an unsound strategy conceived by a politically influenced and militarily inept high command.
>
> Throughout the structure and machinery of the National Government there are interlocking ties of interests, family, financial, and political. No Chinese, no matter how efficient, can hope for a position of authority because he is the best-qualified man. He must have other backing. In too many cases, such backing was the support and loyalty of the Generalissimo and his army comrades, which kept them in posts of responsibility regardless of their qualifications. The direct result has been the unsound strategy and faulty tactics of the Nationalists in their fight against the Communists.

Senator WILEY. Whose report was that?

Secretary ACHESON. That is General Barr, United States Army.

LOSS OF UNITED STATES MATÉRIEL TO CHINESE COMMUNISTS

By the end of 1948 the struggle in North China had virtually ended with the complete collapse of the Nationalist armies. Eighty percent of all the matériel which we had furnished, both during the war and after, to the National Government, was lost; and 75 percent of that is estimated to have been captured by the Communists.

One reason for this large capture, General Barr points out, when he says—

> that the Chinese Nationalist Government never destroyed any—the troops never destroyed any of the matériel, when they were about to surrender or run.

He says:

> The Chinese seemed inherently unable to destroy anything of value.

SUMMARY OF UNITED STATES EFFORTS IN CHINA

Now, at the very end of my remarks here, I briefly sum up some of the things, material and otherwise, which the United States did in aid of its policy in China.

Speaking first of things on which it is impossible to put a dollar value, first is the aid rendered by the United States forces in China in planning and in carrying out the movement of the Chinese Government forces into the areas occupied by the Japanese.

Second is the evacuation of the Japanese troops from those areas.

Third is the aid rendered by the United States marines in North China; in occupying key areas and maintaining control for the Government of essential railway lines until the Government was able to take over.

Fourth, the aid provided by the United States military advisory group.

Apart from this, the United States Government, in the period from VJ-day until early 1949, authorized grants and credits to China totaling approximately $2,000,000,000, of which approximately $1,600,000,000 were grants, and $400,000,000 were on credit terms.

This total is divided almost equally between military and economic aid. The amounts do not include United States surplus property, except where the sales were on credit terms.

Surplus property, with a total estimated procurement cost of over a billion dollars, has been sold to China for the agreed realization to the United States of $230,000,000, of which $95,000,000 were on credit terms.

By the spring of 1949 the military position of the Chinese Government collapsed to the point where the Chinese Communists controlled the major centers of population, and railways from Manchuria south to the Yangtze.

The military collapse of the Chinese Government had, for the most part, been the consequence of inept political and military leadership, and a lack of the will to fight on the part of its armies, rather than inadequate military supplies.

It was at that time the considered judgment of responsible United States Government observers in China that only the extension of unlimited American economic and military aid involving the use of our own troops and operations which might require the extensive control of Chinese Government operations would enable the Nationalist Government to maintain a foothold in South China.

It was believed that United States involvement in Chinese civil war under the existing conditions would be clearly contrary to American interests.

As the last note of this tragic story, I should like to read you the message of the Acting President of China, General Li Tsung-jen.

Senator WILEY. What is the date?

Secretary ACHESON. May 5, 1949, in a letter which he addressed to President Truman. He says:

> This policy—

he had described our help to China during the war, and then he had discussed our aid to China after the war as I have described it to you. He says:

> This policy of friendly assistance was continued when some years ago General Marshall under instructions from your good self took up the difficult task of mediation in our conflict with the Chinese Communists to which he devoted painstaking effort. All this work was unfortunately rendered fruitless by the lack of sincerity on the part of both the then Government and the Chinese Communists.
>
> In spite of this your country continued to extend its aid to our Government. It is regrettable that owing to the failure of our then Government to make judicious use of this aid and to bring about appropriate political, economic, and military reforms your assistance has not produced the desired effect. To this failure is attributable the present predicament in which our country finds itself.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is a very clear, concise statement, Mr. Secretary.

I believe that I now have a better idea of what our policy has been, I might say, after World War II, than I had. I didn't keep myself informed of our policies in China as I should, perhaps.

Chairman CONNALLY. Was that the Acting President?

Secretary ACHESON. The Acting President, the man who succeeded when Chiang Kai-shek retired—General Li Tsung-jen became Acting President, and remained Acting President until General Chiang Kai-shek resumed the Presidency in, I believe, 1950.

May I answer a question of Senator Brewster's?

You asked me for the date of the embargo. It was imposed in August 1946, and lifted in May 1947.

Senator BREWSTER. Do you know whether or not arms shipments were resumed, following the lifting of the embargo?

Secretary ACHESON. I can probably find out. I just do not happen to have it in my mind.

Senator BREWSTER. All right.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley, I believe it is your time for questioning.

Senator WILEY. All right, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I think that you should be complimented on a pretty clear-cut statement as to the facts that heretofore were not brought to our attention in relation to this Chinese situation, and a very clear-cut statement of the complex position that we occupied in seeking to find the way to combat the Communist influence.

POSSIBLE COMMUNIST SYMPATHIZERS IN STATE DEPARTMENT

What have you to say about the purported influence of Communist sympathizers in the Department during this period, in arriving at the various steps which were finally arrived at?

Secretary ACHESON. Senator Wiley, I think this whole matter has been discussed at very great length before the Foreign Relations Committee by Secretary Byrnes, when those charges were originally made in 1946.

I do not believe that the officers of the State Department who were either attached to the Military Establishment, first under General Stilwell, and then under General Wedemeyer, or the officers attached to our diplomatic and consular missions, had any other purpose in mind at any time than their service to the United States and serving American interests.

I think that during the war their great effort was the one which I have discussed here this morning, of trying to bring all forces in China together for the purpose of fighting the Japanese.

I think you will find that running throughout the voluminous documents in the white paper, in which the reports of some of those officers are reprinted. I do not believe there was or is any Communist influence any way affecting the determination of Chinese policy, either then or now.

PREPARATION OF MARSHALL'S INSTRUCTIONS FOR CHINA MISSION

Senator WILEY. You did say, I believe, in your statement that in 1945 General Marshall prepared what he thought the instructions should be, and there were four others who worked with him.

Did I understand you correctly, that there were four others who help him? He prepared one statement, and I understood you to say Secretary Byrnes had a statement and that out of these two statements came the amalgamated instructions that went finally under the approval of the President to Marshall.

I may not have understood you correctly that Marshall had worked out his with the aid of somebody else.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator WILEY. Who were those four?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't remember that I said there were four who assisted him or whether there were four altogether. I believe that the generals who worked with General Marshall were General Handy, General Hull—there is another general whose name slips my mind, but I can look for it here.

Chairman CONNALLY. Wedemeyer?

Secretary ACHESON. I will have it in just a moment.

It was General Handy, General Hull, General Craig, and General Marshall.

Senator WILEY. Thank you.

INTELLIGENCE ON POSSIBLE RUSSIAN INTERVENTION

What reasons, diplomatic or otherwise, are there to believe that if MacArthur's suggestions in Korea had been carried out that Russia would strike? Have you got any intelligence source or anything to indicate that if MacArthur's suggestions had been carried out that Russia would intervene?

Secretary ACHESON. The grave danger, I think, which would be created by the suggestions which involve an attack on the territory of China, would be that that creates a situation which directly involves both Russian self-interest and may very well involve Russian treaty obligations.

I pointed out, I think, in my opening statement that if air and sea attacks were made on China, these would be attacks on the territory of the Soviet Union's principal satellite.

Senator WILEY. I remember that statement very well, Mr. Secretary. Have you any specific information from your intelligence sources or diplomatic sources that would be in addition to what you said in the beginning?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I am not referring in this to any specific information which anyone has reported as to the intention of any particular person. I am talking about the danger of action and the possibility of action which the Russian Government might feel itself called upon to take.

Senator WILEY. Then I think your answer is that there is no additional information from any intelligence source or diplomatic source outside of what you see as a danger situation that would be created. You have no specific information on the subject?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, we have, as you know, a good deal of intelligence information, but what I am trying to say is that is not the sort of information which says that so-and-so stated that he would or would not do something.

POSSIBILITY OF STABLE SETTLEMENT IN KOREA WITHOUT EXTENDING WAR

Senator WILEY. If the Chinese Reds are pushed practically out but we do not destroy the feeder rail lines and the Chinese north thereof, do you think the Chinese Reds will remain quiet?

Secretary ACHESON. The problem of the future possibility of any Chinese attack has some, of course, important relation to where the fighting at any time might end, but fundamentally it is not I think influenced by that. It doesn't make any difference exactly where the fighting may end.

The point is, is a settlement going to be made or is it not going to be made where the Chinese will not have the will and the desire to come back in and fight again?

If the forces were pushed back to the Yalu River in accordance with your hypothesis here, if installations behind that were attacked, then their tack would be to recreate them or find some substitute for them. The important element in bringing this thing to a stable end would be to change the will to do this.

Senator WILEY. Well, let me substitute the name "Kremlin" for the "Chinese Reds" and say that if the Chinese Reds are pushed back of the Yalu but you do not destroy the feeder rail line and the nests north thereof, do you think the Kremlin will remain quiet and not intervene?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I don't believe that the destruction of those facilities would have any bearing on whether they would remain—well, I shouldn't say that. Let me start over again.

I do not believe that destruction of those rail lines would operate to induce them to remain quiet. I think it would have the opposite effect.

Senator WILEY. Well, I guess that is one way of answering it, but the real question was if we do not destroy them, but we do push them back, do you think the Russians will remain quiet?

In other words, if we just get them back of the Yalu and leave them up there, have you any information or any judgment that we haven't got so far as to what the Russians will or will not do under those circumstances?

Secretary ACHESON. I think that we have given you the information which bears on this question.

EFFECT OF MARCH 20 MESSAGE TO MAC ARTHUR ON HIS DISCRETION AS THEATER COMMANDER

Senator WILEY. Do you think that General MacArthur, 8,000 miles away, fighting a real war, due to the message of March 20, had less power to negotiate with an enemy commander than he had before?

Secretary ACHESON. I should think that the message of May 20 pointed out to him the situation as it existed before and should continue to exist.

Senator BREWSTER. May 20?

Secretary ACHESON. March 20. In other words, the negotiations carried on by a commander in the field with enemy forces is, in cases that I know about, conducted at the direction of his Government.

That was the case in the earlier statement which General MacArthur made along, I believe, in September or October of 1950. That statement was one prepared in Washington, sent to him, and was issued by him at the direction of this Government, and when he repeated it later, that was again done upon the direction of this Government.

Senator WILEY. What is the answer; "Yes" or "No"? Do you think General MacArthur had less power to negotiate with an enemy because of this message than he had before?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I am pointing out that I think he had the same power that he had before.

Senator WILEY. O. K. Was the letter of MacArthur to Congressman Martin the match that touched off the power keg, so to speak, figuratively?

Secretary ACHESON. I think that was the thing which produced the meeting on the 6th of April which had the consequences which you know.

FOREIGN OPINION OF MAC ARTHUR

Senator WILEY. I think you have stated that the foreign powers did not have anything to say about the recall of General MacArthur. Of course they had no power, I suppose. Was there any expression of opinion by any of them before or after the so-called letter to Martin was exposed?

Secretary ACHESON. Senator, you asked us to find, if we could, anything we have in our files indicating that foreign governments requested, brought about in any way the removal of General MacArthur, and I pointed out that we have nothing of that sort.

You also asked us to see if we have in our files anything which foreign governments stated, anything critical of General MacArthur. We have not as yet found anything of that sort. We are continuing to look in the files.

Senator WILEY. And you have no personal recollection of any talks or other contacts with them on that subject?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; I have not.

Senator WILEY. Do you think it was MacArthur's duty to suggest what he thought should be the appropriate strategy even though his ideas might run contrary to the Chief of Staff?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I think that the field commander not only could but should make any suggestions that he thinks proper to the Chiefs of Staff.

Senator WILEY. Do you recall that the testimony I think of all of them showed that he was not insubordinate and he violated no military directives?

Secretary ACHESON. I recall the testimony.

Senator WILEY. And I think you testified yesterday that out of the four or five hundred copies of the paper we discussed were sent out for the benefit of the Voice of America, that none that you know of was sent to MacArthur; is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; I don't think that is correct.

Senator WILEY. What is the fact?

Secretary ACHESON. I did not say that a copy was sent to General MacArthur as an individual. A copy was sent to the headquarters, the military headquarters in Tokyo, and it was that copy which was the one that was inadvertently shown to the press.

QUESTION OF MAC ARTHUR'S SUPPORT OF UNITED STATES POLICY

Senator WILEY. Now if we take the President's message on page 189 of the compilation, you will notice that the President says:

> * * * I have concluded that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States

Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties.

I think you said you helped with others to get out that statement; am I correct?

Secretary ACHESON. I can't find what you are reading from. Would you tell me the page again?

Senator WILEY. 189.

Secretary ACHESON. 189?

Senator WILEY. Right at the top, "Statement of the President." I read the first sentence.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes. This statement by the President was one of the papers which had been prepared following the President's decision on Monday, April 9, I believe it was, and which was brought back to a meeting in the White House on the afternoon of Tuesday, the 10th of April.

I did see this paper and I did collaborate with General Marshall in the preparation of it.

Senator WILEY. In view of the fact that the President says he is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties, I am asking you: What evidence is there of his failure to carry out any policies in view of your previous statement that said he was not insubordinate, and he had not violated any military directive? We are talking about broad terms—policy.

Secretary ACHESON. What these words mean to me is very clear, Senator, that it is the President's statement that General MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties.

The policies, I believe, which are in particular reference here are those policies which have to do with limiting the hostilities to Korea and not taking steps which may extend them into Manchuria or China and possibly beyond that.

I think it was very clear indeed that General MacArthur was unable to give his wholehearted support to those policies, that he had stated so publicly, and that there was a situation there in which there was public disagreement between the President of the United States, with his responsibilities under the Constitution, and his responsibilities under the United Nations resolution, and General MacArthur, who was the instrument in the field for carrying out those policies.

Senator WILEY. Then if you refer to the second paragraph, where the President says it is fundamental, however, that military commanders must be governed by the policies and directives issued to them in the manner provided by our laws and Constitution—the same explanation goes for that, too?

Secretary ACHESON. The explanation of that is that I believe it is one of the most fundamental concepts of American constitutional thought, that a military commander must be governed by the policies and by the directives issued to him in accordance with law.

In other words, it is the doctrine of the civil supremacy.

Senator WILEY. Well, our difference, Mr. Secretary, is that you have already said, and others have said, he was not insubordinate, he violated no military directive, it was his privilege to make suggestions, and he made such suggestions; you have shown no place where he violated any of them.

He just differed in what he thought the policy should be. Now, if I am wrong in that, I would like to be corrected.

Secretary ACHESON. He differed and he differed publicly.

Senator WILEY. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON. He, in effect, challenged the policies as laid down by the President.

DIRECTIVE OF DECEMBER 6 ON PUBLIC STATEMENTS

Senator WILEY. Now will you turn to page 194 of the same booklet? There we have, after MacArthur had been fired, an explanation of a statement by General Whitney. Now it says among other things that General Whitney pointed out the following:

> 1. The directive of December 6 was not directed to General MacArthur personally but was directed to all executive agencies of the Government.

Do you disagree with that conclusion?

Secretary ACHESON. I believe it has been stated several times that it was not in terms directed to General MacArthur personally but had a wide address, that is, it was addressed to many people. I believe it has also been stated that the writing of it, the issuance of it, grew out of some situations which did relate to General MacArthur.

Senator WILEY. Well, we will take No. 2:

> Immediately after its receipt, General MacArthur submitted a proposed communiqué to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who informed him, among other things, that it was not necessary to submit communiqués referencing military operations.

Do you think that is correct?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I believe it is. This is a military paper. I think what they are talking about, it is in the files you have before you, is that it was not necessary for him to submit to them his daily report of the progress of the battle. It is purely a factual statement that you put out as to what occurred in the preceding 24 hours.

MAC ARTHUR'S FREEDOM TO SPEAK ON KOREAN WAR

Senator WILEY. No. 3—

> The President, in a press conference in January, appeared to this headquarters to specifically define General MacArthur's authority, but denied that there was any curb on his authority "to speak freely on the Korean War."

Do you agree on that?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; I think that is not an accurate statement of what occurred.

Senator WILEY. What did occur?

Secretary ACHESON. I shall read it to you in just a moment, when I find it here.

The question which was put to the President, was as follows—I understand that the propriety here is that I may read the question, but I may not—I can indicate what the President's reply was, but I am not permitted to quote it—the question was:

> Mr. President, the Chicago Daily News has a story——

Senator BREWSTER. I can't quite hear you.

Secretary Acheson. The question is:

> Mr. President, the Chicago Daily News has a story from Tokyo saying there is evidence that Washington has stripped General MacArthur of authority to speak freely on the Korean War. It says that they have taken away from General MacArthur the authority to issue communiqués on the real situation of the military operations in Korea.

The President indicated that that was not the fact.

> Question. It isn't true——

Senator Wiley. You mean, you can't give us the language of what he said?

Secretary Acheson. It is a perfectly silly thing. The language is "It isn't true." I have given you the language.

It should not be put in the public record, because there is a rule that the President, in his press conferences, may not be quoted. You must paraphrase what he says.

I am paraphrasing what he said: "The President indicated it wasn't true."

Then, he was——

Senator Wiley. You mean he emphasized it with a little preliminary language?

Secretary Acheson. No; no, sir.

I am really just attempting to maintain the propriety here. He was asked whether they had taken away from General MacArthur the authority to issue communiqués on the real situation of the military operations in Korea, and he points out that that is not the case.

Then, he goes on when he was asked again whether it was not true, he went on again to make the same answer, and to indicate that if anybody would call the Defense Department they could get the same information from them.

Therefore, what we are talking about in the press conference is whether or not the authority had been taken away from General MacArthur to issue communiqués on the real situation of the military operations in Korea.

Now, the idea that was presented and discussed was not that he could say anything he chose about the Korean War of any sort.

APPLICATION OF DECEMBER 6 DIRECTIVE

Senator Wiley. No. 4:

> Furthermore, the directive of December 6, by its terms and spirit, was interpreted at this headquarters as applying solely to formal public statements and not to communiqués, correspondence, or personal conversations with others.

Is there anything wrong about that?

Secretary Acheson. I have no idea how the directive was interpreted by that headquarters. I should not have interpreted it that way myself.

Senator Wiley. Five:

> The general feels that he has complied meticulously with all directives he has received, not only recently, but throughout his entirely military service.

Six:

> The general has interpreted both his statement of March 24 and his letter to Congressman Joseph Martin, dispatched from here 4 days prior thereto, as deal-

ing exclusively with the military situation and within the area of his uncontested authority to speak. The one bore no slightest relationship to the other.

I presume you do not agree with those conclusions here?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

Senator WILEY. Now, Mr. Secretary, if you will turn to page 198, at the bottom of that page, you will find that he recommends:

MAC ARTHUR RECOMMENDATIONS

> Apart from the military need as I saw it to neutralize sanctuary, protection given to the enemy north of the Yalu, I felt that military necessity in the conduct of the war made necessary—

this is from the speech of MacArthur's—and then there are four different points that he made. Those state the conflict in recommendations with the military establishment of this country, do they not? He recommended them, and they thought it was untimely to put them into operation at the time he recommended them.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I don't know what you mean by the conflict in recommendations. It does not represent the conflict which has existed as a result of General MacArthur's public statements.

One of the great areas of conflict is left out of this by the wording of the first part of this paragraph. He says, "Apart from the military need as I saw it to neutralize sanctuary, protection given to the enemy north of the Yalu, I felt that military necessity in the conduct of the war made necessary," four things.

Most often the controversy that has been engendered is about the first thing, that is, the bombing of Manchuria, which the General takes out of this statement by saying "apart from," and he puts it down on four points.

If you say that these represent the conflict in regard to the first one, the intensification of our economic blockade against China, there is no conflict about that.

Senator WILEY. We are agreed on that.

Secretary ACHESON. Our own economic blockade is complete, and we have been making great efforts and had some success in increasing the economic measures of others.

Second, the imposition of a naval blockade against the China coast, that was a matter of circumstances under which that could be recommended with any possibility of success.

[Deleted.]

Fourth, the removal of the restrictions on the forces of the Republic of China on Formosa, with logistical support to contribute to their effective operations against the Chinese mainland, I believe General MacArthur says that he was not correctly quoted on that, so I don't know what he really did say there; but there is a difference of view as to the use of Chinese forces on Formosa, outside of Formosa, at this time and under the circumstances now prevailing.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Secretary, have we gotten from you the real reason why MacArthur was recalled?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

ATTENDANCE AT MEETINGS ON MAC ARTHUR RECALL

Sentor WILEY. Can you tell us who, outside the people you have mentioned, attended any of these meetings?

Secretary Acheson. Nobody else attended any of these meetings.

Senator Wiley. That you were at?

Secretary Acheson. That is correct, sir.

Senator Wiley. There is testimony already that one witness stated that there were others present, but he was not allowed to give their names, as I recall it. Maybe that was not at any of your meetings.

Secretary Acheson. No, sir; it was not at any of my meetings.

Chairman Russell. Senator Wiley, your time has expired.

Senator Johnson?

REASONS FOR DETERIORATION OF CHINA SITUATION IN 1946

Senator Johnson. Mr. Secretary, would you elaborate a little bit on why, after these agreements were entered into in January and February—the agreements of cessation of hostilities, Government reorganization, military organization—it seemed shortly after that period that those agreements started crumbling. Why did that happen?

Secretary Acheson. That grew out of the maneuvering which took place between the National Government and the Chinese Communists, each one seeking to get some advantage over the other.

The political negotiations are reported at very great length in this so-called Chinese white paper. They are incredibly complex, as complex as only Chinese negotiations can become.

One side makes a proposal; the other side says that they will accept one of those proposals, but have four qualifications on each of the others. Then the one making the proposal comes back and will accept certain of the qualifications but has qualifications on those. And after a while it becomes impossible to follow.

That, I believe, was not the real heart of the matter, that was more the negotiating outside. The real heart of the matter was that each side believed that if these negotiations could be strung out while they made maneuvers in the field, that important cities or important areas might be brought within either the jurisdiction of the Communists, on the one hand, or the Government on the other, and that they would be in stronger positions if they ever came to setting up either the temporary government or the final government.

Senator Johnson. It would seem, though, that there had been a meeting of the minds here and that they had reached three agreements, and that both sides refused to carry out those agreements. Or did the Chiang government refuse to take the steps that he was supposed to, or was it both of them?

Secretary Acheson. I am afraid the real difficulty, Senator, was there had not been a real meeting of the minds. There had been agreement on some pieces of paper, but I think both sides had reservations as to whether they were really going to go through with it, and under what circumstances.

SUFFIENCY OF AMERICAN AID TO CHIANG

Senator Johnson. As you look back on it, did the reduction that was made in the program recommended by General Marshall to the Congress make any difference one way or the other? As I remember your statement this morning, he made a recommendation of some $570 million in economic aid, that finally was reduced to roughly $400 million.

Secretary ACHESON. I think it is fair to say that, in the light of the picture which I gave you this morning, the difference between those two amounts would have no appreciable effect on the outcome of this whole story.

SECURENESS OF RED CHINA REGIME AT PRESENT

Senator JOHNSON. In your opinion, Mr. Secretary, is the Communist regime secure in its control of China at the present time?

Secretary ACHESON. At the present time, Senator, I see no forces which are strong enough or active enough in China to threaten the existence of that regime.

Senator JOHNSON. What are the prospects of Chiang's return to power on the Chinese mainland in your judgment?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I think that this is highly speculative, and I am not sure that it is going to do the whole situation much good for me to speculate about it. When I said that I don't see any forces strong enough to threaten the regime, I meant I didn't see them anywhere.

Senator JOHNSON. We heard a lot about considerable guerrilla forces supposedly located in China. Do you have any information as to their size or strength?

Secretary ACHESON. I think it has been testified here that there are guerrilla forces. I believe the approximate number of these forces was stated and was cut out by the censor; so I shall not repeat the offense by stating them again.

The situation appears to be that these forces are not at all united. Their efforts are, therefore, not as effective as they would be if they were operating together. I do not believe that under the present circumstances they threaten the existence of the regime.

[Deleted.]

POLICY TOWARD RED CHINESE GOVERNMENT

Senator JOHNSON. If the present Chinese Communist regime is secure, how does the State Department propose to deal with it?

Secretary ACHESON. I am not quite sure that I understand your question. Do you mean do we propose to deal with them or don't we propose?

Senator JOHNSON. You said they are secure, and I presume if they are and there is not much hope at the moment of upsetting them, what is our program so far as they are concerned? How are we going to——

Secretary ACHESON. Well, our attitude toward it is that this is an authority on the mainland of China which we did not recognize as the legal government of China.

You asked me whether, from a physical point of view, there is any force there which looks as though it were threatening it.

There is not, as I see it. So far as the Korean situation is concerned, I expressed, on Friday or Saturday, the nature of any dealing which would take place between the United Nations or the United

States, or both, and those forces, for the purpose of bringing this war in Korea to an end.

As to our general policy with China, it is based firmly upon the principle which has been its base for the last, at least, half-century, and perhaps longer than that, which is, in the first place, one of deep interest in and friendship for the Chinese people.

Secondly, we have always stood for the physical integrity of China, and we are against the domination of China by foreign powers.

We see the physical integrity of China being threatened by separatist movements which are growing up in many of the provinces.

We see another object of our policy, that is, to keep China free from domination of foreign powers, being threatened by the efforts of the Soviet Union.

It will be our constant effort to oppose those trends.

When you ask me how to do it, I cannot answer that at the present time without either engaging in such vague generalities that they would not mean anything, or talking in a way which would be unwise, from a public interest.

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Secretary, on May 16, I sent you a letter asking that four letters between the Armed Services Preparedness Subcommittee and your Department be reviewed, and, if possible, that those letters be declassified.

If you found that was not in the national interest, I asked that they be rewritten.

They all had to do with the general internatinal rubber situation.

Could I ask you to take another look at that letter, and give me a reply?

Secretary ACHESON. I should be very glad to do it, Senator Johnson.

Senator JOHNSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith?

MILITARY AID TO CHINA IN THE CHINA AID ACT OF 1948

Senator SMITH. Mr. Secretary, I want to ask you some questions about the Yalta situation which I never had satisfactorily cleared up. Before I get to that, I would like to ask you when you referred this morning, in your testimony, to the act of the Eightieth Congress authorizing certain amounts of economic and possibly military aid to the Chinese Nationalists, is it not a fact that the $125 million item was considered, from a standpoint of putting it on a basis similar to Greece and Turkey. I think you mentioned, or were going to mention that and decided not to. Wasn't that a change in policy there, as distinguished from our recent Turkey policy, on the recommendations of the State Department? I understand they thought it would be unwise to apply the same principle?

Secretary ACHESON. I said, Senator Smith, this morning that the State Department, the War Department and all of the branches of the executive branch of the Government concerned in this matter believed that it was unwise.

The House of Representatives thought one way and the Senate thought the other way, the Senate taking the view which coincided with our view.

Senator SMITH. It was just left with the general understanding that it would be used for military purposes. I think you are correct. I am just trying to get my recollection clear.

Secretary ACHESON. I said it was generally understood that the Chinese Government would probably use the funds for this purpose.

The reason that I dwelt on that aid bill of 1948 was that that was the last chance that there existed to take the view, if anybody wanted to take the view, that the United States should commit unlimited resources and its Armed Forces to the struggle in China. If the United States had wanted to do that, that was the last time it could do it.

Now this matter was laid before the Congress, the Congress understood it perfectly, and the Congress had what I think is the sound judgment not to do that, but I just wanted to bring out the fact that that is where it was.

THE YALTA CONFERENCE

Senator SMITH. Now, Mr. Secretary, you were Assistant Secretary of State, if I am correctly advised, or Under Secretary of State at the time of the Yalta Conference in February of 1945, is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir, I was Assistant Secretary of State at that time. I became Under Secretary of State I believe in August 1945.

Senator SMITH. Were you familiar with the preparations for the Yalta Conference, the policies and so forth and what happened there? Let me ask first, you were not at Yalta as I recall it?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir, I was not there, and I was not familiar with either the preparations for what was to be done there, nor was I familiar with what was done there.

I know about the Yalta Agreements after I became Under Secretary, and in response to some question I made a wrong answer in a press conference which was picked up in Moscow and commented on, and I then had to find where these papers were and study them.

There was a great deal of difficulty in finding the papers; I finally did and read them, and I believe that is the first time I knew the content of those documents.

Senator SMITH. Could you advise us why Nationalist China and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek were not included in the Yalta Conference?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I can only do that from what has already been testified here. That is that the Russians were not engaged in the war in the Far East, and the Russians were very particular to insist that in the conferences which they attended with Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt, those conferences related to the war in Europe and this was one of those situations.

Other conferences which took place, such as the Cairo Conference having to do with the Far East, were not attended by the Russians because they thought that would be adverse to their interests in some way, and for that reason, the primary purpose of this conference being the European war part of it, the desire to deal with this thing in the Far East made it impossible to ask the Chinese to come there. The Russians wouldn't have done it.

CAIRO CONFERENCE

Senator SMITH. As I recall it, the Conference in Cairo was held in December of 1943 and that was attended by President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Prime Minister Churchill. In the statement that was issued after that, which appears on page 519 of the white paper, this language appears—I think you have already suggested it, but I will read it from the Cairo Agreement—

> It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.

I think that is the verbatim language of that statement which apparently appears in the State Department Bulletin of December 4, 1943.

REASON FOR NOT INFORMING CHINA OF YALTA PROTOCOL

I understand from reading the book of the former Secretary of State at the time, Mr. Edward R. Stettinius, on pages 93 and 94 of that book which is entitled "Roosevelt and the Russians at the Yalta Conference" that:

> On February 11, 1945, the following agreement was signed by Marshal Stalin, Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt.

I won't read that agreement because it is already in the record in connection with General Marshall's testimony, but that agreement primarily refers apparently to concessions to be made to Russia because Russia came into the war, and those concessions were obviously at the cost of China. What amazes me in Mr. Stettinius' language is that he says just following the text of this secret agreement:

> This agreement regarding Japan is a top secret document and did not appear in the protocol of the Yalta Conference. It was taken to Washington and deposited in the President's personal safe. Few of the President's closest advisers knew of its existence. It was feared that if too many people knew about it, the information would leak out and reach Japan.

Then a little further down—this is the important point:

> The Chinese were not notified immediately of this agreement at Yalta for fear the secret would not be kept in Chungking. Marshal Stalin told President Roosevelt at Yalta that the Russians would start sending divisions across Siberia, but insisted this must be done in complete secrecy. The President agreed, therefore, that only after the troop movements were completed would he explain the decision to the Chinese. The President, of course, did not live long enough to do that.

Now, can you give us any explanation of that procedure that would clarify the reasons for our making a secret deal with Russia, leaving out our ally, Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Nationalists, and keeping the whole matter secret until the Russians moved in?

Secretary ACHESON. Since you haven't read the agreement that you are referring to, I have to guess that it is the Yalta Agreement.

Senator SMITH. I will be glad to read it, if you wish.

Secretary ACHESON. I just want to know which it is. If it is Yalta, I know the answer.

Senator SMITH. It is the Yalta Agreement. It starts out:

> The three great powers—the Soviet Union, the United States of America, and Great Britain—have agreed that in two or three months after Germany surrenders and the war in Europe has terminated, the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that—

and then——

Secretary ACHESON. I know what you are taking about. Yes, I know what has been given as the reason, and which sounds to me like a sound reason.

What the Governments of the United States and Great Britain were attempting to do here, as I described at great length this morning, was to get the Russians to come into the war in the Far East in time to be effective and contain those armies there before we had to make the assault on Honshu.

It is quite obvious that if you publish to the world that three months after a date which had not yet occurred the Russians were going to begin the movement, and a rather delicate movement, of forces across Siberia in order to take this action, that Japan would have the complete initiative and could do anything it liked.

Therefore, this was not told anyone. It was a military secret of the greatest possible importance. It was well known that things which were stated to the Chinese were not kept as secrets and, therefore, it was thought this would be out and everybody, including the Japanese, would know it, and therefore it was kept secret until the events had occurred.

Senator SMITH. I bring this up because it seems to me that is the moment of time when, if any, we did not play full fair with our own ally, Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese, because we were making the price of Russia coming in a price that China had to pay.

Now are you familiar with whether or not that agreement with Russia was carried out? In other words, did Russia take over the surrender of Manchuria?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. When the final show-down came?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, they did.

Senator SMITH. And did Russia turn over the Japanese captured arms that were left there when they got to Manchuria by surrender to the Chinese Communists?

Secretary ACHESON. I think probably they did.

EFFECT OF YALTA AGREEMENT ON NATIONALIST STRENGTH

Senator SMITH. I recall your saying, I think, in some conversations to me, and possibly in your speech at the Press Club in January 1950, that the Chinese just fell away from Chiang Kai-shek. He no longer had any influence as this thing deteriorated and there was not anything we could have done to save the situation.

Did the action that we took at Yalta and the moving in of the Russians, taking over Manchuria, turning over those arms to the Chinese Communists, possibly cause Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to lose face in China, and especially in Manchuria where, as I understood, he had hoped to bring about some changes and reforms and restore the land to the people, and so on, after the Japanese war was over?

Secretary ACHESON. In my opinion, no, sir.

Senator SMITH. It had no bearing.

You do not think the fact that the Russians came in and took over the surrender of the Japanese arms, turned them over to the Communists, just at the time the generalissimo was having his trouble with the Communists, had any effect on his face position, which is so important in the Far East, with his own people?

Secretary ACHESON. Senator, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's troops were in the extreme southwestern part of China, and Manchuria is in the extreme northeastern part. It took us several years of very great effort to get his forces in Manchuria in time of peace. How in the world he could have ever gotten to Manchuria to take over the surrender of 700,000 armed Japanese, I do not know.

Senator SMITH. I am not advocating that. I am just asking whether the surrender to the Russians rather than to us, who are really the conquerors of Japan, or some other friendly power other than Russia, and the arms being turned over to the Chinese Communists, resulted in the feeling among the people of China that Great Britain and the United States had not done very much for Chiang Kai-shek, and to use a slang expression, "They sold him down the river." In this secret agreement with the Russians those supplies had gone to the Chinese Communists and his hand with the Communists was very much weakened.

My question then is: We have been saying later Chiang lost prestige and lost face. I know that we all admit that——

Secretary ACHESON. I don't admit it.

Senator SMITH. Don't you think he lost face?

Secretary ACHESON. No, I don't at all, and I don't think he thought he did. I think, as I told you this morning, he thought that the making of the treaty of August 1945 between China and the Soviet Union was of great assistance to him. In fact, his government was very much worried that the Russians were going to cancel the treaty.

Senator SMITH. Well, of course, there is a difference of opinion about that, to the extent to which he had to do that.

U. S. ENCOURAGEMENT OF INTERNAL REFORMS IN CHINA

Now may I ask you this? You mentioned this morning, and I agree with you entirely, that the question of reform in China was most important, and you suggested that Chiang Kai-shek had not done much along those lines. What steps, if any, were taken by us when we were advising the Chinese, when we had our military advisers in there, to help them train a free and democratic leadership in China?

We have been criticizing Chiang for not having done it, but I am wondering whether we took the opportunity to try and do anything about that side of the picture, which we must have known then as we know now was most important in light of the dissatisfaction among the people.

Secretary ACHESON. Senator, we took a very considerable number of steps along that line.

First of all, let me say that I do not in any way, and no one in this Government ever did, minimize the great difficulties with which Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was faced. It was a hard problem that he had to deal with.

There were financial missions which were sent out by the United States Treasury to work with the treasury officials of his government in order to get their finances in shape. There were agricultural and missions of very considerable number which went from time to time to be of assistance along this line.

ATTITUDE OF STATE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL ON CHINA

Senator SMITH. Well, now, my next question is this: You have testified about General Marshall's mission to China, which I am familiar with by reading the compilation in the white paper here. But as I read the white paper, just about the time General Marshall went out there and when all these things were developing, some of our own representatives in China, representing the State Department there, were arguing in favor of the Chinese Communists that it was an agrarian revolution, and that we ought to be turning our attention to them and giving less support to Chiang and the National Government and more support to the Chinese Communists.

I have tried to read the appendix here. I see the dispatches by various persons like Davies and Service and so on, and it seemed to me they were arguing that we were making a mistake in supporting the Nationalist Kuomintang side and should be supporting the other side.

If you could do it, I wish you could locate for me about the time when that thinking was changing apparently in our own people, State Department people, out there. It must be around 1944—1943 or 1944.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, in my judgment, Senator, you have not accurately described the thinking of any of our State Department people. It was not a question in their mind of supporting the Chinese Communists and not supporting the Generalissmo. What they were interested in, and what General Hurley was interested in, was in trying to get the forces of both the Communists and the Nationalists directed against the Japanese and not directed against each other. And all these reports that you refer to have to do with the troubles which they ran into in trying to get all these armed men fighting Japanese rather than watching one another or fighting one another.

So far as this agrarian revolution is concerned—to state a negative is a very difficult thing to do—I do not know of any State Department people, in the sense of our Foreign Service officers or departmental officers, who thought that the Communists were merely agrarian reformers. They understood they were Communists, and in these reports that you have referred to you will see several times that they refer to their Moscow training and their Marxist rigidity.

I draw your attention to one statement by General Hurley—and I would not believe that you mean to refer to General Hurley as a State Department man; he was there as the President's representative trying to bring this amalgamation of the fighting forces against Japan together, and at page 86 of the white paper, General Hurley says:

> I pause to observe that in this dreary controversial chapter, two fundamental facts are emerging: (1) the Communists are not in fact Communists, they are striving for democratic principles; and (2) the one-party, one-man personal

> Government of the Kuomintang is not in fact Fascist, it is striving for democratic principles.

Now, those were General Hurley's views. They were not the views of the State Department, and not the views of Ambassador Harriman. They were his observations in this letter, which I have just referred to.

So far as the agrarian part of this is concerned, if you want to go into the details of Communist techniques, when the Communists were down in southeast China, in the Kiangsi Province, having been driven out of the industrial areas, they changed their propaganda, which up to that time had been directed to the workers in the cities.

They then changed it to appeal to the peasants in southeast China, and they claimed that their great interest at that time was in agrarian reform. I don't think that deceived anybody. I don't think that any of our people believed that that is all they were.

They were using the appeal which they thought was best suited to appeal to the people in that part of China where they were, and that turned out to a very great benefit to them, because they had to move from southeast China to northwest China, in agrarian areas, and they kept up this kind of propaganda, which got a lot of people to go along with them; but I think we have very little doubt that these were Moscow-trained Marxists.

EXTENT OF EXTERNAL CONTROL OVER CHINA

Senator SMITH. I think you said, Mr. Secretary, in your letter of transmittal of July 30, 1949, which impressed me very much—

> The heart of China is in Communist hands. The Communist leaders have foresworn their Chinese heritage and have publicly announced their subservience to a foreign power, Russia, which during the last 50 years, under czars and Communists alike, has been most assiduous in its efforts to extend its control in the Far East. In the recent past, attempts at foreign domination have appeared quite clearly to the Chinese people as external aggression and as such have been bitterly and in the long run successfully resisted. Our aid and encouragement has helped them to resist. In this case, however, the foreign domination has been masked behind the facade of a vast crusading movement which apparently has seemed to many Chinese to be wholly indigenous and national.

Would you agree from that statement that apparently what we have witnessed is a conquest in the case of China by an external power, Russia, and that today we are witnessing the control of China, that is Communist China, by an external power, Russia? Can we draw that conclusion from your statement there?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I think we have gone into that once before.

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON. And I explained just how this thing operates.

STATE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL IN CHINA

Senator SMITH. A minute ago, Mr. Secretary, you quoted Ambassador Hurley, and I just wanted to read an extract from his report to the President of November 28, 1945. That is on page 581 of the white paper, and it opens:

> MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I hereby resign as Ambassador to China.

That is when he withdrew. He says on page 582:

> While these objectives had the support of the President and the Secretary of State it is no secret that the American policy in China did not have the support of all the career men in the State Department. The professional Foreign Service men sided with the Chinese Communist armed party and the imperialist bloc of nations whose policy it was to keep China divided against herself.
>
> Our professional diplomats continuously advised the Communists that my efforts in preventing the collapse of the National Government did not represent the policy of the United States. These same professionals openly advised the Communist armed party to decline unification of the Chinese Communist Army with the National Army unless the Chinese Communists were given control.

Later on down he says:

> I requested the relief of the career men who were opposing the American policy in the Chinese theater of war. The professional diplomats were returned to Washington and placed in the Chinese and Far Eastern Divisions of the State Department as my supervisors. Some of these same career men whom I relieved have been assigned as advisers to the Supreme Commander in Asia. In such positions most of them have continued to side with the Communist armed party and at times with the imperialist bloc against American policy. This, Mr. President, is an outline of one of the reasons why American foreign policy, announced by the highest authority, is rendered ineffective by another section of diplomatic officials.

That was very alarming to me when I read it; and that, and the study of the white paper, and the discussion of this matter was why, on my own responsibility, I went to the Far East in 1949, but I won't go into that at the moment.

Secretary ACHESON. I think, as long as you mentioned that——

Senator SMITH. I would like very much to have your comments.

Secretary ACHESON. I should like to say that shortly after that letter was made public, the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate had extended public hearings, I believe they were public, on this matter.

Secretary Byrnes appeared and all this matter was gone into, individual people were discussed, and it took a long time to go into; and I think that the view which was put forward was that General Hurley was mistaken in what he said.

Senator SMITH. That was before I was on the Foreign Relations Committee.

Secretary ACHESON. The hearings would be available to you, and you would have the full comments.

Senator SMITH. Going back to the Yalta conference again——

Mr. Chairman, might I ask how much more time I have here?

Chairman RUSSELL. You have about 3 minutes, Senator Smith—almost 4 minutes.

REASONS FOR RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN WAR ON JAPAN

Senator SMITH. In making the Yalta agreement, Mr. Secretary, you felt that your representatives realized that Soviet participation in the Japanese war would give Russia the right to take part in the Japanese peace settlement?

Wasn't that what Russia was driving at, to get into it at the eleventh hour, so that she could take part in the peace settlement, and get a bite of China, as subsequently it appears she was able to do?

Secretary ACHESON. I do not think that that was the principal point, nor the issue involved in those discussions.

As I have said, our efforts, the Government's efforts, were to get the Russians to get into the war, since she was going to get in anyway, to get Russia in early enough so that she could occupy the troops on the mainland, and not have those troops free to engage in the battle for Japan which was impending.

Now, Russian participation or intervention in Manchuria was something which nobody had any power to prevent. It would inevitably have taken place. It was much better to have it take place when it could do our fighting effort some good than to have it take place after that effort was over and we had suffered severe losses.

Senator SMITH. Do you think that is a justification for our having made a secret agreement that in effect legalized the theft of parts of China and interests in China from the Chinese without their knowing anything about it or without their being represented and keeping it from them until the Russians had moved into Manchuria so that nothing could be done about it very much, even if they had wanted to?

Secretary ACHESON. That was the reason why it was done. Looking at it in the light of what was known at that time, I doubt very much whether anyone in this room would have disagreed with it.

Senator SMITH. I may be unable to look at the situation at that time, but I can't help but feel that it would have been very difficult for me to have undercut an ally in that way, and then keep the matter secret from the ally.

Secretary ACHESON. If you heard the full military story and the losses that this Government was going to take, I think you would have thought differently, Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Has my time expired?

Chairman RUSSELL. No, sir; you have a minute.

EFFECT OF YALTA AGREEMENT ON CHINA

Senator SMITH. Did our representatives realize that the Chinese Nationalist Government would suffer tremendous loss of prestige as a result of this agreement, by which China was virtually robbed of sovereign rights, without being consulted or even informed?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't think that was the fact at all. And since we have been talking about General Hurley, one of the things that is worth calling attention to is that in his letter of resignation he refers with considerable favor and praise to these arrangements. He says on page 583:

> I am purposely omitting from this short paper a discussion of my negotiations with Britain and Russia for the recognition of the territorial integrity and independent sovereignty of China and the procurement from both of these nations of an agreement to support the aspirations of the Chinese people to establish for themselves a free, united, democratic government. These negotiations, as you know, were successful and so far as Russia is concerned, were solemnized in a treaty and exchange of letters.

Now, that is the treaty which carries out the Yalta agreement.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse.

POSSIBLE EFFECT OF SOVIET-CHINESE TREATY OF 1950

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, what is your interpretation of the Russian-Chinese mutual aid security compact? Is it your interpretation that in view of existing conditions in Asia as of today, an extension of the war onto the mainland of China by the United Nations forces would place Russia in a position, as far as international law is concerned, to justify intervention on her part in the name of the Russian-Chinese Treaty?

Senator ACHESON. Yes, Senator Morse, I believe that the treaty is of such a nature that it would give the Russians that opportunity and it would also give the Chinese a very considerable lever to demand that the Russians do that.

Senator MORSE. Is one of the reasons, among others, for our Government's opposition to MacArthur's apparent desire to follow a course of action which would now extend the war onto the mainland of China the existence of the Russian-Chinese Treaty?

Secretary ACHESON. That was one of the reasons; yes, sir.

SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONSHIP ON MANCHURIAN RAILWAYS

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, did you tell the committee what your understanding is of existing relationships between China and Russia in regard to the operation of the Manchurian railroad system?

Secretary ACHESON. I understand from the same treaties which you have just referred to—wait a minute, I am mistaken here. I should like to make this answer subject to correction.

As I understand it, there were seven agreements made at the time the treaty to which you have referred was entered into. These agreements were signed between February 14 and April 19, 1950.

They have to do with the economic relationships between Communist China and the U. S. S. R. One of these provides for the transfer to Communist China of Soviet rights and the joint administration in the Chinese Chiangchung Railroad, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Port Arthur, and the transfer of Soviet properties from Port Arthur and Dairen to Communist China.

With the exception of the transfer of property in Dairen, these steps were to be taken immediately upon the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan or not later than toward the end of 1952.

Now, of course, we only know what has been given out by these arrangements, and we do not know what they actually were. It may be that some arrangement of this sort has been made and that some arrangement of this sort would be carried out, but we are not accurately informed of the details or as to when or in what manner it will be done.

POSSIBLE EFFECT OF BOMBING OF MANCHURIAN RAILROAD

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, is it your understanding and belief that the mutual-aid treaty between Russia and China probably encompasses a promise of assistance on the part of Russia to China in case of interference with the Manchurian railway system by way of bombing or other attack on the part of a foreign power?

Secretary Acheson. I should believe it highly probable that in connection with the Chinese intervention arrangements were made along the lines that you suggest and perhaps more extensively than you suggest.

Senator Morse. Is it your understanding and belief, Mr. Secretary, that the recommendation of General MacArthur for bombing in Manchuria would undoubtedly include bombing of railway terminals on part of the Manchurian railway system?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Morse. Is it therefore fair to say that another reason for our Government being opposed to MacArthur's recommendation for the extension of the war on the mainland of China was the great danger that his program would involve a bombing of the Manchurian Railroad which would greatly increase the risk of Russia coming into the war at that point?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

BASIS OF WARTIME ALLIANCE OF UNITED STATES AND U. S. S. R.

Senator Morse. Now Mr. Secretary, prior to Yalta, with Russia supposedly an ally of the United States in the prosecution of the war in Europe, was it not true, and necessarily so, that the State Department through its appropriate officials sought at all times to cooperate with Russia on the diplomatic level in carrying out what was then the joint enterprise of the United States and Russia, namely, the defeat of our enemies in Europe?

Secretary Acheson. Yes; I think that is correct, Senator. The State Department during that period had less to do with that than some other branches of the Government, because we were in the military effort and in the supply effort, but what you say is correct, that insofar as that touched our duties, the State Department did that.

Senator Morse. Is it not true that your duties were touched in regard to the United States relations with Russia whenever the President of the United States during that period of time called upon the Secretary of State for advice and counsel in the field of foreign policy relations with Russia?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Morse. Do you think that there is justification for a feeling of mine that I have entertained that references to American-Russian relationships during the period of World War II prior to Yalta in which relationships the State Department and the American military and other official departments of our Government sought to maintain a working alliance with Russia, are now by way of hindsight sometimes referred to by the critics of the State Department and our Government as a whole, as proof, as alleged proof, that a very friendly and sympathetic and cooperative relationship developed between certain officers in the State Department and the Russian Government?

Secretary Acheson. I think that attitude has been expressed abroad; yes, sir.

Senator Morse. Do you agree with me that when we come to analyze prior to Yalta—and I believe I will have something to say about Yalta in a moment—all advice or communications or exchanges between the United States Government and that of the Soviet Union during the World War II period, it is only fair and proper that those exchanges should be read in light of the fact that we were trying to cooperate with Russia as an ally in a joint war enterprise aimed at defeating the totalitarianism of Italy and Germany which was at that time threatening the freedom way of life in the world?

Secretary ACHESON. Italy, Germany, and Japan.

Senator MORSE. And Japan.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. Now, as to the Yalta agreement, Mr. Secretary—first, before I come to Yalta, let me clear up another point as far as my own thinking and doubt is concerned in light of the record to date in this hearing.

EXPRESSIONS OF ALLIES' FEAR OF EXTENDING WAR IN KOREA

It is my understanding that one of the reasons for our Government rejecting continually and expressing concern over MacArthur's proposals for extension of the war in Asia was that we felt among other effects of the implementation of the proposals would be the creation of embarrassing relations with some of our allies; am I correct in that understanding?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes; I think that is correct for some of the reasons which you have given in your earlier questions.

Senator MORSE. Well, my difficulty with the record to date, Mr. Secretary, on this point is that I do not think it sets out very clearly a factual basis for this concern on the part of our Government, because if I understand you correctly—and the other witnesses left the same impression with me, in fact, they were inclined to say I should turn to the State Department for an answer to the problem that I raised—it is my understanding that you have testified that you do not know of any direct representations that were made by any of these allied governments in criticism of or opposition to or concern about the proposals of MacArthur to extend the war beyond the limits of Korea.

Now I may be quite wrong in the value that I place on this point in the record, but I think it is a rather important point. I think the American people, if the evidence exists to the extent that we can on a public record, and to the extent that we can't, they at least ought to be placed in a position where their representatives on this committee can inform them that such was the case, ought to have available to them some evidence of this concern on the part of our allies, and therefore proof that it would have been jeopardizing the work of the allied team in our world opposition to communism if we adopted the MacArthur proposals.

Now I put this simple question to you: Do you have available any evidence, documented or otherwise, that will demonstrate to this committee that there was great concern among our allies in respect to MacArthur's proposals for extending the war?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I think there is a very considerable body of evidence to indicate, not indicate, but to show conclusively, that they were very disturbed about the possibility of action, which later on was publicly announced as the MacArthur platform.

I think what is bothering you is that this is not connected with any criticism or talk about General MacArthur himself, because his espousal of this business came rather late in the game, and then rather in a rush; but ever since the beginning of this Korean effort it had been very clear to us and to our allies that their view, which coincided with our view, was the abhorrence of the danger which might be created of an extension of this war until it involved either a general war in the Far East or a world war.

We knew that this was a danger which had to be guarded against very carefully, and at the time of the discussions, after the Inchon landing, in New York between the three foreign ministers—Mr. Bevin, Mr. Schuman, and myself—and later with the United Nations people, they wanted to be very clear that this whole effort was directed toward ending this aggression in Korea and that it was not going to go any further.

We discussed that in our meetings between the three of us, and it was our view that that was our attitude. They made it very clear that it was their attitude also—the French, the British, and ourselves—in these tripartite meetings.

In the discussions in the broader groups in the general assembly it was also made very clear. It came up in connection with the "hot pursuit" matter, which has already been discussed, in which the attitude of the six governments—very representative ones—who were consulted was strongly adverse.

Very considerable worry was expressed by them that this is the sort of things which gets you by stages right into a broad conflict.

As the war went on in North Korea, we met, I think, once a week, perhaps more often when things were going, moving very fast, in Washington with the ambassadors of the countries who had troops in Korea.

Their governments were interested in being kept abreast not merely of the day-to-day communiques of what happened but of what the plans were because of this omnipresent worry that something might extend the hostilities.

I think that you will see that the whole record of the discussions in the UN of a cease-fire or a settlement indicate that the nations associated with us felt very strongly that every possible way ought to be explored to end this thing by some kind of negotiated settlement rather than pushing it in an unlimited way in the military field.

This attitude was very prevalent among nations not associated in a military way—India, the nations of the Middle East, particularly, who several times took the initiative in trying to find some way of resolving this.

So that I think there was absolutely no question in our minds as to what the attitude of our allies was and how it operated on these particular proposals, not because they were made by General MacArthur but long before they were made publicly by General MacArthur, when they were possibilities which everyone knew existed.

EXPRESSED CANADIAN AND BRITISH FEARS

Senator Morse. Let me say, Mr. Secretary, that, as far as my own thinking is concerned, that is an exceedingly helpful statement for the record, because I think it is a point that needed to be pin-pointed and nailed down in this record.

Is it not also true, or do you recollect reading about it in the public press, that Mr. Pearson of Canada went so far as to make some public statements about his Government's concern of the extension of the war in Korea, and he included in his public statements, at least as reported in the press, a direct reference to MacArthur himself.

Secretary ACHESON. I remember the speech by Mr. Pearson. I didn't remember that particular reference in it. Mr. Pearson was a member of the Good Offices Committee, which was set up, and he and the President of the Assembly, and I believe the Swedish representative, were the three members.

He was very much concerned with the dangers which would come from an extension of the military operation, and I think was taking a very leading part in exploring every possibility of having a negotiated settlement.

Senator MORSE. Is it not true that Mr. Pearson, in some of his statements that at least got into American newspaper and periodical references, implied that Canada had to face the fact as to whether or not it could be a participant in an Asiatic program that involved commitments on the mainland of China.

Secretary ACHESON. I don't recall that part of his speech, but I can well believe that that question would produce very serious problems for the Canadian Government.

Senator MORSE. Is it not also true that at the same time about which we are speaking there was considerable discussion in the British Parliament and House of Commons in regard to the danger of Great Britain becoming involved in an Asiatic war on the mainland of China if MacArthur's program became the policy of the United States?

Secretary ACHESON. I believe that is correct, Senator Morse. There were resolutions introduced by private members which drew attention to these grave dangers and urged the Government not to become involved.

Senator MORSE. Therefore, for purposes of emphasis, by way of repetition, would you agree with me that there was ample indication on the part of our allies that they were not prepared for and not in agreement with and not sympathetic to a program which would have the result of extending the Korean War beyond the limits of Korea itself?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I would.

INTERESTS OF CHINA AND YALTA AGREEMENT

Senator MORSE. Now, a few questions about Yalta. The Senator from New Jersey this morning in his examination of you spent a considerable amount of time on Yalta and expressed the view in his questions—which I understand is a view that honest men can hold—that the Yalta agreements were at the expense of China without the Nationalist Government knowing the commitments at the time they were made.

Is it your opinion, Mr. Secretary, that the Yalta agreements were at the expense of China rather than in the interests of the long-time protection of China?

Secretary ACHESON. I think they were in the interests, the long-time interests of China.

REASONS FOR EXCLUSION OF CHINA FROM YALTA CONFERENCE

Senator MORSE. Am I correct in my understanding that there were two reasons, two main reasons, why China wasn't included at the conference at Yalta? One was Russia's objection to having them included, because up until that time she had confined her activities to the European war; and, second, that any agreements that were reached at Yalta in respect to Russia, at the insistence of Russia, had to be kept secret until Russia was able to carry out her part of the agreement.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I think that is right.

Senator MORSE. Am I correct in my understanding of your testimony that the main reason for not notifying the Generalissimo in advance of the Russian troop movements was the fear on the part of parties to the conference that such matter was of such military importance to all parties concerned that it must be kept from the Japanese, and there was a danger that, if the Chinese knew about it, it would not remain as a secret?

Secretary ACHESON. That is my understanding; yes, sir.

PROBLEM OF TAKING JAPANESE SURRENDER IN MANCHURIA

Senator MORSE. Now, in regard to the questioning as to why the surrender of the Japanese troops in Manchuria was not either to the Generalissimo or to the United States forces, am I correct in my understanding that the very physical aspects of the problem would have made that impossible, first, because as far as Nationalist troops were concerned, they were down in the southwest of Asia; and this problem of surrender was up in the northwest of China—northeast of China.

Secretary ACHESON. Northeast of China.

Senator MORSE. And, second, we did not have any American forces in that vicinity at all; did we?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; we did not. In fact, it took us a very considerable time to get any considerable amount of American forces in Korea.

Senator MORSE. Is it not true also, in respect to a military surrender, you just don't surrender to an individual; you just don't fly someone in, in this case to Manchuria, either the Generalissimo or a deputy of the Generalissimo, or an American officer, or a commission of American officers, and surrender to them; but that in cases of military surrender you have to have a sufficient military force present on the scene to enforce the terms of the surrender.

Secretary ACHESON. That is right.

Senator MORSE. Is it not true that the only military force that existed in Manchuria in any great number capable of carrying out the terms of the surrender happened to be Russian forces?

Secretary ACHESON. That is right.

Senator MORSE. And, therefore, from the standpoint of the military necessity of the situation, it was most appropriate that the surrender should be to the Russian forces, even though in hindsight we wish that we had had other forces to whom the surrender might have been made?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

Senator MORSE. Therefore, you do not agree with the implication, do you, Mr. Secretary, that because the Generalissimo was not in on the scene of the surrender that the United States was therefore guilty of undermining and undercutting an ally?

Secretary ACHESON. I do not agree with that version.

INTERNAL REFORMS IN CHINA

Senator MORSE. Now, a question was asked you as to why we did not do a better job of obtaining leadership for the Generalissimo with regard to his domestic problems, and you have testified that we had sent over agricultural teams and commissions and we had sent over financial teams and commissions. Is it not also true that there were in China under the Generalissimo's regime a relatively large number of American-educated Chinese who were not given positions of great leadership in the Generalissimo's regime because apparently they were not entirely sympathetic with some of his policies, procedures, and programs?

Secretary ACHESON. I think that is true, Senator; at least I think essentially. American educational organizations, religious organizations, foundations, have made a tremendous effort in China in educating Chinese in all the professions.

NATURE OF YALTA CONFERENCE

Senator MORSE. One more question, Mr. Secretary, in regard to Yalta. Is it your understanding that Winston Churchill, representing the great British Commonwealth of Nations, was in complete agreement as to the procedure which was agreed upon at Yalta?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. There has always been one question that has bothered me about the Yalta conference as far as the physical arrangements and physical procedure is concerned. I have never known whether I am right or wrong in my understanding, but I have read it many times that most of the Yalta Conference was conducted on a three-man basis, with only President Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Stalin together in a room, and occasionally a stenographer was called in for dictation on memoranda, but that the President did not have available at his right arm during the actual conference itself, during many hours of it, any representative to advise and aid him. Am I correct or wrong in that, or don't you know?

Secretary ACHESON. I just don't know, Senator Morse. I wasn't there, and I have had very little talk with anyone who was there.

Senator MORSE. Now, Mr. Secretary, I want to say that I think the statement that you made here this morning, on our Government's China policy, is one of the clearest digests and synopses of a very complex international matter that it has ever been my privilege and pleasure to hear.

May I say, parenthetically, that I wish some such synopsis had been available to the American people at the time the white paper was issued. I think they could have digested your synopsis this morning, but they have had a hard time chewing the white paper; but time will not permit me to more than propound to you now——

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has already expired. However, you may complete your statement, Senator.

Senator MORSE. I will just finish my statement.

I do want to ask you a series of questions, Mr. Secretary, as to what information is available in the State Department, or elsewhere in the Government, in regard to the operation of what is commonly referred to in America is the China lobby.

Senator McMAHON. Who?

Senator MORSE. The China lobby, and I will ask further questions on that in the next round.

Senator WILEY. Have we got an expert on that?

Chairman RUSSELL. I think technically your time expired before you asked that question.

Senator MORSE. I just wanted to put the Secretary on notice.

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, I think that I should announce, for the benefit of all the members of the committee, that we shall not have a session tomorrow afternoon.

We shall recess shortly after 12 tomorrow, as soon as the Senator who is questioning, has concluded, after 12 o'clock.

We shall recess, due to the fact that we have some voting on the floor.

The committee now stands in recess until 2:30 this afternoon.

(Thereupon, at 1:11 p. m., the committee stood in recess until 2:30 p. m., that same afternoon.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Present: Senators Russell, Connally, Byrd, Johnson, Saltonstall, Morse, Knowland, Hunt, Cain, Stennis, Long, Wiley, George, Smith, Hickenlooper, McMahon, Sparkman, Gillette, and Brewster.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committee will come to order.

Senator Green?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Secretary, I would like to go a little further on the Yalta matter and the question of the Dairen and Port Arthur and the Manchurian Railroad.

Secretary ACHESON. I couldn't quite hear you.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I said I would like to go a little further into the matter of Dairen and Port Arthur and the Manchurian Railroad, deals that were made between Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin and inquired about by Senator Smith.

Without replowing the ground any more than is necessary, I think Senator Smith raised the question that this was an agreement between those three in the absence of Chiang Kai-shek for the disposition of certain ports and properties.

YALTA AGREEMENT AND EFFECT ON SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS

In other words, Dairen and Port Arthur were to be returned to Russian dominion, at any rate partial dominion, and the interest in the Manchurian Railroad was to be given to Russia.

Now in the light of the fact that this agreement was kept completely secret from Chiang Kai-shek or the Kuomintang Government, it seems to me that such an agreement was in direct violation of every principle that we had announced in World War II beginning with the Atlantic Charter in which we said we would not support the advancement of colonial imperialism.

We also, I believe, at Cairo agreed with Chiang Kai-shek that the territory "stolen" from the Chinese and Russians should be returned to him. Now, it runs through my mind that Russia originally took Port Arthur away from China and imposed its will in one way or another on certain railroads and we put ourselves in the position of supporting the return of imperialistic operations there and extraterritorial rights without Chinese consent.

Secretary ACHESON. I think when you say "without Chinese consent" that it is covered by agreement, which says, "it is understood that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the President will take steps to obtain the concurrence of Chiang."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand, yes, that the provision is in there, but isn't it a fact that we were causing or in fact compelling Chiang Kai-shek to consent to these extraterritorial or other rights in something which has historically and legitimately been China's. Isn't that a violation of our announced anti-imperialistic policy growing out of World War II?

Secretary ACHESON. I think "compel" is a strong word. I think it is clear we were going to use our efforts to get his concurrence here. But I think it is true that the matters concerned in this agreement are extraterritorial rights and have to do with the matters that you referred to.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, sir. We make such a vigorous statement about the territory of China which Japan had stolen, and we become so righteous about that, on the one hand. Then we turn around, on the other, and agree to secure the concurrence of Chiang Kai-shek, which I think, taking the diplomatic face off, means that we will coerce Chiang Kai-shek into this agreement.

Now, it seems to me that from a matter of principle, that is absolutely incompatible. Do you believe that it is compatible?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, I believe it is compatible. I think you are entitled to make the point that you are making, Senator. The reasons for the agreement were the reasons which I gave this morning.

I think they were valid reasons in the light of the military situation as it was then thought to be, and I think that at that time these agreements were in the best interests of China and of the Allies, and as I pointed out this morning, I think that for a long time afterward the Nationalist Government of China believed that they were in the interests of China.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I think there is room for argument on that score. I will admit that Nationalist China did agree eventually to these things. But I wonder if that did not put us in a position then of having expediency of the moment violate basic principles which we said we were striving for in the world?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't think so. I think you are entitled to argue that point.

UNITED STATES MEDIATION EFFORT IN CHINA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, in our China policy, which you discussed at length this morning, we attempted to settle the differences in China at that time by a joint participation, regardless of the percentage of participation, which included the Communist forces. The program included even arms to some of the Communist forces under the program that was presented about the time General Marshall was over there on the settlement activities; is that not correct?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; I don't think we undertook to settle the differences. I think the Chinese undertook to settle the differences and we undertook to help them mediate in that effort.

So far as the arms question is concerned, arms were asked for for the equipment of the new National Army, which would contain these 50 divisions of National troops and 10 divisions of the others, that is, arms to partially equip them. Those arms were never used for that purpose because of the breakdown in discussions.

REASONS FOR EMBARGO ON CHINA, AUGUST 1946 TO MAY 1947

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, we undertook to mediate, I believe the record shows. But we went further, didn't we, Mr. Secretary. And when they refused to go along with the terms which we had precribed through General Marshall, then didn't we put embargoes on and withdraw aid and use all of the economic sanctions which were at our disposal in reprisal against their refusal to accept our recommendations there?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; that is not correct.

There was an embargo put on, from August 1946 to May 1947. That was put on because General Marshall was the person who was running the executive headquarters which, with the consent of both parties, was stopping the fighting and therefore we could not be in position of furnishing assistance to one of the parties to the dispute.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. After the technical end of the embargo, isn't it a fact that for almost a year after that, for one reason or another, export permits were blocked so that no particular quantity of aid, either economic or otherwise, in fact, went to the Nationalists?

Secretary ACHESON. I do not think that is correct, Senator.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is my understanding that that was, in fact, the case.

The record shows practically no shipments were available to them because of the technicalities of export permits that arose from time to time.

Secretary ACHESON. That is a matter which can be ascertained from the record.

We will look it up, sir.

ASSISTANCE TO CHINA, 1945 TO 1949

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Isn't it a fact that after the Japanese surrender, to all intents and purposes no military equipment of any utility whatsoever as military equipment, and I mean any substantial volume, went to the Chinese Nationalists from the time of the surrender of the Japanese until perhaps sometime in 1949?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; that is not correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Did we ship military equipment or supply military equipment, such as guns and ammunition to the Chinese Nationalist Government in any appreciable quantities after the Japanese surrender?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. During that period?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, we did. We can get a record of that and then make it available to you. One instance that occurs to me immediately is that on the withdrawal of the marines, very large quantities of ammunition and equipment were left for the Nationalists.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am aware of the fact that the claim is made that we have shipped several billion dollars, two billions or more, of aid, and a lot of it was called military, to the Chinese Nationalists, after the surrender of Japan. But is it not a fact that practically all of this equipment in these large categories that have been referred to, had been demilitarized so that it could not be used for strictly military operations?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir, that is not correct. I believe after the armistice, we completed the very extensive program of arming the 39 divisions, all with first-class equipment; and the entire record of what was turned over can be gotten, if the committee wants to spend the time and effort of having a first-class accounting job done on it. You cannot get it from questioning me because I am not in a position to know about those details.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And the Chinese Nationalist Government did get a lot of so-called military equipment which we had in the South Pacific, did they not?

Secretary ACHESON. A great deal of the surplus was turned over to them as well as the other things which I have mentioned.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And of that so-called surplus, isn't it a fact that that was all reported as demilitarized equipment and which could not be used for military purposes?

Secretary ACHESON. I can't answer that. I think some of the planes which were turned over were cargo planes, or if they were battle planes, they had been changed into cargo planes, but if that is true, it is undoubtedly in the record somewhere.

EQUIPMENT AND AID AVAILABLE TO NATIONALISTS AND COMMUNISTS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now there has been a great deal of discussion here about the failure of the Chinese Nationalists, that is the increasing failure, and the increasing successes of the Communist Army. Isn't it a fact that from 1946 on through 1947 that we were not supplying cartridges, ammunition, and guns and things of that kind to the Chinese Nationalists, and they were using up whatever reserve stocks they had while the Communists in north China were being given increasing amounts of munitions and equipment either Japanese captured or from the Russians?

Secretary ACHESON. I think we have been over once the question of what we were supplying during this period and the question of the embargo. I think that during the period you are talking about the successes were on the side of the Chinese Nationalists.

Toward the end of the period the battle turned the other way and the Chinese Communists acquired a great deal of material by capture from the Nationalists. I have no knowledge of what was furnished to them by the Russians.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I would like to call your attention, Mr. Secretary, on the point of the supplies and equipment of the Chinese Nationalists in about 1946, to the testimony of General Marshall on February 14, 1947, when he returned after his mission to China in early 1947, with respect to the military activities of the Chinese Nationalists, in which he said, very significantly——

Secretary ACHESON. What are you reading from?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am reading from his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee at that time.

Senator McMAHON. Marshall's?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, Marshall's. He was testifying on February 14, 1947.

Secretary ACHESON. What period is he talking about?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. He had just come back from China and he is discussing the whole situation as he found it there. That is the whole context and purport of his testimony. He says:

> The thing is a very confused thing. They—

referring to the Chinese Nationalists—

> sent troops to north China with only two rounds of ammunition per gun at one time and had some very good reverses.

He had talked previously about the lack of information and the difficulty of finding how much they actually had in workable ammunition and supplies and what the Communists had.

Secretary ACHESON. I do not think that quotation is supposed to indicate or does indicate in any way that they only had two rounds of ammunition per gun.

What he says is that they went there with only that amount with them. I think General Wedemeyer pointed out several times that one of the great weaknesses of the Chinese Nationalists was their complete ignorance of the whole question of logistics and supply.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, if they were on a diminishing supply of ammunition and equipment, which was being used up all the time and they could not replenish it, and their opponents, the Communists, were on an increasing supply of ammunition and equipment, which they could replenish, and did apparently replenish, is it going beyond reason to say that the Chinese Nationalists under those circumstances would eventually have to succumb?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, if those two facts were true, it would tend in the direction you say.

I don't know anything to show that they were true.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I think there is a great deal of existing cumulative evidence that would indicate that there are strong arguments along that line.

Let me ask you——

Secretary ACHESON. There is this one thing I think which is what I was drawing attention to this morning—that General Barr pointed out that no engagement which took place while he was in China as military adviser was lost for lack of equipment.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes; I am aware of that. I am also aware of certain other statements of observers on the ground that they simply didn't have the ammunition to sustain fighting during that period of time when they finally began to lose; they just petered out on their equipment and they did surrender because they just had nothing to shoot—no guns.

Secretary ACHESON. I don't believe there is any reliable evidence to that effect.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. When we did attempt to meditate the situation in China through the offices of General Hurley and General Marshall, we adopted apparently as a line of mediation at that time the inclusion of the Communist groups into the Government or governmental activities of the Republic of China. I am aware that you testified and the record shows that the Nationalist Government was to be dominant in that particular original set-up. What I am getting at is this: If we have a policy in Korea today short of the destruction of the will of the Red Chinese and the aggressors to fight, will we not be following the same type of policy of settlement which will include gains and positions for the Reds that we followed during that period of attempted Chinese settlement?

Secretary ACHESON. I do not believe so at all, Senator.

ACHIEVING A SETTLEMENT OF KOREAN CONFLICT BY DESTROYING RED CHINESE WILL TO FIGHT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, is it the policy to effectuate—I will not say destroy, necessarily—but to effectuate the loss of Red Chinese will to fight? Is that a part of our policy?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, as I pointed out, the only way in which to get a stable settlement is for the parties on both sides to want a stable settlement, and not want a situation where they may want to upset the stable settlement. To that extent, you wish to bring about a change of purpose.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I will ask you the question: Will anything short of the cessation of the Red Chinese desire and willingness to fight be the accomplishment of either our purposes or the United Nations' purposes?

Secretary ACHESON. I think, as I have said, what you have to bring about is a change in their purposes. Their purpose now is to drive us out of Korea. You have to bring a change in that, so that their purpose in that is to have a stable settlement.

If you do that, you have a chance in getting it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But, is that their entire purpose?

Isn't their purpose in driving us out of Korea to establish firmly the expansion of the Communist Government in China and Korea?

Secretary ACHESON. It is so in Korea, to drive us out of Korea and establish it in Korea.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If they drive us out of Korea, won't that give them increased standing in the Orient, by virtue of this success?

Secretary ACHESON. Undoubtedly.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And do you think that their sole purpose is just to have a military action and win a military victory, and drive us out of Korea to extend the communistic movement in Asia?

Secretary Acheson. Well, I would say that I think it is both; their purpose is to drive us out of Korea, and to establish Communist domination in Korea.

That will have some of the effect that you mentioned as being understood by them.

Senator Hickenlooper. Now, it is our purpose then, or part of our policy, to destroy or to eliminate the Red Chinese Communist troops, to destroy the will to continue the fight?

Secretary Acheson. Well, I think that I have stated that as clearly as I can, in answer to several earlier questions.

Senator Hickenlooper. Yes.

Well now, if, as I understand it—and I will ask you whether you understand it also this way—but it is a part of my understanding that General MacArthur, one of his major objections, or one of his major objectives, was to destroy or to withdraw the Red Chinese will to fight this thing in Korea, and thereby stop the war—I say one of them, I am not trying to limit it.

Secretary Acheson. I would like to recall two statements of General MacArthur's here, one on page 361, and one on pages 361 and 362. He said:

> I would be glad to have a cease-fire in Korea on honorable terms at any time. I have had no other thought and hope in the last 10 months than to bring it to an honorable end with the least bloodshed that is possible.

Then, later on that page, and going over to the next page, he says:

> Every recommendation I have made is to that end and to that purpose and none other. The glorification of a so-called over-all victory or conquest, as you put it, has never even entered my thoughts. What I am anxious to do is to bring the enemy to a round-table discussion on an honorable basis which will cause him to stop his depredation.

Senator Hickenlooper. Yes.

Secretary Acheson. That is his own words; and I think there is the best answer.

Senator Hickenlooper. Is there any difference between that policy announced by General MacArthur and the policy of our Government, I mean as far as that statement goes? I am not talking about any other policy.

Secretary Acheson. That statement is very much the statement I made to you a little while ago. The great difference is how you bring that about.

Now, if you will seek to bring it about by so-called breaking the will of the Chinese, by bombing Chinese territory, then a whole new set of considerations comes into play.

Senator Hickenlooper. Yes.

Secretary Acheson. That is what the argument is about.

DISAGREEMENT ON HOW TO END CONFLICT

Senator Hickenlooper. And as I understand it, one of the major differences of opinion is that we are content to go along with this interminable sacrifice of American life and billions of dollars of American property while MacArthur proposed practical military means which have at least a strong chance of destroying the Red Chinese ability to continue this fight.

Secretary Acheson. I do not agree with that characterization of the two points of view at all, sir.

Senator Hickenlooper. Well, at least when we were up on the Yalu and when the Red Chinese started to come over, we did not go over back in Manchuria and bomb their marshaling centers and their arsenals and their places where they could reequip.

Secretary Acheson. That is right.

Senator Hickenlooper. That is correct. We were following the policy of not getting out of the territorial limits of Korea.

Secretary Acheson. That is correct.

Senator Hickenlooper. We do not know whether had we bombed their marshaling centers and their arsenals and supply dumps and airplane concentrations, whether that would in and of itself have ended the war.

From a military standpoint, however, it undoubtedly would have had some effect upon the facility with which they could regroup back over the Yalu, isn't that a fair assumption?

Secretary Acheson. It would have had some effect. I think the military testimony is that it would not have ended the war.

Senator Hickenlooper. I believe the military testimony as I recall it said that they did not know that it would be decisive in ending the war.

I do not believe that they said that it would not necessarily be decisive. That is as I recall.

But instead of doing something of that kind which from a military standpoint would have contributed to the discomfort of the enemy and contributed to his disruption we elected under the policy which we followed to continue the fighting. We were driven back down the peninsula. We have suffered thousands of casualties and the war is not over yet.

Now the thing I have been asking of every witness, I have asked of you and I expect to keep on asking, what implementation of the policies of establishing peace, what implementation of those policies are proposed that give up hope of an ending of this struggle in Korea? I have never had an answer to that that is understandable other than that we want peace, we desire peace, we hope that they will get tired of fighting and we hope something will happen to end the conflict.

Now, if you feel that you have canvassed that situation——

Secretary Acheson. If I feel that I did what, sir?

Senator Hickenlooper. If you feel you have canvassed that particular situation.

Secretary Acheson. I see.

Senator Hickenlooper. If you feel you have, the situation that I have announced, then it is not necessary for you to answer again. Or if you have any comments, you may make them.

Secretary Acheson. I think it is the same question you asked me yesterday.

Senator Hickenlooper. Yes.

Secretary Acheson. And I answered it to the best of my ability.

Senator Hickenlooper. Yes.

Secretary Acheson. That I thought the methods proposed by General MacArthur were highly dangerous and were likely to produce greater loss and suffering than what is being done.

I thought the military testimony was, if my recollection is right, that it was not likely to be decisive, and my conclusion is that the course we are pursuing is the most likely to produce a settlement in Korea with the minimum risk and danger and loss to our country.

Chairman Russell. The Senator's time has expired. Senator Kefauver.

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Knowland.

Senator Knowland. Mr. Secretary, yesterday I believe you testified to the fact you were appointed Assistant Secretary of State on February 1, 1941. Is that correct?

Secretary Acheson. Yes.

MESSAGE TO CHIANG TRANSMITTED BY BROWDER

Senator Knowland. Were you familiar with the fact that on October 12 the then Under Secretary of State, Mr. Welles, at the request of Mr. Earl Browder for a transmittal to Mao Tse Tung, gave this as a statement of American policy in regard to China? I want to read it to you:

> With regard to the specific charge that the State Department in Washington has informed Chungking's representative that our Government would be displeased if complete unity was established in China between the Kuomintang and the Communists, what this statement alleges is the exact opposite of the fact. The State Department in Washington has at all times taken the position both in diplomatic contexts and publicly that the United States favors complete unity among the Chinese people and all groups or organizations thereof.
>
> With regard to the specific charge that these officials continue the old policy of war against the Communists in China, this Government has had no such policy either old or new. This Government has, in fact, viewed with skepticism many alarmist accounts of the serious menace of communism in China.

Were you familiar with that statement of policy while you were Assistant Secretary of State?

Secretary Acheson. I don't recall the episode that you refer to there. As I gathered what you read, it seems to me that the idea of unity among all the groups in China is in accord with the statements of the generalissimo that I went over this morning, and was in accord with the policy which was certainly active a few years later when we were trying to unify the groups fighting the Japanese.

Senator Knowland. Mr. Secretary, I listened very intensely to your statement this morning, and I thought you covered the ground you cared to cover very well, but I did not find any new material to what you had included in your letter of transmittal to the President on July 30, 1949, in the white paper. It is the same general scope, is it not, of your letter of transmittal to the President?

Secretary Acheson. I wasn't trying to add any new material.

YALTA AGREEMENT

Senator Knowland. I would like to ask this, Mr. Secretary. At the time of the Yalta Confernce you were in the Department of State, and we have had some discrepancy in the testimony regarding that. I wondered, either of your own knowledge at the time or since you have assumed the increased responsibilities in the State Department, whether you could clear up something that I think needs clearing up before this committee.

On page 564 of the first volume of the hearings before this committee, which is in the green cover, I was interrogating Mr. Secretary Marshall relative to the Yalta Conference, and I said to him:

> Were you familiar at Yalta with the Manchurian provisions of giving Dairen and the rights on the Manchurian railroad and Port Arthur to the Soviet Union?
>
> Secretary MARSHALL. I don't think I was, sir.
>
> Senator KNOWLAND. You were not. Was that made in the political——
>
> Secretary MARSHALL. Yes.
>
> Senator KNOWLAND (continuing). Committee?
>
> Secretary MARSHALL. Those were entirely separate from the military.
>
> Senator KNOWLAND. They were separate from the military?
>
> Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Now, going from the testimony of Secretary Marshall over to the hearings before the House Committee on Un-American Activities of August 5, 1948, Mr. Alger Hiss was on the stand, and then Congressman, now Senator, Mundt was questioning him by coincidence on the same subject, and here is what he had to say:

> Did you participate in the portion of the Yalta Agreement which gave Russia control of the chief Manchurian railroad?
>
> Mr. HISS. That was not part of the political agreement. I knew nothing of that until many months later. That was in the military talks in which I did not participate.

Now, could you throw any light on who is correct, Secretary Marshall or Mr. Hiss, in their recollection of the Yalta Agreement and who dealt with that particular subject?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; I do not know. I think the persons who were there are the best people to tell you about it.

Senator KNOWLAND. I call your attention to the fact that on June 1, 1951, in answer to a request that I had made during the hearings, the Defense Establishment, over the signature of Mr. Lovett, wrote a letter to the chairman of the committee, and the last paragraph deals with this same subject:

> (*h*) At what time was General MacArthur notified of the Manchurian provisions of the Yalta Agreement (p. 1472 tr.)?

Then Mr. Lovett has this to say:

> General MacArthur was informed of the decisions made by the combined Chiefs of Staff at Yalta in February 1945. There is no record in the Department of Defense of General MacArthur having been informed of the Manchurian provisions of the Yalta Agreements, which was made on the political level and not a military decision.

So, apparently after his testimony they went back to the Defense Department, reviewed the situation and by letter over Mr. Lovett's signature, make the flat-footed statement that it was not a military decision but was one that was taken up in the political committee, and you say you have no knowledge of that?

Secretary ACHESON. I have no knowledge of that at all, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. As an Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Secretary, did you have anything to do with the assignment of Mr. Hiss as one of the American representatives to the Yalta Conference?

Secretary ACHESON. What I had to do with it was to sign his travel orders, which I did, as I signed the travel orders of all members of that delegation.

Senator KNOWLAND. You made no recommendations of any kind that he be included on the mission to anyone, directly or indirectly?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

WALLACE MISSION TO CHINA

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, referring to the year 1944, at that time I find that in addition to being Assistant Secretary of State, you were a member of the Department of State Policy Committee from January 15, to December 20, 1944.

This, of course, was prior to the Yalta Conference.

You have testified this morning relative to the trip to the Far East of the then Vice President of the United States, Mr. Henry Wallace.

Was that an official Government mission to China?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes it was. He went as the representative of the President.

Senator KNOWLAND. Of your own knowledge, do you recall who accompanied Mr. Henry Wallace as part of the mission out there, to meet with the generalissimo?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, there were various people. I believe among them was the Chief of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. John Carter Vincent.

Secretary ACHESON. John Carter Vincent.

Senator KNOWLAND. Did you have anything to do with the recommendation that John Carter Vincent accompany Mr. Marshall?

Secretary ACHESON. Not that I can recall.

Senator KNOWLAND. Pardon me, strike that; accompany the Vice President, Mr. Wallace.

Secretary ACHESON. Not that I recall. It was not in my field of responsibility.

Senator KNOWLAND. I find on page 551 of the China white paper, where it discusses the various conferences held—Vice President Wallace with President Chiang Kai-shek—that in addition to Mr. John Carter Vincent being present, Mr. Owen Lattimore was present. Do you know under whose authority he attended those conferences?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; he was an employee of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Senator KNOWLAND. On the recommendation——

Secretary ACHESON. Wait a moment. My assistant tells me that he was an employee of OWI. He was an employee of the Chinese Government, either before or after—before. I am correct in that. He was an employee of——

Senator KNOWLAND. On the recommendation of the Government of the United States, I understand.

Secretary ACHESON. I don't know anything about that. I had nothing to do with it.

Senator KNOWLAND. Let me call your attention to page 553, since you have testified that Mr. Wallace's mission was an official mission of this Government, where it gives part of the conversations between President Chiang Kai-shek and our Government's representative there, and I am reading from page 553:

> President Chiang referred to the clever Communist propaganda to the effect that they were not tied to the U. S. S. R.; that they were, in fact, nothing more

than agrarian democrats. As a matter of fact, the Communists follow the orders of the Third Internationale.

Now, that was Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's view of the Communists.

Now, let me read our Vice President's views.

Secretary ACHESON. May I find this thing that you are reading?

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes, sir; page 553 of the China white paper.

Now, immediately below that—it is about half way down the page—Mr. Wallace, the Vice President of the United States, and, it seems, the official representative of this Government, was giving his opinion of Communists to the generalissimo, and I quote:

> Mr. Wallace referred to the patriotic attitude of the Communists in the United States and said that he could not understand the attitude of the Chinese Communists as described by President Chiang. President Chiang said that the difference in the attitude of the American and the Chinese Communist might be explained by the fact that there was no possibility of the American Communist seizing power, whereas the Chinese Communist definitely desired to do so in China.

Now my question, Mr. Secretary, is this: Is it not a matter of fact that up until the attack by the Nazi regime upon the Government of the Soviet Union, the Communists in this Nation were doing everything they could to disrupt our war industry then trying to give aid to Britain and the western allies, and it was only upon the attack on the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany that they finally came around to support the war effort and possibly in that case it was more because of Russia than because of the United States. Are you familiar with that history?

Secretary ACHESON. I think that is correct, Senator Knowland.

POSSIBLE EFFECT OF EMBARGO ON MILITARY SUCCESS OF NATIONALISTS IN 1947

Senator KNOWLAND. Now I would like to ask this question: In your introduction to the white paper to which I have previously referred on Roman numeral XI, the letter of transmittal, you had this to say, which you repeated in your testimony this morning:

> By the time General Marshall left China at the beginning of 1947, the Nationalists were apparently at the very peak of their military success and territorial expansion.

Do you believe that that was a correct statement as of that period of time in 1947?

Secretary ACHESON. If I can find—"By the time General Marshall left China at the beginning of 1947," at the bottom of the page?

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes. I say you believe that that was a correct estimate of the situation at that time that they were at the peak of their position in China?

Secretary ACHESON. That I described this morning.

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes; that is what I understood.

Secretary ACHESON. In the same way; and I pointed out it was a very deceptive peak because by overextension they got themselves in a very bad situation.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Secretary, you were familiar with the official statement issued by the President of the United States on

December 18, 1946, relative to our policy toward China, were you not?

Secretary ACHESON. December 18?

Senator KNOWLAND. December 18, of 1946.

Secretary ACHESON. I undoubtedly was.

Senator KNOWLAND. Did the State Department draft that statement for the President, do you know? It is on page 689 of the white paper.

Secretary ACHESON. I cannot answer that because I do not recall. Undoubtedly, the State Department had a good deal to do with drafting it, whether it drafted the final draft or not.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, could you find out for the committee whether the original draft was prepared in the State Department?

Secretary ACHESON. I undoubtedly can find that out.

Senator KNOWLAND. I want to call your attention to the bottom of page 691 of the white paper, reading as follows:

> From VJ-day to the end of February, shortly after General Marshall's arrival, the total was approximately 600 million, mostly in transportation costs. Thereafter the program was reduced to the fulfillment of outstanding commitments, much of which were later suspended.

And then further on in the next paragraph it says:

> Aircraft, all nondemilitarized combat material, and fixed installations outside of China were excluded; thus no weapons which could be used in fighting a civil war were made available through this agreement.

Are you familiar with that?

Secretary ACHESON. I think we were talking about that this morning, and this was during the period of the embargo which went into effect in August of 1946 and was taken off in May 1947.

Senator KNOWLAND. I was merely raising the point in view of the fact that by your own statement in the letter of transmittal to the President, China—the Republic of China—had reached a high point in its getting back a good deal of the country, how much part the placing of the embargo and the constant pressure to form a coalition with communism might have played in the undermining of the morale of the Government of the Republic.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I explained that very fully, I thought, my own view on it, this morning, and I do not think that it is exactly the way you stated it. I don't think what we did had that effect.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CHINESE AND GREEK SITUATION

Senator KNOWLAND. Are you familiar with the top secret memorandum C–62–7 of General Wedemeyer to Chiang Kai-shek, dated November 10, 1945?

Secretary ACHESON. Not by that description, sir. Have you got it there?

Senator KNOWLAND. I have it here.

Secretary ACHESON. Is it in the white paper?

Senator KNOWLAND. No; it is one of the documents apparently eliminated from the white paper.

Now I read you subparagraph 3 (d) relative to conference with Secretary of State.

Secretary ACHESON. The date of this paper?

Senator KNOWLAND. This is November 10, 1945. It said:

> He repeated the President's words "promising support to you and the Nationalist Government," but he also declared the President's instructions that the United

States positively would not participate in Chinese military clashes, nor could any facilities be given for the Central Government's actions against rebellious military elements within Chinese territory.

Doesn't that mean, Mr. Secretary, that no aid—we were telling the President of the Republic of China that no aid could be given that would be used against rebellious elements within Chinese territory, and is not this exactly counter to the policy that we followed in Greece, where we not only supplied arms and a mission, which went down to battalion level, but kept the mission there under General Van Fleet until the Communist movement had been crushed in Greece?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, this policy is different from the policy which was in effect in Greece. And I explained this morning at very considerable length why that was so and why we felt, I think, it was quite impossible to solve the problems in China by military force, and that we were supporting the official efforts of both the generalissimo and the Chinese to solve their difficulties by negotiation.

It is also true that the view of not adopting the same policy that was adopted in Greece had the approval later on of the Congress.

Senator KNOWLAND. No effort was made in the Greek situation, was it, Mr. Secretary, to suggest to the King or the Prime Minister that a solution might be found in setting up a government that would have 20 members of the party of the Prime Minister, and then to bring the Communists into the government for a minority representation?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, the Greek Government did not make that suggestion. They had attempted to do that earlier and had adopted a different policy. It was a very different situation.

ALLEGED PRESSURE ON CHINESE NATIONALISTS TO NEGOTIATE

Senator KNOWLAND. Let me read you from this same document, paragraph 4 (d), dealing with the conference with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

They declared plainly American military aid to China will cease immediately if evidence compels the United States Government to believe that any Chinese troops receiving such aid are using it to support any government which the United States cannot accept, to conduct civil war or for aggressive or coercive purposes.

Does that not serve notice on the Government of the Republic that after asking them that they greatly reduce their number of troops in being and we undertake certain commitments to supply the lesser number of troops, which we have suggested that they then form, that as to those troops any equipment that we furnish them should not be used in a civil war?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't think it is referring at all to the situation which would exist after the contemplated constitutional government went into effect. I think it is relating to what I said this morning was a strong belief, and the belief of the Chinese too, that there was not available force in China to settle these problems by force, and therefore you have to resort to negotiation.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Secretary, is it not a very clear indication of the very type of pressure Senator Hickenlooper mentioned earlier that we had constantly exerted upon the Government of the Republic that they take the Chinese Communists into a coalition, and is not that indicated by the message which Vice President Wallace conveyed to the Generalissimo in 1944, in which the Vice President on behalf of this Government was trying to paint the Communists as being good, loyal American citizens, and therefore he could not understand why the Chinese Communists were not the same type, and the generalissimo, with all his experience in that area of the world, was trying to point out that Communists, as we now know, in this country were tools of the Soviet Union?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, that is a somewhat involved question, Senator.

Senator KNOWLAND. It is involved, I admit, but this is an involved subject, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you wish the question read back to you by the reporter?

Secretary ACHESON. I am just trying to get it straightened out in my mind.

Yes; will you read it to me, please?

(Whereupon the pending question was read by the reporter.)

Secretary ACHESON. I think there are two matters involved in that. One was whether this was pressure on the Chinese Government to do something; and the other was—was it pressure which derived from the mistaken estimate of the nature of the Chinese Communists.

In regard to the latter question, I think both the generalissimo and all those on the American side working on this problem understood the nature of Chinese communism. There wasn't any doubt about that.

Senator KNOWLAND. Including Mr. Wallace?

Secretary ACHESON. No. I should say that that quotation which was read, from Mr. Wallace, was quite contrary to what was thought in the State Department and Defense Department.

Senator KNOWLAND. He was representing the Government of the United States, was he not; and had there with him at that time Mr. John Carter Vincent, head of our Far East division?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct. I don't think that is likely to reflect where Mr. Wallace got his particular views about communism in the United States.

I think, as I tried to point out this morning, there was no illusion about the character of the Chinese Communists, or the fact that they were Moscow-inspired.

The generalissimo understood that, and we understood that.

The generalissimo's proposals were made with that knowledge in mind. They were his proposals. They were not our proposals, and he understood the necessity of working out his problems in North China through negotiations, because he could not work them out through force.

What we were doing is telling him that we were engaged in that effort, but we were not engaged in an effort which was to finance or to give assistance to civil war, because as I pointed out this morning, civil war would destroy every possibility of surmounting the difficulties which the generalissimo had before him, the difficulties with the Japanese, the difficulties with the Communists, the difficulties with the Russians in Siberia, the difficulties that came from the revolutionary spirit in China.

Those could only be surmounted by peace and by strengthened Nationalist Government, and the whole chance of the future of China would be destroyed by civil war.

EVENTS AFTER MEDIATION BREAK-DOWN

Senator **Knowland**. Mr. Secretary, after the negotiations broke down and Secretary Marshall came back and reported that they broke down, then how did China have a chance to save the Republic except by combating the Communists in the same way that the Greeks have had to combat the Communists and the same way the Koreans have had to combat the Communists?

Secretary **Acheson**. I pointed out this morning, Senator Knowland, that they broke down because both parties, the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists, believed that they could from time to time take advantage, each one of the other, by some military operation. This led to more and more fighting and this led to a complete collapse of the effort.

The Chinese Government did not take the view until July, the 4th of July, 1947 that this attempt was officially over and in fact there were several statements after General Marshall left by the National Government that it was still continuing and it was still its purpose to negotiate a settlement with the Communists.

Senator **Knowland**. Mr. Secretary——

Secretary **Acheson**. When they declared on July 4 that the Nationalists were in open rebellion against the government——

Senator **Saltonstall**. Communists.

Secretary **Acheson**. The Communists were in open rebellion against the Nationalist Government, and an attempt to suppress them by force—we had already raised the embargo and we helped, so far as we could, in that effort; but all of our military people, all of our diplomatic people, thought this was a hopeless effort on the part of the Nationalist Government, and could only end in disaster.

UNITED STATES PRESSURE FOR COALITION GOVERNMENT

Senator **Knowland**. Mr. Secretary, are you familiar with the Department of State letter, dated October 2, 1946, to Admiral Smith, of the Maritime Commission, in which it states:

> It is the desire of the United States Government that these commercial-type vessels be destined for United and Democratic China under a coalition government. It is, therefore, understood by the Chinese Government that if it appears to be in the best interests of the United States, the latter may disconinue the transfer of these vessels.

Wouldn't you say that was a type of pressure to bring them in support of a coalition government, and if they were as enthusiastic for a coalition government as you indicate in your testimony, would it have been necessary to bring these various pressures, such as the message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the letter from the State Department, that in the event they didn't form a coalition government, military aid would cease and certain types of economic aid would cease?

Secretary **Acheson**. I think that is the letter that was signed by Mr. Clayton.

Senator **Knowland**. That is correct.

Secretary **Acheson**. And it was superseded in a few days by another letter which said to go ahead and transfer the ships.

Senator KNOWLAND. Is my time up?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, your time is up. Senator McMahon.

BIPARTISAN AGREEMENT ON FAR EAST POLICY EXCEPT CHINA

Senator McMAHON. Mr. Secretary, there has been a good deal of discussion from time to time on the floor of the Senate concerning the fact that we have not had a united foreign policy on the Far East, whereas we have had one in the other areas of the world. As far as you recollect, Mr. Secretary, has there been any difference of opinion conveyed to you in your official capacities as to our policy in regard to the Philippines?

Secretary ACHESON. I should think that we are quite united on that.

Senator McMAHON. And the same question with regard to Japan.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. We fortunately have a complete agreement, as I understand, on that.

Senator McMAHON. And with the Dutch East Indies?

Secretary ACHESON. I do not know of any differences of opinion there.

Senator McMAHON. Do you know of any on Indochina, a difference of opinion?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

Senator McMAHON. And the Malay States?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

Senator McMAHON. Now, have I covered the main areas in the Far East?

Secretary ACHESON. I think so.

Senator McMAHON. And as far as you recall, there has been no difference of opinion on our policy in those areas over the past years in which you have served this Government in an official capacity?

Secretary ACHESON. I think that is right, Senator McMahon.

Senator McMAHON. Now, however, it is alleged that there is a difference of opinion and has been in regard to China, and more particularly, with regard to Chiang Kai-shek. I would hazard the guess that you would agree to that, after listening here today.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I think recently there has been.

CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATION ON CHINA POLICY

Senator McMAHON. It has been constantly said that there is no consultation with the Senate on the policies that we should follow in the Far East, that it has been a unilateral policy and that if there is an unfortunate result in China, it all came about through the pursuit of a policy in which only the Government and majority of the Congress had responsibility.

Mr. Secretary, can you tell us of your own knowledge, as to the consultations that were held with the Appropriations Committees of the Congress regarding the policy that this Government should follow with regard to China?

Secretary ACHESON. I can't recall all of them, Senator McMahon. I should have thought that over the period of time since the war we had had a very considerable number of consultations with the various committees—both the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees and Appropriations Committees—from time to time.

I thought I had kept those committees informed about what was going on in those areas, pretty much the same way we have with regard to other areas of the world.

I didn't know there was any difference of view as to what we were doing until fairly recently. The period that I was out of the Department, from July 1, 1947, to the beginning of '49, I don't know of my own knowledge, but the record seems to show very considerable meetings between the foreign committees of both House and the Appropriations Committees and General Marshall, in which he went in an extremely frank way into what was going on.

Senator McMahon. I have made some research, Mr. Secretary, as to the hearings which took place before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee previous to my becoming a member of that committee on January 15, 1949.

But I can only speak of my own knowledge for the meetings that occurred with the Foreign Relations Committee since that time. I, however, had an opportunity to very quickly review the hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee concerning the problem of China, when General Marshall was Secretary of State.

Those hearings disclose that he reported to the Foreign Relations Committee on his assignment to the Far East what he found and what he recommended, and for your information, because I presume you would be glad to know and to have this record carry the information, there was no dissent evidenced in that record as to the policy which was to be pursued.

When General Marshall became Secretary of State in 1948, there was proposed by the executive branch the appropriation of some $500 million for economic aid to the Chinese Government. Are you familiar with that?

Secretary Acheson. $570,000,000. We were discussing it this morning.

Senator McMahon. Have you read the hearings that took place before the Foreign Relations Committee in regard to that suggested authorization?

Secretary Acheson. I have not read all of them, Senator McMahon. I have read some parts of them, and I think I quoted from some parts of them this morning.

Senator McMahon. From some parts of the hearings, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator McMahon. I would rather doubt that you quoted from the Senate hearings because as far as I know they have never been printed. I believe that the House hearings were printed.

I might say that the Senate hearings are most revealing. I have been insisting for some months past that one of the greatest examples of error being converted into accepted fact by its constant reiteration is the claim that all parties did not participate in the China policy, share and share alike. I refer of course to these hearings on the China aid bill in the Eightieth and Republican controlled Congress when our very distinguished friend and colleague, the late Senator Vandenberg, was chairman of that committee.

DECLASSIFYING AN EXECUTIVE SESSION TRANSCRIPT

I do not know about the propriety of reading from this record, since it has been an executive record. I notice that Senator Hickenlooper quoted from the record, executive record of General Marshall's testimony just a few minutes ago, and with the unanimous consent of the committee, Chairman Russell, I would like to ask Chairman Connally as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee whether he believes it proper for me to examine the Secretary on the basis of this record.

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, if it is not declassified——

Senator MCMAHON. Well, it never was classified. It was taken in executive session. It is a record I would say, Mr. Chairman, that should be made known to the American people because it demonstrates clearer than anything else could that the Foreign Relations Committee not only was in possession of such facts as the Executive Department had at the time, but were in complete agreement as to the foolishness and the lack of wisdom in pursuing the support of military pursuits in China.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator, do you yield?

Senator MCMAHON. I yield if it is not taken from my time. It is a procedural question, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes. Could it be taken out of his time?

I want to point out that this will raise an issue. I quoted briefly from an executive transcript yesterday, and pointed out that I was so doing, and that I assumed if it were required it would be continued to be treated as executive.

This will raise the question if there are other portions of the record which might seem to present possibly a different light on the matter; that those also, I assume, would be equally available.

Chairman RUSSELL. If there is any part of the record——

Senator BREWSTER. I do not know how far this might lead.

Chairman RUSSELL. Any part of the record that is made available here—I think all of it——

Senator BREWSTER. I am addressing myself to the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee now as to the immediate question of whether we read from a record of that committee; and I just thought it ought to be clear as to where it might lead.

Chairman CONNALLY. If the Senator from Connecticut thinks it is important, I will not raise any objection.

Senator KNOWLAND. On a procedural objection there, I certainly have no objection to the Senator from Connecticut reading that or anything else he wants to; but I do feel that the point raised very clearly by the Senator from Maine should be understood; that, if part of this executive hearing is quoted from, then we will have the same right to examine the Secretary on other phases of the hearings which may have been held, which may throw a little different light on the subject.

Chairman RUSSELL. So far as the Chair is concerned, I have not been called upon to make a ruling, but my ruling will be that if it is made, if that part of the hearing is used as a predicate for the question, of course, the entire hearing will be used by any other Senator that might desire.

Chairman CONNALLY. You mean on the same subject or any hearing?

Chairman RUSSELL. Not any hearing. If you use part of the hearing, I think it is only fair to permit the rest of it to be used.

Chairman CONNALLY. I think it is true of the particular matter; but I wouldn't think that would be to open up the whole hearing on everything.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chair would not undertake to rule on the materiality, the pertinency, or relevancy of it; but the Chair has been pretty busy ruling on a good many questions asked here.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley.

DISCUSSION OF CHINA AT EXECUTIVE SESSIONS IN 1948

Senator WILEY. I think the particular hearing in question resulted, as he afterward said, when Marshall came back, and the question before the committee at that time was what aid, if any, we should give.

And—I remember the occasion very clearly—we got, as has already been stated quite succinctly by the Secretary, a picture of the situation. I agree with Senator McMahon, we agreed to the amount of money that should be set aside for that purpose, and all this and that.

There are a lot of funny things that were said that might lend to the humor of the occasion, particularly by the present chairman. At that time, we agreed, as subsequently stated by MacArthur, that we should not get our nose in the door and put troops ashore and all that. The result was that we agreed on a certain amount of money, and the House followed another policy, and the result was a compromise between the two Houses, as I recall it.

That is what I think Senator McMahon means by the foreign policy that was involved at that time.

It did not involve any secret agreement that afterward became known to us, the Yalta agreement and other agreements that were the function of the Executive. Nothing was said about such things as the Yalta agreement, where we agreed to Russia taking possession of various territories that have been mentioned here today.

What was done was simply—am I not right, Senator McMahon?—questions involving how much money was to be designated as aid to China.

Senator McMAHON. The discussion, Senator Connally, showed a complete, unanimous agreement in the committee that the Chinese situation was just hopeless.

The chairman of our committee has been spoken of, and was not then chairman, and I must say that, in reading the testimony, he was prophetic in what he said in these meetings concerning what the future course in China was going to be, due to the corrupt bunch of thieves and incompetents that surrounded Chiang Kai-shek.

Senator BREWSTER. Did this antedate the Marshall mission?

Senator McMAHON. This was subsequent to the Marshall mission. This was a review of the situation, as it happened in 1948. This record demonstrates, beyond a question of a doubt, to anybody that reads it, that this committee was unanimous, the Foreign Relations Committee, in its belief that we had to give some money to China for economic aid, but it was so convinced that there should not be anything designated as military aid that they appropriated, or recommended an appropriation, of $100 million, at the suggestion of the Senator from Texas, in the bill, for Chiang to use as he saw fit, which, as he pointed out, would be for military aid, without committing us to military aid, per se, and the House——

Chairman CONNALLY. Was that $100 million, or——

Senator SMITH. One hundred twenty-five million.

Senator MCMAHON. Yes, $125 million.

Now, if we are trying to get at the bottom of what happened in China, certainly one of the major things that this country must understand, and this record must contain, is the procedures that were taken here, in the National Legislature, concerning this question.

There are some things in this record that will undoubtedly embarrass some Senators who are trying to prove something different than they advocated at the time. That may be somewhat unfortunate; but nevertheless, since this is a very important hearing, I believe that this entire record of these hearings should be made available for the record of this committee.

Senator BREWSTER. Do you have any similar records regarding before the Marshall mission, to show——

Senator MCMAHON. We have a record which Senator Hickenlooper read from this morning, which I have not had a chance to examine, except most hurriedly, which gives General Marshall's testimony after his return from China.

Senator BREWSTER. Before he went——

Senator MCMAHON. I don't think there is anything here that I have seen——

Senator BREWSTER. If there were, wouldn't you consider it of great importance?

Senator MCMAHON. If it exists, I would like to have it in; but what I would like to do would be to have in this record all of the executive hearings with regard to China before the Foreign Relations Committee, because I think it will be most illuminating to the American public, and do away, once and for all, with the claim that has been reiterated a hundred times on the floor of the Senate that the minority party, then the majority party, in the Foreign Relations Committee was not consulted with regard to our policy.

Senator KNOWLAND. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Senator BREWSTER. Are you familiar with Senator Vandenberg's statement on the floor that he was not consulted regarding the Far East policy?

Senator MCMAHON. I am familiar, Senator Brewster, with Senator Vandenberg's remarks as contained in this record when specific questions were presented.

Senator BREWSTER. That is 3 years after the policy was formed, 3 years too late.

Senator MCMAHON. Whenever it was formed, the record will speak for itself, and the context of the time in which it was shown.

Senator GEORGE. May I ask Senator McMahon, was this after General Marshall was made Secretary of State?

Senator MCMAHON. Yes, Senator.

OTHER EXECUTIVE-SESSION DISCUSSIONS OF CHINA

Senator GEORGE. Have you got any record of his first appearance before the committee, or first visit back, probably in February, March, or April?

Senator McMAHON. I have not had a chance to go into this, but in the Foreign Relations Committee, as you remember, Senator George, in the spring of 1949, after I did become a member of the committee, we did hear a complete review of the Chinese situation.

Senator GEORGE. Yes; I remember that.

Senator McMAHON. And in 1948, Senator, we appropriated $125,000,000 for Chiang's government to be repaid out of the customs duties to be collected at the ports by an American mission.

Senator GEORGE. I recall that; yes, sir.

Senator McMAHON. Do you recall that we took much testimony on that? Were you in complete agreement as to the lack of good sense that was in that proposition? It finally ended up in—I forget just how much money in the bill, Mr. Secretary, in the spring of 1949; it became a question of liquidating the Chinese policy——

Secretary ACHESON. Are you asking me how much money——

Senator McMAHON. In the 1949 bill.

Secretary ACHESON. I think the authorization was for $338,000,000 of economic aid, and this $125,000,000 you spoke of to be used——

Senator McMAHON. That was in 1948, and General Barr testified that——

Secretary ACHESON. Later; I do not recall.

Senator McMAHON. That they had not lost a battle due to the lack of ammunition. You remember that testimony?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I do.

Senator McMAHON. You quoted from it this morning.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes.

Senator McMAHON. Have you had a chance to read the executive hearings of the Foreign Relations Committee in the spring of 1949?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't think so, Senator. I don't recall.

Senator BREWSTER. I think there would be no objection, I assume, to anything of this character, but some of the statements the Senator from Connecticut seemed to imply take in a great deal more territory.

The China policy that we have been discussing was formulated, the Secretary indicated, back in 1945. It is in that period that the question had arisen; and, as I understand, the Senator from Connecticut isn't prepared to indicate what consultation preceded the Marshall mission.

ATTITUDES EVIDENCED IN PAST EXECUTIVE SESSIONS ON CHINA

Senator McMAHON. Mr. Secretary, for your information and the information of the record—and I hope this is not being taken out of my time, Mr. Chairman—there wasn't a single word of criticism, as far as I have been able to pursue these hearings, from any member of the Foreign Relations Committee, Democrat or Republican, regarding the policy that was followed in China, nor a single suggestion of a change of policy that is contained in the hearings of this committee over the years that I have been able to examine.

Senator Brewster. And was there any consultation prior to the Marshall mission? Unless that is established, the statements of the Senator from Connecticut can be extremely misleading.

Three years later they faced a fait accompli. Then it is a very different question than 3 years earlier.

Chairman Russell. Any Senator here has been permitted to make any statement he seets fit in his own time. Some procedural matter, if it arises, of course that is entirely different, but any Senator if his statements are acurate or not, as long as he is making them in his 30 minutes, can make any statement he sees fit.

Senator McMahon. Mr. Chairman, the only reason I will not suggest and will not move that these hearings be made a part of this record is because at the time they were heard it was in executive session and Senators expressed themselves perhaps somewhat more freely, a little differently than they would have if they would have known that the record was to become a public record.

I shall insist in the Foreign Relations Committee that these records be made public, so that they can be made a part of this committee, giving to each Senator, however, and this will be part of my motion, a reasonable opportunity to go over the hearings, not to change the sense of anything that is said, but to correct certain modes of expression which were used on an informal basis. I think it important to have in the record at this point, and I make it without fear of contradiction, that in the years between '47 and '49 there was not a single, solitary suggestion made for the formation of policy, change of policy, or disagreement with policy by any member of this committee.

MAKING PUBLIC PAST EXECUTIVE SESSIONS

Senator Smith. Will the Senator yield for a question? Will the Senator include the report of the Senator from New Jersey, which he made in '49, and the recommendations he made?

Senator McMahon. I will be glad to include them.

Senator Smith. I would like to have them included, because one Senator, at least, was very much disturbed.

Senator McMahon. The Senator will be interested in reading his own comments and those of his colleagues in the hearings that took place on China. They are very revealing.

Senator Smith. I think it is very proper to have all this testimony in the record. I have no objection.

Senator McMahon. I am happy about that.

Senator Brewster. Will your motion cover making available any of the records of the Foreign Relations Committee that may have a bearing on this Chinese situation?

Senator McMahon. That is right.

Senator Brewster. From the beginning of the 10 years?

Senator McMahon. From the end of the war in 1945, VJ-day, until date; though I have no objection to going back of that, if you like.

Chairman Russell. Let's proceed in an orderly manner.

Senator Brewster. Will the Senator yield for another question?

Senator McMahon. Just one more.

Senator Brewster. Would you include in that that the Senator from Connecticut and the Senator from California, pass, as they have been, on any questions here of alterations?

Senator McMahon. Well, we cannot do that because the Senator from California is not a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. This is purely a Foreign Relations Committee matter.

I would assume that the Senator from Texas will designate some other minority member.

Senator Knowland. Mr. Chairman, I have a procedural point.

Senator McMahon. I am always happy to work with the Senator from California.

Senator Knowland. I have a procedural point. I hope the Senator, when he made his suggestion, will include, since he has raised the point—and all of us are seeking information—that he will include the Foreign Relations Committee hearings going back to the time of the Yalta Conference, because I think it is quite pertinent as to when the Foreign Relations Committee was first advised as to the Manchurian provisions of the Yalta agreement, and so that we will have the full story; I think all of us are interested in the facts, and I would be most happy if they could disclose everything that needs to be disclosed.

Chairman Russell. Senator Knowland, it is my view that this joint committee has no jurisdiction over these pertinent Foreign Relations Committee records. It is wholly within the jurisdiction of the Foreign Relations Committee, and I think it would be improper for us of the Armed Services Committee to try to handle the printing of the records of the Foreign Relations Committee. If Senator McMahon wishes to discuss it on his own time——

Senator George. Will the Senator yield?

Senator McMahon. I will yield.

Senator George. I want to make this observation. I think it is proper to say that prior to the passage of the Reorganization Act we did not have records made of strictly executive sessions with heads of the State Department, unless the session related to some legislative matter then before us. So, I do not think you go back much further than 1946. I think that is the date of the Reorganization Act.

Senator McMahon. Now, Mr. Secretary, I call your attention to the committee report——

Senator Brewster. Are you through?

Senator McMahon. Yes, I am through with my procedural question.

Senator Brewster. Has it been disposed of?

Senator McMahon. I am going to consult with the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee with regard to the next step, and at his convenience I am going to talk with him about it so that we can have a meeting of 15 minutes, and settle this question.

Senator Saltonstall. Will the Senator yield for a procedural question out of your time?

Senator McMahon. Not out of my time.

Senator Saltonstall. I mean not out of your time.

Chairman Russell. The Chair cannot keep up with these 30- and 40-second procedural matters. Now that is expecting too much of the Chair. We will have to generalize on this time.

Senator Saltonstall. May I ask this question?

Chairman Russell. Yes.

Senator SALTONSTALL. It seems to me, as a member of the Committee on Armed Services, the Senator from Connecticut raises this question in my mind. I am not personally interested in whether the Senator changes his point of view or not; he is entirely privileged to change his point of view. But I am very much interested as a member of this joint committee in having before me all the possible facts and statements because we have got to pass on some of these questions, and if there is information that is available to some members of the committee and not available to other members of the committee, it puts us in a very difficult position who do not have that information. Therefore, it seems to me that we have got to——

Chairman RUSSELL. If the Senator will pardon me, that is a very simple matter, and we have done it before in these hearings. We have requested hearings from the Committee on Appropriations and other committees. If the Senator desires to see these hearings, if he will address me a letter, I will transmit it to the chairman of the Foreign Relations requesting him to make these records available for the use of the committee. We have done that heretofore in the hearings of this committee.

The Senator from Connecticut.

Senator McMAHON. Mr. Secretary, are you familiar with the report of the Foreign Relations Committee to the Eightieth Congress, second session, on the so-called aid-to-China bill?

Secretary ACHESON. In a general way.

SENATE ATTITUDE AT TIME OF PASSAGE OF CHINA-AID ACT

Senator McMAHON. I call your attention to page 10 of that report, Senator Vandenberg reporting for the committee:

> China is a maze of imponderables. It is impossible to know the quantity and type of aid necessary for the restoration of a stable and independent China. The committee is convinced, however, that the assistance contemplated in this bill should appreciably strengthen the position of the National Government without at the same time involving the United States in any additional commitments of a military nature.

Does that refresh your recollection, Mr. Secretary, as to the attitude of the Foreign Relations Committee in regard to the China-aid bill?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; that seems to me to be what I recall.

Senator McMAHON. Had you been aware up until fairly recently of any difference of opinion with regard to the policies that should be followed with regard to Chiang Kai-shek in the Senate—limiting it to the Senate?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't recall any great difference about that until, oh, I think it is almost coincidental with the publication of the white paper. I think at that time there became a good deal of controversy about it.

Senator McMAHON. Do you recollect, Mr. Secretary, during the hearings in the spring, March, of 1949, the Foreign Relations Committee thoroughly reviewing the situation then existent in China?

Secretary ACHESON. I think that is right, Senator.

Senator McMAHON. Do you recollect or recall any suggestion that was made by any member of the committee different in scope or purpose than the one that was finally adopted with regard to our further actions in China?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't recall it now, but that is not very fresh in my mind.

Senator McMAHON. Well, as I recall it, Mr. Secretary, there was a complete agreement in the Foreign Relations Committee in the spring of 1949 that we had best get out of China as fast as we could. And the only point upon which there was some difference of opinion was as to the rate of withdrawal, some believing that it was best in view of the chaotic disintegration that had taken place, that we had better cut our losses and leave immediately, and others suggesting that perhaps it would be well if we were to spend some 25 millions of dollars on providing further food in some of the cities in South China. But there was no suggestion of wholesale aid, either economic or of a military nature, that took place at that time.

Now, Mr. Secretary, I want to examine you in some detail on the hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee, but because of the limitation that I have imposed upon myself, namely, a consultation with the other members of the committee, because I have the portions marked, particularly that which I wish to put in this record, I shall cease my questioning at this point until I have an opportunity to take it up with the chairman of the committee.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hunt?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Secretary, I should first, if you please, like to understand better the relationship of the Secretary of State with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the General MacArthur removal question.

NO PERSONAL MEETING BETWEEN ACHESON AND MAC ARTHUR

You testified several days ago that you had never met General MacArthur personally. Will you just say a word on how this was possible, when you and General MacArthur had been working on Japan as a common problem in recent years?

Secretary ACHESON. How is it possible that I did not meet him?

Senator CAIN. Yes. Just out of my serious curiosity, I wonder how it is that two great American leaders can collaborate and work on a problem without having occasion to meet each other.

Secretary ACHESON. The fact of the matter, Senator, is General MacArthur was in Tokyo and I was most of the time in Washington and held here, sometimes going to international meetings in other parts of the world.

When I became Secretary of State General MacArthur very courteously and kindly invited me to come to Tokyo, but I have just not been able to do it. Therefore such personal contact as we have had, we have had through people whom I have sent out there to see him, and I think on occasion some of his officers have come back here.

Senator CAIN. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, my assumption is that as the Secretary of State, you have thought highly of General MacArthur's administration in Japan since the end of the war. May I ask if that is a correct assumption?

Secretary ACHESON. I was asked about that the other day and said that I did think——

WHITE HOUSE DISCUSSIONS ON MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

Senator CAIN. Mr. Secretary, you have testified that you first met with the President, Mr. Harriman, General Marshall, and General Bradley on Friday, April 6, to discuss the MacArthur question. I understood you to say that you were not aware of any thought that was being given to remove General MacArthur from his Far East commands prior to Friday, April 6; is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. When I was asked to come to the meeting on the preceding afternoon, I knew that this matter would be one of the matters which would be discussed, of course.

Senator CAIN. But prior to your advice of the Friday meeting, you had not been aware of any move on foot to remove General MacArthur?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

Senator CAIN. I thank you. When the question of removing General MacArthur was being discussed, did you as the Secretary of State question the desirability of removing General MacArthur so summarily at a time when the Japanese peace treaty was pending?

Secretary ACHESON. The summary part of it causes me some difficulty. I don't know that that particular matter was considered by me. It may have been.

Of course the problem which would arise from the removal of General MacArthur so far as the Japanese situation is concerned was one of the principal questions, and I gave a great deal of thought to it and, of course, developed the general facts in regard to it.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Secretary, with reference to the premature release of the information that General MacArthur was to be removed, is there any other conclusion to be drawn that one of the five men involved in the meetings was responsible for that premature release?

Secretary ACHESON. Oh, yes; I should think that was the last conclusion that I would draw from that fact.

Senator CAIN. There were only five men in attendance at the meetings in the White House which resulted in a decision to remove General Douglas MacArthur from his Far East commands.

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct, but after the decision had been reached, then there were a lot of steps which had to be put into operation, including the sending of telegrams and that involved a great many people in and out of the Government. So there are all sorts of possibilities for rumors being started.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Secretary, was any consideration given in the White House meetings to some method which might secure agreement between the President and General MacArthur and continue to maintain General MacArthur in authority in Japan?

Secretary ACHESON. I think consideration was given to all possibilities. This was regarded, as you know, as we all would regard it, as a very serious matter indeed.

The great problem in my mind was that a great deal had been done to try and bring about agreement, and it seemed that General MacArthur had taken, and publicly taken, an attitude of the utmost seriousness which was directly contrary to that of the President. Now, it is very hard to see how you could resolve that.

Senator CAIN. If there had not been a premature release, was it the intention of the White House meetings to permit General Mac-

Arthur to turn over his several commands and take leave of his troops and of the Japanese people in a normal manner?

Secretary ACHESON. I think, as I recall the orders, which you have before you and which have been made public, the intention was that those orders should be delivered to him at what would be 8 o'clock Washington time on Wednesday—what is it—the 11th. And that the relief would take place at that time.

I am not familiar, I don't think there was any idea in anyone's mind about whether he should or should not do anything other than he wished to about saying good-by to anybody.

REASONS FOR MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

Senator CAIN. Mr. Secretary, the Chiefs of Staff have repeatedly testified before this committee, and stated the reasons which they gave to the Secretary of Defense, and which the Secretary gave to the President on Saturday, April 7, in support of the President's decision to relieve General MacArthur.

Will you please give to us the reasons which you offered in support of the President's decision to relieve General MacArthur—you, as the Secretary of State, not just as a person?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, at the meeting when the decision was taken, I didn't offer any reasons except a conclusion.

The matter had been discussed at preceding meetings. I think it has already been stated that what occurred at the meeting on Monday was that the opinion of the Joint Chiefs was given and that each of us was questioned as to our advice, and each of us gave it; and it was very short. The question was should he be relieved or should he not, and I said my advice was that he should be relieved.

Senator CAIN. Well, you do not mind if I press in search of just as much information as we can get. I have understood you to say at this meeting you were merely asked the question should the general be removed from his far eastern commands, and your answer was, yes, you think he should be.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I don't think that is quite correct.

Senator CAIN. That is why I am asking you.

Secretary ACHESON. I understand fully, Senator Cain. I think that what we have brought out in my own testimony and that of others was that the discussion of this matter took place on Friday morning with the President and took place between the rest of us without the President on Friday afternoon. It took place again on Saturday morning with the President, at which time everybody was—everybody agreed that they would consider that thing over the week end and in the meantime General Marshall would get the advice as to what should be done by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Now, on Monday advice of everybody was given, and the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was that he should be removed. That was the advice which each one of us gave in turn. It was not a question of being asked should he be removed, it was just a question of giving your advice. You could give any advice, and that was the advice that to me seemed to be wise.

Senator CAIN. I think I am beginning to understand; as I see the situation on that Monday morning, either the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, speaking for the JCS, gave the military reasons which he advanced in support of a possible decision to remove the general from command. At that same time I imagine the President was anxious to get the very best considered advice from the State Department, and you stated one or more reasons why in your opinion as Secretary of State, General MacArthur should be relieved.

As far as the general public knows, the only stated reason for the relief of General MacArthur was from or came from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There has been no question up to this point as to what reasons might have been stated by the State Department.

Secretary ACHESON. The reasons were given by the President in the statement which he released. Now, I think I have already said that I cannot repeat the conversations which occurred but that I could give my own views, which I did give to the committee in testimony on Friday or Saturday or both and, now, the final steps were as I have just described them to you.

NATIONS WHICH VETOED "HOT PURSUIT"

Senator CAIN. I thank you, Mr. Secretary. The Secretary of Defense and JCS and you as the Secretary of State have testified that the United States wanted to engage in "hot pursuit" of enemy aircraft, and the testimony indicates that you were authorized and directed in November 1950 to attempt to secure approval from the 13 nations having ground forces in Korea for such hot pursuit.

I had understood from your testimony that you referred this question to five nations and then to a sixth nation, and that these six nations denied the proposal. I want only to have the record show, coming from page 4574, that General Marshall testified as follows with reference to hot pursuit:

> That was considered, concurred in by me. As a matter of fact, I urgently recommended it. It was concurred in by the Secretary of State and approved by the President, and the Secretary of State was directed to take that up with the 13 nations involved with us in the fighting in Korea. They voted solidly against it. So for the time being, we had to drop that.

May I ask you, Mr. Secretary, to advise us of the six nations with whom this proposal was taken up and discussed?

Secretary ACHESON. I have the six nations here.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

Secretary ACHESON. I do not believe that is really a matter of great relevance to the work of this committee, which nations they were.

Senator CAIN. May I suggest—well, I think it is, sir. If you have no serious objection, we would like to have it. I asked the question in part because the Secretary of Defense said he had taken this question up with 13 nations, and your testimony has been you took it up with 6.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I see no point in making—well, a point of this. I should ask that the names of these nations should be considered by Admiral Davis as something that he might well delete from the public record.

Senator GEORGE. Give us the date, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary ACHESON. Beg pardon?

Senator GEORGE. Will you give us the date?

Secretary **Acheson**. This occurred along the middle of November. The question arose out of some—it came up on the 7th of November and the discussions took place between the Department of Defense and State on November 13, 1950—no, they took place sometime—the date is not given. And on November 13, 1950, we transmitted telegrams to our representatives in certain capitals asking them to take this matter up.

[Deleted.]

Senator **Cain**. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary **Acheson**. And now, I think I should just like to call attention to the fact that Secretary Marshall spoke of this on page 908 of the record and said that on November 13, 1950, "our Department advised several of the member nations" in Korea about it.

Senator **Cain**. Yes, sir.

Secretary **Acheson**. And then he read into the record the general nature of what we advised them. Later on he said something about 13 nations.

Senator **Cain**. He said 13 nations, yes, sir.

Secretary **Acheson**. But the first time he said, I think, "several." Now, my own thought on it had to do with "several" and I cannot testify about 13 because I do not have any recollection of or knowledge of 13.

What we did was to take up with these nations the fact that we were considering this step and that it might be necessary for us to do it and we were informing them about this fact.

We did not ask them to agree or not agree. We asked our people to put up the situation as well as they could to them.

As I say, the results that came back were unanimously adverse and very disturbed replies. I informed General Marshall as to some of these countries in a letter of November 21, of 1950, and as to one of the countries' attitude in a letter of November—I think it is November 24.

Senator **Cain**. You made reference to that one day last week, sir.

Secretary **Acheson**. Did I?

Senator **Cain**. Yes.

REASONS WHY OTHER NATIONS WITH TROOPS IN KOREA WERE NOT CONSULTED ON HOT PURSUIT

Mr. Secretary, you would, to my way of thinking anyway, most logically take such a question up with all of the nations having ground forces in Korea. When you designed a draft of a cease-fire proposal, it was circulated, according to the testimony, among those same 13 nations having ground forces in Korea.

Would you please, sir, state the seven other nations who have ground forces in Korea, and which were not presented with this hot-pursuit question; and merely tell us why, in your opinion, the question of securing their approval for hot pursuit was not taken up with them?

Secretary **Acheson**. Well, as I said I was examined on this thing before, I do not recall why it was limited to a certain group, unless that was—this was—a representative group, and perhaps, for security reasons you don't want to go further, and the names of the other countries I will put in.

I should like those to have the same security treatment by Admiral Davis because you can obviously find out who were the ones who were consulted by taking the total and subtracting those who were not.

Senator CAIN. The record carries publicly, I think, the 13 nations having ground forces in Korea.

Secretary ACHESON. I just have not got them that way.

Senator CAIN. Well, if at this point in the record the information could be provided, say, by Mr. Fisher, I would appreciate it.

Secretary ACHESON. I will be glad to get that. I have not got them set up by ground forces.

FORM OF COMMUNICATION WITH NATIONS ON "HOT PURSUIT"

Senator CAIN. Mr. Secretary, I am not unmindful that the Secretary of Defense said before this committee that he had urgently approved this hot-pursuit proposal as being something which every military authority in this country thought was important to the maintenance of the security and integrity of our limited American forces in Korea.

For that reason, I should like to ask you if you can provide us with the exact form of the message or the question which was taken up with the six nations.

I want to know, sir, to what extent our leadership in this country endeavored to get our allies to approve hot pursuit, and the only way in which I think I can understand that conclusively is to have a look at the words that you sent to our American embassies overseas.

Secretary ACHESON. I shall supply that message to the committee on the understanding that it is not going to be taken up and released to the press, because, if it is, I cannot give messages to and from foreign governments which are going to be given out to the press.

So, if I have an understanding from the committees that this will be treated on a security basis and will not be released, I will be glad to furnish a paraphrase of that.

I take it, Mr. Chairman, in doing so I have that understanding.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I should like to object to receiving it on that basis, as a member of the committee.

Chairman RUSSELL. Very well. You hear the objection, Mr. Secretary, and you will be guided accordingly.

WHY "HOT PURSUIT" WAS NOT DISCUSSED BY UN

Senator CAIN. Mr. Secretary, I understood you to say on, I think it was, Friday that this question of hot pursuit was referred by our State Department direct to the embassies representing us in these six countries and was not referred to either the Security Council or the Good Offices Committee of the United Nations.

I would like to have you tell us in brief form, sir, why a question of this importance was not referred to the United Nations, which presumably has authorized all of our activities in Korea.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I think we discussed this also before, Senator Cain. I will go over it again, if you wish me to.

I pointed out previously that this was a matter having to do with military tactics. I doubted whether we would want to inform the enemy before performing the tactic that we were going to perform it. If you took this up with the Security Council, that would be the result.

It would similarly be the result if you took it up with the sixty-odd nations in the General Assembly. It had to do with a tactical military operation which involved pursuit for, I believe, a period proposed of 2 minutes, or something of that sort. I do not think that it was put forward by the Air Force as a matter of great importance, as you indicated that it was a moment ago.

My recollection of General Vandenberg's testimony was that from the military point of view it had little significance, but was important from a morale point of view.

However, that is a military matter that I am not concerned with now.

Senator CAIN. If you are correct, Mr. Secretary, you are pointing up a seeming and rather large discrepancy between the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, if I am, it is in the record and if it isn't in the record, I am wrong, so I will leave it at that.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Secretary, I have been told, and I may have been misinformed, that the Good Offices Committee was created in order that certain problems which are obviously within the Security Council could be bypassed. If there be any truth in what I have been told, why was not this question of hot pursuit referred to the Good Offices Committee of the United Nations?

Secretary ACHESON. I think you misunderstood what has been said, Senator Cain. The Good Offices Committee was created to conduct negotiations if that could be done with those who were fighting the United Nations troops in Korea for the purpose of bringing about a settlement beginning with the cease-fire, moving into a truce, and then some kind of a settlement. It had nothing whatever to do with the conduct of the operations in Korea. It had only to do with the negotiation if it could be started to bring about a settlement.

Senator CAIN. My appreciation, Mr. Secretary, of this problem is that hot pursuit would have been one of those factors designed to more readily bring a cease-fire result in Korea, and if it is the function of the Good Offices Committee of the United Nations to confer among themselves as to how to bring this war in Korea to a satisfactory conclusion, I should certainly have thought that they were the one most important agency to consider the question of hot pursuit which normally and properly ought to have been discussed by all 13 nations having troops in Korea, sir, and not by less than 50 percent. That would be my view.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I pointed out why I think that isn't correct, Senator.

CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING PRESIDENT'S PROPOSED ANNOUNCEMENT

Senator CAIN. I thank you, sir.

[Deleted.]

Mr. Secretary, you have testified that the President authorized you to negotiate last March with those 13 nations having troops in Korea, and that you sent a draft of a proposed cease-fire order to each of these governments. Did I understand you to testify in that fashion?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; you did not. We did not send any draft of a cease-fire order to anybody.

Senator CAIN. Does the committee have before it a draft and the date of that cease-fire proposal, sir?

Secretary ACHESON. There is a paraphrase in this collection of papers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which tells what was in the proposed message that the President was going to deliver.

Senator CAIN. We have been led to understand that the Supreme Commander in Korea never saw the proposed draft. I ask this question: May I ask why it was thought unwise to send a draft of the cease-fire proposal to the United Nations Commander in Korea, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary ACHESON. Why it was not considered wise?

Senator CAIN. Why it was considered unwise or——

Secretary ACHESON. There was no occasion to do it, Senator Cain. We had informed General MacArthur that we were negotiating something or considering something. We had gotten up a draft of the paper with the Joint Chiefs, and if you read the paraphrase, and if you read the full cable, the full text, which was put in by Admiral Sherman and deleted by the censor, you will see that it was not a paper which dealt immediately specifically with detailed military operations. We had the military advice which was necessary at the time from the Joint Chiefs, and there was no occasion at that stage to go any further.

Senator CAIN. Did we have any reason, Mr. Secretary, to believe that an intended cease-fire proposal would find favor with the enemy?

Secretary ACHESON. Would what?

Senator CAIN. Would find favor with the enemy?

Secretary ACHESON. No. I think the chances were probably against it getting anywhere, but it had other important collateral usefulness.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Secretary, as I recall the message to General MacArthur of March 20, it stated that several weeks of negotiations would be required. I am aware that we were intending to negotiate not with our enemies but with our allies. Whose recommendation was it that our troops in Korea should sit still for an indefinite period of time while the Allies were negotiating among themselves?

Secretary ACHESON. There was no such recommendation by anybody.

Senator CAIN. I think the March 20 message says that it will take several weeks at least, or more, to complete these negotiations. The only military construction I could give to that is that for several weeks the operation in Korea would be suspended in midair.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I think you are quite wrong about that, Senator Cain. The idea stated in this message was first of all that there was work being done on a proposed statement by the President.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

Secretary ACHESON. Secondly, that the other nations had a feeling that pending the chance to see whether this got anywhere, there should not be any major operation above the parallel. Nobody said he was prevented from doing, or anything else. It said they had that feeling.

Then it says—

> that time will be required to determine the diplomatic reactions and permit new negotiations.

That is if any new negotiations develop with the Communists, that will take some time.

Then we say that—

> Recognizing that the parallel has no military significance, we want to find out what latitude he needs and wants to conduct his operations.

There was no suggestion that he be limited. This was telling him what the general attitude was, and saying "What freedom, latitude, do you need?" and he replied he was all right the way he was.

Senator CAIN. You have told us, sir—I want to be awfully certain that I understand—that 7 out of the 13 nations who as our allies have ground forces fighting in Korea were not made aware that the Defense Establishment of America thought that hot pursuit was an imperative necessity.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I don't know that your words "imperative necessity" are the correct words there. If you are asking me whether my testimony is that this was taken up with six nations and not with the others, the answer is, so far as I know, "Yes."

Senator CAIN. I thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Lodge?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Fulbright?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Tobey?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Sparkman?

REASONS FOR RUSSIA'S ACCEPTANCE OF JAPANESE SURRENDER IN MANCHURIA

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, this morning, in answer to a question from Senator Smith, you were discussing the surrender of the Japanese in Manchuria. As I recall, the question was as to why the Japanese in Manchuria were allowed to surrender to Russia. Did they surrender to Russia?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Rather than to the Nationalist Chinese? Did I understand correctly you to say that the reason was that at that time the Nationalist Chinese were far in the southwest of China?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; they were removed by many hundreds and thousands of miles from the scene of surrender.

There were also several hundred thousand heavily armed, very effective Japanese troops, and it took a little force to receive the surrender of that group of armed men; and the force that was there—the only force that was there—was the Russians.

Senator SPARKMAN. When had the Russians moved that force into Manchuria?

Secretary ACHESON. They moved that force into Manchuria, I should think, about 3 or 4 days before the first atomic bomb was dropped. I can get that information.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, it was subsequent to the Yalta agreement?

Secretary ACHESON. Oh, yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. And in accordance with the terms of the Yalta Agreement?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Sparkman. And so they did have forces there capable of receiving the surrender of the Japanese?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

WHEN AND HOW NATIONALISTS MOVED TO MANCHURIA

Senator Sparkman. There were no Nationalist Chinese in there; and, of course, we had no troops in there, did we?

Secretary Acheson. No Chinese, no American troops there.

Senator Sparkman. Yes.

Were the Nationalist Chinese later moved up into Manchuria?

Secretary Acheson. They were moved up considerably later. The time when they moved in—I think that was some time in 1946; I cannot put my finger on the date.

Senator Sparkman. Well, that can be supplied.

Secretary Acheson. I believe it was in 1946. Wait just a moment.

Senator Sparkman. That can be supplied later. I do not care so much about the date, but they were moved up into Manchuria at a later time. Did we move them?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir, we moved them. They were moved up in 1946, and it was some time, I think before August of 1946, about that time.

We furnished the water lift which took, I think, 250,000 of the best troops, the ones that were American-armed and trained, and they were moved by water lift to the ports of Manchuria and then they went up along the railroad, and they were supplied by the United States. We supplied the logistical support which kept those troops in the field.

Senator Sparkman. Now, at that time, were the Communists, the Chinese Communists strong in Manchuria?

Secretary Acheson. At that time, the Russians were moving out and the Communists were moving in; also the Nationalists were moving in.

The original date, I think, for the evacuation by the Russians was sometime in March. The Chinese Nationalists Government asked the Russians to delay their departure from Manchuria because they were not in a condition to move into Manchuria, and they feared if the Russians moved out, the Communists would take over.

General Marshall, in dealing with the question of the cease-fire, and reorganization of the forces, got an agreement that both the Russians and the Chinese Communists would recognize and approve the movement of the Nationalist forces into Manchuria, and that was done in '46.

And in that connection, while I mention that, something was brought to my mind today.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to correct a statement I made this morning, which was an error on my part because I misread my notes.

I was discussing this morning, at page 4857 of the record, and 4859, three agreements which the Chinese entered into in January and February, '46.

One was the cessation of hostilities; another one was the one to reorganize the government; and the other one was the one to reorganize the army.

I said, through inadvertence, that General Marshall participated only in the cessation of hostilities.

He also participated in the reorganization of the army.

I meant to state that, but I stated it erroneously.

The one he did not participate in was the governmental reorganization, and the constitutional.

So, if that can be in the record, it will be understood that I made a mistake on those two pages.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right, sir.

EXTENT OF COALITION EFFORT IN CHINA

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, in connection with this coalition form of government, or whatever it may be called—I believe General Marshall referred to it in some other term rather than coalition, but I believe you referred to it as coalition—at least, it was a mixing, was it not, of the Communists and the Nationalists in some kind of a constituent assembly?

Secretary ACHESON. Not quite that, Senator Sparkman. This was called a national council.

Senator SPARKMAN. A national council.

Secretary ACHESON. This government was, this provisional government, was to be in force from the time the agreements were finalized until the constituent assembly met and adapted a constitution and voting took place, at which time constitutional government would go into effect.

It is more or less the same sort of thing which happened in some of the European countries, where you had a provisional government at the end of the war, which represented all the resistance elements, including the Communists and the Maquis, and whoever these people were who were resisting until the constitution was set up. This was done in Italy, France, Belgium, Holland, various places.

Senator SPARKMAN. How far along did this proceed? Did it ever get to the point that there was a council actually set up?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; it never got into effect at all.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, did I understand you correctly to say that, first of all, this plan had been proposed by the Generalissimo—Chiang Kai-shek—and also by the leader of the Communists?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Did they make the initial proposal?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. When I say it never got into effect, the coalition part of it never got into effect. The only thing that happened was there was a meeting of a constituent assembly, which recommended a constitution. That was agreed on and recommended, but it stopped; the constitution was never adopted and never went into effect. Nothing happened after that.

This proposal was first worked out between the Communists and the Nationalists in the agreed form on the 11th of October, 1945. That grew out of preliminary agreements which had been initialed under the mediation of General Hurley.

General Hurley left before the 11th of October, 1945, and after he left these agreements were signed. They provided for the general principles by which this provisional government should be set up and the way a constitution and a constitutional government should be set up.

Then, working under those general agreements, futher meetings were held in January and February 1946 at which much more detailed provisions were worked out between the Communists and the Nationalists, and some of the other minority parties in China.

Those were the ones that provided for this provisional government called the National Council of 40 People, all of whom should be appointed by the Generalissimo, 20 from the Kuomintang Party, and the rest in proportions which I do not remember from the Communists and the other minority groups.

AMBASSADORSHIP OF GENERAL HURLEY

Senator SPARKMAN. When did General Hurley become our Ambassador to China?

Secretary ACHESON. He went out in 1944 as the President's personal representative. Ambassador Gauss resigned, I think, in the very end of 1944, and I think Ambassador Hurley took office in January or February of 1945. The dates are in this white paper at the very beginning of General Hurley's mission.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, I thtink that is good enough.

Secretary ACHESON. He presented his credentials on the 8th of January 1945, although he arrived in Chungking as the President's personal representative on the 6th of September, 1944.

Senator SPARKMAN. Then his work in China commenced September 1944 and extended to November 1945?

Secretary ACHESON. No; he didn't stay there as long as November.

Senator SPARKMAN. I thought you said it was November he came back.

Secretary ACHESON. He resigned on November 26, I believe, but he had come back to the United States before that. I believe in the early part of October or late September 1945.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, Mr. Secretary, what I am trying to do is to follow this down as best I can to see when this disagreement with reference to the China policy really started.

Apparently it did not start during the time that General Hurley was in China, because I am now reading from a statement which he issued on November 27, 1945, in which he says:

> I am in agreement with the President and the Secretary of State on our foreign policy,

and he further says:

> It was a source of gratification to me that in all my missions I had the support of President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull, Secretary Stettinius, President Truman, and Secretary Byrnes.

Secretary Byrnes was Secretary when he left the service, wasn't he?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator SPARKMAN. I was also interested in this statement as to his directive when he went to China, and I want to quote from his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee on December 5, 1945, as follows:

> My directive was to prevent the collapse of China during the war, and we did. My directive was to sustain the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. We did. My

> directive was to harmonize the relations between the Military Establishment of the United States and of China. We did. My directive was to keep the Chinese Army in the field and contain as many Japanese as possible to protect our men on the beaches and in the jungles, and we did. Our directive was to harmonize diplomatic relations between our Embassy in Chungking and the Government of the Republic of China, and we did during the war.

And not just once but several times in the course of that testimony he repeated his mission and the fact that it had been carried out and that in carrying it out he had had the complete support of President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull, Secretary Stettinius, President Truman, and Secretary Byrnes.

Quoting further from a press release which he himself put out and from which he quoted in his testimony as follows:

> Hurley issued a statement endorsing President Truman's outline of American foreign policy as contained in his recent Navy Day address.

That was in 1945, apparently our Ambassador to China at that time recognized some kind of a foreign policy which he stated the President had laid down in his Navy Day address of that year.

UNITED STATES ATTITUDE TOWARD COMMUNISM IN CHINA IN 1945 AND 1946

Now, Mr. Secretary, something was said about the thinking on the part of the people, some people, that the movement in China was really not a Communist movement but that they were agrarian reformers. I believe you said that you were always of the opinion that they were Moscow controlled or dominated; is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I was pointing out also that the view of the State Department people was along that line, and Ambassador Hurley reports his conversations in the white paper which he had in Moscow. He reported there that the view was held by Stalin and Molotov that the Chinese Communists were not really Communists.

There is in the white paper a report by Ambassador Harriman from Moscow which cautions people against—it is on page 96 of the white paper—in which he says that Russian policy in China is going to be dictated by Russian interests.

Senator SPARKMAN. That was our Ambassador in Moscow?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. What was his name?

Secretary ACHESON. Averell Harriman.

There is also the report from Ambassador Gauss which is included in here also on page 64, under the title, "Pessimism of Ambassador Gauss," in which he has a series of conclusions such as:

> Russian intentions with respect to the Far East, including China, are aggressive.
>
> The Chinese Communists have a background of subservience to the U. S. S. R., but new infleunces—principally nationalism—have come into play which are modifying their outlook.

And he takes a little pessimistic view of the future.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, our Ambassador to China preceding that was General Hurley; is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; that is correct.

DEMOCRATIC ASPIRATIONS OF CHINA IN 1945

Senator SPARKMAN. I want to read something further from a speech made by General Hurley before the National Press Club here in Washington on November 28, 1945. I quote as follows:

> In 1944 American, Chinese, and other world statesmen freely predicted the collapse of the Government of the Republic of China and the disintegration of the Chinese Army. It was at this time that I received the most intricate and difficult assignment of my life.

Then he goes on and tells us about his mission to China as I referred to a few minutes ago, and then he adds this, and I quote:

> The Government did not collapse, the Chinese Army did not disintegrate. The Chinese stayed in the war and fought to a victorious finish. We had in China as secondary objectives: (*a*) To unify anti-Japanese forces in China, (*b*) to prevent civil war in China, (*c*) to support the aspirations of the Chinese people to establish by themselves a free, united, and democratic government—

and he points out how they had succeeded.

Then, I want to read this further selection from his speech.

> Both the Communist armed party and the National Government have adopted the slogan which represents their objective, a government of the people, by the people, and for the people. Both the Communists and the National Government state that their objective is to make effective in China all the rights of man enumerated in the Constitution of the United States. All the parties of China contend that their purpose is to make democratic processes effective throughout China. There is considerable controversy between them about how this should be accomplished and who should exercise the power.
>
> I am rather astonished when some of my friends here seem to indicate that those two issues are indigenous to China. Please understand that I am under no delusions about China's capacity to achieve democracy at once. I think it will probably take as long for China to achieve democracy as it did America.
>
> Few people in America understand the great progress toward democracy that has been made in China during the past 30 years. China's attitude on international behavior is similar to that of the United States. China is not imperialistic, it is not communistic. It desires to be democratc.

EXTENT OF RUSSIAN DOMINATION OF CHINA

Now, when General MacArthur addressed the Congress he said this, and I quote from his speech:

> * * * the Colonial era is now past and the Asian peoples covet the right to shape their own free destiny. What they seek now is friendly guidance, understanding, and support, not imperious direction; the dignity of equality, not the shame of subjugation. Their prewar standards of life, pitifully low, are infinitely lower now in the devastation left in war's wake. World ideologies play little part in Asian thinking and are little understood. What the peoples strive for is the opportunity for a little more food in their stomachs, a little better clothing on their backs, a little firmer roof over their heads, and the realization of a normal nationalist urge for political freedom.

In his testimony before this committee, Senator Fulbright asked him if he believed that it would—I will read his question:

> Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you think that there is no chance whatever that a country like Poland or China can ever be disassociated from the Kremlin and the control of the Kremlin?
>
> General MACARTHUR. I have never said the Chinese were under the control of the Kremlin.
>
> Senator FULBRIGHT. You don't believe they are?
>
> General MACARTHUR. I believe there is an interlocking of interests between Communist China and the Kremlin. The degree of control and influence that the Kremlin may have in China is quite problematical.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, do you think——

General MACARTHUR. I have said that the main issues in Asia are the ones I put forth in my speech.

Do you believe that Communist China is as far disassociated with the Kremlin as General MacArthur indicates, both in his speech and his testimony?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir. I should think the connection is closer than he indicates.

Senator SPARKMAN. You think that certainly so far as the ruling class of China, Communists of China are concerned, that it is under the domination, direction and control of the Kremlin?

Secretary ACHESON. In the way that I pointed out in the previous answers to questions along this line, through the introduction into positions of power of Moscow-trained loyal Communists who are glad, very glad indeed to carry out the Moscow line.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, up to the time that General Hurley was making these speeches and issuing these releases, and testifying in this manner, did you know of any questioning, or any opposition to our foreign policy as it related to China?

Secretary ACHESON. You are referring to General Hurley?

TIME OF DISAGREEMENT ON CHINA POLICY

Senator SPARKMAN. I said, up to the time that General Hurley was making these speeches, and testifying, as I read a few moments ago, did you know of any disagreement or opposition, within our own Government, our own country, to our foreign policy as it related to China?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir. I don't think I had any suggestion to that effect.

Senator SPARKMAN. I don't ask you beyond that time, because, as I understand, Senator McMahon plans to carry on with the hearing at a later time, to show that even at a later date, there was no indication of any opposition or disagreement to it.

I wanted to find out when and where this disagreement started, and over what.

Just one other question, Mr. Secretary, and I am going to quit.

Chairman RUSSELL. You have about 3 minutes.

Senator SPARKMAN. I won't use all of it.

NATIONALISTS AND THE YALTA AGREEMENT

With reference to the Yalta agreement, something was said here this morning about the secrecy of it, and the failure to notify Chiang Kai-shek. I am not sure that I remember this correctly, but was not a part of that agreement that President Roosevelt was going to get in touch with the generalissimo and discuss these features with him?

Secretary ACHESON. I read that portion just a moment ago.

Senator SPARKMAN. I failed to get it. But, in other words, he was not to be kept in the dark, as I understand, but this was to be communicated to him.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. That is correct. I testified to it this morning and again this afternoon, I think that the reason for not——

Senator SPARKMAN. It was a military matter that had to be kept secret.

Secretary ACHESON. Military secrecy involving the movement of troops from the European theater to the eastern theater.

Senator SPARKMAN. As I recall, Secretary Byrnes in his book stated that part of the agreement was the President Roosevelt was to communicate with the generalissimo and that he did, and that it was accepted by the generalissimo.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I think Ambassador Hurley was informed by President Roosevelt in late March or early April 1945, and Mr. T. V. Soong was informed about it, I believe, on June 9, 1945.

Senator SPARKMAN. Did the generalissimo ever make any——

Secretary ACHESON. Ambassador Hurley informed Chungking under instructions on June 15, 1945.

Senator SPARKMAN. Did the generalissimo ever make any protests against it?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't think so. I quoted this morning a statement of his that he thought that the treaties which were worked out as a result of this Yalta agreement, treaties which were worked out between China and Russia, were very helpful to China.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

LETTER FROM BRADLEY CLARIFYING THE RECORD

Chairman RUSSELL. Before we recess, I have a letter I wish to read for the record:

MAY 31, 1951.

DEAR SENATOR RUSSELL: There is a possibility that my reply to Senator Wiley's questions regarding the April 5 meeting, which I called of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to inform them that the President was concerned about some statements which had been made by General MacArthur, and that they should begin studying the military aspects of it, may leave the impression that General Vandenberg, General Collins, and Admiral Sherman were present personally at this meeting.

The diary which I had before me at the time merely showed a JCS meeting from 5 to 5:30 on the afternoon of April 5. It did not show who was present. As a matter of fact, General Vandenberg and Admiral Sherman attended in person. General Collins could not be there but was represented by General Wade H. Haislip, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.

This same impression may have been left when answering other questions regarding this subject which appear on pages 1935, 1937, 1953, 1987; particularly on pages 1988, 1989, 1990, and 1992.

If you and the committee think it advisable this letter might be made a part of the record in order that it will show clearly that General Collins was not present at the JCS meeting called for 5 o'clock on the afternoon of April 5.

Sincerely,

OMAR N. BRADLEY.

We will now stand in recess until——

PROCEDURAL MATTER ON SECRECY OF INFORMATION SUPPLIED TO COMMITTEE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, just before you adjourn, I would like to make clear I objected a moment ago to receipt of certain information requested by Senator Cain from the Secretary, which the Secretary said he would furnish with the understanding that it would not be made public. I objected to that under those conditions, and I still object. But I want to make it clear that in objecting I had no basic idea in mind of making it public when it was received.

My idea was that if it was submitted to the committee, it will then depend upon the committee's opinion as to whether or not it would be made public. The committee would have to undertake the responsibility of that. I would not necessarily vote for making it public myself. I do not know.

Senator LONG. Mr. Chairman, I believe since that comment is on the record, if that position is going to be taken, then those that take that position, of course, I suppose will be ready to share the responsibility, or take the responsibility for us not being able to get all the information we would like to have in this investigation for our own enlightenment.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, in view of Senator Hickenlooper's statement, I did not proceed to advise the Secretary that there was no way I could guarantee him that the matter would not be made public. Under our procedure here, why, if the papers come into the custody of the committee, and the majority of the committee sees fit to release that matter or make it part of our public record, they have the authority to do it. So I therefore did not go into details. When Senator Hickenlooper made his statement, I assumed that the Secretary understood how he is situated with respect to this matter.

Senator Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. I was not quite clear whether the Senator was objecting as a matter of principle or whether he had some reference to this particular item.

Chairman RUSSELL. I thought he made that very clear in his statement he just made.

Senator BREWSTER. No. His statement was he didn't necessarily mean he was going to make it public. But what I thought was if the Senator from Iowa should examine this particular item and perhaps concur that it should be kept secret, it would solve the problem. I think the further we can get without coming to an impasse the better. I think the Secretary made his position quite clear, and if the Senator from Iowa should feel it is all right to keep it secret, it might solve the matter.

Chairman RUSSELL. Of course, the Senator from Iowa could not control the matter because the majority of the committee might vote him down even if he vigorously insisted on keeping it secret.

Senator BREWSTER. I thought you were asking whether there was unanimous consent.

Chairman RUSSELL. I did not ask any such thing at all.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. My point is this committee puts itself in an untenable position if it begins to receive documents with the commitment in advance, before it knows what the document is, that that document will not be made public. I think we stultify ourselves and our actions, and I just can't——

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I find it very difficult to agree with the Senator from Iowa because I think every time we impound a document we do exercise that power, and if it is possible to get some material which we need by any members who were willing to agree to the stipulation, I see no objection in principle to the thing.

Chairman RUSSELL. Of course, we all realize, gentlemen, how we are situated with respect to these documents. I do not know of any particular power we have to hale these documents before the committee; if the Secretary sees fit to put that condition on the supply of this document, and I do not know of any reason—if we were to take a majority vote in advance that they would not release the document to the public, then, of course, any Senator would have his freedom to change his mind, as we have often seen done, and then vote to release it later, so still there is not any guaranty.

Senator BREWSTER. I am very reluctant to establish a precedent here with the Secretary where he may determine the matter. I have indicated the President has the power, but I do not like to establish the precedent that the Secretary has that power, and I think in view of his very frank statement we can get over this bridge without establishing a precedent with the Secretary as to what he will or will not present. I do not accord to the Secretary what is generally recognized to the President.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, of course, there is a very simple way, by the taking of a vote to subpena documents from the Secretary, and then see if we can get them or not. That is a very simple way to investigate and find out. It is not complicated.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, at this time I had hoped to avoid having to.

Senator LONG. It would be for the purpose of publishing it generally to the Nation, not for the purpose of enlightening the committee.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, there is no way of guaranteeing—and I am not going to guarantee—to the Secretary it is or is not going to be public, and I cannot afford to do that. I only have 1 vote out of 26. But we can take that up later.

As the matter stands now, we will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning, bearing in mind, gentlemen, we are going to recess tomorrow—as I stated today before this committee recessed this morning—shortly after 12 o'clock tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 5:10 p. m., the committees recessed to reconvene at 10:05 a. m. Tuesday, June 5, 1951.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

TUESDAY, JUNE 5, 1951

United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:05 a. m. in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), Wiley, George, Smith, Green, Hickenlooper, McMahon, Lodge, Sparkman, Gillette, Brewster, Byrd, Saltonstall, Johnson, Morse, Kefauver, Knowland, Hunt, Stennis, Flanders, and Long.

Also Present: Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge of the committee staff of the Armed Services Committee, William H. Darden, clerk, Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff, Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman Russell. The Secretary of State advised me that he wishes to make a brief statement before the questions start. You may proceed, Mr. Secretary.

TESTIMONY OF HON. DEAN G. ACHESON, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY ADRIAN S. FISHER, LEGAL ADVISER—Resumed

TELEGRAM TO EMBASSIES REGARDING HOT PURSUIT

Secretary Acheson. Mr. Chairman, when we rose yesterday afternoon, Senator Cain had requested that I furnish the telegram which was sent to certain of our embassies in regard to this hot-pursuit matter.

There was some discussion of that in the committees. I have given that consideration over the night and I shall be glad to read the telegram at the present time. The telegram is dated November 13, 1950: "Please discuss with"——

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Chairman, may I say something just from a procedural standpoint, that is without any qualification. I have no intention of moving to make it public or anything of the kind, but it is without restrictions? I mean it may be censored.

Chairman Russell. That is what I understood the Secretary to say. He had given it thought over last evening and that he had decided that he would print it here in accordance with all other evidence that goes into the record. It will be handled in line with the procedures that we have adopted.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I want to make it clear that I have no objection to the censoring of it at the moment, if the censor believes it should be censored.

Chairman RUSSELL. If there is any objection, it will depend on the censor and then the committee will take action on it later.

You may proceed, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary ACHESON (reading):

> Please discuss with Foreign Minister at earliest possible moment grave problem confronting UN forces in Korea in use by enemy of Manchuria as privileged sanctuary for forces which are in fact attacking UN forces in Korea itself. See excerpt from Austin's statement to UNSC on November 10.
>
> This problem arises in two respects. First, ground forces can move into Korea and supply themselves from bases and lines of communications which are largely sheltered by immunity of Manchuria. Secondly, enemy aircraft (nationality not always known) operate from Manchurian fields, dash into Korea air space to strike UN air and ground forces and then fly to safety behind Manchurian border a very few minutes away.
>
> UN Commander has strictest orders about violations Manchurian territory in addition to orders to use extreme care in operations near the frontier itself to insure that hostilities are restricted to Korea. This determination to play according to the rules imposes most serious handicap in face of an enemy which is willing not only to break the rules themselves but to exploit proper conduct UN forces.
>
> United States Government is determined to do everything possible to localize conflict in Korea. This is illustrated by rigorous instructions to commanders as well as by efforts made to adjust accidental intrusions into Chinese territory by offering compensations for damages, et cetera. It is obvious, however, that the abuse of Manchuria by the enemy could easily impose an intolerable burden upon UN forces operating lawfully and properly on UN missions in Korea.
>
> Therefore United States Government wishes to inform government to which you are accredited that it may become necessary at an early date to permit UN aircraft to defend themselves in the air space over the Yalu River to the extent of permitting hot pursuit of attacking enemy aircraft up to 2 or 3 minutes' flying time into Manchuria air space.
>
> It is contemplated that UN aircraft would limit themselves to repelling enemy aircraft engaged in offensive missions into Korea.
>
> We believe this would be a minimum reaction to extreme provocation, would not itself affect adversely the attitude of the enemy toward Korean operations, would serve as a warning, and would add greatly to the morale of UN pilots who are now prevented from taking minimum defense measures and for whom in case of bomber pilots it is impossible under existing conditions to provide adequate air cover.
>
> For your information we are not asking the concurrence of Government because we believe the highly limited application of hot-pursuit doctrine in this situation would turn upon military necessity and elementary principles of self-defense, but we think it important that Government be notified of the problem. Please telegraph any reactions NIACT.
>
> ACHESON.

Chairman RUSSELL. Will you tell us what that NIACT means?

Secretary ACHESON. That is a type of immediate reply. It is a reply which gets immediate treatment and is not dealt with in the order in which the replies come in. It is pulled out.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I would like to know the interpretation and explanation a little bit of the term "Government concurrence there."

Secretary ACHESON. May I leave the discussion of this telegram until people question me, Senator?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Surely.

Secretary ACHESON. I must give various bits of information that I have been asked for.

GOVERNMENTS HAVING GROUND FORCES IN KOREA

I was also asked yesterday what governments other than the Governments of the United States and Korea had ground forces in Korea in the middle of November 1950. I have here the governments which had the three types of forces, and I will read the ground forces.

Australia, United Kingdom, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey.

Air forces: Australia, Belgium, Canada, United Kingdom.

Naval forces: Australia, Canada, France, United Kingdom, New Zealand, Thailand, Netherlands.

MILITARY MATÉRIEL SUPPLIED TO CHINA AFTER RAISING EMBARGO

I was also asked yesterday by a Senator to supply the information as to what military matériel was supplied after General Marshall, as Secretary of State, raised the embargo which had been imposed in August 1946, when he raised that on May 26, 1947. Following is the reply to the request.

On May 26, 1947, the Chinese Government was informed that the Department of State would approve the sale to China of 130 million rounds of surplus rifle ammunition and would approve export licenses for transport planes and spare parts for all equipment, including combat items previously transferred under the eight and a third group air program.

On June 25, 1947, the Chinese Government purchased 130 million rounds of ammunition for 10 percent of procurement cost. The ammunition was shipped on July 14 and August 11, 1947, from the west coast of the United States.

In July 1947 the Chinese sought to purchase 43 C–47 aircraft as part of the eight and a third group air program.

Since this program was already fulfilled, the Chinese were told they could buy through normal surplus-property channels. They purchased 150 C–46's on December 22, 1947.

On December 9, 1947, the Chinese signed a commercial contract for 6½ million rounds of .50-caliber ammunition.

On December 16, 1947, the Chinese were informed of the availability of surplus ammunition, explosives, combat matériel, including combat planes, for the eight and a third air group program.

On January 7, 1948, the Chinese signed a contract for the purchase of all surplus ammunition in the Marianas for 1 cent on the dollar.

In March and April 1948 the Chinese were informed of the type and quantity of surplus ammunition available in Hawaii and the Pacific.

On April 29 and June 11, 1948, contracts were signed whereby the surplus sale of ammunition located in Hawaii was covered.

On May 22, 1948, contracts were signed for the sale of surplus ammunition remaining in the Pacific and not including—not included in previous contracts. The bulk of this was located at Okinawa.

The China Aid Act, providing 125 millions as a grant, which could be used for military assistance, was approved on April 3, 1948.

By December 31, 1948, 60.9 million dollars had been shipped. The breakdown of this is given on page 953 of the white paper.

During 1949 an additional 55 million were shipped, making a total of 115.7 million under this grant, leaving a balance on January 1, 1950, of 9 million unshipped.

As of February 28, 1951, 4½ million remained unshipped, although 3½ million were in procurement, so that only 1 million remained unobligated.

Then, I have a note which might be useful here to put in, that after December 1948, at the request of the Chinese Government, all shipments under the 125 million air program were shipped to Formosa. About half of the shipments under this program, accordingly, went to Formosa.

In addition to the grant aid mentioned above, the Chinese had been steadily procuring arms in small quantities from commerical sources with their own funds.

During 1949, shipments to Formosa included 123 million .30-caliber rifles—I am sorry, 123,000 .30-caliber rifles; 68 million rounds .38-caliber ammunition; 19 million rounds .45-caliber ammunition; 30 Sherman tanks from the United Kingdom; 100 light tanks; 100 scout cars; 200 AT–6 aircraft.

Then, I have one other point that I should like to bring out.

Yesterday, I think, in answer to a question of Senator Knowland regarding the letter to Admiral Smith, which was dated October 2, 1948, it was asked whether this was a letter signed by Mr. Clayton and superseded a few days later. My statement about a few days later was in error.

The letter to Admiral Smith referred to by Senator Knowland, was dated October 2, 1946, and the letter from Assistant Secretary Garrison Norton to Admiral Smith to which I referred was dated April 18, 1947. That is all I have.

DEFINING "GOVERNMENT CONCURRENCE"

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, is it in order now, without asking a question, to simply ask the Secretary to amplify a little what he meant by the words "Government concurrence" in that telegram? I think I know, but I would like to have that amplified.

Chairman RUSSELL. If Senator Stennis is willing to have it done on his time.

Senator STENNIS. Yes; that is all right.

Chairman RUSSELL. I understood you to say Government concurrence was not sought in the telegram.

Secretary ACHESON (reading):

> For your information we are not asking the concurrence of the Government—

this means of the government to which the recipient is accredited—

> because we believe the highly limited application of the hot-pursuit doctrine in this situation would turn upon military necessity and elementary principles of self-defense but we think it important that the Government—adding, to which accredited—be notified of the problem. Please telegraph any reaction.

In other words, we are not asking that the Government to which the recipient of this telegram is accredited concur but we wish to inform the Government of the situation and of the reasons why such action might be necessary and we are asking the Government to indicate its reaction.

Senator SALTONSTALL. But as the result of that they objected.

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis, you may proceed.

POSSIBILITY OF NAVAL BLOCKADE

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Secretary, it is not my desire to intentionally repeat, and I will be as brief as I can be. But I want to ask you a few questions with reference to the possibility of a naval blockade as set out by Admiral Sherman. Now, of course, I understand that there is a resolution passed by the United Nations with reference to an economic blockade. You advocated that and it was a United States resolution introduced, as I remember.

Now, was there any movement on foot on this matter of getting the United Nations to blockade, first diplomatically and of course there is the military question—is there any active movement now in the United Nations for planning of a naval blockade?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; and I think that Admiral Sherman made it clear that he had not recommended a naval blockade, nor had it been overruled and it is his judgment that the best way to proceed at the present time is the way we are proceeding, by trying to make as complete as possible the economic restrictions and, therefore, that is what we are concentrating on.

Senator STENNIS. I know, but if a military or naval blockade would be practical then I should think there would be some movement or some effort in the United Nations to try to work out some plan that would be prepared for possible use at some future time, anyway. Is there any activity or any agitation by the United States in the United Nations for that plan?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir. As I said, a naval blockade at this time has not been recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We are not pushing it in the United Nations because we believe we are much more likely to get our results by increasing the economic restrictions rather than asking nations to go further in a military way than they are prepared to go in the economic way.

UN RESOLUTION ON ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

Senator STENNIS. Now, in reference to the economic blockade, Mr. Secretary, as I understood the resolution, it left each member nation largely to its own judgment as to the application of this blockade. Is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. The resolution recommends that:

> Every state—
>
> A. Apply an embargo on the shipment to areas under the control of the Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China and of the North Korean authorities of arms, ammunition, and implements of war, atomic energy supplies, petroleum, transportation materials of strategic value, and items useful in the production of arms, ammunition, and implements of war.
>
> B. Determine which commodities exported from its territory fall within the embargo and apply controls to give effect to the embargo.
>
> C. Prevent by all means within its jurisdiction the circumvention of controls on shipments applied by other states pursuant to the present resolution.
>
> E. Cooperate with other states in carrying out the purposes of this embargo.
>
> F. Report to the Additional Measures Committee within 30 days and thereafter at the request of the committee on the measures taken in accordance with the present resolution.

Senator STENNIS. Item B there, does that not largely leave it to the discretion of the member nation as to the application of the resolution?

Secretary Acheson. I think what B is intended to do is to ask each country to determine which of the commodities mentioned in the resolution are exported from the jurisdiction of that particular country. Clearly in some cases only a few items which met this description would be exported from that country.

In other cases more, and in many cases different items. They are asked to ascertain those and to put controls on them and to report what they have done.

Senator Stennis. Well, how long do you think it would take for a resolution like that to begin taking effect, assuming that all parties are going to act in good faith?

Secretary Acheson. I should think that it could be put into effect very speedily indeed; and I am hoping that when we get this first report on the 26th of June, we will see that it has already been put into effect.

Senator Stennis. Well, after it is put into effect, then, it would take months before there would be any real results felt, isn't that correct?

In other words, it is not something that is going to operate immediately, so far as results are concerned?

Secretary Acheson. We pointed out, I think, in prior testimony, Senator Stennis, that some of the nations have already taken rather broad action along these lines. Therefore, that has already had its effect.

As other nations begin to follow that and put in these restrictions, they will take effect and will be felt, depending on the item, either immediately, or not so immediately.

Senator Stennis. Mr. Chairman, may we have order?

Chairman Russell. The question is for order.

Senator Stennis. I couldn't hear the answer of the Secretary.

My point is that at best, it would take some considerable months for this economic blockade to bring results, tangible results of a very appreciable quantity, and that something else ought to be considered in the meantime.

It took six months or more to get the resolution passed, and we are going to have to wait now several months before it is felt, if it is put into full effect, and then that may not be sufficient; it seems to me like there should be some activity on behalf of the United States with reference to some other measure along the same line in which, I understand, the next step is a naval blockade.

Secretary Acheson. Well, Senator——

Senator Stennis. A United Nations naval blockade; that is what I am talking about when I say naval blockade.

Secretary Acheson. I think in the respect in which you are now questioning me there is no difference in the time when a stoppage of imports is felt, whether that stoppage is brought about by the action of the nation in not shipping it or by the action of a navy in stopping it outside territorial waters. In other words, the material is not arriving.

In either case it may take some time for that stoppage to affect the whole economic structure of the country concerned. And I think this is true with regard to China—that measures of an economic character will not be immediately felt. They will take some time to have their effect.

Senator STENNIS. But you are very hopeful of the success of this economic blockade, are you not?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir, I am.

POSSIBILITY OF ATTACK ON HONG KONG

Senator STENNIS. Well, Mr. Secretary, the other day you referred to Hong Kong, and as I understood, you made reference there to possibilities of Honk Kong going over to the Communist side. Did I correctly understand that?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

Senator STENNIS. Talking about the possibilities, not the probabilities.

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir, I meant no possibility of Hong Kong going over the Communist side. The possibility that I think we were discussing was that there might be an attack on Hong Kong, and it might be captured.

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON. That is what I had in mind, not any defection.

Senator STENNIS. I am glad to get that cleared up because I thought you mentioned in connection with one of the possible effects there of a blockade that you thought it might go over.

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

Senator STENNIS. With reference to the possibilities of being captured, you meant.

USING VETO RELATIVE TO RED CHINA IN UN

Now, as I recall, the other day you said on the question of seating Red China there had been 77 votes in connection with that matter or the related subjects, and that the United States position in it had been sustained 76 times. That is preliminary to this question:

Now, as I understand, the outright veto would not be applicable to a question like this?

Secretary ACHESON. The question of the veto arises only in the Security Council.

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON. That is one organization out of the 46. It is not applicable in the other 45.

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON. In the other 45 the question is one of a majority vote.

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON. In the Security Council the question is whether a vote of one of the permanent members, even though that permanent member is in a minority of one or two or three or four, operates to defeat the entrance of a proposed member. That is what is meant by the veto. Does that answer your question?

CHINESE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT'S ADMISSION TO THE UN

Senator STENNIS. Yes, I think so. I have a memorandum here about the terms of the United Nations Charter providing the Security Council shall consist of 11 members of the United Nations and with the Republic of China to be one of the permanent members. That word "Republic of China." I understand that the Red Communist regime over there calls itself the Chinese Peoples Republic. It may be a play on words there, but it is certainly a valid technical proposition there to exclude her on those grounds alone. The Republic of China does not meet the requirements of the Republic of China as the words are used with reference to either membership in the Charter. Have you any thought on that subject?

In other words, the Charter uses the words, the "Republic of China"; and I understand the Reds operate under the name "Chinese Peoples' Republic."

Secretary ACHESON. You have correctly quoted the Charter, Senator, in chapter 5, where it says that the Security Council shall consist of 11 members of the United Nations—the Republic of China, France, the U. S. S. R., the United Kingdom, Great Britain, and North Ireland, the United States of America shall be permanent members.

The argument that you make can be made.

Senator STENNIS. I think that could prove to be very material. I just thought that had already been developed perhaps and that argument already made within the councils of the United Nations. I didn't know. I was asking for information.

Senator Hunt has brought up a point here and asked me to develop it with you, that the references in the United Nations Charter being references to the nation itself or to the party in power, he wanted to get your idea if you made a distinction there.

I think what worries a lot of us is the legal ground upon which we can base an exclusion of Red China and maintain it morally and legally before the peoples of the world.

I think that is a matter that has got to be met. I am sure you do.

SIGNIFICANCE OF STRONG U. S. LEADERSHIP IN UN

Secretary ACHESON. Senator, a lot of arguments can be developed of all sorts. If I could just state what I think is the important thing here—as we pointed out, there are 46 organs of the United Nations. The important attitude which can be taken here is one of leadership, and in taking that attitude, it is necessary to convince other nations and have other nations feel that they wish to act with the United States in taking the view that the Communists cannot shoot their way into the UN.

If you can present that great major thought powerfully to your associates in the UN, then you can get them to vote with you on preventing this thing from happening, and you have to have them feel that way and believe that way to make this whole effort successful on account of the fact that there are 45 organizations in the UN where one power doesn't have the decisive voice.

Therefore, it would accomplish very little if, through lack of a persuasive leadership, the Chinese Communists were in 45 parts of the UN and were not in one part.

When it comes to that one part, the same arguments prevail to prevent the action of letting the Chinese Communists in. In other words, they do not get in unless there is a majority of seven out of the 11 that want them in.

The way to prevent that happening is to do what I have suggested and to present the great broad reasons why this should not be done.

That has happened and it has been successful and it will be successful in my judgment. The only time when this question of the significance of our vote—because we shall vote against this in all of these organizations—any time when the significance of our vote in the Security Council would arise would be if we were in the minority of four or less.

We don't expect to be in the minority. We expect to be in the majority, and I think we can stay there as long as we give this good, strong leadership to it.

If we are in a minority, then the point arises as to what to do about that situation. I should think before that arose, and if one believed that that situation was going to arise, the thing to do would be to ask the World Court what the significance of a vote of a permanent member on this matter is.

If the World Court would decide that that is a veto, then that settles the matter in the Security Council. You have to get some decision of that sort because if you are in a minority of four or less on the main question, you will be in a minority of four or less on the subsidiary question of whether this is or isn't, whether an adverse vote is or isn't a veto.

Therefore, to sum it all up, I think the important thing to do is to continue what we have been doing and I think very succesfully doing, and that is giving the lead in bringing together the majority in all these organizations of the UN with the view that a claimant for seating cannot shoot his way into the UN and cannot get in by defying the UN and fighting its forces.

That is a very powerful position, much more powerful than legal arguments based on the words of describing a nation, and I have every belief and hope that that will continue to prevail.

Senator STENNIS. Well, I think that is well said. That is certainly a more powerful answer than trying to rely upon these technicalities of this use of words, as you said, but what I was thinking about is having an alternative ready if you should find yourself in this minority or should find yourself on the little end of an adverse decision by the World Court, if you should submit it to that.

It seems to me like you had better not yield to anything or submit to anything because to my thinking if we let Red China in, why that means the end of the United Nations that we can take a part in, and that is why I was so concerned about it.

I know a lot of people at times thought there was no moral justification for excluding them, but the more they looked into it, why, the more reasons they found.

I mean it looked like they were morally justified in excluding them, but that legally they were entitled to the seat, but I think your attitude of keeping the majority with you and giving them cause to want to vote that way, of course that is the best course as long as you can keep it that way.

WAS KOREAN AGGRESSION INSPIRED BY RUSSIA?

I wanted to ask you this with reference to the starting of this war. Now undoubtedly the Korean aggression by Northern Korea—do you think that was inspired by Russia?

Secretary ACHESON. I think the Soviet Union has complete domination over the Government of North Korea.

Senator STENNIS. Yes; no question about that. In fact, they planned it and trained that army for that purpose; is that not correct?

Secretary ACHESON. It certainly trained that army, and it was an offensive army, armed for offense. They did take the offensive, and I think that your conclusion is correct.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, that is all I have; thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Gillette.

CONSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENTIAL POWERS REGARDING KOREA

Senator GILLETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I would like to have you bear with me and go back to some fundamentals. You are aware, of course, how much disturbed and bewildered our people are over this Korean episode. They write in to all of us thousands of letters and ask what we are doing in Korea. No war has been declared. Why do we have a quarter of a million people over there?

I would like to ask you that question: Without a declaration of war, what are we doing with a quarter million troops in Korea?

Secretary ACHESON. Senator Gillette, I filed on Friday or Saturday a long memorandum which is one of the appendices to these hearings, in which we set out the precedents and the authorities and powers of the President, and they are all in that memorandum.

Senator GILLETTE. Yes, sir.

Now, referring to that memorandum—and I think, in substance, it covers the memorandum of July 3, 1950, prepared by the Department of State on the authority of the President to repel the attack in Korea—is that the document to which you are referring?

Secretary ACHESON. That is the document to which I am referring.

Senator GILLETTE. That is the document; is it not? I quote from that document, page 16:

> The President, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, has full control over the use thereof. He also has authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States. Since the beginning of United States history, he has upon numerous occasions utilized these powers in sending armed forces abroad. The preservation of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace is a cardinal interest of the United States. Both traditional international law and article 39 of the United Nations Charter and the resolution pursuant thereto authorize the United States to repel the armed aggression against the Republic of Korea.

Now, that, of course, calls attention to the traditional authority, and I think it is supported by almost all legal authorities, of the President of the United States to take certain action in sending armed forces; but how are we proceeding there? Are we proceeding under that traditional authority or are we proceeding under the obligations of articles 43 and 39 of the United Nations Charter?

Secretary ACHESON. I think that, so far as the President's action under the Constitution of the United States is concerned, we are proceeding under his powers, and those powers and precedents relating to them are set out in the memorandum.

So far as the United Nations is concerned, the resolution of the Security Council authorizes and requests, under the Charter of the

United Nations, assistance in carrying out the repelling of the armed attack on Korea.

"UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS"

Senator GILLETTE. I quote from the same document, page 16, of this little compilation here:

> Secretary Acheson at his news conference on June 28 emphasized that the actions of the United States had been taken in support of the United Nations. "After June 25," he said, "all action in Korea has been under the aegis of the United Nations."

Do you still adhere to that statement?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. Then, you are not relying, or the President is not relying, on his traditional authority as Commander in Chief of the United States forces. He is acting under the—I don't think "aegis" was a very fortunate word; that is "protection" or "shield"—but he is acting and we have been acting under the authority of the United Nations Charter; is that true?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir. That was not what I had in mind.

Senator GILLETTE. What did you have in mind?

Secretary ACHESON. Just what I said in answer to the last question you asked me: That, so far as the President's using the forces of the United States, he has his authority and his powers as President and Commander in Chief; and among those reasons which in the past have animated the President, and properly so, in using the Armed Forces, is the carrying out of international law and American interests; broadly, in the preservation of international law.

Now, I was pointing out that this whole operation is under the aegis of the United Nations and that it is not a question of the whole series of nations acting independently to the same result.

It is that the United Nations itself has authorized and requested the nations to act together under the Charter, each nation exercising the powers given to it in is own constitution, to bring about the result sought by the United Nations, which is to repel the armed attack.

Senator GILLETTE. Well, what I am trying to find out, Mr. Secretary, in my poor way, is at what point did the President cease action in his capacity as Commander in Chief of the forces of the United States, given authority to send them where the security of the United States is threatened or where foreign policy requires. At what point did he cease to act in that capacity and at what point, I am asking you, did he commence to act under the aegis of the United Nations?

Secretary ACHESON. I do not think it is an alternative, Senator Gillette. I think the President has always been acting under this authority as President of the United States and as the Commander in Chief, and he is carrying out those actions to accomplish a purpose authorized and requested by the United Nations.

Senator GILLETTE. Well, starting back to that first authority then, is it your contention that the President as Commander in Chief alone, Commander in Chief of the United States forces, without reference to the United Nations, would have authority to send American troops to the number of a quarter million into such action as may be taking place in Korea without action by the Congress of the United States and declaration of war?

Secretary ACHESON. It is very hard to try to see what would have happened if one of the great elements of our foreign policy were not in existence; that is, the United Nations. But I believe, as a theoretical question, the President did have that power; yes, sir.

PRESIDENT AS UN AGENT

Senator GILLETTE. Now, before, on the 30th of June when the President stated that he had sent forces to cover and support Korean troops and that he had ordered the United States forces to strengthen the Philippines, to give military assistance to the Philippine Government, and so forth, in what capacity would you say he was acting at that time?

Secretary ACHESON. In the same way that I have just described to you.

Senator GILLETTE. Not as agent of the United Nations?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I do not think the President has acted as the agent of the United Nations until the United Nations asked the United States to set up the unified command; in that respect we are exercising some functions which they asked us to.

Senator GILLETTE. But that was on the 7th of July.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; but, as I said, he was not acting as the agent of the United Nations in any way until the United Nations asked him to act as agent, but he was, on the 30th, acting in the way that you and I have just been going over; that is, he had his power and authority as President and Commander in Chief, and he was exercising those powers to try and carry out the purposes laid down in the resolutions of the 25th and the 27th of June.

UN MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

Senator GILLETTE. Now, if we are acting, as you stated, under the authority and under the aegis of the United Nations, it goes without saying that we should abide by the rules laid down by the United Nations Security Council; is that not true?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, we have always attempted to act in a way thoroughly in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations.

Senator GILLETTE. Well, I call your attention to article 46 of the United Nations Charter:

> Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.
>
> There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements—

on all questions of this type—

> The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council.

Has such a committee been set up in the United Nations to your knowledge?

Secretary ACHESON. I believe that there was—it is not now—a military staff committee which worked for a long time on trying to set up as a permanent organization the armed forces referred to in those paragraphs of the Charter. That effort to set up those forces was, as you recall, blocked by the Soviet Union, so that those forces were never set up; and, therefore, they have never had a staff to direct them, because they never existed.

UNITED STATES ACTING AS THE UNIFIED COMMAND

Senator GILLETTE. But under that United Nations Charter under which we are acting, the Security Council, whether with a Military Staff Committee or not, is the responsible authority for directing the forces of the United Nations engaged in this project or in a similar project. Is that not true?

Secretary ACHESON. It might well have been if the forces contemplated there had been set up. But the Security Council, knowing that those forces had not been set up and, therefore, that the whole staff arrangements contemplated in this Charter had not been able to be put into existence, asked the United States Government to furnish the direction of those forces by acting as the unified command, and the United States Government accepted that responsibility and is now acting as the unified command.

Senator GILLETTE. Well, but that is under the third directive; that was July 7—was it not—when they asked the contributing nations to contribute forces to a unified command and asked the United States to name a commander?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes.

Senator GILLETTE. That is the directive?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

Senator GILLETTE. Is there anything in that directive which clothes the United States independently of the Security Council with authority to direct those forces?

Secretary ACHESON. This says:

> Recommends that all Members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to aforesaid Security Council resolution make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States.
>
> Requests the United States to designate the commander of such forces.
>
> Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating.
>
> Requests the United States to provide the Security Council with reports as appropriate on the course of action taken under the unified command.

I think that gives, and was intended to give, the United States the full function of command.

Senator GILLETTE. Well, that answers the question I was about to ask you. It is your interpretation that that directive under that July 7 date clothed the United States of America with full power, a delegation of power from the Security Council to direct the war operation in Korea. It is subject to a report to the Security Council and nothing more.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, the command function was given to the United States, yes, sir.

UNITED STATES ADHERENCE TO UN RESOLUTIONS

Senator GILLETTE. And it is also your interpretation that the United States without an interposition of the Security Council or its agents can change the character of the war, can expand the war or contract the war in any way it sees fit, subject only to report of what it has done.

Secretary ACHESON. I don't make that contention at all, sir. I have said that what the United States has been trying to do and what the resolution of July 7 again referred to was to give prompt and vigorous support to the resolutions of the 25th and 27th of June 1950 to assist the Republic of Korea in defending itself against armed attack, and thus restore international peace and security in the area.

Now the military aspects of that campaign fall under the command direction, and if it becomes necessary in the military conduct of the war to move here or there or respond to this or that attack, then the command has that authority.

Senator GILLETTE. It is your interpretation that we have that authority, that we do not have to do more than to report what we have done?

Secretary ACHESON. In accordance with what I have just said. I have tried to make that clear.

Senator GILLETTE. Then why, Mr. Secretary, did you when you were contemplating the question of hot pursuit, when you were contemplating the question of blockade, take it up with the other nations? Was it a matter of courtesy or a matter of obligation?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, it is very important that in carrying out this campaign we have the enthusiastic and warm support of all those who are taking part in it, and therefore we have endeavored to keep in closest touch, closest consultation with them, and have a very continuous exchange of ideas and advice back and forth.

Senator GILLETTE. Also then according to that interpretation of yours, we could take such action as we saw fit to close the war, to take the initial steps toward an armistice or any other treaty of closing hostilities without referring it to the Security Council of the United Nations?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, the Security Council, or rather the General Assembly—the Security Council has not been able to act on this question because there was a resolution introduced which was vetoed by the Russians, and therefore the Security Council has been unable to act.

There have been resolutions of the General Assembly which make clear the course that the General Assembly thinks is wise, and the United States is endeavoring to follow the course which has tremendous international support and is not contemplating taking unilateral steps of its own.

Senator GILLETTE. Well, the Assembly action of course is purely advisory, it is not binding.

Secretary ACHESON. This is not binding, but it is very important. It is a recommendation of the very greatest importance.

Senator GILLETTE. It would be persuasive.

Secretary ACHESON. It would be more than persuasive. It is a very important act indeed.

UNITED STATES AUTHORITY TO TERMINATE KOREAN WAR

Senator GILLETTE. Then may I go back to my question, and at the risk of seeming unpleasant, I will ask you again:

Do we have, in your interpretation, the authority to take action to close the Korean War without submitting it to the United Nations?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I don't know what you mean by taking action to close the Korean War.

Senator GILLETTE. I mean an action to arrange an armistice, an action to arrange a peace treaty, or negotiation for the cessation of hostilities—any of these actions.

Do we have the right to do it without submitting it to the United Nations?

Secretary ACHESON. I should think the Unified Command would have the right, if it wished to, to bring about an armistice. I think it has that right.

I doubt whether the military command would undertake to work out a solution of the political problems of Korea. I don't think that is covered under the heading of command function in the military field.

I think that the United States, as the military command, would consult in the closest possible way with its colleagues in this operation before making proposals about an armistice or before accepting proposals regarding an armistice which have been put forward by the other side.

Senator GILLETTE. I thank you, Mr. Secretary. I may say that I deplore your interpretation and repudiate it personally, but I thank you very much.

Senator WILEY. There are differences, aren't there?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Flanders.

MAC ARTHUR PLAN RELATIVE TO STARTING WORLD WAR III

Senator FLANDERS. Mr. Secretary, all the witnesses who have appeared before us have emphasized the danger of starting world war III if all of General MacArthur's proposals were adopted. Some of them have been adopted.

This leaves unadopted the naval blockade of the Chinese coast, taking the wraps off Chiang Kai-shek's army, such operations on the mainland as he may elect, and the bombing of Manchuria.

In previous testimony you have indicated the procedural and other difficulties in the way of a naval blockade. I don't remember that you have indicated that in any event such action would necessarily tend to start world war III.

That leaves the release of the troops on Formosa for operations on the mainland and the bombing of Manchuria as two steps which might start world war III.

Am I correct in the assumption that in the point of view of the administration the bombing of Manchuria is the more to be feared of these two?

Secretary ACHESON. It would have much more of a tendency to bring on a general enlargement of hostilities.

Senator FLANDERS. Before raising the question as to whether there may not be an equally serious risk, though of a different sort, in our present policy, I would like to get a little clearer idea as to what our policy is.

MILITARY AND POLITICAL POLICY IN KOREA

Every witness in these hearings has been asked several times about the significance of the thirty-eighth parallel in our military and political policy.

The replies at all times have been in well-chosen words and impressive to the ear. When, however, they come to be read in cold print, they have seemed to me to be quite empty of real meaning.

The nearest approach I have seen to anything like information on this subject is to be found in a colloquy between yourself and Senator Smith last Saturday forenoon.

I wish to refresh your memory and mine by reading a portion of that colloquy:

> Question. Now, I am not quite clear in my mind yet from the testimony, Mr. Secretary, as to our present objectives in Korea. Let me put the question this way:
>
> Do we consider the objective of the United Nations in Korea the restoration of the preaggression status of Korea or the unification of the entire country?
>
> Answer. Well, I tried to make that clear yesterday, Senator. I am glad to go over it again.
>
> Question. I think it is so important that it is well to reiterate it, because I am not quite clear yet what we are driving at there.
>
> Answer. What I said yesterday was that the military objectives of the United Nations forces in Korea are to repel the armed attack which took place against the Republic of Korea and to restore peace and security in the area.
>
> That is what they are trying to do with military force.
>
> Question. Could I ask you right there—when you say "the area," that is the trouble. Do you mean the area below the thirty-eighth parallel, which is the South Korean part of it, or the entire Korean area?
>
> Answer. If you are going to restore peace and security you have got to restore it in the area. You have not restored peace and security if there are people on the other side coming over and fighting you. You have to try and stop that condition of fighting and war that is going on.

That is the end of the quotation. You, then, Mr. Secretary, go on to discuss the long-time political objective of the United Nations, which is much more clear than the immediate military objective seems to be.

As Senator Smith indicated, the definition of our military policy hinges on your meaning when you use the word "area."

When I read that colloquy, I assumed that it meant that the orders given to General Ridgway and through him to General Van Fleet, are to clear of hostile forces the area south of the thirty-eighth parallel, and to preserve freedom of action in such an area north of the parallel as would give assurance that South Korea was kept clear. Is my assumption correct?

Secretary ACHESON. Would you read your question part again?

Senator FLANDERS. This last is my—I indicated when my quotation ended. Do you want me to read it over again?

Secretary ACHESON. Just the part where you asked me a question.

Senator FLANDERS. When I read that colloquy, I assumed that it meant that the orders given to General Ridgway, and through him to General Van Fleet, are to clear of hostile forces the area south of the thirty-eighth parallel, and to preserve freedom of action in such an area north of the parallel as would give assurance that South Korea was kept clear. Is my assumption correct?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't know that I can recall, or state, whether it has been stated here, what the precise military instructions are which have been given to Generals Ridgway and Van Fleet.

The purpose of whatever instructions have been given to them is to defeat the attacks which are being made on Korea; to repel, in as effective a way as we can possible do it, the attacks which are being made on Korea; and to take such military action, either north or south of the parallel, as we may need to do to bring about the conclusion of this campaign, with failure on the part of the Chinese, and success on our part, to repulse attacks on the Republic of Korea, sir.

Senator FLANDERS. Now, by the "Republic of Korea," do you mean the Republic of Korea as it existed south of the thirty-eighth parallel?

Secretary ACHESON. That is the Republic of Korea.

Senator FLANDERS. That is the Republic of Korea?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator FLANDERS. Then I would judge that my assumption is correct.

MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THIRTY-EIGHTH PARALLEL

I wonder if it is correct to say, as did more than one of the witnesses from the Department of Defense, that the thirty-eighth parallel has no military significance; if the military task is to keep the country south of that parallel clear of hostile forces, it would seem to me that it has a definite military significance.

Now, our present policy as described—is it an old policy, or a new one?

Is it one which was delivered to General MacArthur, or has it been adopted since?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, the instructions which go to the commander in the field have a great deal to do with the situation that that commander is facing.

General MacArthur's position which existed in early October, was very different from the situation that exists now.

After the Inchon landings, the United Nations forces had cut the North Korean armies in two, so that one part of that army was retreating north of the thirty-eighth parallel, toward its capital in on section; and toward the east coast in another; and a very considerable body was trapped in South Korea.

And, the instructions which were given had to do with the reduction of both of those forces.

Part of his effort had to go toward capturing the troops left in the south, which I believe amounted to pretty close to 100,000 men, if not more.

The main question that arose in the north was what he should do in regard to forces which were retreating northward, and the sound military decision was made, I believe, that if he could pursue those forces and either surround them and get their surrender or destroy them as a military unit, he would have accomplished a great stroke both in repulsing the attack which was made on the Republic of Korea and in opening the way for a political reunification of Korea, and that is what General MacArthur undertook to do. Then the Chinese Communists came in and created a different military situation—and that was testified to at very considerable length.

Senator FLANDERS. Yes, sir.

Secretary ACHESON. And therefore the task which General Ridgway can now carry out, being faced with a very numerous enemy, is different from what General MacArthur could have carried out in October 1950.

Senator FLANDERS. Under the existing conditions General MacArthur then did not violate instructions in his advance to the borders of Manchuria?

Secretary ACHESON. Not as far as I know. There has been discussion as to whether or not some of his actions were in accordance with the interpretation of the plans that the military had in mind, but that is out of my field, and I do not know of it.

CHANGING NATURE OF KOREAN MILITARY TASK

Senator FLANDERS. Now, with the military task at present confined in general terms to keeping South Korea clear of hostile forces, the military commander would have a large measure of the freedom of action necessary to accomplish it. He can occupy positions north of the parallel; he can range freely with bombers and observation planes in North Korea; he can watch the movement of troops and supplies and he can disrupt communications and destroy personnel and matériel as far as the ability of our Air Force and the conditions of the weather permit him.

The assumption is, I take it, that this can and will be continued indefinitely until the Communist Chinese government gets sick of it.

Now, here is where the element of risk comes into it. When this limited objective is adopted and carried out, what reason is there to believe that the Chinese will get sick of it?

We hear from time to time that the flower of their army is destroyed, and then there is the advance to the parallel and we find a new and fit and well-organized resistance.

Is it not then pure assumption that that will end at the second foray or the fifth or the tenth or the twentieth?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; it is not pure assumption. It is a reasoning from all the facts available that this is the best course that we can follow in bringing about the result desired and force a settlement of this situation so that there will be peace in that area and that these attacks will not be resumed.

Senator FLANDERS. Are we not dealing with a government which, like the Soviet Government, has no interest in individual lives and takes no account of mass slaughter in obtaining its objectives?

If we combine this with a free flow of matériel from Soviet sources, must we not assume this to be a war of attrition which is without visible limits?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; I wouldn't reach those conclusions. I do not think that there is certainly a free flow, and I don't believe there is an unlimited flow of matériel, and I think that the military testimony is pretty clear that the quality of the Chinese armies is suffering very severely at the present time.

It is quite true that I believe that the government does not care about individual lives, but I think it will be concerned about the destruction of its trained armies and the loss of its matériel.

Senator **Flanders**. Do you not feel, however, that even though we can say these are reasonable assumptions, they are nevertheless assumptions?

Secretary **Acheson**. Well, I don't think they are—I don't want to quibble about words. They are conclusions which you reach from all the information that you have. They are obviously not facts because they are in the nature of conclusions as to future situations.

PLANNED REDUCTION IN POPULATION

Senator **Flanders**. Now it has been rumored, how authentically I do not know, that the program of the Communist government of China includes a planned reduction in its population by 10,000,000 or so. Have you heard that rumor?

Secretary **Acheson**. No, sir; I have not.

Senator **Flanders**. It is said to have been incorporated in an official Chinese Communist program. I assume, again assuming, either that that program does not exist or you would have seen it.

Secretary **Acheson**. Well, I don't know that either assumption is correct.

Senator **Flanders**. Certainly the sending of grain from China to India, as I understand has recently been done, means the saving of lives in India and the destruction of lives in China.

Why would not such a campaign as is being carried out in Korea perhaps fit in the Communist China's policy and program all too neatly to be comfortable for us, and is there not here a measure which must be reckoned with, directed particularly against our human resources?

Must not our administration give the most serious thought to balancing between these objectives and existing risks of the kind I have just been suggesting on the one hand, and the less obvious risks of starting world war III on the other?

Secretary **Acheson**. No, sir; I do not believe that if the Chinese Government was intent on reducing its population, it would pick out its army as the place to start. There would be easier and more profitable ways of reducing the population than that.

Senator **Flanders**. But still the point that I was making in this question was the fact on the one hand—I think we must call it a fact—that the Chinese government is more or less calloused about the loss of men and the danger to us in that point of view in an extended war of attrition, that these are existing risks on the one hand and what seemed to me to be the less obvious risks of starting world war III on the other.

This war of attrition really touches us on our most tender spot, and that is the lives of our young men, and it should lead us, it seems to me, to consider other alternatives for changing the character of the conflict, if it is possible.

RISKS OF STARTING WORLD WAR III

Now it would seem to me that General MacArthur's proposals for bombing Manchuria can be interpreted and executed in a way which involves a minimum risk of starting world war III.

Freedom to maneuver, to observe, and to bomb in North Korea is essential to the protection of South Korea. Should we decide that it is desirable to clear all of Korea of Communist forces—and I am afraid that the conclusion will be borne in upon us more and more strongly as the month go by—all that would seem to be required would be that we have in Manchuria the same freedom of maneuver in the air, and perhaps in the air alone, not on land, to make our protection of the whole of Korea possible.

In other words, we would extend to Manchuria the same kind and degree of freedom that we now have in North Korea for the protection of South Korea.

It seems to me to be foolish to talk about invading the mainland of China when the military objectives can be stated in so much more limited terms.

It would also seem that it would be foolish to assume that such a limited undertaking would start world war III. Communist China is fighting against us an unlimited war. They hit us with all their force wherever they find us. If we undertake only those military operations which hamper or prevent Chinese operations in North Korea, it would seem to me that there is not the slightest excuse for any nation to assume that we are provoking such a direct attack on the total sources of Communist power in China, Siberia, or elsewhere.

It strikes me we are in a rather silly position and that more resource and enterprise would diminish the serious risk of the war of attrition to which we are presently subjected without materially increasing the risk of starting world war III.

LIMITED EXTENSION OF WAR AREA

Now, Mr. Secretary, I would like your observations on this possibility of a limited extension of the area of conflict which would simply extend to the territory north of North Korea the same type of action that we are now using in the territory north of South Korea.

Secretary Acheson. Senator Flanders, I have discussed that at considerable length several times. I think I can sum it up by saying that I regret that I cannot agree with you that to undertake air activity against Manchuria would not produce the gravest risk of extension of this war throughout the Far East and very possibly throughout the world. A catastrophe of that sort would be so terrible for our own country and for all those associated with us that we cannot undertake that very grave risk.

Senator Flanders. I have not, however, in your previous testimony seen any indication that you were thinking of an extension of the military operations which would be in their nature tactical rather than strategic, and that is the point that I am trying to make—that there is a possibility of extending operations short of large-scale strategic operations.

Secretary Acheson. Well, I don't believe that either the Chinese or the Russians would be very much impressed with a difference between the words "tactical" and "strategical."

The point is, are you or are you not going to attack Manchuria? And if you do attack Manchuria, you can say, of course, we are only doing this in a limited way, but that doesn't assure that the other people are going to deal with it in a limited way.

It seems to me that sets in operation a chain of events, which in all likelihood would spread to general war.

Senator FLANDERS. I asked for your point of view, Mr. Secretary, and I think I have it quite clearly. I would only ask that you do think and continue to think—as I am sure that you do—of the serious risks of our present campaign of action so far as its effects on American manpower are concerned.

Secretary ACHESON. We have those constantly before us.

Senator FLANDERS. That is all, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. Did I understand you are going to close at 12 o'clock?

POSSIBLE NEED TO RECALL WITNESS

Chairman RUSSELL. I said at 12 or shortly thereafter. I thought if some Senator was within 10 or 15 minutes of the conclusion of his questions, we might let him continue, but I didn't intend to take up any new examination after 12 o'clock.

Senator BREWSTER. I am somewhat overawed with the responsibility of even questioning the Secretary, as I have contemplated in the last 24 hours the problems of any adequate presentation of the varying points of view.

I would deem it most helpful, both for the committees and the Congress and the country, if there were time to digest properly the implications of the Secretary's statement, rather than more or less incur the necessity of shooting from the hip as a result of the very ample resources the Secretary has in his prepared statement and the very great intelligence and competence in his field and the necessarily fragmentary preparation we can have.

I will not presume to speak regarding the other members, because I am the junior member of all the 26 here, so perhaps my inadequacies in the matter apply to a considerably lesser degree than the remaining members—certainly those who have served for a long time.

I say that in order to explain why I wish for a few days at least to look the records over and if my questions, which I ask now, because I may not have an opportunity later, reveal limitations, I must simply ask your pardon on that account.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chair wishes to repeat again that—this is perhaps the most repetitious statement in the entire record that is replete with repetition—that every Senator on this committee will have an opportunity to ask any questions he desires of any witness.

Of course, I would be less than frank if I were to agree with the apparent implication of the Senator's statement that we should recess the hearings now to give members of the committee an opportunity to study the record.

I do not think that would be appropriate action; but any Senator, however, has the right to move for a recess if he wishes at any time in the future that they see fit, and I might observe that I have never seen the Senator from Maine at a loss before, and I am sitting here in anxious anticipation of his questions that will show such a lack of knowledge of all of the matters that are involved in this hearing.

Senator BREWSTER. I appreciate the statement of the chairman, but I am also very much impressed with the awful possibilities that I am not fulfilling completely adequately our own responsibilities.

I did notice that the chairman, according to a quotation in the paper, expected that the Secretary would conclude on Wednesday or Thursday. That may well be.

Chairman Russell. Well, the chair has made no such statement whatever. He has expressed the hope that the Secretary would conclude, and that is as far as I have gone with any witness that has been before this committee.

I have expressed the hope that by Wednesday or Thursday we might have concluded hearing the Secretary; and if any members of the committee still have questions after Wednesday or Thursday or Friday or Saturday or next Monday, we will proceed with the examination of the Secretary.

Senator Brewster. Will it be in order, possibly——

Chairman Russell. I might say that the Senator does not entirely extinguish my hope that I might at least enjoy it, whether it ever comes to fruition or not. [Laughter].

Senator Brewster. Will it be in order, possibly—because, I think, everyone would conclude that the Secretary is as important a witness as we have had before the committee, that it might be possible, if one member, at least, who feels his inadequacy, should be permitted before the hearing is concluded, to possibly ask the return of the Secretary for further comment?

Chairman Russell. Of course, the committee has the authority to recall any witness that they may desire and I have taken occasion to advise every witness who has been here that the committee did retain that right, and that any witness might be recalled to the stand if the committee deems it proper to do so.

CHINESE AID AFTER LIFTING OF EMBARGO

Senator Brewster. On the matter of aid, Mr. Secretary, I was the one who asked you yesterday about the amount of aid that was furnished after the lifting of the embargo.

I think you covered that fairly well in your statement here this morning. I base that on the fact that, as I recall it, General Marshall had testified that after this embargo—from August 1946 to May 1947—was lifted, there was a period of aproximately 10 months, when it did not prove practicable for very large shipments to be made. That is apparently supported by your statement, aside from the 130,000,000 rounds of ammunition to which you alluded.

I gather from the transcript, of which I now have a copy, and of your statement this morning, that most of the additional aid did go after the first of January 1948, so that for a period from August 1946 to January 1, 1948, the shipments were extremely limited, aside from this 130,000,000 rounds of ammunition, of which you spoke. Is that a fair summary?

Secretary Acheson. I am looking over the things I reported, Senator Brewster, this morning. On July 14 and August 11, 1947, 130,000,000 rounds of ammunition were shipped.

Senator Brewster. Yes.

Secretary Acheson. In July 1947, the Chinese sought to purchase some C–47's; they actually did purchase 147 C–46's on December 22, 1946.

Senator Brewster. That is—purchased?

Secretary **Acheson**. They purchased them.

Senator **Brewster**. I was asking about shipments, and of course that is practically January 1.

Secretary **Acheson**. The only shipments here, that I have, before January, 1948, are the 130 million rounds.

Senator **Brewster**. Yes.

Secretary **Acheson**. And the 150 C–46's, if they were shipped when they were purchased.

I don't know when they were shipped.

Senator **Brewster**. That was December 22.

Secretary **Acheson**. Twenty-second.

Senator **Brewster**. Yes; so that that is practically the first, so my statement is substantially correct?

Secretary **Acheson**. It seems to be.

TWO BILLION OF AID TO CHINA

Senator **Brewster**. There have been certain cliches, I think they term them, that have ramified throughout all this, to embarrass both sides of the discussion, and the one most frequently reiterated by the ones who supported the administration is this "two billion of aid to China," subsequent to VJ-day.

I think an examination of both the white paper, and your statements, indicate more recent evidence that the assumption that that was military aid has never been stated by you, at any rate, or by any responsible authority, is that correct?

Secretary **Acheson**. I think it has all been set out in the white paper.

Senator **Brewster**. Yes; so that you had to deduct—and even after you reduce that figure to the $747 million, of that amount $335 million was services and expenses in the transportation of the forces there in China, so that that reduced it to some $430 million?

Secretary **Acheson**. I don't carry these figures in my mind, Senator Brewster.

Senator **Brewster**. And then, in the breakdown of that, you got into a further reduction as to how far it contributed to the military potential.

On March 15, 1949, in a letter to Chairman Connally, after using the two billion figure, which runs through all these discussions, you said:

> While the Chinese Communists have captured the major portion of military supplies, exclusive of ammunition, furnished the Chinese Government by the United States since VJ-day.

That is very interesting because I assume that matériel of almost every character isn't much use without ammunition. I guess you and I are both sufficient military experts to appreciate the desirability of ammunition.

CHINESE SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION

Secretary **Acheson**. I think ammunition is very important in a military operation.

Senator **Brewster**. Very important?

Secretary **Acheson**. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. I think that General Stilwell said in a quotation on his part, or rather in his own typical capacity for expression, that what the Chinese people needed was bullets. As I remember it, he is quoted to have said in one of his more truculent moods—that from the start of the Japanese aggression the prime need of the Chinese Nationalist Army has been, in the words of General Stilwell, "Bullets, damn it, just bullets."

Now, is it not fair to say that in an appraisal of this aid that to the extent that the Nationalist Army suffered from a lack of ammunition it is a little unfair to criticize them for losing their equipment that they did not have any bullets to shoot?

Secretary Acheson. I am not aware that the Nationalist Army suffered for lack of ammunition.

Senator Brewster. You are not?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir. I think that General Barr stated the opposite.

Senator Brewster. And is that entirely adequate, as far as you were concerned?

Secretary Acheson. I think General Barr stated the facts, as I understood it.

Senator Brewster. Are you familiar with the fact that Colonel L. B. Moody, United States Army, an Ordnance Corps officer now retired, made a study of aid to China with one of our missions?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir; I am not.

Senator Brewster. Never heard of it?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir.

Senator Brewster. Well, he stated on April 11, 1950, in a speech here in Washington that the inevitable defeat of the Nationalist Army was due to their deficit in these items of infantry weapons and especially ammunition and the Communist superiority in these items resulting from persistent United States action.

You would not consider that was a fair statement of the situation?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir; I would not.

I find that in answering your question earlier about materials turned over—I started with May 26. Prior to May 26, in April and May the United States Marines——

Senator Brewster. What year?

Secretary Acheson. 1948, when the marines withdrew, they turned over large quantities of small arms and artillery ammunition rather than evacuate it with them when they were ordered to withdraw from North China. I should have put that in.

Senator Brewster. I think that was artillery ammunition.

Secretary Acheson. Small arms and artillery ammunition.

Senator Brewster. I remember ammunition—I emphasize ammunition.

Secretary Acheson. Well, it says "small arms and artillery ammunition." It is ammunition for small arms and artillery.

Senator Brewster. Well, I am not quite sure whether that means small arms ammunition or not. It may or may not.

Secretary Acheson. It is my understanding that is what it is.

Senator Brewster. All right. Now, and I quote, Colonel Moody went on to say:

> It is obvious that military aid means to the Chinese infantry weapons and ammunition above all else, and it is precisely these items which the United

States has consistently denied, delayed, or limited. Only passing reference will be made to the billions of moldy cigarettes, blown-up guns and junk bombs and disabled vehicles from the Pacific islands, which have been totaled up with other real or alleged aid in various State Department, Communist and leftist statements to create the impression that we have furnished the Nationalist Government with hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars worth of useful fighting equipment. From the start of Japanese aggression—

and this has the quotation made in the language of General Stilwell—

the prime need has been "bullets, damn it, just bullets."

Now you disagreed fundamentally with that statement, I gather, of Colonel Moody?

Secretary ACHESON. I disagreed with it, yes, sir.

FIGHTING QUALITY OF CHINESE NATIONALISTS

Senator BREWSTER. Yes. I say you disagreed with that. Now, there has also been the persistent report that the Nationalist armies would not fight. Hasn't that been a rather widely spread report?

Secretary ACHESON. I think I went over that in some detail as to the operations in '48 and the early part of '49.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes. Now, are you familiar with the statement of General Mao as to the casualties of the Chinese Communists in their movements south?

Secretary ACHESON. General Barr?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON. No, I haven't got that.

Senator BREWSTER. I will ask you how to pronounce M-a-o officially.

Secretary ACHESON. The head of the Chinese?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON. Mao Tse-tung.

Senator BREWSTER. Very well, Mao Tse-tung. Are you familiar with his statement as to the Communist casualties in the conflict with the Nationalist troops?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. That has never come to your attention?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't say that it never has. I am not familiar with it.

Senator BREWSTER. At any rate, if it did, it never impressed you?

Secretary ACHESON. It may have impressed me. I am not familiar with it now.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, it impressed me very greatly as it seemed to be bringing such questions up as the contention of the fighting quality of the Nationalists. His statement was that in the 3 years of civil war from July 1946 to July 1949—that is the 3 years covered by this period—the number of their killed and wounded was 1,233,600. Now does that impress you at all?

Secretary ACHESON. If that was true, that would be heavy casualties.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, do you think that General Mao Tse-tung might exaggerate his losses?

Secretary ACHESON. It is quite possible; yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. That has not been the policy of our Government, has it, in concealing the nonbattle casualties for 10 months from us?

Secretary **Acheson**. Our Government hasn't concealed nonbattle casualties.

Senator **Brewster**. They were never revealed until the past week under the examination of this committee, but I realize that is not under your jurisdiction. Do you then question the possible accuracy of General Mao Tse-tung's statement?

Secretary **Acheson**. I should have doubt about it; yes, sir.

Senator **Brewster**. And for what purpose would he exaggerate that?

Secretary **Acheson**. I don't know.

Senator **Brewster**. You do not have any motive why he would exaggerate it, but you think he may have?

Secretary **Acheson**. That is correct.

Senator **Brewster**. Is it something you would not like to believe.

Secretary **Acheson**. Something that he would not like to?

Senator **Brewster**. No, that you would not like to believe.

Secretary **Acheson**. No. I would believe it if it were true.

Senator **Brewster**. I asked whether you would like to believe it.

Secretary **Acheson**. I would like to believe whatever the truth is, yes, certainly.

Senator **Brewster**. Well, would it embarrass you at all if the Chinese Nationalist troops had accounted for 1,223,000 casualties during the period that you are undertaking to prove to us that they would not fight? Would that embarrass you at all?

Secretary **Acheson**. Not the slightest bit.

Senator **Brewster**. Not the slightest?

Secretary **Acheson**. No, sir. It would surprise me a great deal.

Senator **Brewster**. The most amazing thing, Mr. Secretary, is that this has never come to your attention. I can't understand how one in your responsible position with a statement of that character might at least have taken some means to determine whether it is true.

If it is true, then much of what you have been telling us is well calculated to deceive the American people. Would you agree to that?

Secretary **Acheson**. What I have been telling you, sir, is the reports made by the American military mission in China.

Senator **Brewster**. Have they ever reported the Chinese Communist casualties?

Secretary **Acheson**. Not that I know of.

Senator **Brewster**. Have they ever reported the Chinese Nationalist casualties?

Secretary **Acheson**. I have no recollection of it.

ORIGIN OF CHINESE NATIONALIST EQUIPMENT

Senator **Brewster**. Now, referring to this Marine episode, of which you speak, Colonel Moody estimated that when they left there the items you speak of gave a 6-day supply, to the Nationalists, for their .30-caliber weapons. That is his estimate of this item of which you speak, namely, what the marines left.

Do you have any knowledge whether or not that would be a correct estimate?

Secretary **Acheson**. I can get from the Defense Department exactly what was turned over if you wish.

Senator BREWSTER. Colonel Moody calculates that in December 1947 at the normal rate of use, the total ammunition in possession of the Nationalists was sufficient for only 22 days in the case of Chinese 7.92-millimeter weapons and for 36 days in the case of their .30-caliber United States guns.

You have no knowledge, I suppose, as to whether or not that is correct?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir, I have no knowledge.

Senator BREWSTER. Now you are familiar with the fact that much of the Chinese Nationalist equipment was of German origin in the early days of the war, are you not?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't know what it was in the early days of the war.

Senator BREWSTER. Did you not know that the Germans had originally furnished, supplied, and equipped the Chinese Nationalists?

Secretary ACHESON. I knew there were German officers serving there with the Chinesse Nationalist Army in the '27–'37 period.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes. And that even in Chungking, as our Ambassador Gauss reported when he returned, reported to me at least, the guns which were protecting Chungking, the antiaircraft guns, were of German origin, and German ammunition, and the bombs which were dropping on Chungking were of American origin, American scrap iron, and American gasoline. That impressed itself very much on me.

Now at the close, with much of the military material of German origin, the question was raised about the transit of very considerable quantities of the German equipment that we captured after VE-day, after Germany surrendered, to the Chinese. Are you familiar with any of the discussions surrounding that?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir, I am not.

Senator BREWSTER. That never came to your attention?

Secretary ACHESON. No.

Senator BREWSTER. Were you in the Department at that time—1945?

Secretary ACHESON. What time?

Senator BREWSTER. 1945. April 1945.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, I was in the Department at that time.

Senator BREWSTER. Do you know whether any of that was ever forwarded from our supplies we had in Germany?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; I don't.

Senator BREWSTER. I discussed that personally with both General Somervell and General Eisenhower at that time, right after the surrender when the Truman committee was looking into the matter, and apparently none of that ever got to China, though it seemed a rather obvious opportunity.

Are you familiar with the fact that a consignment of 20,000 rifles had actually left a German port for China, but was stopped en route by an order signed by Lauchlin Currie on White House stationery forbidding any such aid to China? Have you any familiarity with that?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Never heard of it?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. I would be interested to have you see what the records would indicate regarding that.

Senator McMahon. What is the date of that?

Secretary Acheson. If you will tell me the date of this letter, I will have it looked up.

Senator Brewster. It was following VE-day and the shipment was urgently recommended by General Wedemeyer and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Secretary Acheson. If you could tell me where to look—where does this information come to you from?

Senator Brewster. I am quoting now from the book by Frieda Utley on the China Story; and she, I think, has proven to be a fairly reliable informant on some of the things that were going on. So I assume it is adequately documented. It would seem to me that the recommendation by General Wedemeyer and the approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff following VE-day might be a sufficient identification of the period.

I know I discussed it in the latter part of May and June 1945, in Paris with General Eisenhower.

LEND-LEASE SUPPLIES FROM INDIA TO CHINA

Now, are you familiar with the shipment of lend-lease supplies from India to China? That has been discussed a great deal in the press. Are you familiar with that episode?

Secretary Acheson. In a general way. I knew about the supplies which were going over the Burma Road and being flown in.

Senator Brewster. I am speaking now of the time following VJ-day. They were shipping these around by ship, very large quantities of this equipment, which were ultimately dumped at sea. Are you familiar with that?

Secretary Acheson. No.

Senator Brewster. You seem to have been somewhat better briefed on the side of the case which would support your thesis rather than the other. I do think these charges are worthy of some attention and explanation if there is one regarding them.

AMMUNITION TRANSFER ON PACIFIC ISLANDS

Now, in the transfer of the ammunition on the Pacific islands. Colonel Moody's analysis shows that of the total offered, only 3 percent was of the required Ground Force types, and only 2 percent of the useful Air Force types and not all of this was serviceable.

Only 52,500 cartridges of the .30 caliber they required for American rifles and machine guns were to be found, accounting for one-fortieth of 1 percent of the total supplies made available to them.

That again, I presume, is a matter with which you are unfamiliar.

Secretary Acheson. I am not familiar with it.

Senator Brewster. Colonel Moody, therefore, calculates that the total of Chinese-produced and American rifle and machine-gun ammunition produced in or acquired in 1948 amounted to only some 63 days' supply in active operations. That again would bear on this question of adequate ammunition.

ACHESON'S TESTIMONY OF MARCH 20, 1947

Now, I refer to this question of the strength of the Chinese Government, which you have indicated was very precarious over a considerable period. On March 20, 1947, you testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee opposing military aid and advice to China. Do you recall that period when you appeared there?

Secretary ACHESON. I testified before a committee. I don't know whether it was for the purpose you state.

Senator BREWSTER. This purports to be a quotation from your appearance at that time. I will read it.

Secretary ACHESON. What is the date now?

Senator BREWSTER. March 20, 1947.

Secretary ACHESON. What committee is this, Senator?

Senator BREWSTER. It is the House Foreign Affairs Committee discussing military aid to China. At that time, according to this quotation, which may or may not be taken out of context, you were purported to say, bearing on this question of the status of the Chinese Government:

> The Chinese Government is not in the position at the present time that the Greek Government is in. It is not approaching collapse, it is not threatened by defeat by the Communists. The war with the Communists is going on much as it has for the past 20 years.

Do you recall that?

Secretary ACHESON. I recall some discussion of this subject; I don't know whether that is a correct transcript. You are not reading from a record of the committee?

Senator BREWSTER. No; I am reading from what purports to be a quotation from the record.

Secretary ACHESON. That is out of the same book you mentioned a moment ago?

Senator BREWSTER. That is right. If you will verify that as to whether that is a fair statement of your remarks, and if it is correct, it would be somewhat at variance with the picture which you have presented here, would it not?

Secretary ACHESON. I will have to look up the text.

Senator BREWSTER. That was not my question.

Secretary ACHESON. I understood that was not your question.

Senator BREWSTER. I said, if it was a correct statement that it would be at variance with the picture presented here.

Secretary ACHESON. I agree with that. I would prefer to see what I actually said, and then I will let you know if what I said was in error.

Senator BREWSTER. If you will let the committee know.

Dr. Stuart, our United States Ambassador, on July 1, 1947, is quoted as follows:

> Persons in direct contact with the Nationalist troops in rural areas state there are insufficient small arms and ammunition to arm all combatant troops in the field.

That is the end of the quotation. That again bears on this question of the adequate supplies of small arms and ammunition. Could you verify whether or not Dr. Stuart did make such a report or statement as that on July 1, 1947?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, I will verify that.

QUOTATIONS FROM CHING YU-CHI'S BOOK

Senator BREWSTER. Now, are you familiar with a supposed report by General Wedemeyer to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek which was received through a Soviet publication?

It purports to be a retranslation from the Chinese of a book by Ching Yu-chi entitled "The Secret Conspiracy Between the United States and Chiang." Are you familiar with that book? Have you ever heard of it?

Secretary ACHESON. No, I have not heard of that book.

Senator BREWSTER. It was published in Hong Kong in 1949. This man purports to have translated this, or his statement in this book is as follows:

> On January 10, 1945, I unexpectedly found myself working in the Confidential Section of the United States command in China headed by General Wedemeyer.
>
> My title was Secretary General of the Chinese Secretariat. In fact it was a confidential secretariat dealing with Chinese and English documents.

And, he goes on:

> I stayed there until June 1946.

Now, he later published this book which purports to be what General Wedemeyer said to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

This has never been brought to your attention?

Secretary ACHESON. Not that I recall.

Senator BREWSTER. It would be worth investigating—is my time running out?

Chairman RUSSELL. I have allowed you approximately 3 minutes, to take time out for my answering your suggestions.

Your time has——

Senator BREWSTER. You are very generous.

I will read this quotation, because I would like to have the Secretary check up on it and find out, and then I am through, I assume.

He says he is not familiar with it.

In this purported report, among other things it says:

> I feel that the occupation of Manchuria is extremely important.

This is General Wedemeyer speaking to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek:

> In the distribution of the troops of the Central Government we must see to it that they can make use of internal communication lines, and that these lines must be made most secure. For instance, the area south of the Yangtse is now entirely under Central Government control, while the area north of the Yangtse, including Peiping, Tientsin, Chinghuangtao, Tangku, Kalgan, is still not completely under Central Government control. I am of the opinion that the communication lines in the latter area must first be placed under control before troops are dispatched into Manchuria to the north, and to Sinkiang and Suiyuan in the west.

That is the end of the quotation.

What interested me, if it is correct, is that it would seem to some measure to indicate the importance of this Chinese Nationalist emphasis on the communication lines, which you indicated was one of the reasons they were vulnerable, namely, the occupation of the cities and rail lines.

If it is true that General Wedemeyer was urging and emphasizing the importance of that, it militated to some extent against what was apparently your criticism of the Chinese Nationalist Government for the pursuit of that policy.

I would be glad if you would check up on this thing and see whether or not there is authenticity to this report.

Secretary ACHESON. I will do the best I can on that.

I suggest that a better way to understand is, General Wedemeyer is to follow me as a witness, and you can get the directive from him.

Senator BREWSTER. What I am interested in is the extent to which you have been adequately briefed on all aspects of this matter. That is one of the reasons of my line of questioning that I have been following.

In other words, I am wondering whether there is a possibility that you don't get a completely adequate briefing.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator.

Senator Long?

ARTHUR KROCK'S MESSAGE TO MAC ARTHUR, NOVEMBER 29, 1950

Senator LONG. On page 137 of the compilation of information there is a report of a message from Arthur Krock to General MacArthur of November 29, 1950.

That communication suggests that Arthur Krock had knowledge of certain protests being made by our allies to the effect that we should stop before we reached the Yalu River over the Manchurian border.

Can you give us any information as to whether our allies were, in fact, making any such suggestions to us?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't get that implication out of it, Senator Long. It looks as though Mr. Krock was talking about some officials here in Washington, what they were saying.

Senator LONG. Some officials here? It says:

> Answering criticisms for military action beyond the thirty-eighth parallel of Pyongyang some officials here saying for nonattribution but for publication that every time such stop-point was suggested you replied you would not accept responsibility for security of your troops if decision was made—

to stop beyond the thirty-eighth parallel.

Apparently that leaves the inference that some of our allies apparently were suggesting to us that we should stop along a line possibly from Pyongyang to Wonsu, or above Pyongyang in good defensive positions and not attempt to go all the way to the thirty-eighth parallel, and clear all of North Korea.

Secretary ACHESON. I don't get that implication, but however your question is——

ALLIES' SUGGESTIONS TO STOP SHORT OF YALU

Senator LONG. Do you have any knowledge of any suggestions made by any of our allies to the effect that we should stop somewhere short of the Yalu River and not attempt to go all the way to the Manchurian border?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. There were suggestions put forward at the United Nations in October and November, of 1950, that there should be a demilitarized zone south of the border, to prevent clashes between UN troops and Chinese or Soviet troops, and that matter was pretty extensively discussed at the UN, and there were several who thought that that would be a sound way to proceed.

Senator **Long**. Did any of our allies suggest that if we attempted to go all the way to the Manchurian border, that the Chinese might come in?

Secretary **Acheson**. There was very considerable concern about that, and in fact the vetoed resolution of the Security Council was introduced with the purpose of making it clear to the Chinese Communists that we had no aggressive designs against Manchuria so that they would not feel they had to attack the UN forces.

Senator **Long**. Can you tell us who our allies might have been, that is which ones it might have been to suggest that we should not go all the way to the Manchurian border?

Secretary **Acheson**. I think it was very generally talked about in the UN. I think the British and the French and the Canadians and maybe three or four others were discussing this situation of a demilitarized zone.

Senator **Long**. If a police action were going on in Mexico and Russian troops were active there, the Americans would become very jittery themselves if they saw the Russians come all the way up to the border of Texas, and I suppose that some of our allies may have thought that for us to go all the way to the Manchurian border might have caused the Chinese to get somewhat trigger-happy, if I might use the expression, themselves. I take it that that was considered by the State Department in dealing with our allies.

Secretary **Acheson**. Yes, sir; you are correct, Senator Long.

Senator **Long**. Was that suggestion made to General MacArthur to obtain his views on that question?

Secretary **Acheson**. I believe that it was, and I believe that in the same volume, I think in this volume that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have gotten out for you, there is some such suggestion.

Senator **Long**. I believe that on the next page General MacArthur stated that there had been no suggestion to him that there should be any stoppinjg point short of the Manchurian border. Quoting from page 138:

> I have received no suggestion from any authoritative source that in the execution of its mission the command should stop at the thirty-eighth parallel or Pyongyang, or at any other line short of the international boundary.

Is that entirely correct?

Secretary **Acheson**. If we can find a communication of November 24. Have you got this compilation gotten up by the Joint Chiefs of Staff? If you will look on page 64, paragraph 60——

Senator **Long**. It says there:

> On November 24, 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised CINCFE of the growing concern of other members of the United Nations over the possibility of bringing on a general conflict if the United Nations forces advanced and seized the entire North Korean area at the boundary between Korea and Manchuria and the U. S. S. R.

Secretary **Acheson**. As the message goes on you will see in those paragraphs numbered a, b, and c they put up to him the question as to whether after advancing to or near the Yalu, CINCFE might hold its forces and terrain dominating the approaches. These would be principally ROK troops and the others could be grouped in positions of readiness.

And he goes on and describes what the general suggestion of the demilitarized zone was. Then you will see on page 65 in paragraph

61 CINCFE disapproves of that suggestion and doesn't think it is a good one.

Senator LONG. So actually it was suggested that it might be well not to go all the way to the border, but to take a dominating position short thereof overlooking the Yalu, in effect?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct, on the 24th of November.

Senator LONG. Of course, General MacArthur's troops never actually reached that point to be holding the dominating land overlooking the Yalu, did they?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir, some of them reached the river.

Senator LONG. That is true, some of them did actually reach the river before the Chinese Communists came in.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. But certainly not in all respects. In some places they did, and in some places they did not.

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct, Senator Long.

CASUALTIES IN CHINESE CIVIL WAR

Senator LONG. You mentioned that you had some doubt about the figure of 1,200,000 casualties, Chinese Communist casualties, in the Chinese civil war. Do you know about how many Chinese Communists there were in the Chinese Army?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; we have the various estimates of that. I think I gave them to you yesterday.

Senator KEFAUVER. That is on page——

Secretary ACHESON. Roughly I think what I said was that at the beginning of the civil war period and along about the beginning of 1946 the Communists had about 1,100,000, of which 400,000 were just guerrillas and the rest were regulars.

Chairman RUSSELL. What were you going to say, Senator Kefauver?

Senator KEFAUVER. I was going to say that is on page 4865 of yesterday's transcript.

Secretary ACHESON. I think at the end the Chinese Communists got up to the immediate neighborhood of 1,600,000.

Senator LONG. Then casualties of 1,200,000 would have been about 80 percent casualties?

Secretary ACHESON. It would have been pretty heavy; yes, sir.

Senator LONG. Which would have been probably greater than almost any army has ever suffered percentagewise.

Secretary ACHESON. Pretty heavy; yes, sir.

Senator LONG. It would be difficult to believe unless someone had actually observed these terrific casualties of 80 percent of the people either killed or wounded in an army, would it not?

Secretary ACHESON. That is why I hesitated to place credence in the report.

RUSSIAN CASUALTIES IN WORLD WAR II

Senator LONG. Have you ever had the casualties of the Russians in World War II called to your attention?

I understand that the Russians never published detailed figures but did state that 15 million Russian men, women, and children perished in World War II. Did those figures ever come to your attention?

Secretary Acheson. That is familiar to me, and I can look up as to what they have published and introduce it, if you wish.

Senator Long. Those figures are so astronomical that personally I am inclined to have some doubt about those figures. Have you ever had occasion to question their correctness?

Secretary Acheson. Well, I think there were vast losses in the Soviet population in the Russian theater of war during World War II, and it might well be that they mounted up to that number. Whole areas, you know, were just wiped out by the Germans.

Senator Long. The reason I raised the point is because in view of what has been suggested here, it would occur to me that possibly the Russians or the Communists might do just the opposite on casualties as do the democracies, that they tend to exaggerate their casualties, rather than to reluctantly publish them.

Secretary Acheson. Well, I think that they have. The Soviet Union has taken the position over and over again that they suffered the greatest losses and made the greatest sacrifices of any nation in World War II.

Senator Long. And they probably do not overlook the opportunity to attempt to make all other nations aware of the fact that they have made the greatest sacrifices.

Secretary Acheson. That has been the constant effort.

Senator Long. In other words, there is some possibility it may serve their purpose to exaggerate their casualties rather than minimize them.

Secretary Acheson. It might; yes, sir.

Senator Long. That is all the questions I have, Mr. Chairman.

MARINE CORPS AMMUNITION AVAILABLE TO CHINESE

Chairman Russell. Mr. Secretary, there has been some question here as to this Marine Corps ammunition. It is possible to get a statement as to the amount of small arms and artillery ammunition that was left there?

Secretary Acheson. The figures on it?

Chairman Russell. Yes.

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Chairman Russell. I do not know whether they are available or not.

Secretary Acheson. I think they are. I think that I can get them.

Chairman Russell. If they are available, we would like also to get the number of rifles and machine guns and artillery pieces—howitzers, fighting planes, and other military equipment—that was furnished to the Nationalist Government of China by this Government after December 7, 1941. I think that that should also cast some light on the equipment that had been made available to them.

The way the record stands now, it only shows the 130,000 M–1 rifles, I believe, and some transport planes have been mentioned.

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir. I shall try to get it from the beginning of the period.

GENERAL BARR'S REPORT

Senator Kefauver. Mr. Chairman, may I make an inquiry in connection with a document also? Whether General Barr's report, which is referred to at page 4877 of the transcript of yesterday, if that report is available and if the Secretary has it.

Secretary ACHESON. I think that report is in the white paper. I will look it up and make a notation in the record at our next meeting.

Senator KEFAUVER. I would like to have my attention called to it when you return.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. I don't think there has been furnished the committee yet—if it has, my attention has not been called to it, and I desire to see it—the original paper that General MacArthur read from during his testimony, setting forth various types of goods and matériel that had been shipped to the Chinese Communists.

I think the record will show that the paper was furnished this Government by an American counsel in Hong Kong.

I would like to have another request made by the staff of the appropriate officials for that paper. It must exist somewhere in Government files.

Senator SPARKMAN. May I say I requested that paper and have been notified it is here. It is in the security room.

Chairman RUSSELL. Is there anything further now that any member wishes to bring to the attention of the Secretary to be furnished the committee?

If not, the committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 12:15 p. m. the committees recessed, to reconvene at 10:05 a. m. Wednesday, June 6, 1951.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 6, 1951

Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:05 a. m., in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), Wiley, George, Smith, Green, Hickenlooper, McMahon, Lodge, Tobey, Sparkman, Gillette, Brewster, Bridges, Byrd, Saltonstall, Johnson, Morse, Knowland, Hunt, Stennis, and Long.

Also present: Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge of the committee staff of the Armed Services Committee, William H. Darden, clerk, Committee on Armed Services; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff, Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations.

RED CHINESE ACCUSE UNITED STATES OF KOREAN AGGRESSION

Chairman Russell. The committees will come to order.

Mr. Secretary, I do not believe there has been any evidence in this record as to the circumstances under which the Chinese Communists were invited to participate in discussions, with representatives of the United Nations, that resulted in the trip, I believe, of General Wu to this country as a representative of the People's Republic of China.

I wish you would make or give us an outline of the circumstances under which that trip was made.

TESTIMONY OF HON. DEAN G. ACHESON, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY ADRIAN S. FISHER, LEGAL ADVISER—Resumed

Secretary Acheson. In answer to your question:

During August of 1950, in the Security Council, while the Russian member of that Council, Mr. Malik, was the Chairman of the Council, he made frequent accusations against the United States of America of aggression in both Korea and in Formosa.

On the 24th of August 1950, the Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai, of the Chinese Communist government, addressed a telegram to the President of the Security Council, who was then Mr. Malik.

This telegram accused the United States of aggression in Korea. If you wish me to read it into the record, I shall do so.

Chairman RUSSELL. If it is not too long, I think it might be well to do that.

Secretary ACHESON. The telegram is as follows:

> On 27 June this year President Truman of the United States of America announced the decision of the United States Government to prevent with Armed Forces the liberation of Taiwan by the Chinese People's Republic Army. Meanwhile, the United States Seventh Fleet moved toward the Straits of Taiwan, followed by the arrival in Taiwan of contingents of the United States Air Force in an open encroachment on the territory of the People's Republic of China. This action on the part of the United States is a direct armed aggression against the territory of China and a total violation of the United Nations Charter.
>
> Taiwan is an integral part of China.
>
> This is not only a fact based on history, confirmed by the situation since the surrender of Japan, but it is also stipulated in the Cairo Declaration of 1943 and the Potsdam Communiqué of 1945 as binding international agreements which the United States Government has pledged itself to respect and observe,
>
> The people of China cannot tolerate this action of armed aggression by the United States Government on the territory of China and are determined to liberate, from the tentacles of the United States aggressors, Taiwan and all other territories belonging to China. On behalf of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, I now raise to the United Nations Security Council the accusation and propose that, for the maintenance of international peace and security and for the upholding of the dignity of the United Nations Charter, the United Nations Security Council is obliged by its inalienable duties to condemn the United States Government for its criminal act in the armed invasion of the territory of China, and to take immediate measures to bring about the complete withdrawal of all the United States armed invading forces from Taiwan and from other territories belonging to China.

Signed "Chou En-lai, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China."

Chairman RUSSELL. Did I understand you correctly to say that Taiwan was being liberated by the Chinese People's Army when that telegram was sent—the first part of it?

Secretary ACHESON. The telegram says that—

> On 27 June this year, President Truman of the United States of America announced the decision of the United States Government to prevent with armed forces the liberation of Taiwan by the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

Chou En-lai charges that President Truman was preventing with armed force the "liberation of Taiwan" by the Communist forces.

RED CHINESE PRESENCE AT UN MEETINGS

Chairman RUSSELL. What is the date of that?

Secretary ACHESON. That is August 24, 1950.

Chairman RUSSELL. So, even at that date, the Chinese Communists said that they were liberating Formosa?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

After that telegram came in, Ambassador Austin on behalf of the United States made his statement on the 25th of August. There was then a motion made in the Security Council that the representative of the Chinese Communist government should be invited to be present when these charges were discussed. The United States voted against that proposal. The proposal was adopted. After discussion of the charges and the Soviet implication to condemn us as aggressors, this was soundly beaten. It received only one vote in the Security Council: that is, the Soviet vote.

The Soviets then brought the same charge in the General Assembly. That was opposed by the United States and led to an overwhelming defeat of the motion.

I believe that the Chinese Communist representative was present in the Security Council and was present in Committee 1 of the General Assembly when these charges were discussed.

I am not altogether sure that I am right as to his presence in both of those organizations. I can look that up.

Chairman RUSSELL. Despite the fact that we voted against the motion to invite General Wu, as the representative of Communist China, to be present when these charges were discussed, the motion was carried?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. And he was invited and did accept?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. And he was permitted to sit in on these meetings?

Secretary ACHESON. I believe he spoke in one or both of the meetings.

Chairman RUSSELL. He stayed in attendance on the United Nations for some months; is that right?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. I believe perhaps September and October.

CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION, DECEMBER 14, 1950

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, I direct your attention to the cease-fire resolution of December 14, 1950, which appears on page 146 of the compilation for the committee.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I am looking at that.

Chairman RUSSELL. I believe our representative did support that resolution.

Secretary ACHESON. I think that is correct, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. What I am getting at, Mr. Secretary—isn't that the resolution that we supported that gave rise to charges of appeasement? Or is that the same resolution?

Secretary ACHESON. I believe we supported this resolution and the resolution which had the five principles in it also.

Chairman RUSSELL. The five principles?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. The resolution to which you have referred was adopted on December 14, 1950, and I believe that we supported that resolution—I am quite sure we did. I think perhaps Senator Sparkman can refresh my memory about that.

Senator SPARKMAN. I am sure we supported the one of December 14. I think the one the chairman has in mind is the January resolution. Wasn't it January 11?

Chairman RUSSELL. I haven't been able to find it, and that is what I am trying to develop here and make clear our position as compared with the implications of that resolution and that vote.

HENRY WALLACE TELEGRAM

Senator KNOWLAND. I wonder while the Secretary is looking that up if I might take up a procedural matter, which will not take more than half a minute.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. Last night I received a telegram from Henry Wallace, expressing some views relative to testimony which occurred yesterday, and I would like to ask that the telegram be printed in the appendix of the record, and I direct the attention of the members of the committee to it.

Chairman RUSSELL. The telegram will be printed in the appendix of the record.

Senator GREEN. May it be read?

Senator KNOWLAND. I didn't want to read it on my time, because of the limited time. I have no objection to the telegram being read.

Chairman RUSSELL. Is there any objection to reading the telegram on the committee's time?

Senator MORSE. I so move that it be read on the committee's time.

Chairman RUSSELL. General Mudge, will you read the telegram?

Mr. MUDGE. Date, June 5 [reading]:

Hon. WILLIAM F. KNOWLAND,
Senate Office Building:

In the June 5 issue of the New York Times is a report of conversation between you and Secretary Acheson regarding my trip to China in 1944. You quote from John Carter Vincent's report on my conversations with Chiang Kai-shek to the effect that I said the American Communists were taking a patriotic attitude in the United States in 1944. What I actually said was that the American Communists were going all out to support the war effort in the United States against Germany and Japan, and I could not see why the Chinese Communists should not be as eager to defeat the Japanese as the American Communists. It seems to me common sense to assume that the attitude of Communists in all countries would be the same with regard to defeating Germany and Japan. For your information, I may say that neither Roosevelt nor I had the slightest illusion as to what the American Communists stood for from August 1939 till June 22, 1941 .

Both of us stood for help to Finland during that period. I talked with the president of the Farm Bureau and the master of the Grange about organizing food shipments to Finland; and when she was fighting Russia you and I know the American Communists were going all out to support the war effort against Germany and Japan. Their reason for so doing is something. Either John Carter Vincent's report of my conversation with Chiang conveys a false impression or my original language was not sufficiently clear.

Superficially, the American Communists were acting in 1944 as patriotic Americans in supporting the common war effort as approved by the United States Senate against Germany and Japan. Of course, everybody now knows that the American Communists were probably doing it for Russia's sake, not for our sake.

Secretary Acheson and Marshall know this as well as you and I, but apparently Secretary Acheson must have been momentarily confused by your question or he could not have replied as he did that my view was at variance with that of the State and War Departments.

In your cross-questioning of both Marshall and Acheson you have endeavored to make it a part of the record that I tried to bring about a coalition government in China in 1944; that is not true. What Roosevelt tried to do was to bring about unity of effort to defeat the Japanese. I made it repeatedly clear to Chiang in 1944 that the United States Government was not interested in the Chinese Communists but in the prosecution of the war against the Japanese.

We were interested in Chiang making sufficient changes in the postwar period to avoid such a catastrophic upset as finally took place. I outlined my views on this subject in a report to Roosevelt which was printed in full in the January 1950 issue of the New York Times for your information and for the record. Pursuant to a request of Chiang for a liaison between himself and Roosevelt, I wired Roosevelt on June 28, 1944, suggesting that he consider General Wedemeyer in this capacity. I trust that you may find it possible to make this wire a part of the current hearing.

End of message. Signed "Henry A. Wallace."

(In view of the fact that the telegram was read into the record, copy of same will not be found in appendix of record.)

UNITED STATES SUPPORT OF UN RESOLUTION

Chairman **Russell**. Have you found this resolution that we supported?

Secretary **Acheson**. Yes; I think I found the resolution to which you refer. We were discussing a moment ago the resolution of December 14, 1950, which appears at page 146 in the committee print. After that resolution was passed, there was a communication sent by the persons referred to in the resolution, known as the Good Offices Committee, to the Chinese Communists, making suggestions for an armistice of troops. The provisions of the armistice were not set out in detail, but they were provided by our Joint Chiefs of Staff for the group in the UN.

That was rejected by the Chinese Communists. They refused to have anything to do with it.

On the 11th of January there was filed in the First Committee of the General Assembly a supplementary report of the group on cease-fire in Korea; that is, this group of three persons. That report stated that in going at a cease-fire and armistice there were five principles which were regarded as sound, and those five principles were set forth by this report.

UN REPORT OF JANUARY 11

On the 13th of January there was a resolution introduced into the First Committee which invited the Chairman of the First Committee through the Secretary General to transmit the principles approved by it on January 13 to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and invited them to inform his as soon as possible whether they accepted these principles as the basis for the peaceful settlement of the Korean and other Far East problems, and on receipt of the reply the Chairman was to convene the Committee to consider that reply.

The approval of these principles and the approval of the draft resolution which I have just read came up on the 13th of January and was adopted by a large vote, the United States voting in favor of it.

FIVE PRINCIPLES OF UN CEASE-FIRE

Chairman **Russell**. What were the five principles?

Secretary **Acheson**. The five principles as contained in the report—I shall read the whole report of January 11:

> The objectives shall be the achievement by steps of the program outlined below for a cease-fire in Korea, for the establishment of a free and united Korea, and for a peaceful settlement of Far East problems.
>
> 1. In order to prevent needless destruction of life and property and while other steps are being taken to restore peace a cease-fire should be immediately arranged. Such an arrangement should contain adequate safeguards to assure it will not be used as a screen for mounting a new offensive.
>
> 2. If and when a cease-fire occurs in Korea, either as a result of a formal arrangement or, indeed, as a result of a lull in hostilities pending some such arrangement, advantage should be taken of it to pursue consideration of further steps to be taken for the restoration of peace.

3. To permit the carrying out of the General Assembly resolution that Korea should be a unified, independent, democratic, sovereign state with a constitution and a government based on free popular elections, all non-Korean armed forces will be withdrawn, by appropriate stages, from Korea, and appropriate arrangements, in accordance with United Nations principles, will be made for the Korean people to express their own free will in respect of their future government.

4. Pending the completion of the steps referred to in the preceding paragraph, appropriate interim arrangements, in accordance with United Nations principles, will be made for the administration of Korea and the maintenance of peace and security there.

5. As soon as an agreement has been reached on a cease-fire, the General Assembly shall set up an appropriate body which shall include representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the People's Republic of China with a view to obligations and the provisions of the United Nations Charter, of far-eastern problems, including, among others, those of Formosa (Taiwan) and of representation of China in the United Nations.

Those were the five principles. Those were sent in accordance with the resolution to the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Communists refused the five principles.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Secretary, will you tell us again who were the five nations that were to pick up this settlement?

Chairman RUSSELL. You will have to take that on your time, Senator.

Senator SMITH. It is just a question of clarification of what the Secretary read. Did you state——

Secretary ACHESON (reading):

> As soon as an agreement has been reached on a cease-fire, the General Assembly shall set up an appropriate body which shall include representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, and the People's Republic of China, with a view to——

Senator SMITH. Thank you, sir.

WHY DID UNITED STATES SUPPORT CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION?

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, if we have had as a consistent policy the denial of representation in the United Nations to Communist China, and to prevent Formosa from falling into hostile hands, why did we or our representatives support that resolution in the United Nations?

Secretary ACHESON. Mr. Chairman, our representatives supported it in the first instance because the State Department directed that we should vote for it.

This matter came up in the morning of the date which the vote was taken, and the vote was taken at 3 o'clock, I think, in the afternoon, and we considered this matter and thought that the sound thing to do was to vote in favor of this resolution.

As we interpreted it, and as we interpret it now, what these principles were, it was that having restored peace and stopped the aggression in Korea, we were then reverting to the situation which existed before in which all questions could be and should be discussed in the United Nations.

The question of the representation of China in the United Nations had been discussed before that, and there was no reason why it should not be discussed again after the aggression stopped.

Similarly, the President had suggested the future of Formosa should be considered in the United Nations, and we thought that after the aggression stopped, that was the place where it should be considered.

There is not anything in our action to indicate that the United States changed its attitude on these problems in any way, or that it would change its attitude in any of the discussions, but it was considered, and I think soundly, that if the aggression ceased, these matters were the subject of discussion.

Chairman Russell. Weren't we moving into a rather unhealthy climate to discuss those matters before that committee?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir. I think that what we said here, what I said at the time, was that this said that it should set up an appropriate body which would include these people.

Now, "appropriate body" could be a very much larger body, and indeed it would have been our purpose to have insisted that it should have included all of the FEC powers who are interested in foreign questions—at least those powers; there may be others, too.

Also the questions which were mentioned in this resolution which says "discussion of far eastern problems, including," and it mentions two. We should have proposed for discussion other problems also.

So that there is nothing in this resolution to indicate that the nations named were to be the only nations who will discuss these matters nor is there anything in the resolution to indicate that the two problems mentioned were to be the only problems.

ORIGIN OF PLAN FOR CHINESE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

Chairman Russell. Now, Mr. Secretary, you have discussed what you might well describe as the Provisional Government in China in 1946, I believe, which was to be composed of all parties in China.

We hear the statement made frequently, in questions, that we, or the United States Government, have put the Communists in Chiang's government.

The expression has also been used that we exerted great pressure to force Chiang to form a coalition with the Communists; and that it was our plan—indicating the plan of the United States Government—to put Communists in the Nationalist Government of China.

Did we originate the plan for that Provisional Government, and if so, how did we go about it?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir.

As I pointed out in my statement, ever since 1937 Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had been taking the position that the solution of the difficulties between the Nationalist Government and the Communists was a political problem and should be settled by political means.

During the time between 1937 and 1944, there were sporadic negotiations, between the Chinese Nationalist Government authorities and Communist authorities, for a political method of settling their differences.

Those negotiations became very active in 1944.

As I stated, General Hurley, who was then the President's personal representative in China, acted as the mediator of a series of meetings which took place between the Communists and the Nationalists, some meetings at Yunan and some meetings at Chungking.

As a result of those meetings, a general agreement was drawn up and executed by the Communist and Nationalist authorities on the 11th of October 1945, which laid down these general principles in two fields:

One was to set up a provisional government which was to be a national council of approximately——

Chairman RUSSELL. Pardon me, Mr. Secretary.

You went over this fully and clearly in your statement; but the point I wanted to elicit from you was whether or not that plan originated with the United States, and was suggested to Chiang Kai-shek, and pressure imposed upon him to adopt that plan, or whether the details of the plan originated with the Chinese themselves?

Secretary ACHESON. As I understand it, sir, this was a Chinese proposal which they worked out, signed in general form, first on October 11, 1945, and then January–February 1946, in more detail.

Chairman RUSSELL. So the plan then was not prepared in the State Department?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

PURPOSE OF RESTRICTIONS

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, another term is used that was confusing me, and that is the insistence that we take the restrictions off Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Government on Formosa—I think it is commonly said, "to take the wraps off of Chiang."

Was the order to the Seventh Fleet, to patrol the water around Formosa, issued with the primary purpose of imposing limitations on the activities of Chiang Kai-shek?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

The primary purpose was the defense of Formosa, and to prevent an attack on the island.

It was quite impossible, it was thought, to handle that situation, to neutralize the island, if we said we wanted to prevent the island from being attacked, if we did not prevent them from attacking from the island—it would not be possible to neutralize the island, if we took that attitude.

Chairman RUSSELL. I understand you stated the primary purpose was to protect Formosa, rather than protect the Chinese mainland?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; no question about it.

COMMUNIST STRENGTH IN CHINA AT END OF WAR

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, you outlined here the situation in China, where there were 116 million people under Communist domination at the time the war ended, I believe you said; and you gave the percentage of the area of China, quite a large area; and then you outlined the comparative military strength which was to be allowed in the unified Chinese Army. You gave it as being 50 divisions of Nationalist troops and 10 divisions of Communist troops?

Secretary ACHESON. That is right, sir; it would be a 5-to-1 ratio.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, there wasn't any such proportion as that of people who were under the control of the two contending parties; was there?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

The ratio of population was about 3 to 1.

Chairman RUSSELL. I ask that question because the statement has been made that General Marshall was endeavoring to force the Communists into the Nationalist army to such an extent that they would be seriously handicapped.

Do you believe, Mr. Secretary, that the Communists, having that proportionate strength, ever seriously intended to fulfill any agreement to have an army that was that disproportionate and a national assembly that was that disproportionate, where they had no power at all, or do you think the Chinese Communists were carrying on those negotiations to buy time?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, it is hard to have a judgment on that, sir. I think in General Marshall's statement as he left China you got the impression that he doubted whether either side went into these negotiations with complete good faith.

TELEGRAM FROM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN CHINA

Chairman RUSSELL. My time has almost expired.

Mr. Secretary, I at one time was one of the most enthusiastic advocates of this Government doing everything they possibly could to assist Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in his struggle with the Chinese Communists. The thing that discouraged me more in that position than any other single thing was a telegram from the United States Chamber of Commerce in one of the largest cities of China. I think it was——

Secretary ACHESON. I wish you would not mention that name.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, it was in one of the largest cities of China. I don't know the name of the city. It was presented here on one occasion to the Armed Services Committee.

Senator BREWSTER. We can't hear you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. I say it was presented here on one occasion to the Armed Services Committee when we were considering some bill dealing with this subject.

I might say I indicated to the Secretary the other day I wished he would look that telegram up if it was in the possession of the State Department. Have you been able to find it?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. This is a telegram which was sent to us, received by us on the 16th of March 1949, sent through our establishment, from the Chamber of Commerce of a city in China. I have asked that the name of the city not be used because I am advised that we are not sure that the people that are involved in this are all in a safe place.

The telegram was read to an executive session, I think it was, of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and presumably, as you suggest, perhaps to the Armed Services Committee.

If you wish me to read it, I will read it, or I can hand it to the reporter to be put in the record.

Chairman RUSSELL. If it is not too long, I would like for you to read it.

Senator KNOWLAND. What is the date of the telegram, Mr. Chairman?

Secretary ACHESON. The telegram is dated—it was received on March 16.

Senator KNOWLAND. What year?

Secretary Acheson. 1949. The telegram is as follows:

> Reference is made to discussions now—

This is from the chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce—

> Reference is made to discussions now understood to be in process in Washington concerning further economic aid to the Nationalist government of China.
>
> This chamber wishes to place itself on record as being opposed to granting further American economic aid to the Nationalist government except on a quid pro basis and on such terms as will guarantee the effective use of such aid in the interests of Sino-American relations, or at least in the interests of China as a whole, rather than for the benefit of "self-interest" groups in the past.
>
> It must not be inferred from the above statement that this chamber favors the policies of the authorities now in control in north China, insofar as such policies have so far been promulgated.
>
> On the contrary it is our considered belief that only after the control of China politics has been taken out of the hands of either extremist group, can economic aid, in the strictest sense of the word, be effectively utilized.
>
> The Nationalist government have since VJ-day avowedly been committed to a policy of eradicating communism from China. On the strength of such a policy, being in the mutual interests of China and the United States, they have sought and are being granted considerable aid from the United States, insisting that such aid be granted them as a sovereign nation and free of any restrictions on its end use, either economic or military.
>
> Those of us who have been able to directly observe the operation of this policy have seen prostitution of the Nationalist government factions and the accomplishment of directly opposite ends. Military, civil, and economic incompetence, or worse, on the part of Nationalist government officials is a matter of record.
>
> The cry has continually been for more, more, and again more aid, but it is an established fact that little or no effective use was made of the huge surpluses and postwar shipments of supplies, and that a considerable part of aid went to favored groups and individuals.
>
> Prior to the ECA program the hundreds of millions of American military and economic aid, and also UNRRA, provided extremely limited benefits to the Chinese people. Bureaus within bureaus set up for the administration and distribution of this aid proved inept, wasteful, and corrupt, totally incapable of implementing rehabilitation programs, but concentrating instead upon inter-bureaucratic controversies over the control of stockpiles and the revenue from cash sales to highest bidders, totally disregarding end uses.
>
> It can be stated without fear of contradiction that the Nationalist government has never invested a dollar of its own money to make possible the utilization of material in rehabilitation projects. Even implementation of the ECA program, ably conceived and effectively administered in its early stages, has suffered from the capacity of Nationalist government officialdom.
>
> Our administrators are able in their own fields, but inexperienced in getting the wiles of self-seeking Chinese in authority whose expressed ideals far too often provide a cloak for realistic thieving and graft.
>
> To fight communism China needed well-fed and disciplined troops equipped with small arms and ample ammunition, commanded by officers themselves disciplined and convinced they were fighting in a sound cause, for a government that would meet its commitments of supply and support, and committed to restoration of normal life and trade for the populace.
>
> Instead the Nationalist government's policy since VJ-day in Manchuria and north China has been treatment of these areas as virtual colonies. Trade and commerce have been stifled, the people taxed unmercifully and swindled out of their reserve holdings of merchandise, bullion, and foreign currencies, had forced upon them the burden of unwanted so-called armies of liberation (actually occupation) most of whom were virtually foreigners coming from the south, ill-fed, poorly clothed, and commanded by officers with a single-minded objective (from generals down) of amassing as much personal wealth as possible.
>
> Armies lived off the country, thus engendering the hatred of the people who had looked to be liberated from the ravages of banditry, strife since prior to the Japanese occupation. In isolated cases where Nationalist troops did successfully fight Communists, the government failed to make good its promises of bonus pay and support. The inevitable result was disintegration of any vestige of discipline or will to fight. Nationalist troops tended to congregate in and misuse cities and

other centers of population. Elaborate fortifications were built only to be abandoned at the first showing of the smallest Communist forces. Warehouses full of military supplies and stores, which the Nationalist government would not release to their own troops were thus painlessly transferred to the Communists. Not without reason did Chiang Kai-shek attain the title, given him on the Communist radio, of "Supply Sergeant Chiang."

Those in a position to intelligently observe, during the past 2 years, the acquisition by the Communists of Manchuria and north China, have witnessed one of the most shameful pages in the history of modern China. With but few exceptions of last-ditch defenses, such as the ill-advised and ill-fated defense of Tientsin, these potential buffers against Communist aggression were abandoned to Communist forces practically without a fight.

Communist forces 4 years ago comprised a small percentage of the total armed forces in China. This strength has been augmented twenty or more fold through voluntary turn-over of Nationalist troops. Many of these are 100 percent (all or partially) American-aid equipped. They carry American arms, use American artillery, ride in American vehicles, are fed with American supplies.

Through our support of a decadent and ineffectual Nationalist government we have not without a measure of truth, been accused of being party to the rape and eventual abandonment of the large part of China, and the people therein, to communism. These people do not want or believe in communism. They hated it to the extent of accepting oppressive colonial treatment at the hands of the Nationalist government—giving up their gold and other reserves and savings—to support what they believed to be a fight against communism. They are battered, beaten, and hopeless—accepting a fate they hate but feel cannot be forse than that which they have gone through in the past 4 years.

China is today in the throes of "peace negotiations" wherein power groups are fighting for control. We must give encouragement to neither extreme, but rather by withholding aid until such time as it can effectively be used for the people, add strength to the growth of a truly democratic group which we hope will develop. We believe, moreover, that if the prospect of controlling large American supplies is no longer a factor at the forthcoming peace parleys, the result may be an earlier agreement on the purely political issues.

We respectfully request that the above views be brought to the attention of the authorities in our Government concerned therewith, and that further aid to the Nationalist government be withheld in favor of eventual aid to a government more nearly subscribing to Sino-American ideals of democracy.

For obvious reasons these sentiments are passed to you in strict confidence as to their origin. It is hoped that the confidential status will be honored.

SIGNERS OF CHAMBER OF COMMERCE TELEGRAM

Senator Knowland. Mr. Chairman, a procedural matter.

Chairman Russell. Yes.

Senator Knowland. It seems to me that this telegram presents the point of view of a person or a group of individuals. We do not know who signed the telegram, as yet.

Now, it may be that we may find that if it is an individual, that he is out of the country and if so, then this committee might want to call him here to find out whether his views in 1951 coincide with the views he had in 1949.

I do not think we should have an anonymous telegram read into the record which clearly follows the line which has been given out for a long period of time in the country, and I do think in fairness to the committee that we should know who the individual or individuals were who signed it, so that we can at least test their responsibility.

Chairman Russell. Well, I have no objection to that, Senator. The one that I saw was signed. I saw it about a year and a half or 2 years ago.

Senator Wiley. Chinese or American?

Chairman Russell. I do not remember. It seems to me it was an American but I would not undertake to testify on that, because it has been too long and I do not have any too clear recollection of the telegram.

I did recall the phrasing in there about the warehouses full of American military equipment falling to the Communists.

The committee has a perfect right to vote to get these names. In my own judgment, they should not go into the public record until—well, they certainly would not have very respectful treatment at the hands of the Chinese Communists, in view of what they said.

Senator Knowland. But to the contrary, I think perhaps if the Chinese Communists knew about this, then they might get out of China, if they knew this telegram had been sent, they might get out very rapidly.

But in any event, I think the names should be available for our record; it is my feeling, when anonymous messages present at least a considerably one-sided point of view.

Senator Wiley. Might I ask, Mr. Chairman, whether the signatories were Englishmen or Americans or Chinese? When you are talking about a chamber of commerce in China in a certain town, is it a Chinese chamber of commerce?

Secretary Acheson. This was sent from the American chamber of commerce in a city.

Senator Wiley. And with American names on it?

Secretary Acheson. I do not know whether individuals' names were on it.

Senator Knowland. Then it is an anonymous telegram.

Secretary Acheson. Well, no; this is a telegram from the consul saying that the American chamber of commerce asked him——

Senator Brewster. You mean there is no name at all?

Secretary Acheson. I do not know.

Senator Knowland. You might have a fellow traveler even in the chamber of commerce who might send in his telegram presenting a point of view. I think it is very pertinent for this committee to have such names as were signed.

Chairman Russell. Where is the consul now who transmitted that message?

Secretary Acheson. I will have to find out, sir.

Senator Smith. Mr. Secretary, might I ask if the source of that was investigated? Did the State Department look into the people? That is one of the telegrams that gave me such concern that I went to the Far East myself, and the answer I got out there was that this was the business-as-usual group who wanted us to recognize Communist China.

I would like to get that into the record, and I think we ought to run that down, if this was the case, as to what I was told out there. I was familiar with this telegram. It was brought, as you said, before the Foreign Relations Committee at the time it was received, and we considered it in connection with the aid-to-China bill at that time, as I recall it.

Secretary Acheson. Well, I cannot tell you whether the investigation was made in China. This was in 1949, and very soon after that we were out of China.

Senator SMITH. Well, I feel if the State Department was using that as a reason for holding up on some of this relief that we were discussing, that we certainly ought to know the origin of the telegram and what the motivation of the people was that sent it.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR READING TELEGRAM

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I have not put forward this telegram as the basis of any action. I was asked whether such telegram exists, and I said it did exist; and I was asked by the chairman to read it, and I read it.

Senator SMITH. I realize that, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman RUSSELL. I want to assume full responsibility for the reading of the telegram. I remember its being presented in executive session of the Armed Services Committee some time ago. It has been quite some time—it seems to me it was a year or a year and a half or more that that matter was pending. It was considered so secret at that time that there was no reporter in the meeting, and I had recalled the telegram vaguely. It had quite an impact on me at the time because of the fact that it purported to originate with the United States Chamber of Commerce in China, and for that reason I requested the Secretary to ascertain whether it was in the hands of the Department of State or of the Defense Department in order that it might be brought here. I asked for it. I assume full responsibility for the reading of it, not for the correctness of it.

Of course, of that I have no knowledge, but I do know it was presented to the Armed Services Committee, and it made a very vivid impression on me, so much so that I recalled it for a year and a half, I think.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, on the same procedural question, I think I recall the circumstances which had caused it to be presented to the Armed Services Committee about that time.

My recollection is—I may be mistaken—General Chennault had given some testimony before the committee. The only point which I think is a valid one is that in that case we knew the individual, we could at least judge as to his competence, and who he was, and his background.

Now, this apparently had also been presented in executive session to the Foreign Relations Committee. It may have had some impact upon them. I do not think, however, that it should be presented either in the committees heretofore or now without our knowing the responsibility or background of the people who purport to have sent it, and it does seem to me under those circumstances the State Department should supply us with that information so we can run it down and see whether those people are still available, whether they still have the same views in the light of what has taken place in the Communist-dominated areas of China, and what their general background was.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, on the committee's time may I either ask the Secretary or the chairman a question or two?

Senator BREWSTER. I cannot hear you.

TRANSMITTAL OF TELEGRAM

Senator MORSE. On the committee's time, may I ask a question or two on the procedural point that the Senator from California has raised, because I think he has raised a very valid procedural point as far as laying the proper foundation in the record for this particular document.

Unless there are objections, I will ask these procedural questions of the Secretary.

Mr. Secretary, am I correct in my understanding that this telegram was transmitted to the State Department by the American consul in the city concerned at the time?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct, sir.

Senator MORSE. Do you know whether or not it is true that when the American consul transmitted this telegram he notified the State Department of the names of the senders of the telegram or did he just notify the State Department that he had been requested to transmit this telegram in behalf of the United States Chamber of Commerce in his particular Chinese city?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, as I recall it—and I will have to get the original telegram to be sure that I am correct—he said that he had been requested by the chamber to transmit this telegram, and he gave us the companies, what the composition of the chamber was.

Senator WILEY. What was that last statement?

Secretary ACHESON. He gave us the composition of the Chamber of Commerce; what American institutions were on it.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, would you be willing to find out for the committee the name of the American consul who sent the telegram so that the committee can subsequently pass judgment on whether or not it wishes to call that consul before the committee for an examination on the surrounding facts and circumstances that provided the telegram?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I shall be willing to do that; if the committee wishes to know what American business institutions were on the chamber, I shall be glad to furnish that. I hope that will not be put in the public record, of course, to be used——

Senator MORSE. That was the next point I was going to raise; that was the next question I was going to ask you.

PROTECTING SIGNERS OF TELEGRAM

Would you also be willing to supply us the full content of the telegram, including the message of the consul himself to the State Department, which message, I understand, would include the names of the American concerns that comprised the chamber, United States Chamber of Commerce, in this city, and possibly include the names of some individuals that he might have listed in the telegram, with the understanding—mark you this, Mr. Secretary, with the understanding—that if you submit that information to the committee, it will be for the secret record of the committee, and not for the public record of the committee?

Secretary ACHESON. I shall be glad to do that, Senator.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I would have to make it clear, Senator, there, that under our procedures, I do not know how you can have an understanding to that effect.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I cannot hear the chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am raising the same issue we had the other day when some suggestion was made about the understanding in advance that the matter would not be released. Our procedure is, as I understand it, one that does not permit such an agreement unless the committee wanted to take a vote on it now. Even then, the committee members, if they saw fit to change their mind, could subsequently release them.

Of course, I think as an individual member of the committee, that it would be a very tragic thing to release the names of people sending a telegram of this kind if they are in China at the present time. That would be a matter at the discretion of the committee.

Senator MORSE. I think, Mr. Chairman, your procedural point is well taken, and as chairman of this committee, I think it is quite proper that you take the position that you take. Not wishing to debate the matter, I was fully aware of the nature of my request, because with my views in regard to the rights of the executive departments in the Government being what they are, I didn't want to be a party to getting from the Secretary a document which might subsequently be released if in the opinion of the Secretary in advance of submitting the document to this committee it shouldn't be released.

I thought we ought to have a very definite understanding with him at the time he fulfills the request that the junior Senator from Oregon has made.

Just let the record show that, as far as I am concerned, I think he has had due notice by my request as to the risks he may run in submitting a document to this committee, which he may think ought to be kept confidential, and he has been placed on that notice and he can do exactly what he wants to as far as I am concerned.

I only want to say that in a matter such as this I think the committee would be very wise, if necessary, to vote on the matter in advance of his submission of the document if he really thinks that the lives of Americans in China would be jeopardized; and, therefore, that it is his duty under his oath to keep that document in the files of the State Department if there is any danger of its being released.

On the other hand, I think the committee ought to be placed in the position where we can have the names of these people, at least the consul, because I think this is a sufficiently important document to call that consul before this committee. If I can get his name, I shall certainly file with the chairman of the committee my personal request, at least, to have him brought before the committee. I wouldn't be surprised if my friend on my left might join me in that letter; but I am going to do it on my own if I can get the name of the consul.

ANONYMITY OF CHAMBER OF COMMERCE TELEGRAM

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, we have all had experience in this country of an organization having a lot of reputable members where a small group, perhaps two or three, will meet in an executive committee and will send out in the name of the organization a message.

Now, I do not think that the mere fact that a hundred American firms, if there were that many in that town, belong to a chamber of commerce would necessarily imply that they all endorsed any such message as was sent in.

They might have held a meeting in which a small group were present, perhaps representing two or three out of a large membership. I think that is pertinent information as to who participated in the drafting of this message and whose views it really represented.

It may not represent the rank and file of the Americans who were in that city at the time. I am only complaining about the anonymous nature of it.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am just as anxious to clear it up as you are, Senator, but I want to do it with proper safeguards around the lives of the people who may have thought this—however wrong they may have been, and according to some people's views, undoubtedly were mistaken in their assumption. But they had some reason for transmitting this message and asking it be given to the authorities of the Government. It may be that they had some ulterior purpose, but I can conceive of a man sending a message of this nature through patriotic motives. I do not want to throw any such man as that to the wolves of communism in China and have him tortured or otherwise punished, if he happens to be there.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. I should think his life would be in more danger in Formosa than in China, because the whole purport of the telegram is to attack the Chinese Nationalist Government. He does not approve too much of the Communists, but nine-tenths of the message is an attack on the generalissimo. I am sure the Communists would not object to that. I am in full support of the stand that the anonymity should be removed.

Chairman RUSSELL. I did not get anything out of the telegram, but that is a matter of opinion, that would lend much aid and comfort to the Communists.

Senator BREWSTER. Very gently they slapped them on the wrist.

Chairman RUSSELL. It does, of course, primarily discuss American aid which was going to Nationalist China.

Senator BREWSTER. Which was the Communist line at that time.

Chairman RUSSELL. That might well be. Of course, it could be these Americans over there were Communists. We have some Communists in this country, and some of them may have gotten over there. My own view is it is unlikely, but it is wholly possible.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I just wanted to say there may be very good and sufficient reasons why the names should not be made public, and I would tend to believe that I would support not making those names public. I would not want to commit myself in advance. But I want to call attention to the committee that this committee did not generate or originate this telegram. The telegram was injected into the hearings a year or so ago by the State Department to bolster its policy in the Orient at that time. We did not make this telegram available. We did not drag it out. It was brought over voluntarily before the two committees, and that is where the information came out.

This committee does not have the responsibility for originally dragging out this anonymous telegram, or at least anonymous up to this point. I feel that we should know, inasmuch as it has been brought into the record here, the authority and what that authority consists of, in the writing of this telegram.

Again I say to you, as I feel at this moment, without committing myself, that I can see many reasons for keeping the names anonymous, and I probably would subscribe to that and vote for it. But we did not originally inject this telegram into, not this record, but into the original record where it was read before another committee.

Chairman RUSSELL. I do not know under whose auspices it was presented to the Armed Services Committee. As a matter of fact, I do not believe there was any witness present, according to my recollection, at the time it was read. I am not clear just exactly how it got there. But I, as a member of this committee, am responsible for it being read this morning here. I, of course, would have had no knowledge of the telegram if it had not been read at a prior hearing.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am referring to the earlier original introduction of the telegram, not this morning.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is undoubtedly true.

Mr. Secretary, do you have the names with you?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Would you be willing to supply them to this committee under the procedural arrangement which we have adopted for dealing with such matters?

Secretary ACHESON. I believe so, sir. I shall look up and see what I have got and then make a report to the committee.

Chairman RUSSELL. I hope you do see fit to do that.

Chairman Connally?

(No reponse.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley?

ACHESON'S CONSIDERATIONS ON MAC ARTHUR RECALL

Senator WILEY. Mr. Secretary, at one of the meetings you had with the group which was considering the recall of General MacArthur, the evidence before this committee, according to the Senator from Arkansas, is that you defended him.

Now, in previous testimony you had something to say on that subject.

Now, what points were raised in his defense?

Secretary ACHESON. Senator Wiley, I don't think I said anything about defending or attacking; and I think that the point you have in mind is that the President stated——

Senator WILEY. What?

Secretary ACHESON. I think the point you have in mind is that the President stated, and I have confirmed, at these hearings, that I pointed out the seriousness of this, and the great importance of reaching a conclusion deliberately and with considerable caution.

Senator WILEY. When you say you pointed out the seriousness of it, just what did you mean?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I have been over that before, and, I think, in answer to questions from you, Senator Wiley.

Senator WILEY. I would like to have you answer it, because frankly I looked for it, could not find it, and that is why I am asking for it from you again.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, the point, as I said—the reasons which led me to advise that this thing should have a lot of thought given to it, and we should proceed with great deliberation and caution in coming to a conclusion, was that in the first place, this involved issues which had to do with the very highest and most important questions of government under the Constitution.

They had to do with the powers, prerogatives, rights, and duties of the President as President and Commander in Chief. They had to do with the position of one of his most important military subordinates, a theater commander, a man who was the supreme commander for the Allied Powers in Japan and the United Nations commander, so it had many international aspects to it also.

It brought in for consideration the effect of any action which might be taken in Japan, and that was very important. It had various possibilities in propaganda use.

Those, together with the military situation, were all things which made this a matter which required deep thought and very careful action.

Senator WILEY. Did you use the word "desertion" in your statement just now?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

Senator WILEY. Of one of the theater commanders?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; I didn't use the word at all.

Senator WILEY. Now, there appeared in one of the papers recently a statement to the effect that Truman had a group of Senators down there and had told them about some reported conversation he had with General MacArthur when he visited him out on the island. Were you present at that meeting?

Secretary ACHESON. Not that I know, sir. I recall no such meeting.

MAC ARTHUR'S ADMINISTRATION IN JAPAN

Senator WILEY. Well, there was one just recently. Now we are engaged really in a world contest against Communist ideas, aren't we? Isn't that what is involved in this global conflict?

Secretary ACHESON. That is involved in it: yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Now I think it is generally conceded, is it not, that MacArthur by his administrative ability and his understanding of the Far East really won the Japanese people for our side and against communism.

Secretary ACHESON. He played a very large part in the whole postwar administration, of course, as SCAP, and did a very fine job indeed.

Senator WILEY. Yes. Well, what I mean is you have stated that this was really a war of ideas on a world scale and we know that all over the Commies are trying to penetrate the thinking of peoples and take them over.

Now you concede the fact, do you not, that under MacArthur's command, Japan has gone away from communism and really come into the camp of the Western Powers in thinking and really in practically all their approaches?

Secretary ACHESON. I think there is a great deal of truth in what you say.

Senator WILEY. Now I asked you yesterday if any of our allies previous to the recall of MacArthur had communicated to you or through you in relation to recalling MacArthur, and I understood your answer to be "No."

Then I got from the questioning by Senator Morse that you did have talks with them in relation to our Government's policy in the Far East and that they approved our policy and we approved their policy. In other words, there was agreement on what our policy should be.

Now in any of these conferences I think you said they did not say anything about MacArthur, but did they show any irritation toward MacArthur?

Secretary ACHESON. I recall no such expressions.

TRANSMITTING MAC ARTHUR'S REPORTS TO UN

Senator WILEY. Now, General MacArthur, in discussing censorship of the State and Defense Departments reports normally made to the UN, stated there was one instance where suggested changes were made which he would not accept. These were changes which seemed to place a political slant upon the military officers' report. He did not know whether the request for these changes in his report came from the State or Defense Departments, but he said the records were available.

He said the change seemed to introduce a political slant which the State Department felt would be advantageous at the UN. He disagreed and stated his reports were intended to be entirely factual. Do you know what the general had reference to?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I think he had reference to a question which arose over I believe it was his twelfth report. His twelfth report included in it—and in this respect it differed from earlier reports—various conclusions and statements which he was making about what seemed to be the political situation.

These matters had been stated by him publicly in a communiqué which was issued previous to the twelfth report. The State Department said to the Defense Department that it did not believe that statements of this sort should be in a communiqué which was a factual recitation of military events, particularly since these statements had already been made public in a communiqué.

The Defense Department transmitted the State Department's views to General MacArthur. General MacArthur took exception to them and said that the State Department's attitude was not correct on this, whereupon the State Department withdrew its suggestions and the report went forward.

Senator WILEY. Did that create any irritation on the part of you or the State Department toward him?

Secretary ACHESON. Not that I know of. It didn't create any irritation on my part because I never knew of it until General MacArthur mentioned it at these hearings. It was in my opinion a quite trivial matter.

LATTIMORE'S CONNECTION WITH STATE DEPARTMENT

Senator WILEY. Now Senator Smith pointed out that Mr. Lattimore was an adviser to the State Department, I think. Has he ever been an adviser?

Secretary ACHESON. I have stated on several occasions and at several times—not in this hearing—the exact relationship which as far as I know has ever taken place between Mr. Lattimore and the State Department. If I can find the data on that I should be glad to state it again.

Senator WILEY. Did he go out with Wallace? I do not want to spend too much time on it. You can look up the date that he was an adviser, if he was an adviser.

Now, did you have personal contact with him?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir. I do not know that I have ever met Mr. Lattimore.

Senator WILEY. So, first-hand, you are not able to tell us what his own ideas were about the Far East, particularly Korea? There was something said at one time, you know, that we could spend so much money and then kind of graciously get out, or words to that effect.

What I am getting at is this: What is your judgment as to the influence of his way of thinking, and his contact with the Department, upon the determination of what our policy eventually became subsequent to VJ-day?

Secretary ACHESON. My opinion is it would have no influence whatever.

Senator WILEY. What?

Secretary ACHESON. That it would have no influence whatever. I will furnish for you as soon as I can get it the exact record of his connection with the Department. As far as I can recollect it now, and subject to correcting my recollection with, as I say, the record, he was never employed by the State Department and was never an adviser to the State Department.

My recollection is that he was invited together with some 15 or 20 other people who were scholars or interested in far-eastern matters to appear at a conference which was held with Dr. Fosdick and Dr. Case and Dr. Jessup when they were consultants to me, a group which included Mr. Stassen and other distinguished gentlemen, and that they had a 2- or 3-day round-table conference. I believe that conference was reported stenographically, and I believe that this committee has asked for those minutes. I believe I have furnished the minutes of those meetings to the committee.

None of those people were paid for attending, although their expenses, their railroad fares, et cetera, to and from Washington were paid, and I believe that is the only connection which he has had with the State Department. But, as I say, I will want to look at the record. But I have announced it several times and I will again answer that question specifically.

Senator WILEY. Well, do you have any recollection that he was employed on a per diem basis at that time?

Secretary ACHESON. I am quite sure that he was not.

PRESENT POLICY IN CHINA

Senator WILEY. Now that our policy seems to be that of sustaining Chiang in Formosa, is there anything in that policy that would go further than that at this time?

Secretary ACHESON. I do not know that I quite understand.

Senator WILEY. Well, I understand that our policy is that we are sustaining Chiang. We have the Navy between him and the Chinese coast, and we are giving him aid. I wonder if there is anything else there in our so-called policy in the Far East in relation to Chiang, and I wonder whether we are going to follow out, possibly, the suggestions of MacArthur to aid him so that he can get in contact with the Chinese on the mainland, or anything of that kind. I wonder if there is anything like that fermenting at this time.

Secretary ACHESON. So far as I know our policy, Sentor, it is, as we have stated here, that we have stated that Formosa should not be allowed to fall in the hands of hostile powers, and are using our naval and air forces to see that that does not occur.

We are also giving military assistance to the forces on Formosa to put them in a state of much better military posture than they are at the present time.

That is very necessary for the defense of Formosa.

Senator WILEY. Are we planning in any way to assist Chiang to make his strength felt on the mainland? I might say that the other night I was looking at the television, and saw Madame Chiang and Chiang and someone questioning them in China. They claimed they had a million and a half guerrillas functioning; they claimed that there were over 500,000 adequate troops on Formosa; and that there was a considerable ferment all over China now, because in China they were finding that the so-called promises of the Commies were not paying off and that there was continual growing resistance.

My thought is this: that if this is a global conflict, I am wondering if in our China policy we have in mind utilizing these constantly increasing forces in our favor to win this conflict, or whether we are going to sit passively by and let—well, let the dust settle.

Have I made my position clear? I want to find out what your policy is.

Secretary ACHESON. I have stated our policy. I think you have stated your position very clearly, Senator. I have stated our policy and that is all I can say about it.

ENFORCING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

Senator WILEY. Well, Senator Cain asked what steps were being taken to get Great Britain and the rest of our allies to agree to a naval blockade of China.

General Marshall suggested the State Department could answer that, but he knew that it was being pressed. Is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. I have answered that question several times also, Senator, and pointed out that we are working on the extension and the vigorous enforcement of the economic restrictions.

We do not believe that it is feasible to undertake to persuade other nations to have a naval blockade when they have not been willing so far to put in a hundred percent economic restriction.

As I pointed out, Admiral Sherman on pages 4315 and 4316 of his testimony says that he believes that that is the wisest course to pursue at this time.

OFFICIALS NORTH OF THIRTY-EIGHTH PARALLEL

Senator WILEY. Well, maybe that is the answer.

All right. There was some discussion by Senator Knowland and General Marshall that SCAP and the UN forces in the Far East should not use any of the officials of the Republic of Korea north of the thirty-eighth parallel, and he asked of General Collins if that was true, or General Marshall, and he said that could be checked.

What is the fact? You have probably answered that before, but I was gone 2 or 3 days.

Did we or did we not restrict the use of these officials of the Republic of Korea north of the thirty-eighth parallel?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; we did not.

We corrected an impression which General MacArthur had erroneously received, through some of the papers which he had read from us, that he should not use these officials.

We told him that was not the case; that what we had expressed to him in the papers that had been sent to him is that while it was highly desirable and very good to use South Koreans, he should use them as his administrators, and not as administrators from the Republic of Korea, which so far had only extended to the thirty-eighth parallel; that the UN had decided that after it was possible to put Korea together, then various steps would be taken to create one government; but, in the meantime, he, as the UN commander, was the person who exercised whatever civil power was exercised, and if he used South Koreans, or South Korean officials, he should use them as his representatives.

ATTEMPTING TO END JAPANESE WAR

Senator WILEY. What basis in fact exists for the frequently made assertion that the Japanese attempted to bring the war to an end several months before the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, prior to the Yalta Conference, and certainly prior to the Potsdam Conference?

What is the basis of the assertion?

Secretary ACHESON. I will now have to rely on memory, on something which occurred very long ago.

I do not believe that there was any attempt by the Japanese to bring the war to an end before the negotiations which finally led to its being brought to an end.

There was considerable active correspondence between Japanese in various capitols and Japanese in Tokyo as to proposals which might be made to save for themselves more than they were able to save at the time of the surrender.

Senator WILEY. Well, I think, Mr. Secretary, that it is important, because you stressed in your remarks, quite possibly, the importance of making concessions to Russia at Yalta to bring the Soviet Government into the war against Japan, and you said that the bomb was dropped, I think, a year after Yalta.

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; I didn't say that because that would not be correct.

Senator WILEY. That is not right? Yalta was February 1945, and the first bomb was dropped June 7, 1945, and I understood you to say that we had not had the bomb yet. We certainly had been working on it for 2 or 3 years, but what importance was this failure of having dropped the bomb on these negotiations at Yalta?

Secretary ACHESON. Would you say that again. I don't understand it.

Senator WILEY. Yes. What was the significance of the bomb not having been dropped at the time we negotiated at Yalta?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I pointed out in my statement, Senator, that when we were discussing the question of bringing the Russians into the Far Eastern war in time to occupy and contain all these troops, which we did not want brought back for the fight on the island of Honshu, that the bomb had not been tested, and nobody knew at that time whether we had a bomb or whether we hadn't a bomb. It was not tested until some months later, and then it went off.

We didn't know before it was tested whether it was or was not going to work. Therefore, at that time the unanimous expectation of all military people, our own, British, Russian, was that there would be a very desperate battle on the soil of Japan carried out by the landing of our troops, with the possibility of very great losses, indeed, if you could judge from the fighting on the islands in the Pacific which had been severe to a degree and, therefore, it was the unanimous opinion of all the military people that if the Russians could be brought in before that assault took place so that army of 700,000 of highly trained, highly armed, and efficient people, could be kept on the mainland instead of being brought back for the defense of Japan, so that the considerable armies in China itself would have to remain where they were, that would be and would mean a great contribution to the battle which was to be expected in Japan.

Senator WILEY. I understand that. But how far had MacArthur advanced in February 1944?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I will have to look that up. I have it here.

Senator WILEY. Was there any chance of the Japs ever getting their Japanese from China or from Formosa back to Japan at that time? Was there? We had command of the sea.

Senator KNOWLAND. You said February 1944; you meant February 1945.

Senator WILEY. 1945, I beg your pardon. I thought I said 1945.

Secretary ACHESON. The general military situation at the time of Yalta was that in Germany the Rhine had not yet been crossed, and it was not crossed until some time in March 1945.

In the Pacific, American troops had entered Manila on the first day of the conference; the battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa still lay ahead; information as to the Japanese Army showed an army of approximately 5 million.

Senator WILEY. Where were they distributed?

Secretary ACHESON. Some of those were in the mainland of Japan, others were in Manchuria, others were in China; others were in Iwo Jima, Okinawa, Formosa, and the other islands which had not yet fallen. With respect to general military estimates, the strategy involved the assault on Kyushu in the fall of 1945, and a landing on Honshu in the spring of 1946.

Senator WILEY. We had command of the sea then, didn't we?

Secretary ACHESON. The estimates were that these operations would involve an American force of approximately 5 million men. Military estimates were the war would continue at least through 1946, and it was felt that the casualties would be very high, some estimates being as high as a million.

Senator WILEY. I mean did we have command of the sea at that time?

Secretary ACHESON. We had command of the seas in general. It would have been perhaps a difficult thing to prevent the transfer back of the people who were only a hundred miles across, if they went through Korea. That was on the inland side of Japan.

POSSIBILITY OF UNITING CHINESE NATIONALISTS AND COMMUNISTS

Senator WILEY. During the Japanese invasion of China Lin Yutang asserts that Chinese Communists were more concerned with fighting the Nationalists than fighting the Japanese, even though the two Chinese groups were supposed to be making common cause against the Japanese prior to the outbreak of World War II. Have you any knowledge on that subject? Was there ever any chance of bringing the two Chinese groups to work together in harmony?

Secretary ACHESON. Senator, I talked an hour and a half on that subject on Monday morning and described in great detail——

Senator WILEY. I don't want you to talk an hour and a half; I just want to know whether in your judgment there was then——

Senator TOBEY. May I interrupt for just one sentence?

Chairman RUSSELL. Does the Senator yield?

Senator TOBEY. Will you yield, Senator Wiley, for one sentence?

Chairman RUSSELL. Does the Senator yield?

Senator WILEY. Yes.

Senator TOBEY. I would like to point out, if I may, that in view of what has been happening here repeatedly down through the days, that there is an injunction in the Scriptures—"Avoid vain repetition."

I wish you would all remember it.

Senator WILEY. Now, Mr. Chairman, I realize that is directed at me, and I suppose I should accept it graciously coming from my good friend, Senator Tobey. But I think he should avoid assuming the right to lecture constantly those of us who have been here day in and day out trying to get at the facts. He has his rights, I suppose, to lecture. On the other hand, we are engaged, as Senator Morse said the other day when he advised Senator Tobey, we are engaged in trying to seek the truth, and I must say that even in the interests of repetition truth sometimes can be discerned where it is not at first contact.

When I think of how men have worked here at this committee, I can only praise them for their loyalty to the purpose. And with that I am going to ask the question again.

Was there ever any chance in your opinion of actually bringing the two Chinese groups to work together in harmony?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. This was the constant effort carried out through General Stilwell, General Wedemeyer, Mr. Hurley, as the President's personal representative, and General Marshall after the war. It was the official policy of both the Nationalists and the Communists, and it was the view of all our military people that it was possible and it was the only way to get real Chinese fighting against the Japanese.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time is up.

Senator WILEY. Just one question.

Chairman RUSSELL. Go ahead.

Senator WILEY. Do you think there is any chance of getting them to work together now?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

Senator WILEY. What did you say?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

Senator WILEY. I will have some more questions.

GENERAL MUDGE'S COMMAND

Chairman RUSSELL. A moment ago, as I stepped in the door, I thought I heard Senator Wiley ask a question as to where General MacArthur's troops were in February 1945. I thought it might be of interest to the members of the commitee to say on February 3, 1945, the distinguished First Cavalry Division under General MacArthur's command captured Manila and liberated 3,000-odd internees at Santo Tomas internment camp. It was under the command of the valued member of the professional staff of our committee, Gen. Verne Mudge, who was in command of that division on that day.

Senator Bridges?

RELEASING WEDEMEYER REPORT

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Secretary, why did the State Department refuse to publish or release the report of General Wedemeyer on Korea made in September 1947?

Secretary ACHESON. The Korean document?

Senator BRIDGE. Yes. You recall, in your white paper you made available the China report, but the Korean report was not released.

Secretary ACHESON. The Korean report was not put in the white paper because the white paper dealt with China and the other report dealt with Korea.

Senator BRIDGES. And prior to it or after it, why was it not made public?

Secretary ACHESON. The Korean report was not made public for the reason that there were certain observations in it which were thought not to be in the public——

Senator KNOWLAND. Speak a little louder, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary ACHESON. It was not made public because of certain observations in it which we believed would not lead to harmonious relations in certain quarters. When we made it available to this committee some few passages of that sort were eliminated from it; otherwise the committee now has it.

Senator BRIDGES. Well, do you not think that if the report had been made public that, first, it would have alerted the American people; and second, it would have alerted certain divisions of our Government to the criticality of the situation—the possibility of danger there?

Secretary ACHESON. I do not believe so, Senator, but you may be right.

QUOTING WEDEMEYER REPORT

Senator BRIDGES. I would like read for the record the part that I referred to on page 6 of the report:

> The military situation in Korea, stemming from political and economic disputes which, in turn, are accentuated by the artificial barrier along the thirty-eighth

> degree north parallel, is potentially dangerous to United States strategic interests. Large-scale Communist inspired or abetted riots and revolutionary activities in the south are a constant threat. However, American forces supplemented by quasi-military Korean units are adequate to cope with such trouble or disorder except in the currently improbable event of an outright Soviet-controlled invasion. Whereas American and Soviet forces engaged in occupation duties in South Korea and North Korea, respectively, are approximately equal, each comprising less than 50,000 troops, the Soviet equipped and trained North Korean People's (Communist) Army of approximately 125,000 is vastly superior to the United States-organized constabulary of 16,000 Koreans equipped with Japanese small arms. The North Korean People's Army constitutes a potential military threat to South Korea, since there is strong possibility that the Soviets will withdraw their occupation forces and thus induce our own withdrawal. This probably will take place just as soon as they can be sure that the North Korean puppet government and its armed forces, which they have created, are strong enough and sufficiently well indoctrinated to be relied upon ot carry out Soviet objectives without the actual presence of Soviet troops.
>
> It appears advisable that the United States organize, equip, and train a South Korean scout force, similar to the former Philippine Scouts. This force should be under the control of the United States military commander and, initially, should be officered throughout by Americans, with a program for replacement by Korean officers. It should be of sufficient strength to cope with the threat from the north. It would counteract in large measure the North Korean People's Army when American and Soviet forces are withdrawn from Korea, possibly preclude the forcible establishment of a Communist government, and thus contribute toward a free and independent Korea.

Then I quote starting on page 13:

> The withdrawal of American military forces from Korea would, in turn, result in the occupation of South Korea either by Soviet troops, or, as seems more likely, by the Korean military units trained under Soviet auspices in North Korea. The end result would be the creation of a Soviet satellite Communist regime in all of Korea. A withdrawal of all American assistance with these results would cost the United States an immense loss in moral prestige among the peoples of Asia; it would probably have serious repercussions in Japan and would more easily permit the infiltration of Communist agents into that country; and it would gain for the Soviet Union prestige in Asia which would be particularly important in the peripheral areas bordering the Soviet Union, thus creating opportunities for further Soviet expansion among nations in close proximity to the Soviet Union.
>
> Present American policy provides that, in view of the failure of the United States-Soviet Joint Commission to succeed in implementing the provisions of the Moscow agreement regarding Korea, the matter be referred to the Four Powers for solution. It also provides that the matter be referred to the General Assembly of the United Nations in the event of the failure of the Four Powers to solve the Korean problem. This indicates that the United States will continue to seek, by consultation with the powers concerned, a solution of the problem, but a failure to reach an agreement on Korea in the United Nations will require that the United States make a decision regarding its future course in Korea: whether it shall withdraw or whether it shall organize a South Korean Government and under what conditions and whether it shall give economic and military aid to such a Government.
>
> A continuation of present American policies will serve to give notice to the Soviet Union and to other nations in the Far East that the United States will not abandon Korea in the face of Soviet intransigence and that the United States will continue to insist upon the fulfillment of the Moscow agreement regarding Korea.
>
> A continuation of present American policies will serve to deny to the Soviet Union direct or indirect control of all of Korea and prevent her free use of the entire nation as a military base of operations, including the ice-free ports in South Korea.

DID CIA HAVE WEDEMEYER REPORT?

The point, Mr. Secretary, I am making, that is just about as accurate a prediction or analysis of the situation and prediction of what happened. Now I want to ask you, you did not suppress the report and then give it out, but who had access to that report? I assume the President did.

Secretary ACHESON. Oh, yes; the President did. I think the report was made to him, and I think all of the appropriate officers in the Defense and the State Departments.

Senator BRIDGES. Well, now we have a branch which coordinates all of our intelligence, Centralized Intelligence. Was it made available to them?

Secretary ACHESON. I assume so.

Senator BRIDGES. Well, I would like to read to you—this is a very important point, I think, because the Centralized Intelligence which we set up here now coordinates our intelligence and makes it available to the appropriate sources, and we had Admiral Hillenkoetter who was the Director of Centralized Intelligence before the Appropriations Committee, and Admiral Hillenkoetter testified as follows in the colloquy which I will read:

> May I inquire as to the date of that report?
>
> Senator KNOWLAND. That report was made in 1947 and has not been released as yet, and this is 1950.
>
> Senator FERGUSON. I would like to ask the admiral if he has seen the report.
>
> Admiral HILLENKOETTER. I have not, sir.
>
> Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think that it would be an important matter for you to have in order that you might evaluate this information from Korea?
>
> Admiral HILLENKOETTER. That is right, sir. I would like to have seen it, but we have not seen it.
>
> Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether it was kept secret from you as well as from everybody else?
>
> Admiral HILLENKOETTER. As far as I know, it has been kept secret from everybody.

Now, the point I want to make is in that Korean report, Mr. Secretary, certainly it outlined the situation accurately and certainly predicted what would happen, and events have borne out, just as we have had other predictions in the past, as to the developments.

Here is the agency which is supposed to evaluate and advise the appropriate departments of the United States Government relative to the best information we have.

Here is his testimony before another committee of the United States Senate that he had never seen it and knows nothing about it.

Don't you think that is a tragic mistake and error?

Secretary ACHESON. I shall be very glad to check up and see whether a copy of this report did go to the CIA. The admiral says he didn't see it. Maybe somebody else in there received it or maybe it didn't go to them.

It was a report which I should think should have gone to the CIA.

As I said when questioned about this report by the press, the report, with some exceptions, states just exactly what we knew, and some of the predictions in the report did not turn out the way he expected the thing to turn out.

CARRYING OUT WEDEMEYER RECOMMENDATIONS

We understood—that part you just read this morning I think was fully understood by everybody.

I have also stated that so far as I know, all the recommendations in regard to Korea made in this report were carried out with the exception of one.

That, and that one you read this morning, and that had to do with the recommendation that the South Korean Scout Force should be under American officers.

That view was not carried out by the military authorities, because it would have left the force without officers in event we withdrew our forces, as the United Nations subsequently requested us to do.

That force was organized and was trained by an American military mission, and has done good work, but it was not officered by Americans.

Senator BRIDGES. On this intelligence situation, also the general recommendations that I read here were not carried out—I mean, the dangers set forth if certain actions happened, which were very clearly set forth, and in spite of those dangers we went ahead with our certain policy, didn't we, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir. We went forward with what was recommended here, which was to create a South Korean Force.

Now, it is true that the North Korean Force had longer training and was more heavily armed than the South Korean Force. That was a difficult thing for us to do on the South Korean side. Many of the North Koreans had been in military service for a great many years.

The point is that some of them were even in Stalingrad—I can't vouch for that, but they had many years of training. Ours had a short time and there is a limit to what people can absorb in the way of heavy equipment and air and that sort of thing.

There was also a limit on what we had available.

QUALITY OF INTELLIGENCE REGARDING KOREA

Senator BRIDGES. We were delving in, at that time, the committee, into whether or not intelligence had failed, or whether there was a failure on the part of the State Department and the Defense Department to pay attention to CIA reports; and this statement of Admiral Hillenkoetter, together with certainly the report which is now available, points up, as far as we could see, the very definite failure of the divisions of the Government here to coordinate and provide to the Central Intelligence the information which was so vital, that they may give a general picture.

This, I might say, was before a full meeting of the Appropriations Committee, and with Senator McKellar presiding, and present: Senator McKellar, Senator Thomas, Senator McCarran, Senator Ellender, Senator Hill, Senator Robinson, Senator Bridges, Senator Ferguson, Senator Wherry, Senator Gordon, Senator Saltonstall, Senator Young, and Senator Knowland, so that there was no question about this.

As a matter of fact, we had two series of hearings on it, and this was the last series.

Senator KNOWLAND. The date of the hearings, Senator?

Senator BRIDGES. The date of this particular hearing was August 28, 1950. We had an earlier one following the attack on Korea, which was, I think we we had our meeting, on June 26.

Secretary ACHESON. I do not believe that there was a failure of intelligence. I think I also was questioned by that same committee that you referred to on this subject.

Intelligence was available to the Department prior to the 25th of June, made available by the Far East Command, the CIA, the Department of the Army, and by the State Department representatives here and overseas, and shows that all these agencies were in agreement that the possibility for an attack on the Korean Republic existed at that time, but they were all in agreement that its launching in the summer of 1950 did not appear imminent.

The view was generally held that since the Communists had far from exhausted the potentialities for obtaining their objectives through guerrilla and psychological warfare, political pressure and intimidation, such means would probably continue to be used rather than overt military aggression.

It was fully realized that the timing of any move in Korea would be ordered from the Kremlin.

Now, the same situation that existed in Korea existed in a number of other places, where the possibility of attack existed, but it was not believed that the attack would take place at that time.

REPORTS RECEIVED CONCERNING NORTH KOREAN INTENTIONS

There has been considerable mention of two reports which are examples of intelligence information concerning the intentions of the North Korean Forces, which were available prior to June 25.

The joint weekly intelligence cable from Commander in Chief, Far East, on March 10, 1950, noted:

> Report received that People's Army—

referred to as PA—

> will invade South Korea in June 1950.

To that was attached this comment:

> Comment: The People's Army will be prepared to invade South Korea by fall and possibly by spring of this year indicated in the current report of armed-force expansion and major troop movements at critical thirty-eighth parallel areas. Even if future reports bear out the present indication, it is believed civil war will not necessarily be precipitated: so that intentions in Korea are believed closely related to Communist program in Southeast Asia. Seems likely that Communist overt military measures in Korea will be held in abeyance, at least until further observations made by Soviets of results of their program in such places as Indochina, Burma, and Thailand. If the Soviets are satisfied they are winning the struggle for these places they probably will be content to wait a while longer and let South Korea ripen for future harvest. If checked or defeated in their operations in these countries in Asia they may divert large share of their effort to South Korea, which could result in a People's Army invasion of South Korea.

That was on the 10th of March.

Now, on the 25th of March——

Senator **Hickenlooper**. What report was that?

Secretary **Acheson**. This is from Commander in Chief, Far East.

Senator **Bridges**. Well, that was a pretty definite statement that they had word that the attack was coming in June.

Secretary **Acheson**. Pretty definite statement? They said a report was received they would attack in June. Then, the comment said, "We don't believe this statement."

On the 25th of March, that is 15 days after this report was sent in, G-2 of the Far East Command, stated his conclusion that:

> It is believed that there will be no civil war in Korea this spring or summer. The most probable course of North Korean action this spring or summer is furtherance of its attempt to overthrow the South Korean Government by the

creation of chaotic conditions in the Republic through guerrilla activities and psychological warfare.

Now, it is interesting to note in this connection that on October 12, 1949, the intelligence summary from Commander in Chief, Far East, G–2, passed on a report that an attack was to be started on the 15th of October 1949, but stated that it was probably fabricated.

November 5, 1949, the intelligence summary had expressed the view that previous rumors of an invasion during August, September, and October of 1949 had been started by the North Koreans for the purpose of causing unrest in South Korea. Also, in his report of December 30, 1949, he advocated that a report that an invasion was to occur in March or April 1950 was not necessarily correct.

The report of January 1, 1950, and February 19, 1950, also contain reports of invasions in March and April 1950, and were discounted.

Therefore, you would have had reports that this attack was going to occur almost every month, and the intelligence of the Far East believed that was not the case.

Senator BRIDGES. Well, Mr. Secretary, the record shows—even the record that you read here shows—that they reported there was to be an attack in June, even though they did qualify it afterwards. That would be a fair analysis; would it not?

Secretary ACHESON. Not only qualified it; they said it is believed that it will not occur. That is a little more than a qualification.

MILITARY AID SENT TO KOREA

Senator BRIDGES. Now, there was a delicate, very dangerous situation in Korea, and the Congress had provided the money for definite military aid to Korea, two things.

In that case, which is, I think, a factual statement of the situation, why did not we send the materials, the military supplies, to Korea which Congress appropriated for?

For instance, let me read you from page 1197 of Appropriations Committee hearings:

> Senator WHERRY. But you have given us the amount of materials delivered to Korea, which is several hundred dollars worth of signal equipment. Is that not right?
>
> General LEMNITZER. Off the record, Senator, the shipments have been limited to a very small amount of signal equipment, principally wire.

Now here we have this dangerous situation, which, as you point out, the reports you quoted from gives two versions there, but nevertheless it is dangerous. Nevertheless, the Wedemeyer report, and we had various other information from intelligence, and so on—why was not the amount of this material and equipment given to South Korea so they could be building up, one? And, two, who ordered it not to be?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I think the answer to that is that it was made available, Senator. And the answer to the second part of your question is nobody ordered it not to be made available. Several people ordered that it should be.

Senator BRIDGES. Well, Mr. Secretary, we have got this sworn testimony from General Lemnitzer, who was the man in charge, who said it had not been.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, let me tell you what had been delivered.

There was turned over to the South Korean Government prior to the withdrawal of the United States forces, under the Surplus Property Act, military equipment, the original acquisition cost for which to the United States had been 56 million, but which had a replacement value at the time it was turned over of $110 million.

Subsequent to the withdrawal of the United States forces, military equipment with an original acquisition cost of one million and an estimated replacement cost of one and a half million was also turned over to the South Koreans. This equipment consisted principally of such items as carbines, howitzers, rifles, machine guns, mortars, trucks, and 20 liaison-type airplanes. There was also included 45 Coast Guard vessels which had an acquisition cost of $13,130,000.

At the time of the surrender of the Japanese—that is, before this—there had been turned over to the Koreans 40,000 Japanese rifles, together with available stocks of ammunition. Other Japanese items useful by the civilian population—I will not go into that.

There was also turned over in the first quarter of 1950 surplus individual equipment for 15,000 men, which included Garand rifles, helmets, boots, blankets, cartridge belts, and tents.

The appropriations were made available by October 25, 1949, under the MDAP. This made $27,640,000 available for Iran, Korea, and the Philippines.

Senator **Bridges**. The point I was addressing, Mr. Secretary, was in that appropriation.

Secretary **Acheson**. Well, the facts in regard to that were that the survey team went out to Korea in December 1949. The agreement which was required by the act was signed with Korea on January 26, 1950. On March 15, 1950, the program agreed upon between Korea and the military mission of $10,970,000 was concluded. That was on March 15.

At the time of the invasion approximately $52,000 worth of signal equipment from excess stocks was being shipped. In addition spare parts valued at $298,000 were en route from San Francisco for shipment to Korea.

Senator **Bridges**. Well, the point is that of this appropriation——

Secretary **Acheson**. One other thing.

Senator **Bridges**. Yes.

Secretary **Acheson**. Under military assistance legislation which permitted eligible nations to buy equipment, South Korea purchased $253,161.40 of military equipment consisting of equipment for 10 AT aircraft and armament and ammunition for naval vessels. Those items were in course of shipment at the time of the invasion.

Now, that is about it, sir.

GENERAL LEMNITZER'S REPORT ON KOREAN AID

Senator **Bridges**. Now, Mr. Secretary, the point here is that here is the man who had charge of it for the Defense Department, and here is his testimony before a committee of the Congress, and he says that out of that appropriation which you have referred to, there was just some wire and signal equipment amounting to a very small part that went, in spite of the fact that this critical condition existed.

I again would like to ask you who held up the sending of the military equipment and supplies to Korea from that appropriation that the

Congress had appropriated and which was available, in view of the serious situation?

Secretary ACHESON. I think the answer to your question is that nobody held it up and that everybody was trying to get the equipment going.

I pointed out that the funds were unavailable until the 28th of October. The agreement was signed on the 26th of January. The program was worked out and agreed to on the 15th of March, and that left April, May, and June—90 days—between the time the program was established and the invasion.

In the course of that 90 days the amounts which have been shipped were what I have just described, and that was all that could be shipped in that period.

Senator BRIDGES. Well, we had an advisory group out there under General Roberts, so that you knew the situation and what was needed. Was there any thought that there should be another group sent—was that the cause of the delay?

Secretary ACHESON. I cannot answer that. I do not know whether it was the group that was out there or some other group that went out but the program was agreed upon by whoever was there on the 15th of March 1950; that is, the military program.

Senator BRIDGES. A procedural question, Mr. Chairman, or statement. I would like to announce that I will bring you a letter asking that General Lemnitzer, who testified before the Appropriations Committee to be called before this committee, because we have got this testimony before another committee of the Congress which is very definite and very specific.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your request will be accorded the same fair and equitable treatment given all the other suggestions for witnesses.

Secretary ACHESON. I would like to add one thing to my answer: That the reason for the difficulty in getting this program going was that in view of the status of equipment of the Armed Forces in 1950, the military equipment for Korea had to come either from new procurement or out of stocks on hand, which needed extensive rehabilitation and repair; and that this could not be done in the 90 days that I have been talking of.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George.

MARSHALL'S MISSION TO CHINA

Senator GEORGE. Mr. Secretary, when General Marshall went out to the Far East, China, the war with Japan had ended.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. He arrived there in the closing days of December 1945.

Senator GEORGE. Now, he stated to us that in his directive, among his other duties, was a responsibility of trying to bring about an integration of government between the Nationalist forces and the Communist forces. He used other language, but is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; his directive——

Senator GEORGE. I don't mean that was the exclusive directive. He was trying to reestablish order in China, or course, and establish something like government, a stable government, but that was among his directives and that followed the end of the war with Japan.

Secretary ACHESON. One of his purposes was to assist in the negotiations which had already resulted in agreement to create this temporary government and then a constitutional government for all of China.

Senator GEORGE. I understand that.

Secretary ACHESON. He directed himself particularly to the cease-fire—the Army part of it.

CHRONOLOGY OF ACHESON'S TESTIMONIES BEFORE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

Senator GEORGE. I am trying to get the chronology here. I don't want to be repetitious in doing it, but this occurred after the end of the war, when the fighting had ceased.

When General Marshall was on the stand, I made inquiry of him about his conclusions when he returned. I had in mind not the time when he came back to assume the responsibilities of Secretary of State but a visit which he made here in February or March.

Secretary ACHESON. I think that was in April 1946.

Senator GEORGE. It may have been April. I would like you to tell me, if you can, whether you came before the Foreign Relations Committee with General Marshall on that occasion.

Secretary ACHESON. I don't remember coming before the committee with him. I was with him a good deal of the time then, and I went to several meetings within the executive branch, but I don't recall that, sir.

Senator GEORGE. I desired to ask General Marshall about that. I did ask General Marshall if he did not conclude that the only way to bring about any stability in government in China was through a coalition or integration of the forces, the Nationalists as opposed to the Communist groups on the other side.

General Marshall's reply to me, based upon his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, after he had been named Secretary of State, when he finally came back, was to the effect that he hardly know what he thought at that time, as there was so much confusion in his own mind as to what he thought could be done or what could not be done.

But I wondered if you were present in that Foreign Relations Committee meeting. I have been a member of that committee for a long time, and I may have things in my mind that I just gathered there as a member of that committee.

I had a distinct impression when General Marshall came back in February, March, or April, I believe you said of 1946, that he thought the only way to stability in government in China was through the integration of those forces that are roughly described as Communist and Nationalist.

He had a rather good opinion of the Generalissimo personally, but thought him entirely out of touch with the people of China, and that the only hope of bringing about stability in government then was to bring in new blood, new forces into the Government. You say you do not recall whether you appeared with him on his visit here at that time.

Secretary ACHESON. I don't recall appearing before your committee with him. I may well have done so. I think as you have described

General Marshall's attitude of mind at that time, it would accord with my recollection of what it was.

Senator GEORGE. Well, that was my distinct recollection and I think that General Marshall correctly described his state of mind, when he had terminated his duties in China and came back and was made Secretary of State, as I recall it, as one of doubt; he seemed to be somewhat up in the air as to what could or could not be done. At least, that was the impression that I had at that time.

Mr. Secretary, were you present before the Foreign Relations Committee when the telegram that we had some talk about this morning was read to the Foreign Relations Committee?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. I distinctly recall the event, but I do not recall that any names were given beyond the general name of the American chamber of commerce in a certain city, and I had some recollection of the name of the firms or concerns represented.

I had a very distinct idea that some of them were not only American but comprised also of certain English interests, at that time. All of us had so many messages from China; the returning missionaries and returning businessmen and men who had come back to this country all came back with messages until it is somewhat confused in my own mind.

Now I want to ask you this, Mr. Secretary. Have you compiled a list of the political directives given to General MacArthur after he had gotten the armies, the United Nations armies, north or substantially north of the thirty-eighth parallel?

Secretary ACHESON. I believe they are all in this document which the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided for you, but I will ascertain that and if they are not all in there, I will make them available.

Senator GEORGE. I am asking about the political directives.

Secretary ACHESON. I think they are in there too, sir, but if they are not, I will get them for you.

EVALUATING MAC ARTHUR'S ATTITUDE

Senator GEORGE. Mr. Secretary, I am not asking you as a military expert, but I am asking you as a witness familiar with these military matters as of necessity you must be at this time. Very generally it has been assumed that General MacArthur's suggestion that the bombing of depots, troop concentrations, and air concentrations in North Korea at the time when his armies were well advanced toward the northern boundary of North Korea was a disposition upon his part, or a suggestion upon his part to extend the war, into other areas.

Isn't it a fair statement to say that General MacArthur as a military man conceived that the bombing of those installations would more speedily end the war and that it was a military decision which was controlling in his mind? Not that he wished to extend the war by that operation. I am not speaking of any other at this time.

Secretary ACHESON. I think that is a fair statement, Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. I think so, and yet it has been assumed by so many of the Senators who have questioned that General MacArthur is trying to extend the war. That did not appeal to me as being his real attitude.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Does the Senator from Georgia yield?

Senator BREWSTER. Will the Senator yield?

I understood you to say North Korea.

Didn't you mean Manchuria?

Chairman RUSSELL. I thought you did.

Senator GEORGE. I said when General MacArthur's armies were in North Korea, near the boundaries of North Korea, I meant the bombing of the build-ups and troop installations in Manchuria, across the border, of course.

Secretary ACHESON. I understood the question to be along that line.

Senator GEORGE. That is what I intended.

Secretary ACHESON. That is what I thought, and I answered about what you thought his intentions were.

Senator GEORGE. Bearing upon that intention, Mr. Secretary, I would like to reach a fair interpretation to put upon General MacArthur's suggestion or recommendation. I believe that General Collins stated that there was never any specific request, but that General MacArthur had raised the question with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and that they understood that he had raised the issue but that there had been no specific request by November 7, 1950, bearing upon a correct interpretation of his real purpose, as a military commander.

[Deleted.]

Secretary ACHESON. I don't think I quite followed your question.

Senator GEORGE. I say, are not those two facts, if they be facts, properly pertinent in evaluating what General MacArthur's real suggestion or what his real intent was? Would you say that his idea was that it would bring about an early termination of the war, rather than a spreading of the war into a wider area?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I think he has said that that was his intention; and I agree that that undoubtedly was his intention, that if he did these things, he would bring the war to an end.

Senator GEORGE. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON. It was our fear he would not bring it to an end.

Senator GEORGE. I understand; but that comes to a mater of judgment, does it not? Was the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and perhaps the State, and perhaps the Defense Department contrary to the judgment of General MacArthur?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. But it is a mater of judgment, at least, is it not?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; it is a matter of judgment.

Senator GEORGE. As to whether it will spread the war, or not.

Now you have not been in Korea, have you?

Secretary ACHESON. No.

Senator GEORGE. Since June 1950?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. The President has not been in Korea since June 1950?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

Senator GEORGE. General Marshall has not been in Korea since June 1950?

Secretary ACHESON. That is right, Senator.

Senator GEORGE. General MacArthur has, of course, been in the Far East for several years and was in Korea on one or more occasions certainly after June 1950, and prior to the appearance of the Chinese Communists in force on the North Korean boundary.

USE OF AIR FORCE

Mr. Secretary, you are to evaluate, I think, fairly, conditions as they existed in October, November, and December of 1950, when you give consideration to the fact that General MacArthur raised the issue, as General Collins said, about the use of the Air Force to stop the tide of the Red Chinese armies that flowed across the Yalu River and down into Korea to attack his troops. At that time, in early November, it was very certain that the Red Chinese were building up a considerable force north of the Yalu in Manchuria, I think; is that true?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; they were building up for some time before they came in.

Senator GEORGE. There had been the Third Army that stood opposite Formosa in the beginning which had gone north and a great part, or many units, out of the Fourth Chinese Red Army had gone north, and they were being concentrated in Manchuria.

Now, I would like to ask if you read carefully the testimony of General Vandenberg——

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I read it——

Senator GEORGE (continuing). At the time when he was before this committee?

Secretary ACHESON. I read it, Senator George. I had to read all this testimony very hurriedly.

Senator GEORGE. Yes. Well, General Vandenberg's testimony, as I understood it—and I think I am putting a fair interpretation on it—was that he, as commander of the Air Force, and the Joint Chiefs did not believe that the use of the Air Force in bombing installations in Manchuria across the border would be decisive, or could be decisive, and not that it might not be helpful to General MacArthur as a protective measure for his own troops who were near the border. But as I understood him—and I want to ask you if you do not concur in this—he felt that if he could use his entire Air Force, the whole American Air Force at his command, that it might have been effective, or at least a very strong counteraction to the movement of the Chinese Reds across the northern Korean border when they came in in force.

Did he not say that if we had used all of our force it would have left us naked to the world?

Secretary ACHESON. My impression of it—and, of course, it is all in the record and it does not make much difference whether this is the right impression—is that he said that in order to undertake an operation of that sort he would have had to have twice the Air Force which we had. That is the impression that was left in my mind. And that in undertaking this operation we might well suffer such attrition as would be very serious for the strategic air force.

Senator GEORGE. That is right. That is very true. But I think a fair interpretation of his testimony before this committee is that before he would have been willing to have undertaken it, he would have to have had twice the force he had in order not to leave us exposed in other parts of the world? But, again, I got the very definite impression that he could have used his entire force of air power to a considerable advantage in checking the flow of the Chinese Army, the Red Chinese armies, down into Korea.

[Deleted.]

AUSTIN'S LETTER PRIOR TO VFW SPEECH

Now, going to Formosa, Mr. Secretary, what is the particularly objectionable statement in the address of General MacArthur to the Veterans of Foreign Wars in August of 1950, if at that time our policy with respect to Formosa was definite, fixed, and well understood?

Secretary ACHESON. Senator George, the statement that General MacArthur prepared for the Veterans of Foreign Wars was to have been published on the 28th of June, I believe, and was actually published on the 29th of August 1945.

Chairman CONNALLY. Not 1945.

Secretary ACHESON. Nineteen hundred and fifty.

Senator GEORGE. Nineteen hundred and fifty.

Secretary ACHESON. It was supposed to have been released on August 27 and was printed a day or so later.

Earlier today I pointed out that throughout August charges were made against the United States in the Security Council that it was engaging in military aggression against Communist China and against Chinese territory by this order of the President's regarding the Seventh Fleet, and on the 24th of August there was filed in the Security Council by the Foreign Minister of China a complaint against the United States.

On the 25th of August Mr. Warren Austin, on behalf of the United States and with the direction of the President, wrote a letter which was circulated throughout the United Nations and given to all members of the Security Council, stating the American position in regard to Formosa.

In that letter he set out the President's statement of June 27, which I shall not read because you are familiar with it.

He also set out the statement of the President on July 19, in which in all cases the President said that this action was taken in no way to prejudice the future of Formosa, and for the purposes which he stated there.

Then, Mr. Austin, Ambassador Austin, concluded his statement by making seven points. These were:

> 1. The United States has not encroached upon the territory of China nor has the United States taken aggressive action against China.
>
> 2. The action of the United States in regard to Formosa was taken at the time when that island was a seat of conflict with the mainland. More serious conflict was threatened by the public declaration of the Chinese Communist authorities. Such conflict would have threatened the security of the United Nations forces operating in Korea under the mandate of the Security Council to repel the aggression on the Republic of Korea. They threatened to extend the conflict through the Pacific area.
>
> 3. The action of the United States was an impartial neutralizing action addressed both to the forces on Formosa and to those on the mainland. It was an action designed to keep the peace and was, therefore, in full accord with the spirit and the Charter of the United Nations. As President Truman has solemnly declared, we have no designs on Formosa and our action is not inspired by any desire to acquire a special position for the United States.

4. The action of the United States was expressly stated to be without prejudice to the future political settlement of the status of the island. The actual status of the island is that it is a territory taken from Japan by the victory of the Allied forces in the Pacific. Like other such territories its legal status cannot be fixed until there is international action to determine its future. The Chinese Government was asked by the Allies to take the surrender of the Japanese forces on the island. That is the reason the Chinese are there now.

5. The United States has a record through history of friendship for the Chinese people. We still feel the friendship and know that millions of Chinese reciprocate it. We took the lead with others in the last United Nations General Assembly to secure approval of the resolution on the integrity of China. Only the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its satellites did not approve that resolution.

6. The United States would welcome United Nations consideration of the case of Formosa. We would approve full United Nations investigation here or on the spot. We believe that the United Nations consideration would contribute to a peaceful rather than a forceful solution of the problem.

7. We do not believe that the Security Council need be or will be diverted from its consideration of the aggression on the Republic of Korea. There was a breach of the peace in Korea. The aggressor attack has been condemned and the combined forces of the United Nations are now embattled to repel the aggression. Formosa is now at peace, and will remain so unless someone resorts to force. If the Security Council wishes to study the question of Formosa we shall support and assist that study. Meanwhile the President of the Security Council should discharge the duties of his office and get on with the item of the agenda, which is the complaint of aggression against the Republic of Korea, and specifically the recognition of the right of the Korean Ambassador to take his seat and to vote on the United States resolution for the localization of the Korean conflict.

That was his position.

CONCLUSIONS ON FORMOSA

Senator GEORGE. I understand, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary ACHESON. May I go on and answer your question? Because there are one or two things I want to bring out.

Senator GEORGE. Yes, sir; but I thought we had now reached the firm conclusion that Formosa must not fall into unfriendly hands.

Secretary ACHESON. General MacArthur's statement, Senator George——

Senator GEORGE. Is that our position now or not?

Secretary ACHESON. Our position is that we are not going to have Formosa fall by force into unfriendly hands.

Senator GEORGE. Fall by force?

Secretary ACHESON. We put the Seventh Fleet in there to do it.

Senator GEORGE. I understand that, Mr. Secretary, but I had understood that our definite position now was that Formosa was not to be permitted to fall into unfriendly hands.

Secretary ACHESON. Our position was as I stated it, Senator George, up until the 25th of June 1950, that we should use all means that we had short of the employment of United States military forces to prevent Formosa from falling into enemy hands.

Senator GEORGE. I know.

Secretary ACHESON. On the 25th we interposed military force.

Senator GEORGE. I understand.

Secretary ACHESON. Now, we have imposed both military force and political methods also.

Senator GEORGE. I understand that and I am now asking about our present policy with regard to Formosa. Is it that it shall not be permitted to fall into unfriendly hands, by force or otherwise?

Secretary **Acheson**. That is our policy, that we are not going to permit is to be taken by force, and we are going to use all our means to prevent it from falling into unfriendly hands; yes, sir.

Senator **George**. Through negotiation?

Secretary **Acheson**. Yes, sir.

Senator **George**. Now, that is the reason I asked you, Mr. Secretary, what in General MacArthur's statement to the Veterans of Foreign Wars is there contrary to the present position, if our present position is that Formosa should not be permitted to fall into unfriendly hands? There may be some implications in it.

Secretary **Acheson**. That is what I was proceeding to answer, Senator George.

Senator **George**. Yes.

Secretary **Acheson**. There are statements—I shall not read this whole report——

Senator **George**. No, sir; I wouldn't have time for you to do that on my time.

Chairman **Russell**. Your time has about expired, but he can read it on the committee's time if he wishes, Senator. That is a rule we have.

Senator **George**. I understand that, and I understand that may be; but the whole burden of that address of General MacArthur was to fix indisputably the position of Formosa so far as we are concerned. That is all that the general is talking about in the final analysis.

He may have thrown in some innuendoes, there may be some unfortunate implications there, but if your present position is that Formosa is not to pass into unfriendly hands, by negotiation or otherwise, I can't see where there was any great trouble there.

Now, may I ask you one other question?

Secretary **Acheson**. I would like to really answer the question, Senator.

Senator **George**. You have that privilege, but since I may not be able to ask you but one more question, will you answer that first and then answer this second?

Secretary **Acheson**. All right.

Senator **George**. The general statement that State was preparing and passing around to the nations associated with us in the Korean affair in March 1951 and which was intercepted by General MacArthur's ultimatum or his statement to the commanders in the field of the Korean and Chinese Communist troops—I am identifying it merely——

Secretary **Acheson**. Yes, sir.

Senator **George** (continuing). Was that statement itself sent to General MacArthur?

Secretary **Acheson**. No, sir.

Senator **George**. He was Supreme Commander in the Far East and Supreme Commander in the Korean fighting, but that statement was not sent to General MacArthur?

Secretary **Acheson**. That is correct, sir.

Chairman **Russell**. Your time has expired, Senator George.

Senator **George**. Yes, I know, but the Secretary said he wanted to answer.

Chairman **Russell**. He may proceed to answer the other question as he sees fit.

OBJECTION TAKEN TO VFW SPEECH

Secretary ACHESON. I was proceeding to answer Senator George's question as to why objection was taken to General MacArthur's statement to the Veterans of Foreign Wars. I have already pointed out that at the time this statement was released, a complaint had been filed against us in the Security Council for aggression against Formosa, and under the direction of the President, Ambassador Austin had stated the position of the United States.

When General MacArthur's position came out, it indicated that in view of current misconceptions about the strategic importance of Formosa, he would like to make the statement which he did make. He talked about our island chain in the Pacific of which Formosa was implied to be a part, and had such expressions as this:

> From this island chain we can dominate with air power every Asiatic port from Vladivostok to Singapore and prevent any hostile movement into the Pacific.

He said:

> If we hold this line, we may have peace. Lose it and war is inevitable.

He said:

> To pursue any other course would be to turn over the fruits of our Pacific victory to a potential enemy. It would shift any future battle area 5,000 miles eastward to the coast of the American Continents, our home coasts—

et cetera.

Now that statement we believed would, and I believe quite correctly, be interpreted by people hostile to us to mean that what the United States wanted was to get control of Formosa, and that is exactly what happened.

This speech was out on the end of August. On the 1st of September the Soviet radio picked it up, and the Soviet radio—I had the exact quotations from it in this book.

I can't put my finger on them, but they charged the United States, they charged that General MacArthur had torn the cover from the real intentions of the United States, that what our real purpose was was to seize Formosa for ourselves. That was printed throughout September.

SOVIET INTERPRETATION OF VFW SPEECH

Shortly after that when the General Assembly met, Mr. Vishinsky came over here and made a series of speeches, and I shall read only two paragraphs from one of them, to bring out the damage which this did to the whole position as stated by the President. Mr. Vishinsky says:

> None other than General MacArthur recently informed, with cynical candor, the whole world about the decision of the ruling circles of the United States of America at all costs to turn Taiwan into an American base in the Far East. This remark was contained in his famous message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention, which we can deplore in discussing this matter. In that message, MacArthur carefully described the strategic significance of Taiwan as an important link in the chain of American bases running from the Aleutian Islands to the Marianas. In that message, MacArthur sought to prove that in holding Taiwan as the most important link in that chain, the United States of America could keep air control of the western Pacific. MacArthur explained and spelled out the role of Taiwan, which he called an unsinkable aircraft car-

rier, a magnificent base for submarines, and a magnificent base also for offensive operations.

It is well known that MacArthur does not waste words, nor does he mince them. MacArthur immediately transforms words into the fiery metal of American weapons. He does not war with words; he wars with his armed forces, not in the name of those objectives which are relevant to the respect for political rights, independence, and territorial integrity of other states, but he wages war in the name of the aggressive purposes and aggressive plans which are the fountainhead of the whole of the aggressive foreign policy of the United States of America.

Now the point that I was trying to make was that in the middle of this very bitter battle which was going on in the United Nations in which we were charged by China and by Russia with doing something which we never had any intention of doing whatever, which was seizing this island, taking it away from the Chinese, and using it ourselves, General MacArthur's speech gave credence to that belief and was so used by people who were trying to make as much difficulty for the United States position as possible, misrepresenting the position of the United States and trying to put us in the eyes of the world into the role of an aggressor nation which was trying to take advantage of the situation in China and seize portions of that territory.

Senator GEORGE. Now, Mr. Secretary——

Secretary ACHESON. That is why it was dangerous.

Senator GEORGE. Mr. Secretary, General MacArthur expressly said in that very speech that we had no intentions of taking it.

Chairman RUSSELL. Is there objection to Senator George proceeding?

Senator MORSE. I ask unanimous consent.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chair hears none.

Senator GEORGE. He stated specifically that we had no intention of seizing that island, in that very document; and I may be all confused, but I thought if we had any far eastern policy, it was that Formosa would not be permitted to fall into unfriendly hands.

Now, if I am wrong, I am wrong.

I think the people of the United States have felt that to be the cornerstone of our far eastern policy.

Secretary ACHESON. I am not arguing about whether General MacArthur correctly stated the strategic importance of it, or correctly stated what was the position of our Government.

But, I am saying, and this is true—it cannot be denied—that his speech did give the impression to people who used it for that purpose that the United States wanted to seize this island.

Now, he may have said, 20 times, that we didn't; but he gave that impression; it came at a time when the President was occupying his Presidential role of stating what the policy of the United States was, and that resulted in two voices speaking on behalf of the United States.

One of those voices was seized upon by people hostile to us to cause us great damage, and it is for that reason that it was, in my judgment, properly withdrawn.

Senator GEORGE. Well, I am not arguing that, Mr. Secretary, but I am more at sea now than I have been for quite a long time. I thought we had reached a conclusion that if we occupied the position we were called upon to occupy in the Pacific that we cannot permit Formosa to fall into unfriendly hands.

Secretary ACHESON. I am not denying that at all.

PROPOSAL OF JANUARY 13

Senator GEORGE. Yes, sir. But we came very near doing it on the 13th of January, did we not, when we made the proposal that four countries, certainly four at least would be included, two of whom were definitely Communist, and the British had already indicated their position with respect to Formosa.

Secretary ACHESON. I don't——

Senator GEORGE. And the place of the Red Chinese in the Council of the United Nations.

Secretary ACHESON. I don't think that is what was agreed at all, Senator.

Senator GEORGE. Well, it was not agreed because they rejected it.

Secretary ACHESON. It wasn't offered. What we stated——

Senator GEORGE. Oh, Mr. Secretary, I beg your pardon.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, you may differ with me, sir, but——

Senator GEORGE. Well, it is a matter of judgment. I know we in Foreign Relations were in consternation for fear they would accept the proposal. Do you recall that?

Secretary ACHESON. I recall that the committee was bothered about it, yes.

Senator GEORGE. Bothered about it. I say bothered and bothered seriously.

Well, I beg your pardon. It is a matter of interpretation. I did not mean that four nations alone would make the decision, but included in the enumerated nations were four of them, three of whom were already against us.

Secretary ACHESON. Senator, I don't know what you mean there is a matter of interpreation. There can be no interpretation about the fact that the principle said there should be included in a group four——

Senator GEORGE. That is right.

Secretary ACHESON. Now, it did not say there should be four, and you could have 50 as long as the four were in the group. Secondly——

Senator GEORGE. Mr. Secretary, on that point, I thought we had very frankly made a mistake, and I thought the State Department had recognized its error, and prayed considerably during about 3 days that the Communists would reject it, and fortunately the Communists did reject the proposal. I think it is a fine illustration of the efficacy of prayer, Mr. Secretary. I may be wrong, but that is the impression I got at that time.

Senator WILEY. You had better be careful; you have taken Senator Tobey's place now.

Senator MORSE. Procedurally, Mr. Chairman, I think the Secretary should be given full opportunity to answer the Senator from Georgia.

Chairman RUSSELL. He shall have full opportunity to make any statement, as full as he desires.

Senator GEORGE. I want the Secretary to have full opportunity, but I so well remember the resolution in the United Nations Council of January 13, and I know in what fear and trembling we received it. We may have been altogether mistaken about it.

I have no disposition to interrupt you again, Mr. Secretary. My time has long since expired.

Senator MORSE. It is on that point that I think the other members of the committee now are entitled to know the Secretary's position. Because with our great respect for the Senator from Georgia, when he speaks, we give heed, and I am not a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and I am a little lost now in this discussion.

Now I would like to hear the Secretary explain what I infer from his remarks is a difference in conclusion that he has with the Senator from Georgia on this matter.

Chairman RUSSELL. It has been an inviolable rule since these hearings opened that any witness who desired to make any response to any question or statement made by a member of the committee was permitted to do so on the committee's time, and if the Secretary desires to comment any further on this matter, he is perfectly at liberty to proceed.

Senator MORSE. I understand that.

Chairman RUSSELL. Proceed, Mr. Secretary.

DISCUSSION AS OPPOSED TO AGREEMENT ON A QUESTION

Secretary ACHESON. Then I should like at least to restate it, Mr. Chairman.

You will recall that on a date in December, the 14th or the 15th, a cease-fire resolution was passed and a group was appointed in the United Nations General Assembly to forward this cease-fire resolution to the Chinese Communists and to try to bring about an end to the aggression and the fighting.

That proposal was rejected. There was then a report made by this cease-fire group and this report undertook to spell out what they thought were five principles that underlay bringing this whole matter to a conclusion.

Those five principles started with a cease fire, worked into a broader truce; took up the question of United Nations authority to take over while elections were being held; referred to the removal of foreign forces as soon as order could be established and the Koreans themselves could take over the thing; and then said after the fighting stopped there should be a group set up to consider other questions which were actively talked about in the Far East; that this other group should include, among others, four powers that were mentioned.

It did not say how the other powers could be added to it but that was undoubtedly to be done by the General Assembly.

Then it said that among the questions that this group should consider would be Formosa and admission to the United Nations on the part of the Chinese Communists.

That report was produced by the cease-fire group—the United States was not a member of the cease-fire group—and a motion was made to approve the principles and have them forwarded to the Chinese Communists as an interpretation of what the cease-fire was all about.

We considered whether we should vote for or against that resolution approving those principles. We concluded we should vote for it, and we did vote for it, and it was sent to the Chinese Communists, and they rejected that as a basis for discussion in any way.

What I have tried to point out is that in this fifth principle what we said is that in keeping with other nations who would include the four mentioned we would discuss two points. Now, I cannot believe that anyone here would undertake to say that we should not discuss any question, once fighting has stopped, once an attempt to bring about by force a solution to those questions was stopped, that we should not talk about any question.

It does not mean that we in any way shall change our attitude toward those questions, but that they are subject to discussion.

The whole basis of the United Nations Charter is that we settle questions by peaceful means. We are required to go before the United Nations Organizations and discuss questions. We are not called upon to agree. We are not called upon to give up our position on anything that we regard as some basic interest.

But we are required to meet and discuss. That is the very heart of the United Nations method of dealing with international problems.

And what we have said here is that we would vote for that principle, which was that after this fighting was stopped we reverted to the two principles which we had been discussing in the United Nations before the fighting began; and therefore the termination of the fighting brought you back to the situation that you were in before.

REALM OF DISCUSSION

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, just at that point, because I think it is so vital, this record is going to close at this point, I am sure the Secretary did not mean to want to go as far as to say we would discuss any problem that they might want to bring up. We would not discuss whether Alaska should go back to Russia; we would not discuss whether the Philippines should be turned over to the Soviet Union? You do not mean to make a blanket statement that no matter what they wanted to discuss? You did not mean that?

Secretary ACHESON. No; I didn't mean to discuss that.

Senator MORSE. I did not hear the Secretary's answer.

Secretary ACHESON. What is that?

Senator MORSE. I did not hear your answer to Senator Knowland.

Secretary ACHESON. What we were talking about in this resolution is discussing far-eastern questions, and the Senator from California suggested that my answer was broad enough to include turning over Alaska or parts of the United States to someone else, and I hastened to say that no such idea was in anybody's mind.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, the same thing would apply to Japan being turned over, or the Philippines. You would not say if the Russians demanded it that we would consider it necessary to discuss those two items, would you?

Secretary ACHESON. Senator, I think we are really getting into the realm of the fantastic here.

Senator KNOWLAND. I don't think so.

Secretary ACHESON. If the Russians or anybody else brought up questions regarding Japan in the UN, we would have to discuss questions regarding Japan. The Russians many times have argued that certain things we have done have not been in accordance with the fundamental legal basis of our position in Japan. We have always met that with argument and won out. That is what we would have to do.

Senator **McMahon**. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to make a 30-second observation off the record, if I may.

Chairman **Russell**. The Chair puts the unanimous-consent request. The members of the committee hear the request. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and the Senator is recognized.

Senator **McMahon**. This off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Chairman **Russell**. Had you concluded?

Senator **McMahon**. I thank the committee.

Senator **Morse**. Mr. Chairman?

Senator **Lodge**. Until what time?

Chairman **Russell**. Just a moment. Before I could say or announce the time of the reconvening of the committee, Senator Morse sought recognition. We have been proceeding a little informally here, and so I recognize Senator Morse.

Senator **Morse**. I seek only to make an announcement for the record as to a procedural position in which I find myself.

It is necessary for me to take a 2:30 plane to Chicago to fulfill a speaking engagement that I have had of long standing, and I shall be back some time during the night.

I will not be here, I am afraid, when my turn to examine the Secretary comes this afternoon; but do you think that I am perfectly safe in assuming that the Secretary will still be here tomorrow?

If not, I would like to make an official request that he be recalled tomorrow morning so that I can examine him.

Chairman **Russell**. I can only say to the Senator that such experience as I have had in committee would lead to the very firm conclusion that the Secretary will be a witness before this committee tomorrow morning.

Senator **Morse**. If it should develop during the afternoon that other members of the committee are through with the Secretary now, I will say for the record that I would like to have him recalled tomorrow morning.

Chairman **Russell**. I think that is altogether unnecessary, but the committee will take note of the Senator's statement.

The committee stands in recess until 2:30 this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 1:02 p. m., the committee stood in recess until 2:30 p. m. that same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(Present: Senators Russell, Connally, George, Byrd, Green, Johnson, McMahon, Kefauver, Gillette, Stennis, Wiley, Bridges, Smith, Saltonstall, Hickenlooper, Lodge, Knowland, Tobey, Cain, and Brewster.)

ACHESON APPEARANCE AT COMMITTEE HEARINGS

Chairman **Russell**. The committees will come to order.

Senator Byrd, my hieroglyphic chart shows that you are the next examiner.

Secretary **Acheson**. Mr. Chairman, may I make an observation?

Chairman **Russell**. Yes.

Secretary **Acheson**. I do not recall whether, in my examination by Senator George this morning, the Senator asked me whether I attended a meeting of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in January 1951, at the time this five-principle resolution was under consideration.

My recollection was that Senator George asked me if I had attended such a meeting; and I thought I had.

Is that what I said—do you remember, Senator George?

Senator GEORGE. I thought you said you thought you had. I don't think you made a positive statement.

Secretary ACHESON. I have looked it up in our record, and find that I did not attend that meeting, but there was a meeting of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the 16th of January at which this subject was discussed by Assistant Secretaries Hickerson and Rusk; and, on the next day, they had a similar meeting with the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, but I was not present on either one of those occasions.

Senator GEORGE. I recall Assistant Secretaries Hickerson and Rusk were there.

Secretary ACHESON. That is all.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd, you may proceed.

WITHDRAWING UNITED STATES TROOPS FROM KOREA, 1949

Senator BYRD. Mr. Secretary, when were the American occupation troops withdrawn from Korea?

Secretary ACHESON. The last troops were withdrawn, which was a regimental combat team, on June 29, 1949.

Senator BYRD. Who ordered their withdrawal?

Secretary ACHESON. The withdrawal was undertaken as a result of a resolution by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which recommended and urged that both the Russian troops should be withdrawn from the north and that our troops should be withdrawn from the south. The withdrawal was finally approved by all departments of our Government, and by General MacArthur.

It started in the spring of 1949. At the request of the State Department the withdrawal of the last regimental combat team was delayed until the 29th of June in order that the South Korean forces might be better organized.

Senator BYRD. Do you know whether——

Secretary ACHESON. The withdrawal started in September, was begun on September 15, 1948. In November 1948 the withdrawal was halted at the request of the State Department, and a regimental combat team of 7,500 was retained until June 29, 1949.

GENERAL HODGES' TESTIMONY ON KOREA

Senator BYRD. Do you know whether General Hodges, the commander of the occupation troops, was consulted as to whether or not it was wise to withdraw?

Secretary ACHESON. I cannot answer that, Senator Byrd. I just don't know.

Senator BYRD. On February 25, 1947, General Hodges appeared before this committee in closed session and no transcript was taken. He appeared for an hour, so the staff tells me. My clear recollection is that he expressed the opinion that under the conditions then existing that the North Koreans would dominate the South Koreans, communize, as he expressed it—I don't know whether he used the word "invasion" or not—if we withdrew and I was wondering if consideration was given to that situation which he expressed here when the order was given to withdraw.

Secretary ACHESON. I can't say, Senator Byrd. I know that the withdrawal had the full support of the Defense Department.

Senator BYRD. Well, if we had not withdrawn from South Korea, do you think the North Koreans would have made the invasion?

Secretary ACHESON. I can't answer that, sir. I don't know what the result would have been. The troops that we had in Korea were to a very large extent administrative troops and were carrying on the military government of Korea, and there were not very many combat troops there.

Senator BYRD. And you don't know whether General Hodges was consulted as to whether or not he thought that withdrawal at that time would be premature?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; that would have been done within the Military Establishment.

SOUTH KOREAN FIGHTING ABILITY

Senator BYRD. Now on June 13, 1950, which was just 2 weeks before the invasion of South Korea, Mr. William C. Foster, then Deputy Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration, testified before the Senate Appropriations Committee and said:

> The rigorous training program has built up a well-disciplined army of 100,000 soldiers, one that is prepared to meet any challenge by the North Korean forces, and one that has cleaned out the guerrilla bands in South Korea in one area after another.

Now when Mr. Foster made that statement, just 2 weeks before the invasion of the North Koreans, I asked him upon what basis he reached these facts, and he said he obtained them from official sources. Do you know what the sources were that would justify him in saying 2 weeks before the invasion that the South Koreans were so well disciplined and so well trained and prepared that they could withstand any attack made by the North Koreans?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; I don't know what the official sources were that he resorted to. The South Korean Army was well-disciplined and has put up a very good fight. They had in the preceding year handled an invasion, which came down below the thirty-eighth parallel, and it was thrown back successfully, and there had been intermittent raids across the border.

Senator BYRD. They didn't put up much of a fight when they were first invaded by the North Koreans. This Chief of Staff document says they did not.

Secretary ACHESON. They were knocked to pieces in the first attack. They have fought very well since they were regrouped and went into battle after our troops began to hold the line.

SOUTH KOREAN PREPAREDNESS

Senator BYRD. General Roberts, head of the United States military mission to Korea, said about that time:

> The South Koreans were not adequately armed because America feared they would attack the North Koreans.

He said that to prevent them from attacking we gave them no combat air force, no tanks, and no heavy artillery. Is that correct?

Secretary Acheson. They did not have any—did not have many tanks. They had light tanks. They had some artillery, but light artillery, and very few aircraft. It was my impression that they did not have those because, in the first place, they didn't know how to use them, and in the second plare, we didn't have them to give them.

Senator Byrd. You couldn't have had a well-trained force if they had only light tanks and very few airplanes.

Secretary Acheson. It was not a heavily armed force, Senator.

Senator Byrd. Have you heard that opinion expressed—it was expressed publicly by General Robert at the time—that they were not armed, because this country feared they would attack the North Koreans?

Secretary Acheson. I had not heard that.

Senator Byrd. You have two leaders here—one, Mr. Foster, who says they were not trained, that they were trained, rather, and another, the head of the United States military mission, General Roberts, who said that they did not train them and equip them because they feared they would attack.

As a matter of fact, they weren't trained to any degree commensurate with the North Koreans.

Secretary Acheson. No, sir; the North Koreans were better trained and more heavily armed.

Senator Byrd. Wasn't that a very grave error that we made in removing our troops from South Korea under those conditions?

Secretary Acheson. I don't think so, sir. The withdrawal of our troops was the result of a recommendation by the United Nations.

Senator Byrd. That doesn't make it an accurate or proper recommendation just because the United Nations made it, I shouldn't think. They were our troops, and it seems to me we should have had some voice as to whether or not those troops should stay there until at least the South Koreans were equipped and prepared to fight should they be attacked.

The point I am getting at is I am inclined to think that had those troops remained there, this invasion would not have occurred.

Secretary Acheson. That may be true.

Senator Byrd. Until they had trained the South Koreans. What is your opinion about that?

Secretary Acheson. I just couldn't have any guess on it, Senator Byrd.

SOVIET TRAINING OF NORTH KOREANS

Senator Byrd. Certainly we know that the Russians were training the North Koreans.

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir; we knew that.

Senator Byrd. Why is it that they succeeded so much better than ourselves in the first place?

Secretary Acheson. The Russian training of the North Koreans had been going on for a great many years. There is a report which I mentioned this morning—I cannot vouch for it—that some of the North Korean troops fought at Stalingrad during the war. At any rate, they had received long training and a good deal of equipment.

Training on our side had been much more recent. We did not have the equipment to give—we gave them as good training as we could and the materials which were available to us.

I think that in the case of training of troops of this sort, I understand from the military people that time is very important and that it takes a good deal of time to get people trained to use these modern weapons to which they are not used. And undoubtedly if there had been more time to train these troops and more time to get equipment for them, they would have been better forces.

Now, it is not necessary that our own troops should remain there in order to do the training because we had a military mission which was there for that purpose.

Senator **Byrd**. But we left, and for that reason it seems to me that by that act of leaving, that is, leaving there an untrained and poorly equipped army was simply an invitation for an attack.

Secretary **Acheson**. You may be right about that, sir. As I say, the United Nations recommended that both sides should withdraw. Our own Joint Chiefs of Staff thought it was very wise for us to withdraw. We thought from the international point of view it was wise to withdraw, and the withdrawal took place—and it may have been unwise.

Senator **Byrd**. Now, you state that the Russians had more time. Well, I thought that we had the same time with the South Koreans as they had with the North Koreans. Korea was occupied by Japan until the surrender and we had exactly the same opportunity and time to train South Koreans as the Russians had to train North Koreans.

Secretary **Acheson**. I believe they had Koreans with them for a long time before the war. As I said, I have heard there were some at Stalingrad. Now, we went in there in 1945 and the troop training did not begin, I think, until sometime in 1947. We started out with the constabulary and that sort of thing, and did not try to train an army until later. The Russians had been working on it for a long time.

POPULATIONS OF NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA

Senator **Byrd**. Well, the South Koreans outnumbered the North Koreans.

Secretary **Acheson**. Yes, sir, about 2 to 1, 20,000,000 in the south.

Senator **Byrd**. Had they been properly and effectively trained, they could have held the North Koreans at the border, the thirty-eighth parallel.

Secretary **Acheson**. If they had more time and better weapons they possibly could have. The North Koreans I think were putting a larger force of people into their army absolutely than the South Koreans were, because this was pretty well supported from the Soviet Union.

Senator **Byrd**. The South Koreans as I understand it have 20,000,000 inhabitants in South Korea, and North Korea has 10,000,000 inhabitants. It certainly seems that if their military mission had done a job over there, if we hadn't withdrawn our troops too soon, that having twice as many to draw upon that it would have been possible to have built a force there that could have withstood the North Korean invasion and that would have then saved the tragedy of this war, am I correct about that?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I am afraid that it isn't quite as you have pictured it, Senator Byrd. If you are operating a totalitarian regime, you can direct everything in that state to the support of an army, particularly when you have a great deal of support from the outside.

ARMING THE FORCES OF SOUTH KOREA

I think everything in North Korea was directed toward the creation of this force and the maintenance of this force with no regard being paid to the civilian part of the population at all. It is not possible to do that in a state which is run on democratic principles. You can only raise a certain amount of the total national income for armed forces. It is more difficult to do.

Senator BYRD. Are you speaking of this country?

Secretary ACHESON. I am talking about South Korea.

Senator BYRD. Didn't we furnish all the arms to South Korea?

Secretary ACHESON. We furnished all the arms and we furnished the training, but it is more difficult to get as much of a concentration on an armed force in that kind of a democracy than it is on the other side.

Also there was, as I said, the question of time and the question of the matériel that was available here.

Senator BYRD. Well, did this country protest against the removal of our troops knowing that the South Koreans were not trained and not properly equipped, as was later proved to be right?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; we did not protest against the withdrawal of our troops. We thought that was the right policy.

Senator BYRD. Well, did you make any effort through this military mission—what was it, about a year before the invasion?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I think probably along in that time.

Senator BYRD. Was any great effort made through that mission to train these troops in an effective way?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; very great effort was made.

Senator BYRD. Evidently General Roberts doesn't think so. He said in the public press that they did not arm them because they were afraid that they would attack the North Koreans.

Certainly there was no great effort made along that line if he held that view, that is General Roberts. I think this is a very crucial question, that this thing may have been avoided and the Southern Koreans, twice the population if they had been properly armed and properly trained, it is not likely or it is probable rather that the North Koreans would not have attacked them, because to Communists, weakness is an invitation.

RESISTING FIRST STAGE OF INVASION

When you have military weakness, that is an invitation to them to attack, and they must have known of the weakness of the Southern Korean Army because they marched straight through it. The Chiefs of Staff report says that. There was practically no resistance in the first stage of the invasion; that is correct, isn't it?

Secretary ACHESON. They went to pieces in the first stages of the invasion; yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. Did that give any concern to you and others who were watching the Korean situation knowing it was a fallacy and might blow up anytime, the fact that the South Koreans were so feebly armed as compared to the Northern Koreans?

Secretary ACHESON. We understood that this was a dangerous situation, and trusted in the fact that the invasion would not take place until the South Koreans were able to handle themselves better. Of course, there was a great deal of thought and concern which was engendered by it.

Senator BYRD. Did you recognize the fact—did you know the weakness of the South Koreans as compared to the North Koreans, and it was evidenced when the invasion came—were you conscious of that?

Secretary ACHESON. I think it was known; yes, sir. It is hard to have——

Senator BYRD. Nobody in the Military Establishment acknowledged it; certainly, Mr. Foster did not do it. He got it from official sources, and he said they were well-trained and well-armed to withstand any invasion.

Secretary ACHESON. I think that our information at the time was that the other side, the North side, was much more heavily armed, and our general impression was that they could carry out their objectives in the northern part of the country, but we did not believe they could occupy the whole country.

Senator BYRD. The fact remains—and I believe you would agree with this—had the South Koreans been armed and trained in an equal manner to the North Koreans, having twice the population, that they could have withheld and prevented the invasion of their own land.

Secretary ACHESON. I believe that is true, Senator.

Senator BYRD. It seems to me that somebody made a very tragic mistake in taking our Armed Force out without first arming and training the South Koreans, because there had been recognized for a long time the trouble in Korea. I have expressed time and time again that very thing in the Armed Services Committee. That was one thing that occurred to me and that it was a very serious neglect on the part of somebody, and maybe quite a number in high authority.

If you had to do it over again, I assume that you and others would see that these troops were armed and in better shape than they were, would you not, before you took the occupation troops out?

Secretary ACHESON. We were trying the best way we could at the time to have them armed better than they were.

Senator BYRD. It was a very ineffective arming, and I think sometime there ought to be some investigation of that because that is what brought about this tragic situation we are now in.

DIFFERENTIATING POLICE ACTION AND WAR

Now, Mr. Secretary, I want to ask you some questions that come to me from your testimony of yesterday. Do you regard the combat in Korea as a police action?

Secretary ACHESON. I regarded it as a military action to repulse the attack made against the Republic of Korea.

Senator BYRD. When does a military action or police action cease to be such and become a war?

Secretary **Acheson**. Well, I think in the ordinary popular sense it is a war if you have fighting with military formations.

Senator **Byrd**. You recognize it as a war now?

Secretary **Acheson**. Yes, sir; in the usual sense of the word there is a war.

Senator **Byrd**. There is a war.

Now, the Constitution provides, of course, as you know, that Congress is the only agency of the Government that can declare war.

Secretary **Acheson**. Congress is the only agency that can declare war, yes, sir; but that does not mean that Congress is the only agency that can start fighting. A war is declared when somebody else attacks you, whatever happens; but what the Constitution is referring to is the declaration of war which has a whole lot of legal and other consequences.

Senator **Byrd**. Under what conditions—I would like you to name the conditions under which you think that a war should not be fought until it is first declared by Congress.

Secretary **Acheson**. I don't think I am able to do that Senator Byrd.

Senator **Byrd**. I think that is a pretty fundamental question. I don't understand why you can't do that, because the Constitution clearly says that all wars must be declared by Congress, and you say this is a war.

Secretary **Acheson**. Well, I think if you consider it for a moment, you will see that it is an almost impossible question to answer.

The last war, where Congress had a declaration, was being fought quite vigorously before Congress got to do that.

Senator **Byrd**. Which war was that?

Secretary **Acheson**. World War II. We were fighting at Pearl Harbor before Congress had any declaration of war.

Senator **Byrd**. That was a direct attack upon us.

Secretary **Acheson**. Yes, sir; and I suppose if there is a direct attack upon us now, we would be fighting.

Senator **Byrd**. I gather that your testimony—

Let's see where the testimony of yesterday is.

From your colloquy with Senator Gillette, did you justify the order of June 26, directing that our forces go into combat at the thirty-eighth parallel, on the ground that it was a United Nations action?

Secretary **Acheson**. No, sir; I don't think so.

PRESIDENTIAL ORDERS OF JUNE 26

Senator **Byrd**. How did you justify that, without the action of Congress?

Secretary **Acheson**. I said that the orders of the 26th provided the Navy and Air Force be instructed to offer the fullest support to the South Korean forces, south of the Thirty-eighth parallel.

The orders were issued to the Seventh Fleet to prevent an attack on Formosa, and so forth.

Senator **Byrd**. Now, the orders went beyond that, didn't they?

Secretary **Acheson**. That was the 26th. Those orders were issued by the President in exercise of his authority as President and Commander in Chief.

They had primarily to do with getting our people out of the Seoul area and giving support to these South Korean forces.

Senator BYRD. Actually the June 26 instructions were furnished General MacArthur by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and MacArthur then had not been made the commander by the United Nations, for the employment of the United States Naval and Air Forces against North Korean units south of the Thirty-eighth parallel. Was that taken under what authority—as the Commander in Chief? Was it taken in connection with our membership in the United Nations?

Secretary ACHESON. Sir, that was taken by the President under his authority as President and Commander in Chief. It was in part to get our own people out of that area. And in part it was in support of the resolution of the 25th which asked everybody to help in the purposes of that resolution.

UN RESOLUTION OF JUNE 25

Senator BYRD. That resolution of the 25th, as I understand it, was a cease-fire resolution.

Secretary ACHESON. The resolution called on the North Koreans to withdraw, asked no one to give any help to the other side. That determined that the action was a breach of the peace, called for the immediate cessation of hostilities, called upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the Thirty-eighth parallel, requests the Commission to do various things, and called upon all members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.

Senator BYRD. But you did not rely upon that resolution in the action taken by the President, which I understand you to say was done as Commander in Chief.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I said all his actions here in relation to American forces are based upon his powers under the Constitution.

Senator BYRD. Well, you referred to the last war. It is true that the attack, that we attempted to resist the attack at Pearl Harbor when it was made, but the next day we declared war on Japan and Germany.

Secretary ACHESON. That is right.

Senator BYRD. There has been no war declared in this case.

Secretary ACHESON. That is right.

Senator BYRD. Where is the analogy here between the two?

Secretary ACHESON. I was not trying to draw an analogy.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION TO DECLARE WAR

Senator BYRD. What I want to know, and I think it is a pretty vital constitutional provision which says that Congress only can declare war. You say this is a war. The President calls it a police action. But you admit it is a war. In what different category is this particular war to other wars we have been engaged in when Congress has declared war? What is the difference?

Secretary ACHESON. What I was saying is from the point of view of constitutional law, I presume that the phrase "declare war" means declare a state of war with the various legal and other consequences which follow from that. Now Congress is the only body that can do that.

Senator BYRD. You are a great constitutional lawyer, but I think the provision in the Constitution was to protect the people of America by the fact that only Congress could declare war, the President or no one else could place us into war except by the action of the Congress.

Now I would like to know what the difference, what special category this particular war is in whereby it does not require a declaration of war, but that the President, as you say, can start the war and conduct the war.

Secretary ACHESON. We have filed a memorandum which shows that for over a hundred years, perhaps 150 years, the President has employed the Armed Forces for various situations where there was not a declaration of a state of war. I believe that his powers and precedents are ample to cover what he has done in this case.

Senator BYRD. To rely on the membership of the United Nations—in other words, the President can start a war any place in the world if he chooses to do it, without a declaration of war by Congress? If he had difficulty in Iran, for example, he can have a war there simply by having troops directed to go there into combat, that can be done—and the United Nations took such action on June 27.

Now, I assumed that the President had relied at least to some extent on the membership of the United Nations, until yesterday you responded to a question by Senator Gillette that the President—you said he relied on his authority as Commander in Chief alone, to send American troops. You may recall Senator Gillette asked, and I have the record here:

> Is it your contention that the President as Commander in Chief alone, Commander in Chief of the United States forces, without reference to the United Nations, would have authority to send American troops to the number of a quarter-million into such action as may be taking place in Korea without action by the Congress of the United States and declaration of war?

And you said you believed he had that power.

ACHESON ADVISES PRESIDENT

Now, it is your opinion as Secretary of State that you could advise the President that he has a right to begin a war as he sees fit any place in the world, acting as Commander in Chief? And if that is your opinion, I would like to ask you the question: Under what conditions do you believe the Congress should declare war?

Secretary ACHESON. Senator Byrd, I did not say that was my opinion and I never would have advised the President he can declare war.

Senator BYRD. You stated that yesterday, Mr. Secretary, in response to the question of Senator Gillette. I do not know whether you advise the President or not, but I assume you as Secretary of State would—but you did advise the President with respect to Korea, did you not?

Secretary ACHESON. What, sir?

Senator BYRD. Did you not advise the President with respect to Korea?

Secretary ACHESON. Oh, yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. And so then you could advise him again, as long as you are the Secretary of State. I would like now to know would you advise the President that he had the power in your judgment under the Constitution to start a war wherever he pleases without having a declaration of war from Congress?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; I would not advise the President he had power to start war whenever he wanted it.

Senator BYRD. Well, you did in this instance?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; I did not.

Senator BYRD. What did you do?

Secretary ACHESON. I advised the President that certain steps were necessary and desirable in Korea.

Senator BYRD. Did you advise him to issue the order of June 27?

Secretary ACHESON. I was at the meeting in which we discussed that order and joined in recommending its issue.

Senator BYRD. That was to send our troops into combat, was it——

Secretary ACHESON. Well, send our Air Force and Army into combat.

Senator BYRD. And that means war, and you admit that that means war, and now you are unwilling to state under what conditions, if there are conditions, where the Congress should declare war preliminary to hostilities. Do you think that Congress should have the right as stated in the Constitution to declare war?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I think Congress is the only body that has the power to declare war.

Senator BYRD. But as I understand your position, then, it is that we are having a war without a declaration of war.

Secretary ACHESON. You may have fighting a great many times without the declaration of war, and throughout our 150 years of history it has happened a great many times, and they are all mentioned in these memoranda we filed with this committee and others.

Senator BYRD. Have we ever had a war in our history for this length of time without a declaration of war, where we have had casualties of 170,000?

Secretary ACHESON. I can't answer that, Senator Byrd; I don't know.

DOCUMENTS IN APPENDIX OF HEARINGS

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd, your time has expired. The Secretary mentioned this document the other day, which has been prepared, which is a compilation of the times in our history when American troops have been employed, I believe, outside the United States or on foreign soil perhaps.

I did not order it printed in the record because the House had already printed it as a House document. I requested the staff to get copies of it and make them available to members of the committee.

However, if the committee desires, it can be printed again, along with these hearings.

Senator BREWSTER. How extensive is it?

Chairman RUSSELL. Eighty or a hundred pages, I would estimate. Is that right, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary ACHESON. The shorter one does not. I think the one that has all the precedents is fairly long.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is the one I thought you had in mind. If you have briefed that one, we will be glad to have it printed in the appendix of today's record.

Secretary ACHESON. This is the one filed with the committee.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is not the one I was talking about. I believe the one the House committee had printed—it was preparerd by the Department of Justice and the Department of State——

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. But it is much more lengthy than this. We will have this printed in the record, and in addition, we will obtain printed copies of the other compilation to which I referred.

Senator BREWSTER. Could that refer also to the other? Make a reference so they will know there is another more extended one. Perhaps it does refer to it.

Chairman RUSSELL. This is the first time I have seen this one. I don't believe it makes any reference to that one.

Senator SALTONSTALL. We are going to have many volumes, Mr. Chairman. Here, for instance, is just one volume. Why couldn't the House report be printed under a separate cover as a separate appendix of these hearings? Would that not save money and also be full, rather than to print a summary and refer to it?

Chairman RUSSELL. The House compendium has already been printed.

Senator SALTONSTALL. That is what I mean.

Chairman RUSSELL. I believe Colonel Galusha is coming in with them now.

Senator BREWSTER. I have a copy of about 12 pages, the short memorandum.

Chairman RUSSELL. This one contains 77 pages of printed matter. I exaggerated a little. I said I thought it had eighty or a hundred.

Senator GILLETTE. What is the date of the document?

Chairman RUSSELL. This is February 20, 1951.

Senator BREWSTER. July 3, 1950, the one I have. Is that the one you refer to now, Mr. Secretary?

Chairman RUSSELL. July 3, 1950, is the one which the Secretary of State has asked to have printed as part of our hearings, and it will be printed in the appendix of the record.

Senator BREWSTER. Could that contain a reference to this other one so that it would be completely documented, refer to the House document?

PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY TO REPEL KOREAN ATTACK

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Reporter, we are now ordering the printing in the record of these hearings the statement offered by the Secretary of State entitled "Authority of the President to Repel the Attack in Korea."

(The document above referred to will be found in the appendix of this record.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Attention is also directed to Union Calendar No. 22, House Report No. 127, Eighty-second Congress, first session, the volume entitled, "Background Information on the Use of United States Armed Forces in Foreign Countries. Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs Pursuant to House Resolution 28, a Resolution Authorizing the Committee on Foreign Affairs to Conduct Thorough Studies and Investigations of All Matters Coming Within the Jurisdiction of Such Committee."

Senator **Brewster**. This memorandum is 7 pages instead of 13. I was mistaken to that extent regarding the one of July 3, 1950.

Chairman **Russell**. The multigraphed copy that I have contains 11 pages. I imagine it would be somewhat shortened in printing, but in any event this one will be printed in the appendix of the record, and attention is directed to all who might be interested in the House report which has been described.

Senator **Saltonstall**. Mr. Chairman, couldn't that latter be incorporated in the appendix by reference, which I assume is the same?

Chairman **Russell**. It will be. That is the reason I described it for the record, Senator Saltonstall, so that there could be a reference to it. Senator Gillette?

Senator **Gillette**. Mr. Chairman, that was the question I was just going to ask. The order is not to incorporate this House document in the record except by reference.

Chairman **Russell**. That was my intention. Of course, the committee can print it again if they wish, but it seems to me it would be an unnecessary expense to have it printed again when copies are available to all members.

Senator **Gillette**. If it is incorporated by reference, that certainly should be sufficient.

Chairman **Russell**. Copies are available not only to all members of the committee but they can be obtained from the Government Printing Office by all citizens who are interested therein.

Senator Smith?

KOREAN POLICY SINCE 1949

Senator **Smith**. Mr. Secretary, in connection with the questions that Senator Byrd has been asking you, it just occurs to me to make a statement here to have you comment on it.

When I was in Korea in the fall of 1949, that is after our troops had been removed, I was advised that the South Koreans had been well trained and were thoroughly able to take care of any attack by the North Koreans, but they probably would need help in case of an attack by either Communist China or by Russia.

Then I recall that in your speech of January 1950 to the Press Club, you did not include Korea in the area of our strategic defense, and the conclusion seemed to be drawn from that that we had done all we could do for the Koreans. They could go ahead and defend themselves, but as far as we were concerned, we were through.

Then I saw an article written by Mr. Owen Lattimore in which he suggested that we should go ahead with $150,000,000 of ECA aid, but as far as Korea was concerned, it was not of strategic importance to us—we should not tell anybody, but we should let Korea go.

I think a great many people are confused on those different reports, and I am wondering if you would comment on that. I am not clear why we withdrew our troops, took the position that the South Koreans were adequately armed, which apparently they were not, and then when the trouble arose we suddenly shifted around and thought we had to go in there for this resistance to that aggression.

I think it would be helpful for the public to understand just what our position was on that.

Secretary **Acheson**. Yes, Senator Smith.

You referred to my speech of January 12, 1950, before the Press Club. After talking about the places in the Pacific where our troops were stationed, and which were regarded as part of the defensive perimeter occupied by us, and mentioning that, I then went on to speak about other areas, and said:

> So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack. But it must also be clear that such a guaranty is hardly sensible or necessary within the realm of practical relationship. Should such attack occur, one hesitates to say where such an armed attack would come from; the initial reliance must be on the people attacked, to resist it, and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world, under the Charter of the United Nations, which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression.

The same idea, which was that people who defended their independence against outside aggression can look with some confidence to the United Nations to assist them, was stated by Mr. John Foster Dulles in his speech of June 19, 1950, before the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, and I read some portions of that.

Senator SMITH. What is the date of that, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary ACHESON. June 19, 1950.

Senator SMITH. That was just before the outbreak—

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH (continuing). Apparently.

Secretary ACHESON. I will read one or two paragraphs that bear on this from Mr. Dulles' speech. He says:

> Despotism, thrown onto the defensive in the nineteenth century, has resumed the offensive in the twentieth century. Already the United States has twice intervened wtih armed might in defense of freedom when it was hard pressed by unprovoked military aggression. We were not bound by any treaty to do this. We did so because the American people are faithful to the cause of human freedom, and loyal to those everywhere who honorably support it.

He then went on to say:

> The American people give you—

that is the Koreans—

> their support, both moral and material, consistent with your own self-respect and primary dependence upon your own efforts. We look upon you as spiritually a part of the United Nations, which has acted with near unanimity to advance your political freedom. It seeks your unity with the North, and which even though you are technically deprived of formal membership, nevertheless requires all nations to refrain from any threat or use of force against your territorial integrity or political independence.

He ends up:

> You are not alone; you will never be alone, as long as you continue to play worthily your part in the great design of human freedom.

PROCEDURE SINCE NORTH KOREAN ATTACK

Now, when the Republic of Korea was attacked on the 25th of June by the North Koreans, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the United Nations Security Council, which was the proper and appropriate body under the Charter, as I have just stated, in answer to questions by Senator Byrd, declared that this was an aggression, and a breach of the peace.

It called on the North Koreans to stop their attack, retire behind the Thirty-eighth parallel, and called on members of the United Nations to assist in carrying out the resolution and not to assist the North Koreans.

On the 27th it passed a resolution asking all members of the United Nations to assist the Republic of Korea with military force, to repel this aggression.

On the 7th of July, it asked the United States of America to assume the command function in that operation.

The President, on the 25th, acting as I have said, in accordance with his constitutional authority, directed the Air Force and the Navy to assist the South Korean forces and also to evacuate our nationals.

The commitment of ground troops was made on the 30th, as a result of the report from General MacArthur which stated that the South Koreans could not hold without assistance; and in telegraphic communication which took place the early morning on the 30th, he asked for permission to put in a regimental combat team, and increase that to two divisions.

That authority was given him, the first authority for the regimental combat team during the course of the telegraphic communication with him; and the authority to enlarge the ground commitment later in the day, after the President had considered the matter.

PRESIDENTIAL CONSULTATIONS WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Senator SMITH. Could you tell me—I think I asked you this before, but I would like to have it in here—why did you feel that at that time it would not have been wise at least to bring that matter before the Congress, to get a resolution, or a joint resolution or something to endorse the President's action, which virtually committed our ground troops to a military battle status?

Secretary ACHESON. As was said earlier in my testimony, when you and I discussed this question, there was a meeting with the leaders of Congress on the 27th, at which the President made a report as to why he had acted the way he had acted.

That seemed to meet with general approval.

It was your recollection that you had suggested that a joint resolution would be desirable. I did not recall that.

You undoubtedly have a better recollection of that than I.

Senator SMITH. I am not sure my recollection is correct. I either suggested it there, or with others at that meeting——

Secretary ACHESON. There was another meeting with the leaders on the 30th, when he told them about the ground troop commitment.

I don't remember that anybody thought that any further procedures were necessary or desirable.

Senator SMITH. Well, it was certainly discussed by some of us that we ought to do something about that in order to be sure Congress was behind the action. I wil not labor that now. I just want to bring out some more of the facts with regard to Korea.

Do you not want to comment on the report that Mr. Lattimore's statement that Korea was not to be kept? The report came to me that he made that statement to your special committee, which was composed of Mr. Jessup, Mr. Fosdick, and Mr. Case at that meeting they had in late October, I think it was. I wanted very much to present my views at that time and wasn't given the opportunity. I thought very strongly on the subject of recognition of Communist

China and on the subject of Korea, but they had a meeting and apparently the suggestion by Mr. Lattimore or somebody was that so far as Korea was concerned, it was not within the scope of our responsibilities, or something to that effect.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I don't know that I ever heard of Mr. Lattimore's views on that.

Senator SMITH. Were the minutes of that meeting kept, by the way? Could we get the minutes of that meeting?

Secretary ACHESON. You have the minutes of them here before this committee.

Senator SMITH. We have them now?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Then I will take occasion to study them and see just what was provided there.

DISTINGUISHING PEIPING GOVERNMENT AND REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Now I want to take up one or two more things in the record as we go along here. You had a very interesting exchange with Senator Stennis yesterday with regard to this question of the possible bringing of Communist China or the Peiping government into the United Nations, and Mr. Stennis raised the question as to whether the Republic of China was not the China that was named in the Security Council provisions of the Charter.

I note that chapter 5 of the Charter, article 23, has the following language:

> The Security Council shall consist of 11 members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council.

Now the question comes up if the Peiping government should try and move in, and if an attempt is made to admit the Peiping government to the United Nations. This question came of substituting them for the present Republic of China, and the way in which we could get around this language that is in the Security Council provision.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, sir, we have no desire to get around any language.

Senator SMITH. I know you have not, but how could you evade the clear implication here that it was the Republic of China that was a permanent member?

Secretary ACHESON. That is undoubtedly what the Charter says, but I was pointing out to Senator Stennis that what we have been able to do far is to present very compelling arguments to our associates in the UN which have convinced them that the Chinese Communists should not shoot their way into the UN.

Senator SMITH. That is true.

Secretary ACHESON. And the great thing, I think, to do is to preserve the great majority which adheres to that view. So far that has been done, and I have great confidence that it will be done.

This argument can be used. I don't think it is nearly as effective an argument as the ones which have been used and which do have conviction.

Senator SMITH. But you have suggested in previous cases I think we have had up before the Foreign Relations Committee, that the question of recognition is a procedural matter, whether you recognize group A or group B, and that you imply that if the question of the recognition of the Peiping government came up, it would be determined by majority vote probably of the Assembly.

That sort of has given me a great difficulty, because it seems to me to have this bridge across here to the Security Council. You would have to remove the Republic of China as a member of the Security Council, and it seems to me clearly the veto would come in at that point.

USE OF VETO REGARDING RED CHINA

There is another question with regard to the veto. I am just suggesting this because you raised the question that the veto doesn't apply where you have merely a procedural question. I am raising the question whether if the Peiping government trys to get into the United Nations by shooting its way in or otherwise—let's say they don't shoot their way, but they try to be good boys and try to get in in a normal way I have difficulty in seeing how we can consider their admission because of this Republic of China rule for one thing. Another, it seems to me very clearly that what we witnessed here in the Far East is the slow but very effective conquest of China, the great area of China, by an external power. I want to ask you whether in your judgment you don't believe that what happened in China is a conquest of the country by Soviet Russia, and there is consequently a control of China today by an external power, namely, Russia; and whether if the admission of Communist China to the UN came up, it would not mean that there would be a recognition or request for recognition by the UN of the conquest by an external power; and whether it would not be a sound position to take against recognition of any conquest by an external power and control by an external power of a member of the UN.

Secretary Acheson. You can make those arguments, sir, and the question is whether they appeal to the people that you want to carry with you. The great and important thing to do is to maintain the majority, and these arguments don't come up at all.

So far we have been able to do it, and I am sure we will be able to do it. You can raise these points and argue them, but in the last analysis, it depends on whether the others agree with you.

Senator Smith. It does provide majority vote to control the action, but if the question came up as to admission to the Security Council of the Peiping government and you took the position that they are controlled today by an external power, the question then comes up whether you wouldn't have a perfect right to exercise the veto on the Security Council question.

Secretary Acheson. Again, Senator Smith, I tried to point out that the important thing is to maintain the position in the whole 46 branches of the UN. You are talking about only one—that is, the Security Council.

We can maintain our position there, and we shall continue to maintain it, and I believe we will have the majority with us. These questions that you are discussing don't come up unless we are in a minority of four or less; and if you are in—if we are in a minority of four or less, then you can not confidently believe that any of these assertions as to whether a veto or our adverse vote constitutes a veto will be supported by the majority. If they are not supported by the majority, then you are overruled.

Senator Smith. Russia hasn't been overruled in the exercise of a veto.

Secretary Acheson. May I finish, sir?

Chairman Russell. Please let the witness finish.

POSSIBILITY OF APPEALING TO WORLD COURT

Secretary Acheson. That is why I suggested yesterday, I believe, that if that situation appeared likely, the sound thing to do might be to ask for an opinion of the World Court, because if the World Court then decides it is a question of whether the veto applies, that would be respected by all members of the Security Council.

Senator Smith. I want to say that I was very glad to hear you make that suggestion, because it seems to me that would be an approach that might well be taken, but I call attention at the same time to the fact that the Soviet Government doesn't appeal to the World Court as to whether she is entitled to exercise the veto or not. There may be occasions when you might feel it is a case that ought to be given attention to, and the veto at least ought to be a two-way street.

I don't think at any time, if I recall, that the veto by Russia on any of these questions where she has put a block in progress, has been challenged by anybody.

I don't think we have ever even suggested taking the question in her case to the World Court; and I am wondering whether that wouldn't be a wise policy for us to begin to consider.

Secretary Acheson. That was done, Senator Smith. The World Court handed down a decision.

Senator Smith. Well, what was that Russian veto?

Secretary Acheson. It had to do with the admission of Italy. It was taken to the World Court and the World Court held that was a vetoable question.

Senator Smith. That it was vetoable?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir; they held that.

Senator Smith. And of course on the procedural question then you suggest that, as China is in, therefore the question whether group A or group B represents China is a procedural question for the World Court, in a case where there is an external conquest of a country like by Russia in the case of China?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir; it was not, but I suggested it should be.

Senator Smith. You think it is a question well worth while presenting to the World Court?

Secretary Acheson. That is what I think.

Senator Smith. Then as to the view as to which group is representative being merely a procedural question to which the veto cannot apply, you will at least come to the view or at least some of us have, that it might be a question to be considered by the World Court. Is that a fair conclusion?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir; a fair conclusion.

Senator Smith. Thank you. I want to get another question straightened out. It seems to me there is a difference in testimony in regard to a directive issued to General Marshall when he went to China. As I recall the testimony, he stated the statement was prepared by the Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, by yourself, and Mr. John Carter Vincent. And he stated that he was so much concerned at the time with the hearings on the Pearl Harbor investigations that he did not really have any opportunity to really work the directive out.

I will just quote from the testimony on page 459 of the printed volume of these hearings, part I. I asked:

> Do you recall who had a hand in the preparation of the directives that sent you to China?

And Secretary Marshall at that time said:

> At that time, Senator—Mr. Byrnes was Secretary of State, and I presume he had a hand in it; Mr. Acheson was Under Secretary of State, and I presume he had a hand in it; John Carter Vincent was the head of the China group in the State Department—certainly, he had a hand in it. I do not know what others did.

Then he went on to state his part.

Now, I understood you to say in your earlier testimony that General Marshall practically wrote his own directives. I wonder if we can get that straightened out, because I have been asked about it by people who heard the testimony.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, sir; if I may have my testimony I will read it to you.

Senator SMITH. It may take a little time to find that, and I do not like to lose my time. If I may, while we are waiting to get the answer to that, I will ask you a further question that I have here in connection with your testimony of yesterday, I think, or last week and today.

RELIANCE ON GENERAL BARR'S REPORT

You apparently relied extensively on the report of General Barr with regard to the question of the Nationalist forces and their fighting ability, and whether they were adequately supplied by us, and I think you referred to a statement by General Barr to the effect that, "Since my arrival," according to General Barr "no battle has been lost for lack of ammunition or equipment."

Now isn't it true that there were other evaluations of the Chinese situation by other competent military men? I recall that when Admiral Badger was before us he gave us quite a different picture than that. When General Chennault came before us, he gave us a different picture, and I am advised that Brig. Gen. Francis C. Brink, who supported General Barr on the mission, of equal rank but longer experience, stated:

> While our directive did not permit us to go into Manchuria, I have seen Chinese troops going up to the front with 1 rifle for every 10 men, 1 truck for about 2 regiments, and no signal equipment except flags. I know that at one time only enough money was available to the army appropriation for one Chinese meal a day for the soldiers.

I am just asking you the question whether there was not really a decided difference of opinion as to whether or not General Barr's statement was right that no battle was lost for lack of ammunition or equipment?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, you have cited others. I was referring to the opinion of the head of our military mission which would seem to me to be the best official view.

Senator SMITH. As I recall, I talked to other military people, General Wedemeyer being one. He is going to be here and can answer himself, but I thought he was under the impression that General Barr had not quite given us the true picture of just what went on there.

NATIONALIST RESISTANCE

Let me ask you another question with regard to the allegation that the Nationalists did not adequately resist, that they gave up without a struggle. For example, I think some of the testimony that we had showed that 40 percent of the Nationalist effectives were actually lost in the battle of Puchang. In other words, they went in and fought so hard that 40 percent of them were destroyed.

At the same time and to illustrate that they did not have the same policy at all these different points, was it not agreed by the Nationalist leaders in Canton to abandon that city to the Communists without a fight, without even firing a shot?

I remember I was out there about the time of the Canton attack coming up, and there was speculation in Hong Kong, speculation whether Canton would fall or whether they could defend it, and then all of a sudden we heard Canton had been just practically turned over.

I am wondering if we have adequate information as to that Nationalist policy. In some cases they seemed to resist and in some cases they seemed to let it go by default, and whether we really have a full picture of that whole thing, enough to just simply condemn the Nationalist army and say they were no good, they gave away this point and that point and gave away the arms we gave them, or whether there were instances where they did make a really courageous defense.

Secretary ACHESON. I think we have quite full information on the reports of the military mission. I read some of them.

Senator SMITH. You have come to the conclusion obviously that the Nationalist army was just no good and there was no use in giving them any further assistance, but I am just wondering whether there wasn't some difference of opinion on that.

FORMOSA POLICY

Now, you spoke this morning about Formosa, and the importance of Formosa, and that it should not get into hostile hands, and there was one expression that you used that, frankly, disturbed me. You said, "Formosa will not fall by force into hostile hands." In other words, we are prepared to prevent any attack on it by force from the Commies from the mainland or otherwise; but apparently from your statement, if we limit our position to one that we will not let it fall by force, it may imply that if it gets into the negotiations for either a cease-fire or a final settlement of the Korean matter, we might go the whole way of letting it get into hostile hands, in spite of its strategic value to us.

Secretary ACHESON. That was not an implication which I sought to give.

Senator SMITH. I did not know whether you intended to use those words "by force," because you did indicate in your discussion of General MacArthur's Veterans of Foreign Wars' letter, for example, and of the discussion of the cease-fire provision that named four countries as being included in the determination of this matter, that the discussion of Formosa might be considered. I thought possibly you had in mind that might lead us to the difficult position of having to recognize an action by a group of nations who would say, "Well, it is better to let Formosa go and admit the Chinese Commies."

Secretary ACHESON. That is not what I had in mind.

LEADERSHIP IN UN

Senator SMITH. Do we take the strong unequivocal position that we do not propose (*a*) to admit the Chinese Communists into the United Nations and (*b*) that Formosa is not going to be turned over to Red China?

Secretary ACHESON. When you say that we will not permit Red China to enter the United Nations, what I have tried to stress so strongly in all these hearings is that the United States does not run the United Nations. There are 60 nations that belong to it; that the chance of having the view which we think is so right adopted depends upon our ability to furnish leadership, and persuasive leadership, to these other countries. That is what we are doing, and I have every expectation and belief that that will continue.

I do not think it helps in the slightest bit in carrying out that important function to be saying we won't permit it.

We cannot—if everybody in the United Nations says the United States is wrong, then our chance of keeping the United Nations as it is now is not good.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith, your time has expired. The witness will be permitted to conclude his answer to your question.

Senator SMITH. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Had you concluded?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. I might just add that the testimony that Senator Smith was asking about in regard to General Marshall is contained from the bottom of page 4854 onward. I think that is very clear, and there is not any possibility——

Senator SMITH. What page is that?

Secretary ACHESON. You were asking me about the preparation of the instructions.

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON. It is very clear on those pages, and I could not make it any clearer.

Senator SMITH. Would you give me those pages again so that I can check it?

Secretary ACHESON. It begins on the bottom of page 4854.

Senator SMITH. 4854.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

FATE OF FORMOSA

Secretary Acheson, I would like to ask you just a few questions that may seem to be disjointed but they are questions that were drawn up and came to my mind by listening to the testimony here.

Now, like Senator Smith and Senator George, I was very much disturbed by your testimony this morning to Senator George with relation to Formosa, so I asked for the record.

Now, on page 5268 of the record you said, in reply—Senator George said:

> I understand that, and I am now asking about our present policy with regard to Formosa. Is it that it shall not be permitted to fall into unfriendly hands by force or otherwise?
>
> Secretary ACHESON. That is our policy, that we are not going to permit it to be taken by force, and we are going to use all our means to prevent it from falling into unfriendly hands; yes, sir.
>
> Senator GEORGE. Through negotiation?
>
> Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Now, does that mean that if the Communists should make an attack on Formosa, and that we believe the forces of the Nationalist government on Formosa are not sufficient, that, in your opinion, we will put troops onto Formosa?

Secretary ACHESON. That is purely a military question I couldn't possibly answer.

Senator SALTONSTALL. But when you use the words "by force or otherwise," it certainly would imply that it would be your recommendation, as the head of the State Department, that our Government not permit it to be taken by force.

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And that if, in the opinion of the military, the Nationalist troops are not sufficient, that we would go further than that. Do you mean that the State Department would recommend that we go further than that?

Secretary ACHESON. That is what I have said is a military question. I couldn't tell the Military Department how to deploy their forces, and if they didn't have any forces to use for that purpose, or were actively engaged somewhere else, they would have to be the ones to decide that question.

Senator SALTONSTALL. But so far as our policy is concerned, either through negotiation, or if negotiation failed, then by force, is it your opinion that we should not allow Formosa to fall into hostile hands?

Secretary ACHESON. That is what I said; yes, sir.

UNITED STATES CONTINUED SUPPORT OF NATIONALISTS

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, there is another thing that disturbs me, or that isn't clear in my mind. Perhaps it is a follow-up on what Senator Smith just asked you:

I listened very intently to your statement of policy that you gave us on Monday morning, and it certainly was a clear exposition.

Now, there is one part that made me wonder. At the very end you cited General Barr's report upon the weakening, the progressively greater weakness of the Nationalist forces.

You cited also the statement of the Acting President of China, that the people of China really did not want to get together.

Now, under those circumstances, it would seem to be reasonably clear that our Government, at the time, had lost confidence in the Nationalist regime.

Does that mean that between that time when those events occurred and General Marshall came back to this country, and the present time when we are supporting the Nationalist government on the island of Formosa, that the policy of our Government has changed? Or was it in sort of a—not in the clouds—but in doubt as to what it should do during that time? Was the dust settling, or what was the policy?

Do I make myself clear?

Secretary ACHESON. Not very clear, but I think clear enough so that I can answer the question.

I will go ahead and answer, and if I don't answer your question, you ask another.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I think it is a very involved question.

Secretary ACHESON. The situation which you had asked me about, the period when General Barr was talking, and the period after General Marshall came back, is, I think, characterized by the understanding or the belief that the efforts to bring about a unification of China through negotiations had failed.

General Marshall ended the effort to mediate when he came back here in January '47, and became Secretary of State.

It had been the opinion of everybody concerned on our military side that that effort was the only one which offered any hope of a Nationalist control over north China and Manchuria. Therefore, when that effort failed, the conclusion was pretty obvious that there was not going to be a unification of China and control by the Nationalist government over north China and Manchuria.

However, the Nationalist government was attempting to bring that about by force. They were using their armies to do that. It had been, as I say, the view of everybody concerned that they would not be abled to succeed in that operation, because it was beyond their power.

Therefore, the view was that they would fail. The question was: How disastrous would the failure be? Would it be merely that they could not reestablish themselves in north China and Manchuria or would they destroy themselves in the effort to do it?

Now, we were doing everything that we could to not have the latter happen and advise them—our soldiers advised them over and over again to be cautious and not take positions which they could not defend and to conserve their resources, so they could maintain themselves as the Government of China and later on resume negotiations or resume military operations.

But it was the belief that if they pursued this military operation, they would fail, and it might have disastrous consequences for themselves.

They did pursue it, they did fail, it did have disastrous consequences for them, and the Government withdrew to Formosa, where they have a much smaller problem, but a difficult one, of maintaining themselves there against the great forces on the mainland.

It was in connection with the Korean War that this Government made its decision to interpose force to prevent an attack from the mainland on Formosa.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I thank you, sir. You did understand what I was trying to bring out.

In other words, then, the position of our Government has been that it has always been friendly to the Nationalist Government, and it has always tried to advise them. When the Nationalist Government didn't take our advice and unfortunate consequences came about, our

Government didn't withdraw its friendly feeling toward the Nationalists, but did not support them actively until the Korean affair came about. Is that a fair statement?

Secretary ACHESON. I wouldn't say did not support them actively. Did not support them with military force.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Did not support them with military force.

Secretary ACHESON. We have always supported the Nationalist Government and no other government in China, and we always supported them with economic aid and I think all through this time with some military matériel.

The change in policy occurred on the 26th of June 1950, when we decided to interpose the Seventh Fleet to prevent——

Senator SALTONSTALL. Do you consider it a military question as to how much further we go beyond the use of the Seventh Fleet in connection with preventing Formosa from falling by force into the Chinese Communists' hands?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

IMPLICATIONS OF CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, there was another question that was asked you, and your answer left me in some doubt. In reference to the resolution of the United Nations on January 13, 1951—I think that was the date—you stated that we voted in the affirmative on that resolution, which put Formosa and the entrance of the Chinese Communists in the United Nations on the agenda.

The Chinese Communists refused that suggestion and it was ended.

Now, my questions is—Did you know when you voted affirmatively at that time, when Mr. Austin voted affirmatively, did the State Department know how those other nations were to be chosen?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir. They were to be, obviously, chosen by the General Assembly.

Senator SALTONSTALL. By whom?

Secretary ACHESON. The General Assembly.

Senator SALTONSTALL. By the General Assembly; so that we were counting upon our leadership and the force of our personality, so to speak, the personality of our Government in the General Assembly to make certain that those other nations were ones that would vote with us, so to speak?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I felt, just like many others I think, in Congress at that time, that we were taking an awful chance, I was awfully relieved when the resolution was turned down.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I think you also have to have in mind that at the time this was going on we were preparing our resolution and getting support for it, which was to declare China an aggressor.

Now, it was a very important thing in connection with that resolution which we subsequently were able to introduce and have adopted, that we should not close the door to some sort of negotiations, and therefore we voted for this and the other nations were very anxious to try it out, and it was tried out, and it failed; and I think it had a very great effect in bringing the General Assembly overwhelmingly in support of our resolution to declare China an aggressor.

PREVENT AGGRESSION AND RESTORE PEACE

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, Mr. Acheson, may I ask you the same question that I have asked of General Marshall and General Bradley, because I would be interested to see your viewpoint, that is, the point of view of the State Department.

I refer to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report for Senate Committees on Korean Operations, page 94 of that report. That refers to a meeting on February 13, 1951, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and representatives of the Department of State. Now, it says:

> During the course of the discussion it became apparent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Department of State would prefer not to express political objectives with respect to Korea until military capabilities there were established. On the other hand, the consensus of the opinions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was that a political decision was required before there could be suitable determination of military courses of action.

Then again, on page 99, paragraph 38, I quote this one sentence:

> It appeared to be generally agreed that at some future meeting an agreement should be reached on the objectives in Korea. It was suggested that the Secretary of State talk to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If this question was not settled before the next meeting, the question would be discussed at the Joint Chiefs of Staff-State Department meeting on that date.

In other words, on February 13 and again on March 15, 1951, there did not seem to be any determination of what our policy in Korea was to be. What is your answer to that?

Secretary ACHESON. I think there was understanding about the policy; but there was a difficulty in determining exactly what the directive as to operations should be. And in paragraph 22 you will see that there was a report there that some of the nations associated with us did not think that there should be military decisions to advance beyond the thirty-eighth parallel until the political decision to do so had been taken by the United Nations, particularly by the nations contributing forces.

Mr. Bevin thought that major penetration should be avoided. And then it goes on to report what you have read, and the discussion in regard to what should be the military operation—how far north of the parallel you should go, what we should be trying to do north of the parallel, involved both the question of military capability—could you go north, and how far north could you go, and also the question of what was the wise political objective in the light of the military capability. We discussed that for some time and later on it has been resolved, I think the operations which are now being carried out indicate what the decision was.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So from the—excuse me. Are you through?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So from the point of view of the Department of State the policy was to prevent aggression and to restore peace in Korea, as you have expressed it here a number of times?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And was that the policy of the State Department on those dates, but at that time there was still doubt as to the military capabilities of how to accomplish it?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So at that time there was a question as to whether to go beyond the thirty-eighth parallel or to stop at the thirty-eighth parallel, or even to go as far as the Yalu River; is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I don't think that anyone was considering going to the Yalu River because that was a pretty difficult thing to do, and has been. But there was some question as to how far it was wise from a military and political point of view to get north.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, may I ask you just this question, which I do not think has been brought out at all but which I believe may be of some value to get your opinion.

Secretary ACHESON. [Deleted.]

DIRECTIVE FOR MARSHALL'S MISSION

Senator SALTONSTALL. Well, just one other question, and I think this is again following up really what Senator Smith asked you. I came away with a feeling that there was a discrepancy between your testimony and that of General Marshall on the drawing up of his instructions on his trip to China. I have been trying to find his testimony, but I have not been able to do it.

I had the feeling that so far as the Marshall directive was concerned that he testified to us that he had nothing to do with the drafting of that directive. He further testified when the question of confirming him as Secretary of Defense, that he was sent a directive or took up a directive just as he left for China and had nothing to do with its drafting at all. I had a feeling that you testified that he did go over that. I was just interested to know if you felt there was a discrepancy between your testimony.

Secretary ACHESON. I don't think there is a discrepancy, sir. I think that in this matter General Marshall was more general than I was.

Senator WILEY. A little louder.

Secretary ACHESON. General Marshall spoke in more general terms than I did. I was somewhat more specific. I believe that he said that he was occupied with the Pearl Harbor hearings, which was the case. He said that several people had a hand in the instructions, which was quite correct.

What I tried to lay out on the pages of the record which I have cited is just the way it happened.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you, sir. I have no other questions.

Senator WILEY. May I ask what was that last statement? We couldn't hear.

Chairman RUSSELL. The reporter will read back the Secretary's last statement.

(The reporter read back Secretary Acheson's last statement.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Green?

Senator GREEN. No questions at present.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper.

CONSIDERATIONS DURING YALTA CONFERENCE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, I am still interested in the question of the concessions made at Walta allegedly to induce the Russians to come into the war after the Germans had surrendered?

Secretary ACHESON. Did you say come in after the Japanese had surrendered?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. After the Germans surrendered. I meant to say Germans, if I didn't say it.

I believe you said that a frontal attack on Japan by either amphibious or by land troops was the plan if necessary, and that would be a very costly and bloody operation if we had to invade Japan with ground troops. I understood that correctly, didn't I?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; that was the military view at that time.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And in February of 1945, at the time of the Yalta Conference, I believe you said one of the reasons was that the atomic bomb had not been proved. We knew we were working on it, but that it had not been proved yet, and there was no certainty that it would be available.

Do you think that had we known at the time of the Yalta Conference that we were going to be able to use the atomic bomb on Japan in August of 1945, it would have changed the attitude toward the concessions to Russia and bringing them into the war against Japan?

Secretary ACHESON. I think it might have, Senator Hickenlooper. I can't possibly really estimate that because nobody knew what the effect of this thing was going to be.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I understand the difficulty.

Secretary ACHESON. A more important effect of the bomb, as Secretary Marshall and Secretary Stimson have testified, was that these two operations completely broke the will of the Japanese everywhere to resist so that you had surrenders which could be brought about of all the troops everywhere.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That was one element of consideration at that time, but I want to go on to another one or two. At the time of the Yalta Conference, which was in February of 1945, wasn't it a practical certainty that Germany was defeated?

She had not yet surrendered, but the Battle of the Bulge was over, we were up to the Rhine, and it was only a question of being able to supply our troops and move on. We were certain at that time that the surrender of Germany would be accomplished that summer, were we not?

I mean as certain as you can be in the future prediction of a military operation.

Secretary ACHESON. I believe that this is correct. I can't quite put myself back in that particular date and remember how it was. The fighting was pretty tough still and I don't think anyone knew how long——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand——

Chairman RUSSELL. Let the witness finish his answer.

Secretary ACHESON. But I understand it was clear that we were going to win the war with Germany.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. At the time of Yalta, was it not pretty well understood that our Navy had then acquired complete command of the Pacific and the seas surrounding Japan in that area, and that we had sunk practically all of the Japanese shipping, that is, the overwhelming percentage of their transport bottoms, through submarine action, air action, naval action, and other action?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir; we had been very successful in naval operations.

Senator Hickenlooper. Well now, if we had been certain at Yalta that the question of German surrender was only a matter of time, arduous though the succeeding fighting days might be, and if our leaders were aware at Yalta, in February 1945, that Japan was at that time dying on the vine, figuratively speaking, that her sources of getting imports into Japan had been cut off, that our air was increasing in such power in that area that we could, by air power and conventional bombing alone, as a matter of fact, destroy most of her installations in Japan and create chaos, if those circumstances were known, and especially had we know of the certainty of the atomic bomb, don't you think that the reasons for the concessions to Russia at Yalta might have dissipated themselves considerably?

Secretary Acheson. Well, I think if the situation had been wholly different it would have been wholly different; and the reasons which were very important at the time would not have existed. I cannot possibly imagine what would have happened with a whole variety of rather vague facts which did not occur.

Senator Hickenlooper. Well, I want to read you something from Admiral Leahy's book on the matter of the Yalta arrangements. On page 318 of his book, I was There, he says, and I quote:

> I personally, as the reader well knows by now, did not feel that Russian participation in the Japanese war was necessary.

He is speaking about the time at Yalta. I continue the quote:

> The Army did. Roosevelt sided with the Army.

In answer to my questions a moment ago you said if all kinds of conditions and circumstances were different in the many fields all different kinds of results would have occurred.

I was trying, at least attempting, to rationalize this situation with three specific conditions: One, the practical certainty that Germany would capitulate in a very short time. Success was as inevitable as any prophecy of success in armed conflict of that kind could be. We knew that Germany was staggering and on her last legs. That is one.

We knew that we had command of the seas and that we had sunk practically all of the Japanese shipping. We knew that we could bomb Japan with conventional bombing at any time we wanted to, and create great devastation on her population, and that by control of the sea we could prevent her from having access to foodstuffs and materials for her population in Japan.

I was posing those conditions, attempting to rationalize the situation, with the idea that those conditions should have eliminated or lessened the pressure or the desirability for making concessions to Russia in order to get her to come into the Japanese war. Do you agree or——

Secretary Acheson. No, I don't agree, sir. I don't believe that it is possible to consider human decisions in the abstract way in which you are now trying to do it.

It was not—these facts were not certain facts. These situations are not like checkers on a checkerboard, which you can move this way or that way and say, "Well, I would have played it a different way if this counter had been in a different square."

Nobody has that degree of certainty. No one knew how long the war with Germany was going on. The Germans were still very powerful and still fighting.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON. They might have lasted a long time. The Japanese still had a lot of sting in them from a naval point of view, and it was not at all impossible to have taken troops across that narrow bit of water on the inside coast.

My own son was out there in the Navy at the time of Yalta, believing they could take an awful lot of chances.

The ability to bring about all sorts of results in Japan by conventional bombing has already been considered and testified to and General Marshall and others have pointed out that you could not believe that by conventional bombing you could prevent a desperate resistance on the home islands of Japan by very powerful forces.

All those facts existed, and I don't think that it is possible to say how a human mind would have operated if you changed some of those facts, because if you changed those, then other facts would have been in existence, which you don't bring into the picture.

I just don't think it is very useful or helpful to try and speculate in this way. All of the considerations that you have mentioned were in the minds of people who made this decision.

CONCESSIONS AT YALTA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I realize there was no certainty about any of these matters, but it appears to me that that may be the same type of argument as to say there is no certainty about you or me ever dying because we haven't died yet.

But, I am submitting from a military standpoint, that the certainty of our power and our ability was at least very much accepted by everyone at that time, and that we could bring Japan to her knees, very probably without an armed invasion, by the use of air power and the further strangulation of her sea avenues.

Therefore the concessions which we made to Russia, in order to get Russia into a war where Russia was not actually needed for victory, seemed indeed to be gratuitous, in the light of history, and in the light of the facts that were known at that time.

Are you aware that General Arnold went to Yalta with the program for the saturation bombing of Japan and the proof of our ability to do it with conventional bombing?

Secretary ACHESON. I am aware that General Arnold was there.

When you talk about the proof, that is another matter.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, we are relying greatly, today, upon what we consider the proof of our ability to destroy the heartland of a potential enemy, through air and other means; and we think that we can do it, and are relying heavily upon that proof; and it is proof, wanting only the actual physical carrying out of that operation and I submit that the proof, short of the actual physical operation, was in existence.

Are you aware that the Navy, at that time, was thoroughly convinced that it could completely hold a 100 percent blockade of the Japanese home islands in February 1945; that they could make it completely effective, and block the Japanese home islands off from access to the mainland of China, or any other source for raw materials and foodstuffs?

I say that the Navy was of that opinion.

My question is: Are you aware that the Navy was of that opinion in January 1945?

Secretary ACHESON. I am aware of the fact that we were able to cut off regular trade, yes; and that had a very profound effect.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I say, Mr. Secretary, it has just been called to my attention, which I believe I have been informed of, but it slipped my mind, that General Arnold in person did not attend at Yalta; he had planned to attend, as I understand it, became ill, and sent a representative there. There might be some confusion about that.

If you will excuse me just a moment here.

I want to call your attention to the fact that President Roosevelt, according to Admiral Leahy, in his book, on page 307, says as follows, with reference to the Japanese phase of the war. This was at Yalta when this was said, according to Admiral Leahy:

> Roosevelt said that with the fall of Manila, the war in the Pacific was entering into a new phase and that we hoped to establish bases on the Bonins and on the islands near Formosa. He said the time had come to make plans for the additional bombing of Japan. He hoped that it would not be necessary actually to invade the Japanese Islands, and he would do so only if absolutely necessary.

Now, will you say, Mr. Secretary, that if we had known that we were going to have an atomic bomb, if we had known that Germany was going to surrender within a comparatively short time, and if we had known that we could strangle the Japanese Islands through Navy blockade and through bombing by the Air Corps, with conventional bombs in addition to any atomic weapons, had we known that at the time of Yalta, would the concessions made to the Russians at Yalta be gratuitous indeed and without reasonable consideration or quid pro quo to us?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I think you would have had a wholly different situation, Senator. If what you are asking me is, if it had been absolutely clear so that you knew the Russians did not have to be brought into the war, then you would not make arrangements to bring them into the war.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON. I think if your hypothesis is right, then I think your conclusion probably is right.

WITH WHOM CAN WE NEGOTIATE IN KOREA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Well, now, Mr. Secretary, I would like to get to the matter of negotiations either with the North Chinese Reds or in connection with the Japenese Peace Treaty, first, with the North Korean Reds. With whom will be negotiate in connection with any cessation of hostilities against the North Koreans or the Chinese Reds, either for an armistice or for any final settlement?

Now I want to make clear what I am trying to get at. Will we negotiate with Mao Tse Tung or his field army authorities, as the field army authorities of an unauthorized government, or will we deal with political officials as well as army officials of North China of the so-called Peoples Republic of China?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I think the only thing that can throw light on that is what has been done in the past, and you know, of course, that the group set up by the United Nations—the Good Office Committee—have attempted to get negotiations started.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you mean with the Communist authorities in Peking, that is, the political authorities of the People's Government of China, or whatever the official name is?

Secretary ACHESON. That is the governmental authorities. The UN has made attempts to get in contact with them. The Government of the United States directed General MacArthur in October, I think it was, 1950, to make pronouncements directed toward the commanding general of the North Korean forces.

There are two instances, where in one case an attempt was made to get a communication to the commanding officer in the field and in the other case an attempt has been made by the UN to get in touch with the governmental authorities in control of the forces.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, regarding the UN proposal which we joined in and approved, calling for a cease fire, speaking of the governmental representatives including the four or five which you named this morning, that included the People's Republic of China, did it not?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That they would sit down——

Secretary ACHESON. That was one of the five principles. The fifth principle was that after the fighting stopped, then outstanding questions in the Pacific including these two would be talked about in a group which included the four named countries.

RECOGNIZING A CHINESE GOVERNMENT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes. Now, Mr. Secretary, this bothers me, and I think it is an extremely pertinent matter. Did not that offer of the UN to which we ascribed and consented and joined in, did not that in fact recognize the existence of the People's Republic of China as a political government whether de facto or de jure making little difference. It constituted a recognition of that Government, in my opinion.

Secretary ACHESON. Recognition by whom, Senator?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. By us in joining in that document, which invited the People's Government of China to sit down around the table to negotiate the question of peace and settlement.

Secretary ACHESON. I do not think it did in any respect.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand that our State Department did not formally document any recognition of any kind of a government, but I am talking about the matter as it resulted in fact. It appears to me to have been a recognition of the People's Government of China.

Now, I believe—I have not been able to document this fully as yet, but it runs in my mind that in the Civil War between the North and South that the Union on the theory that the action of the Confederacy was an unauthorized and unrecognized government refused to deal or negotiate with the government as such at the time of the close of the Civil War but instead meticulously dealt with the field commanders, the commanders in the field, simply as armies in the field and without the official recognition of an authorized or existing government.

Now, that is what I am trying to get at in this China situation. Are we apt to get ourselves into a position where we have step by step in spite of our declarations recognized the existence in one status or another of a government in North China dominated and controlled by a government of the Red Chinese?

Secretary ACHESON. I do not think so, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you think that we can deal on an official basis or negotiate on an official basis with the British Government sitting here, with the Russian Government sitting here, with the American Government sitting here, and with such other governments as may officially send their representatives around, and with a recognized political official of the so-called People's Government of China, without by that act in fact recognizing the existence of an actual recognizable government of the Communist Chinese?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I think you are using a phrase in a very confusing way, Senator Hickenlooper. When you talk about recognizing a government, that means that a government accepts an authority some way in another country as the official government of that country with whom it will conduct diplomatic relations.

When you are talking about dealing with this authority in China for the purpose of bringing the war in Korea to an end, what you are really saying is that we know that those authorities exist and we will deal with them for the purpose of bringing about a conclusion in which we are very much interested. Now those are wholly different things.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Indeed, but we propose to go further and deal on a basis of future continuing and forcible settlements, and that would require the strength and power of a recognized government entity in my judgment, and in that way we would in fact, leaving out the technicalities of recognition, that would in fact be a recognition of the Red Government of China, which would force us into a most difficult position if our policy is to be followed as we understand it to be now.

Secretary ACHESON. I don't agree with that, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Why was not the Nationalist Government, the Republic of China, why was it not included in those nations that were to sit down and discuss the cessation of hostilities there?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't know that, sir. We didn't write the resolution. Our only decision was as to whether we were going to vote for it or against it. It undoubtedly would have been a matter insisted upon by us that the Nationalist Government should be included.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But did we insist on the Nationalist Government being included?

Secretary ACHESON. We never got to that point. The resolution was adopted, it was sent to the Chinese and rejected.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand, but do you mean to say they just put a resolution under our nose and we signed it without having participated in the provisions of the resolution?

Secretary ACHESON. We didn't sign it at all, sir. The question was brought up in the committee as to whether you would vote for this resolution or whether you would vote against it. We voted for it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, the word "signing" has a general connotation of approving. Whether we actually took pen in hand

and wrote the necessary signatures on a piece of paper is somewhat beside the point. I am talking about our approval of the matter.

Did the chairman say my time is up?

Chairman RUSSELL. You have 1 minute. I have just been notified you have 1 minute.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There is a hearing in the library and I have been unable to get it over here by now, but I understand that this is in the hearing of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Eighty-first Congress, in connection with the investigation of the Chinese Communist activities.

General Mao is quoted as saying that:

> The war between China and Japan is an excellent opportunity for the development of our part. Our determined policy is 70 percent self-development, 20 percent compromise, and 10 percent fight the Japanese.

Now, I would like later, when my next turn comes, to take up that matter as to whether or not the Chinese Communists contributed anything in a material way—that is, anything substantial in a material way as compared to the Nationalist Government of China in the fighting of the Japanese war and in joining with us as allies of the other nations in the struggle against the Axis Powers.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you desire to comment on that statement?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir. The Senator said he wanted to examine me about it later.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Johnson.

Senator JOHNSON. No questions at this time.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Kefauver.

ARRANGING SEQUENCE OF INTERROGATION

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Secretary, I know the hour is late and I hate to bother you with any questions this time of day.

Senator McMAHON. Pardon me. Mr. Chairman, what time do you intend to stop?

Chairman RUSSELL. Around 5 o'clock, Senator. If Senator Kefauver uses all of his time, I will probably recess the committees after he concludes. If he doesn't, we will recess after the conclusion of the questions by next Senator in order, who is the Senator from Connecticut.

Senator McMAHON. Thank you.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I have just a procedural matter. As the Chair knows, I think with the exception of the chairman himself, and one or two other members, I have regularly attended these sessions, I don't think I have missed more than a few minutes of any of them.

I am required to go to California for 2 days. I would not want to be in the position of requesting that the Secretary come back for some questions that I had hoped to be able to ask him.

I don't think I would take more than 30 minutes and possibly a good deal shorter. I would appreciate it very much if it could be worked out without inconvenience to the Secretary to be able to propound some questions to him.

I admit the situation may be a little irregular, but due to the circumstances being such as they are, if that courtesy could be extended to me, I would personally appreciate it very much.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chair is perfectly willing to stay here if the Secretary is.

Senator MCMAHON In view of Senator Knowland's engagement, I would gladly waive my place to him, with the consent of the chairman and the committee.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I would suggest this, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. It would have to be done by unanimous consent, because the Senator from Iowa made a motion when we were arranging the agenda for this hearing that you could concede your time to another Senator, and that motion was defeated.

Of course, with unanimous consent, if there is no objection, after the Senator from Tennessee has concluded his questioning, the Senator from California—I am happy to bear testimony to the diligence with which he has attended these hearings—will be permitted to question the Secretary of State.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that the Senator from Connecticut not be required to give up his time; but that he might be able——

Chairman RUSSELL. I stated that he could not do so. I asked if there was unanimous consent. In view of the motion that was made in the committee by the Senator from Iowa, I propounded it as a unanimous-consent request, and that is what the Chair has done.

Senator LODGE. Just to reserve the right to object—I shall not object—do I understand that if the Senator from California has his period now that tomorrow we will begin with Senator McMahon and then go on down the list?

Chairman RUSSELL. I think, in view of the generous attitude of the Senator from Connecticut that he would certainly be entitled to be the first Senator to examine the witness tomorrow morning, and it would be my intention, if the unanimous-consent request is agreed to, to have Senator Knowland follow Senator Kefauver; then recess the committee until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock, at which time the Senator from Connecticut, if he is present, will be called by the Chair to question the witness.

Senator LODGE. And then after him we will go down the line?

Chairman RUSSELL. Of course, we will follow the ordinary procedure.

Senator LODGE. We would not go gack to the Senators who have been absent today——

Chairman RUSSELL. Oh, no.

Senator LODGE. And may be back tomorrow?

Chairman RUSSELL. We have never done that. It never has been done. I keep a very careful chart here. The Senator might not understand it, but I do.

Senator LODGE. There are many things that the Senator from Georgia understands that I do not understand.

Chairman RUSSELL. I keep a very careful chart of how the Senators are questioning, and I do not think I have made an error yet in it. I may have. It would be my intention to call the Senator from Connecticut in the morning and then call the Senator from California; if he is absent, of course, his place will be taken by the Senator from

Wyoming, and then the Senator from Massachusetts, Mr. Lodge, would be recognized.

Senator LODGE. Thank you very much.

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Chairman, before the unanimous-consent request is put, if the chairman and members of the committee want to recess at 5 o'clock, and if the Secretary is tired, as I know he probably is, I would be glad to stand in the place of the Senator from Connecticut, Mr. McMahon, on the unanimous-consent request. But if the idea was to go on until 5:30, why, I will get my questions in.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think that we might proceed here, Senator Kefauver. If the Senator wishes to propound a unanimous-consent request, I shall be happy to submit it.

Senator KEFAUVER. I only brought that up in case everybody was tired, and wanted to leave early at 5 o'clock.

Chairman RUSSELL. What are your wishes?

Secretary ACHESON. I am perfectly willing to stay.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Secretary of State says he has no objection to proceeding as outlined. We have already spent about 6 to 7 minutes time in straightening it out, so I suggest that the Senator from Tennessee proceed.

KEEPING INFORMED

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Secretary, I have a feeling that your statement on the China policy and the statements of other witnesses at this hearing have been very helpful to the Members of the Congress and to the public, and particularly to the members of this committee who have been privileged to be here and hear the testimony.

I feel that this information has certainly more value than it might be to the enemy in the leaks that they might have gotten from it, and I think that it shows a way in which Congress—or an indication of the way in which Congress might be kept more currently informed, and the people better informed, for the purpose of making them the judges of public opinion as to the fixing of policy.

As you know, Mr. Secretary, beginning about 1941, and until the time I got to the Senate in '49, I proposed a plan in the House for a report-and-questioning period to enable the committees to invite Cabinet ministers and top administrative men to appear and give reports and to answer questions, under rules that related to them, feeling that that would keep us all in better touch with one another, and that much value came from face-to-face meetings.

While the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has had the advantage of frequent reports, the Armed Services Committee has not had such a great advantage, and Members of the House and Senate generally have not been kept currently informed by meetings of this kind.

This has nothing to do immediately with the problems involved here, but I wonder if you could state briefly your feeling as to whether or not a procedure of that kind might not be helpful to the administration, to the Congress, and to the public generally?

Secretary ACHESON. I think, Senator Kefauver, that I was examined about that at the time of the LaFollette-Monroney Committee, which was working on the Reorganization Act, and I took a sympathetic attiude toward the proposal.

I see many difficulties that would have to be surmounted.

I recall that ex-Secretary Stimson was very much in favor of that, and I was greatly influenced by his opinion.

Senator **Kefauver**. It would be of interest to know that every member of the Cabinet, except one, was in favor of it.

Mr. Secretary, I was very much impressed with your statement a few days ago, on page 4534 of the record, in which you stated, paraphrasing, that the American people, and their allies, have the will to work together when their freedom is affected, and that if we can pool our resources and enter into joint action, that we have a good chance of winning any conflict and of keeping the peace of the world, which I thought was a very splendid statement.

WORKING EFFICIENCY OF THE UN

In the conflict in Korea, the United States has been selected as the agent to carry out the activities of the nations associated with us. Of course, in Europe we have a council of 12, in which, I believe, foreign ministers have been consolidated with the military advisory council.

But what worries me, Mr. Secretary, is in the making of these plans for joint action, and determining what joint action should be taken, in the conclusion of peace arrangements, such as Senator Hickenlooper was talking about, in the necessity of having better staff work, military staff work among the nations involved with us, that we do not have a satisfactory way of carrying that program on. The United Nations cannot be satisfactory in this instance because one of the major nations is on the other side, and if the conflict were enlarged, I should think that the delegation of the United States as an agent might lead to difficulty.

In Europe we have a 12-headed council in which the delegate from Iceland theoretically at least has the same voice as the delegate from the United States—12 bosses for General Eisenhower.

Do you not think it is time, Mr. Secretary, we explore more seriously some method of trying to get better political government or direction and better joint staff work back of these joint moves that we make with other free peoples, if we are going to be able to successfully carry out the high purposes that you stated in your original statement?

Secretary **Acheson**. We are constantly working on that, Senator Kefauver, and I think have brought about very considerable improvements in all the machinery, and we shall continue to work earnestly at it.

Senator **Kefauver**. Well, do you not think that it is time that the nations involved, at least in the Atlantic Pact, meet to see what definite steps toward a better working arrangement could be arrived at?

Secretary **Acheson**. Well, the proposal which I think you have in mind is one on which the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee addressed a letter to me some time ago, and I subscribe to that.

Senator **Kefauver**. I was very happy to note that your letter this year was not—well, is more friendly toward the idea than your letter of last year, which I think shows that we all improve as we go along, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary **Acheson**. I am glad to have your commendation, Senator.

Senator **Kefauver**. But in any event that is one of the paramount problems that we have in view of the fact that the democracies do have the great preponderance of power under our free enterprise system, can carry on a conflict more successfully because we have more to look forward to. But our difficulty has been finding arrangements to work together. Is that not true, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary **Acheson**. There are some difficulties in having a large number of nations working together, but those difficulties have to be surmounted, and I think we are doing pretty well.

GENERAL LI TSUNG-JEN'S LETTER

Senator **Kefauver**. Mr. Secretary, on June 4, at page 4881 of the testimony, a question was asked by Senator Johnson and myself too, and you read from either a letter or a part of a letter from General Li Tsung-jen of May 5, 1949, in which he says in part that in spite of the help that has been given by the United States that the Nationalist Government of China has not made judicial use of it, et cetera.

Is that all of the letter of the Acting President Li Tsung-jen?

Secretary **Acheson**. I think I was asked about that yesterday and said that I would undertake to find out. I have not been able to do that yet. However, I shall do it.

Senator **Kefauver**. And, Mr. Chairman, can the letter be filed as an exhibit to the testimony?

Chairman **Russell**. It can be. I think I suggested to the Secretary yesterday that the committee would probably desire to have that entire letter.

Secretary **Acheson**. And I said I would undertake to look into that. I do not know of anything that President Truman would object to having made public—but I have not seen it all.

FEASIBILITY OF RELYING ON COMMUNIST AGREEMENTS

Senator **Kefauver**. Now, Mr. Secretary, what worries me about the situation in Korea, aside from not knowing how the conflict is going to be brought to a conclusion, is that matter of whether we can place any reliance upon any peace treaty that might be made with the Chinese Communist Government.

You stated in your opening statement and I think we are all agreed that a great deal of reliance cannot be put upon the present leadership there. So then, if we make an agreement with them, what assurance can we have that the agreement will be carried out?

Secretary **Acheson**. Well, I think I said in answer to earlier questions on the same subject, Senator Kefauver, that an agreement to have value is one which really has to reflect certain existing facts. Those facts, if they are of the nature which make for keeping of an agreement, will be an important factor on its being kept.

Therefore, if the situation growing out of this fighting is that the Chinese Communists have learned that they cannot carry out their purpose of driving us out of Korea, and that they suffer very heavily in attempting to keep it up, that they recognize that the purpose has to be dropped and find a solution which they are willing to keep—that is the real basis on which we can expect to have success.

Senator KEFAUVER. Well, I suppose what you and I and all of us have in mind, and what the State Department has in mind is being sure that when a settlement is reached that it is one that we can place reliance upon. Is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. As much as you can—as much reliance as you can have in this situation.

Senator KEFAUVER. Well, is that matter not being discussed between you and the ministries of state of other countries as to what guaranties or what must be done to see that the agreement is kept that is arrived at?

Secretary ACHESON. That is a very important matter which has been discussed within this Government and also with others, yes, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. And it is not contemplated that any cease-fire or any agreement reached would tend to involve the matter of recognition of the Peking regime; is that the way I understood your testimony, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

INTERPRETING WEDEMEYER REPORT

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Secretary, I feel that during the time of this hearing that questions that are brought up, even though they may not be in the committee room, that you should have an opportunity of stating your position and your answer to them.

Yesterday after the committee hearing, Senator Brewster made a speech on the floor of the Senate which you undoubtedly saw, that he challenged your statement that General Wedemeyer did not recommend military aid to Nationalist China, but you said:

> Although his actual recommendations do not call for military aid, it is possible to read that in it.

Senator Brewster stated, according to the quotation from the Star—and I have checked the record and it is true—quoting:

> More bare-faced distortion I have never read.

In fairness to you—and I notified Senator Brewster and he is here—do you wish to make any comment about that matter?

Secretary ACHESON. I think that my statement was clear and fair and accurate, and I do not think that Senator Brewster's characterization of it was correct.

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Secretary, in the China white paper at page 774 in the Wedemeyer recommendations I do find here one of the recommendations is:

> That China inform the United Nations promptly of her request to the United States of increased material and advisory assistance.
>
> That China accept American advisers as responsible representatives of the United States Government in specified military and economic fields to assist China in utilizing United States aid in the manner for which it is intended.

That does not appear to be a direct recommendation that the United States military material be furnished, but that it have an advisory commission to direct the use of such material as may be given or as may be there. Is that what you meant, that military assistance might be read into the recommendation?

Secretary **Acheson**. Yes, sir; I think I said that if you went through the report, it was clear that he thought that military assistance was a desirable thing. I pointed out that in the conclusions this was not referred to. To back my words I have here:

> General Wedemeyer went to China and returned. He made recommendations, which are printed in the white paper, in which he recommended assistance of economic and military equipment for a 5-year period, which would require congressional authorization. Although his actual recommendations do not call for a grant of military aid, it is possible to read that in. He does talk about the desirability of that.

Senator **Kefauver**. Now the first part of your statement is almost a restatement of the Wedemeyer report on page 260 of the white paper as I read it:

> The Wedemeyer report recommended in general that the United States provide military and economic aid to China under a program of assistance over a period of at least 5 years requiring congressional authorization.

But then the actual recommendations were as I read them rather vague on the subject, but you say you could read it into the recommendations.

Secretary **Acheson**. Yes, sir; that is what I said.

Senator **Brewster**. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Brewster. Do you yield, Senator Kefauver?

Senator **Kefauver**. Yes, since I mentioned Senator Brewster's name.

Senator **Brewster**. I would simply like to ask the consent of the committee that what I said on this subject on the Senate floor yesterday should be incorporated in the appendix of our record so that the people may be able to pass for themselves on the issue of whether the Secretary or I were warranted in our conclusions.

Chairman **Russell**. Is there any objection to including Senator Brewster's speech upon the floor yesterday in the appendix of the record?

Senator **Kefauver**. Mr. Chairman, I notice the speech, the first page of it deals with this subject. I wondered if the Senator—the rest of it seems to be about other matters.

Senator **Brewster**. I think it all bears on the question of whether the Secretary was guilty of an obvious distortion. It is on page 6297 of the Record and runs through to page 6302, and it seems to me there were a great deal of items there bearing on the fact of whether the Secretary was accurate.

Chairman **Russell**. Is there objection? The Chair hears none. Senator Brewster's speech upon the floor of the Senate on yesterday will be incorporated in the appendix.

(The document referred to above will be found in the appendix of the record.)

BARR REPORT

Senator **Kefauver**. Mr. Secretary, the other day I suggested that General Barr's complete report be made available to the committee. Has that been presented?

Secretary **Acheson**. We are taking steps to get it from the Defense Department.

Senator KEFAUVER. On page 4877 of the record it was stated that General Barr said that no battles were lost because of lack of ammunition that was furnished to the Chinese Nationalist Government. Can you elaborate on that any, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir, I can't. I have talked about it. This is his report, and I would like that to speak for itself.

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Chairman, can the report be made an exhibit to the record?

Chairman RUSSELL. It can if we can get possession of it. The Secretary, I understand, is negotiating with the Defense Establishment to secure a copy of the Barr report.

I wasn't clear in my own mind as to whether the reference made by the Secretary referred to some formal report or the testimony he gave before the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Senator McMAHON. Mr. Chairman, I shall read that significant portion of General Barr's testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee into the record in the course of my examination of the Secretary of State tomorrow morning.

Chairman RUSSELL. If the report is furnished and does not bear classification, it will be printed in the appendix of the record. If it does bear classification, then the committee will have to decide what disposition to give the document under our procedure heretofore adopted.

CABLE SENT BY MAC ARTHUR, SPRUANCE, AND WEDEMEYER

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Secretary, I also wanted to ask—on page 4924 of your testimony in this record certain quotations are given from the report of General Hurley, which in turn have been taken from page 86 of the white paper.

Is that a complete report? Does the white paper contain his complete report?

Secretary ACHESON. Not at that page. I will have to look it up. A lot of his reports are printed in the annex to the white paper.

Do you want me to look it up now?

Senator KEFAUVER. No, I don't want you to look it up. Please do that and advise me.

As I understand, Mr. Secretary, General Hurley and the others who were in China during the time when some negotiation, consultation or negotiation was going on between the Nationalists and the Chinese Government, did they all arrive at substantially the same——

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator meant the Chinese Communists.

Senator KEFAUVER. I meant Chinese Communists. Did they all arrive at substantially the same conclusions and recommendations as to the course that should be taken to try to conciliate the differences between the Communists and the Nationalists?

That is, General Hurley and Chiang Kai-shek and General Marshall, who went over shortly afterward.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I think that there was pretty complete unanimity of view on that. This matter was discussed back and forth across the Pacific quite a good deal, at the time when we were working out the general policies as to whether we should help with the elimination of the Japanese from China; that is, all this water lift took them back, and the air lift which took the Nationalist troops up there in their places—there was considerable discussion with the military authorities in China.

The general program of asistance was worked out, and on the 7th of December 1945, when there had been some consultation back and forth with General MacArthur and Admiral Spruance and General Wedemeyer as to the capability of our forces to do these various things, these three military commanders, General MacArthur, Admiral Spruance, and Geneal Wedemeyer, sent a cable back showing what they could do, and they end up by saying:

> It is suggested that the United States assistance to China, as outlined above, be made available as a basis for negotiation by the American Ambassador to bring together and effect a compromise between the major opposing groups in order to promote a united democratic China.

That was in a cable of December 7, 1945, which although it is marked "top secret" also says, "Cryptographic security does not apply."

Senator KEFAUVER. The point I want to make—another point I wish to make——

Secretary ACHESON. This was sent from MacArthur, Spruance, and Wedemeyer.

Senator KEFAUVER. So then—it was sent by whom?

Secretary ACHESON. General MacArthur, Admiral Spruance, and General Wedemeyer.

Senator KEFAUVER. Then they were all in agreement on what should be done?

Secretary ACHESON. That is—I just read you what they said, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. Then that policy was the policy which General Marshall was sent to try to effectuate—to try to effectuate such policy, with such other recommendations as were written in his orders, is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH CHINESE COMMUNISTS

Senator KEFAUVER. One matter I would like to make clear also is this, Mr. Secretary: It is frequently stated in this country that the United States tried to push the Chinese Communists into the Nationalist regime, the inference being that this was against the will of Chiang Kai-shek; that this was originated by the United States Government, and was the recommendation of this country.

Is it not true that Chiang had negotiations on with the Chinese Communists long before we entered the picture?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. The policy of dealing with the Communist situation in China as a political problem was announced by him in 1937 and negotiations were continued sporadically until 1944, and then intensely until the agreements were reached between the two factions on October 11, 1945, and in January and February 1946.

Senator KEFAUVER. When was the first representative of the United States in China who had anything to do with these negotiations?

Secretary ACHESON. Throughout the war, General Stillwell and a little later General Wedemeyer, were trying to bring them together for the purposes of carrying on the war.

Vice President Wallace, as I have already testified, spoke to Chiang Kai-shek in the spring of 1944. General Hurley undertook to mediate, and did successfully mediate, in 1945; in the fall of 1944 and 1945.

Senator **Kefauver**. Were these mediators who were brought to China to try to help with the problem, were they requested by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek?

Secretary **Acheson**. Well, the presence of the generals was, of course, requested by him; but not for this specific purpose.

Vice President Wallace, in talking with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, as I said in the earlier part of my testimony, received from him the statement that he, Chiang Kai-shek, would appreciate American assistance in bringing about some understanding with the Communists, and would not regard it as meddling in the internal affairs of China.

Senator **Kefauver**. Then, was General Marshall's visit, and were his efforts with the approval and upon the request of Chiang Kai-shek?

Secretary **Acheson**. I don't know that General Marshall's mission was at the request of the generalissimo, but his efforts in China were with the approval of Chiang Kai-shek.

Senator **Kefauver**. It was in furtherance of a general plan to which Chiang has agreed, is that correct?

Secretary **Acheson**. A plan which he, I think, had originated.

CONDITIONS ON FORMOSA SINCE 1949

Senator **Kefauver**. Mr. Secretary, I get the impression that since the Nationalist Government has been forced to go to the island of Formossa, that it has gone through a substantial reorganization, and has been democratized considerably; and that it is doing, generally, a better job; and that the people still under the jurisdiction of the Nationalist Government are better satisfied, and have a greater desire to stand for it and try to do something about getting back into control of China, all China.

Do you have any information—I know you have information, but can you tell us what your information is on that subject?

Secretary **Acheson**. I think the conditions on Formosa have improved since—sometimes in 1949; I think they have improved and they have gotten better and I think the administration is better.

Chairman **Russell**. The time of the Senator from Tennessee has expired.

Senator **Kefauver**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

USE OF VETO

Chairman **Russell**. Under the unanimous consent agreement granted a few moments ago the Chair recognizes the Senator from California, Senator Knowland.

Senator **Knowland**. Mr. Secretary, first taking up the point raised I think yesterday relative to the rights of the People's Republic of China as possible successor of the Republic of China in the United Nations, whereby there would be a change in the administration rather than the admission of an entirely new government, I understood you to say that because there was a change in representation of the same country, rather than it being a new country coming in that you felt that under those circumstances it was highly doubtful that the veto could be used. Is that substantially correct?

Secretary ACHESON. I do not think we talked yesterday about my opinion on that.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, we have in this last day or two, relative to the use of the veto in the United Nations regarding Red China. If I am mistaken, I will begin making interrogations on that point. I have a distinct recollection of discussing the possibility of the use of the veto against the admission of Communist China into the United Nations.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, we have discussed that, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes, and now my question is, assuming for the moment that it had not been the People's Republic of China which is a Communist regime, but that there had been a revolt by the old Manchu Imperial regime in China who had taken control of the mainland, would you think that they then could be the successors in interest to the Republic of China which still remains in the United Nations Charter?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I think you are getting into a question which would delight the international lawyers and on which I really have not got any valid opinion.

The question would be whether it is the same state or another state. I do not think that is really the important thing here. I think the important thing is, as I have been trying to bring out—you must give some vigorous leadership here along the lines of principle which appeal to the nations you want to have agreement with and if you get them into an agreement with you then you will be able to establish this position in the 46 agencies of the United Nations, and that is what we have done. We have been very successful in it and I hope we will continue to be.

And if we reach a point which we do not believe we shall reach, where we are in a minority then obviously we have lost in all those agencies, those parts of the United Nations where you go by a majority vote. Of course, that would be a very small minority.

At that point the question would arise in the Security Council, which is the only one affected by this matter, as to whether an adverse vote is a block or merely puts you in a minority as to whether this is a place where the so-called veto applies; that is, is it a place where the vote of one permanent member blocks it?

There are a great many arguments that can be made to that. I was pointing out that the best place to make them is in the World Court because if you make them in an organization where you are in a minority of four or less, you are not likely to prevail with them.

Senator KNOWLAND. Frankly, while you may have stated this possibility of going to the World Court on other occasions, at least I do not recollect having heard that point of view expressed for any extended period of time prior to these hearings. Has that been the general position of the Department?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't think that I have stated it except in these hearings.

CHAIRMANSHIP OF SECURITY COUNCIL

Senator KNOWLAND. That was my impression.

I would like to ask one additional question before getting into a line of questions I want to follow. Has the United States, either alone or in conjunction with the 14 or 15 nations which have now supplied troops to the UN and the other nations which at least are giving moral support to the UN, given consideration to the possibility of changing the rule whereby the chairmanship of the Security Council passes among the members by rotation, and that now for the second time we find Mr. Malik presiding over the Security Council and in a position to sabotage the efforts of collective security?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't believe so, sir. I have not had it under consideration. I don't know whether that is a bylaw of the Security Council or whether that is a part of the fundamental law.

Senator KNOWLAND. Does it not become a very important issue to which some consideration might be given—that in violation of the Charter one member is not only giving aid and comfort from a moral point of view to an aggressor, who is now shooting United Nations troops in Korea, but in addition to that is supplying implements of war, and at the same time having the representative of that Government sit at the head of the highest organization, highest committee within the United Nations?

Secretary ACHESON. We have constantly pointed out the considerations which you have in mind, except for the one as to what place at the table the Russian delegate sits. We have not considered that point.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, I hope, Mr. Secretary, merely expressing the view as one Member of the Senate of the United States, that somebody will begin to give some consideration to that situation.

ACHESON PRESS CONFERENCE ON FORMOSA POLICY

Now, going back to this December 23, 1949 document, which is now in the record—I mentioned the other day that the President of the United States in his statement on January 5, 1950, pointed out that further aid to Formosa would be cut off, which I thought was in conformity with the December 23d what you call a guidance memorandum and what I call a policy memorandum. I want to call your attention to a document which just came into my hands the other day, though it was not in any sense classified, but I had missed it or had lost my recollection of it.

On the same day that the President of the United States made his statement there was released to the press a statement by the State Department, official press release, Department of State, January 5, 1950, No. 11.

Secretary ACHESON. What is that, Senator?

Senator KNOWLAND. This is United States policy with respect to Formosa, issued, and purports to represent your viewpoint. It said:

> At his press conference today the Honorable Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, made the following extemporaneous remarks regarding the statement of the President concerning United States policy with respect to Formosa.

Do you recall making some extemporaneous remarks?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I do.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now I would like to read you from page 2 of that. This is apropos of the question as to whether the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate has been kept fully advised on foreign policy in the Far East.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, might I ask the Senator the date of that?

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes this is January 5, 1950, the same date that the President made his announcement. Now I quote:

> That, I think, gives you the background as to why it was necessary to make the statement at the present time. It would have been desirable from our point of view if the whole question of the Far East and all the parts of the Far East and of Formosa, which after all is a small part of a great area in the Far East, could have been discussed very fully with members of both parties on the Hill before any statement was made, but one has to choose in this life, and it was more important to clarify thinking than it was to go on and have the most desirable of all possible things, which is consultation.

So I take it by that you clearly stated that there had not been time for consultation with the representatives of the two parties and the Foreign Relations Committee.

Now I want to read your next paragraph:

> Now getting down to this statement, let's be clear about one or two things. There has been a great deal of amateur military strategy indulged in in regard to this matter of Formosa. The underlying factors in the decision are not in that area.

Now to whom were you referring as amateur strategists, in view of the fact that the Secretary of National Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Chief of Staff of the Army have all testified that in their judgment Formosa should not be allowed to fall into unfriendly hands, and that its loss would be detrimental to the strategic security of this country?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I was not referring to the professional military people, but to a great deal of discussion which had gone on in the press.

Senator KNOWLAND. Let me read you this part of your statement, or the statement issued in your behalf:

> If we are going to maintain the free nations of the world as a great unit oposed to the encroachment of communism and other sorts of totalitarian aggression, the world must believe that we stand for principle and that we are honorable and decent people and that we do not put forward, as propagandists do in other countries to serve their advantage, only to throw them overboard when some change in events makes the position difficult for us.

Isn't that precisely what we did in the case of this December 23 so-called guidance memo which I call a policy statement?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I don't think so, sir. I was referring here to something different from that.

VIEWS OF AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION

Senator KNOWLAND. I would like to call your attention, Mr. Secretary, to a statement issued by the Americans for Democratic Action on September 25, 1950, and read from page 4:

> The United States should immediately withdraw recognition of the Chiang Kai-shek government as the Government of China, and treat it as a de facto authority on Formosa for the time being. The matter of seating Communist China in the UN has to be linked at this moment to China's intentions with regard to Korea and Formosa.
>
> The United States should propose that before consideration is given to seating Communist China, the UN has to receive from the Government the most explicit assurance that it will not intervene militarily in Korea and will not force a military solution of the Formosa problem, both issues now before the UN itself.

Was that, the viewpoint of the Americans for Democratic Action, ever the viewpoint of the Department of State?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. Do you agree or disagree with that point of view?

Secretary ACHESON. No; I say it is not the view of the Department of State.

Senator KNOWLAND. Then I take it that you disagree with that viewpoint expressed.

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

BASIS OF CEASE-FIRE PROPOSAL

Senator KNOWLAND. Going back to the January 11 statement in the United Nations wherein we did instruct our representative, Mr. Austin, to vote for this resolution, that is 1951, wherein we instructed our representative, Mr. Austin, to vote for the cease-fire proposal, you have already testified that among the nations named were Communist China, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain, all of whom at that time had agreed that Formosa should be turned over to the Communists and all of whom had expressed an idea that Red China should be admitted into the United Nations.

Are you familiar with the fact that there appeared an article in the New York Times dated January 12 by a responsible correspondent at Lake Success, Mr. Walter Sullivan, in which he said—and I quote:

> United States circles indicated an expectation that the Chinese Communists would reject the plan presented today and implied that American support had been given with this expectation in mind.

Is that a correct statement of fact?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, it is correct that I believed that the Chinese Communists would reject the proposal, and I think I stated that to some members who are now in this room.

Chairman RUSSELL. Had you concluded your statement?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. Did we support the resolution having in mind that they would reject it?

Secretary ACHESON. I have stated we expected they would reject it, and we did support the resolution.

Senator KNOWLAND. Supposing the Chinese Communists had accepted the proposal. Would we not then have been in a position, if good faith was involved, to negotiate with them on the question of both Formosa and Red China's admission into the United Nations?

Secretary ACHESON. We would have been in the position if they accepted these principles, we would then have to see whether they would have stopped the fighting and ended the aggression.

If they had, we would have been in the position which we were in before the aggression started, which was that both of these matters were matters which were being discussed in the United Nations and where we had taken the position that that was the proper place to discuss them, and we would have continued where we left off before the aggression started, discussing these matters.

That does not mean in any way that we would have changed our position in regard to them.

Senator KNOWLAND. Are you familiar that in the same article the following paragraph appeared, and I quote:

> One of the key points discussed by delegations afterwards was the possible outcome of talks between the great powers including Communist China and Formosa, Sir Benegal—

I assume Sir Benegal Rau, but it merely speaks of him as Sir Benegal—

> indicated that in India's view if today's proposal was carried out faithfully, Formosa would be turned over to China.

Do you agree with the Indian viewpoint as expressed?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir, I do not.

PLAN TO UNIFY ARMED FORCES OF CHINA

Senator KNOWLAND. On the 19th of June 1946 you appeared before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs relative to a bill that was then pending, I believe H. R. 6795, to provide military advice and assistance to the Republic of China.

Do you recall your appearance before the committee?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't recall it, but if you say I was there, I undoubtedly was.

Senator KNOWLAND. Let me read you something to see if it brings any recollections to you.

Secretary ACHESON. Are you reading from the transcript of the committee hearing?

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes, from what purports to be an extract from the transcript. This deals with your statement before the committee:

> The Communist leaders have asked, and General Marshall has agreed, that their integration with the other forces be preceded by a brief period of United States training and by a supply of minimum quantities of equipment.
>
> Mrs. ROGERS. Mr. Secretary, how many Communists is it anticipated will be trained under the proposed plan?
>
> Secretary ACHESON. I think they will try to take all the units that are going to be put into the new army immediately preceding their joining the new army and give them 60- or 90-day training.
>
> Mrs. ROGERS. But can you give us any approximate number that will be trained?
>
> Secretary ACHESON. I do not know. If the total size of the army is going to be 60 divisions, I do not know what proportion of the personnel would be Communist.
>
> Mrs. ROGERS. Could you get that proportion for us?
>
> Secretary ACHESON. The information that I have had handed to me is that of 60 divisions which are contemplated the personnel would be equivalent to 50 divisions which will come from the National army, and the proportion which would be the equivalent of 10 divisions will come from the Communist army.
>
> Mrs. ROGERS. Is there any way we could have an agreement with China whereby she would not use arms against us?
>
> Secretary ACHESON. Well, I suppose we have that in the United Nations Charter. There all the nations agree that they will not employ force against any country except in accordance with the principles and under the procedures of the Charter.

Do you recall that testimony?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't recall it, Senator; but I have no doubt that I gave it.

Senator KNOWLAND. Are you familiar, Mr. Secretary, with the——

Secretary ACHESON. This thing that you are talking about in that testimony was what I have been talking about in these hearings; that is, the proposal that in connection with setting up the constitutional government for all of China, there should be a unification of the armed forces on the basis of 5 to 1—5 Nationalists to 1. That had been worked out by General Marshall.

These units would be created as those which were to be demobilized were disposed of and those which were to stay in the regular service were picked out. That, of course, would only be done after the constitutional arrangements had been made and all these documents had been signed, and you have the interim government, and the amalgamation of the forces was taking place.

It was General Marshall's view at that time that we should have people ready to train these new units and to have equipment for them; and each one of these divisions should receive 90 days of training with their equipment, and then be put into the army where it would ultimately serve, and the purpose of this testimony was to get that approval.

There were some arms which were sent to Peking for this purpose. They were never delivered because the whole project broke down and never came to fruition.

Senator KNOWLAND. Have you ever been advised that in the shipments, among the first shipments under the $125,000,000 program to north China, one of the urgent needs which had been requested by the Republic of China's forces had been BAR's—that is, Browning automatic rifles—and that in the first shipment that was received in China, all of the BAR's arrived without a single magazine in the shipment, which made them about as valuable as baseball bats?

Has that ever been brought to your attention?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir. I never heard that story before.

EMBARGO OF AUGUST 1947

Senator KNOWLAND. Are you familiar with the testimony, before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, on February 10, 1948, in which the following colloquy took place between Mr. Vorys and Secretary Marshall, and I read:

> Mr. VORYS. As I understand it, we had an embargo for 10 months on the shipment of arms to China, and then the ammunition that we did authorize to be shipped, which they purchased, had not gotten to the troops yet.
>
> Now, why is that?
>
> Secretary MARSHALL. Do you mean the original embargo, and then the later development? The embargo was in August 1947, and the release was in May 1948.
>
> Mr. VORYS. That is about 10 months?
>
> Secretary MARSHALL. Yes.

That is the embargo period that I think you previously mentioned in some of your testimony?

Secretary ACHESON. That is the same embargo I was talking about.

BLAIR HOUSE MEETING OF JUNE 25

Senator KNOWLAND. I would like to call your attention, Mr. Secretary, to the June issue of Harper's magazine, to an article by Mr. Albert L. Warner, a responsible correspondent in Washington, and commentator, reading from page 101, on which he makes the following statement, which relates to the Blair House conference, and deals with the question of Formosa:

> There was an obvious air of tension as the conferees gathered in the President's residence diagonally across Pennsylvania Avenue from the White House. While they awaited dinner Mr. Acheson told the President of the swift United Nations action. He was enthusiastic that a beginning had been made to check the aggression. Now Secretary Johnson brought up the question of Formosa. In the new outbreak of danger in the Far East this island off the coast of Communist China must be considered.
>
> It was a delicate subject for Johnson to press. Eight months earlier he had been overruled and Acheson's laissez-faire doctrine for Formosa had become administration policy. But Johnson pushed his point: The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that this island in hostile hands would be inimical to American security. He suggested that Gen. Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, should speak on the question. The President listened as Bradley dwelt upon Formosa's strategic importance; strictly in the light of American security Formosa was more important than Korea.

Do you recall that incident?

Secretary ACHESON. I recall the meeting. I do not think that that is exactly what happened.

Senator KNOWLAND. Can you point out the inaccuracies in that paragraph?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I could go through the paragraph pointing out the inaccuracies. What occured at the meeting on the 25th, which I think is the one he is talking about there, was that we had worked from Saturday night through until Sunday night. I had been—my assistants had been working with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and together we had drawn up a series of recommendations for the President.

The Secretary of Defense and General Bradley had just returned from Tokyo and if I recall they had a meeting of some sort in Norfolk or Newport News which they had to go to on Sunday so we did not see them until we met at the White House.

I presented at the President's request the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department. Those recommendations included the movement of the Seventh Fleet up to the Formosa Straits. It was decided to do that and not make any announcement of any kind in connection with the Seventh Fleet until it was there, because if you did you might precipitate some trouble before it arrived there. As far as sending the fleet to Formosa was concerned that was all worked out and recommended and nobody had to argue with me to make the recommendations. I participated in that. The only discussion I recall before the actual meeting took place was the reading of a top-secret document from General MacArthur giving his views of the strategic importance of Formosa.

FUTURE OF FORMOSA

Senator KNOWLAND. I would like to read from an article in Time of August 7, 1950, the following paragraph:

> Secretary of State Dean Acheson had persuaded the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, against the advice of General MacArthur, that the United States should not intervene in Formosa. He advanced the remarkable argument that if Russia had its way in Asia, the Communists would eventually become highly unpopular among Asian people and the United States would gain popularity for its nice-mannered nonintervention.

Now, have you ever made any observation that approximated that view in regard to the situation in China?

Secretary ACHESON. No; I think that is quite incorrect in all respects.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Secretary, going back to the questioning this morning of Senator George, I want to clear up this point because I think it is a very vital one in our future policy as it relates to Formosa.

Is it the opinion of the State Department and is it the policy of the Government of the United States that Formosa will not be permitted to get into Communist hands?

Secretary ACHESON. I think I have gone into that about a thousand times.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, I am sorry, Mr. Secretary, but because of the confusion raised by your perhaps inadvertent answer earlier that you would not allow the island to be taken by force, I would like to know specifically whether it is now the policy of the Government of the United States that under no condition will Formosa be allowed to fall into Communist hands.

Secretary ACHESON. Obviously, Senator Knowland, it is quite impossible for me to answer the question as you put it.

What we have decided in the Government is made public and is well known: That the Armed Forces of the United States are standing by to prevent any attack on the island, to prevent the fall of the island so far as those forces can do so.

It has been made clear that we think the island in the hands of a power hostile to the United States is something to be prevented so far as we can prevent that. Force is one way to prevent it if the island is attacked. Diplomatic and other arrangements are ways that you prevent it if force is not used.

There may be a whole lot of situations which nobody has contemplated and will not arise in which one cannot use the expression "the United States will not permit it."

SUGGESTED COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, have we at any time carried on discussions that would take an intermediate step and permit Formosa to be taken over under some kind of a UN trusteeship regardless of the views of the Republic of China?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; I know of no such.

Senator KNOWLAND. Has any such proposal been made to your knowledge?

Secretary ACHESON. There were a great many proposals made in the press and otherwise at the time the President made his statement of January 5, that it should be taken over by the UN or that it should be given back to Japan. We have never done anything in favor of those views.

Senator KNOWLAND. Do you know of any proposal on or about the 26th of April either before, well, before that date, within 30 to 60 days of it——

Secretary ACHESON. April of what year?

Senator KNOWLAND. Of this year—whereby Mr. Ralph Bunche would be appointed a UN High Commissioner for the whole of Korea as part of a settlement?

Secretary ACHESON. I do not recall that.

Senator KNOWLAND. Do you know of any proposal whereby the Republic of China on Formosa would have some kind of a trusteeship set up for it as part of a settlement?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't recall anything of that sort.

Senator KNOWLAND. Would the Government of the United States oppose the setting up of a trusteeship that was proposed over the opposition of the Republic of China on Formosa?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, that couldn't be set up. If you have an army on Formosa which is going to oppose the setting up of a trusteeship, then it would not be set up unless somebody goes in there with force to set it up, and it would not be our purpose to go in and fight the people on Formosa in order to set up a trusteeship.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time is up, Senator Knowland.

Senator KNOWLAND. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and I thank the committees for your courtesy.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committees will now stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 5:34 p. m., the committees recessed, to reconvene at 10:08 a. m. Thursday, June 7, 1951.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

THURSDAY, JUNE 7, 1951

Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:08 a. m. in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), George, Wiley, Smith of New Jersey, Green, Hickenlooper, McMahon, Lodge, Sparkman, Gillette, Brewster, Byrd, Bridges, Saltonstall, Johnson of Texas, Morse, Hunt, Cain, Stennis, Flanders, and Long.

Also present: William H. Darden, clerk, Committee on Armed Services; Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge of the committee staff of the Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; and Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman Russell. The committees will be in order.

Under the unanimous-consent agreement adopted yesterday afternoon, the Chair recognizes the Senator from Connecticut for his questioning period.

TESTIMONY OF HON. DEAN G. ACHESON, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY ADRIAN S. FISHER, LEGAL ADVISER—Resumed

Senator McMahon. Mr. Secretary, there has been an effort going on for several years to establish what I regard as some fictions in history. One of them is the fiction that at Yalta that was given to Russia which made it possible for the Chinese Communists to have a victory in China.

Now there is a great fog about this, and what I want to do is reduce it to its simplest terms. Will you therefore give me the principal items which might be termed "consessions" that were made to Russia at Yalta?

Secretary Acheson. This is in its bearing on the Far East?

Senator McMahon. That is right.

PROVISIONS OF THE YALTA AGREEMENT

Secretary Acheson. Yes; I shall be glad to do that.

The provisions of the Yalta agreement, so far as they affected the Far East, were that—

> 1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia shall be preserved;
>
> 2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz:
>
> (*a*) The southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union;
>
> (*b*) The commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U. S. S. R. restored;
>
> (*c*) The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Machurian Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company, it being understood that the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria;
>
> 3. The Kurile islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

Then it goes on to say:

> It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.
>
> The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.
>
> For its part the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the U. S. S. R. and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

Senator McMAHON. Mr. Secretary, neither you nor I are military strategists, but have you ever heard or have you ever been told of any military connection between the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek and those concessions that were made to the Soviet Union at Yalta?

Secretary ACHESON. No, Senator McMahon; I think there was none.

SENATOR WILEY'S SPEECH ON RUSSIA, JULY 1945

Senator McMAHON. I think that it would be interesting to refer briefly to a speech that was made by one of our colleagues, one of our distinguished colleagues, the ranking member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Wiley, which was made in the Senate on July 25, 1945. I refer to this speech in no sense of criticism whatsoever.

I think that Senator Wiley bespoke the feelings of the American people and the feelings of the administration on this day in July of 1945. Certainly, as I read it now, it was my mood on that day, and I read it because it seems better than anything else that I could put into the record at this time to put these events that we have been talking about in the context of their time instead of trying to view them with the 20–20 hindsight that so many of our distinguished gentlemen seem to be gifted with.

And so, with your permission, Mr. Secretary—I guess I don't have to ask that because it is out of my time—I want to read an excerpt from Senator Wiley's speech into the record:

> There has been widespread spineless reluctance to express American opinion that Russia should enter the war against Japan.

This bears on Senator Hickenlooper's questioning of you yesterday. To go on:

> This reluctance—this hush-hush policy of relating our deepest convictions—is ridiculous.

It does not involve any military secrets to state our intense feelings in this matter. In millions of American homes, mothers, fathers, and sweethearts are waiting anxiously for news of Russia's intentions. Hundreds of thousands of our brave soldiers, sailors, and marines are poised for the tough and bitter invasion of Japan.

I might interpolate to say that the Senator certainly had reason to believe it was coming about after Iwo Jima, Tarawa, Saipan, and Okinawa, which were among the bloodiest battles of history.

They know and we know that if Russia declared war, if her bombing fleets roared out from Vladivostok over to Japan, these acts might be the final ones to force a quick surrender of the Japs. Thus, countless American lives are at stake in Russia's decision.

Our ground troops, seamen, and airmen have carried the overwhelming load of the bloody Pacific fighting for 3½ years. We have every right to speak bluntly and plainly, the only language the Russians understand, anyway.

Why then should we pussyfoot with our Russian ally and not declare only that we want them to make common cause in the Pacific?

Why then should we not strengthen President Truman's hand by making known this desire from here at home in no uncertain terms?

Why should we act like helpless "Milktoasts" when we have vast financial and other bargaining power to use as pressure on Russia?

Why should we follow the lead of the "Nice Nellies" of our State Department who have been more concerned with diplomatic niceties than with the preservation of American interests and lives?

Let no one say that we are meddling in Russia's business when we tell them that we want them to carry their load in the Far East. From 1941 to 1943 the controlled Russian press never hesitated to denounce America and Britain for their alleged delay in opening the second front in Europe.

Now the shoe is on the other foot. But we are not denouncing Russia. We know how she has bled in the war with Germany. We know of her valor and her courage. But we know, too, that her security demands that the Japs be licked. We know that whether or not Russia enters the war she will make big postwar demands regarding Asia at the peace table.

Thus America has everything to gain and thousands of her boys' lives to lose unless Russia joins in the Pacific struggle.

It would be our dearest hope that Russia's mere entrance into the war would be sufficient to make the Japs throw in the sponge without a single additional Russian boy's or a single additional American boy's dying.

But we cannot foresee the future. We can, however, say that it is apparently the overwhelming sentiment of our people that we will not easily forget Russia's contribution in the Far East if she pitches in with us and will not easily forgive her shirking of her responsibility if she remains on the side lines.

I would be remiss in my obligations as a United States Senator if I did not voice, in all humility but with all the force at my command, the feeling of millions of Americans that Russia do her part in the Pacific.

Senator WILEY. What was the date?

Senator McMAHON. July 25, 1945.

Senator WILEY. Yalta was February?

Senator McMAHON. Yalta was in February.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL BARR TO FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, 1949

Now, Mr. Secretary, if there is no causal connection between what was done at Yalta, despite the best efforts of well-intentioned men to pretend that there was, could we perhaps put in this record at this point—I dislike to take the time to read it, but don't know how else to get it in—the statement of Maj. Gen. David J. Barr, made to the Foreign Relations Committee on March 22, 1949.

You talked at great length with Major General Barr about the Chinese situation, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I talked with him at the time of his return.

Senator McMahon. You have a high opinion of his competence and his ability?

Secretary Acheson. He is a very fine officer.

Senator McMahon. That is shared by some of my colleagues on this committee.

Major General Barr was one of the pioneers in the development of the tank at Fort Knox, and has occupied very responsible positions during the war in the Mediterranean theater. He was chief of staff of the Sixth Army, which was the Army group that conducted the operations that started from Italy and Corsica; invaded southern France, went up the valley of the Rhone and through the Vosges Mountains into southern Germany.

The general appeared on that day. This also will be useful in demonstrating that the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate was kept constantly informed by the State Department and by our responsible officials as to our policy in China.

Before I read this, perhaps, I should put into the record a quick summary of the pages of testimony that we received in the Foreign Relations Committee, after the Reorganization Act; and you will recollect that Senator George pointed out the other day that before the Reorganization Act there was no stenographic transcript kept of the Foreign Relations Committee meetings, a very unfortunate thing, I might say.

Chairman Russell. Senator McMahon, you were discussing General Barr's qualifications and experience, and I think it might be well to show that he commanded the Seventh Division in Korea until he recently rotated to the States, and is now in command of the Armored School in Kentucky.

Senator McMahon. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Lodge. Will the Senator yield?

Senator McMahon. Not on my time.

PUBLISHING EXECUTIVE TRANSCRIPTS

Senator Lodge. As a procedural matter, is the Senator going to put all this into the record without having a vote of the Foreign Relations Committee?

Senator McMahon. Mr. Chairman, at this time what I propose to do is to give the comments of General Barr without the comments of any Senator on his testimony.

Senator Lodge. It seems to me as a matter of procedure, Mr. Chairman, that anything that is from an executive record ought not to be made public without a vote of the committee.

Senator McMahon. Mr. Secretary, there were 1,160 pages of testimony——

Chairman Russell. If the Senator will permit, that is a matter that the Chair cannot rule on; that is not an Armed Services Committee record.

Senator Lodge. This is the first time that I can remember that this has ever been done, and I personally have no objections if General Barr would want to make it public. He is a fine, very fine, man, and I have great confidence in him. But this is quite on a par with revealing private conversations in the White House or anywhere else.

If we are going to start doing this, it is going to change the whole conduct of the business of Foreign Relations Committee hearings.

Senator McMahon. Senator, at this time I will not press for the showing of any colloquy at all, and I assure you that the statement that Major General Barr has made is not of a classified nature. I will not read at this time the statements of any Senator, because I certainly would want to take that up in the joint committee.

As for the statement itself, it is a statement that has been repeated. It is in the official report, you see, and I cannot see any harm in reading what General Barr told our committee.

Senator Brewster. Would that apply to anyone else who, at any time, appeared, that their statements similarly might be used? For instance, the Secretary has been there a great many times, and I presume he has spoken in executive session. I think it should be determined before we start.

Senator McMahon. Well, I wish to and I shall take this on my own responsibility, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, a procedural point?

Chairman Russell. I will recognize Senator Morse on a procedural point.

Senator Morse. In view of the fact that the Senator from Massachusetts has raised a procedural matter——

Senator Wiley. Louder.

Senator Morse. In view of the fact that the Senator from Massachusetts has raised a procedural matter, I would like to assure the Senator from Massachusetts that my position on these procedural matters is a very consistent one. I think he has raised a point of procedure that ought to be carefully considered by the committee.

SETTLING THE PROCEDURAL ISSUE

I think the same principle applies when this committee gets possession of a document that the State Department does not want to have released.

Now, the Senator from Massachusetts raises objection to the fact that a colleague on this committee has physical possession of a document of another committee; and I point out to him that—and this, of course, always works both ways—I do think we ought to go into this procedure matter as to whether or not we should receive in this committee a secret document from another committee, just because a member of the committee has physical possession of it.

Senator Lodge. In reply to the Senator from Oregon, I fail to see the connection between the two.

We have a situation here which is important, and I really don't see that there is any precedent being established at all.

Senator Morse. I wouldn't expect the Senator from Massachusetts to see the similarity, but from the standpoint of a basic legal matter, they have something very common——

Senator Lodge. This isn't a legal affair. There are those of us here who are not lawyers——

Senator Morse. That is just the view of the Senator from Massachusetts. I think he is as wrong on this point as I have found him to be on most others.

Senator Lodge. The Constitution does not require that we have to be lawyers——

Senator Morse. Certainly a member should follow constitutional——

Chairman Russell. We will not have any more of that type of discussion, gentlemen.

Senator Saltonstall. May I raise a procedural point, that in view of the discussion back day before yesterday, I wrote a letter to Chairman Russell asking that for members of the Armed Services—or asking that the Committee on Foreign Relations—whether the Committee on Armed Services could have either an abstract or the full record of the executive sessions, and my suggestion was that Dr. Wilcox, and, if the Committee on Foreign Relations would permit it, General Mudge be permitted to abstract and make little concrete paragraphs of the pertinent facts without putting into it in any way the statements of the members of the committee.

In that way and only in that way it seems to me that the Armed Services Committee could have the same knowledge of the facts for their consideration as the members of the Foreign Relations Committee.

I would most respectfully call that to his attention at this time because I have already spoken to Senator Connally and asked him if he would give consideration to that letter.

As Senator Russell has pointed out, it is a matter completely within the jurisdiction of the Foreign Relations Committee, but I think it would be helpful to us on this table to have the same information as the members of the Foreign Relations Committee have. I would respectfully call that to his attention as a matter that I hope the Foreign Relations Committee will take up.

Senator Morse. I do want to press, Mr. Chairman, on a procedural point and say most respectfully to the Senator from Connecticut that I think the Senator from Massachusetts raises a procedural point that ought to receive the very careful consideration of this committee at this time before the Senator proceeds, because suppose some member of the Atomic Energy Commission should have physical possession of some atomic energy secret which he thought would be perfectly all right to put into the record of another executive committee hearing, and assume full responsibility for doing it himself.

I say that the majority of his colleagues on that committee, however, have the right to determine whether or not he should be allowed to assume full responsibility for putting into the record what might be a secret document of another committee.

Now if I understand the Senator from Massachusetts correctly, that is his point. If it is, I agree with him on that point, and I think we have a procedural matter here as to whether or not we ought to allow the Senator from Connecticut to put into the record a secret document or transcript from an executive session of another committee.

PROCEDURE FOLLOWED WITH OTHER COMMITTEE'S EXECUTIVE TRANSCRIPTS

Chairman Russell. Well now, gentlemen, this is not the first time this matter has been before the committee, though it is the first time that any issue has been raised.

Of course as a member of the Armed Services Committee, I have some reluctance to undertake to pass on or rule upon any question that is being discussed between the members of this committee who happen to be members of the Foreign Relations Committee, because the Foreign Relations Committee is the committee where this record was made.

It was not made in the Armed Services Committee. If the committee wishes to vote upon any question that may be raised, I shall submit it to the committee, but I want to point out that members of the Armed Services Committee have used records that were taken in our executive hearings of the very highest secrecy in these investigations and have used them as predicate for questions.

We have a procedure here to undertake to protect security matters. We have Admiral Davis whom I have found to be an exceedingly able man with sound common sense who passes upon the security nature of any matter that appears in this record.

If the security angle is what is involved, we have protection on that because Admiral Davis will undoubtedly delete from the record anything that would adversely affect the national security.

Now for my part as a member of the Armed Services Committee I do not wish to participate in any discussion as to what shall be done with the record of the Foreign Relations Committee. Now if the Senator from Connecticut or any other member of that committee uses a record, in my judgment it ought to go through the normal procedure, go into the record, be examined by Admiral Davis.

If he thinks it involves national security, he will undoubtedly eliminate it. Otherwise it seems to me it is a question for the Foreign Relations Committee to determine. The proprieties of the use of this matter is something that does not address itself as I see it to the Armed Services Committee, and it would be my inclination unless some member of the committee makes a motion of some kind, in which case I will submit it if it is in order and germane, that if the Senator from Connecticut reads this matter, it will then go through our normal processes to have it determined as to whether or not it adversely affects the national security or the national interest.

POSSIBILITY OF MAKING WHOLE RECORD PUBLIC

Senator McMahon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just say this: That I want it plainly understood that what I am going to refer to is a prepared statement made by General Barr covering his analysis of why Chiang Kai-shek was unsuccessful. I intend at this time to offer no colloquy or to quote any statement by any witness that would have to be put in the context of a colloquy to be understood.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, before we conclude the matter, I would like to know from the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee whether he feels this does establish precedent as to the use of executive records, so that we will not have to have the matter——

Chairman Connally. The chairman just stated a while ago that the Armed Services Committee and this committee here have produced numbers of things.

Senator Brewster. I am not objecting. I just want to be clear.

Chairman Connally. I see no reason why you would have one rule for one committee and a different rule for another.

Senator Brewster. So that that does not mean that the executive records of Foreign Relations will be available for use here?

Chairman CONNALLY. They have always been available for use of members of the committee. They can come there at any time. Senators for that matter, we have always made our records available for any Senator who wants to come there to the committee and read the executive hearings.

Senator BREWSTER. I am asking about presentation here in this joint committee now.

Chairman CONNALLY. I will leave that to the Senator from Connecticut. I do not care to get into any argument about this thing.

Senator BREWSTER. Does the Senator from Connecticut expect to raise an issue as to whether or not other portions of executive records might be used?

Senator MCMAHON. That I can't tell at this time, Senator., I am not foreclosing myself on this great issue, because this record of 1,160 pages taken since the Reorganization Act demonstrates the utter falsity of the claim which has been made in print and on the floor of the Senate a hundred times that we did not have a policy in the east upon which both parties have been consulted.

It also demonstrates that there were some 16 meetings held. I have said 1,160 pages, and this was entirely devoted to the subject of China, to say nothing of some 60 other records in which the thread of China testimony is pursued.

Furthermore, this record will demonstrate—and I challenge anybody to read it and deny it—that there was not one single suggestion made at any meeting by any member of that committee which was not throughly considered and either unanimously accepted or unanimously rejected, and I am getting, for one, just a little bit tired of this effort to pervert history.

Now Mr. Secretary——

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, before this procedural matter is concluded, I would like to——

Senator MCMAHON. Mr. Chairman, I do not yield at this time.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator McMahon, the Chair will undertake to protect you on your time, but if a member of this committee raises what is purely a procedural question, I think that he has the right to do so.

If the Senator from Maine has what is strictly a procedural matter, why——

Senator BREWSTER. Yes. I want the record, particularly in view of what the Senator from Connecticut has just said, to be entirely clear that my desire and anxiety has been the use of these records, but not unless it met with the full sympathy of the chairman and the other members who are not dissenting.

He speaks of 1,160 pages. I want the whole 1,160 pages to be available to demonstrate the truth and accuracy of the statements which he is making, and I want that to be very clear. Now if there is any question about it, I think we ought to clear it up now, not later.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chair stated his views on that, and so far as I am concerned, I am not undertaking to deal with anything pertaining to the functions of the Foreign Relations Committee, but when a matter is brought here into this committee, we have a procedure for the joint committee, and that revolves around the effect it would have upon the national security.

Senator Lodge. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one procedural observation, and I shall ask when I conclude that unanimous consent be given that all these procedural matters not be taken out of the time of the Senator.

Chairman Russell. The Chair will undertake to protect the Senator on that and always does.

MANNER IN WHICH EXECUTIVE TRANSCRIPTS SHOULD BE HANDLED

Senator Lodge. In my opinion anything what is executive in the Foreign Relations Committee should only be put out following a vote of the committee.

Now that is my view. I gather that the Senators here disagree with me about that, and. of course, any Senator who is a member can go and get the transcript physically and he can read. He can read it to other Senators; he can read it to the press. I think that that is a precedent that is going to come back to plague us. It means that in the future I can go and take the transcript and go and put it out; and that has never been true before, and I think it is too bad.

Chairman Russell. The Chair does not know about the precedents in the Foreign Relations Committee, but I have already adverted to the precedent of use of records of the Armed Services Committee in these hearings.

I might further say that the records of the executive and highly secret meetings of the Appropriations Committee have likewise been used for a base of examination in these hearings. The Senator from New Hampshire, Mr. Bridges, dealt extensively with the records of the Appropriations Committee on some highly sensitive testimony. At least it was at the time it was taken. I don't know it is so important now. At the time it was taken, immediately after the attack in Korea we had hearings on the nature and extent of the operations of our intelligence service, and that has been used in this record and no objection was raised.

I am not saying what the Foreign Relations Committee should do, but as far as the Chair is concerned, he is going to permit these hearings of any committee that is brought here by any member to be used unless they are found to be prejudicial to the national interest and eliminated by Admiral Davis, who has been requested by the committee to discharge that function.

I think I might say at the present time the Department of State has a representative assisting Admiral Davis because of the fact that the Secretary of State is testifying. Let the record be complete.

Senator Morse. On a procedural point, Mr. Chairman. It will not take more than a half a minute.

I completely understand the chairman's point of view. I think it is true, however, at least I don't recall, that we have ever discussed in the Armed Services Committee the use to which members of the committee would be privileged to put the hearings of executive sessions of the committee. I am very much of the opinion of the Senator from Massachusetts that his particular procedural point is right as a matter of sound policy. Because I think, as an individual Senator attending an executive session of the Armed Services Committee, I should not at a meeting before some other Senate committee where the Armed Services Committee may be part of the combined committee proceed to disclose the executive minutes of the committee without the consent of my colleagues on the committee. Now I just feel that.

Now, I understand on the other hand the limitation that the Senator from Connecticut wishes to use in connection with this particular statement of the witness before the committee. I am not going to say anything more about it. The chairman has ruled on it. I just wanted the record to show, however, that I happen to be one who believes that the soundest procedure, if you are going to protect the executive minutes, is to have a rule of a committee that the minutes cannot be used by a member of the committee outside of a meeting of that committee without the vote and consent of the committee as a whole.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, we started out in these hearings with the avowed purposes of getting all of the facts that were available and making public all of those that did not adversely affect the national security. In my judgment it is a matter for determination of the committee that has custody of it.

I must say I did not think it was at all improper when a member of the Armed Services Committee used the executive hearings of this committee as a basis for asking questions.

It so happens that the censor saw fit to exclude that subject from the record. Very little of it went out. But it was done, and I did not think it was improper.

Now there is no motion before us and the Senator from Connecticut will proceed.

LIMITATIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE SESSION TRANSCRIPTS

Senator McMAHON. I think perhaps I can satisfy everybody by referring to the volume that is before me to refresh my recollection of the statement that was made to the committee by General Barr. I would like to ask the Secretary if he received a similar report on or about that time. In that way we will avoid using the record except for the refreshment of the recollection of the Senator from Connecticut. I call attention to the Senator from Massachusetts again that I postponed consideration of the full introduction of these 1,160 pages because it contains colloquies of Senators until I have a full consultation with the committee.

Senator WILEY. Will the Senator yield without taking it from his time?

Senator McMAHON. I will with the chairman's permission.

Chairman RUSSELL. Is there any objection? The Chair hears none.

Senator WILEY. Because the statement the Senator made, I thought, was so broad, I thought it only fair to say that during my term on the Foreign Relations Committee, which has been some years now, that at no time did we know anything about these so-called secret commitments which were basic in this policy. Until the Secretary made his statement I am sure none of us knew what the position of the Government was and the reason for these concessions to the Russians in the Yalta agreement.

At least, I didn't, and I can't remember that was ever discussed in our committee. Am I wrong about that?

Senator **McMahon**. As far as I have read this record, I think the Senator from Wisconsin is correct, that the Yalta agreements were not referred to. It is highly significant that in all of the testimony taken before knowledgeable men who had been consulted on occasion after occasion, there isn't a single word of criticism, as far as the Senator from Connecticut has been able to read the record, reflecting upon the proposition that the concessions, so-called, made at Yalta of a couple of ports and a half interest in a railroad are what caused the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek. But rather, running all through this testimony is the proposition—documented to an amazing extent—that Chiang Kai-shek's downfall was caused by the corruption, the rottenness, the inefficiency, and the stupidity of the Chiang Kai-shek government. That is what the record shows.

Senator **Wiley**. Will the Senator yield?

Senator **McMahon**. I would like now to proceed with my examination.

Chairman **Russell**. The Senator declines to yield.

Senator **McMahon**. Mr. Secretary, as I recall it, General Barr came to the committee and reported that many pages could be written covering the reasons for the failure of Nationalist strategy.

He stated as follows:

GENERAL BARR'S REPORT OF 1949 ON NATIONALISTS' FAILURE IN CHINA

I prepared this statement just with an idea of being able to quickly give you a background on why I think that the Nationalists have failed, or certainly are at the point of failure, in China.

Many pages could be written covering the reasons for the failure of Nationalist strategy. I believe that the government committed its first politico-military blunder when it concentrated its efforts after VJ-day on the purely military reoccupation of the former Japanese areas, giving little consideration to long-established regional sentiments or to creation of efficient local administrations which could attract wide popular support in the liberated areas.

Moreover, the Nationalist army was burdened with an unsound strategy which was conceived by a politically influenced and militarily inept high command. Instead of being content with consolidating North China, the Army was given the concurrent mission of seizing control of Manchuria, a task beyond its logistic capabilities.

The government, attempting to do too much with too little, found its armies scattered along thousands of miles of railroads, the possession of which was vital in view of the fact that these armies were supplied from bases in central China. In order to hold the railroads, it was also necessary to hold the large cities through which they passed.

As time went on, the troops degenerated from field armies, capable of offensive combat, to garrison and lines of communication troops with an inevitable loss of offensive spirit.

Communist military strength, popular support, and tactical skill were seriously underestimated from the start. It became increasingly difficult to maintain effective control over the large sections of predominantly Communist countryside through which the lines of communication passed.

Lack of Nationalist forces qualified to take the field against the Communists enabled the latter to become increasingly strong. The Nationalists, with their limited resources, steadily lost ground against an opponent who not only shaped his strategy around available human and material resources, but also capitalized skillfully on the government's strategic and tactical blunders and economic vulnerability.

Initially, the Communists were content to fight a type of guerrilla warfare, limiting their activities to raids on lines of communication and supply installations. The success of their operations, which were purely offensive, instilled in them the offensive attitude so necessary to success in war. On the other hand, the Nationalist strategy of defense of the areas they held, developed in them the "wall psychology" which has been so disastrous to their armies.

As the Communists grew stronger and more confident, they were able, by concentrations of superior strength, to surround, attack, and destroy Nationalist units in the field and Nationalist-held cities. It is typical of the Nationalists, in the defense of an area or a city, to dig in or retire within the city walls, and there to fight to the end hoping for relief which never comes because it cannot be spared from elsewhere.

The Chinese have been unable to be convinced that in the defense of a city from attack by modern methods of warfare, it is necessary to take up positions away from the walls where fire and maneuver is possible.

Further, they have been unable to be convinced of the necessity for withdrawing from cities and prepared areas when faced with overpowering opposition and certain isolation and defeat, while the opportunity still existed for them to do so.

In some cases their reasons for failure to withdraw and save their forces was political, but in most cases I believe that they were convinced that by defensive action alone they could, through attrition if nothing else, defeat the enemy.

Because of this mistaken concept and because of their inability to realize that discretion is usually the better part of valor, large numbers of Nationalist troops were lost to the government.

It must be understood that all through the structure and machinery of the Nationalist Government there are interlocking ties of interest peculiar to the Chinese: Family, financial, political, etc. No man, no matter how efficient, can hope for a position of authority on account of being the man best qualified for the job; he simply must have other backing. In too many case, this backing was the support and loyalty of the generalissimo for his old army comrades, which kept them in positions of high responsibility regardless of their qualifications. A direct result of this practice is the unsound strategy and faulty tactics so obviously displayed in the fight against the Communists.

Cooperation among and coordination of effort between the armed forces leaves much to be desired. The ground forces, being the older and dominant arm, is the source from which the large majority of top military positions are filled. These officers, mostly old and loyal contemporaries of the Generalissimo, have little or no knowledge of the newer arms, the air force and the navy. The Chinese Air Force, consisting of eight and one-third groups, is far in excess of what a country bereft of gold credits can support. Although it has among its personnel over 5,000 United States trained pilots, it accomplished little, other than air-lifting troops and operating its transports for personal gains. There was an ever-present reluctance to take a chance on losing equipment or personnel, which was clearly reflected in their constant refusal to operate at other than high altitudes. It is my belief that there was an ingrained resentment in the Chinese Air Force against killing Chinese Communists who had no air support.

All of these factors are important and unfortunate because the Chinese Air Force, unopposed, could have rendered invaluable support in ground operations had its capabilities been properly employed. From a military viewpoint, the case of the navy is not so important since its employment, right or wrong, could have had little effect on the final outcome, all operations being land based. From an economic point of view, it could have been of inestimable value in suppressing smugglers in Hong Kong-Canton waters had it been willing to suppress and not participate. It became so involved that it was completely relieved of this mission in March 1948 and reputedly millions of dollars in customs revenue continue to be lost to the Government.

It might be expected that the Communists, being Chinese themselves, would also suffer from these faulty Nationalist traits and characteristics, and to a certain extent they do, but they have wisely subordinated them and made their ideology of communism almost a fetish. By means of total mobilization in the areas they control, propaganda, and the use of political commissars within their armed forces, they maintain loyalty to the established order. Their leaders are men of proven ability who invariably outgeneral the Nationalist commanders. The morale and fighting spirit of the troops is very high because the are winning.

Do you recollect being advised in a similar vein, Mr. Secretary, at that time or on or about that time?

Secretary ACHESON. I find in the white paper on pages 325 to 338, inclusive, the report of General Barr in 1949, and I think that is the time you are reading about.

Senator MCMAHON. That is right.

Secretary **ACHESON**. I think that this report contains a great deal of what you have said, and there may be others, too. That is the one that I put my hand on at this moment.

Senator **MCMAHON**. Mr. Chairman, how much time have I got?

Chairman **RUSSELL**. The Chair, of course, had to make a rough approximation of the time.

Senator **MCMAHON**. I hope it was not too rough.

Chairman **RUSSELL**. I might state that by some miracle, Dr. Wilcox, who also keeps the time, came over to me and said that the best he could reckon it when the Senator's time will expire—the Senator has about 15 minutes. He took a little more than that in discussing the procedural matters, and I have——

Senator **MCMAHON**. I have taken about 18 minutes?

Chairman **RUSSELL**. I said you have about 15 minutes. You have used about 15 for your examination.

Senator **MCMAHON**. Thank you very much.

Senator **BREWSTER**. Will you read us the citation that the Secretary gave? I did not get that page.

Senator **LODGE**. Page 325.

Senator **BREWSTER**. Page 325; excuse me.

EDITORIAL IN LIFE MAGAZINE OF SOVIET-CHINESE TREATY IN 1945

Senator **MCMAHON**. Mr. Secretary, I do not know whether you are a regular reader of Life magazine, but in the issue of September 10, 1945, there appeared an editorial entitled "Peace in Asia," subtitle "The Moscow Treaties Give China Her First Real Chance To Complete an Old Revolution," and it starts out:

> Twelve days after Japan gave up, there was announced in Moscow and Chungking an agreement which was as great a victory for common sense as the defeat of Japan was for armed might. The Soong-Stalin treaties contain less ammunition for pessimists than any diplomatic event in the last 20 years. The signatures of two men have done as much to assure peace as all our Flying Fortresses. An extravagant statement? Consider.

It then goes on with a full page to give the reasons why the situation has been handled with such judiciousness and such foresight. Many of the prophecies that were made in this editorial have not come to pass, but it is interesting as again trying to establish the events of that time in the context of the feeling of men who were not gifted with the godlike propensity for complete and accurate foresight of events still to come.

I would ask, Mr. Chairman, that this editorial be printed in full in the appendix.

Chairman **RUSSELL**. Without objection, it will be printed in the appendix.

USE OF GOLD CREDIT TO CHINA DURING WAR

Senator **MCMAHON**. Now, Mr. Secretary, I wish you would turn your attention to an entirely different matter. Do you remember when it was that—in the early 1940's—a credit was granted to the Chinese Nationalist Government?

Secretary **ACHESON**. Yes, sir. I think that was in a public act passed in 1942, as I recall it.

Senator **MCMAHON**. Now, what was the nature of that credit?

Secretary ACHESON. As I recall it, it was a $500 million credit, passed by Congress sometime in 1942.

Senator McMAHON. How much of it in gold?

Secretary ACHESON. I think my recollection is that it could be drawn in any way the Chinese Government wished to draw it.

Senator McMAHON. Do you know how much of it was drawn in gold?

Secretary ACHESON. My recollection is that it was about $200 million, somewhere in that neighborhood.

Senator McMAHON. Do you know, Mr. Secretary, whether this was simply earmarked here, or was it physically transferred to China?

I would assume that it would be earmarked.

Secretary ACHESON. I think it was earmarked, and I think a great deal of it was transferred physically to China, and sold there.

Senator McMAHON. Now, Mr. Secretary, I have been informed that the Chinese Nationalist Government issued, against this gold, bank notes payable in 2 or 3 years, in small denominations of $10, $20, and $50.

I have also been informed that these notes were sold to the inside clique around Chiang; that they were sold, for Chinese dollars, at the official rate which was, at various times, 20 to 1, and I believe it got up as high as a thousand to one.

I am informed that at that time the black-market rate on Chinese dollars, to the American dollar, was as much as 500,000, and—yes—a million to one.

In other words, that this clique took Chinese dollars which they had gotten together, at the rate of a million Chinese dollars for one American dollar, and proceeded to buy notes of the Chinese Nationalist Bank, which were backed up by the $200 million gold credit, at the rate of 20 Chinese dollars to 1, and that when the notes came due, this bunch of crooks cashed in the Chinese bonds, took dollars in and gold, and proceeded to invest it in the United States of America, for their own private profit.

What can you tell us about that transaction?

Secretary ACHESON. Senator, I was looking at the white paper, on page 488, which I think contains about all I can contribute to this particular operation, because it is one which was within the scope of the Secretary of the Treasury's jurisdiction.

This is a memorandum to President Roosevelt, from the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Morgenthau, of December 18, 1943, which is reference—he says:

> You have spoken of a request of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek for an additional $1 billion of financial aid to China to be used to help control inflation and for postwar reconstruction.

Then he gives the facts regarding inflation in China, and says the possibilities of its control are as follows, and then he talks about that; and then he has some paragraphs which bear on the matter that you have been discussing. He says:

> China has tried two similar monetary remedies for alleviating inflation without marked success.
>
> 1. The Chinese Government issued and sold dollar securities for yuan, setting aside $200 million of the aid granted by the country for the redemption of the securities. (These securities were sold at exorbitant profit to the buyers. For instance, a person holding $100 in United States currency could have quad-

rupled his money in less than 2 years by selling the currency for yuan on the open market and buying the dollar securities issued by the Chinese Government.) I believe that the program made no significant contribution to the control of inflation.

EFFECTIVENESS OF $200 MILLION GOLD SHIPMENT ON CHINESE INFLATION

Senator McMahon. So, Mr. Secretary, we sent $200 million over there in gold, out of the Treasury of the United States, in order to save their currency, and it resulted in no significant contribution to the control of inflation?

Secretary Acheson. That is what the Secretary of the Treasury states here; and, he goes on to say:

> The Chinese Government has recently been selling gold at a price in yuan equivalent to $550 an ounce, about 15 times the official rate. We have shipped to China more than $10 million of gold and they have sold about $2 million of gold for yuan. This program has not been tried sufficiently to warrant any definite conclusion as to its possible effect.
>
> China now has $460 million of unpledged funds in the United States and is getting about $20 million a month as a result of our expenditures. China could use these funds in selling gold or dollar assets for yuan, although in my opinion such schemes in the past have had little effect except to give additional profits to insiders, speculators, and hoarders and dissipate foreign exchange resources that could be better used by China for reconstruction.
>
> Under the circumstances, a loan to China for these purposes could not be justified by the results that have been obtained. It is my opinion that a loan is unnecessary at this time and would be undesirable from the point of view of China and the United States. Large expenditures on ineffective measures for controlling inflation in China would be an unwise use of her borrowing capacity which should be reserved for productive uses in other ways. On reconstruction, it is too soon for us to know the best form of aid we might give to China.

And then, he gives his recommendations.

Senator Wiley. What year was the $200 million given?

Senator McMahon. Nineteen hundred and——

Secretary Acheson. The money loan was made available by Congress in 1942, and this memorandum is on December 18, 1943, so it is between the date of the act, and December 18, 1943.

Senator McMahon. Now, Mr. Secretary, you have an intelligence service in your Department of State, haven't you?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir. We have a security service, which is for the purpose of carrying out our responsibilities such as passports and visas.

Senator McMahon. You would not consider it a part of your responsibility, the responsibility of your Department, because you have to deal with this government, to find out what became of that $200 million in gold, and how much of it lined the private pockets of the speculators, grafters, and corruptionists?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir. We have no authority, no funds, and no means of conducting such an investigation.

Senator McMahon. Well, do you know of any such investigation that has been conducted by this Government into this transaction?

Secretary Acheson. No. It would not be in my Department, if it had been conducted.

Senator McMahon. Let me say for the record, Mr. Secretary, that I regard this, and I do not say this to you personally, because you have stated you were not responsible, but certainly in this Government there must be some department that is responsible for the thorough investigation of this corrupt transaction. If this money has come back into this country for the purpose of influencing public opinion, or any part of it, on American policy, those things should be made known to the American taxpayers who were robbed in the first instance by this corrupt gang of crooks. I should hope that the administration would start to do something about it.

No further questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hunt?

Senator HUNT. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain?

Senator CAIN. Mr. Secretary, I asked you a number of questions on Monday about the subject of hot pursuit, because I did not clearly understand some of your answers.

I have undertaken, since Monday, to find every reference in the record to hot pursuit.

STATE DEPARTMENT MESSAGE TO ALLIES ON "HOT PURSUIT"

Witnesses have discussed this question of hot pursuit on at least 20 different occasions. These references indicate most clearly that there is no agreement or understanding within the Defense Establishment on the steps which were taken by the State Department in discussing the question of hot pursuit with those nations with whom we were fighting as partners, last November, in Korea.

I continue, sir, to be concerned about the message which you, as the Secretary of State, sent on November 13, 1950, to six allied governments through our embassies, upon the subject of hot pursuit.

You offered this message in its entirety to the record on Tuesday.

Against this message, with your diligence and help, I should like to ask a number of questions in an effort that, as an individual, I might begin to have an appreciation of the subject.

Mr. Secretary, as I have read your message of January 13, 1950, it sought to inform the six nations with whom it was discussed that the United States, as the unified command agent of the United Nations, might be soon required by military necessity to permit United Nations aircraft to defend themselves by pursuing attacking enemy aircraft up to 2 or 3 minutes' flying time into Manchurian air space.

My first question is, sir: Is this not so?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I put the full telegram into the record, so I think that it will speak for itself.

I have no quarrel with what you have said.

Senator CAIN. Well, Mr. Secretary, if it be so, as I think I can establish, sir, that the Defense Establishment remains in doubt concerning many aspects of this question of hot pursuit, I want to be certain in my own mind that your message only sought to inform the six nations that the United Nations might soon be required to permit hot pursuit of enemy aircraft over the Yalu River.

I just don't want to continue to be in doubt in my own mind, and I have no desire to be unfair to you, sir, or myself or anyone else.

Secretary ACHESON. I said, Senator, that you are quite right about the six nations.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

Secretary **Acheson**. I think the thing that—I think that your general summary of the fairly long telegram in a couple of sentences is quite accurate, but nevertheless the telegram is in the record.

Senator **Cain**. Thank you, sir.

The message, Mr. Secretary, as I read it, emphasized the seriousness of the problem, and I want to emphasize the seriousness of the problem which was existing last November and continues to exist.

This message pointed out that hot pursuit would add greatly to the morale of the United Nations pilots who, as a whole, were prevented from taking minimum defense measures and would provide protection for bomber pilots for whom, under conditions existing, it was impossible, to use your words, Mr. Secretary, "to provide adequate air cover."

Is this not then a completely accurate interpretation of the portion of the message to which you have just made reference?

Secretary **Acheson**. I think you read from it.

Senator **Cain**. I did indeed, sir.

Mr. Secretary, in your message to the six governments, your purpose did not seek concurrence, because it was your stated and considered view that military necessity should be the overriding factor, and that the United Nations field commander and the JCS ought to possess the authority to employ hot pursuit when in their opinion that was advantageous to maintaining the security of our forces. Is my feeling on this point conclusively correct, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary **Acheson**. The telegram says:

> we are not asking the concurrence of the government—

that is, the government to which the recipient is accredited—

> because we believe the highly limited application of hot pursuit doctrine in this situation would turn upon military necessity and elementary principles of self-defense, but we think it important that the government be notified of the problem.

Senator **Cain**. Yes, sir. Well, that is to say, Mr. Secretary, that you recognize that military necessity would require imposing hot pursuit on the enemy, and you purposely therefore did not wish to put the field commander or the JCS in a position where other nations could veto or deny the right of our field commander to protect the United Nations forces under his command; is that not so?

Secretary **Acheson**. I think that is correct. We were preserving the freedom of the command to act if it felt that military necessity required it.

Senator **Cain**. Thank you, sir.

UNITED NATIONS ROLE IN KOREAN OPERATIONS

In previous testimony, Mr. Secretary, you have stated that after June 25, 1950, all action in Korea has been under the aegis of the United Nations. Does this remain your view, sir?

Secretary **Acheson**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Cain**. Mr. Secretary, do the free nations of the United Nations have a military committee? Is there a military committee within the United Nations?

Secretary **Acheson**. I will have to look that up. I believe that there was a committee of that sort set up under the Uniting for Peace Resolution in October, but that was for the purpose of that particular resolution. I will have to read it.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Secretary, what I am getting at, if you have an opportunity to look into that question, is this: I would like to know what is the function of the United Nations Military Committee, and, if there is such a committee, I want to pose to you, later on, this question.

Why was not the problem of hot pursuit referred to the United Nations Military Committee? You have previously said in answer to questions of mine that it was not advantageous or practicable to refer this question to either the Good Offices Committee or the Security Council of the United Nations, and I continue to explore the possibility of some other agency within the United Nations which properly ought to examine such a question as this, for it may come again, sir.

Secretary ACHESON. I think I can answer that there is no military committee of the United Nations which has jurisdiction or function to perform in connection with the conduct of the high command in Korea, the united command in Korea.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Secretary, let me ask you this: How is it possible or proper to confer unilaterally with particular allied nations about Korean War problems and requirements when I have understood you to say that all the Korean action taken is under the aegis of the United Nations?

Secretary ACHESON. This is a possible operational matter on which it was desired to get the attitude of some of the countries, and we conferred with the countries and obtained their attitude, and——

Senator CAIN. Again I seek, sir, only information——

Chairman RUSSELL. Just a minute. Has the witness finished his answer?

Senator CAIN. I beg your pardon.

Secretary ACHESON. I said we conferred with some of the countries, got their attitude, informed the Department of Defense about that, and the Department of Defense on that information made up their own mind as to what they thought was proper from a military point of view.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Secretary, you are being very helpful, as other witnesses have, in providing us with information on this question which has so many aspects to it. Am I understanding you correctly to say that with reference to future operational needs, that it is likely that the United States, acting as an agent for the United Nations, will discuss future operations unilaterally with some of the nations but not with all of the nations who are our allies?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; you did not understand me to say anything like that.

REASON FOR CONSULTING ONLY CERTAIN NATIONS ON HOT PURSUIT

Senator CAIN. Well, we have this one example, sir, in which some of the nations with whom we are fighting know what our intention is and other nations with whom we are fighting, on the basis of the record, did not have the slightest idea that this country of ours was even considering the need for pursuing and destroying enemy aircraft. And I am worried about it.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I don't think you need be worried about it, Senator. After this information was conveyed to the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that they would not engage in this tactical operation, and therefore it was not necessary to go further. If they had thought otherwise, then it might well have been necessary or desirable to consult other people.

Senator CAIN. I think in all the course of these hearings I have never read a message from either our Defense or State Department which so clearly stated a problem and which so forcefully advocated a particular course of action. That message was written by the State Department. That message asked for concurrence from no one. That message said that things are going to be required. And yet, as soon as that message was discussed and considered by some of our allied friends, we have not since, so far as I know, heard the question of hot pursuit being discussed by those in authority in this country.

Secretary ACHESON. I think that General Vandenberg pointed out to you that the situation at the time this message was sent was wholly different from what it was when the fighting was 250 miles farther south.

Senator CAIN. And the Secretary of State would not begrudge me the observation that on the basis of what we read every day in our papers, sir, we are likely soon again to be confronted with circumstances practically identical to those which confronted our forces last November. We are being very successful on the ground. The farther north we go, the more we minimize the effectiveness of our own air power, and the greater need there shall be for destroying enemy aircraft which has as its only purpose the total destruction of our allied forces in Korea.

So some of us, Mr. Secretary, in the most serious sort of a way are trying to anticipate the needs of tomorrow.

May I ask you this: On Tuesday, Mr. Secretary, you listed the Allied nations which in mid-November, almost 5 months after the war began in Korea, had sent sea, air, and ground forces and elements to Korea. They were Australia, United Kingdom, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Belgium, Canada, France, New Zealand, and the Netherlands.

On last Monday you named the six nations to whom the hot pursuit message of November 13, 1950, had been sent. It seems to me that there must have been, Mr. Secretary, some considered reason as to why this important message was not sent to some of our allies who were fighting and dying with the United States in Korea.

The message used forceful language in describing that enemy aircraft were operating from a tremendous advantage in hampering our air and ground movement.

Will you give me now your very best recollection—you were most uncertain about it the other day—as to why the Secretary of State informed some nations of the need for hot pursuit and neglected to inform others, all of whom, Mr. Secretary, were joined in a common effort?

I continue—not to be curious—I continue to want to know what we were thinking about in November which justified separating some nations from other nations when there were only a handful of nations to begin with.

Secretary Acheson. Senator, we have been over this several times. I have given you all I know about it. I shall be very glad to do it again if you wish.

Senator Cain. Mr. Secretary, what you gave me on Monday—I seek not to be embarrassing—all you said on Monday was you couldn't remember why you took it up with some and not with others.

I am merely asking: As a result of these hearings has it not brought back to your mind what you were thinking about on that occasion when the JCS, the Secretary of Defense, and yourself were in agreement that hot pursuit was the hottest practical question of that day? There must have been some reason.

Secretary Acheson. Senator, it does no good to say there must have been some reason when I have told you all the reasons that I know, which were that we were asked to take this up and get the attitude of some of the nations regarding it. We took it up with the group, which I have described as a representative group. We got a unanimous reaction from them adverse to it. On the basis of that and on the basis of the changing military situation the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided it was not necessary, and therefore we did not go forward with the rest, as we might well have done if they had come to a different conclusion.

WHY HOT PURSUIT WAS NOT CARRIED FURTHER

Senator Cain. Well, I wanted to ask you this question, which follows right along with what you are saying: After you got a negative reaction from the six nations conferred with, did the Secretary of State consider posing the problem to the other Allies who were then fighting with America in Korea?

Secretary Acheson. We forwarded the views of each one of the countries with whom it was discussed through the Secretary of Defense, and it was decided that they did not think it necessary to go forward with the matter.

Senator Cain. Have those papers, sir, been made a part of the record, either in its appendix, or in our executive version, or in some other fashion?

Secretary Acheson. My communications to the Secretary of Defense?

Senator Cain. Yes.

Secretary Acheson. No; you have not asked for those.

Senator Cain. I would appreciate them if that is a proper request.

Mr. Secretary, did you advise, and I think you have just said so, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the nations by name who, having been conferred with, were opposed to hot pursuit?

Secretary Acheson. I have answered that.

Senator Cain. Did you, sir, advise the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that you had thought it proper not to take the question of hot pursuit up with some of our allies who were fighting with us in Korea?

Did you ever tell them of your reasons, if any were given, as to why you did not confer with those other nations?

Secretary Acheson. The nations with whom we took the matter up were shown in the letter. Therefore it could be deduced from that the nations with whom we did not take it up.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Secretary, as a party to those who approved hot pursuit——

Secretary ACHESON. I couldn't hear you, sir.

Senator CAIN. I beg your pardon, sir. As a party to those who approved hot pursuit, did you not have a duty and obligation to take the question up with every nation with whom we were joined in combat in Korea? I think you will not misunderstand.

Secretary ACHESON. I don't understand the question. As a party, is that what you said, as a party?

Senator CAIN. I said as a party. Let me say it another way. As I understand it, sir, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense—and the question of whether or not the President was conferred with remains in doubt, but the others were in complete agreement and in support of invoking hot pursuit, and against that I ask if you did not consider it to be your duty to at least inform every nation with whom we were fighting of what America's intention in this line was?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Secretary, I will not press this very much, but on page 4574 you said this in answer to a question by Senator Bridges:

> I think I have been over that before, Senator Bridges. General Marshall's recollection was it—

referring to hot pursuit—

> had been approved by the President. I did not recall that, but he is undoubtedly right. It was my duty to take it—

referring to the question—

> up with these various countries, and, as I told you, we took it up with six countries.

And what I am getting at, Mr. Secretary, if it was your acknowledged duty to take it up with some of the nations, why with some of the nations, why wasn't it likewise your duty—and I feel deeply about this—to have informed all of the nations?

Secretary ACHESON. It might well have been if the Defense Department had asked me to go further with the question when I made the report on the six. They decided that they did not want to go further with hot pursuit, and there was no occasion to go to any other nations.

POSSIBLE FUTURE NEED FOR HOT PURSUIT

Senator CAIN. For what reason was it decided not to employ hot pursuit even though military necessity so required? Were not enemy aircraft continuing to come across the Yalu River for the purpose of destroying our ground forces and air elements after the middle of November 1950?

Secretary ACHESON. I shall have to leave the military situation to the military. The point is that it was decided after this information was given that it was not necessary or desirable or both to go forward with this tactical operation, and as I brought out, General Vandenberg has said, and this telegram points out, that the element of military necessity in this was more particularly the morale of the pilots.

Now as soon as the fighting went down farther south, that situation did not exist.

Senator CAIN. Well, in terms of logic, Mr. Secretary, I remain concerned. Aircraft continue to cross the Yalu River for the sole purpose of destroying us, and it remains a fact today, so far as I know, that our airmen are not permitted to cross the Yalu River in seeking to destroy our enemy.

So I just can't believe that circumstances when judged by military necessity, Mr. Secretary, have changed to any extent which would justify dropping this possibility of destroying the enemy.

Secretary ACHESON. I think you are wrong about that, Senator. I do not recall that the Chinese Air ever seriously or perhaps at all attacked our ground forces.

The particular reason for going across the border was that the fighter pilots had to break off at the border. The fighter pilots are not at the border, and that situation doesn't exist at the present time.

Senator CAIN. You and I have both been reading with interest and with distress, too, that enemy jet aircraft are being employed steadily, if not in large numbers, immediately south of the Yalu River.

It, therefore, remains a fact that those jets can come over and annoy, harass, and destroy some of our precious people and if they are able to get back north as far as the Yalu River, they are just as safe as they could possibly be.

Secretary ACHESON. I understand they are not attacking our ground forces and are either not able to or they don't do it, and they do create a problem in the bombing missions which are carried on in the north for the fighter pilots, who chase them as far as the border and then don't go farther; but this problem is not as acute as it was.

Senator CAIN. Well, sir, we simply have a difference of opinion and we had better let it go at that for the time being.

Mr. Secretary, to your knowledge, has the question of hot pursuit been referred to some or all of our fiighting allies since is was dropped last November?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; it has not.

Senator CAIN. At a later date, in order to be of service to the committee and, I think, to the Secretary likewise and to the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, I shall merely place in the record all of the many references to this subject as they have been offered to this committee by the members of the JCS, by the Secretary of Defense, by General MacArthur, by the Secretary of State, and I think that as a result a further exploration of the subject will be in order.

Mr. Secretary, if I have any further time, I should like to begin this subject, if I may.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator has about 3 minutes.

CIRCULATION OF MARCH PROPOSED PLAN FOR NEGOTIATIONS

Senator CAIN. I have long been concerned, Mr. Secretary—that is merely a personal feeling—because General MacArthur was not provided with a draft of the proposed cease-fire order in March.

I began to discuss some questions about it the other day, beginning on page 5037, and this was my first question:

> Mr. Secretary, you have testified that the President authorized you to negotiate last March with those 13 nations having troops in Korea and that you sent a draft of a proposed cease-fire order to each of these governments. Did I understand you to testify in that fashion?

> Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; you did not. We did not send any draft of a cease-fire order to anybody.

I have run across in this connection what seems to be a rather large contradiction in terms, and, Mr. Secretary, I want to ask your advice about it.

On page 4668 of the record——

Secretary ACHESON. You might read a little further, Senator Cain, where it says:

> Senator CAIN. Does the committee have before it a draft and the date of that cease-fire proposal?

Senator CAIN. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON. And—

> Secretary ACHESON. There is a paraphrase in this collection of papers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which tells what was the proposed message that the President was going to deliver.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir. On page 4668 the following colloquy appears between the Senator from Texas, Mr. Johnson, and the Secretary of State:

> Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Secretary, we have been told that a planned cease-fire proposal in the Korean War broke down as a result of General MacArthur's March 24 ultimatum to the North Koreans and Chinese Communists.
>
> Would you tell us in some detail from your viewpoint precisely what hapened?
>
> Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. We were working—we had been working with the Defense Department on a proposal which we both were considering that, as the head of the state, of the Government, which had been asked by the UN to be the command, the UN command, the President might make a statement laying down what he proposed as an ending of the aggression and the stopping of fighting in Korea.
>
> That matter had been discussed by me with the President sufficiently to get his authority to go ahead with it although no final paper had been laid before him.
>
> The matter had reached the point where a draft of a proposed statement was made, and had been circulated to the governments who had troops with us in Korea.
>
> The replies of most of these governments had come in, although not all of them had come in on the date in question.
>
> Some of the governments approved the statement without any suggested changes; others suggested some editing changes in it, and, as I say, I think two—perhaps more—had not replied on that date.

Now, Mr. Secretary, for there probably is a sound reason for it, I should like to know how it was that in answer to my question, I think it was a comparable question, you said that no draft had been circulated to anybody, and in answer to a similar question by Senator Johnson, you said that a draft had been circulated to everybody and that most everybody had responded to it.

Secretary ACHESON. That is why I asked you to read the last two questions which you had not read. What you first asked me was whether a draft of a proposed cease-fire order——

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

Secretary ACHESON. Now, a cease-fire order is the document which the Joint Chiefs of Staff worked out at the time we were discussing the cease-fire in the UN, and is a quite long and technical military document, which would be issued by the troops' commanders on either side in the event there is an armistice.

That tells exactly what troops must do, the points to which they must withdraw, the actions which they are or are not to take, and a great many rather complicated military matters.

Therefore, when you say, "Has a draft of the proposed cease-fire order been sent out?" I said "no," that we didn't send a draft of a cease-fire order to anybody. You then went on and asked me about the date of this proposal for ending the war.

I said there was a paraphrase of that and it is in the book. You then started to examine me on whether it was sent to General MacArthur and I responded to that.

Senator CAIN. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON. So that the line of questioning was quite different in the two cases.

Senator CAIN. I thought it was comparable. I apologize for having placed my question in an improper fashion. You have taught me, as a result of what you have just said, that the draft proposal was a document leading in the direction of a hoped for cease-fire action in Korea.

Secretary ACHESON. You have got a paraphrase of it, which I have referred to, and I will draw your attention to it again in this Joint Chiefs of Staff—it is on page 101. It is paragraph 43.

Senator CAIN. I will look that up, sir, and study it. I thank you for the reference.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator.

Senator CAIN. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Lodge?

Senator LODGE. Mr. Secretary, I would like first to ask a few questions about the future.

WEIGHT OF KREMLIN IN KOREAN CONFLICT

Do you think the Kremlin has enough influence to bring enough pressure to bear to stop the aggression in Korea if it wanted to?

Secretary ACHESON. That is a hard question for me to answer. It is purely in the realm of speculation. I think the Kremlin's influence will be very helpful if directed in that line.

Senator LODGE. Even if it was not decisive, it would certainly——

Secretary ACHESON. I don't know, Senator Lodge; I really cannot answer that.

Senator LODGE. You have got no opinion as to whether it could exercise a good deal of weight in stopping the aggression?

Secretary ACHESON. I have already said that I think it would exercise a good deal of weight.

Senator LODGE. Yes.

Let me now read an excerpt from your opening statement. This occurs on page 4534 of the record of June 1, and then I want to ask you some questions about it:

USING TIME TO BUILD UP OUR DEFENSES

> The basic premise of our foreign policy is that time is on our side if we make good use of it. This does not necessarily mean that time must bring us to a point where we can match the Soviet Union man for man and tank for tank.
>
> What it does mean is that we need to use the time we have to build an effective deterrent force. This requires us to create sufficient force-in-being, both in the United States and among our allies, to shield our great potential against the possibility of a quick and easy onslaught, and to insure that our allies will not suffer occupation and destruction. And back of this shield we need to have the potential that would enable us to win a war.

I would like to ask you some questions based on this statement: First, do you think that we are making good use of the time that our men are buying for us in Korea?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I think we are making good use of it. I think everybody involved in the effort wishes that things could go faster, but I don't know of any way myself in which they could be made to go faster.

Senator LODGE. Do you think that we have a moral obligation to use the time that our men in Korea are buying for us in order to get strong as quickly as possible?

Secretary ACHESON. I think every possible consideration should lead us to do that—the one you mention and our own national security, everything that we have, should be thrown into that.

Senator LODGE. Do you think we are able today, in your phrase, to shield our great potential against the possibility of a quick and easy onslaught?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't think those forces exist today, sir.

Senator LODGE. Do you think today we are able to insure that our allies will not suffer occupation and destruction?

Secretary ACHESON. Not with the forces available today.

Senator LODGE. I note you said that back of this shield we need to have the potential that would enable us to win a war.

You do not say the force that will support really firm diplomatic pressure on the Kremlin. Did you fail to say that because you do not believe that we should be in a position to put such diplomatic force on the Kremlin?

This question will undoubtedly be censored, and maybe should be censored, but I would like to know, for my information and for that of the committee, whether you do not believe that an object of American foreign policy ought to be to develop enough military strength that we can put firm and effective diplomatic pressure on the Kremlin to use their influence to stop the aggression in Korea.

Secretary ACHESON. I think that I have testified before various committees and made a great number of public speeches along the line of saying what we must do is to create situations of strength; we must build strength; and if we create that strength, then I think that the whole situation in the world begins to change so far as the potentialities of the Soviet Union being able to achieve its present purposes is concerned; and with that change there comes a difference in the negotiating positions of the various parties, and out of that I should hope that there would be a willingness on the side of the Kremlin to recognize the facts which have been created by this effort of ours and to begin to solve at least some of the difficulties between east and west.

Senator LODGE. And you do not feel that—or, rather, you would desire that we would build that strength more quickly if we could possibly do so?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes; if we could wish it into existence, I would wish it into existence right at this minute.

Senator LODGE. Would you favor going to three shifts, for example, in order to build the air force that we need, to give a specific illustration?

Secretary ACHESON. That is out of my field; that belongs in the field of other officers of the Government.

Senator LODGE. I would like to do a little Monday morning quarterbacking, which I do not apologize for because I think the way you win next week's game is by doing a little Monday morning quarterbacking.

POSSIBLE PAST MISTAKES ON KOREA POLICY AND DEMOBILIZATION

With hindsight, don't you think we would have been better off if we had obtained the congressional authorization for the action that we took in Korea last summer?

Secretary **Acheson**. Well, I think that a lot of people who now think that we should have would have been satisfied if we had done it; to that extent, yes.

Senator **Lodge**. That is your answer?

Do you think that we made a mistake when we pulled our own troops out of Korea in June 1949?

Secretary **Acheson**. No; I don't think that I regard that as a mistake. That, as I pointed out yesterday, was the recommendation of the United Nations; it was the recommendation of our Military Establishment, which thought our troops were much more seriously needed somewhere else. That recommendation met with the approval of the commander in chief, Far East; and it seemed to me then, and I think it was the right decision to try and build up the Korean forces. You would have to consider that if you had not done that two things might have happened: Either the attack would not have taken place. That would be, of course, very good if that attack had not taken place.

On the other hand, there was a considerable wish on the part of the Koreans that they should have the forces withdrawn from the north and from the south. We could not ask the Russians to withdraw their forces and hope to succeed without withdrawing our forces.

The forecast that we had in Korea were, with very small exceptions, not combat forces; they were administrative forces.

Their presence there might have prevented the attack merely because they were there, not because they were combat effectives.

Senator **Lodge**. Well, the former commander in chief, Far East, I think, has stated on this record that in retrospect he feels that it would have been better to have left the troops there, and I think the Defense Department has also testified to that effect.

Secretary **Acheson**. Well, you have to consider what would have happened.

Senator **Lodge**. You certainly would not favor pulling the troops out of Europe, would you?

Secretary **Acheson**. I beg pardon?

Senator **Lodge**. You would not favor pulling troops out of Europe, would you?

Secretary **Acheson**. No; I think that is a different situation.

Senator **Lodge**. Do you feel we made a mistake in 1945 and 1946 to disarm as rapidly as we did?

Secretary **Acheson**. Yes, sir; I think that was a mistake.

WISDOM OF DENOUNCING YALTA AGREEMENTS

Senator **Lodge**. Do you think that in retrospect Yalta appears to have been a tragic miscalculation, even though it is one that maybe anybody else would have made if they had been in power, but in retrospect it appears to be that?

Secretary Acheson. No, I don't share that view.

Senator Lodge. So you do not favor denouncing the Yalta Agreement?

Secretary Acheson. Well, you see the Yalta Agreement was preliminary to treaties which were entered into between China and the Soviet Union. Those would be the treaties which would be denounced if anything was denounced. I don't know what good that would do.

It has been pointed out to me that the Soviet Union has already superseded those agreements entered into with the Chinese Communists.

Senator Lodge. Still we could if we wanted to, could we not, just state that we today do not approve of the decisions that have been made there, couldn't we?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir, that could be done.

FULFILLING MILITARY AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES OF UN IN KOREA

Senator Lodge. The statement has been made to me quite often in letters that I received that when we went into Korea we did it with the avowed and declared and formal purpose of liberating the whole of Korea, and that if the fighting in Korea stops with any result less than that, it will be a failure of the United Nations mission, is that correct?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir; I don't think that is correct.

Senator Lodge. So it is true, is it, that if a cease fire or an armistice were to be arranged on the basis of the thirty-eighth parallel, that would be squarely within the purview of the basic United Nations policy?

Secretary Acheson. That would be within the resolutions of the 25th and 27th of June 1950. The United Nations resolutions beginning in 1947 have confirmed what was in the Cairo Declaration, that there should be a free, united and democratic Korea, and that is the constant policy and effort of the UN and of the United States.

Senator Lodge. But it is your contention, is it not, that we would keep faith with the policy of the United Nations if we agreed to an armistice at the thirty-eighth parallel?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir; neither the United Nations nor the United States has ever undertaken the obligation to unify Korea by force.

EFFECTIVENESS AND POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENT OF UNITED NATIONS

Senator Lodge. Now I would like to ask you some questions regarding the future of the United Nations and whether the experience that you have had in the last 2 years, the experience that the United Nations has had in the last 2 years have caused you to develop any suggestions for improving and strengthening the United Nations.

Along that line have you any suggestions as to changes that could be made in the United Nations Charter regarding the expulsion of members of the United Nations who are flagrantly out to destroy the United Nations from within?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir; I have no suggestions of doing that. That has not been the policy of the United States.

Senator Lodge. To expel members?

Secretary Acheson. It has not been the policy to do what you just stated, to expel those members who are opposing the policy of the United Nations.

Senator Lodge. Maybe I did not make my question clear. I am speaking about the expulsion from the United Nations of nations who are flagrantly seeking to destroy the United Nations. That can't be a good thing for the United Nations to have nations in it who wish to do that.

Secretary Acheson. The whole basis of the United Nations has been, and our policy in connection with it has been, to attain universality. We would like all nations to be members of the United Nations.

That is why we have so strongly opposed the Soviet Union when it has been keeping the nations which ought to be in the organization out of it.

Mr. Hull stated in his very famous speech in April 1944 it was the conception that you would have a world organization which would be founded on two great things. One would be the cooperation of the great powers.

They were committed to this so that those powers who had the great residue of military force under the Charter would be working to support the principles and policies of the Charter.

The other great foundation of the United Nations was that through this Organization the world would be operated on the basis of law and justice. Force would not be an instrument for settling disputes.

All disputes would be settled peacefully and through the cooperation of the nations in the United Nations and its various organs you would increase not only the peace and security of the world but also the economic and moral foundation of the lives of all the peoples in the nations which belong to it.

Senator Lodge. Well, I realize that that was the hope and that was the original policy. I just ask you whether you think that it is possible for any organization to survive when there are members of it who are actively trying to destroy it and whom you have no way of punishing or expelling.

Secretary Acheson. I think that the policies which I have been discussing with you this morning and which for so many years have created strength here offer the best possible hope I know of of bringing about a situation where those nations who have been trying to destroy the basis of the United Nations will cease doing that and will work within the Organization.

I think it is probably better that there should be an international forum where these nations have to appear in an attempt to justify their conduct than that that should not take place, and I think that their conduct has been shown up much better by their own performances within the United Nations than it possibly could have been done by the efforts of anybody else.

Senator Lodge. So your remedy for this situation is to try to change the attitude of these nations rather than try to expel them from the organization?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, and I think their attitude has changed only as the nations who are really supporting the principles of the charter become strong and able to protect themselves.

Senator LODGE. Now at the last General Assembly a Collective Measures Committee was set up in accordance with the terms of the United Action for Peace resolution. I believe that is true, is it not?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir, that is true.

Senator LODGE. Can you tell us anything about the progress that has been made under that Collective Measures Committee?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; there has been a resolution of the 18th of May which we have read into the record here in which the Collective Measures Committee has recommended and the first committee has adopted and the General Assembly has adopted a series of economic restrictions which should be put into effect in trade with Communist China.

Those that I pointed out would bring many nations which have agreed to them up to the level of what some of the other nations have been doing for some little time. I think it will have an important effect.

We are hoping and believing and working so that that committee will go forward to increase the efficacy of economic measures.

COMPARISON OF VETO ON SECRETARY GENERAL AND ON SEATING RED CHINA

Senator LODGE. As I recall it, last October, toward the end of October I think it was, Ambassador Austin publicly and formally and officially threatened to use the veto on any candidate for the position of Secretary General other than Mr. Trygve Lie. I wondered whether in retrospect you think that was a wise step to have taken?

Secretary ACHESON. I think that was a necessary step at that time, Senator.

Senator LODGE. Because there are many people who are not experts, who say that if you are willing to use the veto on a secretarial question like that, why are you not willing to use it to keep the Communist Chinese out of the United Nations.

I have that comment made to me all the time.

Now what is your comment on that?

Secretary ACHESON. Have you heard my earlier testimony on this point, Senator?

Senator LODGE. I heard your earlier testimony about the seating of Communist China, but I have not heard you testify about this matter of using the veto on the Secretary General. Now maybe you testified on that; did you?

Secretary ACHESON. No, I didn't talk about that.

Senator LODGE. No.

Secretary ACHESON. But I talked about using the veto, so-called, in connection with the Communist Chinese.

Senator LODGE. I heard your testimony about that and going to the World Court to get a decision on whether it is procedural or whether it is not. But I have not heard you testify, and I don't think you have testified on the question of Ambassador Austin's threat to use the veto in the matter of the Secretary General. I would like to have you elucidate that because I think many people sincerely wonder why that is not a case on all fours with any other procedural question.

Secretary ACHESON. In connection with the election of the Secretary General, the Charter itself provides that a vote of a permanent member against a candidate prevents that candidate from being elected.

We undertook to use our vote in that way on any candidate other than Mr. Trygve Lie.

You questioned me about that, as to whether I thought that was wise in retrospect, and I thought under the circumstances at that time it was wise.

Now, do you want me to compart these two things?

I have stated so far as the Chinese Communists being admitted to the UN is concerned, we are opposing it, we have opposed it, we have opposed it successfully, we have carried a majority to that view in 76 votes. The one in which that was not done is no longer important because it was reversed the following year.

Therefore, at the present time the Chinese Nationalists sit in all 46 organs connected with the United Nations and in the United Nations, and the Chinese Communists do not sit in any.

Now we have said that we expect that to continue, and the way to continue it is to continue to put forward positions so strongly and persuasively that you carry these majorities with you.

Now I pointed out that if you get in the Security Council, which is the only one where there is the possibility of an adverse vote by a permanent member that would defeat the entrance of the Chinese Communists—if you get into a minority of four or less, then the question arises whether your vote, which we will continue to cast against the entry of the Communists, operates to block it although seven others vote in favor of it.

And the only way of determining that—there are only two ways I know of determining it: One is to ask for a vote of the Security Council, and the other one is to ask for an opinion of the World Court. I pointed out that the World Court has seemed to me much the better organ to pass on this thing because if you imagine yourselves in a minority of four on the substantive question, you would probably be in a minority of four or less on the question as to whether your adverse vote did or did not constitute a veto.

This is a matter on which there have been several points of view, and it has been argued back and forth. The World Court is the organization which can decide it.

Senator LODGE. I did not mean for you to repeat all that. I was aware of most of that.

What I was getting at is the use of the veto on the Secretary General. Is that a procedural question or not?

Secretary ACHESON. That is provided for explicitly in the Charter. There isn't any doubt about that. The other question is one in which there is an argument.

Senator LODGE. Well, I wish somehow it could be stated in terms that the citizen could understand. I think it is too bad because it means endless misunderstanding.

Is there any possibility of following the line which was successfully adopted in the case of the United Nations resolution, whereby a veto in the Security Council on matters involved in aggression was bypassed, so as to bypass the veto on the admission of new members?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; the admission of a new member is provided for explicitly in the Charter, and that matter has gone to the World Court, and the World Court has ruled on it.

Senator LODGE. So that a veto can keep out a country like Italy, for instance?

Secretary Acheson. It was in connection with Italy that the World Court made the ruling.

Senator Lodge. The World Court decided that that was a vetoable question?

Secretary Acheson. It decided, yes, sir, that this was a question which had to be passed upon by the Security Council before it could be voted on in the General Assembly, and it decided that the adverse vote of a permanent member blocked the Security Council from making a recommendation or a nomination to the General Assembly.

POSSIBILITY OF AMENDING UN CHARTER

Senator Lodge. And is there no way of proposing an amendment to the Charter or some other legal device whereby that situation can be changed?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir, you can propose an amendent to the Charter, but amendments to the charter are subject to being blocked by the adverse vote of a permanent member of the Security Council.

Senator Lodge. Well, now that gets me to the point—If the day comes that we have regained the initiative that we threw away, that we have created what you call situations of strength, and that we are able to get a few things done our own way, instead of constantly having them push us around, so to speak, are there not some changes and improvements that can be made in the basic organization of the United Nations so that we will not be up against these frustrating situations all the time?

Secretary Acheson. I have pointed out to you what the Charter says about amending it. If a permanent member votes against the amendment, then the amendment doesn't take place.

Senator Lodge. I am trying to get the discussion on a broader, less technical plane. Do you think that we can depend on the United Nations to maintain the peace of the world after we once regain the initiative, or do you think it is so impossible to change it and so impossible to correct its errors that we ought to create a new world organization?

Secretary Acheson. Well, I think the United Nations is becoming increasingly effective; through the efforts of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Rio Treaty, and our own efforts here we do create such a situation of strength that the Soviet Union will recognize that fact and will undertake to deal according to the provisions of the Charter.

Senator Lodge. And will then stop vetoing Italy and Ireland and all these other countries it is vetoing now?

Secretary Acheson. I think those things might very well be worked out if we get to a point where we can work out the major questions and differences between us.

Senator Lodge. How much time have I got, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Russell. You have about 2¼ minutes, Senator.

POSSIBILITY OF A UN FORCE OR INCREASED CONTRIBUTIONS

Senator Lodge. Do you not consider that one of the most vital elements in the whole question of the success of the United Nations is whether or not the members in the case of aggression will pledge manpower roughly in proportion to their population?

Secretary ACHESON. I think it is of great importance that they should put up manpower. Now, whether it is in proportion to their population or in proportion to their means, or whatever else it is, I wouldn't undertake to say, Senator. But it is most important that they should get forces into the field in support of the United Nations; yes.

Senator LODGE. It seems to me that there isn't any single thing that shakes confidence in the United Nations more surely than the idea that when we have a vote there that is settled 54 to 5 in favor of what the United States wants, that then only the United States and a handful of other nations put up the men.

Would you not agree that has a very discouraging effect on a great many people?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I think your question is whether they have a vote in favor of something the United States wants.

I think if the vote is in favor of what is the right and proper thing to do and, of course, within the principles of the Charter, then it is discouraging to people if only a few nations respond. For that reason we have been using all the efforts we can to get as many nations to respond as possible.

Senator LODGE. And the response is increasing, is it not?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes.

Senator LODGE. The favorable response is increasing?

Secretary ACHESON. That is true, yes, sir.

Senator LODGE. But there are some, without mentioning any names, wouldn't you say there are some nations whose record in support of these activities against aggression has been discouraging, distinctly disappointing?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I don't want to discuss the nations. We are constantly working to improve the response, and I think we are having increasing success with it.

Senator LODGE. Thank you very much.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis?

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I pass.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Flanders?

FUTURE OF KOREA AFTER CONFLICT

Senator FLANDERS. Mr. Secretary, supposing that all of Korea were cleared of the invaders and that the country was pacified, and supposing in due time, as was originally contemplated by the United Nations, that elections were held. Would you feel confident that the elections would be anti-Communist if they were held within a year or so?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, you are asking me to predict elections under circumstances which are very hard for me to foresee, Senator.

Senator FLANDERS. I have a real point in mind, and I think a very important point. Here is a country which has been under the protection of the United Nations, and as a result some millions of its people have lost their lives, and there has been a terrific destruction of property as well as loss of life. I think we ought to be wondering right now as to finding out so far as we can as to whether or not that is leaving a good taste in the mouth of the Korean people themselves.

I think that is something we should be thinking about, should be investigating, and I was wondering if any thought had been given to that, and if you had any thought on the matter.

Secretary ACHESON. A lot of thought has been given to it in the past, and I think that we were quite confident that if the campaign of last fall had been successful, that the elections which were held then would have been very strongly anti-Communist.

Now it is hard to tell, without being able to talk to people or understand what their attitude is in North Korea at the present moment. I wouldn't have any doubt that the elections in the south would be anti-Communist.

Senator FLANDERS. I am thinking of this in connection with both the statement made by the new envoy from Korea as to the great loss of life and destruction, and also of the President's expression of hope that Korea could be rebuilt, as to whether it might not be useful now to, useful perhaps in shortening hostilities, useful at least in putting a stronger burden of guilt—if you want to use the word "guilt"—on the Chinese, if arrangements could be made with the United Nations for the offer of rebuilding when peace is assured; and some arrangements made, for instance, with the existing government that the agrarian reforms—I hesitate to use that phrase because it is a fighting phrase—the agrarian reforms—there could be some arrangements made with the existing government so the agrarian reforms could be carried out; so that the Communist Party would have no leg left to stand on, and the support of the Communists by China would more clearly and plainly be seen to be to the detriment of the people of Korea.

It seems to me there is an area in there for diplomatic action which might well be begun now.

I may say that in all of this investigation I have been personally less interested in who done what, when, where, and why, than I have been on what to do next. I am hoping that some useful suggestions as to what to do next are coming out of this.

This suggestion I am just making is one of the things which has occurred to me.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, a great deal of thought has been given to the whole economic question in Korea and to the reconstruction which would take place afterward.

The United Nations has set up a commission, has got a director general of that commission. The great difficulty so far has been it has not had a chance to operate.

Senator FLANDERS. I am not thinking so much of that as I am of public action.

Secretary ACHESON. You mentioned the question of land reform. It has been pointed out several times that that was well on its way to completion.

Senator FLANDERS. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON. And if this attack had not taken place in the year 1950, it would have been somewhere above 80 percent complete; and therefore it would be picked up after the war, and, I am sure, carried on to completion.

We have thought about the matters you speak of and will continue to think about them.

Senator FLANDERS. I am just suggesting as to whether or not the time may not now be opportune for the United Nations to declare a program for Korea which will make even more plain than it is at the present moment, if that is possible, that the intervention of the Chinese Communists is a very bad thing for the whole population of Korea, because we have this program in mind and we pledge ourselves to it.

I want to say that to the extent that it involves any action by the Congress, I think there are a large number of Senators here who would pledge themselves to support such action.

That, Mr. Chairman, is all I wanted to do, to make the suggestion that I felt more positive action on a program might well shorten the present hostilities.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Fulbright?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Tobey?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Sparkman?

VOTES ON SEATING OF CHINA

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, a few minutes ago, in answer to Senator Lodge, you repeated the statement you made a couple of days ago, that the United States had won 76 out of 77 votes. It is now 77 out of 78, is it not? Was there not a vote the last day or two that ended up with an 11 to 1 vote?

Secretary ACHESON. That may be, Senator.

Senator SPARKMAN. And England changed her position. There was some comment in the newspapers and over the radio about it. I don't remember what body it was in.

ELECTION OF UN SECRETARY-GENERAL

Secretary ACHESON. I am glad you brought that to my attention. I shall look into it and change my figures.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, Mr. Secretary, you said that it was provided in the Charter that the Secretary-General should be elected by the vote of all of the five members. I have failed to find that in explicit terms.

I do find that there must be a unanimous vote by the five great members on all questions except procedural questions. And further I find that the Secretary-General is elected upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

Secretary ACHESON. I think that is what I had in mind.

Senator SPARKMAN. I wanted to be sure that you did not intend to say it was explicitly said that the Secretary-General should be elected by the unanimous vote of the five members.

Secretary ACHESON. If I said that, I was probably in error.

UN CEASE-FIRE PLAN OF JANUARY 13, 1951

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, yesterday you were testifying something about the cease-fire resolution of January 11, when the five-point conditions were laid down.

I think there has been a great deal of criticism as to the attitude of the United States in supporting that resolution. But I wonder if it might not be well for us to remember that that came at a time when we were just about at the worst condition that we ever were in Korea.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. As a matter of fact, isn't that the same date that we received that letter of gloom from General MacArthur, either January 11 or January 10, in which he indicated that there was no hope whatsoever in Korea? I am sure the record will show it was dated January 10.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, it is the 10th of January, and it appears on page 85, paragraph 44, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff compilation.

HURLEY'S 1945 VIEWS ON CHINESE COMMUNISTS AND NATIONALISTS

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, Mr. Secretary, I have been very interested in following these developments with reference to our policy in China. I think Senator McMahon pointed out the other day that most of the criticism that has been directed to the administration's foreign policy has centered on China and centered there very largely because things went wrong there.

The last opportunity I had to ask you some questions I quoted at length from some of the statements that Ambassador Hurley made, because he was over there during the formative state of this policy.

I want to at this point, Mr. Secretary, refer to a press conference that Ambassador Hurley gave on April 2, 1945, and which he inserted in the record of the Foreign Relations Committee on December 5, 1945, and I quote from that as follows:

> Correspondents asked whether the Ambassador could say anything about his view of the role, if any, played by Moscow in that relationship between the Communists and the Chungking government.
>
> General Hurley replied that he would prefer to let the Soviet Government speak for itself, but he would say that in his conferences in Moscow the attitude of Russia had expressed a desire for closer and more harmonious relations with China.
>
> The Ambassador went on to say that it was a matter of common knowledge that the Communist Party of China supports the principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. That is, those principles generally referred to as the three peoples' principles of government: Government of the people, by the people, and for the people.
>
> He pointed out that all the demands that the Communist Party had been making had been on the democratic basis and that they had led to the statement that the Communist Party in China were not in fact real Communists. For the Communist Party was supporting exactly the same principles as those promulgated by the National Government of China, and conceived to be the objectives also of the National Government.
>
> Asked if the Ambassador could describe how the Communist Party differs from the National Government, General Hurley said that, as a matter of fact, the divergence between the parties in China seemed to be not in the objectives desired because they both assert that they are for the establishment of a government in China that would be upon centralized authority and conduct itself along democratic lines, employ a democratic process, but that the divergence between them is the procedure by which those objectives could be achieved.
>
> Explaining further, he said that the Communist Party would like for the National Government to inaugurate certain reforms immediately, and to do this, they had suggested a bipartisan coalition government.

There is a great deal more that I might quote, but it is along the same line.

Did you get the impression from our Ambassador to China at that time, General Hurley, that he was in favor of this thing that he said both parties in China were working for—that is, getting together to achieve a democratic, unified government in China?

Secretary ACHESON. I had no impression from General Hurley at that time—I was working in a wholly different field in the Department of State, and I had nothing to do with this operation, and I had no discussions with him on this point.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, what I have read you is a statement from General HURLEY. If he had stated that in your presence, would you have drawn that conclusion?

Secretary ACHESON. I am familiar with General Hurley's reports as they are printed in the white paper and as I have gone over them later. I think what he states there is what the reports indicate he believes.

Senator SPARKMAN. And he actually visited the Communists, did he not?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, as I pointed out in the testimony, he was mediating between the Nationalists and the Communists, and in the course of that he went to Yenan.

Senator SPARKMAN. I read further from his testimony before the committee. This is General Hurley speaking:

> The Communist armed party had never been visited by an American general, or finally, by an American ambassador, until I flew to Yenan at a time when we were all still in contact with the enemy. At that time I had a rather reasonable conference with the Communist leaders. I did obtain what was thought to be a basic program for unification.

The Chairman then asked him this question:

> When was that?
>
> General HURLEY. I left there, I believe, November 10, 1944. That is more than a year ago, now. At that time I got to know Mao Tze-tung, the chairman of the Communist Party, and I found him not an altogether unreasonable individual. I found many subjects on which we could agree. I invited him at that time to go to Chungking with me to interview Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. He felt that he could not go, himself, but he sent the No. 2 Communist leader, General Chou En-lai, with his staff with me to Chungking. We continued the discussions. Those discussions brought out many various, different plans for the unification or at least coordination of the armed forces of the republic.

And so on.

Mr. Secretary, I would like to make it clear for the record that I certainly am not reading any of this for the purpose of criticizing General Hurley.

I do believe, however, it will be helpful to the American people to have recalled to their attention how widespread was this feeling, as erroneous as it may have been, that there could be successfully worked out in China a coalition of the forces there that would bring peace to that war-torn country.

Did you not feel that there was general feeling along that line?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; both in China and in the United States.

Senator SPARKMAN. And in the United States, and by all parties and all peoples?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

FAVORABLE VIEWS OF MARSHALL MISSION AT THAT TIME

Senator SPARKMAN. I have here, furthering the idea of showing what the thinking of some of our outstanding people was at that time, some remarks that were placed in the Congressional Record by a very distinguished Republican Congresswoman, with whom I had the pleasure of serving; I have reference to Clare Boothe Luce:

> Mr. Speaker, the Nation should be grateful, indeed, for the extraordinarly diplomatic job which Gen. George Marshall has done in China in recent weeks. The following editorial from the Washington Post of March 27 reflects the opinion of many who have watched the development of events in the Far East with considerable trepidation, but who are vastly reassured by the fruits of General Marshall's statesmanship.

I want to quote briefly from the editorial as follows; the editorial was entitled "Marshall as Go-Between." It is as follows:

> General Marshall as go-between. The return of General Marshall to his own country is the occasion for the review of his accomplishments in China. These have exceeded all expectations. When the President, in an inspired moment, appointed him special envoy to Chungking, the extreme hope was that he would be able to arrange a truce between the rival armies owing allegiance respectively to the National Government and to the Communists. This he has done. But General Marshall was not content with this achievement. He has brought together the two main elements in distracted and war-weary and inflation-torn China on a plan for the unification of China. The job called for the exercise of those great talents of tact and diplomacy which General Marshall displayed as wartime Chief—

and so on and so forth.

CONGRESSMAN JUDD'S VIEWS ON CHINA IN 1945 AND 1947

Mr. Secretary, you are familiar, of course, with the outstanding leadership that Congressman Judd, of Minnesota, has exercised, particularly with reference to the Far East, are you not?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Sparkman. You know about his experience in China? I mean you know that he has had a good long period of experience in China?

Secretary Acheson. Yes.

Senator Sparkman. I call your attention to excerpts from a speech which he made on the Town Meeting of the Air on December 27, 1945, which he himself inserted in the Congressional Record at page A107, January 18, 1946. I am not going to read the whole speech, but I want to read just three short paragraphs:

> The restatement by President Truman of our China policy should enable General Marshall and all of us to cut through the fog of claims and counterclaims and get the facts as to who in China really wants unity and who does not.

May I interpolate there that I assume that the restatement by President Truman is the same statement to which Ambassador Hurley referred in his press report that I refered to the other day, and I think it was made on Navy Day in 1945.

Secretary Acheson. It was made on what?

Senator Sparkman. Navy Day, I think.

Secretary Acheson. It was made on the 15th of December, I believe.

Senator Sparkman. It may have been. I am not sure. I quote again from Congressman Judd:

> If the Communists agree to become a political party without an autonomous army and Chiang refuses to establish a democratic government with legal and equal status for all parties, then he is exposed and ought to be.
>
> If, on the other hand, he is willing to establish such a government and the Communists are unwilling to give up their separate army and administration

and become the loyal opposition instead of an armed rebellion, then their pretenses are exposed and ought to be.

Don't you interpret that as advocating a bringing together of the two parties exactly as Ambassador Hurley was trying to do, as General Wedemeyer recommended, as I understand General MacArthur recommended, as General Marshall worked on while he was over there?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I interpret it as approval of the program as anounced by the President.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes. I also call attention to an editorial, or rather an article inserted in the Congressional Record on pages A2438–2440, of May 23, 1947, that insertion made by Congressman Judd, of Minnesota. The article is written by Frank Wilson Price entitled "China's Liberals Get Their Chance," and in inserting the article, Congressman Judd said:

> It was a pleasure to read something from one who knows what he is talking about.

It is a lengthy column. I am going to read just a couple of paragraphs. Here is one:

> General Marshall's mission to China is commonly described as a failure. It is true that he failed to achieve his immediate objective of mediation between the National Government and the Communists. But his success in strengthening the liberal and democratic forces outside the Communist Party has not been fully appreciated. The liberals are the men and women who will ultimately bring about a Chinese solution of China's problems. The question is whether they have enough power and influence at present to effect much-needed political reforms to avert a serious collapse in the national economy, to inspire a tired National Government with new ideas and fresh morale, and to provide a positive, constructive answer to the Communist challenge. That they have been given a new chance to try cannot be denied.

And then this paragraph:

> China's liberals now have a chance, a unique chance, to build a new political democracy and a cooperative economic order upon past foundations—traditional village self-government, the strain of liberal thought in China's cultural history, a casteless social democracy that in many ways puts American society to shame, and the lessons learned in the struggles, the successes, and failures of recent decades. If they can lead China forward now the whole world will breathe more easily. If they fail, because of unresolved internal strife or because of international developments, the whole world will suffer.

I want to read another paragraph that really precedes that:

> Within 6 months American prestige in China reached a new low owning to widespread anti-American agitation fanned by leftist elements over the marine rape case in Peiping and in opposition to the continued presence of 10,000 marines in north China. Since the job of repatriating 3,000,000 Japaese was done and the truce teams were only marking time, the United States Government wisely announced on January 29 that it would withdraw all American troops within 90 days and discontinue its futile peace efforts. This move, together with the departure of Communist leaders from national territory, has effectively silenced much criticism against America and has restored considerably the prestige which the American Government enjoyed at the end of the war.

Apparently there was considerable support for the marines out of China too, was there not?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

OTHER VIEWS OF CHINESE SITUATION AT THAT TIME

Senator SPARKMAN. There is another editorial inserted in the Congressional Record by Congressman Judd, on page A449, February 4, 1946.

I read as follows:

> The People's Consultative Conference has taken a second step toward Chinese unity.

By the way, the Consultative Conference was the beginning, was it not, by which this so-called coalition was worked out?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Sparkman (reading):

> All those interested in a stable far eastern peace—and Americans are especially concerned—will cheer this progress. We know, however, that the road ahead in China is still a long one, mined with factionalism, rotting with inefficiency and worse. All the patriotism and wisdom which Chiang Kai-shek and other leaders can summon will be required to make the new truce work.
>
> Last night's agreement provides an interim coalition government and the method of choosing the National Assembly, which will meet in May to write a new constitution. This political agreement, in turn, was made possible by the earlier military truce brought about by our General Marshall.
>
> In brief, Chiang's Kuomintang gives up its one-party totalitarian position and the Chinese Communists agree to the merger of their troops into a reorganized National Army. In the temporary coalition cabinet the Kuomintang gives up seven or eight seats and creates several new ones, so that the total can be divided equally between itself and a combination of all other parties. In the National Assembly the Kuomintang is to have a plurality, but not enough to steam roller the others. So-called democratic minority parties will hold the balance of power between the Kuomintang and Communists.
>
> If Chiang is able to keep his promises China soon will have a representative government, individual rights, and civil liberties. At best it is difficult to change overnight from a dictatorship to even a halfway democracy. Chiang faces added difficulties. The old guard in his own party has fattened too long on power and privilege to welcome change. And the Communists, who have been running their own dictatorship in the north even more tightly than Chiang, are not likely to be so enthusiastic about civil liberties for others when they are inside the government as when they were on the outside.
>
> Probably Russia will be the determining factor. If Russia considers Chinese unity to be in her own long-run interest—as we believe it to be—Stalin may tell his boys to be good. Otherwise, they will have plenty of opportunities to wreck Chiang Kai-shek's plan for national unity.

That pretty clearly describes what was being done there toward bringing the two together, does it?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Sparkman. And placed in the Congressional Record with the apparent approval were Congressman Judd's—

Mr. Chairman, how much more time do I have?

Chairman Russell. You have about 4 minutes, Senator Sparkman.

Senator Sparkman. Mr. Secretary, there are many things that I want to question you about, but I would like to continue this, in order to indicate the general approval, as I see it, of the American people, and certainly our leaders at that time.

SENATOR VANDENBERG' COMMENTS IN 1947

I want to quote from a speech made by Senator Vandenberg in connection with the resignation of Mr. Byrnes, and the nomination of General Marshall to be Secretary of State.

He was presenting it to the Senate, when he said this——

Senator Wiley. What is the date?

Senator Sparkman. January 8, 1947; pages 159 and 160 of the Congressional Record for that date.

January 8, 1947 is the correct date.

Now, I quote:

> General Marshall will be welcomed by his countrymen as Secretary Byrnes' successor. He will bring to his assignment a stout heart, a shining integrity, a rich experience, and a lifetime of dedication to his country. He has always had the total confidence of Congress, as well as that of all his military and civilian colleagues, at home and abroad.
>
> Now, Mr. President, since this sudden and unusual interruption in the State Department's personnel undoubtedly is causing speculation all around the world, I think it is highly important that the Senate of the United States, continuing to pursue what has been an effective bipartisan foreign policy, should make it perfectly clear immediately that there is no interruption to this unity by the episode to which I refer.

And then, in a speech which the late beloved Senator Vandenberg made before the Cleveland Council of World Affairs, on January 11, just a few days after, he made the same tribute to General Marshall, and said that:

> Here lies a vast and friendly republic—

he said he wanted to talk about China—

> Here lies a vast and friendly Republic, rich in wisdom, equally rich in its democratic promise for tomorrow, and historically fixed in the orbit of our good will. Since 1911, when Dr. Sun Yat-sen gave China her new vision, she has been struggling against bitter odds, toward the light of a new day. While recognizing the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek, we have—through a year's mission headed by our distinguished General Marshall—been impartially urging that it produce unity with a rival armed party, the Chinese Communists.
>
> Under the determined leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, a National Assembly has just produced a new constitution and the Government is being reorganized with a coalition of non-Communist parties. We can hope that this Nanking charter, with its first great national election promised before Christmas, will weld together a strong and competent China.
>
> It is my own view that our own far eastern policy might well now shift its emphasis. While still recommending unity it might well encourage those who have so heroically set their feet upon this road, and discourage those who make the road precarious. Our marines, having finished their task, are coming home. But there will never be a minute when China's destiny is not of acute concern to the United States and to a healthy world.

And, this further comment from Senator Vandenberg, made on the floor of the Senate. He said:

> one of the greatest and ablest men of this Nation, gifted not only with a military sense but with a high sense of statesmanship, has spent a year—one of the best years of his life—in China, trying to work out a policy for this Nation; and so far as I am concerned, I have been quite willing that he should have the opportunity to see whether it could be done.

And so on and so forth.

Do you believe that Senator Vandenberg was correctly stating the attitude, generally, of this country, and of many of its leaders, when he was giving approval to the mission of General Marshall?

Secretary Acheson. Well, I wouldn't want to interpret what Senator Vandenberg said. I think that what you have read indicates his high regard for General Marshall, and the fact that he was in favor of his having had the opportunity to do what he tried to do, his approval of whatever that constitution was, that had been adopted; I think it is only fair to point out that at the time he spoke, the effort to bring the Communists and the Nationalists together had failed, and that he referred to a non-Communist coalition, which was then in——

Senator **Sparkman**. The latter part he did; but he did refer to the efforts of General Marshall to work out a coalition, bringing in the Communist army.

I referred to that in the first part that I read.

Secretary **Acheson**. Yes; I believe that he did.

Senator **Brewster**. What was that citation?

Senator **Sparkman**. I will give it to you.

I think my time is about up.

Chairman **Russell**. Your time has about run out, Senator.

Senator Long?

KOREAN STRATEGY AND OUTLOOK IN JANUARY 1950

Senator **Long**. Mr. Secretary, I wanted to see if I could get my mind clear on certain events described, occurring on page 83 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's secret memorandum.

Near the bottom of that page, I noticed that on January 9, 1951, it was stated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to General MacArthur:

[Deleted.]

Senator **Long**. That memorandum went on to describe the other things suggested by General MacArthur that could not then be done; however, that two National Guard divisions would be sent to Japan; and that efforts would be made to intensify our economic blockade with China, and those things have been done.

Secretary **Acheson**. That is correct.

Senator **Long**. As was suggested at that time?

Secretary **Acheson**. That is correct.

Senator **Long**. Aside from that, you might say the only thing that might have been done in addition to what was stated here, was there has been a strengthening of the divisions already in Korea by sending personnel to replace casualties and by sending additional men there and putting a proper rotation proceeding into effect, which would help out with morale.

Secretary **Acheson**. I believe that is correct, sir.

Senator **Long**. Now, based on those facts, I take it, on page 84, the recommendation was then made that General MacArthur should defend in successive positions, inflicting maximum damage to hostile forces in Korea, subject to primary consideration of the safety of his troops and the basic mission of protecting Japan; and that if it should become evident that evacuation was necessary to avoid severe losses of men, he should prepare to evacuate.

Now, based on those recommendations, on page 85, General MacArthur then recommended that based on the limitations that were imposed upon him—which I understand have not been changed—and the morale of his troops, as well as unwarranted criticisms, all of which he felt had a deterrent effect upon the battle efficiency of the men, only if there were overriding political considerations should he attempt to remain in Korea. Is that the effect of that next message?

Secretary **Acheson**. I believe so. It is stated right here.

Senator **Long**. Now, as a matter of fact, there had been no removal of these so-called handicaps the general had complained of; is that right?

In other words, his recommendations to impose a naval blockade, to bombard China by naval gunfire, and to carry our air power into

Manchuria were not followed. So really there has been no change of those conditions basically.

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

Senator LONG. It gives me the impression that General MacArthur felt that it was impossible to do just exactly what we are now doing. I read here—trusting that this is a fair interpretation of what General MacArthur said:

> Under these conditions, in the absence of overriding considerations, his command should be withdrawn from the peninsula just as rapidly as it was tactically feasible to do so.

Then it goes on to say:

> On the other hand, if the primary political interest of the United States lay in the holding of a position in Korea, and thus pinning down a large segment of Chinese military potential, the military course was implicit in the political policy, then the United States should be prepared to accept the casualties which would result, with the attendant hazard to Japan's security.

That was in effect saying to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the commander in chief that we will simply stay here and be annihilated if you suggest it, and if it is necessary for the security of this country; but we wouldn't advise it unless for political reasons it simply has to be done.

Is that about the effect of that message?

Secretary ACHESON. I think perhaps you may have overstated it a little bit, Senator Long. I think he didn't say anything about being annihilated, but he said we have to stay and accept casualties, which would result in hazard to Japan.

I think it is true that the situation turned out to be less unfavorable than was thought at the time this message was written.

Senator LONG. His estimate was certainly more alarming than the situation turned out to be.

Secretary ACHESON. I think that is correct, sir.

Senator LONG. And in that message he placed a burden upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President to accept the responsibility for something that in his judgment might well be disastrous if we pursued the course that we are engaged in at this time.

Secretary ACHESON. He gave them what I am sure was his best judgment; that he wanted to be instructed.

ANTICIPATING CHINESE INTERVENTION IN NOVEMBER 1950

Senator LONG. I was one of those who was impressed by your estimate of the political situation at the time our troops crossed the thirty-eighth parallel. I believe at that time that you, like General MacArthur and many others, felt that the Chinese Communists would probably not come in.

I believe you stated at that time that you felt that China would not want to sacrifice her seat in the United Nations to engage in this warfare in Korea. That was part of the reason upon which you were inclined to guess that China would not come into the Korean fighting.

Were there other considerations that you happen to think of offhand that caused you to believe that the Chinese Communists would not come in if we continued to carry the war farther north?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I think that our estimate was that China had the capacity to come in. Now, in trying to judge its intentions, we looked at all the factors that were available and on those factors I think we all came to the conclusion that it was more likely that they would not come in than that they would.

But in all these matters that is only an estimate. You can't operate on that estimate as a fact. You have to always remember that the other side of the estimate may come into being.

Among the reasons for believing that they would not come in were the amount of well-trained troops which they would have to commit, the possible weakening of the Government in China itself, the lack of real advantage to China itself in coming in, and these are some of the factors—its position internationally, it would probably lose ground rather than gain ground in its international position.

There were several of those factors which led us to believe that in making up their minds, it seemed the chance was greater that they would not do it than that they would do it.

CHINESE LOSSES RESULTING FROM INTERVENTION

Senator LONG. Of course, we are constantly aware of the losses of lives of our boys in Korea and it is a matter of very deep regret for all of us that this situation should come about. Now and then it might be well for us to consider the enemy's losses as well.

They are losing a lot more lives than we are losing though I know that the average American wouldn't care to trade 1 American life for 50 Chinese lives.

Nevertheless, it might be well to consider some of the disadvantages that our enemies have incurred by Chinese intervention in Korea.

China did suffer at least in some degree from that; did she not?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; there have been very severe losses on the Chinese side.

Senator LONG. In the first place, internationally the situation on Formosa had been due primarily to a phase of the Chinese civil war, with the result that most nations, including this one, had been reluctant to take any part in its prior to that time; is that right?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I think that is correct.

Senator LONG. So that when China intervened in Korea, she at least lost part of her chance to ever have Formosa, did she not—at least, under the Chinese Communist Government?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. That lead to the interposition of the Seventh Fleet, and I think has affected the attitude of many nations regarding that issue.

Senator LONG. When she went into Korea, she also lost much of the initiative that she had in Southeast Asia, by tying down her armies that might have been used to subjugate or at least in one form or another help to bring under Communist rule Indochina and other nations of Southeast Asia.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I think she had to move armies north into Manchuria.

Senator LONG. If she had not used those armies in that area, she might have been employing them in Southeast Asia to destroy first one nation and next another, even at this time.

Secretary ACHESON. That might have been done.

Senator LONG. When she came in, she also lost face with the rest of the world in world affairs by putting herself in the position of being an international criminal; did she not?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir; I think so.

Senator Long. She also sustained a large amount of economic injury as a result of a blockade and as a result of having to devote her industries to supporting an effort that thus far has not been successful—at least, in achieving its objective?

Secretary Acheson. Very severe injuries from those sources.

Senator Long. As a nation she certainly reduced any influence she may have had in the ultimate settlement of the Japanese Peace Treaty?

Secretary Acheson. I think that is correct.

Senator Long. The probabilities are that she may very well have lost a chance to have a seat in the United Nations as well?

Secretary Acheson. That is correct.

ADVANTAGES FROM OUR INTERVENTION

Senator Long. You believe that prior to the time she came in, that was such an important thing in world affairs that she would think a long time about sacrificing that position of influence in world affairs before she would attempt to influence the outcome of the Korean fighting by intervening in it with her own troops?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Long. On the other hand, if we had not gone into Korea, all the rest of the free nations who were looking for leadership would have lost faith in us; would they not?

Secretary Acheson. I believe so.

Senator Long. By going in we did give other free nations hope and courage by saying that they did have a reliable friend on the part of the United States that would live up to its commitments and that would try to help those that wished to defend their own freedom.

Secretary Acheson. I think it had a tremendous effect upon the rest of the world, along the lines you indicate.

Senator Long. Now, much of the effort of the Communists in depriving others of their freedom involves weighing that factor of whether or not the people will actually fight or resist.

When people see that they have a chance to successfully resist, there is certainly much greater inclination on their part to make the effort; is there not? In other words, when other free nations of the world feel that they have a chance of successfully resisting Communist aggression, they will make the effort, where otherwise they might simply give up because they would think it was hopeless.

Secretary Acheson. I think that is true. In many cases it affects the morale if you know you have a good fighting chance; that is what the phrase describes.

Senator Long. There was a point made to me some time back that, much as we Americans might hate to admit it, we never are really stirred to make the sort of effort that we must make to defend ourselves until someone actually deals us a harmful and damaging blow, such as occurred to us at Pearl Harbor or the sort of slap in the face that occurred prior to World War I when Germany was sinking our ships with her submarines.

If the Chinese had not intervened, there would have been some difficulty in getting the American people to make the tremendous efforts they have been making as a Nation now; would it not?

Secretary **Acheson**. Well, I don't know about that, Senator Long. I think we were making very vigorous efforts before the Chinese came in. I think it brought home to people very strongly the extent of the danger to which the whole world was subjected, and which the whole world faced.

Senator **Long**. The probabilities are that because of this Chinese intervention Congress has been much more willing to provide the funds and put on the taxes that are necessary to carry on a defense effort.

Secretary **Acheson**. You are in a much better position than I am to know the answer to that.

Senator **Long**. My judgment is that Congress is.

Those are all the questions I have now, Mr. Secretary. Thank you.

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Gillette?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Brewster?

Senator **Brewster**. Mr. Chairman, how long do you intend to run?

Chairman **Russell**. If the Senator uses all his time we will run until 1:15.

Senator **Brewster**. Would you permit me to divide my time 15 minutes now and 15 minutes after lunch? I say that because I did have a luncheon engagement; that is the reason.

Chairman **Russell**. Without objection on the part of any member of the committee, the Senator from Maine will be permitted to divide his time.

Senator **McMahon**. Mr. Chairman, would it be possible to recess now and then come back 15 minutes earlier?

Chairman **Russell**. It would be a little difficult, Senator McMahon. I have told two or three Senators that we would reconvene at 2:30, so I do not know whether I could notify them of the change.

BEGINNING OF "OPEN DOOR" POLICY IN CHINA

Senator **Brewster**. I think my questions can be divided into two periods. I want, Mr. Secretary, to develop our historic policy regarding China, as it seems to me it should be a part of this record, as taken from the Archives, and, I presume, that for the modern world, that really dates from the so-called open door policy. Would you say that was a fair statement; that that did represent our traditional policy regarding China in this century?

Secretary **Acheson**. Well, our policy in regard——

Chairman **Connally**. Will the Senator yield?

Senator **Brewster**. Yes.

Chairman **Connally**. I thought the Secretary had given a complete statement of the history of China some time in the hearings heretofore, did he not?

Secretary **Acheson**. I attempted to Monday morning.

Chairman **Connally**. Yes.

Senator **Brewster**. I would like to ask you whether Secretary Hay's statement of November 1899 was the origin of this open-door policy when he asked, and I am quoting now from the United States Relations With China, compiled for the Committee on Foreign Relations, as follows:

> Hay asked the powers involved in the struggle over China to give guaranties that in their respective spheres of influence or interests they would not interfere

with the equality of rights of nationals of other countries in matters of tariffs, railroad tariffs, and harbor dues.

That was the origin of the open-door policy, was it not?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I think that we have thought that the treaty of July 3, 1844, is the earliest statement of it, and that was followed by other treaties, but the open-door policy is usually associated with Secretary of State Hay.

Senator BREWSTER. That was the Treaty of Wanghia that you are referring to. I am quite willing to have its antiquity further established.

I am incorrect. This was compiled by the State Department. I thought that it was done at the request of the Committee on Foreign Relations, but apparently it is transmitted to the President.

Following that, we returned the Boxer indemnity in 1908 through congressional action, which further cultivated our good will to China, did it not?

Secretary ACHESON. We did, under congressional action, set up——

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON (continuing). Funds under the Boxer indemnity for educational purposes.

Senator BREWSTER. I find the statement on page 3 of this history, that at that time this was aimed primarily at Russia, which was pushing down through Manchuria, and threatening Chinese control over that vast territory. That is the statement of the State Department, so I assume you will agree with it. It is on page 3 of the history.

Secretary ACHESON. I don't know what you are reading from, Senator.

Senator BREWSTER. I am reading from the compilation, United States Relations With China, made by the State Department.

Secretary ACHESON. You are reading from page 3?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

> These extensions were initially aimed largely at Russia, which was pushing down through Manchuria and threatening Chinese control over that vast territory.

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct; I find it.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, subsequently there was the Russo-Japanese War and the Treaty of Portsmouth, September 5, 1905, which mentioned—and this is on page 5—

> the two signatories to restore Manchuria to China and to observe measures that would apply equally to all nations in the commerce and industry of Manchuria.

That apparently recognized the Chinese rights and preeminence in Manchuria.

HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF TRIRTY-EIGHTH PARALLEL

Are you familiar, Mr. Secretary, with the origin of this division at the thirty-eighth parallel?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I am familiar with that.

Senator BREWSTER. I am familiar with the statements that it was originated with the War Department as a recommendation for the division. Is that what you refer to?

Secretary ACHESON. I will get my notes on it. Yes, sir; the division at the thirty-eighth parallel was recommended by the Secretary of War, was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by State, Army, Navy, Air Force Coordinating Committee, and was approved by the President.

Senator BREWSTER. Are you familiar with any earlier reference in our historical diplomatic discussions to the thirty-eighth parallel?

Secretary ACHESON. Am I?

Senator BREWSTER. Are you familiar with any earlier discussion of the thirty-eighth parallel as a dividing line in Korea?

Secretary ACHESON. No; I am not. I was under the impression that this was taken up about the 10th of August, and was decided in a day or so and was solely for the purpose of accepting the surrender.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes; I understand.

Secretary ACHESON. It was not a division of Korea. Korea was supposed to be a united, free, and independent country.

Senator BREWSTER. Isn't it rather interesting to note the thirty-eighth parallel in Korea was proposed 45 years earlier by Russia as a means of dividing the spheres of influence of Russia and Japan incident to the episodes around the Russo-Japanese War?

Secretary ACHESON. I am not familiar with that, Senator.

Senator BREWSTER. You would consider that a rather interesting precedent in the situation in view of your idea now that possibly that may be where the spheres of influence will be divided between the free nations, the United Nations, and the Soviet-dominated group.

Secretary ACHESON. It would be interesting. I shall look it up if you wish me to.

Senator BREWSTER. I am stating it as a matter of fact. You will find it alluded to in several discussions of the matter. I am a little surprised again that your staff has not more adequately briefed you, because it has seemed to me that it is at least significant that Russia apparently was aiming at that 50 years ago, and it seems now on the point perhaps of achieving it as ar esult of the settlement that you apparently contemplate.

"OPEN DOOR" FURTHER ENUNCIATED

To move along to the subsequent enunciations of this, Secretary Knox in 1907 and 1908 again urged this same policy. It appeared in the Lansing-Ishii agreement of November 2, 1917, I think you referred to, and that secret protocol at that time which further enunciated it was on page 9 of your history.

Secretary Kellogg in 1927, page 11—and I now come to the period of Japanese expansion into China and the enunciation of the nonrecognition doctrine by Secretary Stimson on page 13, which stated, Mr. Stimson did on behalf of our Government, that it does not intend to recognize any treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928.

I believe that was the Knox Treaty, to which treaty both China and Japan as well as the United States are parties. It goes on further emphasizing on.

On page 15 Messrs. Hay and Hughes are referred to as emphasizing this principle as being a cornerstone of our policies in Asia as the Monroe Doctrine was in the Western Hemisphere.

Now we come to the difficulties with Japan, and Japan was moving down into China in the period following 1930, and Mr. Hull was making repeated statements opposing this. This appears on page 17; the Japanese started war in 1937 at Marco Polo Bridge, and we undertook to contain that.

ANALOGY TO JAPANESE INVASION OF CHINA

We finally come down to the declaration of Mr. Hull denouncing the use of force in setting up the new Chinese regime under Japanese auspices. This was a public statement by him on March 30, 1940, as contained in the book here at page 24, and I want to read that into the record because it seems to me it has a very pertinent application. This is Mr. Hull speaking in March—March 30, 1940:

> In the light of what has happened in various parts of China since 1931, the setting up of a new regime at Nanking has the appearance of a further step in a program of one country by armed force to impose its will upon a neighboring country and to block off a large area of the world from normal political and economical relationships with the rest of the world.

Would it be fair to say that the present activities of the Soviet in the last 6 years apply almost perfectly to that statement?

Secretary Acheson. You are talking about the activities of the Soviet Union where, sir?

Senator Brewster. In China.

Secretary Acheson. Well, I pointed out on many occasions that the efforts of the Soviet Union in the western and northern provinces were all in the direction of acquiring Soviet control over those provinces, and if that is the thing that you have reference to, then I should say "Yes," it would apply to that.

Senator Brewster. And those were parts of China?

Secretary Acheson. That is correct.

Senator Brewster. I go on quoting:

> The developments there appear to be following the pattern of other regimes and systems which have been set up in China under the aegis of an outside power and which on their functioning especially favor the interests of that outside power and deny to nationals of the United States and other third countries enjoyment of long-established rights of equal and fair treatment which are legally and justly theirs.

Would that too characterize the present regime in China with its Soviet influence?

Secretary Acheson. I think there is a parallel there.

Senator Brewster. I won't read the remainder of it. There are about two paragraphs more on that page of the same tenor.

Now on page 26 at the top of the page:

> The United States refusal to stop its support of China and the unwillingness of the United States to compromise on the principle of Chinese sovereignty were among the immediate motivations of the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

Do you agree with that statement?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir; I think so.

Senator Brewster. Then to the extent that those were the motivations, we became involved in the Second World War as a result of the attack on Pearl Harbor, to a substantial extent as a result of Secretary Hull's refusal to recognize Japanese encroachment on Chinese sovereignty.

Is that a fair statement?

Secretary Acheson. Yes; I thing that Mr. Hull perhaps went further than refusing to recognize them. He was opposing them very vigorously.

Senator Brewster. Yes; I think so. Now, there is 50 years of our policies to preserve the open door in China, its independence, and integrity.

Do you feel that our policies in the last 6 years have been successful in achieving continuance of that independence and integrity of the Chinese Government?

Secretary Acheson. Well, the result is clearly that the Chinese Government has not been able to do the things that you speak of.

Senator Brewster. So that the 50 years or a hundred years, as you put it, of our objective to keep China so that it was preserving its independence and integrity is now, at the very least, in very serious question.

Secretary Acheson. Well, I think that what your question does is to give the impression that by the efforts of American diplomats we have been completely successful in doing this until the last few years, in which case we are not completely successful.

That was not the case. Throughout this whole period there were very grave deterrents of Chinese sovereignty. In fact, there was hardly any period during that long stretch of years during which that did not exist.

Chairman Russell. Half of the Senator's time has expired.

Senator Brewster. I would like for you to tell me after lunch whether you feel there is any comparison between those and that which we have today.

Chairman Russell. The committee will stand in recess until 2:30.

(Whereupon, at 1 p. m., the committees recessed to reconvene at 2:30 p. m., the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(Present: Senators Russell, Connally, Wiley, George, Green, Hickenlooper, McMahon, Lodge, Brewster, Bridges, Johnson, Morse, Cain, and Stennis.)

Chairman Russell. The committee will come to order.

Senator Brewster will resume.

TESTIMONY OF HON. DEAN G. ACHESON, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY ADRIAN FISHER, LEGAL ADVISER—Resumed

Senator Brewster. Mr. Secretary, I think you have stated somewhat earlier in the matter that you did not know of any communism or procommunism influences in the State Department. Is that correct?

Secretary Acheson. If you can find what I said in the record.

Senator Brewster. Well, is that your opinion?

Secretary Acheson. I do not know of any Communist influences in the State Department; that is correct, sir.

Senator Brewster. And what about the past? Have there been in the past?

Secretary Acheson. So far as anyone was known at the time, we did not believe there were any people who had Communist sympathies.

We have discovered cases of disloyalty or security risks which have been separated from the service under our loyalty program.

Senator BREWSTER. And others who you felt were poor security risks?

Secretary ACHESON. I mentioned that.

Senator BREWSTER. You had some in Hong Kong very recently?

Secretary ACHESON. You may be right. I recall some instance.

Senator BREWSTER. You don't know of the removal of two aids in Hong Kong within the past month?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, I do know about that.

Senator BREWSTER. That was on the ground they were poor security risks?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

CASE OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF TWO BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIALS

Senator BREWSTER. And have you had reports on the recent episode involving apparently Britons high in the foreign service in Britain, and that is reported in the press today?

Secretary ACHESON. I heard that on the radio this morning. I had inquiry made at the British Embassy about it, but they know no more than the radio report.

Senator BREWSTER. Had you had any earlier report on anything to indicate that anything of this sort would develop?

Secretary ACHESON. No.

Senator BREWSTER. And you have had no earlier reports regarding the possible treasonable activities of Donald MacLean as head of the American Department of the British Foreign Office?

Secretary ACHESON. No.

Senator BREWSTER. Are you acquainted with him?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't believe so. I have at one time or another met most of the staff of the British Embassy and I probably met him.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Guy Burgess assigned to the Far Eastern Department and specializing in Far Eastern affairs?

Secretary ACHESON. The same thing is true of him.

Senator BREWSTER. What is that?

Secretary ACHESON. The same answer would go for him as the other.

Senator BREWSTER. One or both I think they said had served in this country, and this report says Mr. MacLean was believed to have a thorough knowledge of secret Anglo-American exchanges on such subjects as the North Atlantic Pact, the Korean War and Japanese Peace Treaty. Mr. Burgess also probably was concerned with the preparation of the Japanese Peace Treaty.

If these men prove to be Soviet sympathizers, it would, I assume, be quite a serious matter in foreign relations.

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

Senator BREWSTER. And we did have the earliest case of Dr. Klaus Fuchs in the atomic-energy development.

Secretary ACHESON. That is right.

Senator BREWSTER. As I understand you had inquired of the British Embassy here but they had no further information about the matter?

Secretary ACHESON. I had inquiry made this morning and that was the answer I got.

Senator BREWSTER. I have here the latest, apparently, off the ticker, which says:

> News of their disappearance caused a sensation in Paris diplomatic circles. One high western diplomat exclaimed—

what appears on the ticker—

> "Oh, my God! There goes the tripartite files of the Big Four Deputies meeting."

If this is true, would that be a matter within the purview of the head of the American desk, or the far-eastern desk?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't know how the British Foreign Office operates.

I imagine that if this man had jurisdiction over relations with the United States, he would have knowledge of what our discussions were in Paris.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, this morning there was considerable said about the matter of consulting the minority members of the Congress, and the responsibility, which seems to be a matter of concern—some concern.

SOVIET DOMINANCE OF CHINA IN LIGHT OF HISTORICAL AMERICAN POLICY

When we concluded this morning, I was inquiring of you about the failure of our foreign policy in the Chinese situation, and in its culminating in the dominance of Russian influence with the Chinese Communist regime.

Would that be a fair statement of the situation?

Secretary ACHESON. You mean is that a fair statement of what your question was?

Senator BREWSTER. No. Of the dominance of the Russian influence in the Chinese Communist regime.

Secretary ACHESON. I think there is Russian dominance in that regime; yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. And to the extent that that influence has become dominant, it is in direct conflict with our historical policy.

Secretary ACHESON. We have always sought at all times to have China free and independent and not under the domination of foreign powers.

Senator BREWSTER. You undertook to suggest there had been exceptions to it in the past, which we, of course, recognize, at various times, both Japan, Russia, Germany, and others; but would you mean to imply that there was any situation heretofore comparable with what we face today?

Secretary ACHESON. The situation today is different in many respects from what was true in the past. What I was objecting to was the impression, which I thought your statement gave, that up until a few years ago, due to American policy, there had not been impairments of sovereignty in China and now there was, and that was the fault of American policy.

I didn't think either the statement of fact or the causation was right.

Senator BREWSTER. I think if you read my questions, that inference will not be warranted. At any rate, all my quotations were from the documentation by the State Department, and it was quite clear that at various times both Russia and Japan had established certain special rights which we had refused to recognize.

You will recall, Mr. Secretary, that I referred very clearly to the Manchuria episode, which was an outstanding illustration, which under Mr. Stimson we refused to recognize and also the establishment by Russia of certain rights.

So that I think it is quite clear that the attempt to imply something in my remarks that hitherto there had been nothing of that sort is quite unwarranted.

But I think you must agree that certainly there is nothing comparable to the situation that now prevails.

I understand you agree to that. It is much more serious today than anything we have seen in the last 50 years.

Secretary ACHESON. It is very different, and I think it is as serious as anything that we have seen.

The nature of Russian influence in China is different from the situation in regard to Japanese influence in China.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON. Which was very extensive, and operated over nearly all of China except certain remote parts. That was brought about by military force, by occupation through arms.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON. This has been brought about in a different way, by——

Senator BREWSTER. By a combination——

Secretary ACHESON. May I finish the sentence?

Chairman RUSSELL. Let us have him finish his statement.

Secretary ACHESON. This has been brought about in a different way; in a way which does not ostensibly interfere with Chinese operations in China by force, but which brings under the influence of the Soviet Union those who are in control of affairs in China. That is very serious, and extremely undesirable.

SENATOR VANDENBERG ON BIPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY AS REGARDS CHINA

Senator BREWSTER. Since there were quotations this morning regarding Senator Vandenberg and Congressman Judd, I think it may be well to perhaps complete the record, and I would like to call your attention to a quotation from the daily Congressional Record of April 16, 1947, page 3474, about the matter of consultation on this policy, which I understand the Secretary agrees has not been conspicuously successful in recent years.

This is Senator Vandenberg speaking:

> What the policy of the State Department is, I am unable to testify. There is a considerable amount of misunderstanding about the so-called bipartisan foreign policy in this country. I have tried to make that plain on several occasions. It is very narrowly channeled within very specific things, namely, the minor peace treaties in Europe and the activities of the United Nations. I have never been consulted about the Chinese policy or the Pan American policy or many other policies, and I am not in a position to be an expert witness for the Senator from Nebraska. My information probably is a little more intimate than that of other Senators, but speaking generally, the facts are as I have indicated.

Do you challenge that statement of Senator Vandenberg, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary ACHESON. I do not wish in any way to comment on the statement of Senator Vandenberg who, unhappily is dead and not able to discuss the thing. I am not challenging——

Senator BREWSTER. Well, you heard the quotation——

Secretary ACHESON. Let me finish, please. I am not challenging it; I am not commenting on it.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, you heard the statements of Senator Vandenberg this morning and, as I recall it, you were asked to comment on it at that time.

Secretary ACHESON. And I declined to comment on it, as I recall.

Senator BREWSTER. You did not decline to do so, I think the record shows.

Secretary ACHESON. I think I refused to in any way interpret what he said.

Senator BREWSTER. That is very correct. That is very different from commenting.

Secretary ACHESON. Very well; have it your own way.

Senator BREWSTER. You use language very carefully and very cleverly, I must say.

Senator CONNALLY. What page is that you quoted from?

Senator BREWSTER. Page 3474. That was on April 16, 1947. I heard Senator Vandenberg make that statement many times on the floor or off.

Chairman CONNALLY. April 16?

Senator BREWSTER. 1947.

Chairman CONNALLY. 1947.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

How much time have I left, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. You have 4 minutes, Senator Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. I have a statement of Congressman Judd, who also was quoted this morning.

Chairman RUSSELL. I beg your pardon; you have 3 minutes.

Senator WILEY. Split the difference. [Laughter.]

Senator BREWSTER. This is from Congressman Judd:

CONGRESSMAN JUDD ON CHINA POLICY IN 1946

Without outside support—

this is from his speech which was inserted in the Record on January 18, 1946, from which the Senator from Alabama, Mr. Sparkman, quoted this morning. His quotation was quite correct, but not entirely complete. He is discussing the Communist influence.

If we go back on our solemn promises to an ally which fought so faithfully by our side, then are there any promises on which we won't go back, if a large enough pressure group demands it? I am shocked that any American should actually propose that we withdraw from China before we have faithfully carried out commitments which we assumed there, such as expelling the Japanese, restoring to China the territory included in Manchuria which Japan seized from her. These commitments, as President Truman reminded us only 12 days ago, were made to the National Government of China, the government of Chiang Kai-shek.

But even if our honor were not involved, our national interests require that we continue to support the Chinese Government. Having fought 4 long years to keep Japan from getting control of China, can we now afford to throw away that hard-brought victory by abandoning China to Communist control?

Can anyone conceivably imagine that China under the Communists would be oriented primarily in our direction, either politically or economically?

The surest way to avoid such a disastrous civil war is for the United States to continue to support firmly our ally, the National Government of China—the same Government our other allies have promised to support. Russia, for example, has pledged both moral and material assistance to that government, so she certainly cannot and will not object to our assisting it too.

Without outside support the Communists cannot wage serious civil war. Their argument that we must withdraw support from Chiang in order to avoid civil war is wholly propaganda. Actually, for us to withdraw support from him would make civil war almost certain because it would give the Communists some hope of success.

If we refuse to assist our Chinese ally, we thereby assist the rebellion which is trying to overthrow that ally.

Thus the only choice we have is, on which side are we to be? Are we to be by decision on the side of our own American interests? Or are we to be by default on the side that is avowedly determined to set up a social, political, and economic order which is the very antithesis of that in which we believe?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator, you got your 4 minutes.

Senator BREWSTER. That is something which I think bears on this, and I understand the Secretary does not have any comment.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you desire to comment on that?

Secretary ACHESON. No.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chairman?

Mr. Secretary, I only have one or two very brief questions on two or three matters I did not think had gotten into the record.

WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS FROM KOREA BEFORE 1950

We withdrew our last regimental combat team from Korea in June 1949, I believe you testified, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary ACHESON. June 29, I think it was.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes. Well, it was in the month of June.

Had the Russian forces in North Korea been withdrawn prior to that time?

Secretary ACHESON. They reported that they were withdrawn at the end of 1948.

Chairman RUSSELL. So according to such information as we have, our troops stayed in South Korea for several months after the Russians had moved from North Korea?

Secretary ACHESON. That is right, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Are you familiar with the testimony developed here that the army which overran South Korea was trained north of the Yalu River in Manchuria?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I am familiar with the statements which were made, and in fact I think I made some myself—that certainly many of the people in this North Korean army were trained outside of Korea, and that there are reports that some of them had been with the Russian armies at Stalingrad.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes. Did you testify that the United Nations had requested withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; that was a resolution——

Chairman RUSSELL. I don't ask for the date. They had passed a resolution?

Secretary ACHESON. It was in October 1947 the United States proposed a resolution in the General Assembly of the UN which contained a provision calling for the withdrawal of all occupation forces, which was adopted in November 1947, the 14th of November.

Chairman RUSSELL. I recall reading a newspaper account sometime in the past that President Syngman Rhee, of South Korea, was urging the withdrawal of United States troops. Do you know whether or not there is any basis of fact to that report?

Secretary ACHESON. I think there was, Mr. Chairman, but I should like to look that up and be accurate, and I should also like to add that the withdrawal of these troops and the proposal that they should be withdrawn was with the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Chairman RUSSELL. And was concurred in by General MacArthur, I believe he testified here?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. He further testified that there was nothing peculiarly threatening at that time in Korea when the decision was made to get out.

INTELLIGENCE ON SOVIET THREATS

Now there has been reference made here to intelligence reports you stated came into the State Department from Tokyo to the effect that information had been received that an attack was planned for June 1950 but that the intelligence officers in Tokyo did not believe that those were accurate reports.

The truth about the matter is we had all kinds of intelligence as to threatened attacks not only in Korea but in other places, had we not, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is part of what is called the war of nerves to move troops around in various parts of the world and cause confusion and fear on the part of the various states?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. We had the intelligence about Korea, but nowhere along the line from Tokyo here was that intelligence so correctly evaluated we could tell just when the blow would fall; is that a correct statement?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Chairman Connally.

Chairman CONNALLY. Very briefly, Mr. Chairman.

PURPOSE OF YALTA CONFERENCE

Mr. Secretary, we have had so much talk about Yalta this and Yalta that. As a matter of fact, our purpose at Yalta was to get Russia into the war against Japan. Was that not one of the main purposes of the Yalta Conference?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, Senator Connally; it was to get Russia into the war at a time when their entrance would be effective in occupying Japanese troops.

Chairman CONNALLY. That is right. Now at that time Japan was still in arms and fighting.

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. Now we did not know whether our atomic bombs would work or not. We had not proved them thoroughly at that time; had we?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir. The test was made I believe in June 1945.

Chairman CONNALLY. So the President and his advisers and others that were at Yalta were exerting themselves to the utmost to get Russia into the war and get her into the war quickly so as to bring about a quick termination of the war against Japan. Wasn't that the dominating purpose in the whole conference?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir, that was the purpose and also, as your question implies, to save a great many American casualties.

Chairman Connally. Exactly, save American lives. There is a lot of talk about measures that will save American casualties if we change our program in Korea. Is it not true that any kind of military operations are going to bring about casualties of one kind or another?

Secretary Acheson. That is true, sir.

Chairman Connally. Inevitably.

PREPAREDNESS OF SOUTH KOREA BEFORE INVASION

Now, there is also considerable conversation and questioning about the conditions in South Korea, and its state of preparedness, before the North Koreans invaded.

I believe that the testimony is that the population of South Korea is about twice as much as that of North Korea, is that correct?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir; I think it is about 20 million.

Chairman Connally. Is it not true, however, that North Korea had its own army, and that there were reports from there that they were able to defend themselves?

As I recall it, Mr. Dulles, Senator Dulles was over there in that territory——

Chairman Russell. You meant South Korea, rather than North Korea?

Chairman Connally. I mean South.

Did I say "North?"

Chairman Russell. Yes.

Chairman Connally. I thank the Senator for correcting me.

And said that South Korea was not as well armed as they claimed they ought to be.

Now, as I recall it, Senator Dulles was over there and visited parallel 38, had his picture taken on the parallel 38, and he reported that they had a good army, and were in position to defend themselves.

There was seemingly no fear in his mind that the North Koreans could overcome the South Koreans.

Now, even our distinguished colleague, Senator Green, was over in South Korea shortly before they were invaded, and they had a review for him of the army, or whatever force it was, I don't know whether they called it the army or——

Senator Green. All forces, army, navy, coast guard, state police.

Chairman Connally. They had a big review for the Senator, and he reported that he thought that South Korea was armed and capable of defending itself against any invasion from the north.

Senator Green. Excuse me, Senator. I know you don't want to misrepresent what I said——

Chairman Connally. No, I wouldn't dare—while you are here.

Senator Green. I think that you must be repeating, or attempting to repeat what I told you about by impressions.

My impressions were quite to the contrary.

I said they made a magnificant showing, I thought, under American guidance; they were entirely armed and equipped by America;

America had trained them admirably. They had changed the whole nature of the people so that they were willing to fight for their defense; but I said I thought it was pathetic, from my point of view, that they didn't have the wherewithal to defend themselves.

They had nothing but light artillary, no heavy artillery; no planes and no tanks; and I said "You can't very well fight tanks with cavalry," which they did have.

Chairman CONNALLY. I remember that. I apologize if I misrepresented in any way.

Secretary ACHESON. I don't think Mr. Dulles reported on the military effectiveness of the South Koreans.

Chairman CONNALLY. Their picture was published in all the papers here, standing up there straddling the thirty-eighth parallel. I didn't mean to interrupt you.

Secretary ACHESON. You didn't interrupt me, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. I don't mean Mr. Dulles was taking any active part, but he was over there on his way to Japan, I suppose, and did visit Korea.

Senator GREEN. I thought I ought in the interests of a correct record to make that statement.

Chairman CONNALLY. I am glad you interrupted. You were there.

Senator GREEN. I was.

Chairman CONNALLY. And you saw the army.

Senator GREEN. It was excellently equipped and excellently drilled.

Chairman CONNALLY. But it wasn't equipped with heavy artillery.

Senator GREEN. That is right.

Chairman CONNALLY. It wasn't equipped with planes.

Senator GREEN. That is right.

Chairman CONNALLY. It wasn't equipped with tanks.

Senator GREEN. That is right.

Chairman CONNALLY. Did you gain the impression when you were there that one reason they hadn't been supplied these heavier implements of war was the fear that there might be a conflict with North Korea?

Senator GREEN. That is right. I think that the Americans were apparently afraid that the South Koreans might attack the North Koreans.

Chairman CONNALLY. That is what I am getting at.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. A point of order, Mr. Chairman. The witness has not been sworn. I withdraw the point of order.

Chairman RUSSELL. I was a little confused by the procedure, but as long as it was on the time of the Senator from Texas and the Senator from Rhode Island was so delighted to respond to the questions of the Senator from Texas, the Chair did not intervene.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I withdraw the point of order.

Senator GREEN. Shall I swear with you or at you?

Senator WILEY. Do you want to affirm?

Chairman CONNALLY. I believe that is all for the present, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bridges.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd.

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Saltonstall. Senator Saltonstall advised me he was compelled to go to a meeting of the full Committee on Appropriations, and I told him I would make that statement for the benefit of the record. Senator Johnson.

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Morse.

EXISTENCE OF A CHINA LOBBY IN THE UNITED STATES

Senator Morse. Mr. Secretary, I want to make a very brief statement in regard to allegations concerning the existence of a force in America known as the China lobby before I ask you questions relative thereto.

I would like to say for the record that behind the sincere differences of opinion in this country over the proper course of the United States to follow in China there has existed the more or less clandestine struggle between two extremist groups, each representing not America's interests but the interests of the two principal contenders for power in the Chinese civil war.

While American Communists and their fellow travelers have ardently backed the Chinese Communists and sought to turn American public and official opinion in favor of Communist ends in China, it was alleged that there has been operating at the other extreme a propaganda and pressure group working for the Nationalist Chinese, Kuomintang, Chiang Kai-shek interests. This latter group is generally referred to in the American press as the China lobby.

Although the vicious operations of the Communists have been widely exposed, to some extent, but I believe still not fully—and I am strongly in favor of a complete disclosure and exposé of Communist activities in the United States and elsewhere in the world—there never has been, however, a thorough public investigation of the so-called China lobby.

Yet often in the political struggle for domination over American opinion the best interests of the United States, it seems to me, have been lost sight of in the smoke arising from the behind-the-scenes battles of these two sets of agents in the United States, representing extreme factions in China.

It is widely alleged that the China lobby, or pro-Chiang group, in the United States has for several years been conducting a violent campaign against American policies in China, chiefly by charging that the State Department, and especially its Far Eastern Division, is a nest of Reds, controlled by Communists and fellow travelers.

These charges have gone along the line that the State Department has set up a foreign policy in Asia contrary to the long-time best interests of the United States, because of its alleged support of pro-Communist interests in China.

In addition, it is believed by many that the China lobby has been especially active in pressuring Congress for financial, economic, and military aid for the Chiang regime, both before and since it retired to Formosa.

It is believed by many that Chinese individuals related to the Soong family—Mrs. Chiang Kai-shek's relatiyes—have immense sums of money cached outside Chinese territory, some of it in the United States, some of it in European countries and in England, some of it some people think in South Africa and some in South America.

It is rumored that T. V. Soong himself has many millions of dollars on deposit in the United States.

It is also alleged that prominent Nationalist officials and generals made fortunes in graft on American loans and grant-in-aid during and since the war against Japan. It is probably reasonable to assume that some of this money is being used to finance propaganda and similar operations in the United States chiefly to promote more money being given to Chiang and the Chiang forces.

This suggests to some a closed circuit of American dollars flowing from Congress to the Nationalists and back again in the form of lobbying activities for still more money for Chiang.

It is alleged that from 1946 to 1949 the Central News Agency, a wholly owned instrument of the Nationalist Government, spent in the neighborhood of $654,000,000 to influence American public opinion.

PAID LOBBYIST FOR CHINA

In March 1948 the counselor of the Chinese Embassy, Chen Chih-mai, hired William J. Goodwin as a lobbyist paid by the Natural Resources Commission of China, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Nationalist Government of China. It is alleged that Goodwin's contract paid him $40,000 a year.

His job called for interesting American investors in China. Goodwin switched to the Chinese News Service under contract starting July 7, 1949.

His new job required him to explain to leaders of thought in the United States, and including Members of Congress, the danger of the Communist movement to the security of the United States, and conversely to urge confidence in the Nationalist Government of China and to seek for it large measures of American support and material aid. It is reported that he received $25,000 a year for this work.

In an interview with Alfred Friendly of the Washington Post, in September 1949, Goodwin said he had converted at least 50 Congressmen, mostly Senators, to his way of thinking on China aid.

He added in a confidential whisper, "China will get anything she asked for," reports Friendly. "China is bound to get what she wants. Just think of the billboards next November if she doesn't," is the quote from Friendly's story of his interview with Goodwin.

FORTUNES ALLEGEDLY AMASSED BY CHINESE INDIVIDUALS

T. V. Soong, Chiang's brother-in-law, resigned from the Kuomintang rather than go to Formosa, it was announced on June 9, 1950. Reputed to be one of the wealthiest men in the world, he left China shortly before the Government fled from Canton to Nanking, late in 1948. At that time an effort was made to have him donate part of his fortune, said to be scattered in banks, as I have pointed out, in France, North and South America, and South Africa. It is believed that he refused and left for Hong Kong, and then for Paris. He is now, I understand, living in the United States.

In January 1950 Madam Chiang ended a 14-month mission to the United States to obtain support in a military mission for the Nationalists, in which she failed.

Doris Fleeson wrote in the Evening Star on January 16, 1950, that the administration arsenals are crammed with facts about the entire Chiang circle—who they are, the wealth they have taken from China, the troubles we have had with them. "With such a story they can make a telling fight, if pushed to it. They prefer not to," she wrote, "because they don't want to lend aid and comfort to the Reds."

Now, it was reported by Robert Allen in a story in 1949 which he wrote for the press—and I quote:

> Note deleted from the white paper, as published, was a State Department list of several hundred top Nationalist officials and generals who made millions grafting on United States aid. The United States authorities know the whereabouts of the secret bank accounts of many of these officials. They are in London, Paris, Chicago, New York, San Francisco, Manila, and Bangkok. Certain multimillionaire Nationalists in the United States are highly fearful the Treasury may freeze their holdings. The Nationalists have demanded the return of these private fortunes.

Then I quote also from Marquis Childs' article of May 5, 1950, in which he says:

INQUIRY ONCE URGED INTO "CHINA LOBBY"

> Both President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson have resolutely set themselves against any investigation of the so-called Nationalist China lobby. Urging and prodding from every quarter has met with a firm "No." The belief is that such an investigation would serve chiefly to further the bitter controversy now focused on American foreign policy in the Far East. Any benefits from showing the sources of paid propaganda and paid pressures would be purely incidental. No one who knows anything about the way things work here doubts that a powerful China lobby has brought extraordinary influence to bear on Congress and the Executive. It would be hard to find any parallel in diplomatic history for the agents and diplomatic representatives of a foreign power exerting such pressures. The methods used cannot, of course, be compared with those of Russian communism, since Russian communism works in each country through an internal conspiracy. Nationalist China has used the techniques of direct intervention on a scale rarely, if ever, seen. The lobby has gained adherents among some ex-Communists in America who have in some instances carried over into this new endeavor the conspiratorial fanaticism they gave to communism.
>
> Another reason for opposing a congressional inquiry is the difficulty—perhaps the impossibility—of digging up the underlying facts. That is particularly true with respect to sources of money. High officials here believe that Chinese Nationalists or members of their families have put in foreign banks considerably over a half billion dollars. But it is so carefully concealed that it could hardly be traced in Swiss and New York accounts to the real owners.
>
> A plane load of 21 American newspapermen has just left for Formosa as invited guests of the Chinese Central News Agency. The news agency is subsidized by the Nationalist Government. (Marquis Childs, May 5, 1950.)

Then I have many others, and one other newspaper story that I want to cite as the foundation for the first question I want to put to you.

This is a news story of the Washington Post by Benjamin Bradlee, September 18, 1949, under the headline "Chiang pays lobbyist here to get funds—former member of Christian Front gets $25,000 salary."

Bradlee writes:

LOBBYIST HIRED BY CHINESE

> The Chinese Nationalists have hired a $25,000 a year lobbyist to get more money for Chiang Kai-shek and to sabotage administration plans to withhold funds. The international influence man is William J. Goodwin, of Roslyn, N. Y., and the Metropolitan Club in Washington, a registered lobbyist and foreign agent with a stormy background of Wall Street finance, Christian Front activity, Tammany Hall politics, and big-time public relations.

In less than 2 years, according to Justice Department records, Goodwin has contracted for $65,000 from the Nationalist Government, first to get help from the United States, then to influence leaders of thought and urge them to approve larger measures of American support and material aid.

With this money Goodwin has given intimate dinners in Washington's exclusive clubs and hotels for more than 100 Members of Congress. He has campaigned for legislators, even while registered as a foreign agent, contributed to their campaigns, and sent some of them flowers and at least one a congratulatory present.

Senator WILEY. Who was that, may I ask?

Senator MORSE. Goodwin.

His checks for entertainment have run as high as $640.

From the Washington Post, by Benjamin Bradlee, September 18, 1949, extract therefrom.

Now, Mr. Secretary, may I say that I have never had any contact or conversations or experience in any way with any person since I have been in the Senate that would justify my saying that I know anything about a China lobby from first-hand contact therewith, if such a lobby exists. But I do feel, Mr. Secretary, that there has been so much talk about the China lobby, so much has appeared in the press and so much criticism has been hurled at you and the State Department in respect to the same, as some of these articles I have quoted from indicate very clearly, that in the course of this hearing an opportunity ought to be presented to the State Department to make any statement that it wishes on the problem of a China lobby, if one exists. That is why I am pursuing this line of questioning this afternoon.

STATE DEPARTMENT ATTITUDE TOWARDS CHINA LOBBY

My first general question—and I will be more specific later—my first general question is this: Do you feel that the broad general account in respect to the existence of an alleged China lobby which is set forth in the statement I have just made for the record, and in which statement I have quoted from newspaper accounts that have appeared in the press in the past, sets forth in any degree whatsoever a factual statement in respect to the existence of what has generally been referred to as a China lobby which seeks to influence the policies of this Government in respect to support for the Nationalist Government regime?

Secretary ACHESON. Senator Morse, I am not able to answer the question as to whether I do or do not feel that the facts are as represented in those statements.

Since you notified me that you were going to go into this subject, I have asked in the Department of State that whatever material we have bearing upon the possibility of illegal or improper use of funds should be collected so that I could look at it. I am told that it has been collected, but I have not had an opportunity to look at it, and I do not know what sort of thing it indicates at all.

I am told that, for the most part, this material is material which comes in in the regular course of affairs from some other agencies to the Department of State and that it is very fragmentary. As soon as I can get to it I will look at it.

I agree with what Senator McMahon has said and what I gather from your remarks that you also believe, and that is that if there is any improper use of funds to influence the foreign policy or any other policy of the United States Government, the people are entitled to know about it, and it is important that they should know about it, and that it would be a very serious and deleterious thing for the United States to have that happen.

The Department of State is not the agency which is charged by law with finding out these matters, nor is it equipped for that. We do not have the administration of the so-called Lobbying Act and the registration under the Lobbying Act. We do not have the administration of the foreign agents registration law.

We do not have an investigatory source of the sort which can be used for this kind of thing. We do not have powers of subpena. We do not have the power to administer oaths, and we do not have access to financial transactions which would reveal, or might reveal, some of these matters.

We are not in any way equipped nor are we charged with the administration of the laws in this respect. So far as I myself am concerned, I would not want to make charges against people under any circumstances unless it was in my line of duty and unless I believed that the charges had evidence, substantial evidence, behind them, which I had and which I could vouch for.

I should be particularly careful not to make any charges against people who could immediately respond that I was doing this because they were criticizing me. Criticism is something which I have to bear as an occupational hazard and I am quite ready to bear it, and therefore I cannot respond to the question because to do so goes beyond my knowledge and would be for me to imply that there are illegal activities going on when I do not have the responsibility for that nor do I have the adequate basis for knowledge.

STATE DEPARTMENT KNOWLEDGE OF FACTS ON CHINA LOBBY

Senator Morse. Mr. Secretary, do you believe there is any basis of fact in the allegation in the Robert Allen article from which I read that the names of some considerable number of Nationalist Chinese were deleted from the white paper because of his claim that they were involved in transactions that showed their involvement in corrupt practices?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir; I do not believe that is true.

Senator Morse. Do you know of any names of Nationalist Chinese being deleted from the original manuscript of the white paper prior to its printing for any purpose whatsoever?

Secretary Acheson. I do not, but I shall have inquiry made as to whether any such thing was done.

Senator Morse. Is there any basis in fact, in your opinion, for the assertion made or implied in some of the newspaper articles from which I quoted that you as Secretary of State sought to prevent an investigation of what is referred to as the China lobby?

Secretary Acheson. That is not correct, sir, in any respect whatever.

Senator Morse. And you know of no such activity of repressing such an invesigation at the White House level; do you?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir; and I do not believe that represents the President's attitude.

Senator MORSE. I am correct in my understanding, am I not, that your investigation of whatever the files of the State Department may show in regard to the information data which have been compiled by your subordinates on the broad question that I have raised as to the possible activity of Nationalists or Nationalist agents in this country will be studied and the study completed by you in time to report to this committee?

Secretary ACHESON. I shall get at it just as soon as I can, Senator. I am fairly occupied most of the day with these hearings and a good part of the evening carrying on my regular duties.

Senator MORSE. I want to make very clear for the record, Mr. Secretary——

Senator WILEY. Can't you fellows talk a little louder?

Senator MORSE. I wish to make very clear for the record that all I have sought to do in raising this matter is to offer the Department of State and, through the Department of State, the administration, an opportunity to put into the record of these hearings any information that they have in their files bearing upon any allegations of lobbying activities on the part of agents of the Nationalist Chinese regime to influence either appropriation legislation or other legislation or American public opinion.

There has been so much discussion of it and so many charges and countercharges that as a lawyer it seems to me the only way to meet such an issue as that is to get it on the record if the information exists, and if this administration has any such information, I personally think that it owes it to the American people to bring the facts out.

If there is not such information, then I think that the American people ought to know that, too; and I repeat, I have no such information. I wouldn't have the facilities to get it if it existed. I have already stated that I have not been myself contacted by anyone in regard to Asiatic policy that would justify my pinning on them the label or the accusation that they were seeking to lobby me for the Nationalist Chinese cause.

But, I am disturbed about it, and I wanted to at least make a good faith attempt to find out what the Government files can disclose on it, if the information is in the file, and I shall await whatever information you are able to give us on the basis of your examination of the information that your subordinates have, I understand, compiled for you.

I do not mean, by that, Mr. Chairman, that this is the last question that I shall ask on this general issue.

I think it is only fair, however, in view of what the Secretary has said, that he should be given an opportunity to look at the information which has been compiled for him in the State Department on the general subject, and report on it to this committee before I continue with my examination here, or elsewhere, on this issue.

Therefore, I will turn to another issue, Mr. Secretary.

WILL MAC ARTHUR PLAN END OR EXTEND THE WAR

Yesterday, Senator George, of Georgia, was examining you, and he asked you, in effect, as I understood his question, if it wasn't your opinion that it was MacArthur's intention, in connection with his recommendations for the prosecution of the war in Asia, to end the war and not to extend it; and I believe it is fair to say that your answer carried with it the meaning that you believed that that was his intention, as I believe it was his intention, to end the war, not to extend it.

Now, for the purpose of emphasis, for the record, I wish to ask you if I am correct in my understanding that it was your opinion, the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the opinion of Mr. Harriman, the opinion of the Secretary of Defense, and the opinion of the President of the United States that putting into effect General MacArthur's recommendations would run such a grave risk of extending the war into an all-out war in Asia, that their fear of that extension was one of the primary reasons for the recall of General MacArthur?

Secretary ACHESON. I think that is correct, sir.

We have gotten two things put together, at this point——

Senator MORSE. You may separate them.

Secretary ACHESON. What Senator George was questioning me about yesterday was, as you correctly and properly said, what was my opinion as to General MacArthur's intention, and he brought out, and I agreed, that it was his intention, by these steps, to end the war, and General MacArthur did not desire to extend it.

I think I pointed out, in answer to questions by Senator George, that in our opinion—that is, the opinion of the people that you have mentioned there—it would have the result of extending it, whether that was the intention or not; and that that was a very grave and serious risk which could not be undertaken.

Now, it was that fact, plus the fact that this matter became a public controversy between General MacArthur and the President, which led all of the people concerned to conclude that he should be recalled.

And, if this had merely been General MacArthur's recommendations, and he accepted the overruling of them by his superiors, that would have been another matter.

Senator MORSE. I did not mean to imply, in my question of you, Mr. Secretary, that the fear of the group that I have mentioned, that the putting into effect of MacArthur's proposals would extend the war into a full-scale war was the only reason for his recall, but it was one of the factors, as I understand it, because I think it was General Collins who testified that although perfectly satisfied that General MacArthur could be counted upon to carry out every military directive, they were fearful that because of the lack of sympathy for the military foreign policy of the Government in Asia at the time, he might, in the exercise of that discretion that goes along with a field commander, follow a course of action some day that might get us into an extension of the war, and we would then be in the swim, so to speak, and thought they ought to have someone in regard to whom they didn't have to entertain that constant fear.

Do you think that is a fair statement?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired.

CORRECTION IN PRINTED RECORD

While you were talking of that, just a few minutes ago my attention was called to an error in the printing of the first volume of the record of these hearings that does a serious injustice to General MacArthur.

I invite your attention to page 30 of the printed record of the hearings, in the first subheading on that page, in the last paragraph. Senator Wiley was examining General MacArthur, and General MacArthur, according to this print says that, and it seems to be completely invalid:

> I have not carried out every directive that I have ever received, but what I was trying to do was to find out what the directives were to be for the future.

I have a page of the original transcript here, and General MacArthur testified, " I have not only carried out," and the word "only" there, was omitted through some error in the Printing Office.

Senator WILEY. That was his testimony, as you said.

Chairman RUSSELL. Of course it was. Here is the original transcript of the reporter, which discloses that the error was not in the reporter, or in the copy that was submitted to the Printing Office, but was in the Printing Office.

I don't know of any way it can be corrected in these volumes, but it certainly should appear in the record that that omission was made, and where it was made.

Senator MORSE. Not only there, Mr. Chairman, but may I make a procedural suggestion, because in a record as voluminous as this, there are bound to be typographical errors——

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Senator MORSE. I wonder if we could not have an understanding that a so-called correction or error sheet shall be prepared and available for appropriate insert in the volumes, calling attention to the fact that there are errors, and what the errors are.

That is very common procedure from the standpoint of the Printing Office.

Chairman RUSSELL. They issue an errata sheet. That is what we will undertake to do, but I thought it well to call this to your attention at this juncture.

Senator WILEY. Of course, Mr. Chairman, that is confirmed by the testimony of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also, that that is what he said.

Chairman RUSSELL. I understand; but my remarks were directed particularly to this specific error.

Senator Wiley?

OTHER PERSONS CONSULTED BY PRESIDENT ON DISMISSAL

Senator WILEY. Mr. Secretary, Secretary Marshall says that the President spoke not only to the Army and Defense Department, but two or three others, outside of the Army and Defense Department, and outside of the State Department in this matter of recalling MacArthur.

Do you know who he was referring to?

Secretary ACHESON. I understand also that the President did confer with some other people but he did not confer with them in my presence, and my knowledge about it is not of my own knowledge at all, and I do not feel at liberty to repeat anything that I have heard.

Senator WILEY. You do not feel at liberty to give us the names of those he consulted with except those you have given heretofore, is that it?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

SENATOR VANDENBERG'S STATEMENT OF 1947 ON CHINA

Senator WILEY. Now, Senator Brewster called my attention to the Congressional Record in the statement of Senator Vandenberg on page 3474, which was on April 16, 1947, and he suggested that I read it into the Record in connection with Senator Sparkman's statement this morning. Senator Sparkman read a part of this Record, and a quote:

> Nevertheless, one of the greatest and ablest men of this Nation, gifted not only with a military sense, but with a high sense of statesmanship, has spent a year—one of the best years of his life—in China, trying to work out a policy for this Nation; and so far as I am concerned, I have been quite willing that he should have the opportunity to see whether it could be done.
>
> Again, I say no man can be dogmatic as to what are the answers to these questions in these difficult times. As to China, the answer apparently is that General Marshall's errand did not succeed.
>
> So far as I am concerned, I should think that the fulfillment of our great hopes in China rests upon the success with which Chiang Kai-shek can enlarge and liberalize his own national government, within which he has been able to assemble every political party in China except the armed Communists; and I should feel that in the case of China, as in the case of all other foreign nations, despite the characteristics of the Chinese Government—characteristics which we do not like, and which we would greatly prefer to change—our great hope in China, I say very frankly to the able Senator from Nebraska, would be for success for the generalissimo in enlarging and liberalizing his own Nationalist government as against the armed Communists.

FACTORS SURROUNDING MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

Now, Mr. Secretary, what would you say—maybe this question has been answered—to the dismissal of General MacArthur—would you say it was a source of satisfaction to Red China?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; I shouldn't say that.

Senator WILEY. What is that?

Secretary ACHESON. I shouldn't say that.

Senator WILEY. You do not think the Red Chinese or the Kremlin would get any satisfaction out of the dismissal of MacArthur, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary ACHESON. I think they would use it in any possible way they could in a propaganda way, or otherwise, to cause us trouble. Perhaps, if that is their satisfaction, I should think you would regard it as such.

Senator WILEY. In these various conferences that you were party to which preceded the dismissal, was the criticism voiced against him because of any friendly relation with some political leaders?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; I heard no such statements made.

Senator WILEY. Was Admiral Sherman's suggestion discussed?

Secretary ACHESON. I did not hear it discussed at all.

Senator WILEY. Admiral Sherman, you will recall, stated that he made the suggestion that a five-star general should be sent to Japan to discuss the matter with MacArthur, or words to that effect.

Secretary ACHESON. I said I did not hear the suggestion made or discussed at all.

COMPARISON TO EAST AND WEST GERMANY

Senator WILEY. Is it not a fact that Russia has practically duplicated the military preparation of North Korea and Red China by her arming of East German forces, and isn't the situation in Germany, therefore, much of a parallel with the situation in Korea, except that in West Germany there are some American troops at present?

Isn't the situation the same, except that there are some American troops and Allied troops?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, there are points of similarity and points of difference between the two situations. It is true that the Russians have created military forces in East Germany. We have protested against that, and said it was a violation of the quadripartite understanding, and the Russians have claimed, and I think, quite cynically, that these are not military forces; that they are only police forces.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK

Senator WILEY. Everybody has recognized that corruption has existed in Chiang's government. We knew that back in the early period of the war, too, did we not? We assisted Chiang.

Secretary ACHESON. We have continued throughout to assist him, sir, and are assisting him now.

Senator WILEY. I think this question has been asked. Is there any question in the minds of our Government as to the personal integrity of Chiang?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; I don't know of any.

MANNER OF MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

Senator WILEY. I do not know whether this would be exactly a fair question or not, but I think I should ask it because you and Sherman have indicated that you were two who didn't just all at once go along with the idea. At least you advanced reasonable arguments of what should or should not be done. If you personally had been in charge of handling the dismissal of General MacArthur, would you have handled it in the way that the President did?

Secretary ACHESON. I think that is quite an unfair question to ask me, Senator. [Laughter.]

Senator WILEY. I wanted to get your personal reaction.

Secretary ACHESON. I perform my own duty, and don't undertake to decide how I could have performed somebody else's duty.

RESULTS OF COALITIONS WITH COMMUNISTS

Senator WILEY. Now, is it not a fact that in every government in which the Communists form a component part, sooner or later they have taken over the same, lock, stock, and barrel?

Secretary ACHESON. Would you state that again, please?

Senator WILEY. I say, in every government in which the Communists have been a component part haven't they taken over the government, lock, stock, and barrel?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; that is not correct.

Senator WILEY. Where, for instance?

Secretary ACHESON. In Italy, in France, in Belgium, in Holland, and I believe in Germany, West Germany.

Senator WILEY. Then, in those governments where they did not take it it is because they did not have sufficient power, isn't that right? They tried to do it, did they not?

Secretary ACHESON. The success of that operation has been largely in the satellites where there have either been Russian troops present in the country, or where the country has been practically surrounded by Russian troops, so that the threat of military occupation was a very real one.

This thing has been done in places like Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland.

Senator WILEY. That is their objective everywhere, isn't it?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; that is their objective.

AFTER KOREAN CONFLICT IS SETTLED

Senator WILEY. And isn't it true, too, that if we were to have some kind of a peace or some kind of armistice with the Reds in Korea, that it would necessitate, in view of our knowledge of Red tactics and the way they have acted in the past, it would necessitate a large standing force of the United Nations to remain in Southern Korea in order to stabilize it, would it not?

Secretary ACHESON. May I have that read to me again?

Chairman RUSSELL. Please read the question, Mr. Reporter.

(The pending question was read by the reporter.)

Secretary ACHESON. It would require troops there for some time, but if the result of the fighting was really to bring a conviction on the other side that they could not achieve the purpose of driving the UN into the sea, then you might have a really stabilized settlement, so that all foreign troops could be withdrawn after a time.

[Deleted.]

Secretary ACHESON. Sir, I don't feel able to discuss the result of negotiations currently under way. That, as the press indicates, is a matter which is currently being discussed, and I just don't think it is wise or in the public interest for me to discuss it on a record which goes to the world.

Senator WILEY. We are doing something? That is what I am getting at.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. What are we doing in Indochina to prevent a second Korea there? Are we doing something there, too?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. We have, as you know, a quite extensive military aid program both to the forces of the free states and to the French forces.

TIME OF ABANDONMENT OF MEDIATION EFFORT

Senator WILEY. At the close of my previous round of questions you said you did not believe that the Nationalist and the Communist groups in China could work together. Yet you asserted you believed that the two could have been brought together at an earlier time. Am I right about that?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, at the end of your question, your period of questioning, you asked me whether I believed now that they could be brought together and I said, No, I did not.

Senator WILEY. I think it is a matter of more or less universal feeling among a vast number of peoples that at one time they thought they could play with the Chinese. I think President Roosevelt before he died woke up to the fact, according to some publications, that he realized that he could not trust the Kremlin. When did you reach the conclusion that the two Chinese groups could not work together? When did that become apparent?

Secretary ACHESON. The policy of everyone who is involved in this thing was that the best effort that could possibly be made in China, the most hopeful one, would be to work out these difficulties by political means, set up a government for all China, unify the forces, get the Japanese out, and so forth. I have been over that at very considerable length.

That was the view of the Chinese Government, the Chinese Communists, of the generals and admirals that I referred to yesterday of the Government here.

General Marshall went over to assist in that effort. He returned in January 1947 and upon his return the effort was then abandoned because fighting had broken out between the two factions, and althought the Nationalist Government continued to say that their policy was to work out an arrangement with the Communists, on July 4, 1947, they declared them in rebellion and undertook to try and settle the matter by military measures.

Our effort to bring about a mediation and settlement was abandoned by General Marshall upon his return to the United States in January 1947.

Senator WILEY. Well, that was the basis of my question, sir. I remember distinctly that General Marshall at first hoped it would be brought about, so we can say that probably in 1947 Government officials in the highest echelon came to the conclusion there was no real opportunity for getting those two opposite factions together. Am I right about that?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I say that was January 1947.

Senator WILEY. I think you answered this question, though I put it down last night when I was trying to figure out a few questions.

WISDOM OF YALTA AGREEMENTS

Do you think in retrospect the Yalta agreements were sound, although in this secret agreement, without the presence of Chiang Kai-shek, the Russian got away with what they got under that agreement

Secretary ACHESON. I think under the circumstances that were motivating at that time, that was a sound agreement.

Senator WILEY. Well, I understand by that you mean that those concessions were necessary in view of the fact that they entered the war against Japan then, because we were really at grips with Japan in February 1945, is that right?

Secretary ACHESON. I went over that at some length, sir. I pointed out that the great need for bringing the Russians into the war at an early period so that they could contain the Japanese troops who were in Manchuria, that this was a need which was recognized by our military people at that time and on which they felt very strongly.

I also pointed out that the Russians were in a position to profit by a victory, a victory which might cost us terrible casualties, because they were on the verge of Manchuria and they could walk in and occupy it anyway.

Senator WILEY. I remember that testimony.

Secretary Acheson. Therefore the agreement had a dual aspect. One was to bring the Russians in at the time when they would be effective, and secondly to try and reduce what they could take.

Senator Wiley. Yes. I think the answer to the question then whether you felt those concessions were necessary would be "Yes"; is that correct?

Secretary Acheson. I answered that question and then you started asking me the reason why I thought so, so I was amplifying.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BIG THREE AGREEMENTS

Senator Wiley. You answered that "Yes." All right. Now there is just one other line I want to get into because this is the only opportunity perhaps that might present itself, and with your legal mind and your approach to the problems I believe that you might throw a little light upon this. We have some executive agreements that have a large scope—agreements like Yalta and Tehran, Potsdam, Quebec, and Cairo. I want to ask first, whether they have necessarily to be secret, and second, whether they are constitutional.

Secretary Acheson. Well, I think that the need for secrecy in this particular agreement has been pointed out before, Senator Wiley.

This involved an undertaking by the Soviet Government to go to war with a nation with which it was not at war. This military action was to take place 3 months after the end of the war against Germany. Obviously, it was not a desirable thing to announce to the Japanese that the Russians were going to go to war with them 3 months after some indefinite day in the future.

Also, I pointed out that it involved troop movements from the European front to the eastern front, and it was not desirable to announce that that was going to take place. Therefore, for reasons of military security, it seems to me highly obvious why this agreement was secret.

Senator Wiley. All of them?

Secretary Acheson. I am now talking about the one we are considering here.

Senator Wiley. I mentioned the others also—Tehran, Potsdam, Quebec, Cairo.

Secretary Acheson. Well, the others, I believe, were not secret, were they? I don't recall that they were. I think they were announced at the time.

Senator Wiley. Their full terms?

Secretary Acheson. Senator, I don't carry that in my mind.

SECRET AGREEMENTS

Senator Wiley. Are there any secret agreements now which have not been made public?

Secretary Acheson. Not that I know of.

Senator Wiley. Are there any secret agreements that have not been made known to the Congress or the committees of Congress?

Secretary Acheson. Not that I know of.

Senator Wiley. I might ask whether any agreements that are now in process of negotiation are in the nature of treaties submitted to the Senate?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't know of any agreements which are being negotiated which are to be kept secret. I presume they will be in the regular course of agreements, either treaties or under some statute.

Senator WILEY. The so-called Pacific pact that is being negotiated now, that will be in the nature of a treaty?

Secretary ACHESON. That has been announced in the press; it has been taken up with the subcommittees of the Senate and House Committees on Foreign Relations and Affairs, and it has been stated publicly that those are going to be worked out in the form of treaties.

Senator WILEY. Yes. It has been taken up informally with the committee of the Senate, with no real definition as to terms, I might say. They are to be brought out in the negotiations, which, of course, would be true if they were secret treaties or open treaties. But I think that information is good news for the public.

I am not trying to be argumentative here. I know what the public feels about these things. I think it is wise to let them know this treaty or any others so that they will have the knowledge and the facts in relation thereto.

In other words, the people were sold such a bill of goods back in Wilson's time of open covenants openly arrived at, that many of them feel there is virtue in that idea. I take it you do too. The public in the Nation should become aware of any agreements that are made unless in the judgment of the President there is, say, military necessity for keeping them secret. Is that about right?

Secretary ACHESON. I think that has been the attitude of the Government right along.

AWARENESS OF SOVIET INTENTIONS DURING AND AFTER THE WAR

Senator WILEY. Well, this morning after I listened to the testimony that came out from Senator McMahon's and Senator Sparkman's cross-examination, or examination, I felt that a good many people during the war were more or less asleep to the real Russia or the intents of the leaders of Russia.

I remember distinctly the testimony of General Marshall when he first left for China and the talk about the hope that we could play ball with the Russians.

Perhaps it would be a little more generous to say that not only the common people but the leaders in Government were unaware of the larger plans of the Kremlin at that time.

Do you think that is right?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes; I do not think——

Senator WILEY. What?

Secretary ACHESON. I do not think that everybody was aware of the plans of the Kremlin at that time.

Senator WILEY. As I remember, Mr. Secretary, the writers and the commentators and Communist sympathizers were all talking about a lasting peace. Through that we were deluded I suppose, into the very channel that the Communists wanted and they could, by utilizing their stooges, do what they have done now.

Of course, the average citizen and the average writer was not in a position to evaluate the international facts. And apparently, as I said before, President Roosevelt felt up to the very last day that he could deal with Joe Stalin. I think he had in mind the $12 billion that we had let them have in lend-lease.

The question I want to ask is: Is it not a fact that our very naiveté is what led us into this international situation with incipient fires ready to break out on the perimeter of earth?

That is question 1, and question 2 is: Are our leaders in Government really so alerted that they will not be taken for another ride by Joe Stalin by any of his tactics?

That brings up the thought whether on this proposed armistice at the thirty-eighth parallel agreement they are alerted to what that might mean. Perhaps the Communists are just getting ready for another push or shifting their forces into Indochina.

They have taken over Tibet, as I understand it. Joe Stalin is building airplanes in Tibet, and that is only about 300 miles by air from the capital of India.

I assume that all these conditions are impressed indelibly on our leaders in Government who, after all, have the responsibility of defining our policy.

Would you comment? I don't ask you to answer the question but any comment you choose.

Secretary Acheson. Senator, you said quite a few things that I would not want to vouch for.

I think that the American people and most of the peoples of the world, probably including the Russian people, believed and hoped that at the end of the last war there was going to be a lasting peace and cooperation through the United Nations and otherwise to maintain that peace and increase the prosperity of the world.

I think that at some point or other, maybe before, maybe at a later point, there were decisions made in the Soviet Union to take a different course.

I think everybody in a responsible position in Government is aware of the dangers and difficulties of the present situation and is doing the best that all of them can to meet those problems.

UTILIZING GUERRILLAS ON CHINESE MAINLAND

Senator Wiley. The other day I asked a question—and I think it was misunderstood, not by you but by others who wanted to misunderstand it—about what we were doing with Chiang on Formosa.

Now is it not a fact that from information you have that on the Chinese mainland there has been created a considerable front against the Reds, and that there are anywhere from a million to a million and a half guerrillas fighting the Reds on the mainland of China?

In view of this changed condition, which, after all, it seems to me, is a betterment in the East—is there anything considered by our policy makers, military or political, that would seem to utilize the change of facts, to our own advantage?

Secretary Acheson. Well, I find that a very difficult question both to understand and to answer, Senator.

Senator Wiley. Well, it is probably my fault. You have had a long chore, sir, and you have done a grand job for yourself, I would say, with that mind of yours. Keeping everything in mind it is a remarkable accomplishment.

Well, let me put it this way: The facts seem to me that on the mainland of China there is between a million and a million and a half guerrillas putting up a second front against the Reds. What are we doing about that?

Secretary ACHESON. I do not—information which I have is not the same as what you just expressed. I was asked about this the other day and testified that I did not see at the present moment forces which were threatening the existence of the regime on the mainland of China.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time is up.

Senator WILEY. May I just ask one question more?

Chairman RUSSELL. One question.

Senator WILEY. Again I do not want to seem to be sophomorish, but here is the situation as I see it: The Reds are concentrating against us in Korea. If there are a million and a half guerrillas on the mainland, and, as Chiang said the other night through his wife—I saw them on television—if they had over 500,000 good troops, and if this war is to be fought realistically, are we in any way utilizing those forces that might be allies of ours to counteract this communistic impact in the East?

You know, as I said, they are within 300 miles of the capital of India. They are pressuring on Indochina. Now, is it not just a matter of common sense to exert pressures wherever we can, especially if we use other forces that are allies of ours, or could be made into allies?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, sir, I think we have gone into the question of the use of the Nationalist troops on Formosa and other places, and the Joint Chiefs have described that at some length, and I have described it several times here.

I don't think there is anything I can add to that.

Senator WILEY. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Kefauver?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hunt?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain?

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

JCS NOTIFICATION OF HOT PURSUIT REPLIES

Mr. Secretary, was a copy of your hot pursuit message of January 13, 1950, given to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't believe so, sir; but I don't know.

Senator CAIN. I think that would account for the fact that there are a number of different impressions among the JCS and the Secretary of Defense concerning what was done with their recommendations to ask other nations about hot pursuit.

Mr. Secretary, does Mr. Fisher happen to have available any of the copies of the letters which you sent to the Secretary of Defense in which you passed along to him the negative reactions of given nations to your message of January 13, 1950? I possibly wouldn't have to ask so many questions on this subject if I knew what was said to the Secretary of Defense and the JCS.

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir; I have copies of those two letters right here.

Senator Cain. Would it suit your convenience to read one or another of them, sir, which would straighten up the record on that point?

Secretary Acheson. Well, I shall read them and then make a request in the record that Admiral Davis delete these, because they refer to particular nations and I do not believe that it is proper for me to put in public records the responses of nations which they think are private.

Senator Cain. I am certain that Admiral Davis will gratify your request.

[Deleted.]

Senator Cain. May I ask, Mr. Secretary—and first I want to express my appreciation for that information—was there an acknowledgment in writing from the Defense Secretary to the Secretary of State?

Secretary Acheson. I haven't got it here. I don't know.

Senator Cain. Perhaps this question woud satisfy my interest. You have not testified that following the date on which you wrote to the Secretary of Defense that there were any meetings on this subject between the State Department and the Department of Defense.

Can you tell us whether you recollect if there were any further meetings on the question of hot pursuit?

Secretary Acheson. I don't recollect whether there were. I can probably look in the records and find out. Following what I have just told you, the matter was dropped by the Defense Department.

REFERRING HOT PURSUIT TO THE UN

Senator Cain. Mr. Secretary, just several days ago I asked what seemed to me like a logical question. Why isn't a matter of this importance referred to the United Nations in its Security Council or the General Assembly? Your answer was that that was not possible for tactical reasons and because Russia was a member of the Security Council.

One of the prime reasons why each of these nations says they were opposed to hot pursuit is that they think the question ought to be presented to the United Nations and an understanding or an agreement reached there.

Does not that, therefore, leave us with an extremely awkward situation? Our allies want us to go to the United Nations, and you advise us that is not an effective instrument to work through.

Secretary Acheson. I don't think that it is in accordance with these letters to say they want us to go there. They think it is beyond the authority we presently have, and if we want to do it, we should go there; but they say if you do this, it will extend the war, and therefore, they are against it for two reasons.

Senator Cain. In a literal way, Mr. Secretary, you do not agree that the United States would exceed its authority if it, as the Unified Command of the United Nations, invoked hot pursuit against the enemy, do you?

Secretary Acheson. I have taken the view that it was within the authority of the Unified Command to do that.

Senator Cain. I must continue to wonder how we are going to follow or permit hot pursuit in the future, if for tactical reasons of military necessity that becomes imperative, for our allies are advising us they think it is beyond our authority to do it, and they want us to go to the United Nations if we are determined to do it.

SOVIET DESIGNS ON CHINA AND THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS

Mr. Secretary, you have testified, sir, in positive fashion on more than one occasion that you were not among those who have ever considered Chinese Communists to be agrarian reformers. I understood you correctly in that sense, did I not, sir?

Secretary ACHESON. I think so; yes.

Senator CAIN. I think, Mr. Secretary, that you have testified that you did not know of any prominent State Department officials who felt that the Chinese Communists were agrarian reformers.

Secretary ACHESON. I think I said that.

Senator CAIN. Thank you. I have understood you, Mr. Secretary, to say that, in your opinion, Chinese Communists were Moscow-inspired and Marxist-trained.

Was that the substance of the testimony you offered in recent days?

Secretary ACHESON. I was talking of allegiance and I don't mean that all people who profess communism in China have been trained in Moscow.

Senator CAIN. But the leaders in the various portfolios. Mr. Secretary, is it not the case, or at least I have understood it to be for a good part of my life, that Russia has had designs on China or has sought to communize China since the early 1920's?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I think that the Russians, long before there was the present regime, had designs on China. In fact in the very early part of this century they acquired virtual control of Manchuria.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

Secretary ACHESON. And they also had strong interests and control over certain of the western and northwestern provinces.

It is also true that the Russians had a mission which was very active in China up until 1927, which was working with the left wing of the Kuomintang Party. I referred to it and its leader who, I believe, was the Russian Ambassador whose name was Borodin, and they had to leave China in 1927.

AMALGAMATION OF CHINESE COMMUNIST AND NATIONALIST ARMIES

Senator CAIN. All of that, Mr. Secretary, being true, I have found it difficult up to this point to understand the force of your support in June of 1946 for H. R. 6795, which had as its purpose the amalgamation of the Chinese Communist and Nationalist armies, and I ask about this in all seriousness because it seems to me that not only you but other prominent administration leaders were sponsoring an amalgamation of the Chinese Communists within the Nationalist army, which certainly would have employed in 10 Chinese Communist divisions many, many leaders who, from my construction, would have been Moscow-inspired and Marxist-trained and desirous only of destroying the Nationalist Army, and in due time freedom on the face of the earth.

I cannot reconcile against China's background why any American would advocate supporting Chinese Communists, sir, as late as 1946, and I thought if you cared to speak more broadly to that subject I, for one, would appreciate it very much.

Secretary ACHESON. I would be very glad to. I have been over it quite a few times, and I will be glad to go over it again.

The policy of working out the difficulties in China between the Communists and the Nationalists, which were very great and succeeded in dividing the country and putting approximately a quarter of the population under the control of the Communists, had been the policy of the Nationalist Government of China since 1937.

The policy of assisting in working this thing out by bringing all of China under one government, by setting up a constitutional system to which all Chinese, whether they were Communists or non-Communists, should belong to one country and have voting rights, and so forth, under one government, the policy of creating one army which would be very strongly Nationalist, 5-to-1, all had received the approval of the Chinese Nationalists and Communists and the highest military in the United States, and that is what General Marshall went out to do, and there was little or no criticism of that policy at that time.

If you were going to put the army together, you had to put it together, and the army which would then be the national army of China had to be armed and equipped and officered.

General Marshall worked out with the two parties the proposals for doing that, which I thought were very good and he thought were very good, and everybody else thought, so far as I know, were very good; and the whole purpose of this bill was to provide some equipment and arms for this new national army.

It was not going to be given to the national army until it was created, until the system had been agreed to by which this new constitutional government would be set up, and the armies put together on this basis.

I testified that that never occurred and, therefore, it was not done. There was no way of getting the Chinese Government Army without having that army organized, equipped, and officered.

Now, so far as your suggestion that this army would have been offcered by fanatical Communists who would have overthrown freedom throughout the world, that would have been the problem of the Ministry of War of the Chinese Government which was being set up.

Senator CAIN. I was referring to its leadership.

Secretary ACHESON. And if they had the sucess which they have had in the other government, they would have weeded out this fanatical Communist group from the army and the problem would have expired.

Senator CAIN. I can certainly understand how the Chinese might have thought that was a proper attempt to be made.

I found it, and find it, difficult in my own mind, though, to understand why we, as Americans, who are convinced that China's Communist leadership is Marxist-trained, should advocate giving it an opportunity to destroy the larger whole, which would have been the Nationalists.

Secretary ACHESON. I have already pointed out that the same thing was done in countries in Western Europe, without bringing that result about.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir; and I thank you for your information, sir.

During the course of these hearings you have made it very clear that this Government officially has no desire or intention, if they can help it, of permitting Red China to be recognized as a member of the United Nations.

RECOGNITION OF RED CHINA

I wonder why it was, and ask your comment on it, if you care to give it, why, as late as June 1950 the very distinguished American leader, Admiral Chester Nimitz, by name, made this observation, as an agent of the United Nations, in Seattle, Wash., and I quote from an article of the Seattle Times, which carries an interview by that paper with Admiral Nimitz. It says:

> The five-star admiral, who has been working for the United Nations for 14 months, also said that United States recognition of the Communist Government of China is inevitable. In predicting recognition of Red China, Nimitz said:
>
> "To have mutually beneficial trade relations with China we have got to have some degree of recognition of their government whether you like the government or not.
>
> "The British did it right away and got kicked in the teeth. After the insults to us and seizure of American property, we cant recognize the Communist regime right away. But I am convinced that the insulting and other incidents were inspired by a third party which wants to keep China and the United States apart."

I wonder where Admiral Nimitz would have gotten the impression, as an agent of the United Nations, and as a citizen of the United States, that it was inevitable that the United States would recognize Red China?

Do you know how that came about, sir?

Secretary ACHESON. I can't answer for Admiral Nimitz. He is a man that has his own views, which are well known to everybody.

STRENGTHENING COLLECTIVE SECURITY BY THREATER CONTRIBUTIONS TO KOREA

Senator CAIN. Mr. Secretary, on the other day you said something which I certainly approved of. You said, in your official capacity, that the overriding ambition of the United States was to build a collective-security system with those nations which are dedicated to peace.

On last Saturday, you spoke with complete justification, to my mind, about the splendid fighting quality of the allied troops who are associated with the United Nations on the ground in Korea.

On page 4663, you said this, in answer to an inquiry by Senator Johnson:

> First of all, if I just might say one thing about the Korean effort. I feel badly when I hear these discussions of the inadequae effort of our allies in Korea.
>
> I think all of them are painfully aware that they are not able to do as much as they would like to do, and I think that they are trying as hard to do the very best they can. I will come to their other efforts in a minute.
>
> In view of the extraordinary gallantry of the action of their troops in Korea which is up to the very highest standards and I think is regarded by our own troops as something to be very proud of, it seems a little bit unfortunate to be talking about the inadequacy of their effort.

Mr. Secretary, I am a great believer in collective security. I criticize the subject on occasions because I don't think we are moving fast enough, as free people, in the direction of getting a truly collective defense system.

As one who feels like that, I make a great distinction between the fighting capacity and the courage of the limited number of allied troops in Korea, and the total number of allied troops.

Every military witness has testified that more allied troops could be used and that more allied troops are required.

Now, I want, sir, to ask you some questions about the actual status of allied contributions in Korea, which has quite a lot to do with the over-all subject of collective security.

May I ask, so that the record is accurate, what is the number of the Allied nations with whom we are jointly associated as a result of our relationship with the United Nations in Korea.

I have understood there are 52. I want to make certain that I am correct, sir.

Secretary ACHESON. You mean the number of nations who have troops in Korea?

Senator CAIN. No, sir.

The number of nations with whom we agreed to crush the aggression in Korea.

Secretary ACHESON. This is the number of nations who voted——

Senator CAIN. Those, I suppose, would be all the nations in the United Nations, except Russia and her satellites.

Secretary ACHESON. I will get the votes for you, and put them in the record; but I haven't got the number of people who voted for each one of these resolutions, here.

Senator CAIN. I think we will probably come to agree, sir, that the number is something over 50, all of whom said it is necessary that we join together in defeating the aggressor in Korea.

Of these fifty-odd nations, Mr. Secretary, can you tell us how many nations have contributed ground forces to the war in Korea?

Secretary ACHESON. That is also in the record, Senator.

Senator CAIN. My latest information in the record came from April 30, 1951, and there were 12 of the 50 governments who had contributed any foot soldiers to Korea.

Secretary ACHESON. The last one, I believe, to contribue is Colombia. I don't know whether those were included in the 12, or not.

Senator CAIN. They are not, sir.

They are scheduled for delivery at some future date, I think it is only several weeks away, now.

PRESENT ALLIES' CONTRIBUTIONS

Do you happen to know, Mr. Secretary, how many ground forces those 12 nations have collectively contributed to the war in Korea?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes; I do know. I can't recall the number, except that it is in this record.

Senator CAIN. Would we agree, Mr. Secretary, that it approximates 20,000?

Secretary ACHESON. My present information is that it is around 26,000; but I haven't got the exact figures; that is, ground forces.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir; I am referring to ground forces.

Now, in order to get, not hard-headed, but just as pressing as we can, may I ask you to give us your opinion—talking always in terms of collective security—why India, just as one of many examples, has made no contribution to combat ground forces in Korea, after a year of war?

I ask that question without prejudice, because it happens that I voted for the wheat-to-India bill.

Secretary ACHESON. India has not, much to our regret, made a contribution. We were hoping that they would, but they have declined to do so.

Senator CAIN. In terms of collective security, Mr. Secretary, how do we go about, in working with our allies to get——

Secretary ACHESON. Excuse me.

I should be fair to her. India made a contribution of a field ambulance unit.

Senator CAIN. I just asked the question concerning combat ground forces.

Mr. Secretary, to use another example, do you think that Turkey and Greece are on a position to make a larger contribution of combat ground forces to Korea than they have committed thus far?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I should rather have the Joint Chiefs of Staff answer that. Both nations have troops. The question is—whether it is the wisest place to have them.

Senator CAIN. Will you tell us, Mr. Secretary, what actual plans are currently being worked on to secure larger combat ground force contributions from some countries, and contributions in combat ground forces from other free nations which have contributed nothing thus far after 12 months of war, or fighting in Korea?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; I cannot tell you that. I can say, as I have said before, that we have active negotiations going on with several nations which we hope will be successful.

Senator CAIN. The more information we can get, Mr. Secretary, the more able the Senate and the Congress will be to contribute to the effectiveness of the present war, and to possible future wars. That is the reason why I seek this information.

NEGOTIATIONS FOR GREATER CONTRIBUTIONS

May I ask, Mr. Secretary, whose responsibility is it, in the United States, to initiate requests for allied fighting contributions for Korea?

Secretary ACHESON. It is my responsibility to carry on the discussions.

The matter is taken up first, in the first instance, with the Defense Department, so that we can know what is required, of what nature, and then I have the responsibility for dealing with the foreign governments.

Senator CAIN. Well, I wanted to be clear about that. Up to date all of the military witnesses have said they needed more troops, from more countries, and they would accept any troops that they could get from anywhere. So I suppose they have made their wishes known to you, and that administratively it is your responsibility to make those wishes known to all of the fifty-odd nations with whom we are associated in the United Nations.

May I ask this question, Mr. Secretary: General MacArthur testified that he thought in a fitting way that any self-contained unit of battalion size, which approximates around a thousand men, would be most desired for use in Korea.

Can you tell us which nations, if any nations, with whom we are associated, are not able to provide a self-contained battalion to the fighting in Korea?

And we are looking toward the future, Mr. Secretary. If this war broadens out, despite efforts to keep it contained within Korea, we are going to have to have more men from more places, and we are going to have to have them in an awful hurry. So that is why I asked that last question.

Chairman **Russell**. Your time has expired. You may answer the question.

Secretary **Acheson**. The answer—I can't tell you that. There will be a good many, I presume. I don't know. That is a military question.

Senator **Cain**. Thank you.

Chairman **Russell**. Senator George?

FULL PUBLICATION OF YALTA AGREEMENT

Senator **George**. Mr. Secretary, the Yalta agreement was made, I believe, in January or February, the early part of the year?

Secretary **Acheson**. I think it was in February 1945, Senator.

Senator **George**. February 1945.

When did its terms become publicly known? There were reasons why it was not published immediately. When did its terms become public?

Secretary **Acheson**. I don't know the answer to that question, sir.

Senator **George**. You have not got that information?

Secretary **Acheson**. I can find out but I just don't happen to have it with me now.

AWARENESS OF MAC ARTHUR'S VIEWS

Senator **George**. Mr. Secretary, in your contacts through the Defense Establishment, Joint Chiefs or however they were made, with General MacArthur, were you ever in doubt about his position on highly important matters, as, for instance, the matters that have been discussed here? Did he make his position clearly known to you insofar as they were political, within your Department?

Secretary **Acheson**. I am not quite sure what your question implies.

Senator **George**. I mean was there any question about his position, say, on Formosa, as an illustration, or any other——

Secretary **Acheson**. The question that I had most to do with General MacArthur about was the Japanese Peace Treaty. Now, on that I had no doubt on his position at any time; it was very clear.

Senator **George**. You had no doubt of his position at any time?

Secretary **Acheson**. In regard to his position on Formosa, I think the first time I knew about any view of that sort was upon Mr. Dulles' return from Japan. He brought me a copy of a memo which General MacArthur had sent to the Chiefs of Staff which was comprehensive.

Senator **George**. That was before his speech prepared for the Veterans of Foreign Wars or subsequent?

Secretary **Acheson**. I believe it was before that.

Senator **George**. Before?

Secretary **Acheson**. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. What I was trying to develop was that you understood and Washington understood his viewpoint, his position. He raised the question clearly, did he not, as to what he thought about how the war should be conducted in Korea?

Secretary ACHESON. In regard to the war in Korea; yes, sir. I think he raised his point of view clearly.

Senator GEORGE. And there was not any doubt about that. Running through his communiques is often found the expression that this is a political or an international question on which we have received no information here.

Therefore, I inquired of you yesterday if you would be good enough to enumerate those political directives that you sent after the United Nations forces were at or about the thirty-eighth parallel after they had gotten out of the bridgehead into which our forces were very early pressed and back up to the thirty-eighth. You said they were in the record here.

Secretary ACHESON. I said I thought they were, and I would look into it to find out. I haven't had a chance.

Senator GEORGE. Thank you very much.

Secretary ACHESON. I don't think there was any great difference between what you would call political directives and other directives on this matter. The one which was a political explanation by the President of what we were trying to do is in the famous message the President sent him on the 13th of January 1951.

Senator GEORGE. That is in the record, I know.

Secretary ACHESON. That is in the record. I think—my own impression is that the points that General MacArthur refers to as political questions are ones as to whether he should go across and bomb in Manchuria and that sort of thing; and I have never understood why he thought he hadn't had direction. I thought he had the clearest possible directive. It is a difference of opinion.

Senator GEORGE. I have no further questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Flanders.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Long.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Green.

LIMITING THE QUESTIONING

Senator GREEN. Mr. Chairman, these hearings have been going on for a long time now. We have heard at length the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Army, Chief of Navy, Chief of Air Force, and now for day after day we have been hearing from the Secretary of State, morning and afternoon, including Saturday and a holiday.

He has answered all these questions put to him fully and frankly and courteously, although sometimes I think there was provocation to do otherwise.

It doesn't seem to me that this thing should go on indefinitely. The Secretary of State has other crucial duties to perform, the Senators have other duties to perform and are members of other committees that are meeting; and there is no end to this in sight, so far as I can see.

I think that we ought to plan somehow not to allow it to go on interminably. Each member, 26 in all, of these two committees, has an opportunity to question the witnesses, each witness, and when he is through with one round, to begin on a second round, and we are now in the middle of the third round.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator is in error. This is the fourth round.

Senator GREEN. As a slight statement of my feelings in the matter and a slight help to ending this thing some time. I repeat what I said yesterday, I am not going to ask this witness any further questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper.

DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER NATIONS ON RECOGNITION OF RED CHINA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, isn't it a fact that the State Department and the policy of this Government in the fall of 1949 and running into January of 1950 was pointed toward the eventual recognition of Communist China?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't think so, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Britain recognized China in, I believe, early January, the 6th, I think.

Secretary ACHESON. That is approximately right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I think that is the date, January 6, 1950, at least at that time.

Did this Government approve—by "approval" I know we have no legal right to approve or disapprove what another sovereign government does—but did we express to the British the general sentiment that so far as we were concerned it was all right with us if they recognized Red China, or did we tell them that we interposed no objections or arguments against it?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; we interposed a good many arguments against it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And will you state for the record here what was our position at that time with regard to the recognition of Red China?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, as nearly as I can recall these discussions we were opposed to anybody recognizing the Chinese Communist government. We expressed our views on this to the British and to the French and to the Indian Government and to others who were thinking of doing it.

We pointed out that the Chinese Communists were denying that they were going to assume any of the international obligations of China. They claimed that they had no obligations whatever from any prior regimes. They were not undertaking any of the ordinary obligations of the state under international law. They were imprisoning our people and seizing our property and violating their treaties with us and various other things which escape my mind now, but there was a considerable list of reasons that we had why these people should not be recognized.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Had you finished?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We had as a matter of fact been holding meetings with the British, the French, and the Belgians, India, and a number of countries during the fall of 1949, had we not, in which the matter of the recognition of Red China was the subject of discussion?

Secretary ACHESON. There may have been meetings. There was a very active correspondence on the subject and undoubtedly there were meetings either with their Ambassadors or with our Ambassadors.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I will not attempt to bring up the issue of quoting from executive hearings, but I would refer you, Mr. Secretary, to your testimony of January 10, 1950, before the Foreign Relations Committee when this matter was rather exhaustively discussed at that time.

Senator GREEN. Excuse me. Isn't this open to the same objection you made to Senator McMahon's quotations as to——

Chairman RUSSELL. Will the Senator yield?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, I yield. I did not make any such objection.

Senator GREEN. What did you call it?

Senator BREWSTER. The objection was not sustained.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I did not object to Senator McMahon reading from the record. I did not take part in that. I think Senator Lodge raised some objection or raised the issue, but I did not.

Senator GREEN. I beg your pardon.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I said that I am not going to read from this. I am not going to.

I want to join with the sentiment expressed by Senator George on yesterday when he called attention to the fact that there was at that time very serious concern over here on the hill with the fear that we were moving rapidly to the recognition of Red China.

CONSIDERATION OF EVENTUAL RECOGNITION

I have read this testimony; I think, perhaps, without putting the testimony in the public record or in the record, that it might not be proper for me to conclude at this moment as to the purport of or as to my understanding or impressions as to how rapidly or slowly we we were going down this road toward recognition of Red China; but we did—this is a question—did we not, seriously and repeatedly consult with other nations on this score, and it was a matter of serious consideration in the State Department for a matter of several months? Is that true?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I have pointed out that we did discuss this matter with several nations. I have no objection to your putting whatever remarks of mine the committee wishes to put out of any executive hearings, in any record you wish to put it.

I recall meeting with the committee on that occasion, and I think probably on some others; and I think the British had just recognized, the Indians had done it before, and, as I recall it, I was asked, as you have asked me today, about discussions with the British, and I told about those discussions, and I tried to tell you about the arguments which we had advanced to the British against doing this.

I think there were several occasions on which the committee expressed worry that we were going to go out and recognize these people; and I assured the committee that we were not going to do that, and in order to allay your fears as far as possible, I said nothing will be done without the fullest consultation with the committee, and that is my recollection.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, I think that is——

Secretary ACHESON. However, you have the transcript and I don't have the transcript.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not want to ask you as to specific answers without your reviewing your exact statements at that time. I do not want to try to put you in that position; but I will ask you this question as to whether or not the State Department was considering that it might be proper and advisable for us to recognize Red China, providing Red China would take a favorable position on recognizing their foreign obligations? In other words, had they taken a favorable position on recognizing their foreign obligations, was it not the policy of the State Department that that might warrant us in recognizing Red China?

Secretary ACHESON. I have no such recollection, Senator Hickenlooper. My recollection is that I was pointing out that they had not recognized any of their obligations. In fact, they repudiated them, and that this was one of the reasons which we were giving the British and others why it was quite wrong.

POSSIBLE VETO ON ADMISSION OF RED CHINA IN UN

Senator HICKENLOOPER. With regard to the United Nations and the admission or the question of the admission of Red China to the United Nations, have you not heretofore taken the positive position or stated that it was our position that that question was a procedural question and not a matter subject to the veto?

Secretary ACHESON. I think that what you say is substantially correct. I have taken that—I mean I made that response in hearings before your committee, where I was repeatedly asked why don't we veto this, and I tried to point out to your committee, as I have to these joint committees, in the first place, that any veto at all applied only to the Security Council and not in the other 45 agencies, and therefore you had to take a position which would carry the majority with you.

I think I tried to point out to your committee that we were voting against this thing.

Now, the question was whether that vote constituted a block. That is what a veto means. And the view of our legal people was that you would lose in that argument—that it wasn't that.

I now say I understand perfectly well there are other views on that point, and that the way to resolve that is by the decision of the World Court.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes; I understand. We have been over that several times. It wasn't exactly that information that I was approaching.

Have not our representatives, at least in the United Nations, publicly stated that we would not attempt to use the device of the veto, that we would, in fact, consider the question of recognition as a procedural matter?

Secretary ACHESON. I can't answer that, but I can find out for you.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, it runs in my mind that I have seen it in the public press. Have we taken that position and notified the other countries of the United Nations in discussions of the question of admission of Red China, that we would take the position that it is a procedural matter and we would not attempt to sustain the veto theory?

Secretary ACHESON. I have said that in your committee, and I think I said it in answer to a question of the press conference—that that was the opinion of the Department.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But the point——

Secretary ACHESON. I said here several times we would favor getting an authoritative legal decision on that from the World Court.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes; that is true, Mr. Secretary. But so far as my own memory is concerned, this is the first occasion when the question of going to the World Court has ever been suggested, that is, as the attitude of the State Department.

I have understood that it has been the Department's position that we would consider this a procedural matter; if we were defeated, that was the end of it; we would not attempt to raise the veto issue.

RED CHINESE COMPARED TO RUSSIANS IN 1917

So far as the Government of Red China is concerned, or the governing authorities, I think you at one time drew an analogy between the Bolshevik government of 1917 in Russia and the Red Chinese authorities in China. That is to the effect that the Red Chinese are taking the same position as the Bolsheviks did in Russia in 1917—that they were not in fact the successor to the Czar's government; they are completely a new government and that they were not the successors to the old government; and that the Red Chinese are taking that same position—that they are not the successors to the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China.

Now, if that is the case——

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct. I think I said that in connection with this very matter of repudiating international obligations.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is right.

Secretary ACHESON. Which were assumed by somebody else whose responsibilities they did not undertake to discharge.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But now if they do not consider themselves the successors to the former Government of China, wouldn't that change their legal position so far as admission is concerned? I mean wouldn't that raise the question that it is a totally different situation, and that the admission of their representatives would not be a procedural matter?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I think that I pointed out that both the Bolshevik Government and this Chinese Red Government tried to work this thing both ways. They say they are not the successors of the other government so far as any obligations are concerned, but that they do succeed to all the rights that the other government had.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes; I think you pointed that out.

Secretary ACHESON. I pointed out that I thought it was an outrageous position to take.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It would seem to me that taking that position would put them in a different legal situation—that is, their factual situation—in connection with the admission of their representatives to the UN.

STATE DEPARTMENT POSITION ON SENATOR'S VISIT TO FORMOSA

Senator Smith of New Jersey went to Korea and Formosa shortly before that period of time—that is, in the late fall and early winter of 1949. When Senator Smith was in Formosa I believe that he asked the advice of the State Department as to going to Formosa. The State Department——

Secretary ACHESON. I don't think you meant to say that. You said when he was in Formosa he asked about advice about going to Formosa.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. When he was in Korea. I believe then he expressed to our diplomatic mission there that he desired to go to Formosa, and he asked the concurrence or the approval or something of the State Department. Washington was contacted and the State Department came back and said they did not think he should go to Formosa.

Now what would be the reason for that, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary ACHESON. I think they advised him not to go; he said he did want to go; and then they helped him go.

I may have the telegram here.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I think you have stated the situation correctly. But I am asking as to why the State Department did not want him to go to Formosa.

Secretary ACHESON. I think I have that information here in the telegram that was sent out.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How much time do you have, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator has about 8 minutes, if he desires 8 minutes.

Secretary ACHESON. The information I have here is that this was in October 1949 and that Senator Smith informed the political adviser to General MacArthur in Tokyo that he had been invited by the chief of the Chinese mission in Japan to visit Formosa and he asked advice about it.

A telegram went back expressing the opinion that any advantages which might accrue from Senator Smith's visit because of his official relationships with American foreign policy might be outweighed by misinterpretation in the Far East and speculation would inevitably arise that his visit was connected with the status of Formosa and China internal politics.

It went on to say that it was entirely up to Senator Smith whether he should go or not; that we would help him go if he wished to go.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Are you finished?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD CHINA AFTER WORLD WAR II

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, beginning shortly after the surrender of Japan, the United States, over the entire period of time, was on a policy of reduced and reducing aid to the Nationalist Government of China.

Isn't that true? Even to the point of establishing at one time for about 10 months an embargo on materials and matériel?

Secretary ACHESON. The amount of material which was sent after the war was, I think, less than what was sent during the war.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And during that period of time Nationalist China became in fact successively weaker until the Nationalist Government retired to Formosa. Is that a fair statement?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, it became weaker, I think, on account of its own acts, as I tried to point out in the statement I made last Monday; that, contrary to all advice it received, it undertook to do things which it did not have the physical capacity to do.

It overextended itself, did not carry out the internal reforms which were necessary, and finally took on the task of fighting on so many extended fronts that it was not able to maintain itself.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes. And now Owen Lattimore, who spent considerable time in the Orient—in fact, practically all of his adult life—is quoted, according to a photostatic copy of a magazine or publication called the Sunday Compass—I don't know anything about it—of July 17, 1949, right in that magazine he said [reading]:

> As a compromise, American policy took a course of relative inaction, but not complete inaction. As it became——

Secretary ACHESON. I couldn't understand.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. He is referring to China—

> As a compromise, American policy took a course of relative inaction, but not complete inaction. As it became more and more obvious that Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang were doomed, the conduct of American policy became increasingly delicate——

Secretary ACHESON. Became what?

Senator HICKENLOOPER (reading):

> Increasingly delicate. The problem was how to allow them to fall without making it look as if the United States had pushed them. Such a policy never succeeds completely, and critics have done their best to make the public believe that the United States did push Chiang and the Kuomintang over the cliff.

That is the close of that paragraph.

Now, Mr. Secretary, don't all the events that have happened since the close of the war show that American policy, foreign policy, directed toward China was to push the Nationalist Government over the cliff and not make it look like we had done it?

Secretary ACHESON. Absolutely, completely no. There is no vestige of truth in that accusation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, there may not be, but the facts certainly make a very impressive situation upon which such an argument can be based, I submit.

Secretary ACHESON. I don't agree with you in any way whatever.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Isn't it a fact, Mr. Secretary, that even near the close of the war in Asia we began a policy of moving out of Asia and China the people who were qualified by experience over there to handle the situation, that we moved them out at various other places, even in the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, and put in people who were unfavorable to Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Government and who followed the corruptionist theory and who advanced that philosophy?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; that is not correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I want to move in that last minute or two into another matter here, in regard to policy in Asia.

MOSLEM COUNTRIES' RELATIONS TO RUSSIA

Do you know, Mr. Secretary, whether or not the Soviet Government has offered to Iraq within very recent days, if not hours, a 20-year nonaggression treaty in exchange for existing oil rights and some other concessions?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; I do not know that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you know whether or not Russia has made similar proposals to other Moslem countries in that area such as Iran, perhaps Turkey and some of those countries?

Secretary ACHESON. There were very active proposals made by the Soviet Union to Iran some time ago, all of which were rejected by Iran.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Hasn't Iran been moving closer into that orbit in the last few months, and I saw on the ticker today that Iran has now barred foreign correspondents from the area of the oil region. I would like to ask you this question——

Secretary ACHESON. Have you finished your question? Did you ask me a question?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes. I am sorry that I put that other on the end of it. My question was, Hasn't Iran been moving more and more into the Russian orbit in the last few months?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; I do not think so. The difficulties in Iran are very acute and very serious indeed and may lead to very great trouble, but I do not think that the movement in Iran is directed toward the Soviet orbit.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How long ago—it slips my mind now; it seems to me it was a year perhaps, or a little longer—that the king of Iran was in this country?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; he visited here, I think, in 1950.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Isn't it pretty well understood that he left this country in what might be termed high dudgeon because of what he thought were the consistent insults and inattention—that is, insults through inattention that he received from the State Department here?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; that is quite untrue.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you know, for instance, of an alleged incident where Iran requested aid from the United States to get a reliable supply of newsprint for its one newspaper of largest circulation, which circulates largely in the army of Iran?

Secretary ACHESON. I believe I have no knowledge of that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have been told—and this is the reason I was asking the question—that such a request was made and that for a good many months not even a reply was given to their proposal. That and a number of other matters which they claimed to be very neglectful on the part of at least our Middle Eastern Division had not helped in the building of friendly relations between Iran and some of the Moslem states and ourselves, but if you have no knowledge of it, then I won't pursue it further.

Do you know whether there are nonaggression treaties or treaties of alliance now being considered and having been proffered by Russia to certain of the Moslem countries in the Middle East?

Secretary ACHESON. I do not know of that.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator Hickenlooper.

ENDING THE QUESTIONING

Gentlemen, not with the slightest intention of causing any member of the committee to withhold any question he might want to ask, but merely to assist me in performing my function of getting witnesses here on time, where the committee will not lose any time waiting for witnesses, I wondered if the Senators would mind indicating about the length of their testimony, whether I should have General Wedemeyer available for Saturday or whether we might be able to conclude with the Secretary of State on tomorrow?

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, it is my present intention, subject to what might develop in the hearing at any time, to finish my questioning of the Secretary in another round of 30 minutes of questions.

Senator BREWSTER. I couldn't hear a word.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse merely advised that it was his present intention, subject to change due to developments in the testimony, to conclude his questions within another 30-minute period.

Senator GEORGE. My questions are ended, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CAIN. My intention is comparable to that of the Senator from Oregon, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do any other Senators care to estimate the time that they think they would require?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think Senator Wiley suggested to me here a moment ago before he left that he had some more questions. I do not know how long. I haven't the least idea. I think Senator Smith is to be back tomorrow. I think he went to New Jersey.

Senator GEORGE. We will have some voting tomorrow afternoon on the floor on this appropriation bill. All the amendments were approved en bloc, but subject to such objections or amendments as might be offered to any of them tomorrow, so they have all gone over for voting, and Senator Douglas is serving notice that he is proposing about 20 amendments, and there are 2 or 3 others.

Senator BRIDGES. There will be 30 or 40 amendments probably tomorrow afternoon.

Chairman RUSSELL. A good many record votes?

Senator GEORGE. Yes; there will be several record votes. Senator Douglas said he was going to request record votes if he could get them on his amendments.

Senator BRIDGES. Senator Byrd has some, I have some, various other people have amendments.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, we will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning, and I might as well announce now that we will have a meeting of the committee on Saturday.

Senator GEORGE. We might be able to finish with the Secretary in the morning.

Chairman RUSSELL. We will endeavor to.

Chairman CONNALLY. I think we should. The Secretary has been here a long tiresome time and I think we ought to finish with him in the morning, the morning session.

Chairman RUSSELL. I should certainly hope to do that, but that is a matter that addresses itself to the discretion of Senators who have questions they might desire to propound.

Secretary ACHESON. Mr. Chairman, before you recess the committees, may I correct an answer which I made to Senator Cain on page 5619 of the Record. When Senator Cain asked me whether copies of my cable of November 13 were made available to the Defense Department, I replied, "I do not believe so."

I had a check made at the Department and I find that five copies were made available to the Defense Department, one for the Secretary of Defense, one for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and one each for the Secretaries of the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy.

Senator CAIN. I thank you.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What was that cable with reference to?

Senator CAIN. The hot-pursuit message.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committees now stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon at 5:15 p. m. the hearing was adjourned to reconvene on Friday, June 8, 1951, at 10:12 a. m.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

FRIDAY, JUNE 8, 1951

Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:12 a. m. in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), George, Green, McMahon, Sparkman, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Lodge, Brewster, Johnson (Texas), Hunt, Stennis, Long, Bridges, Saltonstall, Morse, Cain.

Also present: William H. Darden, clerk, Committee on Armed Services; Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge of the committee staff of the Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff, and Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman **Russell**. The committees will come to order.

Senator McMahon?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Lodge?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Fulbright?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Tobey?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Sparkman?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Gillette?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Brewster?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. The chairman?

The chairman passes.

Senator Connally?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Wiley?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Smith?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Green?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator **Hickenlooper** (having just entered the room). Here.

Senator **Cain**. I thought as a junior I was going to float to the top of the list by default.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I just entered just now. I think someone else should have a chance to go on. I don't have my questions ready. I say I just entered this thing last night. I had my 30 minutes last night. I am not prepared to go on this morning. I did not anticipate that.

Senator **Stennis**. Mr. Chairman, I want you to know that it is the first time I heard the Senator called on when he couldn't answer.

Chairman **Russell**. I think he answered beautifully. Don't be critical.

Senator **Stennis**. I am not being critical.

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Bridges?

Senator **Brewster**. Before we proceed, had you made any statement about the program for the week end?

Chairman **Russell**. I stated on yesterday we would have a session tomorrow, Senator Brewster.

Senator **Brewster**. What about this afternoon?

Chairman **Russell**. Well, there is some doubt about being able to handle it this afternoon because of the fact that the appropriations bill is up, and I understand there are a number of amendments on which there will probably be a record vote, and it is very doubtful we will have one this afternoon.

If we should get information which indicates that there will be lengthy debate on any of these amendments and no vote will be had, I thought we might sit this afternoon. I understand the prospects for that are rather dim.

POSSIBLE RECALL OF THE WITNESS

Senator **Brewster**. Yes. What about the possibility that if we conclude our questioning regarding the Secretary, that it might be possible to have him back later on after we have had these other witnesses?

Chairman **Russell**. The committees of course have the authority to recall any witness that they see fit, and I have advised every witness who has been before us up until now when they concluded that phase of their testimony that there was a likelihood or at least a possibility that the committee would recall them.

Senator **Brewster**. That affects my own approach because I think both in justice to the Secretary, the committees, the Congress, and the country, that the more it should be abbreviated naturally it is desirable for all concerned because every one is busy, and if there were time to study the whole record and perhaps pin point the things which are of major significance and importance, why I think it might be beneficial for all concerned. That I know affects my own approach to the matter.

Chairman **Russell**. I, of course, do not know what the attitude in the committees will be with respect to any specific witnesses, Senator Brewster.

Senator **Brewster**. I had hoped that it might be possible to suspend on Saturday at least. We have been running a pretty heavy schedule. Have the committees taken any action on that?

Chairman RUSSELL. The committees have taken no action on it and of course the majority of the committees have a right to vote against a Saturday session if they desire so.

In the opinion of the Chair we should push along with these hearings with all possible vigor, allowing of course every Senator to ask any question that might appeal to him as being desirable to ask of any witness.

Senator BREWSTER. You are very generous in that regard certainly.

Chairman RUSSELL. But we must recognize the fact that we have here two of the, I won't say most important, but two of as important committees as there are in the Senate that have considerable legislation before them. I do not think that we could justify delaying these hearings.

I want every Senator to have every right to ask questions, and as far as I am concerned, I shall see that he does have it, but I do think these committees should be willing to press along. If the majority of them, however, do not want to have a Saturday session, they have it wholly within their power to vote against it and the Chair will be guided by that vote.

Senator BREWSTER. I would certainly hesitate to put myself in the category of the chairman and some of the other members, who have not only very important committees, but are very responsible for what is going on in appropriations and others.

I know how the chairman is situated.

POSSIBILITY OF "GETTING A DAY OFF"

I had thought that if we could take an occasional day off, it would enable everybody to catch up, at least, with his homework, and maybe get a little ahead.

We have been keeping up with this thing so constantly that it is pretty difficult, both on the individual members as well as on the witnesses and the committee.

I talked to the Senator from Mississippi last night, and he rather shared the view that possibly a suspension on Saturday would be beneficial all around.

I don't know whether he is of that considered opinion today, or not.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I assumed that we were going to be through with Mr. Acheson, for one thing; and I didn't know that the Chair had already announced the program of the committee.

I wouldn't disrupt any plans the Chair has made. I think it would be helpful to the members to get Saturday off. I know it would to me, but I wouldn't just hold out.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator from Georgia is pretty well aware of the importance of home work, and I try to keep up with mine, and I have fallen sadly behind here in the last several weeks; so, I have worked until 8 or 9 o'clock in the evenings to try to keep current with it.

However, I also think we have a responsibility to the Senate and to the country to push these hearings as vigorously as we possibly can, to a conclusion, in order that we can do our regular legislative work, and it is not confined to these two committees.

Other committees of the Senate are being delayed by the fact that all of our energies and efforts are directed to these hearings.

The Senator from Maine well knows it is difficult to arrange a hearing of another committee on Saturday, particularly where the matter is only brought up on Friday; whereas these committee have followed the policy of sitting on Saturday. We have been in session on several Saturdays since these hearings commenced.

But the majority of the committees can control the action of the committees. It is the considered judgment of the Chair that we ought to have a Saturday session. If the majority of the committees wish to vote otherwise, I hope they will feel free to do it.

Senator HUNT. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hunt.

Senator HUNT. I should like to discuss this situation from just another angle.

ENDING THE HEARINGS

The way things look at this time we are not going to finish up with this by the Fourth of July, and we expect, I hope, to take a few days at the Fourth of July.

It would seem to me it would be perhaps a good procedure to have, if possible, a full meeting of the committees and see if we couldn't get unanimous consent to decide on a date at which these hearings would be terminated.

I see no other way to end them. One witness will call for another and another witness will call for two more, and we will be on this thing all the rest of this session, if something doesn't happen to bring an end to it.

As I have been reading the record, it appears to me that about 8 out of 10 questions are questions that have been previously asked and answered, seemingly in just the vain hope of finding something to tie to.

I thing it is getting, frankly, Mr. Chairman, to be just a little ridiculous, and I believe the public is beginning to look at it from that angle.

I think we should get together and decide on a date for bringing these hearings to a close.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Apropos the remarks that the Senator from Wyoming has made, I think there have been repetitious questions asked, but I submit we have not gotten answers to some of the vital questions in which not only these committees are interested, but in which the public is interested.

For instance, one of the most vital questions is what is our plan to implement our policy for peace in Korea, and that has not been answered. It has been repeatedly asked by any number of questions. The question has not been specifically answered. I do not know whether any other member of the committees knows it or not, but I do not know myself from the evidence we have received what the program of this Government is, or the United Nations is, to establish peace, to coordinate Korea, and what are our objectives there, and it is just an indeterminate fighting there, and I think we can pursue that matter if there is a possibility of getting an answer to that.

Senator HUNT. Mr. Chairman, may I say and suggest that all we need to get that answer is to get a crystal ball, and then we can probably get it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I hope that the destinies of the United States and the United Nations and our people are not dependent upon a crystal ball.

Senator HUNT. It depends upon the events of the future and the events that have occurred.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Chairman, may I make a parliamentary inquiry, sir?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain.

Senator CAIN. For planning purposes, may I ask if my conclusion is correct that the Senator from Maine, before the procedural question was raised, was recognized in his own right for a round of questions?

Chairman RUSSELL. No, he was not; he raised a procedural question.

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Chairman, I would like to speak on the procedural question. I like the Senator from Wyoming, as he knows, very much personally, and it has been a pleasure to be associated with him on the Armed Services Committee and to work with him; but I do not think he makes a fair statement when he says that this hearing is ridiculous in any way.

It is never ridiculous when you are trying to get at, and your purpose is, to determine what is for the best interests of our country; what provides for the security of our country; and in view of our record in the past, or looking toward the future, like the Senator from Iowa, I certainly hope that the future of our country is not going to be decided by looking into any crystal ball; and the only way I know of to judge the future or to forecast the future is based somewhat upon the experiences of the past and, I think, that the fundamental job of any administration, to be successful, or any group operating any government, is to foresee the future or prepare for the future

It is the essence of good government, and I certainly think that we have every right to explore the past, to examine the present, and question about the future here.

While I agree with the Senator from Wyoming if we can work out a date here when we can conclude, I do not think that because certain Senators have been repetitious in making their inquiries, there is any reason for holding the whole Senate procedure up to ridicule.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, the Senator from Wyoming did not suggest a date, as I understand it. He just said that he wished to pick some date that was reasonable, and ask unanimous consent. I think he has a reasonable point.

Senator BRIDGES. I agree with that point. The only thing I do not agree with him on is the characterization of the thing, and I do not like to differ with him—I do not like to do it with friends such as he and I are, but I do with him on that.

I think that if we could work out some reasonable conclusion date, as I said, certainly I would agree to that.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Brewster?

Senator BREWSTER. I think that our objective was stated by the chairman when he asked unanimous consent for the procedure by these two committees which was, I think, to find out the truth about this situation; and that is the objective.

I think the Senators should be reasonably satisfied that they have got a fair appraisal of the whole background of not only the Mac-

Arthur episode but our far eastern policy, and I would say that would be the date when we should terminate this.

I certainly do not agree at all with the Senator from Wyoming that we have got very near to that as yet.

I think we have heard General MacArthur, we have heard the Chiefs of Staff, we have heard the Secretary of State, but there are quite a lot of other people that they frankly indicate know about this.

The Secretary, Mr. Acheson, has repeatedly referred to matters which he does not have immediate cognizance of; so it seems to me a little early to say when we are going to get through.

Chairman RUSSELL. There is no motion before the committee. The Senator from Wyoming made a suggestion. While others would agree with him, I would say he discouraged me considerably when he said he saw no hope for bringing these hearings to a conclusion by the Fourth of July. I know the Senator won't mind my making that statement.

Well, it is the purpose of the Chair to hold a hearing on Saturday unless the majority of the members of the committees decide otherwise.

Senator WILEY. What was that, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. It is the purpose of the chairman to hold a meeting of the committees tomorrow, Saturday, unless a majority of the committees vote otherwise. That is what originated this whole discussion, Senator Wiley.

Senator BRIDGES. Am I the next one, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

TESTIMONY OF HON. DEAN G. ACHESON, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY ADRIAN S. FISHER, LEGAL ADVISER—Resumed

TELEGRAMS FROM AN AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN CHINA ABOUT CHINESE SITUATION, 1949

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Secretary, the other day we discussed a secret—or a telegram which you mentioned that had been received from China. I have in my possession two which I have held confidential up to this time, which is the first I have mentioned them—two telegrams, one of which, I think, is perhaps a copy of the one which you referred to, which is unsigned, but was transmitted to the Secretary of State from [deleted].

I might say that these came to me as a member of the Joint Committee of the House and Senate on Foreign Aid, which we have, which I was chairman of at one time, and Senator McCarran is now chairman and I am a member.

May I ask you if [deleted] is the community and is the chamber of commerce that is referred to in your telegram, to see if I have——

Secretary ACHESON. Senator, answering that question, I should like to say that after I was questioned about the telegram which you are referring to the State Department got in touch with the president of that chamber of commerce, who is at present in New York. We discussed the matter with him and asked if he had any objection to our stating his name and the name of the city and the name of the consul involved.

He said he thought that that would be a most dangerous and undesirable thing, and he hoped very much that we would not. He said that there was a member of that chamber of commerce who is still in Communist China, and that he would have the gravest apprehensions for this man's safety and the possibility of his return.

He stressed the very vicious "hate America" campaign which is under way in Communist China, and said the "trumped-up charges of spying for this Government were very common." Therefore he plead with me not to identify the city in any way.

I should like to add further that at the present time we have 30 Americans who are being held in China and we are working with their companies, in some cases with religious organizations which they represent, to try and get them out. We are getting them out in two's or three's, but the situation is very dangerous and very delicate.

If the committee requests me to answer that question, I shall answer it. I should ask that the censor delete the name, whatever comes out of my answer.

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Secretary, I don't want to embarrass any Americans over there, and if the use of [deleted] will embarrass them, I ask that that question be classified too so that it will not be released.

But I would like to point out that the telegram that the Secretary of State referred to was in 1949, and it was from a community that the Communists had taken over in late '48; and, therefore, that it might be a prejudiced telegram when it was sent from a community that was already in the hands of the Communists.

But I withdraw my mention of the name so not to identify it, and I either ask it be classified or strike the name from the record so it will not endanger anybody.

Now I have another telegram to ask you about. It is of a similar nature from [deleted] which was signed by [deleted]. Am I dealing with the same thing?

Secretary ACHESON. I believe you are, sir.

Senator BRIDGES. Then I ask that be classified. I do not want to embarrass, not embarrass, but endanger any American. But I do think that we should have on the record, Mr. Chairman, the fact that the telegram which was in question and discussed was received in 1949 and it did come from a community in China which the Chinese Communists took over in 1948, and reasonably I believe could be perhaps a forced expression or it might be a prejudiced expression.

I ask that the name of the community and the names of the individuals I mentioned be classified or deleted so not to endanger anybody.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think that is a good suggestion.

Secretary ACHESON. Very, yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Is that conceded, that they did come from people who were Communists?

Senator BRIDGES. My point was that I think it could be on the record without mentioning the name of the city in any way or the names of individuals which would in any way endanger further individuals; the statement I made was that the telegram came in '49, and in late '48 the Communists took over the particular community, which I will not identify that the telegram was received from, so that the telegram might not be a free expression, might be prejudiced or might be perhaps a trifle forced.

Senator Wiley. Thank you.

Senator Bridges. But I want to be sure not to endanger anybody by the use of the name of the community or the individuals.

ALLEGED STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR MUCCIO

Mr. Secretary, the other day I asked you about John Muccio, the American Ambassador to Korea, and the statements which I had been informed that he made, and that was in the line of a letter by Hugh D. Scott, Jr., who is a Member of the House of Representatives, in which he said that he, Mr. Muccio, the American Ambassador, tried to convince him we were not fighting communism, and he also defended the arming of the North Koreans by the Russians.

Now the Secretary as I recall it said in effect that he could not believe those statements. Because of the matter, I again talked with Mr. Scott, Congressman Scott, and he said that Mr. Muccio, the American Ambassador's statements were made to him in the presence of another Congressman, Henry J. Latham, of New York, and four or five other individuals. He also said that he had been told——

Chairman Connally. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Senator Bridges. Certainly.

Chairman Connally. Is this the same man Scott who was chairman of the Republican National Committee at this time?

Senator Bridges. He was at one time.

Chairman Connally. Was he working at that on his job as Congressman?

Senator Bridges. I assume he was working at his job as Congressman. But neither here nor there, Mr. Scott informs me that the statements were made in the presence of another Congressman, Henry J. Latham, and four or five other individuals at the time.

Senator Wiley. Date? What is the date of the communication?

Senator Bridges. The date of the first communication that I quoted from, I do not know the date when Scott talked with Mr. Muccio, but the date of his letter was October 4, 1950, and the date of his last communication to me was June 6, 1951, in addition to a personal talk I had with him.

He said that this was also discussed on a television program which Senator Fulbright and he discussed matters on some 2 months ago.

Now I am also informed that the same statement was made to a former or I think a present member of the State Department staff but who was a former official in that area who might be available to substantiate that statement.

What I was going to ask you, Mr. Secretary, was you expressed faith in your American Ambassador there. Here is a statement of one Congressman which he says is substantiated by another Congressman and four or five other people, and that similar statements were made to a member of your own staff whose name I have, and if it should be proven true, that these statements were made, whether you would dismiss Mr. Muccio for that remark? I mean if you were satisfied as we are satisfied that these statements are correct, that he made those while serving as American Ambassador?

Secretary Acheson. Senator Bridges, after you brought that statement of Mr. Scott's to my attention, or told me the substance of the statement, I expressed confidence, which I again express, in Ambassador Muccio, who is one of our very finest men in the Department, and informed him of the substance of your question and he has replied in a very vigorous way, saying that that is entirely incorrect and stating exactly what the conversation was he had with the gentleman named; and I shall be very glad to send down to the Department and get the telegram and introduce it into the record.

Senator BRIDGES. I think we would like to have it.

VERIFICATION OF ALLEGED STATEMENT

It isn't a question of Mr. Muccio saying one thing here, and you apparently express faith in him, and at least said you couldn't believe it.

I go back to Congressman Scott, with a verification of another Congressman and four or five witnesses, plus a statement which he is purported to have made to a member of your own staff.

I haven't talked with him, and others who have talked with him have expressed it, and I certainly think it would be wise for the record to have such a statement as you care to put in, as you received from Mr. Muccio.

My point is, and I don't know Mr. Muccio, I haven't met the gentleman——

Secretary ACHESON. He is a very fine officer who served with General MacArthur, whom General MacArthur has said very fine things about; who accompanied General MacArthur to the Wake Island conference; who was decorated by the President for his gallantry; who has stuck with the Korean Government during the most dangerous of all of these campaigns, and encouraged them.

I don't think any person, either soldier or civilian, has put his life in more hazard than Ambassador Muccio, and he performed a great service in holding the South Korean Government together in the days when they were being driven back and forth across Korea, encouraging them and putting heart in them to hold the fight against the Communist attack.

Senator BRIDGES. I am interested in what you say.

My basis was upon the statement of a man whom I respect, and whose integrity has never been questioned, and who seems to have witnesses to back up what he says.

So it comes down to Mr. Muccio's statement and to one by Congressman Scott and the Congressmen and the other witnesses who were present. But if this did come out here and you had an American Ambassador or an American representative of the Department who did express those thoughts, and you were convinced of it, he should be dismissed, shouldn't he?

Secretary ACHESON. I haven't got the thought in mind but if he was expressing thoughts which are unfair to the policy of the Government or disloyal or anything else, he should be; yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator BRIDGES. Yes.

Senator WILEY. What was the alleged statement?

Senator BRIDGES. He was alleged to have said, and I quote:

IMPLICATION OF ALLEGED STATEMENT

You may be interested to know that our American Ambassador to Korea tried to convince me that we were not fighting communism. He also defended the arming of the North Koreans by the Russians.

Senator WILEY. I didn't hear. Defended what?

Senator BRIDGES. Defended the arming of the North Koreans by the Russians.

I talked with him after my conversation with the Secretary here and he said, and I quote from part of the letter, and I talked with him personally:

> Of course, Muccio's statement to me was made in the presence of Representative Henry J. Latham, of New York, and of four or five members of the Embassy staff. I have no doubt that Muccio discussed the controversy with Acheson when Muccio was in this country sometime ago. In fact, Senator Fulbright mentioned the matter on a television program with me about 2 months ago, and commented on the fact that Muccio had denied my charges.

Then, without involving another member of the State Department staff, I will say that I understand that he made similar statements to this person, though I haven't talked with the person and that is secondhand entirely coming to me. My only statement in direct reference comes from Mr. Scott.

Senator GREEN. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Senator BRIDGES. Certainly.

Senator GREEN. Is the objection to the fact that he said we were not fighting communism in Korea?

Senator BRIDGES. Yes, and the defense of the Russians arming the North Koreans.

Senator GREEN. But the first statement was that we were not fighting communism?

Senator BRIDGES. Yes.

Senator GREEN. Do any of us believe we are fighting communism there? Aren't we fighting aggression? Isn't the United Nations fighting aggression as distinguished from communism?

Senator BRIDGES. I think that we certainty are fighting communism.

Senator GREEN. The distinction has often——

Senator BRIDGES. I certainly think that communism—Russian-dominated communism—is our enemy in this world.

Senator GREEN. The distinction has often been confused and very regretfully—this confusion about whom we are fighting. The Government has sometimes made the mistake, or representatives of the Government, that we are fighting communism. We are not fighting communism. We are fighting aggression.

Senator BRIDGES. The Senator from Rhode Island is entitled to his opinion. I know we are resisting aggression, but I think we are fighting communism the world over, and communism is a world-wide conspiracy.

If the Senator doesn't think we are opposed to a world-wide conspiracy of communism and that we are resisting that, he and I differ. He is entitled to his opinion, and I certainly am entitled to mine.

Senator GREEN. And Mr. Muccio is entitled to his.

Senator BRIDGES. I am not saying, Senator Green, that the American Ambassador said that. I said I have been informed by people in whom I have confidence that he did say that, and I have no reason to believe but that they are telling me the truth. If he did say that, I say he is not—regardless of perhaps his future action—that he is not a fit person to represent America and certainly is saying things out of line with the policy for which certainly General MacArthur and other people have paid the penalty of dismissal when they have just stepped a little out of line in differing, not on sympathy with communism, but on the method of fighting communism.

Senator GREEN. My point isn't whether he said it or not, but if he did say it, it is quite conceivable that he gave a different meaning to the word "communism" than what you do; because that mistake is often made by people in high position like yourself.

Senator BRIDGES. There is no mistake about me on that. I think communism is a world-wide conspiracy and I am against Communists wherever they appear, whether they appear in this country or whether they appear in China or Russia or Poland or wherever they appear.

Senator GREEN. Certainly. You are against sin, but in Korea we are not fighting sin; we are not fighting communism; we are fighting aggression.

Senator BRIDGES. That is a very close distinction. If the Senator can content himself and satisfy himself that we are not fighting communism, but we are fighting aggression, and distinguish between the two; if he can be well satisfied and his New England conscience, which I know so well, can justify that, why I just beg to differ with him.

Senator WILEY. What sin are you talking about?

POSSIBLE USE OF VETO TO PREVENT THE SEATING OF RED CHINA IN UN

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Secretary, you have at various times here been questioned about the seating of China, Communist China and the People's Republic of China, in the United Nations and you have said repeatedly that we had opposed their seating in the past and we would continue to oppose it.

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

Senator BRIDGES. Now, there is just one point. General Marshall in testifying here said that he would go so far as to use the veto to block it. You have always carefully refrained from going that far.

You have said we have opposed it, we will continue to oppose it; but you have not, I think, expressed yourself on that.

I know that from other remarks that you have made from time to time that you feel it is a procedural matter, and that the veto could not be used.

Now, from a practical point of view, and inasmuch as the distinguished Secretary of Defense has made the statement that it should be used, don't you think—or would you care to comment on that.

I personally feel that if Russia has used the veto, as they have, all over the lot, that we should be justified in using the veto to stop or to go to any length to stop the seating of Communist China, and I would like to have an expression that.

I know you have covered other angles to it, but on that particular thing I would like to have your expression.

Secretary ACHESON. I have covered this angle several times when you were not here, Senator. I will be glad to cover it again.

Senator BRIDGES. I wish you would, on the veto thing.

Secretary ACHESON. What I have said before I shall not repeat at great length. On this particuular subject, I pointed out that the question of whether a vote of a permanent member in itself blocks the seating of representatives of a member state, arise only in the Security Council, and that we would vote against it.

Whether that operates to be a veto is a matter which is in dispute. I have said we would vote against it.

The only way to settle that dispute is to take it to the World Court, and I have said that we would be in favor of that.

I pointed out that this only arises in case you are in a minority of four or less. If you are in a minority of four or less on the question of whether they should be seated, you would be in a minority of four or less if there was a vote in the Security Council, as to whether your vote constituted a veto.

Therefore, the only place where you could get a decision on this, which is authoritative, is in the World Court, and we would be in favor of that.

Senator BRIDGES. So that, if after the vote in the Security Council, if our vote against the seating was challenged as a veto, then you would appeal the case or take it to the International Court for determination?

Secretary ACHESON. Either before or after, whichever seemed to be the best procedure.

Senator BRIDGES. Yes.

Do you think that it would be respected if we had a decision from that Court?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I think the World Court's decisions would be respected.

Senator BRIDGES. Do you think it would be by Russia?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator BRIDGES. You do?

Secretary ACHESON. It would have to be; the other nations would respect it.

PARTICIPATION OF SOVIET UNION IN JAPANESE AFFAIRS

Senator BRIDGES. I see, in looking over some old reports and newspaper clippings, and I have gathered that you once testified that you favored a liberal government in Japan, a government in which the Soviet Union would have a part. Is that true?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't place what you are talking about, Senator.

Senator BRIDGES. I mean, in discussing once a liberal government in Japan, you referred to a government, a liberal government, in which—or it is reported that you favored a government in which—the Soviet Union would have a part, I assume, as a result of setting up—following the outcome of the Pacific war. I mean that was a report.

I just want to know if you recall any such thing.

Secretary ACHESON. I don't recall any such thing; and I don't understand what you would mean by the Soviet Union having a part in the government of Japan. The Soviet Union was one of the nations which received the surrender, and General MacArthur was the supreme commander, and General Ridgeway is now, representing all the powers.

There were set up, by Mr. Byrnes, at the time of the Moscow conference at the end of 1945, two institutions which had to do with the military occupation government of Japan.

One was the Far East Commission, which had certain powers. That was made up, I believe, first of 10 nations and perhaps now of more than that, of which the Soviet Union is one.

There is an allied council in Japan, which was set up at the same time as these Moscow agreements, on which the Soviet Union has a representative. That council has never functioned because of obstructions which the Soviet Union has imported into its procedures.

I do not know what else you could be referring to.

Senator BRIDGES. Perhaps that is the reference made.

DOCUMENTS FROM HURLEY HEARINGS, 1945

Mr. Secretary, when the so-called China white paper was issued—why were the 12 documents which former Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley had referred to when he testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in December 1945—why were they not included in the China White Paper? Because you certainly included very generously from other documents in the whole case.

Secretary ACHESON. I do not carry in my mind what those papers were, or whether they were or were not included.

If you will give me the place where General Hurley referred to the documents I will identify them, find out whether they are in the white paper, and if they are not there, why they were not there.

Senator BRIDGES. This hearing occurred in December of 1945 when Mr. Hurley came back and testified before the Foreign Relations Committee at that time.

Secretary ACHESON. I will have that looked up and supplied for you.

Senator BRIDGES. Thank you, sir.

Are you aware of the fact, or do you consider it significant in the publication of the China white paper, that your statement of January 12, 1940, and your introduction to the China white paper which attacked the Nationalist government of China provided Vishinsky with material for his intemperate attack upon China and upon the United States in the UN? Do you think that the introduction to the China white paper and your statement of January 12, 1950, looking back on it, were unwise because of the basis it provided for Vishinsky for making his very violent and intemperate attack?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir. I think that what was said in there was correct. That can always be used by hostile propagandists.

ORDER OF QUESTIONING

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, when the committee convened this morning at 10 o'clock, there were not a great many members present and I called the name of a number of the members of the Foreign Relations Committee to reach a Senator to examine the witness. If it is the pleasure of the committee that I revert to the regular order as if all members have been present, I shall do so. Otherwise the order of questioning will be somewhat involved.

I am perfectly willing to take it either way.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, inasmuch as I think there were only two of us here at the time——

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator from Washington was present.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I said there were two of us here.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And it was just at 10 o'clock, I think there would be less confusion if the Chair reverted to the regular order.

Chairman RUSSELL. Without objection the Chair will so do.

Senator Connally?

Senator BREWSTER. I may only point out my elimination from the questioning. I can't be here tomorrow.

Chairman RUSSELL. It will defer the questions of the Senator from Maine. I called on the Senator from Maine this morning.

Senator BREWSTER. Did you?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, when I came in here the room was in complete confusion. It did not look to me as though there had been a question. I thought I was here at the opening and raised by procedural question.

Chairman RUSSELL. I did not think there had been too much confusion. There were present Senators——

Senator CAIN. The room, sir, was in complete order. You were calling names.

Chairman RUSSELL. There was no confusion.

Senator CAIN. You were calling names with clarity.

Senator WILEY. You were calling names? I haven't heard any name calling.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Connally.

ADMISSION OF GERMAN SCIENTISTS TO THE UNITED STATES

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, I do not think I care to ask the Secretary but one question. Senator Hickenlooper the other day raised a question that the Russians got all the German scientists and we did not get any, something to that effect. I have a letter here from S. A. Goudsmit, senior scientist, Brookhaven National Laboratory.

I do not know what that Brookhaven Laboratory is, but he sets forth in here a general statement about the matter which arose during the testimony of General Vandenberg. I think Senator Hickenlooper brought it out, and so I would like to put that in the record.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, Mr. Chairman, I know Dr. Goudsmit. I have no personal objection to it whatsoever. I question the propriety of taking somebody's letter as testimony.

Chairman CONNALLY. I will submit it to you.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I say I raise the question of propriety of taking a simple letter. Dr. Goudsmit is available for testimony.

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, I will withhold it at present but I shall certainly want to get it in the record.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not think I shall enter formal objection to putting it in the record. I merely raise the question. Here is unsworn testimony allegedly of Dr. Goudsmit not subject to examination.

Chairman RUSSELL. The question of propriety is one that addresses itself to the member of the committee which is offering the matter.

We have offered any number of newspaper articles, letters, other printed material of one kind or another, Senate floor speeches and otherwise have gone into the record without the person offering them having been sworn.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. At that point, Mr. Chairman, may I suggest as far as I recall every document of that kind has been offered in connection with the examination of a witness, in connection with his testimony, so that there can be examination on the statements in the document issued.

Now Dr. Goudsmit, if in connection with the examination of General Vandenberg Dr. Goudsmit's assertions in his letter could be presented to General Vandenberg for instance for his comments, that is a diffrent thing.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator, we have not followed the rules of procedure in a court in these hearings. We have put a great deal of matter in this record so that at one time or another I do not know just how many exhibits we do have, but they cover just about as wide a range of statements as can possibly be conceived of.

I am not ruling on this question. I am perfectly willing for the committee to settle it, but I might say it would set no precedent to put it in the record because we have offered a great deal of matter for the record at one time or another.

Chairman CONNALLY. Senator Bridges of New Hampshire this morning quoted a telegram from Mr. Scott and made a whole lot of statements and introduced it in the record. I do not see why that is so sacred and this is not.

It is just an explanation that we tried to get these German scientists and did get a lot of them but that most of them were not suited for our tasks. Russia did not get many of them either. Of course if Senator Hickenlooper wants to testify about this matter and did testify and does not want any answer to his testimony, I shan't press it at this time.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well now, Mr. Chairman, such statements as that are wholly unwarranted. I did not testify about the matter. I asked General Vandenberg, who was a member of this particular defense group at that time, about the circumstances surrounding the attempt to get in certain German scientists.

At that time he admitted and he so stated that we had received some in this country. It was about the others that we were asking. Now I don't care.

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, the Chair expressed the wish that we may avoid clashes of this character. I do not think it will add to the record, and certainly does not lead to any conclusion, even though it is in the time of the Senator from Texas.

The Senator from Texas will proceed.

Chairman CONNALLY. Is this excluded?

Chairman RUSSELL. No; it is not.

I stated that the Senator could read it if he cares to, or offer it for the record, if he saw fit.

Chairman CONNALLY. I will read it, and take up my time.

Chairman RUSSELL. It does.

LETTER FROM S. A. GOUDSMIT ON GERMAN SCIENTISTS

Chairman CONNALLY (reading):

The Honorable TOM CONNALLY,
United States Senator
United States Senate Building, Washington, D. C.

This is headed: "78 Benson Avenue, Sayville, N. Y." [Continues reading:]

DEAR SENATOR CONNALLY: From newspaper accounts, I gather that the problem of imported German scientists arose during the testimony of General Vandenberg. You may be interested in the following facts which do not support the impression created by Senator Hickenlooper's questions on this subject.

It is well known and has been reported in many newspaper and magazine articles that the foremost German rocket experts are now working for us. In other technical fields, England and the United States managed to get the keymen, while some are working for France. Only a small number of technical men of importance were rounded up by Russia, and it is not at all certain that these were put to work effectively in the framework of Russian technological development. However, Russia may had a greater need for the more routine type of technician and engineer of which there are many in Germany. On the whole, however, it must be stressed that German technology and, much more so, German science, had declined considerably under the stifling influence of nazism on education. There were no German scientists, and only few engineers, from whom we could learn something new.

Shortly after the war, lists were prepared of names and qualifications of German scientists who might be available for industrial or academic work over here. The demand for these men turned out to be very small, even though transportation for their families was provided by the Armed Forces and was not charged to the prospective employer. A number of scientists found their way to the United States of America under these arrangements but through personal recommendations rather than as a result of the lists which had been prepared. Never did I hear of any obstruction against bringing these men here either from the State Department or any other Government agencies or officials. If the plan were not more successful, it was because the qualifications of the German scientists were, on the whole, far below our requirements, with only few exceptions. A number of technical men were brought here by the Armed Forces and put to work in their laboratories. It was hoped that eventually most of them would be absorbed by private industry and the universities, but I believe that this, too, has not worked out as expected.

I was the scientific chief of a small group that investigated the German A-bomb project. As early as the fall of Strasbourg, in November 1944, we had collected enough information to report that the Germans were hopelessly behind in their A-bomb work and were even on the wrong track. Although some of the world's greatest scientists were working on it, the totalitarian atmosphere was not conducive to advances in such a difficult field of science. Their incredible lack of progress was a great surprise to their colleagues in the Allied countries. There was absolutely nothing in this field which we could learn from them, except how controls can kill science in a short time. I testified about this lack of success by the Germans in December 1945 before the Senate Committee on Atomic Energy. Senator Hickenlooper was present at that time. Under separate cover, I send you a copy of a book describing the investigation of the German A-bomb project.

I sincerely hope that the information contained in this letter will be of some interest to you. More precise details can certainly be obtained from the military authorities in charge of "operation paper clip" which was originally organized to bring German scientists here and may still be active.

Respectfully yours,

S. A. GOUDSMIT,
Senior Scientist, Brookhaven National Laboratory.

I believe that is all, Mr. Chairman.

COMMENT ON LETTER ON GERMAN SCIENTISTS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If the Senator has some time, would the Senator yield to me for a comment?

Chairman CONNALLY. Yes; I yield.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I said I had known Dr. Goudsmit, and I have great respect for his abilities. I recall his testimony about the lack of material progress of the atomic enterprise in Germany, and the reasons for it.

He gave them very clearly, and why we made progress and why they didn't.

I didn't mention the atomic matter in connection with my examination of General Vandenberg. It was not that subject matter at all. It was in connection with certain other known scientific advancements where the Germans had exceeded us, and were superior to us, at the end of the war, fields which we had scarcely touched.

That was the field into which I was inquiring.

We had some German scientists over here, I was aware of that, but there were others, I am quite convinced, that were trying to get over here to help us in certain fields where we were really pioneering, and where the Germans had made considerable progress; and I was merely inquiring into the details.

I went into certain allegations and asked General Vandenberg whether certain allegations were true, and he said his memory was faulty on that, he didn't recall. He recalled some meetings but he couldn't recall the details.

I mentioned no names and I went no further on that examination; but it had nothing to do whatsoever with the progress of atomic science in Germany.

Again, I say, I have great respect for Dr. Goudsmit's ability and for his knowledge. He had a very interesting job in investigating the progress of atomic science in Germany in 1944 and 1945.

Chairman CONNALLY. Have you respect for his integrity?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Certainly I have; but his letter, I don't think, touches the subject matter at all that I was interrogating General Vandenberg about.

Thank you, Senator, for yielding to me.

Chairman CONNALLY. Glad to do it.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall? Senator Saltonstall was just called out to attend a meeting of the Committee on Appropriations.

Senator Johnson?

Senator JOHNSON. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse?

WISDOM OF OFFICIAL TRAVEL BY HIGH OFFICIALS

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, during the course of these hearings you and other witnesses have been asked by some Senators as to whether or not you and they have been in Korea or in Formosa or in Japan since VJ-day or since the beginning of the Korean War, and you, like some of the other witnesses, have replied that you have not been.

Do you place any particular significance on the fact that neither you nor General Marshall—possibly some of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—have been in Japan or Korea or Formosa, from the standpoint of any implication that your failure in not being in Asia places you in a position not to be fully advised as to our needs and problems and operations in Asia?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; I think there is no significance to that.

Senator MORSE. Is it not true, Mr. Secretary, that your advisers in Asia have kept you fully informed in regard to facts and circumstances and information which are needed by the State Department in reaching judgements in respect to the formulation of policy?

Secretary ACHESON. I think that is true, sir.

Senator MORSE. Do you agree with me that if we should ever adopt the standards or the criteria of service that a Secretary of State or a Secretary of Defense or anyone else in high position in this Government, who is charged with the responsibility of development of our foreign and military policy, should keep himself in position of becoming a world traveler to the scene of every international problem before he formulates or participates in the formulation of a governmental policy in respect to that problem, that he would very soon dissipate his energies and not be in a very good position to carry out his duty?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. I think that is true; and it is also true that since the war there has been a very great additional burden on secretaries of state to go to various parts of the world for conferences.

Since the war the practice of having personal conferences involving the Secretary of State has grown very much. I think in Mr. Byrnes' book he points out the number of days that he was Secretary of State and the number of days that he was outside of the United States during that time attending conferences, which was a very large proportion of it, and pointed out the burden and difficulty that that imposes.

I myself have spent a very considerable part of the time since I have been in office attending these meetings, either the Council of Foreign Ministers or the meeting of the three ministers or the North Atlantic Treaty, on matters of that sort. It creates a great problem.

In the old days there used to be commissions which were appointed to represent the President or the Secretary.

Senator MORSE. I would like to say for the record also, Mr. Secretary, that the reverse implication of this type of questioning in its application to General MacArthur is equally unsound.

I am not one of those who thinks that because General MacArthur had not been back in this country for some 14 years meant or that it necessarily followed that he was not aware of our foreign policy problems and of the program of his Government in the field of foreign policy.

WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS IN 1949

You also have been questioned, Mr. Secretary, in the course of these hearings in regard to the situation that existed at the time our troops were taken out of Korea, and, as I read that part of the transcript of record, I am left with the impression that some implications seem to run through the questioning that our Government very well knew or should have known that it was a very dangerous thing to take our troops out of Korea at the time.

I am not talking at this point about my own personal opinion because that was expressed at the time publicly in opposition to taking our troops out of Korea. It is not my view that I wish to bring out at this point.

I seek, however, to bring out what was the apparent view of our Government officials both here and in Asia at the time.

In fact, as the record shows, I have been critical of our Korean policy since July 28, 1945, when on the floor of the Senate at the time of the United Nations Charter debate, I urged the recognition of the provisional government of Korea.

Mr. Secretary, in that speech on July 28, 1945, I urged the recognition of the provisional government of Korea and forewarned, as the speech will show verbatim, that I thought there was a great danger that if we did not recognize the provisional government of Korea and put into immediate practice the principle of self-determination set forth in the United Nations Charter, there was a danger that Korea would fall as a ripe plum into Russia's lap.

I forewarned also in the speech on July 28, 1945, that I believed if we did not recognize the provisional government of Korea, there was great danger that Korea would become a threat to the peace of Asia. I might have said to the world, but I didn't.

I remember some months later, after the partition, which I also protested, that Arthur Vandenberg came to me and asked me what I knew about Korea that was not generally known, and I said "Absolutely nothing; but we all know about the Russian pattern. And the Russian pattern in every satellite that it becomes involved in is to take over."

And I said, "They will take Korea over if we follow this course of action."

Now I make these comments only to say it is pretty well known on the record what my position has been on Korea, and I thought we followed from the very beginning a mistaken course of action in Korea.

But, be that as it may, I shall always do my best to get into the record of hearing the facts as I believe them to be on any particular point. In regard to the examination that was conducted and the cross-examination of you the other day as to taking the troops out of Korea, I would like to call your attention to page 242 of the transcript of this record when I was questioning General MacArthur and asked him in view of what has happened since the taking of troops out of Korea he did not think it was a mistake.

I said I didn't mean to ask it as a hindsight question but only to find out if he now thought it was a mistake.

He says on page 242:

> In the aftermath and hindsight, I should say it was a very grave mistake.

Then he goes on to say this:

> At that time, Senator, at the time our troops were withdrawn, it was the strategic concept of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that that was not a proper place for the employment of American ground troops, that is that it involved inherent dangers to place United States ground troops in continental Asia, and it was as far as the military was concerned, the strategic consideration that our troops should not be left there because they might be trapped, that is if the Soviet and the Communist Red China and everybody had suddenly hit, the position of a

small garrison there would have been very dangerous indeed, and the strategic concept was for the withdrawal of those troops.

There was nothing peculiarly threatening at that time in Korea when the decision was made to get out.

Do you agree with me, Mr. Secretary, that this testimony of General MacArthur set forth on pages 242 and 243 of the transcript support the observation that you made in your testimony yesterday, that at the time it seemed to be the wise thing to do to take the troops out of Korea?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I think it does.

It is also a fact that the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which is described here as being held at the time our troops were withdrawn, which was in late forty-eight and up to the middle of forty-nine was also their attitude in forty-seven when the initial steps were taken in the United Nations. Plus the further fact that they thought that these troops were needed elsewhere.

Senaor MORSE. Is it a fair conclusion of mine, do you think, Mr. Secretary, that any implication that might have been left in this record by an examination of anyone and the responses to that examination to the effect that the taking of the troops out of Korea at the time was solely State Department responsibility is not entirely correct, because the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military advisers of our Government, also shared the view at the time that that should be the policy of the United States with respect to its troops in Korea?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir, both Departments were agreed on that. I think if anything the State Department held up the withdrawal a little while.

TRANSMITTAL OF PRESIDENTIAL PRONOUNCEMENT TO MAC ARTHUR

Senator MORSE. Also in this record, Mr. Secretary, as I read it at least I feel that the implication has been left by some that it was a great mistake on the part of the President and of the State Department not to transmit to General MacArthur the actual text of the proposals that were being made at the time by the President of the United States through his Secretary of State in connection with the suggestions to our allies for ending hostilities in Korea.

Do you think, Mr. Secretary, that it should be deemed necessary under the circumstances that existed on or about March 23 and 24 that General MacArthur should have received the exact text of the proposals that you were making in behalf of the President to our allies while you were still in the stage of negotiating those proposals, in view of the fact that you had sent him a message that made very clear that proposals were being made?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't think there was anything unusual or mistaken about that, sir.

Senator MORSE. That leads me to my next question. When you say there was not anything unusual, is it or is it not common practice of the State Department and the White House to send in advance to military commanders in the field or for that matter to other top military or State Department officials in foreign posts the exact text of proposals that are being made by this Government to foreign governments in advance of the acceptance of those proposals?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, if I might separate that into the military aspect and then the aspect having to do with our own people in the field, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were participating in the drafting of this message or this negotiated statement that the President was supposed to make.

They had it and the normal course would be to rely upon their judgment to say as much as they thought was necessary from the military point of view to the commander in the field, and I don't think anybody would tell them what was necessary to be communicated. They would do whatever they thought was right in that respect.

So far as our own people are concerned, it depends on whether the negotiation is being conducted in the foreign post or whether it is being conducted here. Of course, if the ambassador himself is conducting the negotiation, then he has all the details about it.

If we are conducting it here, we keep him informed as much as we think he needs to be informed to respond to any questions or take any action that we ask him to take in the foreign post.

Senator MORSE. Is it not true that General MacArthur had been requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit to them and through them to other Government officials any suggestions and recommendations that he wished to make in regard to what terms for settlement should be urged by his Government?

Secretary ACHESON. May I look at this? Well, that message ends up with the phrase "Your recommendation desired."

Senator MORSE. That is right.

Secretary ACHESON. I think one can either interpret that as referring to the whole telegram or referring to the sentence preceding it which says:

> State has asked the Joint Chiefs what authority General MacArthur should have to permit sufficient freedom of action for the next few weeks to provide security for the United Nations forces and maintain contact with the enemy.

I think you could reasonably interpret that as applying to either, either that sentence or to the whole message.

Senator MORSE. Even if it applies to either, it still left General MacArthur in a position to make recommendations in regard to a proposed settlement for the conflict in Korea, because the protection of his troops was inseparably involved in a proposal for the settlement of the conflict, was it not?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir, he could have made any recommendations he wished.

Senator MORSE. There isn't any question about it.

IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET-CHINESE TREATY OF 1945

Mr. Secretary, you were examined yesterday in regard to negotiations at Yalta and you testified, as I recall, that Russia agreed to enter into a mutual defense treaty with China, that is true, is it not?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't know that it is called a mutual defense treaty. They did agree to enter into a——

Senator MORSE. I think your language was, "mutual aid."

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir—

> for its part the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the U. S. S. R. and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

Senator Morse. I think you previously referred to that as the Sino-Stalin proposals.

Secretary Acheson. Sino-Soviet Treaty.

Senator Morse. Well, at that time the Nationalists were in control in China, were they not?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Morse. That is clear indication that at that time at least Stalin left the impression with Churchill and Roosevelt that the Soviet Union was willing to work out on a cooperative basis with China a mutual defense program for conducting the war against Japan as of that time?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Morse. How much time do I have left, Mr. Chairman? I have another subject I want to cover.

Chairman Russell. Senator Wiley?

Senator Morse. No. How much do I have left?

Chairman Russell. Oh, you have left, Senator, some 7 minutes.

Senator Morse. That will be sufficient. I want to ask you a few question, Mr. Secretary——

Chairman Russell. Six minutes.

CRISIS IN IRAN AND THE INTERNATIONAL OIL SITUATION

Senator Morse. I want to ask you a few questions in regard to possible crisis in Iran. Speaking hypothetically for a moment, if conflict should develop in Iran that would destroy at least the availability to the allies of the oil resources of Iran, and if as a consequence of an Iranian dispute we should become involved in a war at least on a larger scale than presently is involved in Korea, would it not be in the interests of the United States that it give immediate attention to its own oil resources and to the availability of oil resources near the United States for our use in case of an all out war?

Secretary Acheson. I think so, sir.

Senator Morse. There is no doubt about the fact, is there, Mr. Secretary, in your opinion, that the conduct of a third world war would make it very important for the United States and our allies to have an adequate supply of oil and oil products for the prosecution of that war if we are to maintain supremacy of the air?

Secretary Acheson. For that and many other reasons; yes, sir.

Senator Morse. Without going into any great detail about it, I ask you if you think there is justification on the basis of our experience in World War II, that we maintain considerable activity in our country in developing our own oil resources and helping other nations close to us to develop their oil resources as a potential of defense in case of an extension of world conflict.

Secretary Acheson. That gets into a field in which the Secretary of the Interior would be much better qualified to speak than I.

Senator Morse. I am coming quickly to the main question I want to ask you, because you know—and I am always willing to have my record on top of the table about these things—you know that for some time past I have been very much interested in seeing to it that we do what we can on a sound economic basis to help our neighbors to the north, Canada, and our neighbors to the south, Mexico and Brazil and Venezuela and other Latin American countries—develop their oil resources. Because I consider it vital to the defense of my own country.

POSSIBLE LOAN TO MEXICO FOR DEVELOPMENT OF OIL RESOURCES

You are also familiar that a couple of years ago I urged upon our Government the making of a loan to Mexico because I felt that a loan to Mexico was an inseparable part of a sound point-4 program, and I felt that that loan should not place a restriction upon development of Mexican oil resources.

Now, I am asking you this question, because I think it is definitely involved in our future defense program. I was advised at the time that one or more Mexican officials had advised the State Department that Mexico didn't want any part of the loan for development of her oil resources.

The discussion was entirely on the basis of pipelines and tankers and railroads and not on drilling or oil exploitation.

I questioned it at the time, though I was so advised by a representative of the President in the White House.

Could you tell me whether or not you have knowledge as to what Mexican official or what Mexican officials so advised the State Department?

Secretary Acheson. Senator, I should have to refresh my memory about that very long and complicated negotiation. I have not looked into it for a good many years, because I did not think it was coming up in connection with far eastern policy.

Senator Morse. I think it is very directly related to far eastern policy from the standpoint of the defenses of our country.

I will close my examination on this point, Mr. Secretary, with the personal request that you do refresh your memory on that point and advise me by memorandum who within the Mexican Government, if anyone, advised the State Department that they didn't want any of the money for oil facilities in Mexico.

I want to say in closing this comment that I think, under our point 4 program, with the constant danger and threat of world war III being what it is, that though I would not have us overlook the oil resources of Iran, neither would I have us overlook the oil resources on our own continent, because in case of world war III I think it is more important that we have access to those oil resources than those in Arabia or Iran.

MAC ARTHUR'S PUBLIC EXPRESSIONS OF DISAGREEMENTS

One final question, Mr. Secretary, on another point.

Am I, by way of summary, correct in my understanding that you concurred with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense and Mr. Harriman and the President on the recall of General MacArthur because, among other reasons, one primary one was that the general was expressing himself in public on American foreign Asiatic and military policy in a way that showed a marked conflict with and disagreement with the position taken by his Commander in Chief, the President of the United States?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator MORSE. And, as you have testified, that left the country in a position where our allies were raising the question as to who spoke for the military and foreign policy of the United States in Asia; which of two voices were they to accept—that of MacArthur or that of the President of the United States.

Secretary ACHESON. That question was raised in this country.

Senator WILEY. What is the answer?

Secretary ACHESON. In this country and elsewhere.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator Morse.

Senator Wiley?

Senator WILEY. I did not get the answer of the Secretary.

Chairman RUSSELL. The reporter will read back the question and the answer.

(The pending question and answer were read by the reporter.)

Senator WILEY. Well, Mr. Secretary, I think that question and answer are not in line with the facts; they do not square, in my judgment, whatsoever, but I will let it go at that.

JAPANESE PEACE FEELERS PRIOR TO VJ-DAY

In an article in Harper's Magazine, Hanson Baldwin has discussed reported Japanese peace feelers prior to VJ-day.

You have previously and briefly alluded to these, as I remember. Would you please go into greater detail? For example, did the Japanese aproach the Russians on the subject? Was there anything communicated to this Government on that subject?

Maybe I can combine another question that would bring the two together. For the purpose of this question let us concede that at the time of Yalta, those who were directing our part in World War II could not anticipate the seemingly sudden surrender of Japan in August 1945.

Why, with the rapid improvement in our position, and in the light of the peace feelers of the Japanese, did we not change our position with regard to concessions to the Russians at Potsdam? Now that question has two of them in one. I recall definitely there has been a lot written about this.

The Japs were ready to surrender, and I think some of the Air Force men made the point that they had practically bombed Japan into submission. There were a lot of feelers, and there was not any need even to drop the bomb. There has been stuff written on that.

What I am getting at is if there were any feelers—what was said and what was done. Why did we then, in view of those circumstances, feel that we had to make the concessions—if there were concessions—to Russia as we did at Yalta?

Secretary ACHESON. Senator, I shall have to rely on my memory as to what I know about the events leading up to the surrender of Japan by knowledge acquired after the events. I did not know about it at the time.

My recollection is that there were no peace feelers put out by Japan until the ones which were communicated through the Swiss Government which led up to the surrender of Japan and, I believe, that was in August—July or August—1945.

Senator WILEY. After or before the first bomb?

Secretary ACHESON. I beg pardon?

Senator WILEY. After or before the first bomb?

Secretary ACHESON. I think that was—when was the first bomb? Was that in——

Senator SPARKMAN. August 6.

Senator McMAHON. August 6, 1945. The test was on July 16 at Alamogordo.

Secretary ACHESON. That is my impression—before those feelers were put out; and very shortly before, through methods which this Government had available to it, it came into the knowledge of the Government the fact that Japanese officials were communicating back and forth with one another as to whether or not it would be desirable that some approaches be made to the United States or the Allies.

My recollection is that it was after the bomb, but I would not want to testify about that because I have not got it clearly in my mind.

I should say that from my present recollection there was nothing of this sort known or suspected at the time of Yalta, and for some time thereafter.

MARSHALL'S VISIT TO TOKYO, AND LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE LIAISON

Senator WILEY. I came through the hall this morning 10 minutes late for this meeting. I was stopped by the press. They said, "Do you know General Marshall has landed in Japan?" I said, "No, we don't know anything. We have to be told by the press." "Well, he has landed. Do you know Ridgway has been called to consult with him?" "No." "Well, what was your question about when you were talking about treaties pending?" I said, as I said last night, I was trying to find what was going on. You are giving me the information now. Well, that is the way it has been. Why aren't we taken into partnership? Why didn't you tell us yesterday something about this thing that is brewing in Japan?

I was inquiring about that, Mr. Secretary. I might say right on that very subject, that when Senator Connally was chairman, when I first went on the committee and Senator Vandenberg became chairman—now Senator Connally is chairman again—I suggested, and finally the suggestion has been partially complied with, that the Foreign Relations Committee be divided up into segments so that various segments would have portions of this globe that we might get acquainted with and be of assistance to this Government in collaborating with the State Department.

Well, up to date we have had the division but we have not had any funds, unfortunately.

But this is just an instance, just an instance now, the newspapers tell me. Now I am going to ask you the question: Is anything brewing in relation to an armistice, a settlement, in Korea?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; there is not, as far as I know.

Now, may we go back and may I comment on your comment?

[Deleted.]

Your question was stricken out and an answer was left in, which said, "Yes, we are working on that." I think that the thing that preceded the part of the record which was stricken out had something to do with whether there were any secret arrangements being gone into. So it appeared to those who read the record that my answer was responsive to an earlier question, which it was not.

Now, so far as your suggestion that I should have told you yesterday that General Marshall was going to Japan, I think the simple answer to that is that I didn't know any more about it than you did, Senator.

Senator WILEY. Maybe that indicates just what is wrong in that picture. [Laughing.]

Secretary ACHESON. No; I don't——

Senator WILEY. Maybe that is what is wrong with this mix-up with General MacArthur, that the military and the diplomatic were not playing ball on this.

Senator McMAHON. Will the Senator yield?

Senator WILEY. Just a minute now.

Secretary ACHESON. May I go on with my comment, in which I said I didn't know any more about it than you did.

I have been up here continuously day after day. General Marshall, I was informed this morning by the Military Establishment, has gone to Japan and Korea in the ordinary course as the Secretary of Defense because he has not been there before and wants himself to see the military operations and how they are going on, and matters of that sort.

There is no reason in the world why he should have telephoned me at these hearings and told me that he was going to take a trip as Secretary of Defense.

Senator WILEY. Well, are you through with that?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Again, it may be that the last statement may be all right. I don't think it is. I think we have come to the conclusion that we are in a global contest. We have come to the conclusion that one of the very seriously erupted places in this world is the nation of Korea.

We have had a lot of talk about pending armistice and agreements, and we are seeking to find out just what the situation is on a global picture. All at once the highest authority in Government "skidoos" off to Japan and Ridgway is called back for consulation.

Again the question comes: Are these military men making the policy, or is the civil government of this United States? That, as I understand, was one of the criticisms against MacArthur—that he dared to suggest that the military should have some right to say about policy.

Now we see them running over there, getting together, and you don't know anything about it. And the reason is that we have been questioning you so much. Well, I don't think the Government works that way in the highest echelon, if there is cooperation and collaboration. We have telephones and telegrams and radios and television.

So that is my comment on that. I am going on to another question before I let off some more steam.

INTERNAL SITUATION IN CHINA AS A RESULT OF KOREAN CONFLICT

The Chinese Communists, we are told, have suffered very heavy casualties. What effect are these casualties having on public opinion? What does our intelligence show—public opinion in China?

Secretary ACHESON. I have no specific information on that.

Senator WILEY. Now, it has been said, time and time again, and I guess it is true, that the Chinese Communists are under the influence and domination of the Soviet Union.

Have you any information, through your intelligence or otherwise, as to whether that domination that is now apparent, should it be the Russians or the Chinese, has created any resentment in China?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

Senator WILEY. Any opposition?

Secretary ACHESON. I have nothing specific on that; no specific information on that.

Senator WILEY. Have you any thought as to whether or not Titoism is coming into being with Mao, in China, or whether they are mere subservient followers?

What is your background, your understanding of the Chinese people?

Is there any light you can throw on that?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I have no information having to do with the growth of Titoism in China.

Now, are you asking me about my background knowledge of the Chinese people?

Senator WILEY. Any information you have as to whether or not there are possibilities that Mao might pull something, a la Tito?

Secretary ACHESON. I have no information on that subject whatever, sir.

So far as the Chinese people are concerned, I think we know that throughout their history they have been very hostile to foreign domination, and that they are very nationalistic, and, to a considerable extent, an individualist people.

Senator WILEY. That brings me back to a similar question used yesterday, only it is from the other angle, yet they work together.

What are we doing to develop or encourage such a development as Titoism in China? Anything?

Secretary ACHESON. Senator, I think that I have to answer that I cannot comment on that.

Obviously, if we were doing something, and if I told you about it, it would immediately become totally ineffective; if we are not doing anything, and I tell you that, then you ask me, "Why don't you do something?" so that this is a field in which public examination is obviously not very profitable.

Senator WILEY. Well, the answer I suppose is the same answer that you gave yesterday——that something is being done but you won't specifically state what has been done or is being done.

POSSIBLE SOVIET AID UNDER TERMS OF SINO-SOVIET TREATY OF 1950

Now, the Soviet treaty of 1950 has been referred to during these hearings on several occasions.

Is there any indication that the Russians are extending the technical and economic assistance they promised the Chinese Communists in that field?

Secretary ACHESON. I will have to get you any information that we have on that. I don't know of it personally.

Senator WILEY. What is your judgment as to whether or not the Chinese Communists could really depend on the Russians to help them in that direction economically and technically?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I pointed out in public statements several times that it seemed to me the Chinese were going down a road which was sure to have disappointment at the end of it; that if China is really looking forward to a future of any sort of industrial development, it will not come from association with Russia but from association with the free world, and that they are taking a very bad course in order to bring that about.

The possibility of Russia being able to aid China in view of all the needs of the vast area of Russia seem to be very slim indeed, whereas a China which was organized and conducted by people who wished to have association with the Western World and on honorable terms could look forward to a great development.

MAC ARTHUR'S RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE UN

Senator WILEY. The last question of Senator Morse suggests this one. What is your interpretation of General MacArthur's responsibilities as commander in chief of the UN forces in Korea; that is, his responsibilities to the UN and to our own Government through to the UN? How do you interpret his responsibilities when he was commander in chief?

Secretary ACHESON. The chain of command was from General MacArthur who was the field commander to the United States Government which was the unified command, and through the United States Government to the United Nations.

Senator WILEY. Is that all you have to say on the subject?

Secretary ACHESON. I will be glad to say more. I thought you were asking me about the chain of command, who was responsible to whom.

Senator WILEY. I was asking you as to how you interpret his responsibilities, the performance of his duties.

He had military and political responsibility there, did he not? He had to report on not only the particular battle line and casualties and a thousand and one things, but also go back and make recommendations and report to the United Nations as their commander in chief.

Now I want to get your interpretation as to how limited and how extensive his responsibilities were. How do you interpret the powers of a theater commander like MacArthur considering his background and his knowledge. He was not consulted on the China policy according to General Marshall when he was out there in 1945. He was fighting a war against Japan then, but later he became virtually ruler of Japan. With your fine mind, sir, interpret his responsibilities under those circumstances. That is what I want.

Secretary ACHESON. As the field commander of the United Nations forces, he had military command of all troops, aircraft, naval vessels committed to the war in Korea by whatsoever nation. He had full military command in the field.

His responsibility was to take his military and all other instructions as the United Nations Commander from the Government of the United States. Those were transmitted through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Whatever UN authority of a military nature there was in Korea was exercised by him.

Senator WILEY. That is your complete statement or interpretation of his function?

Secretary Acheson. That is all I can say in answer to your question. If you wish to examine me further, I will be glad to respond to anything that you think I have omitted from that statement.

OTHER PERSONS CONSULTED BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE DISMISSAL

Senator Wiley. Now yesterday I asked you about those three or four other persons whose names you would not give that attended or were consulted by the President. Were they engaged in Government employ?

Secretary Acheson. The answer to that I believe so far as I know is "Yes."

Senator Wiley. They were in the employ of the United States Government in different branches of the Government?

Secretary Acheson. Well, sir, I cannot go any further in this matter. I told you I am not at liberty to say who they were and I am not at liberty to give information which leads up to somebody guessing who they were, but I think I am entitled to say that they were officials of the United States Government so far as I know.

Senator Wiley. Were they the political advisers of the President?

Secretary Acheson. Senator, I can't respond to any further questions on this point.

Senator Wiley. Were they consulted more than once?

Secretary Acheson. I don't know, sir.

Senator Wiley. How much time has I left?

Chairman Russell. You have about 6 minutes.

Senator Wiley. I don't know how you keep time.

Chairman Russell. You have according to Dr. Wilcox 8 minutes, so I will go by his figures.

Senator Wiley. I agree with that.

I am perfectly willing at this stage of the game to waive that 8 minutes. I would like to hear Senator George.

Chairman Russell. Senator Kefauver?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Knowland?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Hunt?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Cain?

KOREAN SITUATION AFTER RED CHINESE INTERVENTION

Senator Cain. Mr. Secretary, we agree, do we not, that our American forces in Korea last November when the Red Chinese entered the war, were considerably fewer in number than is the case today? Our total American strength—air, sea and ground—was much less last November when the Red Chinese entered the war than——

Secretary Acheson. I think it was less. I don't know how much less, Senator. The difference is in bringing up the forces to full strength.

Senator Cain. I think you will agree with that contention, for I speak from the authoritative figures coming out of the Military Establishment and it merely shows that we today are much better equipped in terms of numbers than was the case last November.

Mr. Secretary, on previous days you have spoken quite fully of the steps you are taking and have been taking to secure additional allied military contributions for Korea. You are willing to agree, are you not, that our allies had but a small number of troops in combat in Korea last November when the Red Chinese crossed the Yalu River in force.

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir; I think that is correct.

Senator Cain. All of us are very conscious that the allied fighting situation was most difficult last November after the Red Chinese entered the war. Because we can understand how difficult that Korean fighting situation was, did you ever consider the possibility or favor evacuating our American forces and allied forces, too, from Korea?

Secretary Acheson. Well, the possibility that we might be forced out of Korea was one which was, of course, very much present in our minds at the time of the very grave danger in December and January of last year and this year. I never favored the evacuation of the troops.

Senator Cain. May I ask, sir, if you have ever known the Joint Chiefs of Staff to favor or consider seriously the possibility of being required to evacuate our troops from Korea after the Red Chinese entered the war in November?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir; I think that the papers which you have before you show that in December and January there was the full possibility that the tide of battle might force us out of Korea.

Senator Cain. Mr. Secretary, I wish at the moment to provide you with some rest and draw the attention of the chairman to some comments I should like to make on this subject of evacuation.

PARAPHRASES OF JCS MESSAGE TO MAC ARTHUR OF DECEMBER 29, 1950

It has often been implied in these hearings that General MacArthur favored evacuating Korea. It has always been my own individual view that the question of evacuating Korea was initiated in the United States and that General MacArthur responded to an evacuation inquiry from the JCS by stating that if the JCS estimate of the situation was correct and if military restrictions prevailing last November were not romoved, it might become necessary to evacuate Korea.

On December 29, 1950, the JCS requested General MacArthur for his views as to conditions which might determine a decision to evacuate Korea.

A paraphrase of this message, Mr. Secretary, appears on page 80 of the JCS report for the joint committees, which I think Mr. Fisher has available for you.

I and other Senators were never satisfied with this paraphrase, because we had reason, or thought we had reason, to believe it left much unsaid.

The Senator from California, particularly, and the Senator from Washington requested a fuller and more definitive paraphrase of the message from the JCS to the field commander last December. This request was satisfied in the last few days and an amplification of the message has been inserted in the JCS report.

Mr. Chairman, the original paraphrase and the amplified paraphrase bear little similarity to each other. I intend, sir, to read each paraphrase and General MacArthur's reply. By doing so I can clear up the evacuation question, at least to my own satisfaction. Against these several messages, I should then like to ask the Secretary of State one or more questions and make a request of the committee.

I would appreciate it, Mr. Chairman, if you found it convenient to follow this.

Chairman RUSSELL. I have sent for some copies of the new paraphrase so I can furnish one to the Secretary of State and follow it myself.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir. It is on page 80.

Senator STENNIS. You may take this one, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am familiar with that.

THE ORIGINAL PARAPHRASE

Senator CAIN. I think we are all familiar with the paraphrase which appears on page 80, because it has often been referred to, but in the interests of continuity, I will impose upon the committee's time to read it. The title, "Decision as to Future Military Action in Korea"—

> The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on December 29, 1950, pointed out to CINCFE that effective resistance at some position in Korea and the deflation of the military and political prestige of the Chinese Communists would be of great importance to our national interests if this could be accomplished without incurring serious losses. Further, the basic directive of CINCFE was modified in that he was to defend, in successive positions, inflicting maximum damage to hostile forces. His operations, however, were always subject to the primary consideration of the safety of his troops. Further, maximum Korean contribution to sustained resistance should be mobilized. Comments by CINCFE were requested as to conditions which might determine a decision to evacuate Korea. It was stated that upon the receipt of his comments, CINCFE would be provided a definite directive.

REVISED PARAPHRASE

On the preceding 2 pages, which because they are inserted do not bear numbers, I should like to read this requested and additional paraphrase of the message of December 29, 1950. Its title, "Personal for MacArthur from the Joint Chiefs of Staff"—

> The following paraphrase is in amplification of the summary of the message of December 29, 1950, in paragraph 37, page 80 of this compilation, as requested by Senator Knowland on page 4594 of the hearings:
>
> Chinese Communists now appear, from estimates available, capable of forcing evacuation by forces of UN. By committing substantial United States forces which would place other commitments, including safety of Japan, in serious jeopardy, or by inflicting serious losses on him, enemy might be forced to abandon exercise of his capability. If with present UN strength successful resistance at some position in Korea without our incurring serious losses could be accomplished and apparent military and political prestige of Chinese Communists could be deflated, it would be of great importance to our national interests. In the face of increased threat of general war JCS believe commitment of additional United States ground forces in Korea should not be made, since our view is that major war should not be fought in Korea.
>
> Not considered practicable to obtain at this time significant additional forces from other United Nations. Therefore in light of present situation your basic directive, of furnish to ROK assistance as necessary to repel armed attack and restore to the area security and peace, is modified. Your directive now is to defend in successive positions, subject to safety of your troops as your primary consideration, inflicting as much damage to hostile forces in Korea as is possible.
>
> In view of continued threat to safety of Japan and possibility of forced withdrawal from Korea it is important to make advance determination of last reasonable opportunity for orderly evacuation. It appears here—

and parenthetically, all of this is coming from the United States to the field commander—

> that if Chinese Communists retain force capability of forcing evacuation after having driven UN forces to rear it would be necessary to direct commencement of your withdrawal. Request your views on these conditions which should determine evacuation. You should consider your mission of defending Japan and limitation on troops available to you. Definite directive on conditions for initiation of avacuation will be provided when your views are received.
>
> For the present—

this refers back to last December—

> this message which has been handled with ultimate security should be known only to your chief of staff and to Ridgway and his chief of staff.

Mr. Chairman, as I said, sir, it seems to me that there is no similarity worthy of the name between the original paraphrase submitted by the JCS to this committee and the supplemental paraphase which came as a direct result of requests from members of this committee.

MAC ARTHUR'S REPLY TO JCS MESSAGE OF DECEMBER 29, 1950

Now on the day following, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Secretary, the field commander, General MacArthur, responded to the message of the preceding day in this way:

Senator STENNIS. What page?

Senator CAIN. On page 81, sir.

> On 30 December 1950, CINCFE made a comprehensive reply to the request for his comments on the evacuation of United Nations armed forces from Korea. He pointed out that United States naval and air potential was being only partly utilized and that the potential of the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa and guerrilla action on the mainland were being ignored.
>
> Further, were the Goverfnment to make a political determination to recognize the state of war forced upon the United States by China and to take appropriate retaliatory measures, the United States could—
>
> *a.* Blockade the coast of China;
>
> *b.* Destroy through naval gunfire and air bombardment China's industrial capacity to wage war;
>
> *c.* Secure appropriate reinforcements from the Nationalist garrison on Formosa; and
>
> *d.* Release existing restrictions upon the Formosa garrison for diversionary action (possibly leading to counterinvasion) against vulnerable areas of the Chinese mainland.
>
> After pointing out the advantages of such action, he stated his consciousness of the fact that this course of action had been rejected in the past for fear of provoking China to a major war effort, but that there was nothing that could be done in any event to aggravate the situation vis-à-vis China. He admitted that Soviet military intervention was a matter of speculation, but gave his opinion that the Soviets would act on the basis of their own estimate with little regard for other factors. His recent request for reinforcement by four divisions had as its purpose the defense of Japan in the contingency of Soviet attack. Further, a forced evacuation from Korea without retaliatory action against China would have a most adverse effect upon the peoples of Asia, including the Japanese, and the eventual results of such action would call for an even greater reinforcement of the forces in the Far East. He understood the demand for European security and concurred in doing everything possible in that sector short of the point of accepting defeat everywhere else. Accepting defeat everywhere else, however, could not fail to insure later defeat in Europe itself. He concurred in the Joint Chiefs of Staff tactical estimate of the Korean situation under the conditions implied; namely, no reinforcements; restrictions on Chinese Nationalist action; no military measures agains China; and the concentration of Communist China's military forces in the Korean sector. The tactical plan of successively contracting defense line to the Pusan beachhead would appear to be the only

way in wihch an evacuation could be accomplished. In such an eventuality, it would not be necessary for the Joint Chiefs to make an anticipatory decision.

Against those three messages, Mr. Secretary, I should like——

Senator GEORGE. A parliamentary inquiry—will the Senator let me ask a question?

Chairman RUSSELL. Will the Senator yield?

Senator CAIN. Certainly, sir.

PUBLICATION OF THE PARAPHRASES OF MESSAGES

Senator GEORGE. Will this be a part of the public record?

Chairman RUSSELL. I have no way yet of determining that.

Senator GEORGE. Will it be determined?

Chairman RUSSELL. It will be determined.

Senator CAIN. By the committee, I presume?

Senator WILEY. Why shouldn't they be in the public record?

Chairman RUSSELL. Was the original paraphrase made a part of the public record?

Senator GEORGE. I do not think you can understand what General MacArthur did or what was done here without that, and with it I think you can begin to understand it.

Senator LONG. I might suggest, sir, that some of that was put in by me yesterday.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did it appear in the public record?

Senator LONG. Yes, sir, if I can't find that.

Senator GEORGE. I beg your pardon for interfering.

Senator CAIN. Will both the Senators from Georgia permit me to say this: It is my understanding, sir, that the original paraphrase which appears on page 90, and which, in the light of the second paraphrase is totally without explanation, has on repeated occasions been referred to and made a part of our public record.

Senator GEORGE. I think that has; but I was speaking of the last paraphrase that you gave.

Senator CAIN. Not to my knowledge, sir, although I think it should be.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, it is the opinion of the Chair although I do not know whether I should undertake to pass on that—we have Admiral Davis, who has been a reasonable man, and who has shown common sense and good judgment, and he should pass on it. But it is my opinion that if one of those paraphrases appeared in the public record, by all means the second one should appear in the public record.

Senator CAIN. That is my belief, sir, and that is one of the reasons why I have called it to the attention of the committee.

Senator LONG. If I may, I would like to point out on page 5537 yesterday you will find that I was reading from the paraphrase, and quoted the page I was reading from.

Senator CAIN. Indeed.

Senator LONG. And on page 5539 I quoted from it again, and that was not censored; and I believe that thereafter I did make some statements from the paraphrase.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Chairman, the Senator from Washington has attempted to put together the several segments that we need to consider as a whole in our attempt to understand the problem before us.

STATE DEPARTMENT ROLE IN MESSAGES

Mr. Secretary, against what I have thus far read, I should like to ask you only two questions, sir: Did you, as the Secretary of State assist in writing the JCS message of December 29, 1950?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't recall that. Have we got anything on it?

Senator CAIN. I ask that question, in part, because it has often been said that with reference to give State Department messages that the JCS helped to compile them, and I want to know in this instance whether the State Department helped to compile a military message?

Secretary ACHESON. I have no recollection of it; but I will look up any notes in the State Department.

Senator CAIN. If you will, sir, I will appreciate it.

Secretary ACHESON. As to whether I was consulted, I will look for any notes.

Senator CAIN. My second question, Mr. Secretary: Did you, as the Secretary of State, see this message of December 29, 1950, before it was sent to our field commander?

Secretary ACHESON. I shall have to look that up also, Senator.

Senator CAIN. I will appreciate that.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ORIGINAL AND REVISED PARAPHRASES

Mr. Chairman, the amplified paraphrase which I have just read includes at least five subjects not covered or mentioned in the original paraphrase delivered to this committee by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It mentions, sir (a) increased threat of general war; (b) a major war should not be fought in Korea; (c) additional United States forces are not intended for Korea; (d) additional forces are not to be expected from other United Nations; and (e) the safety of Japan is threatened.

These omissions, Mr. Chairman, from the original paraphrase are not only very startling to me, but their omission did not provide our joint committee with an accurate estimate of the situation in Korea, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw it to be on December 29, 1950.

The joint committee has sought—and I think done an excellent job up to date—only the facts in the Korean problem.

The original JCS paraphrase, undeniably, from my view, prevented our committee from getting some of the important facts relating to the Korean situation.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff paraphrase of the message of December 29, 1950, was largely, sir, misleading. Whether this was an intentional act, I have no present way of knowing, sir.

EXPLANATION FOR DIFFERENCES DEMANDED

In having a high regard for the persons and the intelligence of the JCS, I cannot understand why they approved a paraphrase which didn't cover half of the subjects included in the JCS message of December 29, 1950, to the commander in the field.

On the face of the original paraphrase, Mr. Chairman, somebody deliberately sought to establish as being true that the field commander was initiating consideration for evacuating Korea.

I feel strongly, sir, about the omissions in question.

I believe that the committee is entitled to a comprehensive and detailed explanation from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In order to get that explanation, I offer the motion that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a whole, or through its chairman, be recalled before the committee, at the convenience of the committee.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator, unfortunately we do not have a quorum present now, and I don't think we can vote on that issue.

Senator CAIN. I would not press, as you very well know, at this time, but I want to make it a matter of record so that the full committee can give consideration to the motion in the near future.

Chairman RUSSELL. There seems to be some very marked differences between the two paraphrases. It, of course, will be handled just as all other of these classified documents are handled.

Before the committee commenced these hearings, we adopted the procedure for dealing with all classified documents. We asked that they be paraphased and submitted. If any Senator was dissatisfied with the paraphrase, a subcommittee was available to view the original document.

That subcommittee was the Senator from California, Mr. Knowland, and the Senator from Connecticut, Mr. McMahon, and they could first take it up with the Department and ask for a more complete paraphrase, or a more complete statement, rather, of the document.

If that failed, then they were to report to the commitee.

In this case, a more complete paraphrase was sought. It was furnished. It has been read by the Senator from Washington, Mr. Cain.

It will be handled as all other classified matters are, so far as the procedure for deletions is concerned.

If any question arises out of the deletion, it will be decided by the committee, under the procedure which we have adopted.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Chairman, I have full respect and confidence for this committee; and, though I do not know him as a person, I have a high regard and respect for our censor, Admiral Davis, situated somewhere beyond the confines of this room.

I have brought this matter to the attention of the committee in order that the committee can give consideration to it; and what the committee wishes to do, I have reason to believe I will be satisfied with, sir.

I will say to the Secretary of State that I have a few more questions which, to me, are quite important, sir; but because I want to get no unrelated matters confused with what I think is the importance of what I have just offered to this committee, I would reserve those remaining few questions to a later time.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George?

Senator GEORGE. Mr. Chairman, I stated that I would have no further questions, but in view of the fact that a very innocent question which I, among others, asked the Secretary, as to whether he had visited Korea, I now would like to ask the Secretary one question on that point.

The fact that General MacArthur was in Korea didn't disqualify him nor prevent him from knowing the things about which he testified, did they, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

MESSAGES BETWEEN JCS AND MAC ARTHUR ON PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL ANNOUNCEMENT

Senator GEORGE. Thank you, sir. Now the message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur about which you were questioned also concluded:

> Recognizing that parallel has no military significance, State has asked JCS what authority you should have to permit sufficient freedom of action for next few weeks to provide security for UN forces and maintain contact with enemy. Your recommendation desired.

You said that that might be capable of two interpretations. One to refer to the whole message and the request for his recommendation might relate solely to the last question.

Now I call your attention to the fact that General MacArthur did respond to that message, Mr. Secretary, and confined himself strictly to the freedom of action which he then had for the protection of his own troops, so he put the interpretation on it that it referred only to the last questison, did he not?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I think that is correct.

Senator GEORGE. That is in the record, yes, sir. Now, Mr. Secretary, I also asked you, innocently perhaps, whether or not the message that was under preparation and to which this message referred, that is "State planning Presidential announcement shortly," and so forth, if that original message had ever been submitted to General MacArthur, and I think your answer was it had not.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; that is what my answer was.

Senator GEORGE. General MacArthur was actually the supreme commander in that area, was he not?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

VOTES ON SENATE FLOOR

Mr. Chairman, may I ask do you expect to quit around 1 o'clock, at least for an hour or two?

Chairman RUSSELL. Oh yes, and so far as I can see now, Senator, it will probably be necessary for us to dispense with an afternoon session. I was not as expectant as you and some other Senators expressed themselves that there would be a great many votes.

I thought Senator Douglas would probably make some lengthy explanation of his first amendment, but to afford all the members of the committee an opportunity to be on the floor, I do not expect to run much past 1.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, if I may observe, I just have a report from Jimmie and he is expecting no vote before 1 o'clock. That is his expectation now.

Chairman RUSSELL. It will certainly be not in accord with the usual operations of the Senate to have a direct vote before 1 o'clock.

Senator STENNIS. I mean he expects no amendments to actually be taken up before 1 o'clock.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis?

MARSHALL VISIT TO TOKYO

Secretary **Stennis**. Mr. Secretary, of course I know you are familiar with all the rumors about the presence of General Marshall in Tokyo may mean something is on foot. It is said there is a team from the State Department and from the Defense Department in Hong Kong, I believe.

I merely mention that without asking any particular questions about it to give you an opportunity to make any comment you want to about the prospects or rumors of peace or ramifications leading in that direction.

Secretary **Acheson**. No, sir.

Senator **Stennis**. I would not ask you to comment.

Secretary **Acheson**. I have nothing further to add to what I have said.

Senator **Stennis**. Well, I did not have the advantage of being here when you discussed that.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Smith?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Green?

Senator **Green**. No more questions.

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Hickenlooper?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. Senator McMahon?

QUOTATIONS FROM STIMSON ON MILITARY ESTIMATES OF WAR IN PACIFIC, 1945

Senator **McMahon**. Mr. Secretary, I think I will be rather brief. Are you familiar with the book, On Active Service in Peace and War, by Henry L. Stimson and George Bundy?

Secretary **Acheson**. Yes, sir; I have read that book.

Senator **McMahon**. Of course Mr. Stimson was one of the great Americans of this century. I think we can agree on that.

Secretary **Acheson**. I should agree very enthusiastically.

Senator **McMahon**. I was interested in what he said in the book concerning the state of mind of the military of this country in the summer of 1945. The state of mind as indicated here was no different than that which existed in the mind of the ranking member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Wiley, or I might add the Senator from Connecticut who at that time was a junior Senator in the Senate.

And I might add as far as I have been able to search the Congressional Record quickly and have it searched, in the summer of 1945 there was no opinion expressed; at least in the Congress, contrary to the spirit of what I will now quote from Secretary Stimson's book:

> Japan, in July 1945, had been seriously weakened by our increasingly violent attacks. It was known to us that she had gone so far as to make tentative proposals to the Soviet Government, hoping to use the Russians as mediators in a negotiated peace. These vague proposals contemplated the retention by Japan of important conquered areas and were therefore not considered seriously. There was as yet no indication of any weakening in the Japanese determination to

> fight rather than accept unconditional surrender. If she should persist in her fight to the end, she had still a great military force.
>
> In the middle of July 1945, the intelligence section of the War Department General Staff estimated Japanese military strength as follows: in the home islands, slightly under 2,000,000; in Korea, Manchuria, China proper, and Formosa, slightly over 2,000,000; in French Indo-China, Thailand and Burma over 200,000; in the East Indies area, including the Philippines, over 500,000; in the by-passed Pacific Islands, over 100,000. The total strength of the Japanese Army was estimated at about 5,000,000 men. These estimates later proved to be in very close agreement with official Japanese figures.
>
> The Japanese Army was in much better condition than the Japanese Navy and Air Force. The Navy had practically ceased to exist except as a harrying force against an invasion fleet. The Air Force had been reduced mainly to reliance upon Kamikaze, or suicide, attacks. These latter, however, had already inflicted serious damage on our seagoing forces, and their possible effectiveness in a last ditch fight was a matter of real concern to our naval leaders.
>
> As we understood it in July, there was a very strong possibility that the Japanese Government might determine upon resistance to the end, in all the areas of the Far East under its control. In such an event the Allies would be faced with the enormous task of destroying an armed force of five million men and five thousand suicide aircraft, belonging to a race which had already amply demonstrated its ability to fight literally to the death.

I might interject at this point that, of course, it referred to the actions on Iwo Jima, Okinawa, Tarawa, Saipan, and Japan undoubtedly. Going on:

> The strategic plans of our Armed Forces for the defeat of Japan, as they stood in July, had been prepared without reliance upon the atomic bomb, which had not yet been tested in New Mexico. We were planning an intensified sea and air blockade, and greatly intensified strategic air bombing, through the summer and early fall, to be followed on November 1 by an invasion of the southern island of Kyushu. This would be followed in turn by an invasion of the main island of Honshu in the spring of 1946. The total United States military and naval force involved in this grand design was of the order of 5,000,000 men; if all those indirectly concerned are included, it was larger still.
>
> We estimated that if we should be forced to carry this plan to its conclusion, the major fighting would not end until the latter part of 1946, at the earliest. I was informed that such operations might be expected to cost over a million casualties, to American forces alone. Additional large losses might be expected among our allies and, of course, if our campaign were successful and if we could judge by previous experience, enemy casualties would be much larger than our own.

Well, Mr. Secretary, I have taken the time to read this into the record because I think it concisely states what the military opinion was in this government, at least in Secretary Stimson's report and I think it completely refutes this carefully woven charge that our Government deliberately did not estimate the true situation in order that certain advantages might be given at Yalta.

It is not a charge that I think appeals to sensible men. But I have found it my sad experience both in the Senate and outside of it that on a complete lack of evidence specious theories will be woven and reiterated, and if not denied on the floor of the Senate, will eventually come to be accepted as fact.

Mr. Secretary, yesterday we discussed the question——

Senator WILEY. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Senator McMAHON. I yield.

Senator WILEY. I think that last statement that you made should be watered down a little bit because I understand the position of a lot of folks to be like this: That assuming the facts to be as Stimson said—and I do not think there is much dispute about that—the question is, did we play ball with our ally, when virtually without his saying so or agreeing, we made the deal at Yalta that we did make. Isn't that the thing? Isn't that the issue?

Senator McMahon. Well, Senator, I will be glad to debate it with you at some other time, but I have just one more matter that I wish to take up with the Secretary.

I tried to emphasize yesterday—and I think it is entirely clear—that there has been shown no relationship between the concessions so called by a couple of ports and a couple of interests in railroads in Manchuria with the downfall of Chiang Kai-shek. I will be interested, very much interested, in any competent military man who will proceed to relate the so-called political concessions made at Yalta with the downfall of Chiang Kai-shek, and will proceed to show that his debacle was caused by what was given at Yalta rather than the crooked, corrupt, incompetent government that he headed.

Now, Mr. Secretary, that leads me rather naturally into the next subject.

SOYBEAN SPECULATIONS IN 1950

Are you informed as to a corner that's supposed to have existed in the soybean market a year ago last June in the hands of certain Chinese in this country? Have you ever discussed that matter with the Secretary of Agriculture?

Secretary Acheson. Yes; I have discussed it with him.

Senator McMahon. Is there anything that you can say at this time concerning the personalities who were engaged in that operation and what action was taken by this Government to break up that operation?

Secretary Acheson. I don't know that I ever knew who the personalities involved were. There was, as I recall it, a very serious situation created by a group of Chinese buying and taking delivery of a certain amount of soybeans, which gave certain controls over the prices. That was a matter of concern to the Department of Agriculture, was discussed by Secretary Brannan with me, and he took certain remedial steps.

Now I can look into it again with him and refresh my memory about it, but that is all I recall on the thing now.

Senator McMahon. You do not know the personalities that were engaged in this attempt to corner the soybean market?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir; I don't.

Senator McMahon. But they were Chinese?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir; they were Chinese, as I recall it.

Senator McMahon. Was there, as you understood, any violation of the Commodity Exchange law involved?

Secretary Acheson. I don't recall that there was.

Senator McMahon. You do not know the source of the funds that were used in this speculation in soybeans?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir; I do not.

Senator McMahon. You do not know the relationship at this time between the so-called China Lobby crowd and this operation?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir.

INVESTIGATION OF CHINA LOBBY URGED

Senator McMahon. Mr. Secretary, I hope that you will not think it improper if I were to suggest to you—and I make the suggestion in all seriousness and with respect for your office—that you consult with the President of the United States and perhaps with your brother Cabinet officers for the purpose of finding out what is going on in this country with regard to this crowd.

I think it is of the utmost importance, and I suggest to you, sir, that it is your duty as Secretary of State, on the basis of the operations which have been carried out in this country, to see about these possible violations of criminal statutes.

The gold deal that I described to you yesterday is a particularly scandalous thing. The American people are being asked to bear heavy taxes in part for economic aid for our allies. It is most important that they be reassured that the money disbursed is being used for the purpose for which it is appropriated.

And the repetition of this kind of business that went on in that gold speculation is a very, very serious thing. I do not say there is any repetition of that particular kind of transaction, but this crowd is getting notorious. It is the subject of talk in every newspaper establishment that I know of.

The St. Louis Post Dispatch ran a series of articles upon the subject of this China lobby.

So I do not ask for any answer, but I merely suggest to your consideration that you give thought to pursuing this matter in the executive department, and I shall give thought to pursuing it in the Congress of the United States.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Acheson. I shall consider your suggestion most respectfully, sir.

Chairman Russell. Senator——

Senator Wiley. May I ask the Senator a question?

Chairman Russell. Does the Senator yield?

Senator McMahon. Do I have time?

Chairman Russell. Yes; you have about 3 minutes.

Senator Wiley. I am interested, I might say, in some of the generalities that you have mentioned and Senator Morse mentioned. However, I have a very good remembrance of lobbies before the First World War. One of our subsequent allies spent a great deal of money on newspapers and everything else.

I remember also the lobbies before the Second World War.

Nations and peoples that have vital interest naturally are very interested in seeking to get us into war to help them.

That has been our history, I think, ever since we became a first-rate Nation. But what I am interested in is there have been insinuations or interlineations in what you have said to the effect—I notice the Secretary yesterday was very guarded—that there was an illegal lobby.

I am interested in knowing whether there is anything crooked or illegal or nefarious going on that would reflect upon the integrity of public officials.

Senator McMahon. Or, might I add, the integrity of people who are supposed to be in this town for correct purposes and are doing things that are not correct.

Senator WILEY. I agree with that. As I say, I do have a very distinct recollection of the great battle in the field of public opinion in both the First and Second World Wars. We were totally unaware of the fact that great international interests were involved and great stakes were involved. How much they contributed toward the final result of getting us into either or both of the World Wars, is, I suppose, something that will be guessed about through the corridors of time.

I did want it definitely understood that I am in favor of anything that will bring to light that fact, if there is corruption; but I do not like the insinuation that perhaps here are people who are doing again what they might legally be entitled to do if they are registered, and what they have been doing through the years, trying to influence America into being on one side or the other.

Senator MORSE. Will the Senator yield?

Senator WILEY. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator from Connecticut has the time.

Senator MORSE. Will the Senator from Connecticut yield?

Senator MCMAHON. I underderstand there are 2 minutes. I will yield to the Senator from Oregon.

Senator MORSE. Would the Senator agree that even if it were found that the members of the so-called China lobby had good enough lawyers to keep them within the legal technicalities, but they nevertheless were attempting to produce a result upon American opinion which would favor giving supoprt to a regime that seeks to get us involved in all-out war in Asia, that the American people are entitled to know the activities of such individuals?

Senator WILEY. Of course they are, and they are also entitled to know the effectiveness of the Communist spending of their gold all over this earth, and what they are doing.

Senator MCMAHON. I cannot yield further because I have a brief, just a very brief, comment to make.

Chairman RUSSELL. It will have to be brief.

Senator MCMAHON. It will be brief, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I would like to be advised of any activities by agents for the Chinese Nationalist Government which violate our laws, either as to the law on registration of foreign agents or other statute in the United States; and if such evidence exists of such violations I would like to be advised by presentation before this committee why they have not been prosecuted.

Senator MORSE. I would like to join in that request.

Senator BREWSTER. I would like to say that I am very much appreciate the Senator from Connecticut making this observation; it seems to me very wise.

Secretary ACHESON. I shall go through the material that I have in my field whenever I have a chance to do so.

Of course, you understand that I have no authority over the registration of agents.

Senator MCMAHON. No, Mr. Secretary; but as the first Secretary in the Cabinet, I think you will agree that you can express to the President what has been considered here now. I notice Senator Brewster has joined Senator Morse and myself, so it shows that it is more than in the interest of one Senator that we would appreciate being advised by the executive department not only as to what they have, but we would like them to get busy and give us the full information upon this subject. We regard it—at least, I think I can speak now for Senator Morse—we regard it at extremely important.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask on the basis of personal privilege——

Secretary ACHESON. I will advise you as soon as I am able to.

Senator MORSE. I ask on the basis of personal privilege——

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chair is advised he was in error about Senator McMahon's time. He has some 4 or 5 minutes remaining. Dr. Wilcox tells me I put him down 5 minutes ahead of the time he started.

Senator MORSE. Will the Senator yield a quarter of a minute?

Senator MCMAHON. I yield.

LOBBYING ACTIVITIES QUESTIONED

Senator MORSE. I know my good friend from Wisconsin does not want to leave dangling in the record a sentence that he didn't complete, but which some might infer sought to leave an implication that there was any member of this committee that doesn't want a thoroughgoing investigation and examination at all times of any Communist activities in the United States, because I want to assure the Senator from Wisconsin that the junior Senator from Oregon will join with him and anybody else at all times in insisting that our Government exercise every vigilance in seeing to it that we continue a thorough investigation of any Communist activities in this country, as I am sure he would join me in insistance that we maintain a constant vigilance against Fascist activities in this country and against the activities of any group such as is alleged in regard to the China lobby, that may be trying to get us into an all-out war in Asia in order to pull out of the international fires the chestnuts of Chiang.

Senator WILEY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator MCMAHON. I yield.

Senator WILEY. I am grateful to the Senator from Oregon for that statement, because it expresses completely my own understanding. As far as I am concerned, I wish we could eradicate all foreign influence of every kind and sort, but we have to acknowledge that because of our economic standing, political standing, and every other angle of what you might call leadership in the world, we are going to be made constantly the target of those people who want us on their side.

If there is such a thing as a China lobby, I know nothing about it, except as I have read in magazines on the situation as stated by both of the distinguished Senators. I do know, and it is a story of our own naïveté in relation to communism, what the Communists have done in our departments in Government and how they have infiltrated everywhere and how much money they can spend. I do know that in Europe they have all the gold they need to buy agents and influence governments. Take France—the situation today is very serious, as we know, because of Communist gold.

It has been alleged that some of our gold did some talking in China—I am telling you the Communist gold is talking all over this earth. I don't want us to be diverted from the purpose of this inquiry, which I said in the beginning was twofold.

Senator STENNIS. A point of order, Mr. Chairman.

POINT OF ORDER ON YIELDING

Chairman Russell. The Senator may state his point of order.

Senator Stennis. A Senator cannot yield to another for the purpose of questioning the witness, and he cannot yield to another Senator for the purpose of that Senator making a speech.

Senator Wiley. I don't know of any rule in this commitee that will authorize such a determination.

Chairman Russell. The Chair has——

Senator Wiley. If he has the time to yield——

Senator Stennis. The committee passed on that matter of yielding to another Senator.

Chairman Russell. We did as to the yielding of time. The Senator from Mississippi is correct on that question. No Senator can yield his time to another Senator for the purpose of questioning, but the Chair has recognized the ordinary functions of the committee.

Members will discuss issues. They will lead the witness, interrogate each other—sometimes with great vigor and almost with fire; smoke anyhow; and the Chair has, therefore, allowed a certain latitude in the Senators' discussing matters so long as it is charged up to some Senator's time.

In this case it was charged up to Senator McMahon. The Senator from Mississippi is correct as to questions, but we have here indulged in considerable discussion across the table; therefore the Chair doesn't think the discussion was out of order.

However, the time of the Senator from Connecticut has expired.

Senator Wiley. I guess that point of order was correctly sustained, then.

Chairman Russell. The Chair did not sustain it.

PURPOSES OF INQUIRY

Senator Wiley. You sure talked me out of my answer.

Chairman Russell. I thought you had about concluded, at the time.

I didn't mean to interrupt the Senator.

Senator Wiley. I was interrupted in about the middle of it.

Chairman Russell. The Chair is perfectly willing to ask for unanimous consent that the Senator from Wisconsin may complete his statement. The Chair hears no objection.

Senator Wiley. I will have to ask that you read back the end of the sentence, just a few words.

(The record was read by the reporter, as follows:)

> It has been alleged that some of our gold did some talking in China—I am telling you the Communist gold is talking all over this earth. I don't want us to be diverted from the purpose of this inquiry, which I said in the beginning was twofold.

Senator Wiley. That is what I said; in the beginning it was twofold, and I didn't want to reiterate.

Chairman Russell. I thought the Senator had come to a good place——

Senator Wiley. Twofold.

First, I said I thought the real purpose of the inquiry was to determine whether or not, before the bar of public opinion, the facts could be produced that would justify the acts of the President.

And, secondly, I thought, ancillary to that, there was a question as to the justification of our foreign policy and the inquiry into the past and present and the contemplated future of the policy.

Now, I thank you.

POINT OF ORDER EXPLAINED

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask unanimous consent of the committee to give a reason for my point of order, and the reason I think the Chair is erroneous in its ruling?

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chair will be happy to submit that question.

Is there objection to the Senator from Mississippi having 1 minute?

The Chair hears none.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I have no objection to what my good friend from Wisconsin might say, or any other Senator; but I think it is part of our plan to bring this to a reasonable conclusion, and we ought to go back to the original rule enacted by the committee, that no one could yield to another Senator for the purpose of asking questions, and that would certainly include the idea of yielding to someone to make a speech.

Another point is—Senators come here for the purpose of hearing information that may be elicited from the witness, and if we relax that rule too much, then the most of us will be sitting here hour after hour listening to speeches.

Chairman RUSSELL. There is much pertinence in the position of the gentleman from Mississippi.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, a procedural question.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator from Maine.

Senator BREWSTER. The Senator spoke about the afternoon and I have just seen Senator Douglas, who advises me that his speeches are going to be limited to 5 minutes, so that it is going to be generally understood that there will be rather frequent votes.

Chairman RUSSELL. I appreciate having that information.

In the light of that information, when we do finally recess here, we will recess until tomorrow morning.

Senator FLANDERS?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Long.

Senator LONG. Just one or two questions, Mr. Secretary.

I notice that——

(There was discussion off the record.)

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chair requests the members to be as quiet as possible. The reporter cannot hear the question.

Please keep your voices as low as possible.

STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENT RHEE ON KOREAN ATTITUDE TOWARD CONFLICT

Senator LONG. I noticed recently that President Syngman Rhee, of the Republic of Korea, stated that he would not accept, as far as his Government was concerned, any settlement of the Korean question other than complete unification of Korea.

Do you have any comment to make on that?

Secretary ACHESON. I have seen such statements in the press, and I have not been able to get any official confirmation that that was his view.

Senator Long. Is the President of the Republic of Korea in position to bind this country on what activities it will take in Korea?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir.

Senator Long. If that is a fair statement of the attitude of the Korean Government, what possibility is there of working out any other settlement other than that satisfactory to the Republic of Korea?

Secretary Acheson. Senator Long, I think it will just make trouble between those of us who are fighting a very difficult fight in Korea, to have theoretical questions brought up and say what one Government would do if another Government took another view.

I say, I have inquired into this and I have no reason to believe that this is the official view of Mr. Rhee; and if I say things which would be difficult for him, it is not going to help this battle against the Communist aggression in Korea.

Senator Long. Now, a short time ago President Rhee also made a statement to the effect, as I understand it, that if we brought in any Japanese soldiers to help us out with the Korean fighting, that his Government would quit, or some such thing.

I don't know just what that was.

Do you recall the effect of that statement?

Secretary Acheson. I heard, also through the press, some such statement, but I think that is quite theoretical because we haven't done it and do not intend to do it.

Senator Long. It would seem a little bit unreasonable for the President of Korea to (1) attempt to tell us who we could get to help on this and (2) what conditions he will permit himself to be saved under.

Secretary Acheson. I would not want to comment on President Rhee.

SCOPE OF UNITED STATES COMMITMENTS

Senator Long. It occurred to me, at one time, that, in deciding what commitments we would make to help defend other nations, that we would have to consider, one, the forces available, which apparently has been considered, and the action we have taken up to now, and even the extent to which we are going in Korea.

Secondly, it would seem to me that it might be well to try to determine where we can defend a practicable line; and it would seem that where your Navy can get in between your enemy and the objective he is trying to reach, such as you have on Formosa, you do not have too difficult a problem; but where you are trying to defend something like the thirty-eighth parallel, you find it very difficult.

Do you have any comment to make on that, or have you given any thought to that subject?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir. We have given a great deal of thought to it, and what you say is correct.

It is much easier for a power which has a great Navy and Air Force, such as the United States, and those associated with it, to defend island positions.

Senator Long. We would have some difficulty in committing ourselves to effectively defend various other places where there is no opportunity to effectively use sea power, however, such as in Iran and India, and places of that sort?

Secretary Acheson. Well, it is more difficult; yes, sir.

Senator LONG. Do you agree with the MacArthur view that we should attempt to put down aggression wherever it breaks, or resist it wherever it occurs?

Senator ACHESON. We have opposed it, and we do everything we can to assist those who are resisting aggression.

Senator LONG. Of course whether or not we will actually use our Armed Forces, as we have done in Korea, that has to be determined, based upon the circumstances?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

Senator LONG. No further questions. Thank you very much.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Lodge.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Fulbright.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Tobey.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Sparkman.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I do have some questions to ask, but may I, before I start, find out what the plan of the chairman is with reference to adjourning? I don't mind running to such time as the chairman wants to go and resuming tomorrow.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, the general policy of the Chair has been to call a Senator for questioning up until the hour of 1 o'clock and to recess after the Senator who was questioning at the hour of 1 concluded his questions. Just a matter of 5 minutes is involved. The Chair has tried to be consistent in his position of exercising every possible recourse available to him to press these hearings, as long as possible.

Senator SPARKMAN. I have no choice.

Chairman RUSSELL. But the Chair is perfectly willing to recess at this time.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I don't even ask for that. In fact, I would rather go on questioning. I will accord with the Chair's wishes. But if we do quit before I finish, I should like to be able to resume on our next meeting.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I hesitate very much to suggest this. I realized that I probably would follow Senator Cain a moment ago, and I carefully timed myself because I have to be in Iowa tomorrow, and I was attempting to correct a few remarks I was going to make. I came back about 22 minutes after he started. I found that he did not use all of his time and I had been passed by.

Now I am going to have to leave this afternoon. As far as I am concerned I have about three items, as much for the record as anything else. I would have about 15 minutes, and I would be willing to limit myself to 15 minutes in order to get that cleaned up. But I cannot be here tomorrow. I merely suggest that.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I propound a unanimous-consent request?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir. It is within the power of any member of this committee any time he is recognized.

Senator SPARKMAN. I ask unanimous consent, since Senator Hickenlooper wants to leave and would miss out tomorrow, that he be permitted to proceed at this time without prejudice to my rights when we meet in the morning.

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, you have heard the unanimous-consent request. Is there objection? The Chair hears none.

The Chair recognizes Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator SPARKMAN. Before you start, may I be certain of this: I will be the first called on tomorrow morning?

Chairman RUSSELL. I assume so. The Senator stated "without prejudice to his rights."

Senator SPARKMAN. That was in my request and I wanted to be certain it is understood.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is the understanding of the Chair that he will call the Senator from Alabama tomorrow morning.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, sir.

Senator CAIN. A parliamentary inquiry, sir?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Senator CAIN. When the Senator from Alabama has completed his questioning in the first period tomorrow, does the Chair then recognize—what Senator, may I ask, does he recognize on this side?

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, the irregular attendance has gotten the order of procedure a little bit askew, but I think it would revert to the Chair after the Senator from Alabama, going from table to table.

Senator CAIN. I appreciate the information. I shall be guided accordingly.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I take it the colloquy since the chairman said he recognized me did not come off my time because I want to get finished in 15 minutes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, if the Senator wishes to look a gift horse in the mouth, I have given him credit for full time. I will give him credit for 30 minutes.

Chairman CONNALLY. He only asked for 15.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I said I thought I could finish in 15 minutes.

I deeply appreciate the courtesy of the Senator from Alabama and the chairman and the committee.

CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING YALTA CONFERENCE

Mr. Secretary, in Admiral Leahy's book I Was There, on page 337, with reference to the Yalta agreement, in which certain rights were given to Russia on which China was not informed, I call your attention to the statement that—

> Despite the secrecy, the Chinese apparently heard rumors of the actions at Yalta affecting their country. Two days after we returned, General Shang Chen, head of the Chinese Military Mission in Washington, asked me for information regarding the Crimean Conference. I could not, of course, give him any information that had not already been published, and wondered why Chen came to me. Later Dr. Wellington Koo, a personal friend of mine and Chinese Ambassador to Great Britain, told me he had heard it rumored that Russia expected to obtain a lease on the ports of Port Arthur and Dairen. Koo said China would view with alarm occupation of these two ports by the Soviets. As in the case of General Chen, I could not tell him that the rumor was well founded, because

the President, to my knowledge, had not concluded his negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek.

I read that to counter the impressions that Chiang Kai-shek was happy with the arrangements for the giving of the port of Dairen or influence over it to the Russians, as well as to Port Arthur.

Then with reference to the question of the end of the war in Japan, I would like to refer to the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary of Report on the Pacific War, issued July 1, 1946, an official document printed by the Government Printing Office, a conclusion with respect to the war situation, under the heading "Japan's struggle to end the war."

While this article does not say that we had intimate knowledge of all these details, it does recite the facts as they existed in Japan beginning in 1944. It alleges in this official document that the Japanese knew they were licked, and they were beginning to arrange their Government and to send out feelers for the terms of peace.

Secretary ACHESON. This is a survey made after the war as I understand it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. This was made after the war; yes, indeed; showing what the facts apparently actually were in Japan.

They conclude in the section beginning on page 25, the last paragraph at the bottom of page 26, and I quote:

> Based upon a detailed investigation of all facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the survey's opinion that certainly prior to December 31, 1946, and in all probability prior to November 1, 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bomb had not been dropped, even if Russia had not enered he war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.

Now, in some ways that may be hindsight, second-guessing. But from the report in this article, it seems that these peace feelers and the efforts and the rearrangements of their Government all lead to the inevitable conclusion that Japan had become convinced that it couldn't win the war.

Are you aware of whether or not the Emperor of Japan asked Mr. Malik in about, well, I would say along about the first part of February 1945, to communicate with Stalin in the interests of acting as mediator to discuss peace terms with the Allies.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I think we have had already a reference in Mr. Stimson's book to the fact that there was a maneuver by the Japanese to bring the Russians in as mediators, which was regarded as a mere move on their part to end the war in possession of all the gains which they illegally acquired beforehand and wasn't regarded as any serious effort at peace, but a mere maneuver.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The information that I have had—which I do not know to be accurate, and I do not claim that it is accurate in the absence of more positive proof than I have at the moment—is that the knowledge of the Emperor's effort to get Mr. Malik, who was then in Japan, to induce Stalin to act as intermediary in early February—was available from communications of one kind or another.

As I say, I do not allege it was true. I would base it on what information I have, and I would not consider it conclusive proof. Do you know anything about that situation?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AID TO GREECE AND TURKEY AND CHINA

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Secretary, in hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which I have before me, on H. R. 2616, a bill to provide for assistance to Greece and Turkey, beginning March 20, 1947, on page 17, I find there was a discussion of the distinction, if any, between the situation in Greece, which justified our aid to Greece, and the situation in China at that time. You were making a statement.

This is from page 17 of the published reports, near the top of the page.

> General Marshall, in his statement of January 6, was urging upon the Chinese Government that it should take necessary steps to make itself more representative and more efficient. That was not directed toward including Communists in the Government, but making the Government more effective in carrying out the purposes of the Government.

And this is the important paragraph—continuing to quote from your statement—

> That is what we are doing in China. The Chinese Government is not in the position at the present time that the Greek government is in. It is not approaching collapse; it is not threatened by defeat by the Communists. The war with the Communists is going on much as it has for the last 20 years.

Now, so far as the "last 20 years" statement is concerned, I have examined your testimony further and you did correct it later in the testimony, showing that the Communist struggle began at about 1935 rather than 20 years before; so it would not be fair to let the 20-year statement stand here, because you did correct it at a later date.

Now, my question is this, Mr. Secretary: It seems that the argument you were putting up at that time was that it was necessary for us to move into Greece and give them very substantial advice and aid because the Communists were about to take over Greece or threatening to take over Greece; but that it was not essential at that time for us to make any extraordinary efforts toward helping the Nationalist Chinese Government because it was not threatened, and I quote:

> It is not threatened by defeat by the Communists. It is not approaching collapse.

Thereafter, the Government, the Nationalist Government of China, increasingly approached collapse to the point where it was forced to go to Formosa.

Why did we not take a more affirmative position toward increased aid to Chiang-Kai-shek's Nationalist Government when the imminence of its loss of the mainland of China became apparent?

Secretary Acheson. Senator, I think, first of all, we ought to be a little bit clear about this testimony here that you are talking about; that is, the testimony under H. R. 2616 which was given on March 20, 1947; and that is the date of that testimony.

Senator Hickenlooper. Yes; I gave the date in there.

Secretary Acheson. I just wanted to be clear we had it in the record.

Senator Hickenlooper. That was beginning in March 1947.

Secretary Acheson. That was the day on which this particular testimony that you are referring to was given.

Now, I was being examined by Mr. Judd, and there are two ideas which run through all of this testimony going along for several pages here.

One is that in Greece we had a military mission which was right with the troops giving the troops strategic information and guidance, and that sort of thing. Why shouldn't we do that sort of thing, and give that sort of guidance in China?

The other point was in China, General Marshall had been trying to bring about a settlement between the Communists and the Nationalists in accordance with the agreements that had been worked out before, as I have stated in my testimony, and Mr. Judd was saying why do we do that in China, when in Greece we are fighting the Communists and are not trying to bring them into the Government.

I was pointing out the reasons in both cases for the difference. This particular question comes up under one of Mr. Judd's questions which he asked me, which was, "If it is wise policy for us to urge, for example, the Government of China to unite with organized Communist minorities there, why is it a wise policy to assist the Greek Government to fight against the same sort of armed Communist minorities in Greece?"

I was pointing out through here that what General Marshall had been trying to do was to organize a government in China through negotiations between these parties; whereas in Greece you had a government where the Communists had a perfectly legal position and could vote. However, there were some of them who were carrying on an armed rebllion against the Government, and you could not negotiate that out. You had to fight it out.

Then, I stated here, as you quoted, that the Chinese Government is not in the position at the present time that the Greek Government is in. It is not approaching collapse.

This was March 20, 1947, and the collapse occurred over 2 years later. The Greek Government was in a position where, without very strenuous military assistance, it would have totally collapsed. I said:

> It is not threatened by defeat by the Communists.

The defeat by the Communists did not occur until 18 months later.

> The war with the Communists is going on much as it has for the past 20 years.

There had been this period of negotiation and period of military operations between the Communists and the Government for some time and what I was trying to point out was exactly what the situation was, and I think I did point it out.

Now I have been over our military assistance and economic assistance to China, and I think I have described exactly and as fully as I possibly can why the courses were adopted which were taken.

Senator HICKENDOOPER. Mr. Secretary, I am trying to keep within my 15 minutes, and I can do it. I have got about 2 minutes more, I think.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is right.

RED CHINESE POSSESSION OF AMERICAN MILITARY EQUIPMENT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I want to ask you this question. If you have no information on it, I would like to ask if you would please attempt to secure the records on this matter.

It is my information that in 1948, August of 1948—we have heard a lot about the surrender of military equipment and supplies by Chinese forces to the Reds.

The information I have may or may not be correct—I do not allege that it is correct, but it comes from sources which should be informed. Anyway it is to the effect that General Barr in his mission to China went over there in connection with the allocation of supplies, American military supplies and equipment, that a meeting was held with certain North Chinese generals.

There were two North Chinese armies allegedly loyal to Chiang Kai-shek. The question of the supplies out of this $125,000,000 aid program was brought up at that meeting. Chiang Kai-shek was not there. His armies were in the south, and his people were in the south.

The original plan was to give this aid to the Nationalist Government armies in the south to enable them to consolidate and to equip. But that at that meeting General Barr of the American forces decided to give the priorities on this equipment to these two Chinese armies operating on the north. That was against the desires of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist armies in the south.

They objected to it strenuously but the American view of the American authorities, including General Barr, prevailed. Priorities were given. The equipment was given to these two north Chinese generals. One of them was General Fu Tso-yi, and the other was General Wang Yao-wu, as I say, over the objection of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist armies.

Within approximately 6 weeks after this material had been given to these two northern generals over the protest of Chiang Kai-shek, these two generals with their armies went over to the Communists in the north without ever firing a shot. So the allocation of that equipment which did go over to the Chinese and which I am informed was the great bulk of all of the military equipment that the Red Chinese captured, was turned over to these disloyal generals in the north at the insistence of this mission of ours which gave priorities to those two northern armies.

I suggest that now. If you have information on that, I would be glad to have it. If not, I would like to have if we can get a hold of it the reports on this particular phase of General Barr's mission in China which had to do with the priorities and the allocation of this matériel and equipment to these two north Chinese generals and their armies together with any record or any report which may be extant and available—if it is extant, I take it, it is available—with regard to the noted objection, to any noted objection of General Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist armies to the priorities given to these two north armies, north Chinese armies, of this material.

Secretary Acheson. Very well. I have no information on it.

Senator Hickenlooper. I anticipated that you might not be fully familiar with that at the moment, but I want to get that in the record. I think I did go over 2 minutes.

Chairman Russell. Yes, you overran your 15 minutes.

Senator Hickenlooper. It is just 2 minutes, have the record show.

Chairman Russell. We won't quibble about 2 minutes.

Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you.

CORRECTION OF RECORD AND PROCEDURAL MATTERS

Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, before the committee stands in recess, may I refer to a slight omission in yesterday's record?

Without finding the exact place, it can easily be ascertained, I read into the record a part of an insertion in the Congressional Record by a Member of the House of Representatives whom I identified, but the name was omitted from the transcript.

I had reference, and I stated at the time, to Congresswoman Claire Boothe Luce. I suppose the only way it can be corrected would be for the printed record to include that and for this to be shown here.

Chairman RUSSELL. Without objection, the Senator from Alabama will be permitted to correct the permanent record.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, a procedural question. Do we have a subcommittee that has been appointed to consider what recommendations should be made to the full committees as to other witnesses to be called?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse, I have not yet appointed that subcommittee. I have deliberately delayed appointing it because new witnesses are mentioned from day to day.

If the committees met today and considered the names of those who had been proposed and eliminated some, we could call others and then the names of other persons were suggested, it would mean that they would have to go back over all of the list of those who had not been called and consider them again.

I thought it might be wise to wait until we were in the evidence of either Mr. Johnson or Mr. Harriman to appoint that committee; so that we would have all the possible witnesses suggested.

Senator MORSE. I share in the observation just made by the chairman, but I asked my question only to guide myself in the procedure that I shall follow, because I shall submit to the chairman this afternoon, in the absence of such a committee on witnesses, a letter recommending that General Barr be called before these committees.

I think the testimony of the last few days has indicated that he is a very important witness for these committees to cross-examine.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chair has a faint recollection that someone has already suggested General Barr, but to make assurance doubly sure, I suggest that the Senator from Oregon drop me a note, and it will go in the files with all the other suggestions and will be considered by the committee.

The committees are preparing to recess now until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. If the Senator from Alabama is present at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning, he will be the first Senator recognized for questioning. Otherwise, some other Senator will be called upon.

The committees now stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 1:20 p. m., the committees recessed to reconvene at 10:03 a. m., Saturday, June 9, 1951.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

SATURDAY, JUNE 9, 1951

Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:03 a. m. in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), George, Green, Sparkman, Gillette, Bridges, Saltonstall, Johnson (Texas), Kefauver, Morse, Hunt, Cain, Stennis, and Long.

Also present: William H. Darden, clerk, Committee on Armed Services; Verne D. Mudge, of the committee staff of the Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff, and Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman Russell. The committees will come to order.

Under the order adopted on yesterday, the Senator from Alabama, Mr. Sparkman, is recognized.

TESTIMONY OF HON. DEAN G. ACHESON, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY ADRIAN S. FISHER, LEGAL ADVISER—Resumed

Senator Sparkman. Mr. Secretary, it seems to me that in the several days that you have spent here the testimony has pretty well narrowed down the issues so far as the Government's foreign policy is concerned to the fact that the opposition has been in a relatively small area, from the standpoint of the globe, that is, China.

Furthermore, it seems to me it has developed that that opposition is of rather recent development. Do you think that is correct?

Secretary Acheson. I think that is correct, sir.

Senator Sparkman. Certainly it has developed following the failure of General Marshall's mission in China, if that is to be termed as a failure?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Sparkman. Or the failure to work out a peaceful satisfactory settlement in the Government of China.

Secretary Acheson. Yes, Senator Sparkman, I think that is right.

Senator Sparkman. Now one thing that has puzzled me, Mr. Secretary, has been the apparent forgetfulness of a lot of us in Congress and a lot of the people in the country as to the attitude that has been expressed from time to time by the American people and by the leaders in this country.

I don't know whether you know him personally or not, but there is a well-known and able Congressman from Ohio by the name of Mr. Bender, George Bender, Congressman at large from Ohio. Do you know him?

Secretary ACHESON. I believe I do know Mr. Bender.

CONGRESSMAN BENDER'S SPEECH ON CHINA, 1947

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Bender has served in Congress for many years. If I remember correctly he was the floor manager for Senator Taft in the Republican nominating convention at Philadelphia in 1948.

I want to call your attention, Mr. Secretary, to an excerpt from a speech that Congressman Bender made on the floor of the House on May 7, 1947. Now, that was subsequent to General Marshall's return from China, was it not?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. And, as a matter of fact, I would tell you that the bill that was under discussion at that time was the Greek-Turkish aid bill. There was considerable opposition to that, was there not?

Secretary ACHESON. I believe so.

Senator SPARKMAN. And I am going to read very briefly and see if this refreshes your recollection as to some of the arguments made against that program at that time. I am going to read from Congressman Bender's speech. I am reading from page 4694 of the Congressional Record of May 7, 1947, and I quote:

> Ever since President Truman made his fateful speech to the Congress, intense pressure has been placed upon our State Department by Chinese diplomats in this country demanding that the $500,000,000 Export-Import loan be released for use by the present Chinese Government. I charge here on the floor of the House that the Chinese Embassy has had the arrogance to invade our State Department and attempt to tell our State Department that the Truman doctrine has committed our Government and this Congress to all-out support of the present Fascist Chinese Government.

That Government at that time in China was the Chiang Kai-shek government, was it not?

Secretary ACHESON. It was, yes, sir; at that time.

EVIDENCES OF SENTIMENT TOWARD CHINA IN 1947

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, I also call your attention to an argument made on the floor of the House while that same Turkish-Greek aid proposal was being debated, an argument made by an able Republican Congressman from the State of Nebraska, Mr. Howard Buffett, and I want to read very briefly from his statement. I read from page 4722 of the Congressional Record, May 7, 1947, as follows:

> Sometime ago, it was announced that America was to help China solve its problems—and that in doing so we were going to drive communism from China.
>
> That scheme was a reasonable facsimile of what is now proopsed in Greece and Turkey. About $3,000,000,000 has been spent to date in China. Our official top man in military and political affairs, Gen. George Marshall, spent a year in China.
>
> Marshall came home in disgust and failure. What did he accomplish? The civil war goes on. Inflation is worse than ever in China. Human butchery has

taken place on a large scale in Formosa. Evil days unlimited seem to be the fate of the Chinese.

In the May 4 New York Times we have a report from an authority on Chinese affairs, Nathaniel Peffer, a professor of international relations at Columbia. Members would do well to read the whole article. I quote briefly from its most significant passage.

Peffer declares:

"Scant as is the hope for improvement, there is no chance of its growth so long as America continues to give even color of support of the existing government. In fact, it has already been diminished by such support as America has given in the form of maintenance of troops in the country, training of the Nationalist army, and the sale on easy terms of surplus property. That this support has been falsely exaggerated by the Communists is a consideration apart.

"The help already given has worked to entrench those now in power, those who make China's outlook hopeless. Whatever America's intention may have been in keeping troops in China—and about this, too, the Communists consciously lie in their propaganda—the effect has been to stiffen the elements in power and negate prospects of reform.

"Those elements listen respectfully to America's exhortations to reform, to institute democracy, whether made by President Truman, General Marshall, or Ambassador Stuart, but they have no intention of giving heed to them. They do not believe they have to. Whatever they may say openly, they believe America has to support them anyway. They believe they are in a position to blackmail America. The reason is Russia.

"Privately men of that class tell a visiting American, if they know him well enough to be frank, that America is going to fight Russia. Therefore, America needs China, and it must and should stiffen up the National Government. It must support the Kuomintang government against the Chinese Communists, because the Communists are the vanguard of Russia.

"What they do not say to Americans but do say to each other is why, then, make any concessions to America in return for support, especially concessions by way of reforms that will cost them the perquisites and profits of monopolistic power?

"And except in words they make no concessions by way of reforms.

"Actually the Chinese Communists say much the same thing. They, too, think America in keeping troops in China has Russia in mind. They say that America wants a base from which to fight Russia and therefore it supports the Kuomintang regime. They hold that a deal has been made: Support for a corrupt, reactionary, and quasi Fascist regime in exchange for service against Russia.

"This must be emphasized and understood in America: Many Chinese not Communist, not even radical, are coming to believe the same thing. And so far as they believe it, they have also come to the conclusion that America has betrayed not only its own traditions but its traditional role in China, which has been to foster republicanism and democracy.

"Therefore—and this, too, should be understood in America—anti-Americanism is growing in China, not only among Communists and leftist students but among the liberal intellectuals and the scholar class who still make opinion. Much of it is incited by Communist propaganda—lying propaganda, no doubt—but not all.

"There is an increasing conviction among all classes that America, having become supreme, is going the way of all great powers, acquisitive in its ends and cynical in its means."

Mr. Buffett cited that with approval and he says here:

The Peffer article represents our position in China.

But you do not have to take his word for it. The logic of his appraisal of the situation is perfectly plain for anyone to see.

There was a good bit of opinion, was there not, both in Congress and out of Congress in this country in opposition to the Chiang Kai-shek government at that time and they were actually using it in argument against the Greek-Turkish program?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Sparkman. Now Mr. Secretary, I want to get back to another subject briefly, if I may, and that is the question that has been brought up several times in the course of this hearing, and is repeated over and over and over regardless of statements that you, the President or anybody else may make regardless of the record that has been created. That question is with reference to our efforts to keep China, Red China out of the United Nations.

VANDENBERG RESOLUTION PROVISION ON USE OF VETO

I think you have given a rather full explanation of that, but there has been considerable questioning of you with reference to the use of the veto. You have stated what the legal situation is, but I want to ask if you remember the action of the United States Senate on June 11, 1948, when it passed what is known as the Vandenberg resolution?

Secretary Acheson. I do remember that, Senator Sparkman.

Senator Sparkman. Do you happen to have a copy of the Vandenberg resolution there? I have got one here but I do not know just what page it is on. Oh, I have found it.

Mr. Secretary, I refer to the Vandenberg resolution which contained six different proposals relating to our relationship with the United Nations. I should like to read the whearas part of it, and then the one that particularly related to the veto:

> Whereas peace with justice and the defense of human rights and fundamental freedoms require international cooperation through more effective use of the United Nations: Therefore, be it
>
> *Resolved,* That the Senate reaffirm the policy of the United States to achieve international peace and security through the United Nations so that armed force shall not be used except in the common interest and that the President be advised of the sense of the Senate that the Government by constitutional process should particularly pursue the following objectives within the United Nations Charter.
>
> 1. Voluntary agreement to remove the veto from all questions involving specific settlements of international disputes and situations and from the admission of new members.

This is a correct statement, is it not, of the Vandenberg resolution as it was passed by the Senate?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir, that is as it appears in the copy which I have before me.

Senator Sparkman. That was the first provision in the Vandenberg resolution?

Secretary Acheson. That is numbered 1, yes, sir.

Senator Sparkman. And, Mr. Secretary, it is rather interesting that in the debate on the floor of the Senate that day, which consumed several hours, I think it is a safe statement to say that more than half the time was spent on this particular provision.

Senator Vandenberg, at that time, inserted into the record a list of all of the cases in which the veto had been used, up to that time; and he showed that if this provision had been in effect, not a single one of those vetoes could have been effectuated.

Mr. Secretary, I don't suppose you remember the vote on that, do you, in the Senate?

Secretary Acheson. The document which I have here is Senate Document No. 48, has a resolution on page 85, and at the bottom of page 84 says:

> On June 11, 1948, the Senate, by a vote of 64 to 4, adopted the so-called Vandenberg resolution, or Senate Resolution 239. This resolution had been unanimously approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 19.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, Mr. Secretary.

I have found that vote. It is recorded on page 7846 of the Congressional Record of June 11, 1948.

There were four votes against that resolution, four votes against the exclusion of the veto power for peaceful purposes.

I think it might be of interest to note that those four votes did not include a single member of this joint committee. The four were: Senator Langer, Senator Pepper, Senator Taylor, and Senator Watkins.

I believe that two other Senators were announced as being against it if they had been present. One of them, I think, was Senator Kem, and the other was Senator Malone.

I think they announced that they would have voted "Nay."

Sixty-four Senators voted in support of that, that the veto should not be used for peaceful settlement, including the admission of new states.

Mr. Chairman, I believe, it seems to me, it would be in order and I should like to have placed in the appendix, as I understand that is the only place you can make such an insertion——

Chairman RUSSELL. Without reading it, yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes. I should like to have placed in the appendix of the record this roll call, starting with the announcement by the Presiding Officer and going through the number of different absentees, as to how they would have voted and including the roll call to the end of it.

Chairman RUSSELL. That matter will be printed as an appendix to the record.

Senator SPARKMAN. And now, Mr. Secretary, that message was to be relayed to the President, and I suppose it was.

Secretary ACHESON. The Vandenberg resolution?

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes; the fact that the Vandenberg resolution had been passed and that the sense of the Senate had been expressed in favor of eliminating the veto.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Was any action taken in the United Nations by our Government to carry out the expression of the sense of the Senate of the United States?

Secretary ACHESON. I believe there was.

Senator SPARKMAN. And when this question came up, let me ask you this, without any details—when the question came up from time to time with reference to the admission of new states, Russia did veto several, did it not?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Is it not true that the United States took the lead in trying to work out a plan whereby new states would be admitted without use of the veto, in keeping with the sense of the expression that was expressed almost unanimously by the Senate of the United States?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. A variety of proposals were made.

CHINA LOBBY INVESTIGATION URGED

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, Mr. Secretary, I am not going to ask you a great many more questions. Mr. Secretary, I keep hearing a great deal about the so-called China lobby. I must say that I know nothing about it, but almost every time we turn with reference to any new development over the last 2 or 3 years, I have heard about opposition in at least one area of our foreign policy, and that is China—that is where it has really grown. I have heard what you have said here, and I am not asking you to restate your situation. As I understand, you have made it very clear, it is not a function of the State Department to make investigations. But I do want to add my word to what has already been said by Senator Morse and Senator McMahon and others, that this Government ought to utilize every power at its command to find out about these charges made in this editorial which Congressman Buffett of Nebraska put into the Congressional Record back in 1947. These things come out in editorials and in the leading newspapers—in our own Washington Post this morning, for instance, I believe. I hope that something will be done to find out just what it is that has been at work that has developed this screen of confusion and falsehood with reference to the work of this Government, particularly in orderly relations with China and the Far East.

Secretary Acheson. Senator Sparkman, this may be a good opportunity for me to make a statement which I should like to make on that subject.

Senator Sparkman. I would be very glad for you to do so.

Secretary Acheson. I do not want to go into your time, but I will go into it when you are through.

Senator Sparkman. I should like for you to.

NATURE OF STATE DEPARTMENT FILES ON LOBBY

Secretary Acheson. I should like to say that yesterday afternoon I spent the time going through the material which has been collected for me in the State Department on this subject.

The material consists of several categories. There is a very large collection of newspaper, magazine, and other public articles on the subject, all very much along the line of those which Senator Morse spoke of the other day.

There are reports from other agencies such as the CIA reporting things which have been said to them, and those are sent along to the other agencies of Government, including the State Department.

There are in that file reports of conferences and meetings between officers of the State Department and officers of other departments in the Government on that general subject, which are general summaries of what information the other departments have, but very sketchy in that regard.

There are reports from our own officers overseas as to what has been said to them by various people. There are reports which have been made to officers of the State Department by people who come in and say that someone has told them various things.

I read all of this material yesterday afternoon, and with one exception, to which I shall revert in a moment, these are all hearsay statements; that is, they are statements which are made not on the knowledge of the person making them, but reporting things which that informant, very often not identified, has been told by others. The exception to that—well, I will go on with that.

The exception to that is a considerable amount of information in the file which has to do not with the improper use of funds or proper use of funds to influence opinion, but with an alleged attempt to violate the law against recruiting in the United States for foreign armies. There is considerable direct evidence on that subject in the file.

On that point, however, the file ends up with the fact that the person who was engaged in this allegedly illegal activity died, and that brought an end to that particular effort.

This information is not sufficient or would not warrant me in making charges of any sort. The information is such that if this hearsay is correct and can be believed, it would support the charge that there is very considerable use of foreign funds in the United States for the purpose of influencing opinion, and there is some reason, if this hearsay is believed, to say that some of these activities, at least, are not in accordance with the law; but that would all depend on whether the hearsay turns out to be correct or incorrect.

In the light of this file, it is quite clear that I could not say that there is not such use of foreign funds, proper or improper. There is sufficient in this file to prevent me from saying that there is not any use of funds.

As I say, the material does not warrant charges. The material is of the nature which, if supplemented by other material, would be useful to the investigating staff, either of an executive agency or a committee of Congress in looking forward into the activities of certain individuals and institutions.

It is not material which, in any fairness, ought to be made public, but it ought to be used by an investigating staff to pursue their investigation.

Already most, if not all, of this has been brought to the attention of such investigating staffs of the executive branch. If any committee of Congress has a staff which wishes to go into that, I would be glad to make this available to that committee.

PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORIZATION OF LOBBY INVESTIGATION

Now I have also reported to the President of the United States the views of the members of this joint committee as expressed to me yesterday by the Senators who have spoken on the record, and I am authorized and directed by the President to say to the joint committee that he has instructed the agencies of the executive branch having powers and duties in regard to this matter to get together all their material and bring it together so that there can be an immediate, or as soon as possible, an appraisal of what is known in the executive branch, with a view to going forward to legal action if that is provable by what is known, or by conducting investigations further if that appears to be the proper course to follow, or in making public the situation if that seems to be the proper course.

He has also authorized me and directed me to say that he will direct all these agencies of the Government to cooperate to the fullest possible extent with any committee or committees of the Congress which wish to go into this matter for the purpose of informing them what is known, for the purpose of helping any investigation, for the purpose of assisting them in coming to a conclusion as to whether or not they wish to have one.

That, I believe is a full statement on my activities yesterday afternoon in this regard.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, would the Senator yield for a question either on his time or out of it on that point?

Senator SPARKMAN. I am afraid my time is up. How much time do I have, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator has 1 minute.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Just one statement the Secretary made is not clear to me. He said the President would cooperate. Does that mean the release to any senatorial or congressional committee of all the papers in relation to this subject in the hands of the Department? Because that is a very vital point.

Secretary ACHESON. I didn't cross-examine the President as to what he meant. I have told you his words to me.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Cooperate.

Secretary ACHESON. I am authorized and directed to say that he has instructed the agencies in regard to their own duties as I have already described it, and that he has or will direct them to cooperate to the fullest extent with any committee or committees of the Congress which may want to look into this matter.

Senator SPARKMAN. Personally I hope that does mean to make available the materials that they have, should such a committee be set up.

If I can get in one more question—is the time up?

Chairman RUSSELL. I think your time has about expired.

Senator SPARKMAN. All right.

Chairman RUSSELL. You probably have a half a minute.

POSSIBLE EVACUATION OF KOREA IN JANUARY 1950

Senator SPARKMAN. In this half minute I want to ask you this one question. That relates to the withdrawal or evacuation in Korea.

On May 11 General MacArthur was quoted through his spokesman as follows:

> General MacArthur's spokesman said today that until January 13—

that is the day the President sent his letter to General MacArthur—

> this year, MacArthur believed Washington officials wanted our forces evacuated from Korea and made a scapegoat for some political advantage.
>
> Maj. Gen. Courtney Whitney, MacArthur's aide, said a January 13 message from President Truman was the Government's first clear statement to MacArthur to hold in Korea.

Do you know of any facts that would warrant any such statement as that?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; there are no facts to my knowledge; and I would go a considerable way in saying that no such facts exist.

Senator SPARKMAN. Nobody here you know of wanted Korea evacuated and the Eighth Army made a scapegoat?

Secretary ACHESON. Not in the slightest degree whatever.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse.

CHINA LOBBY ISSUE

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous consent of the committee to give me not more than half a minute to make a comment on the Secretary's report to us on the China lobby issue, in view of the fact that I and Senator McMahon raised the issue in the first place.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chair will put it for a minute, but the Chair cannot keep up with half a minute.

The Senator asks unanimous consent to be permitted to comment for 1 minute. Without objection, it is so ordered. Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. I want to say, Mr. Chairman, I think the Secretary of State is to be commended for the response he has made to the inquiry that Senator McMahon and I put to him in regard to the China lobby.

I think also the President of the United States should be commended for the instructions that he gave the Secretary of State for transmittal to this committee in regard to this issue.

I sincerely hope that both the executive branch of Government and the appropriate committee of either the House or the Senate will proceed without delay to a thoroughgoing investigation of the charges that exist in the public mind in respect to the China lobby.

I fooled you, Mr. Chairman; that was less than a minute.

Chairman RUSSELL. Thank you.

Senator KEFAUVER. May I make a parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator is recognized.

Senator KEFAUVER. Has any program been agreed upon, or was it the plan of the committee, as to following up the suggestion of the Senators from Oregon and Connecticut, with reference to the so-called China lobby—does this committee have any plans in that regard?

It is all an integral part, I take it, of the far eastern policy.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chair has had no specific plan in that connection, Senator Kefauver, nor has the committee taken any formal action on it.

It has been discussed in rather vague terms, and I use the word "vague" with respect to no particular evidence. A number of charges have been read. The Senators who read them to the committee, as I recall, without exception, stated that they did not have, within their own knowledge, any information that they could present; but charges that appeared from time to time in the public press were presented to the committee.

The Chair had not made any plans to go into any specific investigation of the subject of the China lobby, but that will be within the jurisdiction of this committee, I would assume, in connection with our far eastern policy.

CHINA LOBBY INVESTIGATION

Senator KEFAUVER. A further parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.

Is there not a subcommittee which is considering and recommending the further agenda for the consideration of the joint committee?

Chairman RUSSELL. There is no subcommittee on the agenda.

There will be a subcommittee appointed to consider the witnesses to be called before this committee, that could affect the agenda; but the agenda of the committee, as agreed upon at its initial organization meeting, which I believe was held on April 30, was that we would go into all facts and circumstances surrounding the relief of General MacArthur, and the military policy in the Far East.

Subsequent to that—I am a bit confused, there; that was the original agenda of the Armed Services Committee, and subsequent to that time, the Foreign Relations Committee was brought into the investigation.

That proposal opens up the whole field of foreign relations, and as the Senator from Tennessee has undoubtedly observed for the past several days, we have had a rather extensive inquiry into the American policy in the Far East and elsewhere, I might say, but I do not think the committee has taken any formal action with respect to the specific investigation of the so-called China lobby .

POSSIBLE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FUTURE WITNESSES

Senator KEFAUVER. A further parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman. Is it the plan of the subcommittee deciding upon the future witnesses to consider whether or not to call additional witnesses in connection with the operations or the alleged operation of the so-called China lobby?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator, the subcommittee has not been appointed yet. I do not know just what action that committee will take.

Giving the opinion of the Chair, if we are going into a comprehensive investigation of the subject to which the Senator alludes, the committee I think should take some action on it. It is my own view that if it is going to be a rather extensive inquiry, it would probably be handled better by a subcommittee of this committee of the Senate than by the full committee.

That is just the opinion of the individual who is the chairman of the joint committee. If we are going into a very comprehensive investigation of that subject, it would be my judgment that either the joint committee should consider it as to whether we wish to underake it through a subcommittee, or whether we wish to present a resolution in the Senate for an investigation.

In my view it would be better handled by a subcommittee of this joint commitee. If it is going to require a great deal of time, I might say to the Senator, it would be my hope that it would be done through a subcommittee because we certainly have not expedited the functioning of the Senate during the past month by being engaged morning and afternoon and many of us throughout the eveing doing work in the offices with respect to the hearing.

It would be my own view that it would be desirable, if the committee desires to make such an inquiry, to do it through the means of a subcommittee.

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Chairman, on a procedural matter again, I brought up the question because apparently this question is going to be fully explored. The matter that is to be explored and how it should be done should be decided upon immediately so that the staff could make the investigations which apparently would be necessary in order to have a full and intelligent presentation of the evidence. So I come back to propose a unanimous consent request that the subcommittee be appointed by the chairman as soon as possible, to report back to the full committee with its recommendations in connection with the procedure or investigation of the alleged China lobby.

Chairman RUSSELL. You mean that when the subcommittee is designated to consider the question of witnesses to be called, they are likewise to make recommendations to the full committee as to the inquiry into the so-called China lobby?

Senator KEFAUVER. That is what I say.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do the members of the committee hear the request for unanimous consent?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, I would respectfuly object to that.

Senator GEORGE. Mr. Chairman, it does seem to me if you are going to have any investigation, it should be by special committee either of the Foreign Relations Committee or the Senate. It ought to be looked into and it ought to be broadened far beyond the China episode. It ought to be an inquiry into the use of money here—influence here to influence public policy in behalf of any foreign government and all foreign governments.

Chairman RUSSELL. Objections have been made.

Senator BRIDGES. If we are going to discuss it further, I have a line of questioning which I want to develop. Along the line Senator George has mentioned, the so-called China lobby and influence is a very minor thing compared to the whole. I want to go into some things which have some pretty ugly implications of other governments and what they are doing here, and it is going to reach some pretty high places.

SPEEDING UP THE HEARINGS

Senator GREEN. May I suggest that this discussion be adjourned until after the completion of the hearing of Secretary Acheson.

Chairman RUSSELL. I don't get that.

Senator GREEN. I suggest the advisability of postponing the rest of this discussion on this matter until we have finished hearing from Secretary Acheson.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think the objection lodged by the Senator from Massachussetts has the effect of stopping it, unless some Senator desires to make a motion.

As Senators know, we have followed the procedure here of calling a special meeting to decide important procedural matters. We have not decided them in the course of the investigation of witnesses, where motions are entered or appeals are made. We have carried them over to an executive meeting of the committee.

I do want to state this, to give my views. I have no objection to any inquiry being made that is of a proper nature into the activities of the China lobby or any other lobby that seems to gain undue advantage at the expense of the American taxpayer.

But, gentlemen, I do not believe we would be justified in taking 26 members of the Senate into an inquiry of that nature. This has been a very important hearing. I think it was one that was demanded by public sentiment in this country.

Certainly a large majority of the Senate felt that an inquiry should be made into the matters which we have under discussion. But there are functions of the legislative branch of the Government that are absolutely essential to the operation of the Government of the United States.

Unless those functions and unless those obligations are properly discharged, the whole Government can collapse for lack of authority or funds, and we have a number of important legislative matters.

I hope that we may proceed with this full committee as expeditiously as possible, consistent with full and thorough inquiry, to bring this phase of this investigation to a conclusion.

I think we owe it to the Senate. It is part of our duty to our country and to our constituents to follow that course.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, may I raise this one procedural question?

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator from Massachusetts.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I objected to the unanimous-consent request of Senator Kefauver and was going into very detailed reasons for my objection when the Senator from Georgia spoke up, and out of my deference to the Senator form Georgia, Senator George, and the respect that I hold for him, the very great respect, I did not say any more.

I will just say to both Senators from Georgia, the chairman and Senator George, that I believe we have gone very thoroughly into this, and I believe also the Foreign Relations Committee should be the one to do it.

Senator HUNT. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator from Wyoming.

Senator HUNT. I should like to make an announcement on a procedural matter I intended to bring up Monday. I expect to move at that time that the committee agree to discontinuance of the hearings of this committee on or before June 30.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse.

"CHINA LOBBY" INVESTIGATION

Senator MORSE. I beg permission to say in regard to Senator Kefauver's request that I share the view that the investigation of the China lobby, and not of the China lobby alone but of all lobbies affecting American foreign policy, should be conducted by the appropriate committee of the Senate, and it is my opinion, it being of course subject to change by changing events, that it should be done by a subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Kefauver.

Senator KEFAUVER. It should be understood that in proposing the unanimous-consent request I thought that would be an appropriate way of bringing the matter to a head one way or another. While the whole Far East policy has been discussed here, I thought a subcommittee appointed by the chairman would be an appropriate committee, with the suggestion which I imagine the committee will probably follow as to the subcommittee, maybe a special committee, that it not only go into the China lobby but all other alleged lobbies influencing foreign policy of the United States. I just thought in view of the passing of time and the necessity of a good deal of investigation that it ought to be brought to a conclusion and decided upon as soon as possible, and I thought that would be an appropriate method of securing action by the committee.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, may I address a word?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I have a growing realization of the difficulty of getting to the real facts with reference to the foreign policy which we have been constantly going into since World War II, and getting into the alleged China lobby and other lobbies of like nature. I heartily agree with the idea that the Foreign Relations Committee look into it, and I express the strong hope they will look into it and thoroughly explore not just the Red China lobby but all lobbies. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, the Senator from Washington asked me on yesterday afternoon as to what Senator would follow the Senator from Alabama, and I told him that the questioning would revert to the Armed Services Committee. I find now that I was in error.

I called on Senator Long for his fifth round of questioning yesterday afternon, so we will have to remain with the Foreign Relations Committee until we conclude the fifth round.

Senator CAIN. I am completely satisfied with the procedure the Senator has indicated he will follow.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Gillette?

Senator GILLETTE. If you are are with the Foreign Relations Committee, you can leave it very quickly. The Senator from Iowa has no questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Brewster?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. The chairman? The chairman passes.

Senator Connally?

Chairman CONNALLY. I pass.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Connally passes.

Senator Wiley?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George?

Senator GEORGE. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Green?

Senator GREEN. No questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenloper? By unanimous consent he had his fifth period on yesterday afternoon.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Sixth.

Chairman RUSSELL. Sixth, I mean, on yesterday afternoon, so I will now return to the Armed Services Committee.

Senator Bridges?

DEFINITION OF "CHINA LOBBY"

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Secretary, yesterday there were some rather violent but vague statements made here with regard the so-called China lobby, and you, this morning have reported that you have taken this up with the President and given us an outline of the situation as you see it.

Now, will you identify or define what is meant by the China lobby?

Secretary ACHESON. I think Senator Morse defined what he asked me to look into, and I think that appears in the record.

Senator BRIDGES. Well, does that mean to include anyone who has consistently advocated support for the anti-Communist National Government of China?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I think we can find what Senator Morse asked me by looking back in the record. I think it was the first time Senator Morse spoke on that.

Senator BRIDGES. Would it help, Mr. Secretary, if Senator Morse were to find that?

Senator MORSE. The answer to your question would, of course, be no, I don't mean to imply that anyone who has consistently advocated the support of the Nationalist Government in China is necessarily a member of the China lobby.

What I sought to raise was the question as to the means that had been used by some, alleged to be illegal means, that constitute the reprehensible acts on the part of some who have sought to influence American foreign policy with respect to Chiang's regime.

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Secretary, you have stated that the United States has given some $2,000,000,000 worth of aid to this anti-Communist Nationalist Government of China, in addition to some intangible military advice, is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. I think that was since VJ-day, Senator.

Senator BRIDGES. Do we support the anti-Communist National Government of China today?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator BRIDGES. Are we today sending to the anti-Communist National Government of China some military and economic aid?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator BRIDGES. When Mr. Rusk stated that the anti-Communist National Government of China is more representative of the Chinese people than the Communist government of China, is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. It won that recognition and we recognize it for the reason——

Senator BRIDGES. And Mr. Rusk, in voicing that policy, is he speaking for the administration?

Secretary ACHESON. He was voicing the policy which the administration has consistently followed.

Senator BRIDGES. Then, in effect, the fact that we do have a China lobby in this country, which I know about, in reality it is supporting the policy of the Government of the United States, is it not?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't know what it is doing, Senator.

Senator BRIDGES. I mean that would be supporting help for the Nationalist Government of China; it would be, if that is what it were doing, supporting the policy of the United States, would it not?

Secretary ACHESON. If that is what it was doing it would be supporting the policy, yes.

Senator BRIDGES. And we rcognize that the anti-Communist Nationalist Government headed by Chiang Kai-shek is strongly anti-Communist, do we not?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

CHINESE COMMUNIST SYMPATHIZERS

Senator BRIDGES. And we recognize that the so-called People's Government of China is strongly pro-Communist, and is killing Americans, and is our foremost enemy in a limited war today?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator BRIDGES. Now, would it be true that anyone who attacked the anti-Communist Nationalist Government headed by Chiang Kai-shek today, whose support is our firm, consistent policy, and in turn supported or advocated the pro-Communist Chinese Government, would be advocating and supporting a policy entirely different from a policy of the United States of America today?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't know what you mean by "attacked." It depends upon what you mean by "attacking" them. If they were advocating that we should support the Communist Government, and not support the Nationalist Government, they would be advocating policies which are contrary to those of the Government.

Senator BRIDGES. And if we have a lobby today, in this country, or a group of individuals who are doing that, they could be readily called the Commounist China Lobby, could they not?

Secretary ACHESON. They can be called a great many things, Senator.

That might be a description.

Senator BRIDGES. And if we find that there are members of the China Communist Lobby in this country that have been using their various powers and operations, and that we find some of them are within the American Government, inasmuch as we fired General MacArthur, or General MacArthur was fired because he differed with the policy of the American Government, should they not be fired immediately?

Secretary ACHESON. I presume that would be the proper action.

OTHER NATIONS' ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION

Senator BRIDGES. Now, there are many other friendly governments in the world today with which we have association who are interested in United States aid, United States help in one form or another, such as Great Britain, such as France, such as the Republic of India, such as Greece, such as Sweden, such as Finland, such as Denmark, such as Colombia, and so on.

If they are over here attempting to persuade or influence American policy, either for the purpose of getting aid in any form, whether it be in loans, grants, or otherwise, or influence legislation, directly or indirectly, they are lobbyists and they should be investigated, should they not?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I don't know whether they should be investigated or not, Senator. I presume that every government that wants something from the United States is trying to influence the Government of the United States.

There are many proper ways and there are many improper ways. If there is any reason that anyone believes that they are doing improper things, then surely that ought to be investigated.

Senator BRIDGES. And if there are governments which are unfriendly to the United States of America, who are Communist governments today, or pro-Communist, such as Russia or any of her satellites, including Poland, they particularly should be investigated, because they are our enemies today. Is that not correct?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I think—I don't want to respond to the phraseology of the question.

Senator BRIDGES. I will change that and ask that "enemies" be declassified and then say that they are in opposition to our policies and our objectives.

Secretary ACHESON. If there is the expenditure of Communist funds—which we have very little doubt is going on—that not only should be investigated, but I presume is continually investigated.

Senator BRIDGES. And which would you say it was more important to do, to investigate, if there are lobbies or influences working for friendly governments, on the one hand, which are anti-Communist, or the investigation of pro-Communist or Communist governments that are attempting to bring influences here, which would be the most important to bring to light, in your judgment?

Secretary ACHESON. I should think that there is continuous and highly desirable investigation of all Communist activities in this country.

Senator BRIDGES. And which would you think, Mr. Secretary, would be the most important to expose and bring to light, the influences, the pressures, the lobby, if we might call it, of our friends and allies, who are anti-Communist, or the same thing, the lobby, the pressures, the influence, of the pro-Communists and the Communist peoples and nations who are fighting everything that we believe in and some of them slaughtering American boys today?

Secretary ACHESON. I should think the Government does put its emphasis on the investigation of Communist activities.

Senator BRIDGES. I would like, Mr. Chairman, as Senator McMahon and Senator Morse have done, to respectfully ask the Secretary of State, not only to assembly such material on any influences and pressures that may be brought in behalf of the anti-Communist Nationalist Government of China, headed by Chiang Kai-shek, but also on the influences, people, pressures, and lobby, if there are any, of the Communist Government of China, which is now slaughtering American boys by the thousands, until the casualties have run to a sum over 174,000 in this country.

INVESTIGATION OF ALL FOREIGN LOBBIES

I would respectfully ask that. I would respectfully ask that the pressures and lobbies and influences of nations first that are friendly to us such as Great Britain, such as France, such as Belgium, such as Holland, and such as Colombia, such as Finland, such as Denmark, such as Greece, such as Sweeden, such as Iran be included in thaat group.

I would then again most respectfully ask for the assembling of data on the influences, the people, the lobby if there are any operating in behalf of the great international oil interests in this country which would include one of the hot spots of the world today here in this country.

I would respectfully ask that we then assemble material on the influences, the pressures and the lobby if any that have been brought in the past and are today brought for the country of Poland which is pro-Communist or Communist country, and for other countries of similar nature which are going on here.

I respectfully ask that an investigation be made of those individuals within the American Government, if there are such individuals, who have in the past, who are in the present espousing the cause directly and indirectly of communism against our better interests and the policy of the United States, and ask that appropriate action of firing them or prosecuting them be taken.

I think, Mr. Chairman, that if the thing is gone into then we ought to go into it all. I would like to see not only our friends and allies investigated, but our enemies.

I want to say that when we start to investigate our friends and allies, that we investigate all our friends and allies. I want to see our enemies investigated and the pro-Communist influences in this country brought out.

Now it is a terrible thing if we have in this country groups which are allowed to operate which are jeopardizing the very life and security of America, and to me that is more important than the investigation of an ally with which we are furnishing aid and assistance today. But if we are going to investigate those kind, then I want these other countries that have been so successful in getting billions of dollars of American aid brought into the open.

I just want to say, Mr. Chairman, and most respectfully to the Secretary, that unless we do that, the whole thing will be a farce. There is plenty of information, as most of you gentlemen know, and I am sure the Secretary does, of the activities of some of these countries and their representatives and the influence they bring to bear here.

It think it is most essential if we go into it, that it all be brought out. I would like to see how those individuals are paid. I would like to see who they employ. I would like to see former individuals in the American Government who resigned, severed their connections, who are now found representing foreign governments and foreign interests.

There is a very interesting list. They will ring a bell pretty well through this country. I would like to see the legal firms that represent these countries or their various interests in this country brought out.

I would like to see all these things, and if we are going to have an investigation, I agree with the Senator from Georgia, Mr. George, that it should be full and comprehensive, and I think it will produce some very startling results, but any investigation limited to a particular group who happen to be our allies at the moment and have been in the past, which we have been supporting, and not look into our enemies and not look into our other allies who have been so successful to the tune of billions of dollars of getting help from this country in my judgment would be a farce and a travesty on justice.

There are a great many people who would be glad to cooperate to that end.

Now, I would like to have you, Mr. Secretary, just as you were requested on the other—and I make my request in all sincerity and very respectfully to you on those things, and I realize that I have included quite a number in this, and there are many more besides what I have included. But if we are going to go into this subject, certainly we should go into the whole phase and the whole situation.

I hope that you will feel, as I do, that it is essential if we look into one, certainly we should look into others.

It is a very interesting thing to me that some of the people in our country seem to think so lightly of the burrowing under in America today by the people who would destroy us, and their representatives, their agents in our country. After all, when the chips are down—and they may be down here in the weeks, the months, the years ahead—I think that would be a very interesting thing to have on the record.

I expect to see in the lives of we here around these tables who live a normal life such a show-down. I hope that it will not come, and I hope as a result of our action, our attitude, our policy, that we can avoid an outright show-down. But it may come, and if it comes, let's have the record straight, complete on the record of just who we have in this country bringing influence for assistance.

I would like to see them, if they are doing this, go way back to the UNRRA program and find out—UNRRA did have some good qualities, but on the other hand, who didn't take the precautions to see that Russia and the Russian Communist satellites used it to their own ends. That is certainly one of the bases in that.

And anyone who had their eyes open in the American Government and didn't see to that, certainly if they didn't know it, then they certainly know it today. It has vitally affected our whole situation there.

INVESTIGATING BOTH ALLIES AND ENEMIES

So, Mr. Secretary, and very respectfully, if we are going to do this, let's do the whole picture and let's make our prime object our enemies and the people who are responsible for the influences who are responsible for putting America in this war economy we are in today, putting the terrific drain on the taxpayers of this country, the people who are responsible for killing thousands of American boys, and others wounded, until they total today more casualties than we had combined in the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Spanish-American War, which was begrudgingly admitted here by one of the previous witnesses—that we have had almost 172,000, and now there are 175,000 casualties.

Let's get a little attention to our enemies.

However, if we are going to go in and start investigating our friends—and if they have done anything improper, I certainly feel it should be investigated and they be exposed. I am for this. But I want all of these influences investigated, all of these countries, and I want the people who are playing it up.

And you will find some very startling facts, because you will find that people who have been very high in the American Government and who have since disassociated themselves are some of the ones representing them.

You will be amazed at some of the legal firms who are representing them and who are getting huge fees for it, and I think that picture should be brought to the attention of the American people.

When we start talking about one thing, when that one thing happens to be—I don't know of any China lobby, but if there is one, and if it is doing anything illegal, certainly it should be exposed. But if they are not doing anything illegal, they are certainly helping carry out the policy of the United States of America today. And the people who call the Chinese Communists merely agrarian reformers, who have done everything they can to directly and indirectly give America a false sense of security as far as the Chinese Communists are concerned, that should be brought out, and it should be brought into the headlines here in our country and people should know it.

Now, if the time comes when bombs start dropping on this country from some enemy—and we now see American boys being slaughtered—but if the time comes when we get civilians and cities being destroyed here, then I would like to see the record straight as to who had a little influence in this and who played a part in it—and I tell you that the feeling will be terrific at that time.

And if you gentlemen want to know the feeling that there is today in this country, I would like to have any of you gentlemen take a trip with me, and you will see the feeling. You just let the show-down come here and let some of our industrial cities and potential be destroyed, and you will see some people up for treason in our country—and if there is anything lower than treason in our country, I do not know what it is. And if they are not up for treason they will be up for accessories or aides to treasonable persons.

We gentlemen sitting around these tables now, if we live normal lives, may see that—and let us get the record straight on that all along the line.

So, I have made of you in the same manner as made by Senator McMahon, of Connecticut, and Senator Morse, a request for this; that is, for all this information on all of this thing, and insofar as they have requested it about the Red China lobby, so-called, or about any illegal activity—or anything that they have done here in this country that is wrong—anything—I think it should be exposed, but I want certain people exposed at the same time. That is all, sir.

Chairman Russell. Senator McMahon?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Lodge?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Fulbright?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Tobey?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Sparkman?

Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I have a few more questions, but aren't there some over there who have not had their round since I have had one?

Chairman Russell. Well, every one has had five rounds, Senator, and a number of us have had an opportunity for our sixth round.

Senator Sparkman. Was my last one my fifth round?

Chairman Russell. You are on your sixth round, right now.

I will be glad to——

Senator Sparkman. I don't want to impose; and if anybody else wants to ask questions I will be glad to pass.

I do have a few more questions to ask before the Secretary leaves, and I think I can get through in just a few minutes.

Chairman RUSSELL. If there is no objection, then, we will start on this table for a while, and see where we will go.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think, in all fairness, they should be given an opportunity.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I have, I think, just a few more questions.

OBJECTIVES IN KOREA AS REGARDS AGGRESSORS

One point that was called to my attention this morning, that interested me greatly, and on which I do not think there has been any testimony at all, here, is: Our country joined with the United Nations in declaring the Red Chinese to be an aggressor in Korea, and we branded it as an aggressor.

Now, you have stated, as the objective, our objective in Korea is to punish the aggressor.

I will scratch that out.

Our objective is to stop the aggression and to get peace in Korea; but has our Government, at any time, considered any peace terms with the Red Chinese or, in stopping the aggressor, considered the terms of the United Nations resolution, which included the words "punish the aggressor"?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; it has.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And it has distinct suggestions as to what to do to punish the aggressor?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, it is doing that now. We are punishing the aggressor now.

Senator SALTONSTALL. You mean through an economic blockade and so on?

Secretary ACHESON. Through that and through the military campaign.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So that the punishing of the aggressor, as included in the United Nations resolution, is including in your idea of stopping the aggression and thereby killing many Red Chinese and decimating their armies, is that your——

Secretary ACHESON. It is all included; yes.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And that would be your idea of the punishing of the aggressor?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes; that would be right.

WISHES OF THE FORMOSANS

Senator SALTONSTALL. May I ask one other question on a somewhat different line. We have had considerable attention in these hearings drawn to the matter of the United States policy toward Formosa, and the Nationalist and Communist policy toward Formosa.

Has our State Department or our Government taken any steps to get the opinions and the judgments of Formosans as to what they want?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. In other words, you do not—our feeling is that 7 million people of Formosa will necessarily either be a part of Red China or a part of Nationalist China or under the United Nations; but what they would like to do themselves has not really been given much thought; is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. No; that is not what you asked me before.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Well, would you answer that, then; excuse me. I thought that is what I was asking.

Secretary ACHESON. You asked me whether he had taken steps to find out——

Senator SALTONSTALL. That is correct; I did that.

Senator ACHESON (continuing). What the main people, the Formosan people on Formosa, thought about——

Senator SALTONSTALL. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON. And I said "No," we had not done that.

In my opening speech to the United Nations last September, I think I mentioned the various factors which ought to be taken into account when the discussion on Formosa in the future took place; they are in that speech, and I think you will find it quite complete, Senator.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Senator Kefauver makes the suggestion to me, Mr. Secretary, which I think is a very good one, to ask whether you would be willing to include in the appendix to the record so much of your speech to the United Nations as concerns that subject?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I shall be very glad to do that.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. The matter will be printed in the appendix of the record.

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD NATIONALISTS AND COMMUNISTS, 1947–50

Senator SALTONSTALL. I have just one more question, Mr. Secretary. The last time I asked you a question I said very frankly it was not very clear, and you said it was not very clear, and I hope this question, which is a difficult one, is reasonably clear.

Last night I read the points made to the State Department on pages 64 and 65 of the white paper. Now, as nearly as I can figure out those covered the periods from 1943 to 1945.

Now, without burdening you with all those eight paragraphs, which were expressions of officers in China, our American officials in China, as general recommendations or conclusions or thoughts for the State Department's consideration, there is this sentence, and I pick it out of the context, but I think it is a full sentence:

> The desirable means to this end is to encourage the reform and revitalization of the Kuomintang so that it may survive as a significant force in a coalition government. If this fails, we must limit our involvement with the Kuomintang and must commence some cooperation with the Communists, the force destined to control China, in an effort to influence them further into an independent position friendly to the United States.

Now, General Marshall went over to China and spent a year, the year of 1946, in China on that general subject of trying to get a stronger China and trying to get peace in China.

You stated to me on page 5343 of your testimony here at the very bottom of the page:

> Secretary ACHESON. We have always supported the Nationalist Government and no other government in China, and we always supported them with economic

aid, and, I think, through all this time with some military matériel. The change in policy occurred on June 26, 1950, when we decided to interpose the Seventh Fleet to prevent—

Then I interrupted:

> Senator SALTONSTALL. You consider it a military question as to how much further we go beyond the use of the Seventh Fleet in connection with preventing Formosa from falling by force into the Chinese Communist hands?
>
> Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Now, my question is: In view of the white paper and those statements on pages 64 and 65, is it fair to state that our Government between 1946 and 1950 believed that the Communists were going to take over the control of China and that we would not only have to do business with them—that is, the Chinese Communists—but also might ultimately recognize it as the Government of China?

Is it fair to state that that was a very important consideration in the minds of the State Department officials between the years 1947 and 1950, or was it always the opinion of the State Department during those years, as it is now, that they would not recognize the Chinese Communists and that they would continue to support in every way possible the Nationalist Government, as indicated by you in your testimony.

Secretary ACHESON. I think——

Senator SALTONSTALL. May I make one more little statement before you start?

Secretary ACHESON. I will get awfully mixed up if you do.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Go ahead.

Secretary ACHESON. The answer to that part of your statement which says "would it be a fair statement to say, and so forth" is "No." Then you went on and said "or something else," which I don't recall clearly in my mind. But the main answer to your question is "No."

To amplify that, the Government of the United States, as I said, has supported throughout the Nationalist Government. The Government of the United States was not contemplating supporting any other government.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And never contemplated it?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

Now what you have quoted here are not views of the Government of the United States.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I understand that.

Secretary ACHESON. But this is a condensation of points made out of a whole series of reports, and one of the points which you read says in the view of these officers who are in the field that if you could keep the Nationalist Government in control—and to do that it would be necessary to have reform and revitalization—that is the best thing.

If that does not happen, then it will fall, and if it does, that in their judgment the Chinese Communists would be the force which would control China, and we ought to try and make it friendly to the United States.

That was not the policy of the Government. This is an epitomization of a series of reports sent in by officers in the field.

Senator SALTONSTALL. The reason I asked that, Mr. Secretary, is I say with all frankness that I had the general feeling through the years, through that period 1946, 1947, and 1948, that our Government believed that some day it might have to recognize the Red Chinese as the Government of China, and I have received from your testimony here a contrary picture, and that is one of the points that is very hard for me to clear up in my mind.

Now you say perfectly definitely that we never considered recognizing the Chinese Communists and we always recognized the Nationalist Government of China. Will you answer that? Well, you have answered that in the affirmative.

Secretary ACHESON. I said that throughout and up to the present time we have always recognized and supported this Government and we have not aided, abetted, recognized, made plans to recognize, or anything in that field, this other Government.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And the only question then is the degree of aid given the Nationalist Government at any one time. That always was a consideration of the State Department, how much aid to give and what type of aid to give.

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you very much.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Johnson?

Senator JOHNSON. No questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse?

PARAPHRASES OF DECEMBER 29 JCS MESSAGE TO MAC ARTHUR

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, before I examine the Secretary, I want to make a few brief statements in regard to the examination of my good friend from Washington, Mr. Cain, of the Secretary yesterday in regard to the item in the secret exhibit that has been before us throughout these hearings entitled, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff Report to Senate Committees on Korean operations," item 37 thereof.

Beginning on page 5739 of the transcript of yesterday the Senator from Washington discussed in detail item 37 as it originally appeared on page 80 of the compilation furnished by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This item was read into the record at that point.

I am taking the time this morning to make comments on this matter, Mr. Chairman, because I see from today's press and heard last night from the radio that the interpretation has been made by some that the Joint Chiefs of Staff failed to disclose to this committee all the information that they should have disclosed.

I do not share that point of view, because I think that if we would take this secret document which I have before me, copy of which has been made available to each member of this committee, and read it in its entirety, as I think we should, that there is only one fair conclusion that can be reached, and that is that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have given us a document that sets forth all the facts and does not involve any failure on their part to disclose to us all pertinent information.

Following the reading of item 37 into the record yesterday, the Senator read an actual paraphrase of the message and pointed out that this paraphrase submitted in response to a request of the Senator from California, Mr. Knowland, contained statements which were not in the summary which was submitted as the original item 37.

I am sure that the Senator from Washington realizes that the second document which he read was in fact a paraphrase of the December 29, 1950, message, whereas the original document was not a paraphrase in the normal sense in which the term is used. It was a summary of the essential items—and I underline the word "summary"—and it must be read in context.

In any event, the purport of the Senator's remarks was to indicate that the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves first suggested in their December 29 message that evacuation of Korea was in the offing—page 5750 of the transcript—and from that point on the response of General MacArthur was to a concept originating in the minds of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and not in the mind of General MacArthur.

Actually, I believe, Mr. Chairman, the record to this date has been replete with evidence that from the day that the Red Chinese crossed the Yalu, all of our military authorities were greatly preoccupied with the possibility of an evacuation. As a matter of fact they had prepared plans for that eventuality—happily, it was never necessary to utilize them.

As a case in point, on page 507 of the record, General MacArthur stated that he had, as a military contingency, prepared plans for the evacuation if forced to do so. He stated that actually he never received any directives either to prepare the plans, or to put them into effect.

Similarly, you will recall that Admiral Sherman volunteered the information that his naval commander had prepared evacuation plans for use at Hungnam, in advance of receiving any directives even from General MacArthur to that effect.

I mention these things, Mr. Chairman, to show that all concerned were alert to the possibility that it might be necessary to evacuate the peninsula. Actually, therefore, no one put it into another's mind. The realities of the military situation made it painfully necessary, and I think the record shows all our military minds for some time had given very careful consideration to plan for evacuation if that contingency should arise.

The December 29 message to General MacArthur stated that "the Chinese Communists now appear, from estimates available, capable of forcing the evacuation by forces of the United Nations." Obviously the estimates available were the reports received from the field, that is, from Tokyo, from General MacArthur's headquarters.

CONSIDERATION OF EVACUATION FROM KOREA IN JANUARY 1950

General MacArthur's January 10 message, which shows on page 2346 of the record, states that it is "a self-evident fact" that his force could not remain on the peninsula, as his force was then constituted.

This gloomy estimate of the situation was dispelled a few days later and was noted by General Collins and General Vandenberg on their visit to Korea.

Now, I want to say, Mr. Chairman, that, although General MacArthur in his January 10 message did say—

> It is a self-evident fact that his forces could not remain on the peninsula as his force was then constituted—

that it should be noted on page 120 of the transcript MacArthur had said that he felt he could stay in Korea, and Collins testified that at that time he questioned that and thought they probably could not stay in Korea.

It also should be be pointed out that General MacArthur also fully concurred in the Joint Chiefs of Staff estimate that the situation was not then as desperate as he previously had thought it to be. In fairness to General MacArthur, I am of the opinion that he was not gloomy about it at all. I am of the opinion that he was showing sound military procedure in his message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I do not know of any other advice under the facts that have been brought out in this record that he could or should have presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Be that as it may, Mr. Chairman, I mention these factors to show that it is as idle as it is futile to sit here and set up straw men in an effort to find out who was the first to conceive of the possibility of our evacuating Korea. I repeat: I think all our military minds were giving thought over a long period of time to the possibility of that contingency developing, and the record shows that all the military leaders connected with this campaign from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Tokyo have been able and alert professional military men. As such, therefore, from the day the Chinese crossed the Yalu River and assaulted our forces, I believe it is fair to state that the record clearly shows that they all envisioned the possibility—and I emphasize the word "possibility"—that we might ultimately be forced to evacuate.

I do not believe that the actions of either General MacArthur or the actions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff led the other to believe evacuation was necessary. That, I might add, is obviously the fact, inasmuch as no evacuation directives were ever issued, either by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or by General MacArthur. The matter never went beyond the planning stage.

SUMMARY NATURE OF ORIGINAL PARAPHRASE OF JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE OF DECEMBER 29, 1950

Now, Mr. Chairman, it is pointed out on page 5749 of this transcript that the original summary of the December 29 message did not "mention" five items which the Senator from Washington seems personally not to have been aware of. He states that in his judgment such an omission of these items caused our joint committees to receive an inaccurate picture of the situation in Korea.

I submit that this is a completely inadequate summary of the case, Mr. Chairman. The Senator from Washington implies that by the Joint Chiefs of Staff not mentioning (*a*) increased threat of full war; (*b*) a major war should not be fought in Korea; (*c*) additional United States forces are not intended for Korea, which MacArthur testified himself he didn't need; (*d*) additional forces are not to be expected from other United Nations; (*e*) the security of Japan is threatened; that in his summary of the December 29 message the joint committee has been kept in the dark by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I submit, Mr. Chairman, that not only everyone in this room, but practically everyone in this country has known, and known since the onset of the war in Korea, that the foregoing were the facts. Certainly they have been stated over and over again, in the press and before this committee, and obviously were well known to General MacArthur.

To include them in the original summary of the 29th of December message was simply to include a mass of detail with which, supposedly at least, everyone was intimately familiar.

I submit further, Mr. Chairman, that by no stretch of the imagination can we place ourselves in the position of claiming that we have been deluded, or kept in the dark, when these are such obvious and well-known facts. I have made a careful examination of the paraphrase of the 29 December message and of the original summary of the message, and feel that nothing which is significant, and which is not and was not common knowledge to everyone reading the directive, was omitted from the original summary.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I wish to emphasize that it is essential to read this compilation in context. Actually, it should be read from beginning to end, the beginning of page 1, to the end of the compilation, by every member of this committee. Anyone so doing will have no question whatsoever that the shortening of item 37 by omitting from it statements which were well-known facts, and which appear in the context of the preceding 79 pages, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not attempting by subterfuge to either prejudice the committee or keep it in ignorance.

However, I agree with the Senator from Washington, Mr. Chairman, that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be recalled before this committee to express himself on this point, and I am satisfied that on the basis of a reading of the complete secret document, itself, and a pointing out to this committee of what this document contains in the pages preceding item 37 in the document, that General Bradl will be able to point out to this committee, and to the country, that nothing was kept from General MacArthur which General MacArthur didn't very well know prior to his receipt of item 37.

CONSIDERATION OF EVACUATION FROM KOREA, JANUARY 1950

Now, Mr. Chairman, I want to call attention to page 1928 of the transcript, where General Bradley, under oath, before this committee, mentions the January 10 message.

Noe what he says:

> On January the 10th General MacArthur came in with a message pointing out that under the present conditions he thought we were going to have difficulty in staying in Korea. He pointed out that the morale of the troops was not too good after a long fight, and some of the remarks that had been made about them at various places in the world and it was rather a gloomy message.
>
> The Chiefs proposed an answer to that and it was discussed with the Department of State and they wanted to put certain political reasons also in this directive. The Joint Chiefs of Staff objected to that. It ended up in a discussion at the White House with the President and the decision was made that the military part of this discussion would be pulled out and sent as a directive to General MacArthur, and then the State Department would prepare with the President a letter on political policy which he would send separately, so the military part of that was pulled out and sent in the directive of January the 12th.

I point that testimony out, Mr. Chairman, because I think it shows that MacArthur was fully advised in response to his January 10 message in regard to the military policy of our Goversment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by the President of the United States in a separate message in respect to our political and diplomatic foreign policy.

Let me call attention now, Mr. Chairman, to page 120 of the transcript, in which General MacArthur says at that point that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were afraid that we could not stay in Korea, but he felt that we could. This is his testimony:

> The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not sure we could stick in Korea. It was my opinion that we could.

As of that time—it was very clear it was his opinion at that time.

We find on page 2346 the text of MacArthur's message of January 10, and I will not read it all, other than to emphasize this sentence from it:

> In view of the self-evident fact that as presently constituted my command is of strength insufficient to hold a position in Korea and protect simultaneously Japan against external assault, strategic dispositions taken in the present situation must be based upon overriding political policy establishing the relativity of American interests in the Far East.

And, as the records shows, following the receipt of that message and the reply of January 12, and the 13th, General Collins flew out to Korea, made his own personal reconnaissance of the situation, and reported back that he thought the situation wasn't quite as serious as General MacArthur had feared in his January 10 message, and that we could hold.

Now, on this matter of evacuation again, Mr. Chairman, let's take a look at 4263 of the record, with Admiral Sherman on the stand. What do we find?

> Senator SMITH. Now, I would like to ask you another question. The point has been raised that General MacArthur was the first one to suggest the possibility of evacuation in Korea. I am wondering if you recall just how that suggestion did originate. I have been trying to study these documents here in this compilation—

referring to this secret exhibit to which I have referred—

> and it seems to me that impression is hardly justified by the memoranda here.
>
> Do you recall whether the suggestion first came as a question from the Joint Chiefs or whether MacArthur himself said he thought we would have to evacuate?
>
> Admiral SHERMAN. As I recall it, and it may be possible to verify it from a reexamination of this compilation—the first report, the first communication that I had, which raised the possibility, came from our naval commander, who, of course, was concerned with questions of shipping and readiness.
>
> For example, at the end of November, probably I would say the 29th or 30th, a day along in there, I remember I sent him one very short message which was that I assumed that he would hold any shipping that he might have need for, hoping that he would stop any return of empty ships to the United States because of the obvious possible requirements.

I cite that, Mr. Chairman, because I think it bears out what I have set forth earlier in my remarks that all of our military officials, in fact, were considering this evacuation possibility.

CONCLUSIONS FROM SUMMARY PARAPHRASE

I close this part of my statement, Mr. Chairman, by giving this sumary statement: In my judgment, the secret exhibit which is before us, in the pages that precede item 37 referred to by my good friend from Washington, Mr. Cain, yesterday, I think, leaves no room for doubt on the part of those who will read it that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had certainly made clear to General MacArthur over a long period of time what their position was in regard to supplying troops, in regard to reinforcements, in regard to extending the war, and in regard to what ought to be undertaken by way of planning, at least in connection with either retreat or evacuation problems and, therefore, I think it ought to be said that I do not share in what I think is the clear implication of the Senator's remarks yesterday, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have in some way deluded this committee or failed to disclose to these committees the full statement of the communications that they had sent to General MacArthur.

Now, Mr. Secretary, I have a series of questions here—I cannot begin to cover them all, but I have a series of questions here—which under the rules and procedure of these committees, I feel bound, as a matter of senatorial courtesy to ask you. They are not my questions. I do not agree with some of the implications of some of the questions, but they are questions that Members of the Senate, not members of these committees, have asked me to ask; and as a matter of giving them the same courtesy and cooperation that I would expect of them if I were a member of one of the committees conducting an investigation of which they were members, I now proceed to ask you these questions with that explanation.

EFFECT OF YALTA AGREEMENT ON SITUATION IN MANCHURIA

One member wants me to ask you on Yalta, on the question of the Yalta Conference as follows: Did not the Japanese have a large stock of arms and ammunition in Manchuria in 1945?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir; I believe they did.

Senator Morse. He points out in a note to his question that some have estimated that these arms were sufficient to supply some five hundred thousand to a million troops for 5 years. Do you know whether that would be a fair estimate?

Secretary Acheson. I don't know about that, sir.

Senator Morse. Did not the Japanese have large arsenals in Manchuria capable of replacing much of this material as it was used up?

Secretary Acheson. There were arsenals in Manchuria.

Senator Morse. As a result of the Yalta agreement were not the Chinese deprived of the use of the two best ports in Manchuria, Port Arthur, and Dairen?

Secretary Acheson. I don't think so, Senator.

Senator Morse. In fairness to my Senatorial colleague, I will now ask you this question, not in the sheet of questions he has handed me, in view of the answer that you have just given.

Is the reason that you do not think so because you feel that the Yalta agreement did not exclude the use of these ports by Chinese ships; that it would have been possible under the agreement reached at Yalta for a cooperative relationship of use to exist between Russia and China in regard to Port Arthur and Dairen?

Secretary Acheson. That was true with the Port of Dairen. Port Arthur was a naval base so that is one reason for my statement.

The other one was that the Russians were in a position, regardless of the agreement at Yalta, to get the rights, which they subsequently got through the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945.

Senator Morse. Did not the joint Russian control of the Manchurian railroads complicate the supply problem of the Chinese Nationalists?

Secretary Acheson. I do not think so, sir.

Senator Morse. On June 7 you indicated that you concurred with the testimony of General Barr which criticized the Chinese Nationalists because, "Instead of being content with consolidating North China, the Army was given the concurrent mission of seizing control of Manchuria, a task beyond its logistic capabilities."

Since the United States transported Chinese Nationalist troops to Manchuria, did we not share some responsibility for placing them in this hazardous situation?

Secretary Acheson. I think, as I pointed out in my statement, that General Wedemeyer's view in 1945 was that the only way that the Nationalist Government could get a hold on North China was through an agreement with the Communists. If they did not get that, then the military operation was probably beyond their power.

He also thought the only way they could go into Manchuria was through agreement first of all with the Communists, the Chinese Communists, and then with the Russians with regard to Manchuria. The arrangements which General Marshall was able to work out through the cease-fire activities and the Army reorganization activities were such that the Communists in China and the Soviet Government agreed to the reoccupation of Manchuria, and at the earnest request of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek we transported and supplied the troops there.

Senator Morse. In the Yalta agreement did not the United States as well as the Soviet undertake to preserve the sovereignty of China, and, when this was violated, should we not have undertaken steps to reduce the danger to the Nationalist armies in Manchuria?

Secretary Acheson. No; I think the answer to that is "No," and also the answer is that we did everything we could to assist and preserve the Nationalist armies in Manchuria, including supplying them.

Senator Morse. Would you agree with me that certainly the answer is "No" if the indication is that we ought to have sent American ground forces onto the soil of China in order to protect and defend the Nationalists?

Secretary Acheson. I should agree with your view.

Senator Morse. The next question: Since the Nationalist armies in Manchuria had been chiefly supplied with American equipment, were they not particularly handicapped by the 10 months' embargo imposed by General Marshall?

Secretary Acheson. The information which I have given earlier was that that was not the cause of their difficulties.

Senator Morse. The next question: In view of the above, why would you answer "No" to Senator McMahon's question?—

> Have you ever been told of any military connection between the defeat of Chiang and those concessions that were made to the Soviet Union at Yalta?

Secretary Acheson. I just don't believe there is any connection at all, Senator.

UNITED STATES ROLE IN CHINA DURING COALITION EFFORT

Senator Morse. You indicated in your testimony that the initiative for a coalition government in China came from Chiang. Is there not a statement in the white paper by the President to the effect that this was initiated at a conference of Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States in Moscow?

Secretary Acheson. I don't think so, sir. I have not heard of that.

Senator Morse. Was General Chennault not correct when he reported in his book, The Way of a Fighter, that General Marshall pressured Chiang Kai-shek to withdraw his troops which had surrounded about 100,000 Communists near Canton and 70,000 near Hankow and had blocked off others from the Kalgan Pass, the gateway to Manchuria?

Secretary ACHESON. I do not recall those episodes. If they occurred during the cease-fire operations, they would have been a part of the efforts to stop the fighting.

Senator MORSE. When the Nationalists reluctantly withdrew, is it not true that many Communists went north into Manchuria, where they secured the Japanese arms which the Russians had taken after Yalta?

Secretary ACHESON. Why they withdrew—I am sorry.

Senator MORSE. I will repeat the question.

When the Nationalists reluctantly withdrew——

Secretary ACHESON. Withdrew from where?

Senator MORSE. From this Canton area, I assume.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, Canton is in the south of China.

Senator MORSE. Well, I guess that what this had in mind is: When the Nationalists reluctantly retreated from their northern positions, is it not true that many Communists went north into Manchuria, where they secured the Japanese arms that the Russians had taken after Yalta?

Secretary ACHESON. I do not understand the first part of the question, but I think it is true that the Communists went into Manchuria and did get the surrendered Japanese arms.

Senator MORSE. I might say that I assumed from the question that he means when the Communist forces forced Chiang into retreat to the south, did that not leave the Communists free to go into Manchuria and seize the arms that were there in Manchuria. And your answer, as I understand it, is that when they did go into Manchuria they were then in the position to get the arms.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. Now, did not General Marshall pressure Chiang Kai-shek to demobilize 100 divisions before even the terms of the coalition were worked out and without any demobilization by the Communists; did that not weaken the position of Chiang?

Secretary ACHESON. Oh, I think that the question misunderstands the situation, at least as I understand it—that the proposal for demobilization was a proposal which should take place at a time when the new armies would be put together under the new constitutional regime and that there would be a demobilization of both forces down to the strength of 60 divisions—and that never took place.

Senator MORSE. Did not the Nationalists agree to admit 13 Communists to a national council of 40?

Secretary ACHESON. I have forgotten the number of Communists that were to be on that council, but the agreement was entered into between the Nationalists and the Communists in the beginning of 1946, January and February of 1946.

Senator MORSE. I judge from the next question that the questioner has in mind that the Nationalists agreed to admit 13 Communists because his next question reads as follows:

> Did not the Communists demand 14 seats, which would have given them veto power as a two-thirds majority was necessary for a change of policy under the Chinese Constitution?

Secretary **Acheson**. I just haven't got those facts sufficiently in mind to answer that question.

Senator **Morse**. After trying for several months to persuade the Nationalists to give the Communists 14 seats, did not General Marshall impose an embargo against all shipments of arms and ammunition to the Nationalists from August 1946 to May 1947.

Secretary **Acheson**. There was an embargo, but it had nothing to do with that political question.

Senator **Morse**. Did not the report of the subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee of the Eightieth Congress state that the Nationalist Government reported that during the period of this truce, which was the period of the Marshall Mission, the Communists increased their control from 60 to 300 government units in China corresponding to counties in the United States?

Secretary **Acheson**. I just don't know about that.

Chairman **Russell**. Your time has expired, Senator.

Senator **Morse**. I want to say in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, that I have done my best to cover my colleague's questions. I fell far short. I feel I have consumed enough of the Secretary's time in this hearing. If any of my other colleagues want to take these questions before the hearing is over and ask them of the Secretary, I will be glad to supply them with the questions.

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Kefauver?

GENERAL AGREEMENT ON FOREIGN POLICY

Senator **Kefauver**. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, before asking my first question, I would like to preface it with a brief statement. That is I feel that your clear and full statements at this hearing have done much to give us of the committee, and I am sure the public generally, a much clearer picture of our foreign policy in the Far East and also, of course, the foreign policy generally in the North Atlantic, which has been touched upon. So that you have answered the questions fully, and I think much good has come from this examination.

As you know, Mr. Secretary, generally insofar as the foreign policy of the Government has gone, I have over the course of the years been in substantial agreement. My objection has been that as to our allies we do not have the satisfactory political government to give General Eisenhower the political backing which I think is necessary in his efforts to have a North Atlantic defense establishment; and that we do not have the means of securing proper conformity and working together in connection with our general foreign policy between us and our friends of the North Atlantic; also that our efforts in what we have done have been too much on a piecemeal basis, have been too complicated, and too far removed from the people.

But I am not going to go into that general question with you at this time.

I agree that our foreign policy, which has largely been nonpartisan or bipartisan, has generally been in the right direction, that we have at least bought the time that will enable us to take other steps which, I hope, may preserve the peace and security of the world.

I do think it is very important, as you are reaching what I am sure you are glad to be the end of your testimony before this committee at this time, to restate the points of our foreign policy in the Far East.

You have done so in your original statement, and it has been discussed from time to time in the hearing.

I would like, Mr. Secretary, in a very amateurish way, to give what I conceive to be a restatement of your ideas as to our foreign policy and ask you if that is substantially correct. I do this in the interest of showing that we do have a definite and, I think, as far as it goes an effective foreign policy in the Far East; and that some statements that we have no foreign policy at all in the Far East are incorrect.

OUR FAR EAST POLICY

Is this true, Mr. Secretary, that insofar as our foreign policy in the Far East we have consistently tried to build up and to support the Nationalist Government of China?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Kefauver. And that another part of our foreign policy is that we have stood by and tried to support the people of the Philippines and to help them in every way possible to see they have security and a stable government?

Secretary Acheson. I think that is correct, Senator.

Senator Kefauver. And that we showed that we were not interested in annexing their territory by doing what I think was one of the greatest things that has ever been done, by any nation—granting the people of the Philippines their independence some 6 years ago?

Secretary Acheson. That is correct.

Senator Kefauver. And, Mr. Secretary, we have had a definite foreign policy in connection with Kashmir in using our good offices to try to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Indian-Pakistan agreement so those two Governments could get along peacefully and pursue what we would hope to be a democratic government. Is that correct?

Secretary Acheson. We have done everything we could through the United Nations to that end.

Senator Kefauver. And that, insofar as Indochina is concerned, we used our good offices in trying to see that the people of that nation had some degree of independence, and that we have supported the standing government against the inroads of the Communists—is that Bao Dai? How do you pronounce it?

Secretary Acheson. Bao Dai.

Senator Kefauver. I mean we supported the Bao Dai government against Ho Chih Min. Is that Communist?

Secretary Acheson. Ho Chih Min.

Senator Kefauver. And is it true that we are pursuing our policy in Indochina in that direction?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Kefauver. And that in Malaya and Burma we do have missions of some kind with which we are trying to assist them to stay a part of the free world?

Secretary Acheson. I think we have been giving assistance there—I will have to look it up—in connection with the fight against the Communists.

Senator KEFAUVER. That is generally a part of our Far East policy; is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes.

INTERDEPENDENCE OF VARIOUS ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES FAR EAST POLICY

Senator KEFAUVER. And that in connection with making a Japanese peace treaty satisfactory with our friends in the Pacific, especially Australia and New Zealand, we have negotiated or are in the process of negotiating agreements with these two outstanding democracies of mutual protection?

Secretary ACHESON. We are now working on such arrangements with Australia and New Zealand.

Senator KEFAUVER. And that is leading in the direction or is part of the general pattern of working out a peace treaty with the Japanese people; is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

Senator KEFAUVER. And that we are taking effective steps, and Mr. Dulles and other members of the State Department have been in Japan recently in an effort to bring about a reinstitution of the Japanese nation on a democratic basis?

Secretary ACHESON. That has been the constant effort of the occupation and all branches of this Government.

Senator KEFAUVER. And that in Korea we are trying to avoid the mistake that was made after World War I of letting aggression be rewarded, feeling that on this first severe test that we had to take a definite stand in the interests of the United Nations and generally of the Far East policy of this Nation; is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. The whole question of collective security was involved, and we have taken a very firm stand; yes, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Secretary, in connection with the importance of maintaining our position and of retarding aggression in Korea, I think sometimes the Members of the Congress and people of the public generally may overlook the importance of what we are doing there as it relates to Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Indochina, Malaya, Burma, and the other nations that we have been in negotiations with in the carrying out of our foreign policy. Do you note that that is true?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. Is it not true that our position, the position of ourselves and our allies in preventing the aggression in Korea, is enabling us to carry forward with more success the foreign policy that we and our friends have decided is the correct one, and these other nations that I have referred to?

Secretary ACHESON. That is true.

Senator KEFAUVER. What would happen, Mr. Secretary, in your opinion, if we should do as some few people have been suggesting and have suggested, but, of course, as General MacArthur and General Marshall and others have said would be catastrophic, if we should withdraw our assistance in Korea and let the country be overrun? What would be the effect upon Indochina, Burma, and Malaya?

Secretary ACHESON. It would be very adverse, indeed, Senator.

Senator KEFAUVER. Another part of our foreign policy has been to consistently maintain that Formosa should not be in Communist hands.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. I suppose an abandonment of our effort in Korea would also very adversely affect our position in Formosa?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Secretary, in contemporary times are there any other parts of our foreign policy in the Far East that you at this time should like to bring out for the attention of the Congress and the American people?

Secretary ACHESON. I think you have covered the main points, Senator, with the understanding, of course, that the whole economic program operates throughout that area.

Senator KEFAUVER. Going back a little bit, another point in your program was trying to assist Chiang on the recommendations of Generals Marshall, Wedemeyer, Admiral Spruance, Mr. Hurley, a generally bipartisan group. They did, upon his invitation, try to assist in bringing stability and working arrangements between the forces in China into effect?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

Senator KEFAUVER. But, at no time, except by the agreement of Chiang Kai-shek, has the American Government tried to force any consolidation with Communists upon Chiang; is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. We have never tried to force that at all.

STRENGTHENING BIPARTISANSHIP

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Secretary, I have a feeling that the American people generally and all parties are in agreement that we certainly cannot have two or three foreign policies in this country and get along; so, I think it has been very helpful to bring about some general understanding again of what we are trying to do. But, unfortunately, we do have disagreement, particularly among us in political life, in our Far East policy.

I think that may be somewhat brought about by lack of understanding of just what the administration's program was and what was trying to be accomplished.

What recommendations do you have to try to get back to the good days when Senator Vandenberg and Senator Connally and many others—and we were able to have a so-called nonpartisan foreign policy and leave out bickering, which hurts our effort, or is that a question you would rather not go into at this point?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I am just doing everything I can all the time to bring that about.

I know nothing that I have not done that I could do.

Senator KEFAUVER. Well, yesterday I had the opportunity, Mr. Secretary, of appearing before the Rules Committee of the Senate in connection with further plans to strengthen or reorganize the procedures of Congress, and I stated there that I thought it would be helpful to Congress and the people, in understanding our foreign policy, if on occasions it would be possible for Cabinet members, and particularly the Secretary of State, to explain to the Members of Congress what our plans and purposes were, and what we were doing at that time, and to have a face-to-face discussion under the proper rules so as to bring out the facts and let the American people know what is going on.

Would you favor such a program, on your own part?

Secretary **Acheson**. Well, I am always glad to discuss these matters with any groups in the Congress, whether they are committees or private groups, or the whole Senate or House, in whatever way they would like to have it discussed.

Senator **Kefauver**. I have no other questions at this time, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I compliment you upon the way you have handled the questions that have been asked you.

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Sparkman, do you desire to proceed now, or shall we proceed with another member of the Armed Services Committee?

Senator **Sparkman**. If it has reached me again, I will take it.

Chairman **Russell**. You were reached earlier, but suggested it would be fair to give some other member at this table an opportunity, and I did.

If you wish to go ahead now, you may proceed.

Senator **Sparkman**. I will, Mr. Chairman.

MILITARY AID GIVEN CHINA

Mr. Secretary, I want to ask you just a question or two about military help to China, without duplicating the great deal that has been said.

Do I understand correctly, from the record, that the only time that there was any let-up in our granting military aid to China was during the 10 months from August 1946 to May 1947?

Secretary **Acheson**. I think that is correct, Senator.

Senator **Sparkman**. That is the way I get it from the record, and that even during that time there were certain arms turned over, I believe, by abandonment by our forces in some area of China, perhaps our Marines.

When did the Marines come out of China?

Secretary **Acheson**. The ammunition was made available by the United States Marines and Navy in north China beginning in April until September 1947.

The other day there was a question raised by Senator Brewster as to whether the phrase "small arms and artillery ammunition" meant small-arms ammunition and artillery ammunition.

The answer is "It did." I have here and will submit as an exhibit in the record a detailed statement of all the ammunition which was turned over by the Marines at that time, and it is all ammunition, and it is ammunition for artillery and ammunition for small arms.

Chairman **Russell**. Since the document consists of only three pages, it will be printed in the record.

(The document referred to above reads as follows:)

ANNEX III. AMMUNITION MADE AVAILABLE BY THE UNITED STATES MARINES-NAVY IN NORTH CHINA—APRIL–SEPTEMBER 1947

When the United States Marines were evacuated from North China, the Military Establishment and the State Department agreed to authorize them to leave behind a number of dumps of ammunition. The Chinese Nationalists were to be informed so that they could take possession, without cost to them. This decision was implemented by the Marines between April and September 1947. The Chinese Nationalists were informed in every case and took control of the ammunition. Small stocks of Navy ammunition were also made available to the Chinese during this period.

A. The following ammunition was abandoned by the First Marine Division during the months of April to May 1947 in the Peiping-Tientsin area:

Type	*Units*
Rockets, high explosive, antitank 2.36 inch	3,646
Rockets, high explosive, antitank 4.50 inch	300
20-millimeter	9,493
37-millimeter	4,993
60-millimeter mortar	47,678
80-millimeter mortar	20,916
75-millimeter gun	5,577
105-millimeter howitzer	64,538
155-millimeter howitzer	18,726
155-millimeter prop, charge	10,725
Grenades, hand	55,529
Grenades, rifle	23,038
Demolition blocks	47,438
TNT, pounds	29,787
Charges, M–12, prop	2,420
Bangalore torpedoes	3,020
Mines, antipersonnel	1,014
Mines, antitank	2,636
Small arms:	
.30-caliber	2,195,370
.45-caliber	94,100
.50-caliber	225,515
Grenade adapters	8,592
Flame throwers, portable	35
Flame throwers, cylinders	302
Bombs, 500 pounds GP	62
Demolition charges	3,248
Artillery fuzes	16,975
Pyrotechnics	13,174
Blasting caps	32,913
Blasting fuze, feet	100,500
Firing device	2,575
Detonators	460
Shaped charges	288
Detonating cord, feet	366.200
Firecrackers, M–11	1,200
Ignition cylinder, M–1	3,000
Napalm, gallons	12,751
Bomb fuzes, AN, M–230	48
Shells, shotgun, 12-gage	9,000
Lighter fuze	72,581

B. The following ammunition was transferred to the Chinese Navy and charged to lend-lease:

(1) Ammunition transferred from storage at Tsingtao Airfield (this ammunition had previously been removed from magazines of vessels transferred to the Chinese Nationalists under Public Law 512, 79th Cong.).

Type	*Units*
3 inch/50	1,246
40-millimeter	6,592
20-millimeter	169,560
.50-caliber	38,150
.45-caliber	250
.30-caliber	99,000

(2) Ammunition in the magazines of some of the ships transferred to the Chinese (while the ships were transferred under Public Law 512, 79th Cong.; the ammunition in the ships was accounted for as part of the transfers accomplished in North China).

Type	*Units*
3 inch/50	1,781
40-millimeter	37,767
20-millimeter	208,835
.50-caliber	80,255
.45-caliber	29,520
.30-caliber	157,414
.22-caliber	55,560

(3) Ammunition transferred at Shanghai shipped from United States as training allowance:

Type	*Units*
3-inch/50	250
40-millimeter	100,000
20-millimeter	150,000
.30-caliber	20,000

C. Between May 19 and September 13, 1947, the Fleet Marine Force, Western Pacific, declared "unserviceable" stocks of ammunition from its reserves which it did not wish to take with it when it evacuated. It abandoned them, small quantities at a time, in revetments near Tsangkou Airfield, Tsingtao, after notification to the Chinese National Army garrison commander.

The ammunition in question included:

Type	*Units*
105-millimeter howitzer	24,665
81-millimeter mortar	30,903
60-millimeter mortar	28,042
75-millimeter howitzer	9,337
155-millimeter prop charge	6,485
155-millimeter prop charge	929
Grenade, hand, fragmentation	27,575
Grenade, hand, all others	13,640
Grenades, rifle, all types	9,650
Bangalore torpedoes	1,810
Small arms, caliber .30, carbine and rifle	1,488,490
Mines, antitank	732
Mines, antipersonnel	686
Shaped charges 40#	634
Shaped charges 10#	200
Grenade adapters, all types	4,272
Shell, 37-millimeter, all types and shot	1,035
Rocket, high explosive, antitank	321
Flares, trip, all types	911
Device, firing, pressure-type	980
Device, firing, pull-type	1,410
Device, firing, push-type	340
Device, firing, release-type	1,040
Lighter, fuze, waterproof	102,000
Lighter, fuze, friction-type	55,000
Pyrotechnic signals, ground	1,010
Fuze, igniting, hand grenade	7,725
Shells, shotgun # 0 0 B	720
Cord, detonating (Prima) 500-foot spools	280

Senator SPARKMAN. As I recall, Senator Brewster was asking that question based upon a statement made by a Colonel Dooley, was it?

Secretary ACHESON. Colonel Moody, I think his name was.

Senator SPARKMAN. Colonel Moody. If Colonel Moody's statement was to the effect that we did not furnish them small-arms ammunition, that is not correct. Is that right?

Secretary ACHESON. This is a record of what the ammunition was that was furnished by the Marines. There was other ammunition also furnished.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, Mr. Secretary, in the China Aid Act of 1948 we did proved for additional military aid; did we not?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct, Senator Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. That virtually sets up a credit of $125,000,000 upon which the Chinese Nationalist Government could draw very largely upon their own discretion, does it not?

Secretary ACHESON. That is right. They had the money put at their disposal and they spent it in the way they wanted to spend it.

Senator SPARKMAN. And they have been drawing on that fund ever since, and I believe you told us the other day there was still about $1,000,000 in that that had not been drawn upon.

Secretary ACHESON. I gave you the figures. I do not remember it.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, I do not care to go over it.

REPORT ON CHINA AID ACT OF 1948

Mr. Secretary, I have just been looking over the report of the Senate committee, the Foreign Relations Committee, that reported that foreign-aid bill, S. 2393, and I want to read briefly from that report. That was during the Eightieth Congress. Senator Vandenberg was chairman of the committee, and in the report submitted by Senator Vandenberg appears the following statement, and I quote:

> Under the present circumstances it is not possible to develop a practical, effective, long-term, over-all program for Chinese economic recovery, predicated upon outside assistance from the United States. We cannot underwrite the destiny of China. * * *
>
> The committee feels that the United States should not be in the position of being held responsible for the conduct of the Chinese Government in its political, economic, and military affairs. It is believed that this aid program, designed to meet the most essential commodity requirements, would relieve human suffering and give the hard-working people of China a chance to arrest the rate of economic deterioration in China, and afford the Chinese Government another opportunity to undertake a vigorous program of self-help. An aid program such as proposed by the Department of State, under the present realities, may not arouse much hopeful enthusiasm among Americans, although the committee believes it sufficient to encourage the constructive democratic elements in China. * * *
>
> During recent months, there has been a great deal of discussion, both in and out of Congress about the desirability of extending military aid to China. The committee considered this question at some length with particular emphasis on the impact of such assistance upon our total foreign policy. * * *
>
> For many years the United States has been deeply interested in the maintenance of the integrity and independence of China—which is clearly one of the essential elements of peace in the Far East. Today that independence and integrity are threatened by civil strife. If no aid is given now by the United States, the inference appears to be clear that we face either the possibility of China becoming a Communist-dominated satellite state or a civil war of increased length and intensity.
>
> China is a maze of imponderables. It is impossible to know the quantity and type of aid necessary for the restoration of a stable and independent China. The committee is convinced, however, that the assistance contemplated in this bill should appreciably strengthen the position of the National Government without, at the same time, involving the United States in any additional commitments of a military nature.

That pretty well stated the viewpoint of the administration in asking for this program, did it not?

Secretary ACHESON. I think so, sir. That stated of course the view of the committee which——

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, and as I recall, the committee reported it unanimously. That was one of those unanimous reports, I think, which occurred with such remarkable frequency during this time.

SENATOR VANDENBERG'S SPEECH ON CHINA AID ACT

On the floor of the Senate Senator Vandenberg said as follows, and I quote:

> As in the case of Greece and Turkey, your Committee on Foreign Relations recognizes that military aid is necessary in order to make economic aid effective. It proposes to make military supplies available, at China's option. For this or any other purpose, at China's option, a grant of $100,000,000 is included in the bill. This implements a heavy program of transfers of military surplus, at nominal prices already under way, and to be extended. Your committee believes, as a matter of elementary prudence, that this process must be completely clear of any implication that we are underwriting the military campaign of the Nationalist Government. No matter what our heart's desire might be, any such implication would be impossible over so vast an area. Therefore, for the sake of clarity, we prefer to leave the initiative, in respect to these particular funds, in the hands of the Nationalist Government. The current net result is no less effective. We want it to be no less effective. But we also want no mistake about the nature of our obligations.

And he went on:

> Under another law the United States will continue to furnish military advisers to the Government of China at her request. At the present time this group consists of 572 officers and 921 enlisted men. This includes military policy and weather and air transport personnel. None of this personnel commands Chinese troops nor engages in combat. Their capacity is advisory only. Combat units of American troops definitely are not involved. Nothing in the pending bill alters these limitations on these plans in any aspect.

That was the policy which the Government carried out, wasn't it, under the China Aid Act?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

AMOUNTS AUTHORIZED AND APPROPRIATED FOR CHINA AID ACT OF 1948

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, Mr. Secretary, you will recall I assume that the final action on appropriations as between the House and the Senate was $400,000,000, wasn't it?

Secretary ACHESON. That was the final amount appropriated.

Senator SPARKMAN. The State Department and the administration had asked for $570,000,000?

Secretary ACHESON. That is true, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, you may not recall that when Secretary Marshall was before us, Senator Bridges asked him the question if he did not think that the Republican Eightieth Congress did very nicely with reference to China in spite of the State Department's attitude.

Senator Bridges was the chairman of the Appropriations Committee at that time. As a matter of fact, you asked for $170,000,000 more than you got, did you not?

Secretary ACHESON. We asked for, the Department or the Government asked for $170,000,000 more than it got. The period of time that its appropriation covered was 15 months. The appropriated funds covered 12 months.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes; and as I recall, the committee pointed out that had your full request gone through, that would have been $463,000,000 to cover the 12 months, and I will say in all fairness that the Senate passed it for $450,000,000, but the final figure agreed on was $400,000,000.

Now, Mr. Secretary, the other day I referred to an editorial that Congressman Judd, of Minnesota, had inserted in the Congressional Record on February 1, 1946, entitled "China Progress." That editorial appears in the Congressional Record on February 4, 1946. It is at page A449 of the Congressional Record.

I did not indicate the paper from which that editorial was taken. I would like to say at this time that it was the Washington Daily News, and I believe was run in all of the Scripps-Howard papers. That was the editorial that so very strongly commended the program of working out the coalition government in China, the program that General Marshall was trying to put into effect.

OPPOSITION TO SURRENDER OF FORMOSA AND KOREA

Mr. Secretary, over the radio last night I heard—I did not read this in the paper, I did not see it in the morning paper, but I heard—that Senator Taft on yesterday in a press interview said that you had shown by your testimony—I think I am quoting correctly as I heard over the radio—a willingness to surrender Korea and Formosa to the Communists.

Have you said anything here from which any such inference could fairly be drawn?

Secretary Acheson. I don't think so, sir.

Senator Sparkman. That is not your belief, is it?

Secretary Acheson. No.

Senator Sparkman. Is that the belief of the Department of State or the administration?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir.

Senator Sparkman. And you adhere to the statement that you have made here repeatedly over and over that we shall do everything that we can to prevent Formosa falling into the hands of the Red Communists or of any group that would be hostile to us?

Secretary Acheson. I have stated that so many times.

Senator Sparkman. And the same thing is true with reference to Korea?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

HONG KONG COURT DECISION ON CHINESE PLANES

Senator Sparkman. Mr. Secretary, I am not sure whether you have been asked these questions or not. If you have, I hope you will tell me and we won't spend any time on it, but some time ago, back about May 21 I think it was, I was somewhat disturbed to read in the press of the decision in Hong Kong relating to the planes, a number of planes that an airline owned by General Chennault, I believe, had claimed.

Then a few days after that there was carried in the press a story that Mr. McDermott, the press representative, Mr. Michael J. McDermott, Department press officer, said that under the embargo against the Chinese Communists that those planes could not be exported to China. Have you made any statement here yet relating to that situation?

Secretary Acheson. I don't think I have, Senator.

Senator Sparkman. I wonder if you could tell us something about that.

Secretary Acheson. Would you tell me again what it is that you are referring to?

Senator Sparkman. On the 21st of May I think it was—yes, on May 21—the Hong Kong court gave a decision relating to certain planes that had been impounded there, I believe, and they had ruled that the title to these planes had passed to the Chinese Communists. Then a few days after that Mr. McDermott said that under the embargo these planes would not be allowed to go to the Communist Chinese.

Secretary Acheson. Yes; this is a matter which has been in litigation for quite a long time in the courts at Hong Kong.

On the date you mentioned, the court before which it was in litigation made the decision which you state. That decision, I understand it has been appealed, and pending the appeal the court order which impounds the planes in question continues in force.

Senator Sparkman. Well, is that the attitude of the Department? Was that correctly stated by Mr. McDermott, that in our opinion under the embargo they would not be allowed in anyhow?

Secretary Acheson. Yes; that is correct.

WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED STATES MARINES FROM CHINA URGED IN 1945

Senator Sparkman. Mr. Secretary, there has been a good bit said here about the withdrawal of our troops from China, our marines from China.

I do not care to belabor the point, but you remember when Mr. Albert J. Engel was a Congressman from the State of Michigan. At one time I believe he was chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee for Military Matters.

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir; I recall he was.

Senator Sparkman. I should like to call your attention to a statement that he made on the floor of the House on November 5, 1945, to be found in the Congressional Record of that date on page A4734, and I quote:

> I want to add, however, that I am very much alarmed at the activity of the American Army in China. You cannot help to move troops in a country that is at war, and China does have civil war, without becoming involved on one side or the other. Selling China war materials is one thing, helping to maneuver her troops into a position where she can defeat those with whom she is at war is another, and is actually taking part on one side of the civil war in China. The American people will not tolerate any action on the part of our Government which will involve them in another war in the Orient. Every American and I think every Member of Congress wants these men brought out of the China-Burma-India theater as soon as possible now that the war is over.

That was a pretty general feeling, was it not, after the shooting war was over, to bring them back home from wherever they were placed?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator Sparkman. Mr. Secretary, I have other citations along this same line, but I am not going to bother to put them in.

QUESTION OF VETOING RED CHINESE SEATING IN UN

I have many other questions that I might think of. I do want to say this, Mr. Secretary, in connection with my questions to you this morning with reference to the use of the veto to keep out Communist

China. Rather I was this morning talking about the use of the veto generally.

I do believe, and I gather from your testimony here that you believe, that we ought not to surrender any resource that we have toward working to the greatest possible extent to our advantage, or our advantageous position in the United Nations; and I do not gather from anything you have said, that you mean that we should foreclose the use of the veto, if the time should ever come when we need to use it.

That was the position taken in the case of Trygve Lie, was it not?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. I personally believe that we ought to use every resource at our command to keep out Communist China; and, Mr. Secretary, I would like to say this, too, because in the statement by Senator Bridges, he seemed to imply that anybody that asked any—raised any questions with reference to the China lobby was exercising a degree of unfriendliness toward the Nationalist Chinese Government.

I certainly do not. I am very strongly for the Nationalist China Government, and have been all along; but I don't think that should prevent us from raising any just criticism that might be raised with reference to the efforts of some of the people who likewise are interested in the Nationalist Chinese Government.

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Chairman, I am through.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hunt?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain?

Senator CAIN. Good morning, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Chairman, I am very grateful to my friend from Oregon, Senator Morse, for the paper he read earlier, in which he maintained that our committee must read and study all of the 79 pages which preceded the paraphrase of the JCS message of December 29, 1950, to General MacArthur, which appears on page 80 in the Joint Chiefs of Staff report for the joint committee, in order that the committee and the country might understand what the paraphrase of the December 29, 1950, message actually intended to say, and really meant.

Such a defense of an official paraphrase, which said little, when there was much that could and should have been committed to writing for the consideration of the committee, appears to me to be totally unrelated to any knowledge whatsoever of how accurate and definitive the military can be, be it so minded; and seeks to justify carelessness which only the Joint Chiefs of Staff are qualified to attempt to explain.

Mr. Chairman, I enjoy the Senator from Oregon, but I am looking for facts which his recitation only further beclouded.

STATE DEPARTMENT ROLE IN JCS MESSAGE OF DECEMBER 29, 1950

Mr. Secretary, with reference to one of my questions to you; on yesterday you testified that you would find it necessary to refer to your notes to see whether you, yourself, participated in the formulation of the December 29 message sent by the JCS to General MacArthur.

Have you been able, sir, to determine your own part in the making of that message?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes; I think I can, sir.

This question came up in the early part of December, I believe on December—I have an idea it was on December 3, I guess it was, and it appears on page 69 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff narrative here, that General MacArthur reported that the situation in Korea must be viewed on the basis of an entirely new war, against an entirely new power of great military strength, and under entirely new conditions.

Furthermore, he reported his command as—

> facing the entire Chinese Nation in an undeclared war.

This is paragraph 4 on page 69.

> Strategic concepts suitable for operation against the North Korean Army could no longer be applied and unless some positive and immediate action was taken, hope for success could not be justified and steady attrition leading to final destruction could reasonably be contemplated. He further stated that this situation called for political decisions and strategic plans adequate to meet the realities involved.

It was then that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the approval of the President and the Secretary of Defense, replied immediately that the preservation of General MacArthur's forces was now the primary consideration and that consolidation into beachheads was concurred in.

Then, paragraph 9, that was discussed again on the 4th of December by General MacArthur, who informed the Chief of Staff as to his views on the Korean situation. These views were later given orally by the Chief of Staff for the Army to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

His basic position was that the United Nations should not fail to accept the new challenge of Communist Chinese aggression and that the full power of the United Nations should be mounted at once. If reinforcements could arrive in time the most advantageous action would be a withdrawal in successive positions, if necessary, to the Pusan area; otherwise the command should be evacuated.

Then, there is in paragraph 10 a long report by General Collins in which he gives the view of the commander in chief, Far East; and that if all or a major part of the—

> above limitations were placed on his command, while it remained under strong Chinese Communist attack, this, in itself, would represent essentially a surrender. Under these conditions the question of an armistice would be a political matter, helpful but not essential from a military standpoint. Our forces would have to be withdrawn from Korea but we should not be precipitate in seeking an armistice—

and so on.

Senator CAIN. May I ask, if that means that you——

Secretary ACHESON. That discussion——

Senator CAIN. You did help to compile the message, and you saw the message before it was sent to General MacArthur in the field?

Secretary ACHESON. I am answering that question, sir.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

Secretary ACHESON. That led to discussions between the Secretary of Defense and Chiefs of Staff and myself during the latter part of December.

On the 27th of December, General Marshall sent me a proposed draft of a directive, a memorandum. That was discussed with me, and on that evening, December 27, it was discussed with the President and General Bradley and General Marshall.

Then, on the 28th, there was a meeting between General Marshall, General Bradley, and Mr. Rusk on the directive, and again on the 29th at 9 a. m. by Mr. Rusk and General Bradley; and the directive was finally sent out as you have it in your files.

Senator CAIN. I thank you.

Mr. Secretary, it has been said by some that the State Department had told representatives of the JCS or the JCS themselves that the evacuation of Korea, which was discussed in the December 29, 1950, message, was to be arranged in such a way as to make it appear to be not a voluntary evacuation but a forced evacuation. Is there any validity in that rumor, sir?

Secretary ACHESON. No; that is totally false, Senator.

Senator CAIN. Thank you. It has been said by some, sir, that representatives of the State Department told representatives of the JCS or the JCS themselves that the purpose of this was to enable the State Department to go to the United Nations and tell the United Nations what had happened in order to justify further steps which might be taken as against the Chinese Communists. Is there any validity in this statement, sir?

Secretary ACHESON. No; that is quite untrue.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Chairman, before addressing other questions to the Secretary of State, I wish to make a statement about this December 29, 1950, message from the JCS to General MacArthur.

QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE TWO PARAPHRASES OF THE DECEMBER 29 JCS MEETING

On yesterday I read into the record, (*a*) the first paraphrase of the December 29 message which the JCS had furnished to the joint committee before the hearings began; (*b*) the amplification of the summary of the JCS message of December 29, 1950, which the JCS submitted to the joint committee early in June, at the request of the Senator from Califorinia, Mr. Knowland, and myself and other Senators; (*c*) the paraphrase of the message of December 30, 1950, which General MacArthur sent in response to the message received by him from the JCS under the date of December 29, 1950.

On yesterday I pointed out on page 5743 that there was no similarity worthy of the name between the original paraphrase submitted by the JCS to this committee and the supplemental paraphrase which came as a direct result of requests from members of this committee.

I stated on yesterday that some Senators had requested a clarifying paraphrase of the JCS message of December 29, 1950, because we had reason to believe that it did not accurately or fully represent the original message which was sent to General MacArthur. I stated that I was startled and disturbed by the omissions and I shall so continue to be until the JCS has provided this committee with an adequate explanation.

As a member of this committee, my understanding from the beginning of our hearings has been that the only purpose of any paraphrase of any message was to protect the integrity of a code. I take for granted that every member of this committee has assumed that a paraphrase of any message would include every important item covered by the message. I pointed out yesterday that the amplified paraphrase of the JCS message of December 29, 1950, included at least five items which were not mentioned in the original paraphrase of that message.

I mentioned yesterday that I had a considerable respect for the integrity and ability of the JCS. I have the greatest respect and admiration for them. But through no prejudice of this committee, a question has now been raised concerning the integrity of the JCS. I have moved that the JCS be recalled before the committee in order that this question of integrity can be examined and justice done to everybody concerned. Unless the committee receives an acceptable explanation about the differences in the two paraphrases of the same message, we shall remain in doubt about the validity of any and every paraphrase which has been or may be offered to the committee by the administration.

I believe that this committee must go further than to question the JCS about the several paraphrases of the message of December 29, 1950. I believe that the committee ought to examine the original message.

As I thought I had reason to believe that the original paraphrase did not adequately describe the JCS message of December 29, 1950, I now think that I have reason to believe that the amplified paraphrase of that message does not relate the whole story.

CONCLUSIONS FROM THE TWO PARAPHRASES

From a thoughtful study of the two paraphrases, I have concluded that the original message probably emphasized to General MacArthur that his primary mission was not that of repelling aggression in Korea but was that of defending Japan. I have also concluded that General MacArthur was probably told that he could only consider the forces of the Eighth Army to be available to him for the purposes of satisfying his primary mission which was the defense of Japan.

I am inclined to believe that the JCS message of December 29, 1950, was not modified until about January 12, 1951, when the Army Chief of Staff and the Air Force Chief of Staff consulted with CINCFE in the Far East. Following this meeting, it seems to me that reinforcements were sent to Korea and several American divisions were ordered to Japan.

Mr. Chairman, I do not know that my conclusions are correct. I was forced to draw them because of the doubts which have resulted from the two paraphrases which the JCS sent to this committee concerning the JCS message of December 29, 1950.

If my conclusions turn out to be correct, this committee will have for the first time an answer to an important part of the MacArthur riddle. It would mean that a political decision had been made in the United States to evacuate Korea. It would mean that General MacArthur took exception to this decision and offered ways in which the United Nations could attempt to satisfy their mission in Korea. It would establish as being a fact that General MacArthur had not been a party to initiating any consideration for evacuating Korea for political reasons.

I do not like to suggest that the administration is seeking to mislead or cover up or keep this committee in the dark . Up to this minute, however, this committee has no reason to believe that it has all the facts surrounding the MacArthur question.

The sooner we recall the JCS and others who may be concerned to the stand in order that they may provide us with every available fact, the better off this committee and the Nation will be. Until explanations have been offered, our committee will be in no position to reach any sound judgments, as I see it, and the Nation will continue to be in doubt.

Mr. Secretary on June 6, sir, on page 5389——

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain, if you will permit a brief interruption there. I think to keep the record clear it should appear that the original message was seen by the two members of the subcommittee who were appointed to see the messages.

Senator CAIN. I am conscious of that certainly, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. And they had approved this paraphrase.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Chairman, I think your observation is properly a part of the record at this point.

TELEGRAM ON CHINESE COALITION OF MAC ARTHUR, SPRUANCE, AND WEDEMEYER IN 1945

Mr. Secretary, on June 6, page 5389, you read an extract of a cable, which you stated General MacArthur, Admiral Spruance, and General Wedemeyer had sent to the United States, which at least implied that General MacArthur favored a Chinese coalition government to include the Communists.

May I ask, Mr. Secretary, if that was your intention?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, my intention was to give you, as I did, the exact words of the cable.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

Secretary ACHESON. And you have it there.

Senator CAIN. Thank you.

I noticed with some interest, and make reference to it because of what you have just said, sir, a story in the New York Times of Thursday, June 7, the headline of which is this: "MacArthur favored Chinese coalition Acheson testifies"; subheading, "Secretary hits at Republican charge only administration had initiated Red deal."

The story is written by William S. White, special correspondent for the New York Times, and the first two paragraphs of the story read as follows:

> Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared today that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur himself had approved in 1945 a program for bringing together the Chinese Nationalists and Communists in promoting a democratic China.
>
> Mr. Acheson thus hit hard at old Republican charges that only the Roosevelt and Truman administration had been the initiator of an attempt to force the Chinese Nationalist leader, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, to deal with the Communists.

Senator SALTONSTALL. What is the date, please?

Senator CAIN. The date of the story?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Of the telegram.

Senator CAIN. It was in the year 1945, I think, and I know that now we will establish the date, sir, correctly.

Mr. Secretary, would you be kind enough, please, to insert in the record at this point, if it is available, the entire telegram from the three generals to which you made reference on a recent day?

Secretary ACHESON. I have got it here. I have no objection to reading it. Do you wish me to read it?

Senator CAIN. Either read, it, sir, or place it in the record at this point.

Chairman RUSSELL. If it goes in just at this point, he will have to read it, Senator Cain; otherwise it will be a part of the appendix.

Senator CAIN. I appreciate that. And, Mr. Secretary, I would then appreciate your reading the message—for on the day of your testimony about it you, as I understand, only its concluding sentence or two. I have never seen this telegram and have a natural interest in it.

Secretary ACHESON. The telegram is top secret, then there are some symbols after that—IVI. I don't know whether I ought to read all this, that this is significant or not. I will leave out all the symbols. I don't know what they mean.

Senator CAIN. Would you permit me to say this, sir? In your testimony the other day you made this reference to the cable—that it was in a cable of December 1945 which, although it was marked "top secret," also says cryptographic security does not apply.

Secretary ACHESON. Very well; that is right. I was puzzling over some symbols here which I shall leave out because I don't understand them.

Senator CAIN. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON (reading):

> Top Secret IVI
> URGENT
> CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY DOES NOT APPLY. HANDLE AS TOP SECRET CORRESPONDENCE PER PARAS 44g and 53a, AR 380-5
> From: CINCAFPAC Adv Tokyo Japan
> To: War Department
>
> 7 DECEMBER 1945
>
> From SCAP to WARCOS for JCS info COMGEN China CINCPAC Pearl passed Com 5th Flt passed COMSEVENTHFLEET pass CINCAFPAC CNO this is TOPSECRET.
>
> 1. Policy of the US in China is subject to WARX 86183 and CNO 302312 refer.
>
> 2. In the absence of specific answers to the questions raised in COMGEN China's CFBX 16459, but assuming that the policy outlined in WARX 86183 will be approved and that the strength of the US Forces in China can be adequately maintained the following comments on the points raised in the latter reference are submitted with the concurrence of MacArthur, Spruance, and Wedemeyer.
>
> 3. The Chinese have requested lift for six more armies totaling approximately 200,000 men with approximately 30,000 tons of equipment into North China ports using US shipping. Thereafter, the Chinese Armies in northern China and Manchuria will require approximately 50,000 short tons of supplies per month. With these forces the CNA will be able to occupy the vacuum left by the disarmament and evacuation of Japanese forces. Wedemeyer states that he should be able to deliver approximately 500,000 Japanese per month to all Chinese ports including FIC north of 16 degrees, Formosa and Manchuria.
>
> 4. A schedule for lifting the six Chinese Armies mentioned above has been worked out making use of about 75 LST's of the Seventh Fleet. Providing the US Navy crews for these vessels can be maintained and further provided no untoward circumstances arise it appears practicable to lift these six armies in about 50 days from the date of approval by the JCS, which date is hereafter referred to as "X" day in this message. The 50,000 tons per month of supplies required by the Chinese armies in the north can apparently be moved in Liberty ships by methods which are discussed in more detail below. It is emphasized that the whole question of lifting the Chinese armies hinged upon our ability to maintain US Navy crews in the necessary LST's for a period of approximately two months. By methods further discussed below it is believed a considerable number of men can be obtained from LST's now in Marianas. It will probably be necessary however to authorize Commander Seventh Fleet to invoke 60 days of military necessity in some cases.

5. A. Japanese crews can be made available for 100 Liberty ships and conversion of those to be used in repatriation can be accomplished in Japan and the Philippine Islands. It is estimated that 25 of these ships manned initially by Japanese merchant crews will be required to supply 50,000 tons per month to Chinese armies referred to above. The first Liberties can be made available in Japanese ports on X plus 21 days and the remainder over a period of 60 days additional.

B. It is recommended that an additional 25 Liberties be made available to the Chinese to release the Japanese manned Liberties supplying Chinese armies. The first six ships assigned to the Chinese can be manned in about 30 days and an additional 19 within six months. Initially maintenance and supply will be moved to Chinese ports in miscellaneous shipping made available by previous action, movement of selected loaded Liberty ships in Japanese, Ryukyus and Philippine ports and loading of ammunition and other supplies in Ryukyus and Philippines on American crewed ships. Following this initial impulse maintenance shipping will be accomplished in Liberty ships as indicated above.

C. COMGEN China will establish depots at local points in China and Manchuria and desired to obtain equipment and supplies for these dumps from the Pacific area instead of from the interior of China where Chinese dumps are located.

6. COMGEN China will establish temporary accommodations for repatriated personnel at ports.

7. COMGEN China will make the necessary arrangements with the Chinese for delivery of repatriated to ships.

Now, there is a garble in "8" and the following telegram corrects the garble, so I will read the corrected telegram:

8. An operating procedure for reception and grouping of Japanese repatriation from China exists in Japan. Procedures and facilities in Japan are adequate to handle increased flow of personnel encompassed by this plan.

9. As stated above it is proposed to man 100 Liberties with Japanese crews and an additional 25 with Chinese crews as they are trained. As indicated above, for some time it will be necessary to use 25 Japanese manned ships for the logistic support of the Chinese armies, but eventually this task will be assumed by the Chinese manned ships. When these 25 Japanese manned ships are released they will be used for repatriation proposed.

10. The Japanese Civilian Merchant Marine Committee will provide crews for 100 Liberties for operation under the supervision of SCAJAP. Conversion will be handled as indicated above.

11. 100 LST's now in the Marianas and at present scheduled for eventual disposal can be turned over to SCAJAP and can be manned by Japanese crews. The first can be ready in Japanese ports on X plus 18 days and the last number of US Naval personnel experienced in amphibious craft available for assignment within the Seventh Fleet. It is suggested that LST's for Japanese manning be turned over to the War Shipping Administration to charter to the Japanese Government for operation by the Japanese Merchant Marine. It is realized that there may be legal difficulties in thus disposing of commissioned US Naval vessels but the exact technique of handling this situation cannot be determined here.

12. Prompt action is requested as 85 empty Liberties become available in December and will be held pending decision. Also continued operation of current instructions will reduce number of LST's now available in Marianas for Japanese manning.

13. It is suggested that the US assistance to China, as outlined above, be made available as basis for negotitation by the American Ambassador to bring together and effect a compromise between the major opposing groups in order to promote a united, democratic China.

End.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Secretary, on June 7, 1951, the following message was addressed to Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, N. Y.:

Following is an extract from hearing of June 6, 1951, page 5,389, which quotes telegram dated June 7, 1945, sent by General MacArthur, Admiral Spruance, and General Wedemeyer which states: "It is suggested that the United States' assistance to China, as outlined above, be made available as a basis for negotiation by the American Ambassador to bring together and effect a compromise between the major opposing groups in order to promote a unified democratic China." The above implies that you favored a coalition government between Chinese Communists and Republic of China. I am desirous of having your views, stating background of above quote and whether in fact the three commanders did recommend a coalition of Chinese Communists and Republic of China. Will you furnish full text of above quoted message? Can your reply be released? While I will be in California for the next 2 days, please reply to my Washington office.

William F. Knowland,
United States Senator.

MAC ARTHUR COMMENT ON 1945 TELEGRAM

On the next day, June 8, the following telegram was received in the office of the Honorable William F. Knowland, United States Senate, and signed "MacArthur, New York."

In response to your message of the seventh I send the following for such use as you may desire: Any inference drawn from anything I have ever said or done that I sponsored a compromise which would favor the forces of communism at the expense of the forces of freedom or would effect a political coalition of such diametrically opposed and irreconcilable forces is a prevarication without color or factual support. For anyone to read such an inference from the quotation contained in your message is almost beyond belief. In the period just following the end of the war China was faced with a complete break-down of that internal unity which had been welded to promote the common defense against Japan. The Communists, but a nebulous threat at the time, constituted only one of many factions which sought ot secure the balance of political power. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was trying desperately to effect a sound basis for political unity through the call of a convention reasonably representative of all segments of the people. It was this situation as I recall it that prompted Admiral Spruance, General Wedemeyer and I with others to meet in Tokyo in the effort to formulate a proposed policy governing American aid for recommendation to Washington.

The purpose of the plan agreed upon in that conference as we saw it and I certainly myself so interpreted it was to strengthen the hand of the existing government with which we had been allied in war to resist a tendency to revert to the traditional China compartmented under war lords with little or no Federal allegiance and engaged in perpetual internecine conflict. With Communists representing a minority faction at that time they were a distinct threat to the unification desired. They did not recognize the supremacy of the Federal power. They consequently had to be destroyed by force or dealt with politically just as we have since successfully done in Japan. It was felt that the American Ambassador by a wise and judicious play upon the potential of American assistance might materially strengthen Chiang's efforts to secure political unification through discouragement of all movement which opposed it by force. As far as I know the proposal which you quote was never again heard from until its resurrection the other day before your committee. My views were never sought either as to its implementation or its interpretation and I heard nothing further from it. It has not heretofore formed any part of the published documents of the State Department dealing with the China question. Nor was it discussed or even alluded to in any way, shape, or manner by General Marshall when he visited my Tokyo headquarters enroute to China. It is fantastic to believe that had he been enroute to implement a recommendation of mine he would have failed even to mention it to me. The action of the Marshall mission was to employ the potential of American assistance as a weapon to force the existing government into a political alliance with the Communists. This was the exact opposite of the intent of the message in reference. Its effect could have been foreseen. It at once weakened the government and materially strengthened the Communist minority. It was one of the greatest blunders in American diplomatic history for which the free world is now paying in blood and disaster and will in all probability continue to do so indefinitely. Had it been intended to convey the interpretation which has been loosely given the message you may be sure that the three who signed it would have so stated in unequivocal language.

Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Secretary, I merely sought in this half-hour of time, to provide the record with the various documents referred to by the Secretary several days ago.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I assume the Secretary will be given an opportunity to make before the committee any remark he cares, or wishes to, at this time.

Senator CAIN. Indeed, sir, I think the Senator knows the rules by which this committee has carried forward its work for the past month or——

Senator MORSE. Let the record show, Mr. Chairman, a procedural fact, that the chairman was tapping with his gavel, which indicated that the time of the Senator from Washington had expired, and I didn't want any other Senator to proceed until the Secretary had been advised that he would be allowed to make an answer, if he chose to.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Secretary is so advised.

Senator CAIN. May I say that that is a source of argument between the Senator from Oregon and the Chair.

Senator MORSEV. If the Senator from Washington had any other idea, he was mistaken.

Senator CAIN. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you desire to comment on that, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary ACHESON. I haven't any desire to comment on General MacArthur's telegram; no, sir.

THE 1945 TELEGRAM AND MARSHALL'S INSTRUCTIONS FOR CHINA MISSION

I think, if you will look at page 567 of the White Paper, you will see that the exchange of messages which were going on with the three military people referred to in this telegram, is a part of the instructions which were to be gotten out for General Marshall to go to China; and on pages 606 and 607, is Secretary Byrnes' memorandum for the War Department; and at the top of page 607, it says:

> In response to General Wedemeyer's recent messages, the State Department requests the War Department to arrange for directions to him stipulating that:
>
> (1) He may put into effect the arrangements to assist the Chinese National Government in transporting Chinese troops to Manchurian ports, including the logistical support of such troops;
>
> (2) He may also proceed to put into effect the stepped-up arrangements for the evacuation of Japanese troops from the China theater;
>
> (3) Pending the outcome of General Marshall's discussions with Chinese leaders in Chungking for the purpose of arranging a national conference of representatives of the major political elements and for a cessation of hostilities, further transportation of Chinese troops to north China, except as north China ports may be necessary for the movement of troops and supplies into Manchuria, will be held in abeyance.

This is page 607.

> (4) Arrangements for transportation of Chinese troops into north China may be immediately perfected, but not communicated to the Chinese Government. Such arrangements will be executed when General Marshall determines either (*a*) that the movement of Chinese troops to north China can be carried out consistently with his negotiations, or (*b*) that the negotiations between the Chinese groups have failed or show no prospect of success and that the circumstances are such as to make the movement necessary to effectuate the surrender terms and to secure the long-term interests of the United States in the maintenance of international peace.

That was one of the documents enclosed with the President's letter of instruction of December 15, 1945, to General Marshall. This memorandum went to the War Department.

There was also enclosed the statement by the President, a long statement on policy which we have referred to many times, and if my recollection is correct, all of these were sent by telegram to the headquarters of SCAP in Tokyo.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, gentlemen, some of the Senators have not completed their questioning, so the committee will take a recess at this stage until 2:30 this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 1:12 o'clock p. m., the hearing was recessed to reconvene at 2:30 p. m. this same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Present: Senators Russell, Connally, Green, Sparkman, Bridges, Saltonstall, Johnson, Morse, Cain, and Long.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committee will come to order.

Senator Stennis?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Flanders?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Long?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chairman?

The Chairman passes.

Senator Connally?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Green?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper having had an examination period yesteday afternoon, I will now revert to the Armed Services Committee.

Senator Bridges?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall?

Senator SALTONSTALL. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Johnson?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse?

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, time will not permit me to ask all of the questions that I have been asked to ask the Secretary by a couple of the Members of the Senate; but in fairness to them, I will ask a few more, and then close my examination of the Secretary.

DATE OF HEIGHT OF CHIANG'S POWER

Mr. Secretary, at the close of my examination this morning, I had asked you a question, and you had answered it, in regard to whether or not the report of the subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee of the Eightieth Congress, states that the Nationalist Government reported that during the period of this truce, which was the period of the Marshall mission, the Communists increased their control from 60 to 300 local government units, corresponding to counties, in China.

The next question is: In view of this major loss of territory, why did you say, in your introduction to the white paper, that when General Marshall left China, that Chiang was at the height of his power?

Would not a correct statement have been to say that when General Marshall arrived in China, that Chiang was at the height of his power?

Secretary ACHESON. No; that would not have been correct. It was after General Marshall arrived that very considerable gains were made by the Nationalist Government.

SHIPPING AND EXTENT OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID UNDER CHINA AID ACT OF 1948

Senator MORSE. The next question is: At the time of the China appropriation of April 1948, did the State Department place China thirtieth or thirty-fourth on an informal priority list of 35 countries?

Secretary ACHESON. I do not know about that at all.

Senator MORSE. Why did the first shipment of arms not move to Chiang until October 1948, just before the election?

Secretary ACHESON. I do not believe that the statement is correct at all.

Senator MORSE. Is it true that only one shipment of American military goods reached Chiang before the major battles north of the Yangtze?

Secretary ACHESON. Would you read that again?

Senator MORSE. Is it true that only one shipment of American military goods reached Chiang before the major battles north of the Yangtze?

Secretary ACHESON. I do not know, Senator. It just does not sound correct to me—but I do not know.

Senator MORSE. Why was Michael Lee, who was recently dismissed from the Department of Commerce, permitted to hold up Chinese gasoline permits from July 1 until September 20 of 1948, when a committee headed by Congressman Judd forced their release?

Secretary ACHESON. I know nothing about that, sir. I was not in the Government at that time.

Senator MORSE. Then, this question, Mr. Secretary, which is the next of those submitted to me to ask of you:

> I understand that an American Ordnance officer stated in view of the overcharging of the Chinese under the April 1948 appropriation, he estimated that since VJ-day approximately three times as much military equipment went to Greece, to defend 7 million people, as went to China to defend 450 million. Is

this correct, or if not, what are the relative figures in equipment, not of dollars charged?

Secretary Acheson. I cannot answer that. I have not got the figures before me.

CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING BARR MISSION TO CHINA

Senator Morse. Is it true that Brigadier General Barr had never been in the Far East before he headed the China mission?

Secretary Acheson. I do not know. That can be ascertained from the Defense Department.

Senator Morse. Why was not Brig. Gen. Alfred G. Brink made head of the China mission instead of second in command, since he was of equal rank with General Barr and had been 5 years in China and 11 years in the Far East?

Secretary Acheson. I do not know, Senator. That ought to be addressed to the Military Establishment.

Senator Morse. Is it true that General Barr was never in Manchuria and only once in China?

Secretary Acheson. That question ought to be addressed to General Barr or the Military Establishment. I cannot answer that.

Senator Morse. General Barr has claimed that faulty strategy was the major cause of the Nationalist defeat. Why did the State Department request the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to remove from the April 1948 appropriation the provision that there should be supervision as to Greece and Turkey?

Secretary Acheson. I think that has been brought out very clearly by the report of the committee.

Senator Morse. The questioner alleges, Mr. Secretary, that when the American mission from China returned, General Brink was not permitted to present to the committee his views which were contrary to those of General Barr. I think he refers to the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate.

Secretary Acheson. I know nothing of any such episode.

SHIPMENT OF KOREAN AID

Senator Morse. This questioner, through me, wants the following question asked: Is it true that it was originally estimated that $22,000,000 was needed to properly equip the South Koreans, but the State Department recommended that this be cut to $11,000,000 in the October 1949 appropriation?

Secretary Acheson. I don't have those figures before me. There were several estimates made of funds which would be desired for Korea. These had to be changed at various stages in the preparation of the bill when the total amounts were reduced.

Senator Morse. I think the record contains an answer to this question, but I will give the question and you can refer to your previous answer.

Is it true that less than $500 of this amount had reached South Korea when the North Koreans attacked in June 1950? As I recollect, you have already testified that is not true?

Secretary Acheson. I think we have put into the record exactly what did reach them.

Senator Morse. It has been reported that in December 1949 the Joint Chiefs of Staff were ready to recommend that military equipment be sent to Formosa but that you as Secretary of State persuaded the President not to do this on the basis of an intelligence report of bad conditions on the island. What was the date of the actual survey on which this report was based, what agency made it, and did it accurately reflect conditions on Formosa at the time it was given to the President?

Secretary Acheson. I have testified very fully about the recommendation which was made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the attitude which was taken by the State Department, which was not based on any such report.

Senator Morse. And which testimony differs materially from the implications of the question?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, I have completed the questions that I was asked to ask the Secretary in accordance with the explanation I made this morning when I first started this list of questions. I say I have completed them.

I have completed those which in my opinion have not already been asked in one way or another in this record, and answered by the Secretary.

I wish to say now, Mr. Chairman, that subject to recall of the Secretary at some later date, I now complete my examination of the Secretary with the comment that I think he has presented the Department of State's position on the issues involved in the MacArthur recall and the reasons why he as Secretary of State concurred in the President's decision to recall General MacArthur, and I think the reason deserving of great weight in public opinion is his point that two voices on Asiatic policy developed, one MacArthur's and the other the President of the United States, and that sound foreign policy on the part of the United States in our relations with our allies made it necessary that a course of action would be followed that would result in having only one voice speak on Asiatic policy.

For that reason, as I understand it, among others, the Secretary of State concurred in the decision of the President to recall General MacArthur.

Chairman Russell. Senator McMahon?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Lodge?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Fulbright?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Tobey?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Sparkman?

Senator Sparkman. Is this a new round, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Russell. No. We have made fairly good progress with the seventh round, Senator Sparkman.

Senator Sparkman. I will promise you to be very brief.

Chairman Russell. Due to some absences.

UNITED STATES POLICY ON FORMOSA AND KOREA

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, I have just read the ticker giving an advance write-up of a speech to be delivered in Milwaukee tonight by Senator Taft, and he is quoted as saying this:

> Even today Acheson really wants to deliver Formosa to the tender mercies of the United Nations, which would probably turn it over to Communist China.

Now, first let me ask you: Can we deliver Formosa to anybody?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; we cannot.

Senator SPARKMAN. Formosa is not ours to deliver; is it?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; it is not.

Senator SPARKMAN. Formosa is today in the hands of the Chinese Nationalists; is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. And is it subject to disposition if the contracting powers saw fit to do so in the Japanese peace treaty?

Secretary ACHESON. It would not be subject to disposition without the agreement of the Chinese Government, which controls it.

Senator SPARKMAN. He is quoted also as saying this tonight: That you apparently are still willing to discuss the surrender of both Formosa and Korea to the Chinese Communists. Is that a correct statement?

Secretary ACHESON. That is not a correct statement of my attitude; no, sir.

CONTROL OF MILITARY STRATEGY IN UNITED STATES

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, I want to ask you this, and I invite the attention of the very able and genial Senator from New Hampshire, who is likewise quoted on the noon ticker as making a speech or giving a statement tonight in which he makes this statement:

> Naive, immature geopoliticians of the State Department are making decisions that control military strategy.

Is the military strategy of our Government controlled from the State Department?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. And he is quoted further as saying he wanted to see the military planning removed from the State Department and returned to the Pentagon where it belongs.

Is the military planning made in the State Department?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN, Who makes our military plans?

Secretary ACHESON. It is done in the Department of Defense under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator SPARKMAN. They are in the Pentagon, are they not?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN, I believe that is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Kefauver?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hunt?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain?

Senator CAIN. Mr. Secretary, if our great Nation, the United States, should find itself involved in a global war, all of us and our families are going to run an equal risk of being killed or hurt in a thousand ways. Because my conviction is that we are running an unnecessary risk of involving ourselves in such a war, I necessarily have a number of questions yet to offer to you.

UNIFICATION OF KOREA BY FORCE

On the front page of the Evening Star of Thursday of this week, there was an evaluation of your testimony, and this comment I want to read:

> A cease-fire order in Korea on the basis of thirty-eighth parallel would in Mr. Acheson's opinion keep faith with UN policy, since "neither the United Nations nor the United States has ever undertaken the obligation to unify Korea by force."

Does that appear in your mind, sir, to be a very accurate estimate of your testimony?

Secretary ACHESON. I was asked a question somewhat along that line and answered it in the record, and I am sure the record correctly reflects it.

Senator CAIN. Presumably this phrase is a quote:

> Neither the UN nor the United States has ever undertaken the obligation to unify Korea by force.

Secretary ACHESON. I am sure it is in the record, what I said, Senator.

Senator CAIN. I remain very curious about that and I need your help, Mr. Secretary.

I want to offer several observations made by our leaders in this country and then ask you a question or two about them.

On October 10, 1950, the President said that the mission of General MacArthur had been to repel aggression and to restore international peace and security in the area as called for by the United Nations.

On October 6, Ambassador Warren R. Austin said this in a public address:

> In June and July of this year the Security Council gave all the necessary military authority to the United Nations commander to repel the aggressor army and restore peace in Korea.

On October 24, the President spoke before the United Nations General Assembly and in part said this:

> In uniting to crush the aggression in Korea, these member nations have done no more than the Charter called for, but the important thing is that they have done it and have done it successfully. They have given dramatic evidence that the Charter works. They have approved that the Charter is a living instrument backed by the material and moral strength of members large and small.

And then, sir, on December 30, you, as the Secretary of State, in a public release to the press, said this:

> Last June the United Nations met squarely the issue of Communist aggression against the Republic of Korea. Fifty-three nations joined in branding the North Koreans as aggressors and called for military action from member nations to drive them out.

My question against those references, Mr. Secretary, is this: It seems to me that we did have a determination some months ago, and before the Red Chinese entered the war, to unify Korea by force, because 53 nations set out to crush the aggressor. And I wish you would tell me to what extent my interpretation as an American, Mr. Secretary, is wrong.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I think that I have been examined on this several times during these hearings, Senator Cain, and have pointed out that the Security Council resolution of the 25th and 27th called for the repelling of the armed attack against the Republic of Korea and for the restoration of peace and security in the area. And that has always been considered the military mission of the United Nations forces in Korea.

This Government since 1945, and the United Nations since 1947, has had as its political objective in Korea the creation of a free, united, and democratic Korea. We were trying to do that before the aggression started; and, if the aggression can be repelled and peace and security returned to the area, we will continue in the United Nations and otherwise to try to achieve that purpose.

REPELLING AGGRESSION

Senator CAIN. I am not able to determine, Mr. Secretary, whether it is because I come from the Pacific Northwest country and that I either find it difficult to understand or am so curious, but nonetheless, sir, it seems to me that we have been guilty of using the English language carelessly, because the only interpretation you can give to crushing an aggressor is to defeating that aggressor wherever you may find him on the field of battle.

You, sir, as the Secretary of State, and the President, have said to the world that 53 nations set out to crush the aggressor, and you would not tell us that you can crush the aggressor by achieving an armistice on or about the thirty-eighth parallel. You could not tell us that, Mr. Secretary; could you?

Secretary ACHESON. I think what we are talking about is repelling the aggression or crushing the aggression, and that is exactly what we have been trying to do; that is what the United Nations Security Council called on the North Koreans to do at the very outset, that is, to cease their aggression and retire behind the thirty-eighth parallel.

If they had properly obeyed the injunction of the United Nations, that is what they would have done.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir; but that is not what all our leaders have said. I admit that we asked the enemy to give up and to quit; but we told him in no uncertain terms last June that if he did not give up we were going to crush him; and the fact remans, Mr. Secretary, that there are thousands and tens of thousands of the enemy in North Korea today whom you and our military leaders tell us today that we have absolutely no intention of endeavoring to crush. We will negotiate with them, if that turns out to be possible; but if they do not see fit to negotiate, I do not know of any intention on our part to carry out our mission to crush the aggressor, and that has worried me. I think, as an American, it will keep on worrying me until I get somebody to give us an adequate definition of what the word "crush" really means, sir.

Secretary ACHESON. I think that you are getting into semantics now, Senator Cain. I think it was quite clear from what you have read that our leaders are talking about repelling this aggression, crushing this aggression.

I don't think it was ever the statement of anybody that was crushing people or doing anything that is required otherwise than to repel this aggression, restore peace and security and prevent the aggression from occurring again; that is what they are trying to do.

Senator CAIN. I do not want to deal, sir, in semantics, because that would unnecessarily abuse your time, and I do not wish to do that.

I want to ask you this question, though, because I remain concerned, because I simply cannot believe much of what I have heard in terms of realism at this table.

UNITED NATIONS MILITARY AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES IN KOREA

What, may I ask, were our united forces doing on the shores of the Yalu River last November if it was not in an attempt to crush the aggressor and to unify Korea by force?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I have already explained that. After the Inchon landing, General MacArthur called on these North Koreans to turn in their arms and cease their efforts; that they refused to do, and they retired into the north, and what General MacArthur's military mission was was to pursue them and round them up, as he was trying to round up that part of their army which remained in the south; and, as I said many times, we had the highest hopes that when you did that the whole of Korea would be united. That did not come to pass, because the Chinese intervened.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Secretary, had the Chinese Reds not entered the war, are we not able safely to assume that we were just about to have unified Korea by force?

Secretary ACHESON. Our hope was that the rounding up, or the surrender of the forces which started this aggression, would result in the carrying out of the UN resolution of the 7th of October, which was to hold elections in the north and, under the United Nations aegis, try and bring that whole country together.

Senator CAIN. If, sir, the Red Chinese had not entered the war, and our allied forces would have rounded up all of those who were a party to the aggression in Korea, we would then have unified Korea by force; would we not?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, force would have been used to round up those people who were putting on the aggression. We were unifying it as a result of the request of the Koreans, and it would be through elections, and that sort of thing.

Force would have played a part by rounding up and defeating those people who had attacked the southern part of Korea.

Senator CAIN. In late November, Mr. Secretary, the allied forces were exercising force against the aggressor, all over Korea.

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

Senator CAIN. After the Red Chinese entered the war, we very shortly thereafter began to employ and exercise allied force in the south of Korea.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, continued to exercise force all over Korea, through our Air Force, of course, and Navy, but not through ground forces, because they had been forced to retire to the south.

Senator CAIN. And, as far as the Secretary knows, there is no intention at this time of soon employing allied military force on the ground in the north of Korea?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I think that you can reach your estimate of the military situation just as well as I can, Senator Cain.

Senator CAIN. I thank you, Mr. Secretary.

STRENGTHENING THE COLLECTIVE-SECURITY SYSTEM

Now, Mr. Secretary, the Star of Thursday—and I use it because it permits one to be more concise—says this in the opening paragraph:

> Secretary of State Acheson said that sufficient armed strength is not available at present to ensure this country's allies against "occupation and destruction."

Against that comment in the paper, I would like to ask you in all seriousness how much has been accomplished in broadening the base of our collective-security system in and around Western Europe so that the United Nations and particularly the United States might take advantage of the rifles and fire power and personnel of, for example, the Turks and the Greeks, which are now available to be employed if agreements are reached with those two nations?

Secretary ACHESON. What you were reading from the Star, Senator, is the question of Senator Lodge which appears at page 5496 of the record.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

Secretary ACHESON. And my answer was: "Not with the forces available today."

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

Secretary ACHESON. We have, as you know, been working with the Greeks and the Turks ever since 1947 to build up their military establishments and put them in a position to be able to defend themselves more effectively.

The results of that work, I think, have been very successful, and we have been able to assist them in building up very good military establishments.

I take it that your question has to do with what steps are now being taken to work out some security arrangement between various nations and those countries.

Senator CAIN. That is it; that is precisely what I want to know.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, in answer to a question asked of me by Senator Wiley the other day, I said it was publicly known this question was under discussion at the present time, and I must respectfully decline to discuss it.

[Deleted.]

AGREEMENTS WITH TURKEY

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir. My second and last question: Does the United States have a unilateral military agreement with Turkey?

Secretary ACHESON. What do you mean by unilateral military agreement?

Senator CAIN. Perhaps I have stated it improperly, sir. I inquire as to whether or not there exists between Turkey and the United States today an agreement which would result in Turkey going to America's aid if America got in trouble or America going to Turkey's aid if Turkey was attacked by an outside aggressor.

Secretary ACHESON. No, no such agreement exists.

Senator CAIN. I thank you. I am glad, Mr. Chairman, I had an opportunity just to make these abbreviated remarks about Turkey, whom I feel so strongly we need if we are to live tomorrow.

BOMBING OF RASHIN

Mr. Secretary, we have been advised by other witnesses that Racin, which is situated in northeast Korea and is employed by the enemy as a large supply and distribution depot and center, was bombed on at least one occasion by allied aircraft.

We have been told that the State Department took action to see that Racin was not bombed again.

[Deleted.]

With reference to this question, the Chief of Naval Operations testified on page 4354:

> The Russians had an arrangement to use Racin. They did use it at times since the war began.

Mr. Secretary, I am satisfied that military necessity would require the destruction of military depots, supplies, and facilities in Racin. It appears to be the case that political considerations have dictated that Racin is to be used in any way and for whatever purpose the enemy wishes.

Your presence with us makes it possible for us and the country to secure a full understanding and appreciation of the political reasons which justify providing our enemy with a fireproof and bombproof supply center in the heart of enemy country.

Will you please, sir, take as much time as you think may be required to brief us fully on this question?

Secretary ACHESON. The question of the bombing of Racin came up, I believe, in the summer of 1950, or August 1950, and, as you have already been told in this hearing, there was one raid which was carried on against it and another was going to be carried on, but was called off on account of weather.

The State Department objected strongly to carrying on raids against a place which was 17 miles from the Soviet border and which raised very great dangers of involving Soviet forces.

This thing came up again in September, at which we presented our view, and the matter of bombing it was not pressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was discussed later at some time in 1951, I believe, and it was unanimously concluded not to do it.

The view that this is an important supply point, I think, is not borne out by the facts. It is 17 miles from the Soviet border. There is a rail line running down from Siberia into Manchuria and then down into Racin. There is no rail line south from Racin, so it is not an important supply point. Supplies would have to go by truck from there.

It was thought that it was much more important to interrupt the rail lines in the southerly parts of it which were not near the Soviet border and which would not run the risk of involving the Soviet forces.

That has been done since and that rail line is interrupted. There is constant naval fire directed at Chongjin, Songjin, and Wonsan, going on well over a hundred days, which is interrupting their line of communications.

Therefore, it seems to us that the advantages of this action were not great and the dangers involved in it were very considerable.

Senator Cain. It seems to me that the Secretary of State has just gotten himself over into the field of military consideration.

A few minutes ago the Senator from Alabama inquired of you as to where military plans were formulated and agreed to, and you said in the Pentagon. I have never known from a military point of view that you ignored or bypassed a supply depot just because it was not quite as important as some other supply source. My understanding is that supplies and military weapons in Korea are transported on the ground by trucks or on foot by one way or another.

But to come back to my original question, sir—the quote of the Naval Chief of Operations was that Russians had arrangements to use Rashin, that they did use it at times since the war began. May I ask what that means?

Secretary Acheson. I don't know, sir; I have no such information.

Senator Cain. I think, Mr. Chairman, that the time ought to come when we would be given another opportunity to ask the Chief of Naval Operations what he meant.

I understood his testimony to be that this was a political question, and our interest in it would be satisfied when the Secretary of State testified.

May I ask, Dr. Wilcox, my time, please sir?

Mr. Wilcox. A little over a minute.

Senator Cain. Mr. Chairman, I have but a minute remaining. I think it would therefore be inappropriate to begin another question of the Secretary.

Chairman Russell. Senator Gillette?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Brewster?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Stennis?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Flanders?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Long?

Senator Long. [Deleted.]

Secretary Acheson. That is correct, Senator.

FACTORS CONSIDERED IN BOMBING OF RACIN

Senator Long. It is always possible, of course, that a navigator might get a little bit off line. Speaking from my own experience, I hate to admit it, but as an amphibious skipper, with a communications officer who was probably no better trained than I was, we once landed on the wrong beach and made a private invasion in southern France, so it is possible that some other naval officer or some other air officer might make some mistake and hit the wrong point, is it not?

Secretary Acheson. There are possibilities for all sorts of involvements of that sort.

Senator Long. Not knowing all the details of the technical features of how these things are done to try to hit the exact target, it just occurred to you that there were too many risks to take the chance of bombing that far away from where you might be involved in direct conflict with the Soviet Union?

Secretary ACHESON. That is right, Senator.

Senator LONG. That is what guided your decision in feeling that such benefit as that point might offer the Russians, that it was not worth taking the chance—for what benefit it might offer the Chinese, that it was not worth taking the chance of becoming involved in a war with Russia?

Secretary ACHESON. That is right, Senator.

Senator LONG. Now, military men call that a calculated risk; in other words, whether the risk of what you hope to gain is worth what you might lose if it did not work out in the way that you hoped that it would.

Secretary ACHESON. That is true.

CRUSHING AGGRESSION

Senator LONG. There was some doubt in my mind about this idea of crushing the aggressors. I do not know whether that language was ever used, but it seemed to me that at one stage of the Korean episode we were actually attempting to crush the aggressor; in other words, as long as we were fighting the North Koreans we hoped that we would completely put down resistance in North Korea, and in doing so we would have crushed the North Korean Army.

Wasn't that our objective at one time?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. We had split their army in two, and a very large part of it was surrounded, and later captured, in South Korea.

Part of the army had gone north, and various bands were trying to slip through the mountains and rejoin them in the north, and General MacArthur went up there to round those people up.

Senator LONG. Now, at that stage when General MacArthur was trying to launch his last offensive, as he stated, against the Chinese border, right up to the border of Manchuria, it was possible that, if the Chinese had not come in, in short order we would have completely crushed the aggression or crushed the aggressor; isn't that true? Isn't it true that we might have completely put down resistance by the North Koreans?

Secretary ACHESON. Both might have happened.

Senator LONG. If China stayed neutral, that probably would have happened?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. On the other hand, when China came in, and when the United Nations themselves declared China to be the aggressor, then the task of crushing the aggressor became a totally different type of task, did it not?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

Senator LONG. In other words, it involved the task of crushing all China.

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

Senator LONG. So that, therefore, when we speak of this term "crush the aggressor," it is a case of referring to two completely different tasks, depending on whether you refer to it before the Chinese Communists came in or after they came in.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes. I think you will find the phrase was "crush the aggression."

REASONS FOR EMBARGO FROM AUGUST 1946 TO MAY 1947

Senator LONG. I wish you would clear up in my mind the embargo that you said at one time existed, especially on the Chinese Nationalists. Would you tell me when that embargo took place, the reason for it, and when it was lifted?

Secretary ACHESON. That was imposed in August 1946 and was lifted in May 1947.

Senator LONG. And what was the purpose of it?

Secretary ACHESON. That was imposed at the request of General Marshall when he was acting on the so-called Committee of Three, as the Chairman of that Committee of Three to bring about the cease-fire and the end of hostilities in China.

There were sporadic attacks which were started on each side, sometimes of considerable magnitude, and General Marshall was engaged in bringing those to an end.

He was criticized by both sides for what he did, and he took the position that it would be quite inconsistent to be acting as the chairman of a group which was attempting to stop hostilities and at the same time be furnishing arms to one side when they started hostilities; and therefore, he requested that military supplies of all sorts should be denied to anybody in China.

Senator LONG. Now, he was at that time in China as an official or unofficial repersentative of the United States Government?

Secretary ACHESON. He was the President's personal representative in China.

Senator LONG. So, as the personal representative of the President, for the purpose of attempting to carry out a cease-fire agreement between the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists, it was his feeling that in that capacity of trying to settle the differences between those factions that it would be inconsistent for us to be supplying arms and aid to either one side or the other?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. He came to that conclusion after fighting had been resumed and he again was trying to stop it.

Senator LONG. And when it seemed clear to him that the fighting could not be stopped, was the embargo lifted?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. It was lifted in May, and some material was even given the Nationalists in April 1947.

Senator LONG. To your knowledge, was there any substantial period of delay in giving aid to the Nationalists after it had become clear to all concerned there was to be no ending of the fighting by peaceful means?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't think so, sir. We put into the record what was done after that time, and I have been asked by the chairman to try and give a more substantial account of all the arms shipments and I am preparing that and will forward it to the chairman.

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD CHINESE UNITY

Senator LONG. At that time it was the policy of this country, I take it, with regard to China affairs that we would attempt to get all the various elements of the Chinese Nation together under one government and which would be a democratic government with free elections; is that correct?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir. We were assisting the agreements which the Chinese themselves had worked out with all factions in China to accomplish that purpose.

Senator Long. And it was the general understanding that the Chinese Nationalist Government, headed by Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek, would be the controlling faction, the majority faction of any group that might be established as a unified government?

Secretary Acheson. That is correct, Senator Long.

Senator Long. That is the type thing to which the wire by General MacArthur referred, I take it, that is by General MacArthur and two others. They were all cognizant that that was the type thing toward which this Government was working.

Secretary Acheson. Admiral Spruance and General Wedemeyer. What they said is:

> It is suggested that the United States assistance to China as outlined above be made available as the basis for negotiation by the American Ambassador to bring together and effect a compromise between the major opposing groups in order to promote a united, democratic China.

REHABILITATION OF KOREA AFTER CONFLICT

Senator Long. Do you know whether anything is being done at this time to attempt to rehabilitate the Republic of Korea, particularly those parts of the Republic of Korea as presently occupied by American troops?

Secretary Acheson. That is being done at the present time under the direction of the United Nations commander. Whenever the fighting is brought to an end, it will be carried on under the United Nations Rehabilitation Commission which was set up in the last General Assembly, but as long as the fighting goes on, everything which is done there is under the command of the commander, UN.

Senator Long. It would seem to me that much of our ultimate success may depend upon the degree to which we can make democracy meaningful to the people of Korea and the type of government which we believe responsive to the needs of those people.

Ultimately we hope to have free elections. If we do, the hope of democracy prevailing in those countries would depend upon the people's experience under that form of government.

Therefore I certainly do hope that everything that can be done will be done to demonstrate to the peoples of Korea that democracy at least by our standards means that the people would someday certainly know a better life and rehabilitate their land.

Secretary Acheson. I agree with you, Senator.

Senator Long. No further questions. Thank you, sir.

Chairman Russell. Mr. Chairman. The chairman passes. Senator Connally?

Chairman Connally. I pass.

Chairman Russell. Senator Wiley?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator George?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Smith?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Green?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Bridges?

STATE DEPARTMENT ROLE IN MILITARY POLICY

Senator **Bridges**. Mr. Chairman, a few minutes ago the very able Senator, my friend from Alabama, referred to a statement which I was supposed to make some hours from now to the effect that the strategy, military strategy, had been affected by decisions in the State Department, and my authority for that, I refer any of the Senators of this committee to the testimony that has been given here by our military leaders over the last few weeks when time after time when questioned about a certain phase of military policy or military strategy or their plans or their program, they would reply that that is a political decision, that that is something in effect that we have to bow to the political on, that that is circumvented by the political.

The distinguished Secretary of State just a few moments ago, in referring to Rashin, pointed out that the military had made an attack on that area and that weather prevented another one; and then that the State Department did protest very vigorously about further attacks. So that I will say to my distinguished friend from Alabama that I expect to make that statement, although I haven't made it yet. I thing the record will adequately bear out my authority for it.

Now, Mr. Chairman, in the last day or two, 2 or 3 days——

Chairman **Connally**. How many times have we been around with the Secretary?

Chairman **Russell**. We are now in the eighth round, Senator Connally.

Chairman **Connally**. How much longer are we going to do this, just one after another?

Chairman **Russell**. Senator, I can't answer that question.

Chairman **Connally**. Exhausting everybody. Eight times. Each Senator has had an opportunity to question the Secretary 8 times, and I suppose it will be 18 times before they get through.

Chairman **Russell**. The Senator from New Hampshire.

Senator **Bridges**. The last 2 or 3 days there have been allegations made and recommendations made to the effect that there is an organized group in this country which is supposed to be irresponsible and performing actions which are not in line with the policy of our country with relation to the China policy, known as the China lobby.

Now I know that the Senators on these committees who have urged the investigation, all of them are my friends and all of them are patriotic American citizens and very patriotic Senators, and therefore I do not believe that they knowingly in any way certainly would want to be associated with the facts which I am now going to present.

COMMUNIST PARTY LINE ON UNITED STATES CHINA POLICY

On September 26, 1949, my good friend and very able senior Senator from California, Mr. Knowland, placed in the Congressional Record on page 13269 a letter from the Communist Party in New York, dated March 1, 1949, and their program for action on the China policy as suggested by the Action Conference on China Policy, New York City, January 29, 1949.

I would like to read it.

COMMUNIST PARTY OF NEW YORK STATE
New York, N. Y., March 1, 1949.

To All Sections and Counties.

DEAR COMRADES: Enclosed please find program for action on China policy, as voted upon by a united front action conference on China, held in New York on January 29, 1949.

We are sure that you will find this material not only informative but helpful in planning sections on China in your communities.

A special outline has also been issued by the national education committee on Communist policy in China. This can be secured through orders from your district education department. The outline can be used as the basis for discussion in your sections and branches.

Any inquiries in relation to further activity can be received by writing to the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, at 111 West Forty-second Street, New York York City.

Comradely yours,

MAY MILLER,
Assistant Organizing Secretary.

The program enclosed, referred to by May Miller, assistant organizing secretary, reads as follows:

1. Demand a congressional investigation.

A. Of the Chinese lobby in Washington. One of the largest spending foreign influences in our Capital; not registered as foreign agents.

B. Of the billions of dollars of private accumulation deposited in American banks and investments by Chinese officials and individuals.

2. Demand a new China policy.

A. An end to all forms of American intervention in China and of plans to aid any elements and remnants of the Kuomintang.

B. Preparation by our Government to recognize the government which the people of China are now establishing.

C. Planning now by our authorities for genuine and self-respecting cooperation with the people's government in China, including normal and friendly trade relations free of any political conditions.

3. Get the facts and implications of the Government's China policy to the American people.

Immediate step for carrying out the action program:

1. Get your organization immediately to pass a resolution on China policy (use the enclosed January conference resolution for suggestions).

Send copies of your organization's resolution to your Senators and your Congressmen; give it publicity in your organization's publication and elsewhere; send a copy to the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy.

2. Make use of the political ammunition of facts; the American people, if they know, will act.

A. Make a drive to get readers and subscribers to Far East Spotlight, the committee's monthly magazine. This is the indispensable tool for every fighter for a new and friendly policy toward China. Previous sources of reliable information about China and the Far East now have an NAM slant; only Far East Spotlight gives you the positive and encouraging facts about the Chinese people's great and successful fight against American reaction, and keeps you up to date about Washington's evil plans to go on backing reaction in China and the Far East. Subscription: $2 a year. Introductory offer: $1 for 8 months. Members of the CDFEP get this free.

B. Push the sale and reading of Anna Louise Strong's Tomorrow's China. Paper bound, 65 cents; cloth bound, $2. Organizational orders for five or more: 25 percent discount.

C. Have meetings on the China policy issue.

(a) The committee can furnish speakers.

In the New York City area: Telephone the speaker's bureau of the committee any afternoon, Bryant 9–6343.

In California, the San Francisco area: Contact Mr. William Kerner, 1841 Ellis Street, San Francisco.

Los Angeles area: Contact Mrs. Jeanette Orel, 362 South Columbia Avenue, Los Angeles.

(b) Send your organization's own speakers to the briefing session on China. First session: Friday night, February 18, 7:30 sharp. Telephone the committee for registration blanks: Bryant 9–6342. No fee.

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My purpose, as I indicated, in reading these charges against the so-called China lobby were instigated by the Communist Party as early as March 1, 1949, and that they have been pressed by them since.

And, in doing this, I want it clearly understood that I am not, in any way, reflecting upon my colleagues here who have called for such an investigation.

That is their privilege. They are my friends, and they are patriotic American citizens and Seantors; but I do feel that this is an important thing and shows definitely where this move started from, originally.

Senator LONG. What is the date of that communication, sir?

Senator BRIDGES. The date is March 1, 1949.

Chairman RUSSELL. I don't suppose that is a Trojan Horse message, like it was indicated that the telegram from the Chamber of Commerce was, do you, Communist-inspired?

Senator BRIDGES. I don't know. It appeared in the Congressional Record of September 26, 1949.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, 1945

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Chairman, on an entirely different subject, I have in my possesion a document from the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, Washington, D. C.

It is entitled "The Chinese Communist Movement," and dated July 5, 1945.

Now, I understand—and the censor will check this to verify this—that this has been declassified, and that it is, therefore, not secret any more, but if there is any question about that, I would ask the censor to check on this.

My reason for bringing this in at this time is here is a report prepared by the War Department Intelligence Division before the war ended in July 1945, which so clearly, just as clearly as Mein Kempf, written by Hitler, indicates what Hilter proposed to do, so it documents completely and predicts the bases of the Chinese Communists, and what they were going to do, and this document has been in the hands—was prepared by the Intelligence Division of the War Department, and, of course, is available to our Government, and with this as a background, I canot see how the people who have made our policies, some of whom have been misled on this thing, have made statements which they have made.

I think this is a very important document. It is dated War Department, Military Intelligence Division, Washington.

Chinese Communist Movement Prepared by Military Intelligence Service

1. THE PROBLEM

The problem of the Chinese Communists is not merely one of how the Communists should be dealt with; even more difficult has been the problem of determining the facts. "Authorities" on both sides have disputed the most elementary statements of fact.

It was considered by the Military Intelligence Service that this state of affairs constituted an impediment to the effective prosecution of military operations in China and in the Pacific. A major project was, therefore, initiated at the end of 1944, under which the most competent analysts—both civilian and military—were assigned to the examination of all material available, and to the compilation of a report on the Chinese Communist movement. The preparation of the report involved the examination of over 2,500 reports, pamphlets, and books.

2. FUNDAMENTAL CONCLUSIONS

Careful study of these materials has led to a number of basic conclusions. Appropriate qualification and detailed authentication for these conclusions is contained in the full report. The most important conclusions may be summarized as follows: (1) The "democracy" of the Chinese Communists is Soviet democracy. (2) The Chinese Communist movement is part of the international Communist movement, sponsored and guided by Moscow. (3) There is reason to believe that Soviet Russia plans to create Russian-dominated areas in Manchuria, Korea, and probably north China. (4) A strong and stable China cannot exist without the natural resources of Manchuria and north China. (5) In order to prevent the separation of Manchuria and north China from China, it is essential that, if Soviet Russia participates in the war, China not be divided (like Europe) into American-British and Russian zones of military operations.

(*a*) *High morale*

The Chinese Communists are the best led and most vigorous of present-day organizations in China. Their morale is high. Their policies are sharply defined, and carried out with a devotion which is fanatical.

(*b*) *Policy of establishing communism through "democracy"*

The Chinese Communists emphasize two stages in their revolutionary program: First, the change of the Chinese semifeudal society into a "bourgeois" (or capitalist) democracy; second, the establishment of communism. The first is their present goal according to their own claims. They insist, however, that the "bourgeois democracy" must have the "support and leadership of the proletariat under Communist guidance." This objective they have achieved in their areas of control; theirs is a one-party controlled "democracy."

(*c*) *"Soviet democracy"*

While the Chinese Communists, call their present political system "democracy," the "democracy" which they sponsor is in fact "Soviet democracy" on the pattern of the U. S. S. R. rather than democracy in the Anglo-American sense. It is a "democracy" more rigidly controlled by the Chinese Communist Party than is the so-called one-party dictatorship of the Chungking Government controlled by the Kuomintang (People's National Party). This is indicated by the fact that Chiang Kai-shek rules by maintaining a measure of balance between the various factions within the Kuomintang and by making concessions to the non-Communist opposition groups outside the Kuomintang in Chungking-controlled China. Whenever he fails, as he has in the past 4 years, to maintain such a balance, he weakens his rule. On the other hand, while minority parties which wholeheartedly accept Communist leadership are tolerated in Communist-controlled China, real opposition parties and groups are summarily suppressed as "traitors." If the Communists' charge of Kuomintang intolerance is true, it is also true that the Communists will be still more intolerant if they ever obtain supreme power in China.

Nevertheless, since the Chinese Communists provide individuals, especially the laborers and peasants, with greater economic opportunities than the Kuomintang Nationalists provide, the Communists enjoy wider popular support in the areas held by their own armies than do the Nationalists in their areas of control. This is the Communists' greatest source of strength in China.

(*d*) *Part of international Communist movement*

The Chinese Communist movement is a part of the international Communist movement. Its military strategy, diplomatic orientation, and propaganda policies follow those of the Soviet Union. They are adapted to fit the Chinese environment, but all high policy is derived from international Communist policy which in turn depends on Soviet Russia. Throughout their history the Chinese Communists have loyally supported and followed the policies of Soviet Russia and have accepted the whole content of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism.

(*e*) *Desire for United States support against Japan and the Kuomintang*

This does not prevent the Chinese Communists from maintaining a friendly attitude toward the United States. Their attitude toward us and all capitalist democracies is conditioned, however, by the extent to which they can obtain benefits from us in the furtherance of their own revolutionary aims; the subjugation of China under Communist rule and the development of a Communist-controlled "capitalist democracy" in China as a preliminary to the introduction of communism. They would use American support to further their struggle against both Japan and the Chungking Government.

(*f*) *De facto independence*

The Chinese Communist movement today is not represented merely by a political party; it is represented by what is a state in all but name, possessing territory (the combined area of which is about the size of France or one-fifth of China proper), a population of probably more than 70,000,000 people, armies, law, and money of its own. The Chinese Communist state is economically primitive, but (at a primitive level) fairly self-sufficient.

Senator LONG. Mr. Chairman, might I suggest that by unanimous consent we might modify our rule to permit Senator Bridges to insert the rest of this document at this point in the record?

Senator BRIDGES. I would be glad to.

Senator LONG. In order not to prolong the hearings.

Chairman RUSSELL. Certainly the Chair will not be in position to oppose anything to expedite the hearing; and at the risk of violating the rule, I will permit the unanimously-consent request. Is there objection?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Is that agreeable to you?

Senator BRIDGES. It is agreeable to me.

Chairman RUSSELL. Without objection, then, the matter will appear in the record at this point.

Senator LONG. It is a very informative document and I am very interested in it, but it is quite long.

Senator BRIDGES. I thank the Senator from Louisiana for not having to read it all.

(The remainder of the document referred to is as follows:)

(*g*) *Rivalry with the Kuomintang*

(1) *Failure of the "Entente Cordiale."*—During the period of the Soviet Russian-Kuomintang Entente Cordiale, 1923–27, the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists cooperated. The Chinese Communists promised to support the revolutionary, Nationalist, democratic program of the Kuomintang. They broke this promise. It soon became evident to the Kuomintang leaders that the Chinese Communists, urged on by Soviet Russia, were aspiring to turn the revolution into a class war in order to gain supreme control over China. In 1927 the Kuomintang therefore turned against the Chinese Communists and Soviet Russia.

(2) *Development of the "united front" movement.*—The ensuing civil war, 1927–37, between the armies of the two Chinese parties was accompanied by the bloody excesses characteristic of all class wars. By 1936 the Kuomintang had almost defeated the Chinese Red Army. The latter was saved by the Kuomintang's acceptance of the idea of a "united front" with the Communists in defense of China against Japan. The united front idea had been developed in Moscow. It applied to Communists in all countries and involved cooperation between Communists and non-Communist groups and parties in the capitalist democracies, as a means of safeguarding the Soviet Union against the threat of Fascist aggression and of expanding the influence of the Communists in capitalist democracies.

Under the terms of the united-front understanding in China, the Chinese Communists pledged themselves, as of 1937, to cease subversive activities against the Government, to abolish their separate government and administration, and to integrate the Chinese Red Army with the Government's Central Army.

(3) *The "war within the war."*—The Chinese Communists did not fulfill this promise. Soon after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the Government assigned to the Communists certain defense zones. The Communists, however, refused to stay within their assigned zones. While the Kuomintang armies, in obedience to the Chinese high command, kept within their assigned defense zones, the Communist armies insisted on being granted entry into any Kuomintang zone that they desired to enter. Whenever the Kuomintang troops refused to admit the Communist troops into their defense sectors and to share with them their exceedingly limited resources they were called traitors by the Communists. When the National Government refused to grant the Communists permission to establish in Kuomintang areas their own separate civil administrations, called united-front governments, which flouted the national authority of Chungking and accepted orders only from the Communist capital, Yenan, the Communists accused the Kuomintang of being "antidemocratic" and the Kuomintang troops of being "experts in dissension." Such tactics inevitably led to clashes with Kuomintang troops. The latter fought in self-defense against both the Communists and the Japanese for the protection of their bases.

Internecine strife led to a general deterioration of the Chinese war situation. After the United States entered the war against Japan both the Communists and the Kuomintang became more interested in their own status vis-à-vis each other than in fighting Japan. The interparty struggle became of paramount importance. For the Chinese believed that American guaranteed victory against Japan, and the fruits of this victory would obviously go to the party that won out in the Kuomintang-Communist struggle for power.

(*h*) *Role in World War II*

In spite of this internecine strife, or quasi war, the Chinese Communists have contributed to the United Nations war against Japan. By organizing extensive guerrilla territories within areas enclosed by the Japanese Army they have prevented the full Japanese exploitation of north China's resources in foodstuffs, raw materials, and manpower. They have also rescued many American pilots who have been forced down in Communist-controlled areas.

Contrary to the widely advertised reports of their sympathizers, the Chinese Communists have, however, fought the Japanese far less than have the Nationalist Government troops. The generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, and his followers have yielded ground politically and militarily to the Communists in order to avoid an open break; as a Nationalist, Chiang Kai-shek has been primarily interested in the war against Japan.

(*i*) *Military capacity small*

The Chinese Communists now claim to have an army of 910,000 troops in addition to local militia forces numbering about 2,000,000 men. However, in October

1944 the strength of the Chinese Communist regular forces was reliably reported as 475,000. The degree to which the increase since October of last year represents an actual increase in fighting capacity depends upon the number of rifles available. Rifles were available for only about 250,000 men in October 1944.

(j) The alternative settlements of the Kuomintang-Communist problem

(1) *General.*—As far as can be seen at present there are three alternatives for a settlement of the internal situation in China: (1) Civil war between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists, a settlement which would be disastrous for the Chinese people, even though it might ultimately decide the question of which party shall rule; (2) institution of a national assembly to inaugurate a democratic, constitutional form of government in which all parties find representation; (3) division of China into two (or more) separate parts, these parts to be united in a loose federation represented by a coalition government of all parties. The decisions of this coalition government would be executed independently by the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang. The two parties would continue to maintain their separate armies and administrations.

Many observers believe that neither of the latter two alternatives is feasible. Both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists aspire to supreme control over China. This being the case some observers believe that civil war is unavoidable.

(2) *Generalissimo sponsors the national assembly.*—Chiang Kai-shek has proposed the national assembly, which is to convene on November 12, 1945, as the only possible means for a peaceful solution of the Kuomintang-Communist problem and for the reestablishment of unity in China. He insists, however, that no unity can be achieved so long as there are several independent partisan armies in China. He therefore demands that the Communists fulfill their pledge of 1937 to subordinate their army to the National Government. He makes compliance with this demand a prerequisite for any political settlement with the Communists.

(3) *Chinese Communists sponsor idea of coalition government.*—The Communists refuse to comply with this demand. They have boycotted the National Assembly and insist that the coalition government is the only solution of the interparty problem in China. The plan for a coalition government might be workable if the Communists would accept a clear demarcation of Kuomintang and Communist areas. But throughout the war the Kuomintang has vainly tried to obtain an agreement with the Communists for a demarcation of defense areas, and there is no indication that the Communists would accept any demarcation of Kuomintang and Communist areas if a coalition government were to be established.

In view of this, the coalition government, were it to be established without the Communists being committed to a specific demarcation of their areas, would only serve the interests of the Communists in that their present areas would obtain legal status by consent of the Kuomintang and other parties, while leaving the Kuomintang part of the country open to further Communist infiltration through legal or illegal means. Chiang Kai-shek has refused to accept the idea of a coalition government.

(4) *Unity or permanent division of China, the issues at stake.*—Here the matter rests (July 3, 1945). For the time being it is a question of the national assembly versus the coalition government. The former provides a chance for unifying China by the agreement of the Chinese armed parties to submit to arbitration and law instead of force. The latter would continue into the postwar period the system of territorial division of China between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists and the maintenance of separate party armies. Real unity cannot be achieved on this basis. Each party insists on its own plan.

(k) International implications

(1) *Common policy of United States and U. S. S. R.*—It is generally believed that a peaceful interparty settlement in China depends largely upon the extent to which the United States and Soviet Russia can follow a common policy toward China. Were the Soviet Union to decide to give active support to the Chinese Communists, in terms of supplies or military aid, while the United States supports the Chungking government, the Russians and Americans would be meeting head on.

(2) *Uncertainty concerning Soviet aims in China.*—Present relations between Chungking and Moscow are cool. The Soviet press is strongly denouncing the reactionaries in the Kuomintang and is openly sponsoring the plan of the Chinese Communists for a coalition government. There are indications that

Soviet Russia envisages the establishment of Soviet domination (along somewhat the same lines as in Outer Mongolia and in Eastern Europe), in the areas of north China adjacent to Soviet Russia; that is in Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, and possibly also the northern provinces of China proper. A typical statement in this regard is one by a Soviet Russian diplomat in China who emphasized that Soviet Russia is determined that all her border states should be "free from unhealthy combination or linkage with other great powers."

The Chinese Communists' plan for a coalition government would conceivably further this aim in that north China and Manchuria might "legally" become the exclusive spheres of influence of the Chinese Communists and hence come under a regime that would be wholly obedient to Soviet Russia. At the same time the coalition government, which would represent all groups in China, would lend China an outward appearance of unity.

On the other hand, it is conceivable that the Soviet Union will try to improve relations with Chungking on the basis of the reestablishment of a unified front between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists. For it has been Soviet Russia's experience in China that cooperation or a united front between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists has always favored the Communists against the Nationalists, no matter what political shading the latter represent, whether reactionary or liberal. By contrast, the Communist cause in China has suffered whenever the Kuomintang has fought the Communists in an all-out civil war. It is possible that this is the explanation for Soviet Russia's apparent willingness to welcome the visit of Dr. T. V. Soong, President of the Executive Yuan and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Chinese Government. He arrived in Moscow and was received by Stalin on June 30. An agreement between Moscow and Chungking would have the advantage, for Soviet Russia, of reducing the danger of immediate disagreement between the U. S. S. R. and the United States.

(3) *The United States and the situation in China.*—(*a*) The postwar peace in the Far East depends on reestablishment of Chinese independence and unity. The type of peace we shall gain by our victory over Japan depends on our success in aiding the Chinese to regain complete independence and to establish unity. For China is the center of the Far East; political, economic, and military relationships in the Far East have always revolved around China. Russia became one of the leading far-eastern powers by acquiring vast regions from China. Russia's growth as a far-eastern power had depended greatly upon its success in extending its influence in China. Similarly, Japan grew to a world power by virtue of her territorial acquisitions in Korea and Manchuria. She grew into a world menace after her vast conquests in China proper in the 1930's.

The independence and territorial and administration integrity of China, including Manchuria, have been key points of United States policy and interests in the Far East. During the past 85 years Russia, and during the past 50 years Russia and Japan, the two leading military land powers in Asia, have been the chief threats to China's independence. Because of this, a considerable part of the international struggle over China has been centered on creating a balance between these two powers. The sea powers, Great Britain and the United States, have maintained the balance between the two land powers. America's concern in this contest between Russia and Japan for control in China has been demonstrated several times. The rivalry between Russia and Japan has centered on Manchuria and Korea.

(*b*) With the defeat of Japan, Soviet Russia will merge as the sole military land power in Asia. Necessary as is the defeat of Japan to the reestablishment of peace in the Pacific, the fact remains that her defeat will upset the whole structure of the international balance of power in the Far East which was developed in the decades before 1931. Deprived of her empire in China, and with her cities and industries smashed to pieces, Japan will be back where she started at the dawn of her modern era; a group of relatively worthless islands, populated by fishermen, primitive farmers, and innocuous warriors. The clock will be turned back some 80 years, to the time the rivalry between Russia and the Western democracies in China began. With the total defeat of Japan, Russia will again emerge as the sole military land power of any account in Asia. But she will be vastly stronger than at any time in the past.

(*c*) Prevention of a repetition of the Polish situation in Manchuria and Korea is essential to postwar stability in the Far East. The problem of postwar peace in the Far East revolves, insofar as the United States is concerned, around two major questions: (1) How can the military-political vacuum in the Far East be filled following the defeat of Japan? (2) How can the United States promote internal unity in China?

The answer to both questions is vitally affected by the action of Soviet Russia, and by the arrangements in regard to the Far East that we can make with Soviet Russia. If it be assured that Soviet Russia will join in the war against Japan, the solution of these questions will be greatly affected by the extent to which we can prevent the division of China along the same lines as Europe into an American-British and a Soviet zone of military operations. For the elements of uncertainty as to Soviet Russia's intentions in China and in regard to the Chinese Communists are very similar to those in regard to Eastern Europe during 1943 and 1944. Many of the fears and speculations current at that time, to the effect that Soviet Russia intended to develop Eastern Europe as an exclusive Soviet sphere of influence, have proved to be right. There is justification for similar fears in regard to north China, Manchuria, and Korea. Just as Soviet Russia's plans in Eastern Europe have been favored by the absence of American and British forces in those areas, so also would Soviet Russia, if she does plan to create a Soviet sphere of influence in north China, Manchuria, and Korea, find herself in a most favorable position if these areas were assigned to her seclusively or ever predominantly as a zone of military operations against Japan.

On the other hand, if American forces cooperate on equal terms with Soviet Russia, Chinese, and British forces in the reconquest and occupation of north China, Manchuria, and Korea, a peace settlement in complete accord with the terms of the Cairo declaration of December 1, 1943, can much more readily be achieved. For it is clear that if the war were to end with us in control of Japan, and with Chungking-Chinese, American, and British forces in control of central and south China, while Soviet Russia and Chinese Communist forces held the controlling power in Manchuria and Korea, a peace settlement in regard to these areas might entail a considerable compromise of the terms of the Cairo declaration. In that case, the plan of Chinese Communists for a "coalition government" might well be the only feasible way of settling the situation in China; north China and probably also Manchuria and Korea would come under the control of native Communists dependent upon Soviet Russian support, and in these areas there would be established the now typical "united front" or "democratic" coalition administrations in which the Communists hold the dominant power. Deprived of the vast raw material resources of north China and Manchuria the present National Government of China would find itself unable to compete with the Communists in the north and to establish a strong and stable state. For this reason it is necessary, for the maintenance of peace in the Far East and for the long-range interests of the United States, that the Cairo declaration be implemented without modification.

P. E. PEABODY,
Brigadier General, GSC,
Chief, Military Intelligence Agency
(For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2).

Senator BRIDGES. Now, it is amazing that this document, prepared by our own military intelligence and submitted in July of 1945 and which is a part of the records here, so clearly outlines the programs, the plans, everything, as to Communist China—it is amazing that, having this, anybody in an official position in our country or anybody who had access to it, could be fooled by their program, what they were going to do.

I submit it for the record. But I would like to have it returned to me personally. Thank you.

And I submit it, Mr. Chairman—I understand it is declassified. If it is not, then the censors will take care of it. I understand it was secret but it has since been declassified.

Secretary ACHESON. May I make a comment on that, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

COMMENTS ON INTELLIGENCE REPORT OF 1945

Secretary ACHESON. In a statement which I made at a press conference on August 24, 1949, which was released to the press afterward, I referred both to the document which the Senator has just read and the military intelligence report upon which it was based.

What the Senator has just read is not the military intelligence report but a supposed summary of it which was put out by an officer who had worked on the report, and I commented on it because Congressman Judd had sent that summary which has just been read around to many of his colleagues in the House and perhaps to Members of the Senate and was of the impression that we had suppressed this by not printing it in the white paper.

I pointed out that this was one of a great many reports which had been made on this subject and I made available to the press two copies of the full report, which is two volumes long, and copies of this document, in saying that I saw no reason to reprint the whole matter; that I had just seen that summary for the first time when Congressman Judd spoke about it.

We were familiar with the long report on which this summary was supposed to be based. The summary had been withdrawn by the military intelligence division. I just make that comment.

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Secretary, in order to clarify it, Mr. Chairman, I mave a copy of the full report, but I thought the summary was sufficiently long so that I did not want to attempt to burden the committee with the full report, and I thought the summary hit the high spots of the thing, so having consideration for the distinguished chairman of this committee, I did not want to bring forth the full report.

Chairman RUSSELL. I appreciate that, Senator, but I do not want my views to prtvent the Senator from getting anything in the record he desires.

Senator BRIDGES. I have no further questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator McMahon?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Lodge?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Fulbright?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Tobey?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Sparkman?

Senator SPARKMAN. I pass.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Johnson?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Kefauver?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland?

(No response.)

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, I just respectfully raise a point of order. I pass.

Chairman RUSSELL. Didn't I call the Senator's name?

Senator SALTONSTALL. No.

Chairman RUSSELL. Oh, I am very sorry. The Chair apologizes to the Senator from Massachusetts. He is faithful in his attendance here, and I apologize to him for not recognizing him by calling his name. I can't understand how that happened. I had marked the Senator passed, perhaps because you passed on the last round.

Senator Hunt?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain?

CRUSHING AGGRESSION IN KOREA

Senator CAIN. Mr. Secretary, earlier in the afternoon the Senator from Louisiana and I were talking about the general question of aggression and aggressors in Korea. I think we were in substantial agreement that before Red China entered the war in November, that the United Nations were well on their way to crushing the aggression in Korea and unifying Korea by force.

I want once more to make this reference to a portion of the speech made by the President before the United Nations General Assembly on October 24, 1950. He said:

> In uniting to crush the aggression in Korea, those member nations have done no more than the Charter calls for.

I have a question, sir, against this observation. It does not necessarily follow, does it, that we must crush Red China if our primary mission is to crush the aggression in Korea of which Red China is a part?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; it does not necessarily follow.

Senator CAIN. I thank the Secretary.

POLITICAL AND MILITARY FACTORS IN BOMBING RACHIN

Mr. Secretary, please do not misunderstand this next question. Perhaps I am the only one confused at this minute. I am conscious, however, that during these hearings we have gotten a number of political evaluations from military authorities and some military evaluations from political authorities.

I want to ask you, sir, how you would qualify yourself to evaluate military problems.

Secretary ACHESON. I would have no qualifications.

Senator CAIN. Permit us to return for the minute, Mr. Secretary, to this question of Rachin. On page 42 of the record, General MacArthur said this:

> For instance, I was very anxious to bomb Rachin. That is in northeast Korea. Its usefulness to the enemy was self-evident. Great accumulations, depot accumulations, were made there. It was a great distributing center. They could run—the Soviets could rnu stuff from Vladivostok right down there.

At this time the chairman, Mr. Russell, asked this question of General MacArthur:

> Going back to this place of Rachin, General, was it possible to bomb that objective without crossing the Soviet frontier?
>
> General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir. No one would have been more opposed to doing any bombing in Siberia than I would.

Chairman RUSSELL. I didn't mean bombing. I meant on your approach and after delivery of the bombs.

General MACARTHUR. No, sir. There was no possibility of crossing the border. It was well within the area, and had we bombed we would have been solicitous to do so in clear weather so there could have been no mistakes.

This testimony, Mr. Secretary, appears to me to be a military evaluation of the capability of Rachin as a supply depot by one of the more highly qualified military witnesses on the face of the earth.

You testified earlier in the afternoon that Rachin—I think this was your phrase—"was an unimportant military supply center." I ask you the question, sir: On what information do you make your judgment that Rachin is an unimportant military depot available to our enemies?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, when we objected to these bombings for the reason it might cause involvement with the Soviet Union and extension of hostilities, we discussed this thing out with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In going into the situation they got out all of the information which they had. We asked them to tell us exactly what the whole military significance of this operation would be, and they went over it and described what the situation was.

We pointed out on the other side the grave dangers which would occur of involvement. They then analyzed further to see how the same objective could be reached with less danger and believed that they had reached it in that way—that by cutting the lines, road and rail and everything else, at a lower place. And looking over the map and their information with it, they thought they could achieve substantially what they wanted to achieve without getting into the dangers which the bombing of that place might get into.

Senator CAIN. It would seem to be so, Mr. Secretary, that the military decision to bomb Rachin in the first place was not referred to the State Department for consideration.

Secretary ACHESON. I was away at that time, and whether we knew about it, or before or afterward, I don't at this moment know.

Senator CAIN. Well, it seems to me, sir, from what you have said that before there were consultations on this question between the JCS and the State Department that the JCS in terms of military necessity had decided that Rachin as a supply base ought to be destroyed.

Secretary ACHESON. I don't know what they had decided, Senator. They had authorized the operation.

Senator CAIN. As I stated a minute ago, we sometimes get military evaluations from political persons and vice versa. I am surprised that the Chief of Naval Operations could tell this committee that Russia has some sort of an arrangement to use Rachin and that the Secretary of State doesn't know what arrangement, if any, the Russians have with reference to Rachin.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I am sorry that is so, sir.

Of course, I know that Russian vessels have gone in there over a great many years. Whether there are any arrangements and, if so, what they are, I don't know.

Senator CAIN. I know the Secretary does not resent any of these questions because Americans and our allied friends are dying, and jointly we seek to find some way in which to stop that killing.

FACTORS INVOLVED IN RULING OUT OF "HOT PURSUIT"

I want to pursue, for a few minutes, Mr. Secretary, another question, another military question; and I say, in all frankness, that I want to get you, if I can, to change an answer you gave to this committee on some of the days in the recent past.

On Monday, and again on Thursday, in response to my questions, Mr. Secretary, you stated that the JCS had ruled out the hot pursuit proposal, of the enemy aircraft, and the JCS and State Department strongly approved, after other United Nations objected, and the military situation in Korea had changed.

In discussing this question on Thursday, I pointed out——

Secretary ACHESON. I don't think I said that.

Have you got the record here, Senator?

Senator CAIN. I trust that we can take time to find that record, because I think that is precisely what you said.

Secretary ACHESON. I think I said, later on, the situation changed, but when we got on back——

Senator CAIN. You may have incorrectly quoted in the newspaper.

We have no ground for argument unless we are talking about the words on which we can agree.

The reference is made in the Evening Star, on Thursday, that you stated that the JCS had ruled out a proposed hot pursuit of enemy aircraft into Manchuria, last November, after other United Nations objected, and the military situation in Korea had changed.

I think, however, sir, that my argument will develop what I think are the facts, with which you can agree or disagree.

In discussing this question on Thursday, I pointed out what, to my mind, was the need for hot pursuit to protect our air and ground elements in Korea, and you responded with these words:

> I think you are wrong about that, Senator. I do not recall that the Chinese Air Force ever seriously, or perhaps at all attacked our Ground Forces.
>
> The particular reason for going across the border was that the fighter pilots had to break off at the border. The fighter pilots are not at the border, and that situation doesn't exist at the present time.

Mr. Secretary, for reasons of logic, it is not possible for me to agree with a portion of your answer; and please permit me to tell you why:

I think that everybody must agree that the proposed hot pursuit was ruled out by the JCS after six of our allies strenuously objected.

I think it is unreasonable for you, Mr. Secretary, or for the JCS to expect this committee and the country to believe that hot pursuit was ruled out because of some change in the military situation.

If my memory is correct, the record ought to establish as being a fact that the hot pursuit was ruled out for political reasons.

If there is any military reason for ruling out hot pursuit last January, or now, or any other time, then the JCS, sir, had better write some new military doctrine and textbooks.

In the Evening Star of Thursday, June 7, I read an AP dispatch of June 7, from Korea, which stated that allied war planes had destroyed or damaged 46 Russian MIG–15s in the massive April 12 air battle.

The battle raged, the dispatch said, at heights up to 4 miles, when 80 MIG's attacked 32 B–29's, making the war's heaviest attack to date on a Yalu River bridge near Sinuiju.

That indicates, Mr. Secretary, that our pilots today and yesterday and the day before and weeks before that have been employed at or near the Yalu River.

One need not be a military man, Mr. Secretary, to answer this question: Would military necessity, if that is the prime consideration, not require following these enemy jet aircraft north of the Yalu in order to destroy them and to provide our bombers with maximum protection?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I think that my statement when I said they are not at the border was too inclusive. Let me read what I did say here.

Senator CAIN. Please, sir.

Secretary ACHESON. The statement which I made, I think, is too broad. On page 5488, I said:

> I think you are wrong about that, Senator. I do not recall that the Chinese Air ever seriously or perhaps at all attacked our Ground Forces.

I think I am correct in that statement.

> The particular reason for going across the border was that the fighter pilots had to break off at the border. The fighter pilots are not at the border, and that situation doesn't exist at the present time.

I think you were correct in pointing out that when they are giving air support to bombers who are conducting operations in that area, they may on occasion, if you are attacking a bridge, be employed; in that respect, my statement was too broad.

I think what I was driving at here is that when the fighting was up in the north, the attacking planes were all over that area and were being attacked by jets on all occasions, and they found it difficult to break off at the border.

Now, you have an operation where it might—I don't know enough about military affairs—be of some advantage for a pilot to go across the border; while the pilot must stay with his bomber and not leave it. Therefore, I do not know if there has been any request from the Joint Chiefs of Staff—in fact, I think there has not been any request from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to revive this idea since the whole operation has moved so much farther south.

Senator CAIN. Well, my intention certainly is not that of quibbling with words nor do I seek to be disrespectful, but because you are one of the more prominent witnesses in this country and every word of what you say is read with real interest by most of our Nation, I want to point out any seeming discrepancies which I find in your testimony, in order that you may be given an opportunity to correct it, and in order that the people of this country will get military judgments which are sound.

Secretary ACHESON. I am glad to have you do that, Senator.

Secretary CAIN. Thank you, sir.

POSSIBLE FUTURE OCCASIONS FOR "HOT PURSUIT"

Mr. Secretary, I ask this question because of my hope and my anticipation that one of these days we are going to be back on the Yalu River, from which we were driven last November: Can you suggest a single logical military reason why enemy aircraft whose sole mission is to destroy and hinder allied operations should not be shot out of the air wherever they are found?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I can suggest the reasons which were given at the time this proposal was brought up for believing that it might be more of a disadvantage than it is an advantage, and that is that if by pursuing an airplane across the border you bring in the air on the other side against your whole operation you may have lost more than you have gained.

Senator CAIN. That was not the thinking, however, of the Military Establishment and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as of the time last January when you, after agreeing with their contentions, were directed to inform our allied members of what the intention of the military people in the United States was.

Secretary ACHESON. You did not ask me that. You asked me if I could think of any reason——

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

Secretary ACHESON (continuing). And I was trying to think of a reason, in answer to your question.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Secretary, in the name of continuity and in the name of just common sense, I want the record to support in a limited way my contention that there is every possible military reason for hot pursuit of enemy aircraft in any war in which America finds itself engaged. I use three brief references from military witnesses.

On page 28 General MacArthur said:

> I know that the air wished from the very beginning to pursue an attacking enemy plane to the death, whether it was over the border or not. The directives forbade that. The question was raised at the very beginning whether we could pursue an attacking plane to a conclusion in an air fight.

On page 807 General Marshall, Secretary of Defense, said with reference to hot pursuit:

> I had urgently recommended it and it was concurred in by the Secretary of State and the President.

On page 2,300 General Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said this:

> From a military point of view we thought it was desirable because it would be tough for a man in a dog fight to keep one eye on the Yalu River and stop the minute he gets there. It is very difficult.

I make mention again to this AP report out of Tokyo on June 7 which said that on April 11 the allied nations had 32 B–29's attacking a Yalu River bridge and that our allied jets were employed in considerable numbers against 80 enemy jet aircraft which were attempting to knock our B–29's out of the air. As this question has arisen in the past, it is certain to be before us in the future.

STRENGTHENING NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Mr. Secretary, you told the comittee on Thursday that every possible consideration calls for the United States to make itself strong as rapidly as possible. I agree with this contention.

However, it seems to me that we are leaving important things in this country undone which could easily be accomplished if some of those in authority would exercise some initiative and sound judgment. It has been testified that the National Security Council is the most important policy-making defense agency in America.

This Council, as you know, is made up of the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the

Chairman of the National Security Resources Board. I think my information concerning the membership of the National Security Council is correct, is it not, sir?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. The statute also authorizes the President to add members as a regular thing or ad hoc as he thinks wise.

Senator CAIN. And have I understood correctly that in recent months Mr. Wilson, the head of our economic operations, has been in the habit of attending the weekly meetings of the Council?

Secretary ACHESON. Mr. Wilson attends, Mr. Harriman attends, Mr. Snyder attends meetings pretty regularly, and on occasion Mr. Foster, the ECA Administrator and the Secretary of Commerce attend, and sometimes the Attorney General.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Secretary, the National Security Resources Board, which was created by an act of the Congress I think it was in 1947 and which is about as important as any agency in this country, has been without a chairman for weeks.

CHAIRMAN OF NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCES BOARD

If the present is as critical as you and every other witness claims it to be—and I think it is—can you explain why the National Security Resources Board is permitted to exist without having as its chairman some American who is nationaly known and respected?

Secretary ACHESON. There has been an Acting Chairman since Mr. Symington was appointed the Administrator of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and I imagine that the President has under active consideration appointing a Chairman.

Senator CAIN. And who might that Acting Chairman be, sir?

Secretary ACHESON. I know his name perfectly well. It escapes me now.

Senator CAIN. Permit me to ask this: When did the last chairman of the NSRB resign?

Secretary ACHESON. I should think it was 2 or 3 weeks ago.

Senator CAIN. I think it was about the 1st of May, which is only a short time ago. The National Security Council, sir, meets once a week or oftener?

Secretary ACHESON. It has not met, so far as I know, that often recently. It used to when Mr. Symington was there.

Senator CAIN. May I ask if, to your knowledge, there have been any meetings of the National Security Council since Mr.——

Secretary ACHESON. Are you talking about the National Security Council or the National Security Resources Board?

Senator CAIN. I am asking questions about the National Security Council, because the Chairman of the NSRB is a member of it, sir.

Secretary ACHESON. I am sorry. Then I have given you wrong information. I thought you were asking about the National Security Resources Board; and, therefore, my answer that they have not been meeting recently is wrong. That meets every week.

Senator CAIN. The National Security Council meets each Wednesday?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes.

Senator CAIN. Has the acting head of the NSRB been in attendance at each of those weekly meetings since Mr. Symington resigned as Chairman of the NSRB?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator CAIN. I find it difficult to understand how so many very prominent policy makers in this country find it difficult to know or remember who the acting head of the NSRB is. I am reminded that the Secretary of Defense, when I asked him a comparable question, was unable to identify the acting head, and all I wish to say in that connection is I hope the President nominates a prominent American real soon in order that all of the country may know who he is and have appreciation for his capability.

Mr. Secretary, with reference to one of my question to you on Monday, I was both careless and unintentionally discourteous. You were not provided with an opportunity to respond to the question. The question was as follows:

> My assumption is that as the Secretary of State you have thought highly of General MacArthur's administration in Japan since the end of the war.

May I ask, Mr. Secretary, if that is a correct assumption?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I was asked that by other Senators and so responded.

UNITED STATES AND SOVIET MILITARY AID TO CHINA

Senator CAIN. I thank you, sir. The evidence before us appears to show that from August 1946 to May 1947 the United States embargoed the shipment of military supplies to the Chinese Nationalist Government. Do you know of any evidence that Russia during this period placed any similar restrictions on the delivery of either Russian or Japanese equipment to the Chinese Communist forces?

Secretary ACHESON. I have no information that they put any restrictions on it; or that they sent any.

Senator CAIN. From May 1947 to January 1948 the only supplies which I think were sent from the United States to the Chinese Nationalist forces were 130 million rounds of ammunition.

Do you know of any Russian restrictions of arms to the Chinese Communists during the period covered in this and the previous question or during the 20-month period from August 1946 to January 1948?

Secretary ACHESON. Can we get that date straight?

Senator CAIN. Yes. I was asking for information covering the period from August 1946 to January 1948.

Secretary ACHESON. That extends the previous question.

Senator CAIN. Yes, it does.

Secretary ACHESON. From May to the—no, the same answer would apply to that.

REASONS FOR CHINESE ABSENCE FROM YALTA CONFERENCE

Senator CAIN. I thank you, Mr. Secretary.

We know that China was represented at the Cairo Conference but was not present at the Yalta Conference. Now, at the Yalta Conference important concessions were made to Russia at China's expense—or so it has always seemed to me. And I have always felt that for purely moral reasons China should have been invited to attend a conference which considered Chinese questions.

I think I know how America would have reacted if a conference had been called between some nations to consider important questions, questions important to America that is, and yet without America being present.

I would appreciate your addressing yourself, if you care to, to this question as to why the Chinese moral right to have been present at Yalta was bypassed.

Secretary Acheson. I have already explained that on the record.

Senator Cain. I have the record available to me. I was not here at that particular time, but I can look it up. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

DECLARATION OF A STATE OF WAR BY CONGRESS

Now, on a recent day, Mr. Secretary, you had a rather extended colloquy with the senior Senator from Virginia, Senator Byrd. The substance of it, if I understood it correctly, was that the administration did not seek a declaration of war against North Korea or any resolution of the Congress with reference to the Communists in Korea because things were moving so rapidly in those days of late June 1950 that the administration had no time to turn to the Koreans.

I want to ask you, Mr. Secretary, why in the present war we do not proceed as we have done in previous wars—which is to have the Congress ratify what amounts to the state of war against an enemy of America. I have been puzzled about that ever since the war began, and have addressed myself to the subject on a number of occasions.

Secretary Acheson. The Government could, if it thought that necessary and desirable, ask for a declaration of war against China. It would seem to me that that would not be the wise course. But we are continuing the fighting against aggression in Korea, and when other people, the Chinese, had come into Korea, we are continuing to fight against them.

That, I think, has the complete approval of the Congress and the people. And the declaration of war would in my judgment put the United States in a different situation from all the other United Nations who are dealing with this aggression in Korea; and I do not think it would add anything. It might detract from the situation.

Senator Cain. Mr. Secretary, on page 5305, during the colloquy you had with the Senator from Virginia, you stated this:

> Congress is the only agency that can declare war, yes, sir; but that does not mean that Congress is the only agency that can start fighting. A war is declared when somebody attacks you, whatever happens; but what the Constitution is referring to is the declaration of war which has a whole lot of legal and other consequences.

You are acknowledged, Mr. Secretary, as being an eminent constitutional lawyer, and I would appreciate your explaining to us what that phrase "a whole lot of legal and other consequences" really means.

Secretary Acheson. I do not claim the distinction which you have conferred on me as a constitutional lawyer.

Senator Cain. I said it in all seriousness.

Secretary Acheson. What I was trying to point out is that, in the accepted popular sense of the word, you are in a war when somebody attacks you, and that, therefore, it is an enemy who may precipitate you into a war. You cannot say you do not get into a war unless Congress declares a state of war. You may be in it when the enemy is forcing you into a fight.

Senator CAIN. As, for example, at Pearl Harbor?

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator Cain. Pardon me.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. I shall not call the names of the Senators but——

Senator CAIN. Would the Secretary be permitted to finish his answer?

Chairman RUSSELL. Oh, yes.

Senator CAIN. For I am aware my time has expired.

Chairman RUSSELL. Will the reporter read the question?

(Whereupon, the record was read by the reporter.)

LEGAL CONSEQUENCES FROM DECLARATION OF WAR

Secretary ACHESON. As I have already pointed out, as you said at Pearl Harbor, or in other similar situations, the enemy by attacking you, attacking the country or its forces, may put you into a state of hostilities so that you are fighting with them, and that is what is popularly called war.

It is not, however, a state of war with its legal implications, which changes the relationships between two states, unless and until Congress does that. That is what I was trying to explain.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir. I would like to pursue that just a little further when I have an opportunity, sir.

Secretary ACHESON. All right.

Chairman RUSSELL. Does any other Senator present desire to have a question period now?

If not, Senator Cain, you may proceed.

Senator CAIN. I thank the chairman.

Mr. Secretary, in November the Chinese Reds attacked our forces in force when they crossed the Yalu River. You have stated that "a war is declared when somebody else attacks you"——

Secretary ACHESON. No; I didn't say "a war is declared." I said you get into a state of hostilities, which is popularly known as being in a war.

Senator CAIN. Well, Mr. Secretary, I don't want to be embarrassing. You have just made a reference to hostilities; but on page 5303 you say in no uncertain fashion: "a war is declared when somebody else attacks you."

I am very well aware of the fact that America—admittedly we are fighting with other nations, but American forces were attacked in a very vicious way late in November, and I am trying to understand what is it in this modern twentieth century that constitutes a formal war. You have told us that a war is declared when somebody else attacks you, but that was several days ago.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, you are quite right in reading from page 5303 of the record that I used the expression "a war is declared when somebody else attacks you." That was not what I was trying to explain.

I was trying to explain that the Congress under the Constitution is given the exclusive power to declare war. That, as I understand it, means that the Congress by that declaration changes the relationship between this country and another state involved.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

Secretary ACHESON. And puts us into a state of war with that other country, and from that flow a great many legal consequences.

I was trying to contrast that with the fact that you could not keep out of fighting what is popularly known as war merely because Congress has not declared it. You may be fighting regardless of what the Congress does because somebody attacks you.

Senator CAIN. I quite agree, sir.

Secretary ACHESON. I was trying to point out that because someone attacks you and your fighting with that other nation is not synonymous with the declaration of the state of war which Congress only can declare.

Senator CAIN. But it has been our habit in wars gone by for the Congress to ratify the steps which the administration has necessarily taken to get on with the winning of the war.

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct, sir. It has in many cases. In many cases it has not.

Senator CAIN. Well, Mr. Secretary, I am not an attorney. I want a little more information if I can on the legal and other consequences which flow from the Congress declaring war, and I ask the question for this reason.

I want to try to find out if, through a declaration of war by the Congress, the American people through the Congress could be more helpful to the administration in bringing this war of aggression to an end at a more rapid time, sir.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I do not believe that the result of this matter of declaring war will bring that about, Senator. The Chinese Communists, of course, attacked the forces of all the United Nations who were engaged in the operation in Korea. I do not think any of them have considered it as wise to regard that as putting them into a state of war with China, but they have thought it better to fight this situation in Korea as we are fighting it.

Now, I think that is the wise thing to do, and I think we can be successful in that way.

WISDOM OF A LEGAL DECLARATION OF WAR

Senator CAIN. Well, Mr. Secretary, the other day you said there was an analogy, if I understood you correctly, between the Boxer Rebellion, in which America had 5,000 troops, and this war in Korea, in which some three-hundred-fifty-thousand-odd Americans are now employed.

I think that were I a member of one of our allies who has either no fighting forces in Korea or very limited forces in Korea, I would certainly maintain there would not be any point in declaring war against what amounts from their point of view to a police action, but as an American, when 350,000 of my fellow citizens are engaged in fighting that war, it seems to me to be something else again and a first-rate war.

You were thoughtful enough a minute ago to say that you were attempting to explain why it was not wise for this country to formally declare war against its allies. You went on to say that in your opinion you thought the country supported that view.

I am not qualified to say whether the country does or does not. I get an awful lot of letters asking me why we don't go to war, and I will give you one example.

Only several weeks ago, because America is not fighting a declared war, it took a special act of the Congress to permit a soldier, if I understood it correctly, who was fighting in the Korean War, to be admitted as a patient to a veterans' hospital because the contention was made that that was not a war out there and that the statute said that only veterans of a war shall be permitted services in a hospital.

Now, what other things are there that would be improvements in the situation if the Congress was to formally declare war?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't think there would be any improvement in the situation, sir.

Senator CAIN. Is that to say that no good purpose would be served if the Congress of the United States supported the action of the administration in the war in Korea, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; that isn't what I said at all. I said I did not think any good purpose would be served by a declaration of war.

Senator CAIN. Permit me to ask you this, Mr. Secretary, in all somberness, if that is the proper word: If we were fighting the Red Chinese and the North Koreans by ourselves in Korea, is it not logical to assume that America would months ago have declared war against our enemies?

Secretary ACHESON. I do not think so. You immediately have a problem that you are in a state of peace with the Government of China. You wouldn't doubt that, would you?

We are in a state of profound peace with the Government of China, and, therefore, it would be somewhat anomalous to declare war against China?

Senator CAIN. You mean we are in a state of peace with the Chinese Nationalist Government?

Secretary ACHESON. That is what we recognize as the Government of China.

Senator CAIN. We likewise recognize that though that Government is a member of the United Nations and our ally, we are not permitting that Government to engage in its own war. That is correct, is it not, sir?

Secretary ACHESON. I just want to be clear about this business, you say, of declaring war against China, would that improve the situation.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

Secretary ACHESON. We are not going to declare war against China because the Government of China which we recognize is not at war with us and, as you say, is our ally; therefore, this form that you are talking about of declaring war presents far more problems than it would solve.

Senator CAIN. Where, may I ask, is the Government, the Chinese Nationalist Government, located?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, you and I both know it is on Formosa.

Senator CAIN. Is it not reasonable, therefore, to assume that if we thought it was proper to declare war that we could declare war against the Red Chinese, which have an official name which I cannot define at the moment?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I don't know. If you want an opinion from the legal adviser, I will get one, but you can obviously see, I think, that you are not going to improve the situation much by that method.

Senator CAIN. One of your reasons for opposing a declaration of war by the Congress is that we have, interestingly enough, no legal government to declare it against.

Secretary ACHESON. No, and you just asked me what possible good can come out of this, and I have said as many times as I possibly can that I can see no good that may come out of it, and a great many complications.

Senator CAIN. Well, I just press a little bit, Mr. Secretary, because we both have mail to answer. We are both responsible public officials, and when people write and ask me why we don't acknowledge a war by declaring war on our enemies, when a war has been going on now for the better part of a year, I do the most natural thing I can think of, which is to say that in due time I shall have an "opportunity to ask your question of the Secretary of State and will provide you with his answer," and that precisely is what I shall do, of course, but what conclusions these citizens will draw from your answer, I am not qualified to say.

I have one last question on this subject: Let us assume, Mr. Secretary, that the war in Korea continues for another year.

Are you suggesting to this committee and to the Nation that at the end of the next year you will still be of the opinion that we should not declare war against our enemies?

Secretary ACHESON. I am not giving any opinion as to what I should think at the end of the year.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

INVESTIGATION OF LEAK OF STATE DEPARTMENT INFORMATION PAPER OF DECEMBER 23, 1949

I would like for just several minutes to go back to your discussion of the December 1949 State Department guidance and policy paper which was distributed in the Far East.

I want to ask you if any investigation of the disclosure of that paper was made by the State Department.

Secretary ACHESON. I have answered that question, I think, at least twice, but I shall be very glad to do it again, if you wish.

Senator CAIN. No, sir. Don't bother to do that.

Permit me to ask you this: I think it has been said that the Army conducted an investigation. I, therefore, ask you why the Army conducted the investigation rather than the State Department, for it was an important State Department matter?

Secreary ACHESON. Well, I have answered that question twice, but I will answer that one right now.

Senator CAIN. I appreciate that. I had not been familiar with your answer.

Secretary ACHESON. The State Department requested the Army to make an investigation in Tokyo where all personnel involved were under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Army, to find out how a paper communicated from the State Department to the Army was released.

The Army did make the investigation, and the Army reported that an officer inadvertently allowed this to be seen by some outside person, reporter or otherwise. That was reported to us.

DISTRIBUTION OF STATE DEPARTMENT INFORMATION PAPER OF DECEMBER 23, 1949

Senator CAIN. Have you stated, Mr. Secretary, what the classification on that paper was, when it was first distributed?

Secretary ACHESON. It has been stated many times.

Senator CAIN. Thank you.

Would you tell me if the paper was circulated rather broadly? I think it has been said that some 500 copies were made available in the Far East, to United States military personnel, as well as to State Department personnel.

Secretary ACHESON. The figure is in the record. I believe it is four hundred and something.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir; all right, sir.

Well, was it distributed 50 percent to military personnel, and 50 percent State Department personnel?

Secretary ACHESON. I think I read all the figures.

Senator CAIN. Then, I will be glad to look up any of those answers that you have already provided, sir.

Secretary ACHESON. What was his question?

I was distracted.

(The record was read by the reporter.)

Senator CAIN. My question, Mr. Secretary, was, Did you distribute 50 percent of the four hundred-odd documents to military personnel and the other 50 percent to the State Department personnel? Or, what was the approximate ratio?

I am not looking for any definite figure.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, it is hard to get that out of the figures there.

Senator CAIN. But it was the purpose of the paper to be distributed to some extent to military personnel in the Far East, sir?

Secretary ACHESON. It was distributed to military personnel in the two areas where the military personnel were doing this information work.

One was Germany, and the other was the Far East, and a considerable number of copies were sent to the military for that purpose.

PREVENTION OF WORLD WAR III

Senator CAIN. Mr. Secretary, please tell me, why does the administration talk so much, during these hearings, and to the country these days, about preventing a third world war, when nothing, so far as I know, was said on this subject back in June or July?

All I remember about last June and July is that we free people were going to Korea to crush aggression.

It was on the evening of April 11 that I remember hearing, for the first time, the President say to the country that our purpose in Korea is to prevent a third world war.

Secretary Acheson. I think that your memory is wrong about that, Senator. This has been the constant preoccupation of our foreign policy ever since the danger became quite acute, and that certainly covers the period that I have been back in the Government.

Senator Cain. I ask that question because of my interest in determining how much consideration we gave last June to the possibility of Red China and Russia entering the conflict.

Secretary Acheson. I have also discussed that, and you will find it discussed in my opening statement.

ADVISABILITY OF A NAVAL BLOCKADE

Senator Cain. I thank you, sir. Mr. Secretary, you are familiar with the testimony offered by Admiral Sherman on the subject of a naval blockade, and I have understood you to testify that in general you agreed with what he said.

Secretary Acheson. That also is very specifically in the record several times. I read a statement of Admiral Sherman's specifically and said I agreed with that statement.

Senator Cain. I then understood you, sir, correctly. I am curious as to how your views as the Secretary of State should be so at variance with some of the views held by important persons representing one of our friends and chief allies.

I just can't understand these seeming differences of opinion. In early April, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, Britain's chief representative on the United Nations, made a provocative and interesting speech in the city of San Francisco on an occasion when I was there.

During this speech he warned against the danger of any military action such as air raids or naval blockade against China as inevitably leading to unlimited war.

You have stated, Mr. Secretary, that you don't believe any such thing, and I wonder if you have reason to believe that the British, through Sir Gladwyn Jebb, subscribe to your point of view, since the time when Sir Jebb said otherwise about a month and a half or 2 months ago.

Secretary Acheson. Senator, I don't know what you say that I have said that I do not believe. Your question is somewhat involved here. Perhaps you had better have the question read again.

Senator Cain. Permit me to phrase it in a more simple form, sir.

The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Sherman, testified to this committee that in his opinion, a United Nations naval blockade was desirable and that it would not necessarily follow that it would result in World War III.

I think your feeling has been that when the economic sanctions are more fully in effect, a naval blockade conducted by the United Nations would be a desirable thing.

Secretary Acheson. I have not said that, sir.

Senator Cain. May I ask you if you believe that a naval blockade would be an effective way in which to shorten the Red Chinese aggression?

Secretary ACHESON. I think that what I have said several times is that I have agreed with the statement that Admiral Sherman made on pages 4315 and 16 of the record. He said:

> And I want to make it clear that I have not advocated establishing a blockade and been overruled. I have discussed the problem here in relation to the recommendations of General MacArthur to go ahead with it, to show what the problems are, what the possibilities are, and to try to make an objective analysis of it.
>
> In my opinion the time has not arrived for such an undertaking, because I still believe that the best way to stop this traffic is by mutual agreement between the United Nations. I think, beginning with the action of some of our own oil companies fairly early in the game, following the things that are now being done through the United Nations and through cooperation, we can make a great deal of headway. It may be that we can make enough. But if we ever resort to a blockade by force, it must be a United Nations operation unless we are going to get involved in a unilateral war between the United States and China, which in my own opinion is extremely undesirable.

I said I agreed with that statement, that I was going ahead as vigorously as I could to accomplish what Admiral Sherman said may well be enough in that statement.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

Now, we have had the reference to the Admiral strongly advocating a naval blockade if imposed by the Nations and reasonably later, after a more effective economic-sanctions blockade, if you want to call it that, had been imposed.

What I was getting at, sir, is that Sir Gladwyn Jebb, who holds about the most important position in Great Britain's representation in the United Nations, has said that in his opinion a naval blockade would inevitably lead to world war III. I do not happen to believe so, sir, but I think it is important for us to determine if you and Great Britain as represented by Sir Gladwyn Jebb are in agreement that a naval blockade, which certainly must be considered if this war long continues, is going to inevitably lead to world war III.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I think I am not called upon to discuss the Sir Gladwyn Jebb statement. That is something for the British Government to discuss. I have made my position quite clear and I think at this time it is all that is appropriate for me to say.

Senator CAIN. Well, I shall certainly not press you, sir, but the Congress must give consideration to the attitude of our allies, particularly when—without any desire to be critical—we are as of this time providing the greater percentage in substance and blood and manpower and matériel that goes into this war.

WISDOM OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

Mr. Secretary, you have favored strongly, I think, the strongest sort of economic sanctions against Red China in order that matériels and supplies of war will not be funneled from Red China into Korea. Is that not correct?

Secretary ACHESON. I have discussed a great many times what we have tried to accomplish, sir.

Senator CAIN. All right, sir. In this same speech of Sir Gladwyn Jebb in San Francisco before perhaps a thousand Americans in early April said that "economic sanctions beyond those already in effect would not carry much weight since China's economy does not rest on foreign trade."

And he said that he "did not favor imposing sanctions on China for fear that might be dangerous, double-edged, or merely useless."

And I seek to determine if you think that is an official British attitude, for if it was, it will explain the slowness with which we free peoples have imposed economic sanctions; and I seek to find out whether or not the British, as is quite possible, and I hope so, differ today in their view from what it was 2 months ago.

Secretary ACHESON. The British attitude was expressed by their vote on the 18th of May in favor of the resolution in New York, sir.

Senator CAIN. I think you have given me a worth-while answer, because their thought, by virtue of the action that they took in May, seems one which was much more healthy, and different from what they felt in early April.

Now, every one of these questions, Mr. Secretary, has behind it all of the Americans who are out in Korea and who can only put to the Congress questions of interest to them, raised to those in authority within the administration of this country.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain, your time has expired. I will have to inquire whether any other member of the committee has any other questions they desire to propound?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. You may proceed, sir.

POSSIBLE RECALL OF WITNESS

Senator CAIN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say this, if I may. Several other Senators who are not here today have asked that I offer some questions of importance to them.

I think those questions ought to be raised sometime along the line, but I would feel that I was not being unfair to those who turned to me, if there was any likelihood that the Secretary of State was to return at a later date on which occasion or occasions the Senators in question could ask their own questions, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator, that is a question that I could not answer categorically because it would depend upon committee action.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. There have been Senators who have indicated that they thought that perhaps the Secretary of State should be recalled, but I could not answer yes or no because I do not know.

Senator CAIN. Well, your answer is quite satisfactory to me, sir, and against my own assumption that there will be adequate reason for asking the Secretary of State to rejoin the committee at a later date, I shall not ask those questions which have been offered to me by my colleagues.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, if there are no other questions, the examination of the Secretary of State is concluded.

Mr. Secretary, I do not know whether it would be the source of either pride or consolidation to you, but your examination here has been the most extensive of any witness who has been before a hearing that has become somewhat noted for the thoroughness not to mention the repetition of the examination.

You have far exceeded in the number of questions, the number of words and the number of hours that you have been upon the stand the record of any previous witness. You have presented your point of view and that of the Department of State ably and thoroughly, and you have enlightened this committee on many aspects of the fareastern situation which we have been investigating.

We certainly have a better grasp of the many very staggering problems which confronted you during your tenure of office as Secretary of State and the steps that have been taken to meet them.

On behalf of the committees I wish to express to you our appreciation for your time, your thoroughness, and for your patience in attendance and replying to the questions that have been propounded.

If there is no further business, the committees will stand in recess until 10 o'clock on Monday morning.

(Whereupon, at 5:05 p. m., the committees recessed, to reconvene at 10:05 a. m. Monday, June 11, 1951.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

MONDAY, JUNE 11, 1951

Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:05 a. m. in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), Bridges, Byrd, Saltonstall, Johnson, Morse, Knowland, Hunt, Cain, Stennis, Long, George, Smith, Green, Hickenlooper, McMahon, Fulbright, Sparkman, Gillette, and Brewster.

Also present: William H. Darden, clerk, Committee on Armed Services; Verne D. Mudge of the committee staff of the Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; and Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations.

WEDEMEYER'S CAREER

Chairman Russell. The committees will come to order.

Today these two committees of the Senate begin the thirty-second day of this joint inquiry into the conduct of our affairs in the Far East.

I think we all share a very real feeling of pleasure as we welcome General Albert Wedemeyer as our eighth distinguished witness.

During the 34 years that have elapsed since General Wedemeyer was appointed to West Point from the great State of Nebraska, he has served his country with honor, with great ability, and with marked distinction.

Throughout his career his assignments have required an unusual capacity to meet difficult and diverse situations. He has occupied not only important positions as a staff officer both in the United States and abroad, but he has also had the exacting responsibility of command frequently thrust upon him.

His assignment as Chief of the Strategy and Policy Section of the Operations Division of the Army General Staff during the earlier years of World War II imposed duties of the highest significance in the successful prosecution of the war. Likewise his assignment as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Southeast Asia Command in October of 1943 called for a background of experience and achievement which could have been acquired only in the highest levels of our national strategy and planning.

The same outstanding ability was again called for a year later when General Wedemeyer was sent to China to assume the crucial duties of commanding general of United States Forces in the China theater of operations. There, incidentally, he also served as Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Many months after surrender of Japan and after General Wedemeyer had returned to the United States, he was again sent to the Far East in response to a Presidential directive dated July 9, 1947, calling for him to undertake a most important mission to China and Korea.

General Wedemeyer is the author of the now famous reports on China and Korea which bear his name. These reports have contributed immeasurably toward a clearer and more objective understanding of the complexity of the military, political, economic, and social problems in those areas of the world.

General Wedemeyer's record both as a soldier and as a representative of this Nation in other fields highly commends the value of his advice and council.

We are glad to have you here, General Wedemeyer.

Under the instructions of the committee, I must administer the oath to you, as has been done in the case of all our witnesses.

If you will raise your right hand. The evidence you are about to give these committees upon the inquiry now in progress will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

General WEDEMEYER. I do.

Senator HUNT. Mr. Chairman, may I raise my procedural matter before the general commences?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hunt, it is my opinion that we postpone that until about 12:30, so that the members of the committees not now present will have an opportunity to pass upon it, and in that way we will avoid possible complaint by those members of the committee who were not here promptly at the morning session's opening.

Therefore, if you do not object, I will announce that we will recess the questioning of General Wedemeyer at 12:30 in order to consider procedural matters.

Senator HUNT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CAIN. Do I understand correctly that the time after 12:30 will be restricted to——

Chairman RUSSELL. I said procedural matters will come up for discussion after 12:30.

Senator CAIN. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, General Wedemeyer, do you have any statement or remarks that you desire to make at this time? If you do have, you may proceed.

General WEDEMEYER. I do, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Then you may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. A. C. WEDEMEYER, UNITED STATES ARMY, ACCOMPANIED BY LT. COL. MALCOLM F. GILCHRIST, JR., STAFF OFFICER, GENERAL STAFF

WEDEMEYER'S PERSONAL VIEWS

General WEDEMEYER. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, as I undoubtedly will be questioned by members of the committee concerning a number of points that are controversial, I wish at the outset to submit a few personal statements. Any testimony that I may give to this committee will be based entirely upon personal views and have no relation whatsoever to the official views of the Department of Defense. I appear as a witness upon the invitation of Senator Russell, the chairman of this committee. I wish to emphasize in all sincerity that I will strive to give information and assistance within my capabilities in an objective, nonpartisan manner.

From time to time, gentlemen, I may allude to previous witnesses who have appeared before you in connection with the investigation. Many of these witnesses I have known and greatly admired in the course of my service in the Army. I have never questioned their loyalties either to country or to principles. At times I am compelled to question judgments.

ASSIGNMENT TO SIXTH ARMY

There have been some conjectures concerning my relief from duty in Washington in 1949 and my subsequent assignment to the Sixth Army. May I state clearly that I requested that assignment at the time Gen. Mark Clark was relieved from command of the Sixth Army. It has proved to be a challenging and an interesting assignment and perhaps the most enjoyable that I have experienced during my 32 years in the Army. The officials and the people throughout the eight Western States which are included in the Sixth Army area have unanimously given me magnificent support in all of the undertakings within the scope of my military responsibilities.

The past few weeks I have been following very carefully the examination of witnesses that have appeared before your committee. There are a few subjects which have been developed in the testimony of those prior witnesses to which I should like, Mr. Chairman, to address myself for the consideration of the members of the committee.

DRAFTING OF WEDEMEYER'S DIRECTIVE

The first point was introduced by Secretary of Defense Marshall. The Secretary was describing to the members of the committee those events that led up to my mission to China and Korea in 1947. The record shows that on May 8, 1951, Secretary Marshall testified, and I quote:

> I thought I would just send him out to look over the ground for me and come back and tell me what he thought; but his idea, and I think it was right, was—he needed as much prestige as possible in what he was doing, and therefore he needed a Presidential directive; and my recollection is he drew up most of the directive himself.

With reluctance, gentlemen, because my recollection of these events is quite different from that of Secretary Marshall, I submit the following:

I would never express concern about a position involving my prestige or my rank. I did not, therefore, suggest that I required a Presidential directive.

After 2 years' close association with the Chinese, and limited contacts with Koreans, I felt confident that I enjoyed their respect and that I would receive their friendly cooperation. Secretary Marshall requested that I draft my directive. I did so and submitted it to him for approval.

A day or so later it was returned to me without any changes and over the signature of President Truman. A copy of that directive is embodied in my report to the President, the China Report of 1947.

Actually I think that a member of Secretary Marshall's staff, a Colonel Carter, suggested the Presidential directive and also ambassadorial rank for me in the effort to be helpful. I think also that the members of this committee are entitled to know that the idea of sending me to China in an investigative role had its genesis in Congress. I believe that Congressman Walter Judd recommended such action to Secretary Marshall.

WEDEMEYER'S VIEWS PERTAINING TO FORMOSA

The second point that has been developed in the course of the investigation here pertains to the testimony of Secretary of State Acheson as recorded on June 1, 1951. The Secretary associated my name with certain policies and actions pertaining to the island of Formosa.

May I state categorically that at all times, at all times I felt that the Nationalist Government could resist successfully the Communist attacks against Formosa. In discussing the State Department's informal memorandum on Formosa dated December 23, 1949, Secretary Acheson conveys the erroneous implication that I not only agreed with the State Department's pessimistic views concerning the future of Formosa but that I even suggested the probable fall of that area to the Communists.

In August 1949 it was my definite understanding that the State Department was on record to the effect that Formosa's fall was probable. I read many official communications emanating in the State Department to that effect.

Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended action to avert such a catastrophe, I was not sure at the time that the State Department would adopt those recommendations. This feeling was based upon the existing policy toward Formosa which, as I recall it, was to attempt to prevent the fall of Formosa by economic and diplomatic measures only.

Assuming that the State Department's attitude and pessimistic conclusions concerning Formosa continued, I felt it would be necessary to take constructive steps to insure the strengthening of the over-all United States position among far eastern peoples and nations. I, therefore, suggested action in the psychological warfare field.

Employment of psychological warfare is standard procedure among all modern nations and in all fields of strategy under such circumstances. In the event that Formosa's fall became a fact, I recommended the employment of the Voice of America and any other informational means which might minimize the effect upon Far Eastern peoples, and I should like to repeat, minimize.

I had no intention, gentlemen, that there should be falsification of the military importance of Formosa or of the policy pertaining to that strategic area.

STATE DEPARTMENT POLICY MEMORANDUM ON FORMOSA

I want to say to you, gentlemen, I would not have been so much concerned about this point, that is about the association of my name with the Formosa memorandum on the part of the Secretary of State, Acheson, had he not resisted the efforts of the members of this committee to obtain the names of the individual or individuals of the State Department who prepared the final policy memorandum which, by the way, was never referred to me.

I believe it was never coordinated with the Department of Defense prior to its dissemination. I made the effort to determine this point and was unsuccessful. I was at that time—this was in 1949, gentlemen, in August—the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations in the Department of the Army. It is possible that this Formosa memorandum may have been prepared subsequent to my departure for my new assignment in the west coast which occurred in September 1949. The date on the memorandum that was actually disseminated was December 23, 1949.

I have inquired in the Department of the Army and have been informed that the memorandum was never coordinated even in my former office, that is with my successor there.

To summarize, I have never accepted the State Department's pessimistic view with reference to the future of Formosa. I have consistently and repeatedly recommended American supervised aid to the Chinese Nationalist Government, presently located in Formosa, in order to stop the advance of communism in the Far East.

MAC ARTHUR-SPRUANCE-WEDEMEYER RADIOGRAM

A third and final point that I should like to present to you gentlemen:

On June 6, 1951, Secretary of State Acheson testified that MacArthur, Spruance, and Wedemeyer were all in agreement in the winter of 1945 with reference to future United States policy in China. His testimony indicates that he derived that information from an official radiogram dated December 7, 1945, dispatched from MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo after MacArthur, Spruance, and Wedemeyer had conferred concerning projected United States assistance to the Nationalist Government in China.

The Secretary quoted a paragraph of that radiogram as follows—this is the last paragraph of that particular radiogram, gentlemen, and I quote:

> It is suggested that the United States assistance to China, as outlined above, be made available as a basis for negotiation by the American Ambassador to bring together and to effect a compromise between the major opposing groups in order to promote a unified democratic China.

The Secretary of State, Acheson, laid great stress upon the fact that this above-recommended action was the policy which General Marshall was sent to China to try to effectuate.

The foregoing unquestionably would lead to the interpretation that I concurred in, and in fact recommended, the formulation of a coalition government in China involving the Nationalists and Communists.

This interpretation is absolutely incorrect. I never believed such a government possible. The paragraph quoted by Secretary Acheson was taken out of context from a message which recommended courses of action to be taken to consolidate and strengthen the position of the Nationalist Government in China.

These recommended courses of action, which are included in the message quoted by Mr. Acheson, covered essentially the plans and necessary arrangements for the repatriation of approximately 3 million Japanese who were in China at the end of the war. Of these 3 million Japanese, about 1,200,000 were military, many of whom were occupying and controlling focal points of communications, lines of communications and production areas—particularly in north China.

With the evacuation of so many Japanese soldiers, vacua would be created, and I proposed to fill those vacua as rapidly as possible with Chinese Nationalist forces to insure (*a*) that order would be maintained in those critical areas, and (*b*) that the Nationalist Government troops would have the opportunity to control those areas instead of the Chinese Communist troops.

I should like to repeat, gentlemen, there was not, in my mind, at least, any idea that the message quoted out of context by Secretary of State Acheson—there was no idea that that message conveyed my approval of any suggestion that a coalition government should or could be accomplished in China.

That is all I have, sir.

COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN JAPANESE WAR

Chairman **Russell**. I believe your first assignment to Asia during World War II was as deputy to Lord Mountbatten in the southeast Asia command?

General **Wedemeyer**. That is correct, sir.

Chairman **Russell**. When were you assigned to command in China?

General **Wedemeyer**. In September 1944, sir.

Chairman **Russell**. You succeeded General Stilwell?

General **Wedemeyer**. That is correct, sir.

Chairman **Russell**. At the time you arrived in China there were two contending forces in China, both of which had armies at their disposal, and both of whom were opposing the Japanese, I believe; is that correct, in 1944?

General **Wedemeyer**. Yes, sir; there were two forces present, Mr. Chairman, the major forces operating under the Nationalist Government, and that was the force that the bulk of the American aid was directed to.

The Chinese Communists, with their headquarters in a remote province in an area, Yenan, had a military force also. Their contribution, from my personal observation and knowledge—that is, the contribution of the Chinese Communist forces toward winning a victory over our common enemy, the Japanese—was very limited.

They did not subject themselves to coordination on my part, a role that I was responsible for as the chief of staff to the generalissimo, and also as theater commander.

They were constantly asking me for supplies, but it was difficult logistically to send them munitions and, furthermore, I found that I could provide munitions to Nationalist forces which I could implement against the Japanese effectively and, therefore, I did so.

For humanitarian reasons I sent 11 tons of medical supplies to Yenan; they had disease and considerable difficulty one severe winter, and, I repeat, for humanitarian reasons I sent 11 tons by air to that area.

Chairman **Russell**. Well, was the fact that there was a conflict of interests between the Communists and the Nationalists injurious to the war effort of the Nationalists against the Japanese?

General **Wedemeyer.** Yes, sir; it would have helped me considerably, sir, if I could have employed those Chinese Communist forces to harass the Japanese lines of communications to the north, but they conducted raids against Japanese outposts to secure arms and equipment, but those raids were making—were not making much of a contribution to the over-all war effort.

I concentrated, as theater commander, upon killing Japanese, frankly, and I tried not to become embroiled in political affairs there as theater commander.

At times I was involved, and, with the passage of time, the generalissimo seemed to have increasing confidence in me, and he would confide and discuss—confide in me and discuss matters of political, economic, as well as of military significance.

COMMUNIST-NATIONALIST FIGHTING WITHIN CHINA

Chairman **Russell.** Well, at the time some of us acquired the expert knowledge of China by spending about 10 days there in 1943, we were told that there were conflicts between the Communists and the Nationalists even then, and that some number of Chinese divisions—I have forgotten the number—were employed in watching the Communists and preventing them from making inroads in the territory that was then held by the Nationalists. Was that not a fact?

General **Wedemeyer.** Mr. Chairman, I cannot comment, of course, intelligently about the condition in 1943——

Chairman **Russell.** How was it in 1944?

General **Wedemeyer.** But in 1944, this experience I had which will throw some light upon the situation for the members of the committee: I was in a very precarious position in the fall of 1944. Tokyo Rose stated that "if General Wedemeyer had any Christmas dinner at all he would eat it in India."

The Japanese were booting me around terrifically. My forces were withdrawing, and the Japanese were advancing rapidly on two focal points: One, the capital, Chungking; the other Kunming, was the terminus of my line of communications, my supply line.

I was cut off from the outside world, as you remember, sir, except by air.

I asked the generalissimo for five divisions from the area to which you refer, that is, the area where they were supposed to have a sanitary cordon, a cordon sanitaire, they called it, to defend against the Communists.

I asked him for five of those divisions, and without hesitation he permitted me to move those five divisions to combat areas away from that particular Communist area.

I have no personal knowledge of his reluctance to withhold troops prior to my coming there, and my own experience would indicate that not a prohibitive number of divisions were tied up to defend against the Communists.

Chairman **Russell.** General, I try to avoid long and complicated questions, but I may wind up asking them, and if so tell me, and I will break them down.

General **Wedemeyer.** That is all right, sir.

CHANNELING ALLIED STRENGTH AGAINST JAPAN

Chairman RUSSELL. During the period in which we were engaged in hostilities against Japan, there were these two conflicting elements in China, the Nationalists, of course, who were much stronger than the Communists at that time, and they were the ones that we were supplying, and recognizing as the Government of China; but so long as the conflict with Japan was in progress we did undertake, did we not, as a matter of national policy, to unite the two conflicting elements, reconcile their differences insofar as possible, in order that both of them might employ their whole forces against Japan. Was that our policy?

General WEDEMEYER. That is correct, sir. Of course, the most competent witness, sir, would be Ambassador Hurley, and, prior to him, Ambassador Gauss, with regard to our policy there; but, naturally, as the theater commander, I did read over all papers pertaining to our policy.

My mission out there was to bring about coordinated and effective employment of Allied means. I even had some British and French forces operating under me. I had about three and a half million Chinese forces operating under my control.

Now, you are absolutely right when you say that our policy visualized the employment of all these Allied means against the Japanese, and every effort that I made was directed along that line.

I should like to add that to my personal knowledge Ambassador Hurley made a similar effort. His conferences with the generalissimo and with the Communists, to my personal knowledge, were directed toward bringing about the amalgamation and the combined employment of Communist and Nationalist military forces at that time, during the war.

He did not meet with much success. Again I emphasize that the Communists did not respond to my personal effort to coordinate their military actions with that of the Nationalist forces, the Chinese Government forces.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you have any personal contacts with Mao Tse-tung during that period, General?

CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERS

General WEDEMEYER. I had personal contacts with all of the leaders of China—Nationalist and Communist—sir. I know personally Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, and Chou En-lai. Chou En-lai is the No. 2 Communist leader. Mao Tse-tung I found to be a philosophic, studious, quiet individual. He speaks no English and most of our conversation was conducted through an interprter.

Chou En-lai is a charming individual, disengaging. You really, all of you, would like him very much and be impressed at first with his sincerity. He speaks English quite well. He went to Yenching University and was a student of our Ambassador, J. Leighton Stuart.

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, at the time of the Japanese surrender——

General WEDEMEYER. I would like to just add one thought I think would be of interest and helpful to the members of the committee.

Both of those men affirmed and reaffirmed their Marxist beliefs, and we talked at great length, because I had read in Germany the two volumes of Das Capital while I was out there as theater commander, and I was fairly conversant with Marxist theory, and I did discuss with those men communism, and they both were avowed Communists, and they were proud of the fact.

I sent such information back to my country, because there were reports—Mrs. Wedemeyer would send me these clippings, indicating they were agrarian reformers, and I wanted the American people to know that at least from my viewpoint and my personal knowledge, they were not. They were avowed Communists at that time.

Excuse me, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is all right, sir. We have a rule here, and I wish you would take full advantage of it, that the witness at any time he may fit may make any statement he wishes. We hope to make the record complete, and I hope you will feel free to make any comments you desire.

CHINESE COMMUNISTS AT JAPAN'S SURRENDER

Now, at the time of the Japanese surrender, what part of China did the Communists dominate?

General WEDEMEYER. What part, sir?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

General WEDEMEYER. They were in the province to the north of Chungking, the capital, the wartime capital. Their capital was known as Yenan, and they dominated a small part of that province, but they did not dominate any area beyond that at the time of VJ-day, 1945. As soon as the hostilities ceased they began to branch out and spread their forces to the east and to the north.

Chairman RUSSELL. Just after the time the Japanese surrendered there was great confusion in certain areas, was there not, General, due to the fact that there were puppet troops there, and Japanese troops, Communists, and Nationalists, all stationed almost within range of each other?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. And there was considerable effort on the part of both the Nationalists and the Communists to entice the so-called puppet troops, I assume, under their ranks, or was there?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. Both sides tried to entice the Japanese troops, who were still armed—1,200,000 of them. It took time, of course, for me to organize to disarm them. They were widely spread, essentially along lines of communication, and occupying the larger cities. The Japanese at the war's end controlled all of the seaports.

Chairman RUSSELL. Describe, if you will, the puppet troops for us. Who were they?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, Mr. Chairman, when you used the term "puppet troops," I was quite perplexed because I just don't know whom you mean. There were some very limited numbers of bandit troops around that were unattached to any political party ravaging the land, but there were no large numbers of puppet troops that I had anything to do with.

CAPT. JOHN BIRCH

Chairman RUSSELL. I got the description from reading a rather voluminous report on the tragic loss of a young captain from my they're singing now baby - ViP

State, named John Birch, who was killed by the Communists over there about the time the war against Japan ended, and they were replete with references about the puppet troops, and I was waiting your appearance to clear up what puppet troops were.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. I should like to pay tribute right now to John Birch, because that boy was a hero, an unsung hero. That chap was parachuted down behind the Japanese lines by myself during the war. That was done with lots of boys, but that chap was coming back to my headquartears to report what he had seen after the war was over, and he was set upon by a group of Communists. They were not puppet troops; they were Communist troops.

I had a long discussion with Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung about this matter and asked them to report to me what disciplinary action they took against the responsible individuals who killed Birch. Birch's action was very fine, and he was a credit to his State and to his country.

Chairman RUSSELL. Thank you, sir. I am sure his family will appreciate that.

General WEDEMEYER. But the puppet troops, sir——

Chairman RUSSELL. And I do, as a representative of the State from whence he came.

THE PUPPET TROOPS

General WEDEMEYER. The puppet troops—whoever is alluding to puppet troops in China at this time may be referring to the Chinese Communist troops that were out in splinter troops in isolated places.

You asked me what areas the Chinese Communists controlled at war's end, and I told you a limited area with its center at Yenan. But there were little groups of Chinese Communists all over China, little parties of them, even in the southeastern part, down in Kwangai Province near Canton. But most of their effort was directed toward the north and the northeast, and obviously with the ultimate objective Manchuria—the control of Manchuria. And there must have been connivance, prior connivance, with the Soviet Communists because it was no time at all before the Chinese Communists were pouring into Manchuria and receiving the arms of the Japanese that had been turned over to the Soviet armies in that area.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, getting back for a moment to the puppet troops, I had assumed that perhaps they were Chinese or Manchurians who had been armed by the Japanese to uphold the fiction of government by some Chinaman.

General WEDEMEYER. Oh, yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. In Manchuria or elsewhere.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes. There was a Chinese general, his name being Wang, who was a puppet leader for the Japanese. I understand now. I am sorry; I did not get it. I was stupid.

And there were puppet troops that operated particularly in the early stages of the war, Mr. Chairman, before I really got over there. They were not a significant group when I got there.

Wang had been liquidated. I do not know whether he was killed but at least he was out of the picture. The Japanese tried to maintain as many Chinese as they could. They armed, equipped, and tried to employ them, particularly, sir, in labor roles more than in military roles because they did not have too much confidence in their fighting qualities.

Chairman RUSSELL. When did you return to the States after the Japanese surrender?

General WEDEMEYER. President Truman ordered me home in September, Mr. Chairman. In September he ordered the Ambassador home also, Ambassador Hurley. We discussed problems in China, French Indochina, and Manchuria.

Chairman RUSSELL. September of 1945?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. And you returned to your command after that?

General WEDEMEYER. I was home 1 week and flew right back and resumed command of the theater.

Chairman RUSSELL. When were you given another assignment?

General WEDEMEYER. May of 1946, sir.

ESTIMATING COMMUNIST STRENGTH

Chairman RUSSELL. At the time you left China in May of 1946 what was the strength of the Communist movement in China as compared to the end of the war in 1945.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, now, of course, any figures that are given to you, sir, are going to be highly conjectural.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I did not mean down to the last man, General; but as to the extent of areas under their control, and whether it had increased in strength, and so on.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. I think a conservative estimate would be about 3 million. I think that is a fair estimate of people who were supporting the Chinese Communist movement and were affiliated with the Chinese military.

Now, the Chinese Communist military would work in the fields and then would don a uniform and take a rifle and fight, and then the next day might be working in the fields again, in the rice paddies.

Chairman RUSSELL. Had they extended their control to any additional areas than those they held at the end of the war?

General WEDEMEYER. Oh, yes, sir. They had penetrated to Jehol Province in the vicinity of Peking and they had begun to pour into Manchuria and Kalgan, a very important western town west of Peking. The extent of their control, both territorially and by numbers, was increasing.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I am sorry, my time has expired.

Senator Connally?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George.

CHINESE COOPERATION WITH WEDEMEYER

Senator GEORGE. General, were there any of the so-called Chinese war lords with any considerable numbers of troops at any point in China when you went over in 1944?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir. Among the leaders of the Chinese Nationalist forces, Senator George, I received quite good cooperation.

I didn't sense that any former Chinese war lord would refuse to carry out my instructions.

Some of them were a little reluctant to accept my instructions at first. That was natural. I was a foreigner and new to them and they were not sure of my purposes. The Generalissimo I think was a little standoffish at first. He had had an unfortunate experience with my predecessor, but gradually confidence was restored and a fine relationship was created.

I received, therefore, I can state to you, friendly cooperation from these men and it increased; it was better as time went on.

At war's end I felt that we were beginning to put spirit, fighting spirit and determination into the Chinese military forces. I found them quite lethargic and apathetic when I went over there in September of 1944, quite discouraged.

Senator GEORGE. Do you mean by that the Chinese forces, the Nationalist forces?

General WEDEMEYER. I do, sir; yes, sir. I had very little contact with the Chinese Communist forces.

MARSHALL'S DIRECTIVE ON CHINESE MISSION

Senator GEORGE. Were you in China when General Marshall went over?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; I was commanding the theater when he arrived in December of 1945, sir.

Senator GEORGE. December of 1945?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Did you talk with him, General?

General WEDEMEYER. Oh, I met him at the airport and gave him the usual military honors, sir. I took him to the Cathay Hotel and put him up in his rooms there, and then I discussed that evening his directive. He indicated his mission in China.

Senator GEORGE. Were you in continuous close touch with him while he was in China?

General WEDEMEYER. Up to the time of my departure, Senator George, I was in close contact with him either by radio or personal contact. About once a week I flew to Chungking to see him and to talk to the Generalissimo.

The bulk of my work, Senator, my greatest responsibility, was to repatriate these 3,000,000 Japanese subsequent to war's end, and therefore I had headquarters in Shanghai, but I moved up to Chungking where the Generalissimo was and where General Marshall was. I moved up there—I would fly up there about once a week, sir, and I had frequent contacts with him and discussions concerning the developing situation.

Senator GEORGE. When did you leave China?

General WEDEMEYER. May of 1946, sir.

Senator GEORGE. In May of 1946?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. General Marshall was there during the entire year of 1946; is that right?

General WEDEMEYER. He came home, I believe, sir——

Senator GEORGE. He came home in March or April.

General WEDEMEYER. March and April of 1946, but he went back.

Senator GEORGE. But he went back; that is correct.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Now how did General Marshall interpret to you his directive, General?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I read it, sir.

Senator GEORGE. You read it?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And what was your interpretation of it?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, his directive substantially required him to broaden the base of the Government, as I recall the phraseology—broaden the base of the Government, and visualized the amalgamation of the Communist and Nationalist forces, and I had had a very wonderful relationship with General Marshall during the first 3 years of the war, sir, and then of course I was sent out in 1943 to be a part of the command there with Lord Louis Montbatten, as the chairman just indicated, and I wasn't as closely associated with the general from that time on, but because of that wonderful relationship that I had enjoyed earlier, I told him very frankly that in my judgment he could not accomplish that mission.

His mission was one that I thought was just like mixing oil and water, sir. I explained to him that from my observation there, the Nationalist forces, as the chairman has developed in his questioning, at war's end controlled the largest area and the most people in China.

They had the most power, and they were determined not to relinquish any of that power.

My observations further indicated at that time that the Communists had a little power, and they were determined to have all of it—all of it.

Senator GEORGE. But you regarded the amalgamation of the two forces as impossible?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; I did, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And you discussed that frankly with General Marshall?

General WEDEMEYER. I did, sir.

COMMANDERS' ATTITUDE TOWARD FORMOSA

Senator GEORGE. Now, General, with regard to Formosa, was it your understanding that the naval and military commanders in China regarded Formosa as vital to a defense of the western area of the Far East?

General WEDEMEYER. You mean the American——

Senator GEORGE. Yes, sir; the American leaders, military leaders, I am speaking of now.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

I don't want to be too semantic in my discussion with you, sir; but the word "vital" to means "mortal."

I am telling you that because when I accepted responsibility here in the Department, I found that we were in agreement with certain allies that a certain area was vital to our security, and I disagreed with that. It was important to our security, but "vital" meant "mortal," and that would mean that we would put all our resources into retaining that area, so I differentiated.

I think that Formosa was considered, among the people with whom I discussed Formosa, as very important to our security. It was an element, an important segment in a chain of bases right along off the coast that enabled us to neutralize any offensive action on the part of a potential enemy.

Senator GEORGE. Yes, sir.

You talked with General MacArthur——

General WEDEMEYER. Many times, sir.

I would like to say, here, because I knew, I learned early that I was going to appear as a witness, and I haven't talked to a Senator, to General MacArthur, to Democrats or Republicans, or anyone, or any newspaper people, since I learned that I might come here.

I wanted to be able to express my personal views without any influence on one side or another.

Senator GEORGE. I am speaking of the time when you were in China.

General WEDEMEYER. Many times; yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. You saw him?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. You knew his views about Formosa?

General WEDEMEYER. I did, sir.

Senator GEORGE. There was never any question or doubt or equivocation about his views of the great importance of Formosa, was there?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir; not in my judgment.

Senator GEORGE. In your judgment?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Did you discuss Formosa with General Marshall; did that ever become a subject of discussion?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir. I don't recall ever discussing Formosa with General Marshall.

Senator GEORGE. You discussed General Marshall's directive, his mission there, and you had a very clear idea of that mission, as you have described it to us today. Is that correct?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Thank you very much, General.

Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bridges?

ANSWERING CONGRESSMAN MARTIN'S LETTER

Senator BRIDGES. General Wedemeyer, if you had been in General MacArthur's position, and received a letter from Congressman Joe Martin, what action would you have taken?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, Senator, I would like to preface what I am going to tell you by saying that, first, General MacArthur occupies a unique position, in my judgment, in this country.

He is a generation ahead of me in the military hierarchy.

He has had positions of great responsibility which involved not only military responsibility, but included diplomatic, political, and economic responsibilities; so, his actions in answering Representative Martin's letter, and the manner in which he did it, might be influenced by that unique position that he occupies.

If I had been the theater commander, if I had been SCAP, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, and received a letter from Mr. Martin, or any Member of the House or Senate, I would answer that letter. Frankly, I would answer the questions posed. I would ask that that information be kept confidential.

I also would have written to my immediate bosses, that is, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I would have sent a copy of the letter that I received from the Member of Congress, and my reply; and I would have recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "Here is a member of Congress who is confused concerning the situation in my theater. I recommend that you contact him as early as practicable and clarify the situation. As a representative of the American people, he is entitled to that information."

Senator BRIDGES. Thank you very much.

WEDEMEYER'S VIEWS ON SENDING GROUND FORCES TO KOREA

If you had been consulted concerning the policy plans and actions immediately after the North Koreans crossed the thirty-eighth parallel on June 25, 1950, what recommendations would you have made?

I ask that because of your report on Korea, and the fact that you are probably as well informed about Korea as any living American.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, Senator, you realize, sir, that I have not been in Korea for some years. I was out there last with one of the Secretaries, the Secretary of the Army, on an inspection trip in the spring of 1949.

I have followed the situation, but only from sources made available to me by the Department of the Army and in the newspapers and periodicals.

Your question is what action would I have taken—would I have recommended to the President?

Senator BRIDGES. Yes; if you had been consulted. You were not consulted, I understand; but if you, who had made the Korean reports, the Wedemeyer reports on Korea, and you who were out there on a special mission making a study of that, had been consulted, what would you have recommended?

General WEDEMEYER. First, I would recommend that we take affirmative action, because, in my judgment we have got to do something affirmative against the Soviet. We have got to indicate to them our determination, and words are not enough; we have got to take action. There would have to be—there must be deeds.

I would have taken punitive action against the North Koreans with my air and with my naval forces, but I would not have put ground forces in Korea.

I would have recommended to the President that he not employ ground forces in Korea, and I will tell you gentlemen why.

POTENTIAL POWDER KEGS

There are lots of potential powder kegs around the periphery of Soviet Russia. They would be happy to fuse those powder kegs, to detonate them, and to cause you Americans to fill them with the best manhood that you have got. That is exactly their primary purpose, in my judgment, to create vacua that you Americans must fill with your most precious commodity, American manhood, and with American materials, and they are going to wreck you if they can economically, and they are going to embarrass you psychologically.

In other words, in my judgment, it is their third team opposing our first team, and their third team at times has defeated us in battle, in combat, and at least it has accomplished a stalemate.

If, as the newspapers indicate, we effect a truce very shortly with Soviet Russia or with their satellites, at the thirty-eighth parallel, that will be tantamount to a defeat for us psychologically. Our first team was unable to defeat successfully the third team of the Soviet.

Now, the answer to your question about exactly what I would recommend to the President on June of 1951—1950, rather—being out on the west coast, as I say, there may have been conditions that I don't have knowledge of, and I may not be a competent witness to tell you that I would not have put ground forces in there categorically, but my fear is that we will continue to fill these vacua and fight under conditions at times and at places of the Soviet choosing, and that kind of strategy will ruin us.

When I was in charge of strategy and policy in the Department of the Army and had considerable knowledge about developments at home and abroad, I continually worked to avoid just such contingency, just such development in our strategy.

PREPARING DIRECTIVE FOR WEDEMEYER MISSION

Senator BRIDGES. General, will you please explain the events leading up to the Wedemeyer mission in 1947? That is, who prepared your directive and for whom did you feel you were functioning as a special envoy—the President or Secretary of State, or who?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I indicated, sir, in my opening statement that there were some discrepancies, insofar as my memory was concerned, in Secretary Marshall's testimony.

I was sent to England to make three talks there in connection with the Kermit Roosevelt Fund. I was sent there by General Eisenhower, who was then Chief of Staff.

Upon my return I was told Secretary Marshall wanted to see me right away. This was in July 1947. I did report to Secretary Marshall, and he told me that the President and he had discussed the question of sending me over to China to conduct an investigation, survey.

He was very much concerned about the deteriorated situation in that area, and he told me to prepare the directive, Senator, and I did.

I sat at his desk and prepared the directive, and I was very careful not to embody any ideas of amalgamating Communist and Nationalist forces, because that was the thing that struck me, as I pointed out to you, Senator George, in Secretary Marshall's directive.

I thought that was a very unfortunate requirement and an impossible requirement, impossible of accomplishment.

Senator BRIDGES. You have testified, General, that you had seen, you had read General Marshall's directive, which caused him to conduct a survey for the President in China when he arrived there in December 1945.

I want to ask you: Do you know who prepared that directive, and did you personally have any influence in its preparation, or were you consulted concerning the mission assigned to General Marshall?

General WEDEMEYER. I was not consulted concerning the mission assigned to General Marshall. I saw subsequently a carbon copy of the original directive that General Marshall showed me in Shanghai, December 1945. The name "Vincent" appeared in the lower left-hand corner of the carbon copy of the directive which I saw, and I presumed that that referred to a State Department employee named John Carter Vincent.

The third question, sir——

Senator BRIDGES. Did you have any influence in its preparation?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir; I had no influence whatsoever in its preparation. I indicated I was not consulted about the directive.

WEDEMEYER AND HURLEY REPORT TO PRESIDENT

Senator BRIDGES. When did you relinquish command of the China theater?

General WEDEMEYER. May 1946.

Senator BRIDGES. What assignment were you given then?

General WEDEMEYER. I was given no assignment immediately within the military, because I was informed that I was to be sent back to China as Ambassador, sir.

General Marshall thought I could help him. We had a discussion about it. There was some talk about my going out as Ambassador when Pat Hurley resigned.

You all may recall he resigned in, I think it was, December of 1945, and I mentioned to you that we both came back and reported to President Truman and gave him a résumé of the situation in the Far East, at President Truman's request.

Senator BREWSTER. You said that was in September or October, did you not?

General WEDEMEYER. I think—in September; yes, sir. I went right back but I think Hurley resigned about November or December. I was quite surprised when I got back there, sir——

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Brewster, you——

General WEDEMEYER. Am I going too fast?

Chairman RUSSELL. No, not at all. You may proceed, but Senator Brewster——

General WEDEMEYER. May I finish, sir? I want to make sure he understands.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bridges, will you yield to Senator Brewster for that?

Senator BRIDGES. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Proceed, sir.

General WEDEMEYER. We came home together. Hurley's health had been very bad. The weather, the climate, the food and things like that, contributed to his poor health, and when he came back he went to Walter Reed for a check-up and I went back to the theater to resume command in the fall of 1945. The exact dates I do not know. They are available to you.

Now, I received word over there that he had resigned. But he told President Truman he was going to resign when he came back, his health being bad. And at that time it was indicated I might go to take his place in that capacity.

I talked to General Marshall about it and he said, "Well, how do you feel about that?" And I told him I had a big task as theater commander—as I mentioned earlier, there were these 3 million Japanese to repatriate; and I wanted to dispose the Chinese Nationalist forces so as to insure the Chinese Nationalist Government would retain control of the areas that had been recognized as part of China at both the Cairo and Yalta Conferences—that is, Manchuria, Formosa, and all of China.

WEDEMEYER'S ADDRESS TO NATIONALIST LEADERS IN NANKING

Senator Bridges. General, in the China white paper there is an account of an address that you were purported to have made to the assembled leaders of the Chinese Nationalist Government in Nanking. What were the circumstances that led up to that presentation?

General Wedemeyer. I was very reluctant to make that address. I saw that in the white paper.

Gentlemen, after my service in China, I did enjoy, I think, a unique position, and, if you will pardon me—I am not being immodest or bragging—but the Chinese people, the officials, trusted me. I had made this very comprehensive survey objectively, and I found things wrong, and I tried to help them by telling them frankly. But I only did this after repeated requests on the part of the Generalissimo and urging on the part of the American Ambassador, Dr. J. Leighton Stuart.

I did only do that after he urged me to do it. I did call a spade a spade. I told the Chinese exactly what I found wrong and made suggestions, hoping thereby to help them help themselves.

Senator Bridges. I guess my time is up.

Chairman Russell. Your time has expired, Senator Bridges.

Senator Smith?

WEDEMEYER REQUESTED RELIEF FROM ASSIGNMENT

Senator Smith. General, did you request relief from your assignment as Deputy Chief of Staff in the War Department in 1949?

General Wedemeyer. I did, sir.

Senator Smith. Could you tell us why you asked for that relief, General?

General Wedemeyer. That's a very difficult question for me to answer.

I had served in the Department for a number of years, and from time to time I made suggestions along policy lines, and those suggestion were not accepted or implemented.

I wouldn't like to convey the impression that I felt that my suggestions were always right. In the field of strategy there are a lot of imponderables and intangibles that can give rise to different views and opinions. But, with developing events in the world, I found that the suggestions I made were sound and in the interest of America, and I felt frustrated. I knew that I could go out to the Sixth Army, which I have done, and carry out orders, and I have done that for the past 2 years, sir, to the best of my ability.

The policies, the plans for American action in the west and in the east, I did not agree with. I don't believe men in uniform should formulate or enunciate policy. I believe that the civilian control should continue.

I have lived in countries, in Germany, for example, where the military controlled, and I don't believe in it. But I do think that some military men have unique opportunities to obtain information and to have experience that would be helpful to our country, and I think these men should be used.

I thought that I wasn't being used in that capacity, sir, so I asked for relief. General Bradley was very kind; he gave me one of the choicest assignments in the Army—that is, away from the policy making.

Does that answer your question?

Senator SMITH. You felt then that the differences of policy between yourself and the others was the basic reason you wanted to get out of the policy-making area?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; and that feeling was not confined to the Far East, sir. All my life, the past 20 years, I have studied and discussed international affairs, as an avocation, you might say. I am interested in history and I have watched developments. All I wanted to do was to give my country the benefit of that.

CONSIDERING WEDEMEYER AS CHINESE AMBASSADOR

Senator SMITH. Could you tell us why you didn't accept the office, the suggestion, that you succeed Mr. Hurley as Ambassador in China? You mentioned a minute ago that you had been considered for that position.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, sir, when Secretary Marshall, who was then a special envoy of the President—this conversation occurred in about January of '46 or February of '46 in Chungking. When he stated that he thought I could help him, that he had observed the attitude of the Chinese, both Communists and Nationalists, toward me, he said, "The Communists may not like you, but they respect you." I thought I could help him, and I told him I would do anything I could to help him. I had already given the two finest men of my staff to give him immediate assistance, and every resource in my theater was at his disposal to help him accomplish his mission.

He said, "I will send a radiogram to the President and indicate to him I should like you appointed Ambassador," and he did this.

I came home in May. I had had sinus trouble in China, and I had an operation at the hospital, and in July I was awaiting appointment as Ambassador. I agreed to do it for 1 year. I stipulated that I would like to return to the military service, that I wasn't prepared for such work, but I would do it for 1 year. He said he would do what he could to have me relieved at the end of a year and returned to the military. I believe there was an order on the President's desk in July appointing me Ambassador to send to you gentlemen for approval.

The then Under Secretary of State, Acheson, sent for me in July and showed me a telegram, as I recall it, stating that the appointment of General Wedemeyer has leaked—that is, the prospective appointment of General Wedemeyer as Ambassador to China has leaked—and was militating against "my delicate negotiations between the Communists and the Nationalists. The Communists are protesting violently."

Dean Acheson said, "I'm sorry about this, Wedemeyer," and I told the Secretary, "Well, I'm not sorry at all about it. There are two factors that I don't like about it. One, I don't think that the Communists should determine who should be appointed by our Government in positions of responsibility, and two, I bought a trousseau, as it were, an ambassadorial trousseau to the tune of about eight or nine hundred dollars."

So he disregarded my first remark and said, "The State Department will take care of the clothes." And I sent the clothes to the State Department along with the bill, and the State Department did pay the bill and the clothes were sent back to me and they are in mothballs. [Laughter.]

Senator Smith. Does that include the top hat?

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir; pearl-gray vest and things I wouldn't wear at a masquerade ball. [Laughter.]

Senator Smith. General, what was about the date of that?

General Wedemeyer. That was July of '46.

Senator Smith. '46?

General Wedemeyer. Then I was assigned, sir, temporary duty in the War Department and General Eisenhower assigned me to Commander of the Second Army with headquarters in Baltimore and I was there for 2 years, sir.

Senator Smith. Did I understand you to say that General Marshall was in China at the time when this——

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir; he sent that radiogram.

Senator Smith. He felt it was wise for you not to accept the job as Ambassador; is that true?

General Wedemeyer. He thought it was wise for the Department or for the executive not to appoint me as an Ambassador, sir. It already had embarrassed his delicate negotiations there.

Senator Smith. Then subsequent to that you were sent on the '47 mission which you referred to before?

General Wedemeyer. That is correct, sir, by General Marshall, but I think at the instigation of Congressman Judd. I think he recommended that action. That of course could be determined. I think that is correct, sir.

ASSOCIATION WITH DECEMBER 23 MEMORANDUM

Senator Smith. Well, now, I think in your opening statement you have covered the next question I want to ask you, which is this. When Secretary Acheson appeared before us he associated your name with a memorandum pertaining to Formosa, the famous December 23 memorandum.

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir.

Senator Smith. If I got your reference correctly in your opening statement, you did not identify yourself with that or the position taken in it so far as it suggested that Formosa was not strategically important to the United States?

General Wedemeyer. That is correct, sir.

Senator Smith. Now, General, you are familiar——

Chairman Russell. Just a moment. Had you finished your answer, General?

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. Thank you.

Senator SMITH. I think your answer is adequate with the statement you made in your opening statement. What I want to do is to identify the December 23 statement that went out from the State Department with regard to Formosa with the one to which you were referring when you said you had no association with that?

General WEDEMEYER. I had never seen that memorandum until just the other day I was going through the files in the Department, refreshing my mind so that I could be helpful to this committee, sir.

Senator SMITH. Well, then, when the statement was made that you recommended that United States policy was to play down the importance of Formosa, I think you explained in your statement just what you meant by your share in that policy. I want to get that perfectly clear for the record.

General WEDEMEYER. Definitely, sir. That is accepted procedure today in psychological warfare and it is necessary, because if those people in the Far East felt that this is indicative of the over-all United States policy—namely, that we are just going to relinquish place after place, give up without effort—they would become very discouraged and would not support our plans to stop the advance of communism. They would be dispirited and therefore we should indicate that we are going to recover Formosa.

Our determination to make amends for this temporary setback or something along that line, and be sincere about it; no falsification.

Senator SMITH. If Formosa was lost, you mean?

General WEDEMEYER. That is correct, sir.

Senator SMITH. But you do not want to leave the impression that in taking that point of view you in any way went along with the suggestion that Formosa was not of strategic value?

General WEDEMEYER. I never, never have made such a statement, sir.

CONFIDENCE IN ECONOMIC BLOCKADE

Senator SMITH. Now, General, are you familiar with the four objectives or major points established by General MacArthur concerning our Far Eastern policy, the points that he mentioned in his address to the joint session?

General WEDEMEYER. I just read all the testimony, sir, that he gave; I have read all of that, and I believe I could recall all of the four objectives, the major objectives that he developed; yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. I have here the points I think that he made, and I can just refresh your recollection on them, and I would be interested in your comments on those points.

First was to continue to intensify now the economic blockade of trade with China.

Of course, we are going ahead with that, and have made real success in that—the economic blockade—since General MacArthur made his statement to the Congress. May I assume that you would be in sympathy with that from the standpoint of the warfare in Korea, and our effort in Korea?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. Again, any statement that I make now—after I left the Department, the Senators present must accept the fact that I am not the most competent witness. My information I get now from the newspapers, periodicals, and a limited number of official papers that are disseminated to all Army commanders, but I don't feel that I am as well qualified as the members of your immediate staff in the military here to comment on that.

If you will, with that background, accept this statement, I definitely believe that we should economically blockade any area where communism is rife. I would not permit the Communists in any area to consolidate against, and to fulfill their promises of power and riches, and strength to the people; I would do everything I could to destroy communism everywhere, and economically, through the economic weapon, we can accomplish a great deal, sir.

It was the economic weapon that defeated Germany in World War I. It was not on the battlefield of World War I that the Allies won ultimate victory.

CONSIDERING A NAVAL BLOCKADE

Senator SMITH. Well, now, the next point is the one that was supported by Admiral Sherman when he appeared before us, with regard to a naval blockade of China; he took the position, of course, that we know, from these hearings and the press, that this should be done by the United Nations, and not unilaterally by the United States; that is the next step to an economic blockade.

I would be interested in your judgment on that as a step in the warfare that is being carried on in Korea to relieve the pressure on our boys there now.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. Again, harking back to the fact that I am not the best witness for information of that kind, sir, in my judgment, every step that we take should be done through the United Nations, as long as we support that internaitonal organization, every step we take; and I was criticized, subsequent to the submission of my China report, for recommending that we go through the United Nations in our policies and in our actions pertaining to China nd Korea, and I think it is mandatory that our country do it and show our sincerity of purpose in operating through that force, if it is to live, if it is to have meaning in the international sphere; that is the way the major power, the United States, should operate.

Now then, I do agree with Admiral Sherman, therefore, that the United Nations naval forces should be employed to effect a blockade any Communist-controlled area that is causing us concern or trouble, and jeopardizing the peace.

GO IT ALONE

Senator SMITH. Would you go a step further, and in the event that we could not get our colleagues at the United Nations to go along with us on that, do you think we should consider a naval blockade unilaterally, in the light of the jeopardy that our boys are in Korea, and the strength that it might give them if the Chinse were pressed by the blockade of the China coast? It represents a difficult question, but I am interested in your thoughts on that subject.

General WEDEMEYER. Senator Smith, if any of these peoples refuse to go along with us in this common objective of stopping the advance of communism, their alternative is enslavement of mind and body; and we ought to make it crystal clear to them that our way is a selfless, Christian approach to international problems; and if they don't follow us, they have the alternative of enslavement.

I can't imagine any civilized nation not going along with us. I just can't understand that premise or that conjecture on the part of some people.

If they don't go along with us, I say we go alone, because we have right, as I understand, right on our side.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator.

Senator SMITH. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd.

Senator BYRD. No questions at this time.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall.

TAKING AFFIRMATIVE STEPS AGAINST COMMUNIST AGGRESSION

Senator SALTONSTALL. General Wedemeyer, there are two issues here. One is whether General MacArthur was properly dismissed, and second, whether his view as opposed to the view of the State Department and the administration as to the handling of the Korean affair is a wise one.

I would like to ask you, with relation to the ending of the war in Korea, now, if our policy, as stated by Mr. Acheson, would seem to be one of stopping aggression and regaining peace in Korea.

Now, our effort in doing that is to prevent the Chinese from coming down with their tremendously larger forces than we have.

Now, under those circumstances, it seems to me it is a negative policy. We can't take any affirmative steps to end the war. I was interested in your statement to Mr. Bridges that you thought that we should take affirmative steps against the Soviet.

Under those circumstances, do you feel that our policy in Korea is a wise one or is MacArthur right as to permitting bombing in Manchuria, or what would be your idea?

Do I make myself clear?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; but your question, you will recognize, Senator, embodies a lot of ideas, sir, a lot of premises.

Let me start out this way, sir. I have emphasized that I might not be considered properly a competent witness pertaining to the decisions reached on that fateful June 25 in this country relative to the employment of our military forces in Korea.

I think our Government was absolutely correct in taking affirmative steps against the advance of communism. We had to do it some place and the time was already overdue, sir.

We should have done it earlier. Therefore, the initial move was correct.

Now, the manner of doing it, I take issue with, but I may not be competent to properly question the soundness of the employment of Ground Forces in Korea.

MISSIONS OF FIELD COMMANDERS

Once a decision is reached and a theater commander is given a mission, that mission should be carefully evaluated prior to issue to determine the political implications.

A commander in the field should be given no restrictions whatsoever in carrying out his mission, sir. And as I see it, the refusal to permit

General MacArthur to bomb bases where the enemy was gathering together his strength to destroy our bases, destroy our boys, to kill our men, in my judgment that is an unfair restriction and an unrealistic approach to a military and to a strategic problem.

No commander should be put in the field and given such a mission. If it is determined that the bombing of those fields will involve another country and if politically or diplomatically we do not want to do that, then the mission should be changed.

General MacArthur should have been told, "We no longer have that mission which requires you to destroy all these North Korean forces, to restore Korea to democratic processes."

OPPOSING RESTRICTIONS GIVEN MAC ARTHUR

They should change his mission. But as long as his mission required him to create conditions in Korea where, as I understand it, we would get a government that is compatible with ours and other free-country governments in the world, and wherein conditions are to be created whereby those people can determine how and by whom they are to be governed without intimidation, then the Government should support him to the hilt, and there should be no restriction whatsoever to the employment of his forces. The lives of our men are involved.

And I personally think he should have been authorized to bomb bases and to take any measures necessary to accomplish his mission.

Now, the people who issued his directive should carefully have studied the implications of that mission; and he should never be given a mission that requires him to bomb bases or that involves the bombing of bases and the blockade of a coast if they did not want to involve that country in a war.

WEDEMEYER ADVOCATES BOMBING BASES

Senator SALTONSTALL. But once we were in it as we were after that fateful decision of June 25, can we change that mission? Can that mission be changed?

General WEDEMEYER. After involvement, sir?

Senator SALTONSTALL. After involvement, yes.

General WEDEMEYER. Only at great psychological loss—loss of prestige in the world, yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So, therefore, you feel that once that mission was established, right or wrong—and you used the word "fateful"—then General MacArthur is correct in his opinion that he should have been allowed to bomb those bases in Manchuria?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And that even though that might involve action with another country?

General WEDEMEYER. That is correct, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. In other words, you agree that that is an affirmative action that permits the mission to be carried out as opposed to what I would term a negative method of carrying it out at the present time?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; yes, sir.

BACKING CHIANG'S GOVERNMENT

Senator **Saltonstall**. Now, may I ask you another question in connection with that; looking to the future, Is it your opinion that we should serve our best interests of security and our responsibilities to obtain a more peaceful world by backing the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek as the Government of China?

General **Wedemeyer**. I am very glad you asked that question.

There has been considerable discussion about the worthiness of this ally, of Chiang Kai-shek, for example, and his government.

Gentlemen, I am not obligated to anybody in China, not to an individual or to a group in China. I conducted myself out there as you would want me to.

I differed with them. Our differences were resolved in a friendly atmosphere; but I was always an American, and I conducted myself, as I stated earlier, as I think you would want me to, looking out for United States' interests primarily.

In my judgment, today, Chiang Kai-shek, and his government, is the best vehicle to accomplish what we are striving to do.

Now, if he were not; if some other leader emerged who had character and ability and who inspired his people with loyalty, I would support that man. I would do it right away.

Chiang Kai-shek does have many fine qualities, and he has his limitations. I am aware of them. I used him to the best of my ability to accomplish our allied purposes in the Far East, and I think we still could use him. I still think he is the man yet remaining who we could use, with all his shortcomings.

WHY CHIANG'S GOVERNMENT FELL

You could ask me, and properly: "Well, why did he fail immediately after the war? Why did he have this series of defeats, and the Communists, who were numerically inferior, took over that vast land?

The answer, in my judgment, is more moral support than material support. His soldiers were lacking in spirit and enthusiasm for the job; and also, they began to lose confidence in their leader, Chiang Kai-shek, and their leaders, the soldiers.

Why?

Immediately after the war, propaganda from Yenan and Moscow repudiating the American objectives in the Far East, calling us imperialists, and indicating that our purposes were ulterior, the American purposes were ulterior—that propaganda, by pamphlets and by radio was continuous and vociferous. I protested to the American Consul General out there about it, and asked him to protest to the Soviet representatives, and it stopped for a while and then it continued vehemently and with increased action.

Now, Chiang Kai-shek lost his position in this country, and in his own country.

The Chinese people, I am sure, after so many years of war, terrific dislocations, psychological, economic—that country was just tired of war. The people were tired of war. All they wanted, I have repeatedly stated to congressional committees here, when talking about that area, all the people wanted was food, shelter, and peace.

And the Communists exploited those basic, fundamental desires of the people; and they exploited the corruption and the maladministrations that were present, to such a degree that Chiang Kai-shek, as I stated, was repudiated as a leader, the troops were dispirited and they didn't fight.

I imagine that what went through most of the hearts and minds was, "Hell! Let's try this other ideology or philosophy," or whatever you might want to call it. But they were just so fed up they just stopped fighting.

Senator SALTONSTALL. In other words——

Chairman RUSSELL. Had you concluded your statement?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Excuse me. In other words, to put it in colloquial language, Chiang Kai-shek is the best bet we have in the Far East?

General WEDEMEYER. In my judgment he is today, Senator; yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, with that thought in mind——

General WEDEMEYER. I should like to say this about the man: In all my contacts with him he was never guilty of duplicity, and he certainly cooperated with me in my 2 years as theater commander with him. I had daily contacts with him, and, as I indicated earlier, we had violent differences of opinion but resolved in a friendly atmosphere, and I always left him with a feeling of trust.

DEGREE OF FORMOSA'S IMPORTANCE

Senator SALTONSTALL. Following that point of view I assumed that you would go a long way to make sure that Formosa is prevented from falling into hostile hands?

General WEDEMEYER. I am sorry, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Will the reporter read the question back?

(Whereupon, the pending question was read by the reporter.)

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; remembering my statement that Formosa is not vital.

Senator SALTONSTALL. But important.

General WEDEMEYER. But most important along that littoral as a bastion against the advance of comunism or of a potential enemy. It enables us to more effectively neutralize offensive action from bases on the mainland.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Would your point of view go as far as to say that we should put ground troops on the island of Formosa if the Nationalist troops are not enough to——

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; once you decided upon the mission, sir, the means should be appropriate to carry it out. And ground forces as well as naval forces and air forces would be essential.

But in future warfare the essential weapon is air. We must have undisputed control of the air. It isn't on the ground that the future wars are going to be settled, sir, it is in the air. I can't emphasize that too strongly—both tactical air and strategic air.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, carry that one step further. I read your statement, and, I am sorry I did not hear it, but I have since listened to you. Have you felt that the policy of the adminstration as exemplified by the State Department in statements of policy and its action has been consistently that Formosa should not be allowed to fall into hostile hands?

That is one of the great questions that is very difficult for me to get clear in my mind in listening to the testimony here.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. I don't feel qualified, Senator Saltonstall, to answer that question completely, as much as you would like it answered, I feel. But I have read many official documents to the effect that the fall of Formosa was probable. That is exactly the way it was worded, these documents were worded—"was probable."

That was what caused me to come forward with a recommendation that we utilize psychological means to minimize the effect upon our allies out there, like the Filipinos, and the Koreans, and other peoples, and still those Chinese who were interested in our continued support.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator Saltonstall.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Green?

FAITH IN THE UN

Senator GREEN. General, I am to have the privilege of asking you a few questions now.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator GREEN. I was very much touched, moved, by your eloquent tribute to the United Nations. I think you really, if you have not used these words, intimated that the future peace of the world depends on the continuation of the United Nations. Is that not true?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir, or some similar organization where we can get collective, get sincere, and self-sacrificing efforts on the part of nations and peoples to achieve collective security; and that means the relinquishing of certain formerly considered vested rights on the part of Americans and other countries.

Senator GREEN. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. In other words, obstructive nationalism has militated against an international organization similar to the United Nations.

Senator GREEN. Well, the League of Nations was founded with the same ideals?

General WEDEMEYER. That is correct, sir.

Senator GREEN. And it failed because it failed to implement those ideals; is that not right?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator GREEN. And the United Nations gave a new hope to the world when it proceeded not only to expound those ideals but implement them?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. And also I think again, Senator, I must emphasize sincerity of purpose. We know one member of the United Nations that wasn't sincere. We have had evidence of that now on the part of Soviet Russia, and a very important member.

And the other thing is the willingness to sacrifice on the part of nations in order to accomplish collective security.

Senator GREEN. Well, do you mean sacrifice policies and not principles?

General WEDEMEYER. Not principles; no, sir.

Senator GREEN. But policies?

General Wedemeyer. Sacrifice, material sacrifice.

Senator Green. And I mean policies as well.

Now this is the first time in the history of the world, is it not, that so many nations have united together to defend a principle such as we have, namely, to fight against aggression? That is the reason we are in Korea, is it not?

General Wedemeyer. Well, sir, I could take you back—I don't think I want to spend too much time here with you, Senator, if you have got lots of work to do, but you can go back 1,500 years. You will find a similar set-up that ended up in the battle of Chalons. I think that was A. D. 451 when Attila the Hun was defeated by a similar group of people ethnologically banded together again today to fight against the Slavs to the east. That is what I am trying to say, sir.

Senator Green. Well, this was an act of aggression, and do you not lay great importance——

General Wedemeyer. I would like to say though, sir, that the cohesive element that enabled them to win at that time was Christianity, in my judgment, and we have got to have faith and we have got to have conviction in what we are doing or we are going to lose this struggle with communism, in my judgment.

DEFENDING PRINCIPLES OR POLICIES

Senator Green. Exactly, but do you not lay great importance on the fact that this is a war of the United Nations and not of the United States alone?

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. The world has been shrunken so that any action taken by any nation is of moment, is of concern to other nations of the world.

Senator Green. And you also eloquently described what would be the effect if we did not act unitedly.

General Wedemeyer. Well, I think our civilization wouldn't be destroyed but it would be retarded for a number of years. I couldn't estimate how many.

Senator Green. And yet I understood you to say, that if they were unwilling to go along with us, we should go it alone?

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir; I feel that we should, because I have the conviction that we are doing the right thing, sir.

Senator Green. Yes; but they may have an equal conviction.

General Wedemeyer. That is true.

Senator Green. It is a question of policy though, not of principle, is it not?

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir.

Senator Green. That you are defending?

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir.

Senator Green. And would you justify sacrificing the future peace of the world and this last hope of uniting nations in order to carry out a principle which we believe perhaps to be right but they believe to be inexpedient?

General Wedemeyer. Well, sir, I don't know to whom you refer when you say "they."

Senator Green. The other——

General Wedemeyer. The other members of the United Nations.

Senator Green. Well, the 50 nations of the United Nations.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Sixty.

General WEDEMEYER. Of course until we get common objectives—I thought we had common objectives, namely, the stopping of the advance of communism.

Senator GREEN. No; I think the common objective which the United Nations seeks is the defeat of aggression.

General WEDEMEYER. All right, sir, we will call it that, sir.

Senator GREEN. That is right.

General WEDEMEYER. The defeat or the stopping of aggression. Now we have aggressions that are either under way or are fulminating out in the Far East, and there are certain nations that have interests out there, economic interests, and we must analyze their motives in refusing to go along with us in stopping that aggression.

Senator GREEN. Well, suppose they simply think it is inexpedient, that we are going too far afield? Suppose they are convinced that it would result in bringing about a world war?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator GREEN. And that is their reason. We can't analyze what goes on in their minds.

General WEDEMEYER. But we are entitled to know what goes on in their minds if they are faithful allies.

Senator GREEN. Certainly. Suppose they say naval warfare means we are guilty ourselves of an act of aggression against China, and if we attack China, Russia will come to her aid.

Suppose they say it is a violation of the United Nations principles in the first place, and in the second place we will have precipitated a war with China and Russia and that will mean a world war? Suppose that is the way they argue?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, Senator, I don't see the basis for such an argument though, sir. I don't mean to be discourteous but I don't see how anyone could say that the employment of our Navy against the Chinese coast could be an act of aggression, when they precipitated this aggression, and——

Senator GREEN. China has not——

Chairman RUSSELL. Just a moment. Let the witness finish.

General WEDEMEYER. They came into this war, Senator, of their own volition. At first, they stated it was just merely as volunteers, but you and I know they have formed integrated units now, military units, armies and corps, and so forth; and they did that of their own volition. They are killing our boys, and I say to you, sir, that if we take steps to blockade their coast, and take naval steps against their coast, we are just taking steps that they invited, that they caused; but we are not guilty of aggression at all.

I don't agree with that, Senator; I am sorry, but I don't go along with that.

NAVAL BLOCKADE AND BOMBING AS CALCULATED RISKS

Senator GREEN. The military witnesses—all those who testified on this subject—have said that a naval blockade and the bombarding of the coastal cities is an act of war.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator GREEN. And if so, Russia was obliged under her treaty, to come to the aid of China.

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir.

Senator Green. And it is hard to imagine our fighting Asia—I mean China and Russia alone, and it would probably lead to a third world war, would it not?

General Wedemeyer. It might, sir; that is a calculated risk.

Senator Green. If so, suppose that is their reason for not coming in. If we go it alone, not only do we precipitate these difficulties, but we also break up the United Nations, do we not?

General Wedemeyer. Well, we might.

Senator Green. And do you think——

General Wedemeyer. I don't want to do that.

Senator Green. Do you think as a matter of policy that is worth while?

General Wedemeyer. No, sir; I am not following you at all. In the first instance, I don't think we can be accused of an act of aggression if we took steps to blockade the coast of China, and if we utilized our naval forces against the coast of China, I don't feel that the Americans can be accused of aggression, because the aggression has already occurred.

We did not precipitate this war, sir, and these Chinese Reds are killing our men, and they have created a situation in Korea about the time that we had it liquidated as I understand General MacArthur testified. We were just about to accomplish our purposes there.

Now, I don't know how long this war in Korea might last; it is a very touch-and-go situation today, sir; we have not won it militarily, and there has been some talk about a truce. Assuming that we have a truce on the thirty-eighth parallel, would that be a vistory for our forces? Do you think it would, sir?

I would like to emphasize, too—I wish I could talk to you at great length—I do not believe that war ever settled an international problem.

Senator Green. No.

General Wedemeyer. Permanently. I do not believe in war as the instrument—as the principal instrument of international policy. It is the policy that we have to resort to when all other means fail, political, economic, and psychosocial; apparently, they have failed, sir, in our negotiations or in our attempt to negotiate with the Communists, Chinese Communists.

Senator Green. Well, it is a matter of judgment, and I do want to find out in your judgment whether it is worth while taking those risks.

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir; Senator, I would state categorically I would accept those calculated risks; yes, sir.

WEDEMEYER'S VIEWS ON MARSHALL'S DIRECTIVE

Senator Green. I now refer to your meeting with General Marshall when he came over and you saw his directive and you advised him that it was impossible of accomplishment. Was that because the directive advised his trying to bring about a united China and you thought that was impossible?

General Wedemeyer. No, sir; I may not have made that clear. I sensed that the Communists—they had a limited amount of power but they were determined, Senator, to get all the power. That was their objective.

After talking some hours with Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung, the two Chinese leaders—the Nationalists had most of the power at that time, sir, and they were not going to relinquish any of it. I was trying to give my Chief the benefit of my experience out there and my limited knowledge, and I wanted to help him.

I didn't believe he could bring together two such divergent forces. Their objectives were entirely divergent.

Senator GREEN. Did you believe his mission to bring about a united China was an impossible one?

General WEDEMEYER. I believe it was, sir; yes, sir; as long as you had a political party that had its private army. If it didn't have its military force, you would have something like the Republicans and the Democrats compared to the Kuomintang and the Communists; but the Communists had a private army.

Senator GREEN. How about bringing about a democratic China? Do you think that is possible?

General WEDEMEYER. In many years to come, sir. Democracy, as I understand it, is based upon an informed electorate. You have 80 percent of the people who are illiterate, and the best thing that could happen today would be a strong man who was benevolent and sincere to lead his people out of this morass and chaos.

Senator GREEN. Then you didn't believe it possible for General Marshall to accomplish that either?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; I did, sir; and I tried to help him all I could.

Senator GREEN. But you didn't believe it was possible for him to accomplish a democratic China.

General WEDEMEYER. I never made a statement like that, Senator.

Senator GREEN. You think he could have done that part of it?

General WEDEMEYER. You could start it and get it under way. It is going to take a number of years to educate these people and inform them of the political and economic democratic structure.

Senator GREEN. Then why, if you think it was impossible, when General Marshall came over to create or bring about a united democratic China, why did you join in the telegram urging the Government to send him over for that purpose?

General WEDEMEYER. I didn't do such a thing, sir.

Senator GREEN. I thought you read it at the very beginning of your testimony.

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir.

Senator GREEN. The telegram of December 5.

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir. In November of 1945 I received a telegram from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under whom I was operating as a theater commander. Are you following me, sir?

Senator GREEN. Yes; I am following you.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. That was in November. I answered that telegram and asked numerous questions concerning continued United States policy in China.

I received no reply to my questions, but in the meantime I went to Tokyo to talk with General MacArthur. I had a conference with him.

The major purpose, the primary purpose, of going to Tokyo was to determine how we could repatriate these 3 million Japanese and how we could move the Chinese Nationalist troops, Senator, from areas where they had been fighting in southeast China up, away up in the north.

Now, the Chinese had no transportation, so we Americans had to provide the transportation to get these Japanese to ports and then over to Japan, you see, 3,000,000 of them. And then I had to transport several Chinese Nationalist armies—armies of the government whose sovereignty we recognized at that time—armies to put into Manchuria and up into northeast China Provinces.

PROMOTING A DEMOCRATIC CHINA

And that was the purpose of that meeting, and now, at the end of that meeting—at the end of that message there was one paragraph put in there, and the connotation of that would indicate—and that is what Secretary Acheson testified here the other day—that I approved, in fact, recommended a coalition government.

As a matter of fact, sir, I was recommending the effort to bring about a democratic government about which you are talking—but a coalition with Communists—well, with my limited experience at that time with them, sir, it was not possible and I have the conviction now, after the events that have transpired, that coalition with a Communist government anywhere in the world is impossible—a successful coalition.

Chairman Russell. Your time has expired, Senator Green.

Senator Green. May I read just one line from this telegram?

Chairman Russell. Is there objection? I hear none, so——

Senator Cain. Mr. Chairman, no objection, but with the provision that the witness be given ample opportunity to answer or explain——

Chairman Russell. Well, of course, Senator, he will have all the opportunity he desires.

Senator Cain. Thank you.

Senator Green. May I proceed, then?

Chairman Russell. Yes; with that understanding.

Senator Green. I thank you, sir. General Wedemeyer, I am trying to clarify——

General Wedemeyer. I know that, sir, and I am trying to help you.

Senator Green. I want to read so that we can clarify the last words in this telegram:

> * * * to bring together and to effect a compromise between the major opposing groups in order to promote a unified——

General Wedemeyer. That is right.

Senator Green. (continuing):

> democratic China.

General Wedemeyer. That is right, sir.

Senator Green. And I understood you to say that in your opinion it was impossible for General Marshall to accomplish that.

General Wedemeyer. Senator, if he could have gotten the Communist Party to give up their army and just divest them of all military strength, in my judgment then a government could have been established where you would have a beginning of democracy.

But, those people are not ready for democracy as you visualize it—none of them.

Senator Green. So by——

Chairan Russell. I am sorry, Senator, but we have to have regular order.

Senator Green. Thank you very much.

Chairman Russell. Senator Johnson.

WEDEMEYER'S DIRECTIVE FOR KOREAN MISSION

Senator Johnson. General Wedemeyer, first I want to refer to your prepared statement of this morning and ask you to clear me up on this question. The first point that you referred to is this matter of recollection of the directive and the reasons for the directive issued to you.

As I gathered, the only difference of opinion between you and General Marshall is that General Marshall recalls that you had suggested the directive because it would give you prestige, and so forth—and in your opinion that was probably expressed by Colonel Carter, instead, to him.

General Wedemeyer. That is correct, sir, and the reason I did that, sir, is—some of you have known me for years and some of you have never seen me. And I never wanted to appear before this committee as a strutter. I abhor any leader, whether he be military or civilian, who struts. And I have never asked for any position of rank or prestige.

That is the reason I emphasized that point. It meant a lot to me personally, sir. You understand, I am not a man that goes about look for rank or prestige.

Senator Johnson. I am sure no member of this committee entertains that thought. But let me ask you this question. Do you think a directive was necessary?

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir.

Senator Johnson. Did you indicate at the time to Colonel Carter or General Marshall or anyone else that you would like to have a written directive or something equivalent to a directive?

General Wedemeyer. I did not indicate anything to Colonel Carter, sir. I indicated to General Marshall that I would like written instructions; yes, sir.

Senator Johnson. So, where you think his memory is faulty is merely——

General Wedemeyer. It is just a small point and I just mentioned to you why I wanted to bring it up.

TIME WEDEMEYER SPENT IN KOREA

Senator Johnson. In that directive, as I read it, you were instructed when your mission in China was completed to go to Korea. How much time did you spend in Korea?

General Wedemeyer. Just about 10 days, sir.

Senator Johnson. When was that?

General Wedemeyer. That was not the only visit——

Senator Johnson. I am getting to that. When was that?

General Wedemeyer. That was immediately after my survey in China; and from Korea, you will note, sir, that I was instructed to consult with representatives of the Government including General MacArthur, so I want to Tokyo first in August and had a conference with General MacArthur concerning his views about Korea.

Senator JOHNSON. That was in line with the language in the directive?

General WEDEMEYER. That is right; and then I went over to Korea, and I spent about a week, I think it was, there, contacting——

Senator JOHNSON. Could you give us the approximate month?

General WEDEMEYER. Oh, it was August, the first week in August, or the second week in August.

Senator JOHNSON. When were you last in Korea?

General WEDEMEYER. The spring of 1949 I went out there with the Secretary of the Army, just as a member of his group, Secretary Royall.

Senator JOHNSON. How long were you there, then?

General WEDEMEYER. About 3 days, sir; and, I was in Korea twice before this mission, Senator.

Senator JOHNSON. And when was that?

General WEDEMEYER. Immediately after the war I flew over there to talk to General Hodge concerning the repatriation of some Koreans who were in my theater.

Senator JOHNSON. How long were you there then?

General WEDEMEYER. About a week, sir; and I again was there in 1946, the spring of 1946, for about a week.

Senator JOHNSON. So you made four visits to Korea?

General WEDEMEYER. That is correct, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. The first, immediately following the war, General Hodge, again in the spring of 1946, upon the completion of your mission in China; and one time when you were on duty here?

General WEDEMEYER. That is right, sir.

WEDEMEYER VIEWS ON MARSHALL MISSION

Senator JOHNSON. When General Marshall talked to you, when he first went out on his mission and showed you his directive and you read it, you told the committee your impressions of the impossibility of accomplishing what he was directed to do, did you make your views known to General Marshall, and tell him, at that conference, what you thought was impossible?

General WEDEMEYER. We were alone, sir. He called me at my office, and asked me to come home, he wanted to talk to me; and he showed me his directive in his suite in the Cathay Hotel, the day of his arrival, and I read the directive over very carefully and told him, in my judgment, it would be impossible to bring those two divergent groups together, and I indicated why, as I stated here—I have repeated it twice, and I will be glad to repeat once more, if you would like me to.

Senator JOHNSON. I don't want——

General WEDEMEYER. That is the recollection——

Senator JOHNSON. I didn't hear you say that you informed General Marshall.

General WEDEMEYER. There was no one else present. We were——

Senator JOHNSON. I am not asking who was present. I am asking if you made it abundantly clear to him, at that first meeting, when you read that directive, that in your judgment it would be impossible for him to accomplish his directive?

General WEDEMEYER. The answer is: I did, sir.

INTERPRETING RADIOGRAM OF DECEMBER 1945

Senator JOHNSON. And at that time you felt that that directive was inconsistent with the recommendations that you and General MacArthur and Admiral Spruance had made in your radiogram of December 1945?

In other words, at no time did you feel as the Secretary of State did when he testified here, that the Marshall directive was substantially what you men had recommended so far as the course in China was concerned?

General WEDEMEYER. That is correct, sir. Senator, I would like to make it clear I never felt that we could coalesce the Chinese Communists and the Nationalist government out there. I never felt in my heart and mind that that was possible of accomplishment.

Senator JOHNSON. And you think the interpretation placed on this message signed by you three eminent gentlemen and by the Secretary of State—and I want to read very briefly part of that testimony:

> Senator KEFAUVER. Then that policy—

referring to the last paragraph of the message—

> was the policy which General Marshall was sent to try to effectuate—to try to effectuate such policy, with such other recommendations as were written in his orders; is that correct?
>
> Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Now would you express yourself in a little more detail on that?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I definitely did not intend in that last paragraph of that communication, if it is possible of interpreting that statement to mean that I was approving a coalition government, I state here and now that it did not faithfully convey what was in my mind or in my heart.

I am confident that all through my service out there, Senator, as a result of my experience—and I tried awfully hard to be objective and unemotional about my problems in China insofar as the Communists and the Nationalists were concerned. I don't believe you were in here earlier when I stated that I felt my primary job was to kill Japanese.

Senator JOHNSON. Yes; I was here.

General WEDEMEYER. So I came to that conclusion though after talking to these Communists and watching them operate or watching them fail to operate at times when I would ask them to conduct certain types of military operations that might contain Japanese in the north, Senator, and therefore give me greater impetus to the south.

WITHDRAWING UNITED STATES TROOPS FROM KOREA

Senator JOHNSON. General, did you agree with our decision to withdraw our troops from Korea?

General WEDEMEYER. I did, sir. Can I qualify that a little bit, sir?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. It was done for economic reasons, Senator. At that time economy was paramount in the Army and we were reduced as I recall it to 630,000 in the Army and it was just a question of not having the bodies to go around.

We left four divisions, four greatly decreased in strength divisions in Japan, and we had one plus in Europe, and we had five very small divisions in this country.

Senator McMahon. Will you fix the date?

General Wedemeyer. 1948, sir. I believe it was 1948, Senator McMahon; 1949 we actually came out, but I think the recommendation and the study—the study was in 1948.

LACK OF SPIRIT IN CHINESE ARMY

Senator Johnson. General Wedemeyer, do you agree with General Barr that the Chinese Nationalists' defeat was not caused by any shortage of military equipment or supplies?

General Wedemeyer. Sir, I read that statement that Barr made. In fact I think he sent it to me or sent it to one of my subordinates in the War Department.

I am not sure—the thing I should like to emphasize to you, though, that the Chinese boys were lacking in spirit. There is no doubt about it in my mind, because look at the way they are fighting now in North Korea. They seem to know what they are fighting for.

Somebody has indoctrinated them and they are fighting very well. They were beginning to fight fairly well toward the end of the war. We had some fairly successful actions in southeast China against the Japanese.

And subsequent to war's end, I talked to my Japanese opposite, and he told me he was surprised at the spirit and élan these Chinese troops had; we killed thousands down around Nanking and Lingling. We killed thousands. I went down and saw it after this action. They were beginning to fight better.

MORAL OR MATERIAL SUPPORT

But after the war—in my judgment moral support is more important than material support—and I don't think we gave moral support to the Chinese National Government after the war. I think there was a question of doubt in the mind of the people there if we were continuing to support Chiang Kai-shek and their leaders.

Their corruption, their maladministration, and these other things were all emphasized by so many people. And, Senator, you are looking at a man who also emphasized those things, and maybe I did it disproportionately.

In my report I stated that we should look at these matters in the background of the things they did do on the affirmative side; namely, they stuck by us when they had many opportunities to make favorable peace terms with the Japanese and thus release about 1,200,000 Japanese for possible employment against us in the Ryukyus and Philippines. So I felt we owed them a deep debt of gratitude there.

And, also, consistently Chiang Kai-shek had epitomized opposition to communism, which, in my judgment, is our primary enemy.

CHINESE IGNORANCE OF LOGISTICS AND SUPPLIES

Senator Johnson. General, the Secretary of State, on page 4963, testified that you had pointed out several times that one of the great weaknesses of the Chinese Nationalists was their complete ignorance of the question of logistics and supplies. Was his testimony accurate on that point, and would you care to give the committee directly your viewpoint?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. Unless a person has had a considerable amount of military training, particularly in the Orient, the supply problem is not appreciated by leaders, by the people involved at all.

I had difficulty in indoctrinating my Chinese generals and other commanders with the idea that they had to stockpile munitions and food behind a projected advance. Frequently they would make an attack, and it would peter out because they didn't have, they couldn't give, the succeeding impulse to their attack. They just didn't have the logistical support behind it. I had great difficulty with that when I was there.

I think after I left that was confounded and compounded; because I don't believe our advisers over there were permitted to go into the operational areas and to continue that type of instruction or advice.

Senator JOHNSON. General, would you give the committee a brief statement on what, in your opinion, caused the military defeat of the Chinese Nationalists by the Communists?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. Briefly.

General WEDEMEYER. My military opinion on that, sir, is lack of spirit, primarily lack of spirit; it was not lack of equipment. In my judgment they could have defended the Yangtze River with broomsticks if they had the will to do it.

Senator JOHNSON. What recommendations with respect to aiding the Chinese Nationalists did you make that were not implemented by the United States?

I may add a little further, tying into that last question, do you think that contributed to that lack of spirit?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I don't know exactly what date now, Senator, you are referring to, but in 1947, after this mission, I recommended moral and material aid in my report immediately—immediately; and any aid that I recommended for China, I recommended American supervision.

If you have read the report, you will notice that I emphasize that, sir, so that American taxpayers will be assured that the dollars, the efforts spent in China were spent in the manner or utilized as they desired it; and after so many years of war and terrific dislocations, in my judgment, China was not able to assimilate this aid without this American advisory assistance, too, sir, so I wanted advice in the economic and in the military fields.

In fact, the Generalissimo often asked me to come over there and be a principal adviser—get out of the American Army and come over there and do that; and I think he asked General Marshall to do likewise, to head up—and he would support either one of us completely, and I think he would have.

He wanted our assistance very much. Now, we didn't give them this moral or material aid, in my judgment. The material aid was given, in my judgment, begrudgingly.

EFFECT OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA

I recall just when I was on duty in the Department—I am covering matters that I could get for you explicitly, the records are clear on it—but I remember the Congress appropriated some funds in April, I believe it was, in 1948, and it was August, Senator, before we, in the

Pentagon, got a directive or the green light, sir, to implement that action so that the Chinese representatives could buy the material that was visualized by the Congress to help China; and at that time the situation was as grave as the dickens.

But I go back to the moral aid. Of course, General Marshall said "a plague on both your houses," when he came out, and that would reaffirm in the minds of these people that the Americans were their traditional friends, they loved the Americans at the close of the war; I think our relations were wonderful, and some of you Senators came out to see them; some Members of Congress came out, and they were impressed with the fine spirit prevailing, but that was torn assunder by this sinister and continued hammering away by—and efficient propaganda that had its genesis in Moscow, I am convinced—in Yenan, where they hammered away and called us imperialists and repudiated our motives and our designs and objectives in that area.

We were trying, according to the Soviet course of action, to exploit these people and to subjugate them, and subordinate them to our desires and designs. Now, I watched that develop. I left in May of 1946, but I could sense the difference, and we even had American boys stoned on the street and spat at; the change was quite noticeable already; and you had a fertile field for the Communist propaganda, very fertile.

MORAL BREAKDOWN IN CHINESE ARMY

These people had been fighting, as I say, for years and were fed up with war, but on the moral side, they were not sure of our traditional American assistance and friendship.

First, Marshall, and then, I think, later, the President made a statement to the effect that they would have to prove themselves, and it was more or less in consonance with what I recommended, Senator. I say, I joined in that symphony or chorus; we just played down their capabilities, and our interest in them, and so forth, and it hurt; and it hurt deeply.

You know as well as I do, I am sure you have had some military experience, that the spirit of your man is about three-fourths of your problem; the equipment and his training the other fourth; and if he has good spirit, determination, and confidence in his leaders, he will do things.

If he does not have these things, he will not accomplish his objectives; he will not make sacrifices, and he will not die, and that is, in my judgment, that is why I say, when you said what in my opinion caused this, I think it was the moral breakdown rather than a material breakdown, although they were lacking in matériel, and I indicated to you some of the difficulties we had in moving equipment out there.

There has been a great deal of emphasis placed upon the quantity of material, the amount of material aid that we have given China.

At lot of the equipment, Senator, that they got from us in procurement value amounted to many millions—I guess it ran over to more than a billion, a billion and a half; but if you take the actual value to the Chinese when they got it, there was nothing more or less than scrap iron, a lot of it. I saw it myself, and a lot of it was equipment that they were not capable of using; a lot of road graders that I saw, quantities, tons of that stuff over there.

Now, of course, by the lapse of time they could get the iron and forge it and make cannon of it, but I am just telling you how distorted the picture was; I don't say it was done maliciously, but it was, to my personal knowledge, done. I am not suggesting that it was done maliciously at all.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator Johnson.

Senator Hickenlooper?

COMPARATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS OF UN MEMBERS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General Wedemeyer, getting back to this question of the unity under the United Nations——

General WEDEMEYER. Senator Hickenlooper, I am sorry I did not hear the first part of your question.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I say, I wish to refer back to the unity that was discussed a while ago under the United Nations, and the desire for a common purpose in carrying out our objectives.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you believe that not only unity in Europe but equitable contribution of material help is essential if this over-all unity is to be accomplished in the United Nations?

In other words, don't all nations have to make a fair and material contribution?

General WEDEMEYER. All of us, Senator Hickenlooper, have to make sacrifices, and I like very much what Senator Green said. I think the primary purpose of people in the world has got to be we are willing to sacrifice. It must be done proportionately.

We are willing to sacrifice our lives, our materials, for this fight for decency in human relationships. There are different concepts of decency, of course, and there are different ideas about the sacrifices people are willing to make; but this great country has got to make sacrifices.

We enjoy a standard of living that is incomparable to any other. Our economic horizons are far beyond anything we ever visualized, and other peoples of the world know it, and it has caused unrest, it has caused envy, and I personally think this United Nations Organization, or a similar organization, must be supported.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General, in World War II, in Europe in the big push after the Normandy landings, we had finally brought the war to a close. In that operation, we had over 60 divisions of troops out of the total of about 90 that were operating there; did we not? That is, the United States had them there.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; we had a little over 60 divisions, sir, and we had the bulk of the air.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. My point is we had approximately two-thirds of the ground troops operating——

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. On the continent of Europe.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is, outside of the Russians who were fighting on the Allied side, and we had the bulk of the air in Europe.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; and the same could be said of the far-eastern theater, Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. We had almost the entire manpower on land and practically all the navy in the South Pacific.

General **Wedemeyer**. That is right; the preponderance was American.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. So that, as far as bulk was concerned, of contribution in World War II, that contribution was an overwhelmingly American contribution.

General **Wedemeyer**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. And now in Korea, of the United Nations forces on the ground today, 95 percent of them, or roughly in that range, are American forces, are they not, sir, on the ground?

General **Wedemeyer**. Senator, I couldn't say explicitly, but approximately, I would say.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Well, there are over 200,000 American ground troops and maybe twenty thousand or twenty-two thousand others, I think, including the Turks. Well they are members of the United Nations, but they are not in the North Atlantic Pact.

We are furnishing practically all of the navy now in the Korean activities, as I understand it. There are a few ships of perhaps Britain and France.

General **Wedemeyer**. That is right.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. But the bulk is ours.

General **Wedemeyer**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Incidentally, we are paying approximately 50 percent of the total operating costs of the United Nations organization as the operating agency.

SUSTAINING THE UN

Now, General, how long do you think we can maintain the idea and the vigor of desired unity in the United Nations so long as we are called upon to do the bulk of all this, either militarily or in a civil and economic way? How long do you think the United Nations can sustain itself on that kind of a basis?

I wouldn't hold you to months or years. My question is: Do you think that it can sustain itself eventually unless there is more substantial contribution by other nations to this common purpose?

General **Wedemeyer**. Well, Senator, that is a very fine question, and I think it would be a very wise man who could answer it.

I can't answer it, but I am going to say this, sir, about the future of the world. If we don't unite in common purpose, we are going to destroy ourselves, because science is making so efficient, so effective, and you know it very well, these new weapons that we are going to have capabilities of destruction that are going to destroy or retard civilization maybe thousands of years.

I believe in concerted action, but in the field of information we have failed to convince them possibly of our sincerity of purpose and of our lack of aggression, aggressive tendency, particularly in Soviet Russia.

Those people don't know that we have no intention of attacking them and aggressing, and so forth. So I think that it is up to us not to be pessimistic or defeatist in our attitude about the United Nations. I would still continue to support some form of organization like that, but, in answer to Senator Green's question, sir, I said

I would go it alone if I had to in order to protect our interests, because I do think American leadership is on the right track.

We are still espousing Christian faith, and still espousing ideals to protect freedom.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General Wedemeyer, this is the first great test of the ability of the United Nations to meet problems raised by its high-sounding principles. I supported the United Nations, and still do; and I hope it does not fail.

But it occurs to me that in this first test, where aggression has been so open and so violent, that outside of the United States and perhaps one or two other countries in some minor degree, the United Nations is not meeting the challenger, which is the very purpose for which it was set up—namely, in order to vigorously preserve the peace; they are letting us go it alone, practically, and pay the bills and furnish the manpower and the equipment and all those things; and, at the same time, they are standing in the way of this country, from a military standpoint, to do what we ought to do: First, punish aggression, and, secondly, destroy—within reasonable limits—the ability of the aggressor to renew the aggression.

In other words, they are limiting us in the activities over there in this very first test of the United Nations' action against aggresion.

Do you feel that there is any basis for support in that kind of an argument?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, Senator, I think having the power that we do—there are only two great powers in the world today, the U. S. S. R. with her satellites, and the United States with her adherents, and I use that word advisedly because we don't compel people to join with us, we hope that they will—our objectives are different, are divergent, and there have been indications that we cannot live in the same world with them, and those objectives have been expressed, not by ourselves, but by the U. S. S. R. leaders.

In my judgment, all of the contacts we have with foreign peoples must be shrowded in candor and integrity. They must characterize our contacts with them with sincerity and enlightened firmness, and I don't believe the last-named characteristic has been implemented in our contact with foreign nations.

I believe in the quid pro quo or a reciprocal approach to these international problems. Other peoples must be willing to make sacrifices too and there must not be unilateral action on the part of the nations in dealing with these potential enemies. Does that answer you?

ALLIED CONTRIBUTIONS IN KOREA AND MUTUAL TRUST

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What I am trying to get at, I am trying to emphasize the fact that in my judgment we are making all the contributions now, that is the overwhelming bulk of the contributions, toward the sustaining of the purpose for which the United Nations was set up.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The bulk of the manpower and the navy. We are paying the bills; we are operating the show.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am thoroughly aware that Britain has a substantial number of troops down in perhaps Burma and some of those places down there.

General WEDEMEYER. They have in Malaya, sir, and the French have in Indochina, and the British have through the Middle East to protect what I might call international interests of the Allies.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well I think in my view they are protecting their own Colonial Empire. They are protecting their own interests and their own territories.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, then, you see, sir, there is the motive for the atmosphere of suspicion, and we have got to eliminate that, Senator, if you will pardon me. We have really got to begin to trust each other in this business.

Now you are a factual person and you want evidence. You want the British to prove their worthiness of that trust. I think they are the finest ally we have, sir.

May I say this? If we try to criticize continuously these other peoples, if we don't approach this in an affirmative way but if we continue to approach it in a negative way—I am talking about the international developments—in my judgment we are never going to get collective security in the world for free peoples.

We are never going to get it, sir, and we have got to be realistic, as I stated, and integrity has to permeate everything we do, and we must make no commitments that we can't fill, but we must require these people to make a proportionate contribution to collective security, and we're not doing that in my judgment.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I am not suspicious particularly of anyone. I am only looking at the results.

General WEDEMEYER. That is what I say. You are factual.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And the results have been that there has been a failure. Whether it is ours or somebody else's, there has been a failure to produce the unity and the proportion of contribution to the first test of the United Nations activities for the main purposes for which it was set up, in my judgment.

General WEDEMEYER. I think you are right, sir, but I think you could go back to the study of history and you will find that in our early days in this country that there were the same problems and the same concerns expressed by various States in the common defense of our early colonial country here right after independence.

I have read considerable about the history in that time and, my goodness, there were very violent differences of opinion about the contribution made by various States, North and South, New England States, and so forth, sir, and motives were questioned and there were suspicions; and this United Nations organization is new. Maybe the United Nations as it now exists will not maintain, but I believe in some world organization if we are going to have peace.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Were you in China, General Wedemeyer, in October of 1944?

CHINA REPORTS OF JOHN SERVICE

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir, Senator, I was ordered home in September by the President. I was home about a week and then I flew right back and I think I got back there before——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, the reason I asked that is are you——

General WEDEMEYER. Oh, in October of '44. Definitely I was. Yes, sir; I assumed command of the theater; yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, in October of '44 were you familiar with report No. 40 from John Service which is entitled, "The Need for Greater Realism in Our Relations with Chiang Kai-shek," and sent to General Stilwell, Commanding General, USAF, CBI?

General WEDEMEYER. I read over, Senator Hickenlooper, all of the material trying to read into my job when I took over command of the theater.

General Stilwell left the theater before I arrived, so I had no advantage or no opportunity to talk to him about the problems there. I read over all these reports and—John Davies, was it?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. John Service.

General WEDEMEYER. Oh, Service. John Service was one of four political advisers that I had inherited when I became theater commander, sir, and I did read all of these reports, I am confident, but I don't identify that particular one, sir; but I can tell you the philosophy behind all of the reports that I received from those four individuals, which was more or less uniform.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I will take that up at my next opportunity.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired.

RECESS

Gentlemen, what is the pleasure of the committee with respect to meeting this afternoon? The best advice that I have been able to get from the floor is to the effect that we will probably not have a vote until late in the afternoon.

The conference report on the aid to India bill is being brought up, and they think it will be some time before there will be a record vote. I should like to have an afternoon session if we can.

Senator BRIDGES. We have on this appropriations bill 2 hours of debate, an hour divided on each side.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, but if they yield and permit the grain to India bill to come in, that would throw it into late in the afternoon before there would be a vote.

Senator BRIDGES. You would have to get unanimous consent on it, though.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is that unanimous consent agreement entered into?

Chairman RUSSELL. I do not think we got to it. No, there is no unanimous consent.

Senator GEORGE. I do not believe they reached one, Mr. Chairman, and the conference report would probably be taken up as a privilege matter, although the appropriations bill also has——

Chairman RUSSELL. The conference report has priority.

Senator GEORGE. Priority over it; yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, suppose then before we start to take up——

Senator GEORGE. I think I will have to be on the floor quite a bit this afternoon because one or two little items in the appropriations bill——

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest if we are ever going to conclude these hearings, we are going to have to continue our meetings, and I move that we continue this afternoon subject to the understanding that when a roll call vote is called, then we will recess.

Chairman Russell. Well, you heard the motion, gentlemen. Those in favor of that motion will say "aye."

(Chorus of "ayes.")

Chairman Russell. Opposed "no."

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. The "ayes" have it.

General, we will now discuss some procedural matters. Unless you care to hear the discussion of the committee on those, we will now excuse you until 2:30 this afternoon.

(Whereupon, General Wedemeyer and Colonel Gilchrist left the room.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Hunt.

Senator Hunt. Mr. Chairman, as I served notice on Saturday, I now offer a motion to complete these hearings not later than June 30.

Now, Mr. Chairman, a very brief discussion of why I make this motion.

MOTION TO ADJOURN HEARINGS JUNE 30

We have been in session now in this particular hearing since May 3. That is a month and 8 days. To the 30th seems perhaps a point where we would be breaking for, I hope, a week at least over the Fourth of July.

Now, some have commented to me that date is too long in the future. Others have said to me that they thought the date really was not far enough in the future.

Out of the remaining 18 days we have there will be two Sundays, there are three Saturdays. Of course, we may work on the Saturdays. That cuts it down an appreciable number of days.

Then, as we all know, with the appropriation bills in the offing the majority leader has said he was going to object to us having afternoon meetings. So I realize by setting the date of June 30 we are possibly establishing a date not sufficiently in the future.

But, Mr. Chairman, we have seen, and recently, almost the impossibility of terminating certain hearings and investigations, and unless we do arrive at some date agreeable to the majority of the committee, there is just no telling how long we may be on this particular matter. I know we all realize how it is detracting from our other work, how it is interfering with the work of the Senate; and it does seem to me we ought to begin to think of closing these hearings up. We have had the five principal witnesses who were directly interested and connected with the action of General MacArthur's removal. They should, of course, be the witnesses that would take the most of the time. We have cut the 30 minutes down again to 15 minutes, which should help some.

But I do not know, Mr. Chairman, how many witnesses you have lined up, and it occurs to me that there may be additional names yet submitted as the interrogation of future witnesses proceeds. But, Mr. Chairman, I offer this motion just simply for it to be discussed, and if it has merit, the date may be amended to an earlier date or a later date. But I do think we ought to start thinking in some way of closing up these hearings.

Senator Cain. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Russell. Senator Cain is recognized.

Senator Cain. My view of Senator Hunt's proposal is this: I should think this committee should come to terms on the selection of the witnesses yet to be heard from. At least I would be sympathetic to such an attempt. I think we ought to determine the length of these hearings by the number of witnesses we want yet to hear from rather than to place any time limit on the hearings.

For that reason I would strongly oppose any time limit, but would be agreeable to working with others in selecting the total number of witnesses we should like to call before us before we have concluded.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Russell. Senator Brewster.

BREAK IN CONTINUOUS TALKS

Senator Brewster. I feel that the constant meetings have perhaps been wise and necessary up to this point, but I do think that with the situation faced on the floor and in other responsibilities of both committees—I know the Foreign Relations and the other—that from now on, since, as has been pointed out, the five major witnesses were heard and given an opportunity to express their views, that occasional interludes would be warranted.

I think it isn't as though we had some legislation before us that we have to pass and save the world. We have not any bill before us at all. I have never ben quite clear what conclusion we are going to arrive at anway: We all have some individual views about this situation.

But I think the great value of giving ourselves, as well as the country, a somewhat comprehensive review of the whole situation is abundantly paying off. I think the work that has been done is invaluable.

But I think that if each week now, instead of having sessions going on afternoon and even night, as the chairman suggested, we should have the afternoons when necessary for floor work, and perhaps even occasionally a morning session with the committees separately, or in our other committees, it would be much wiser and much more prudent. And the conclusion of these hearings is not anything that seems to me at this time vitally involving the national security.

So, I should not want to see such an arbitrary limit proposed at this time, certainly until we see a little more clearly as to what other witnesses we are going to hear and what they may have to offer. I do not think the witnesses will require any such time as the previous ones, and the 15-minute limitation helps; so I think it may speed up now.

Senator Hunt. Mr. Chairman, along the line of Senator Brewster, I am thinking of the work in our own committee. Subcommittees have had ready reports to the full committee for quite some time now; and so I think that breaks would, as suggested, give an opportunity to send those bills out.

Senator Knowland. Mr. Chairman, this is the first time I have been at these hearings for a period of 3 days or so, and I am wondering whether in that interval any steps have been taken to cull the list of suggested witnesses.

NUMBER OF WITNESSES TO BE HEARD

It would seem to me that the suggestion Senator Cain made would have a great deal of merit if we could come to an agreement as to the number of witnesses that it would be desirable to hear; and I think that the suggested estimate of a hundred could certainly be greatly reduced. Of course, I have not seen the list. But I cannot believe there would be that many that we would want to hear.

Therefore, I think that after we have cut that list down to a reasonable number, then we would be better able to vote on the motion of Senator Hunt. I would be rather reluctant myself to vote on his fixed termination date without having some agreement on the number of witnesses, because once you fix a firm date and then if the majority leader determines he would not allow a meeting in the afternoon and we had other committee business, we would find actually we would not have time to do an intelligent and constructive job with what witnesses we had to hear. That would be my only objection now to the proposed fixed-date termination.

Chairman RUSSELL. No action has been taken on the number of witnesses the committee will hear, Senator Knowland. I said, I think on Friday or Saturday of last week, that I did not think it was wise to do that until we had come nearer to the end of the testimony of the witnesses the committee has already invited. As witnesses are put on the list and other witnesses are eliminated, it will require a reevaluation of all those that have been listed in order to determine whether or not new witnesses would be called.

I thought it was wise to have the list complete before we undertook to cull over them and determine who will appear.

I want to repeat again that the "hundred witnesses" I mentioned—the press asked about how many witnesses had been suggested and I said, "Oh, from all sources, a hundred or more." But there have not been that many suggested by members of the committee. I think the number suggested by the members of the committee is 26, as I recall it.

Of course, we have had requests from a number of individuals that they be permitted to testify. Some of them you might want to hear and others I do not think the committee would care to hear. The "hundred witnesses or more" that I suggested was all those that had been suggested by word of mouth and by their own request. I am confident it would run that many. But the number of formal requests that have been submitted by members of the committee is 26.

So, I want to make it clear that as to that "a hundred," we would not seriously consider hearing that many witnesses.

Senator GREEN. Mr. Chairman, isn't there another way in which we could modify the length of these proceedings, and that is instead of having seven rounds, as I think we did in this case hitherto, why not limit it to two rounds or some other smaller figure? There has been a great deal of repetition, and that might be avoided.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall.

SUBCOMMITTEE TO CHOOSE FUTURE WITNESSES

Senator SALTONSTALL. If Senator Green is finished, would it be in order now, in view of Senator Hunt's motion, to make a motion that the Chair appoint a committee of not more than five, and the chairman has been very fair in his conduct of the hearing, and I am sure he would be fair in the selection of such a committee, to consider what witnesses might be heard by the committee and, at the same time, after giving consideration to that, give consideration also to Senator Hunt's motion and suggestion, and come forward with a recommendation as to the number of witnesses, and, based on the number of witnesses, a possible closing date?

I will make that as a motion, if the Chair would care to receive it.

Senator HUNT. I should be glad to accept that as an amendment to my motion.

Chairman RUSSELL. Any member has a right to make any motion he sees fit, and the Chair will entertain and receive any motion that is made by any member of the committee. I had rather thought that to give a little broader representation to the subcommittee that, perhaps, seven would be better than five.

Senator SALTONSTALL. If it is in order, Mr. Chairman, I will move the amendment of seven.

Chairman RUSSELL. I do not think that the subcommittee should undertake to confine the full committee on the number of witnesses; but I will be glad to appoint a subcommittee any time the full committee directs me to do so.

I am just as anxious to bring these hearings to a conclusion as any member of the committee. I have frequently stated that we want to bring them to a conclusion just as speedily as possible, consistent with allowing every member of the committee the full right of examination of witnesses.

I have undertaken to prove my faith by my work here in keeping the committee going. I do think that it might be wise if we deferred action on Senator Hunt's motion for a few days until we see what progress we make. But he made his motion, and——

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, might I suggest that the Senator has indicated his willingness to modify his motion, and my idea would be that the committee—the subcommittee would not have the power of attorney, so to speak, of the full committee to come to a final conclusion, but would merely make recommendations back to us, based on the number of witnesses that, in their judgment, they thought we should hear, and the amount of time they thought it would take to cover that. Then, we would have the matter before us in some kind of a culling process, and it would be subject then to the final decision of the full committee.

Senator SALTONSTALL. That was my intention.

Chairman RUSSELL. It is your purpose that should be done immediately?

Senator SALTONSTALL. It seems to me, sir, that I get called upon and asked all the time, outside, "Now, how long is it going to take and what are you going to do," and it seems to me, to clear the air a good deal in the minds not only of ourselves, but also in the minds of the people who are reading the testimony, if the Chair would appoint a committee of seven, that subcommittee not to bind the full committees, but to go over the list of possible witnesses, make its recommendations, and make its recommendations as to methods of conducting the hearings in the future, with an eye to bringing them to a conclusion.

LIMITING ROUNDS OF QUESTIONING

Senator GEORGE. Mr. Chairman, I think it would be most unwise to limit the number of witnesses. I do not think it would be unwise to limit the questioning by members of the committee.

I do not think you can afford to close this hearing and exclude any important witness who may hereafter appear. Somebody may be brought up that nobody has thought up that we would want to hear.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Absolutely.

Senator GEORGE. I do not think though it should be practicable now to limit the time that each member of the committees would have in cross-examination, some reasonable period, and then get through with it.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, as the member of the committee that made the first motion on limitation of examination, at least with respect to the time that would be consumed on each round, I want to say that I agree with the Senator from Georgia as well as with Senator Green.

I serve notice of a motion that starting with the next witness after we finish with General Wedemeyer—I agree we have somewhat the same situation we had when I made my motion in the first instance. The Senator from California, Mr. Knowland, raised the point that we ought to apply the limitation on the next witness rather than the witness we were then questioning. I think he was right then, and I think the same objection would be proper now as to the motion I will make.

I serve notice that I will move, starting with the next witness, that each member of the committee be confined to two rounds of 15 minutes each per witness.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. Did I understand Senator Saltonstall's motion contemplated that the chairman of the committees would act as the chairman of this subcommittee?

I didn't know whether he made that clear.

PROPOSED SUBCOMMITTEE TO AGREE ON WITNESSES

Senator SALTONSTALL. I did not make that clear, but I think it would be extremely helpful, and I would be very glad——

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chairman would be very glad to let someone else assume that responsibility.

Senator MORSE. I move it be included in the motion.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I would say, most respectfully, that we have all come to have a profound respect for the fairness of the chairman; and, therefore, I believe he should serve and I make my motion with that thought in mind, that the suggestions of the committee of seven would not be binding on the committees, but would give us a little planning, a little idea of planning, as to where we are going.

If that committee did its job well, it would leave the door open for any emergency witness that might come up, as Senator George has suggested.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you put the number of the members of the committee in your motion?

Senator SALTONSTALL. I followed the Chair's suggestion of seven.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do I understand the purpose of the motion of the Senator from Massachusetts to be that this committee will canvass the situation so far as the number of witnesses is concerned, and then make recommendations as to which of these witnesses presently known about, probably should be called. Do I understand that the subcommittee will also make recommendations as to the possible mechanics of speeding this hearing along to a termination, that its recommendations will be unlimited and it will submit its program for the future conduct of the hearings, with an idea of closing them as reasonably soon as possible.

Senator MORSE. I didn't understand that.

I thought the recommendation was on the witnesses only——

Chairman RUSSELL. I didn't uderstand that the subcommittee was to undertake to pass upon the procedure of the full committees, that those motions would be referred to it, but merely that they would suggest to the full committee the list of witnesses who should be summoned here, or whose attendance should be requested, with a recommendation, perhaps, as to the advisability of fixing a closing period for the testimony.

I do not think that the subcommittee should undertake to deal with all the matters of procedure.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I didn't mean that.

The very evil of the thing, the objectionable feature is to fix a definite date for the closing.

It would——

Chairman RUSSELL. The full committees will have to do that if it is done, Senator.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand that, but understand the subcommittee is only to recommend to the full committees, what the full committees will have to pass on; but it seems to me until the subcommittee canvasses the situation and sees what they think we are up against, that we have to pass on, and even then, an exact date might not be feasible.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that the chairman, or the Senator from Massachusetts, restate the motion?

I believe we have agreed on it largely.

Chairman RUSSELL. My understanding of the motion is that the Senator from Massachusetts moved that a subcommittee of seven, including the chairman, should survey the list of witnesses suggested to appear before these hearings, and determine those whom they should recommend the full committees hear, and make a report thereon to the full committee; that, as a suggestion, they should consider the motion made by the Senator from Wyoming, Mr. Hunt, that the hearing be concluded not later than June 30.

Senator STENNIS. And make recommendations, as far as they see fit, on the time part?

Chairman RUSSELL. That is right.

That is my understanding of the motion.

Is that correct?

Senator SALTONSTALL. That is correct, and that their recommendation be as such, to be determined by the full committees.

Chairman RUSSELL. I said—report to the full committees.

Now, all those in favor of the motion say "Aye."

(There was a chorus of ayes.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Opposed, say "No."

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. The ayes have it unanimously, so far as the Chair understood.

The Chair will undertake to appoint the members of the subcommittee this afternoon.

MOTION TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF ROUNDS

Senator MORSE. I make a motion that, starting with the next witness, each member of the committees be limited to two rounds of questions each, of fifteen minutes of examination.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I have no objection, of course, to the Senator's motion.

The only thing I would suggest is that inasmuch as it affects the rights of the Senators who are not present, that rather than putting that motion at this time, that that be taken up either at this afternoon's session or tomorrow morning's session, so that all members of the committee will be on notice that the procedural matter also included a limitation on debate because some Senators are quite properly sensitive on this matter of termination of questioning.

I think that——

Senator MORSE. I accept that, Mr. Chairman, with the understanding that we take my motion up at the beginning of the session tomorrow.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator from Iowa.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I am going to suggest that this question of the limitation, which, at the present time, I don't have any objection to, but——

Chairman RUSSELL. Don't leave the room yet, please, gentlemen.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It will be very properly in the hands of this subcommittee for recommendation, and we can pass on it, if the subcommittee canvasses it——

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator can move to submit it to the subcommittee, if he desires.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator from Maine.

Senator BREWSTER. I certainly sympathize with the restraint manifested by the Senator from Oregon, with which I am in hearty sympathy; and I am hopeful, under the inspired example, that he will find that all Senators will observe it.

I think this Wedemeyer thing now will be a very good opportunity to test it, and I don't believe we will require more than two rounds; and I would much rather see it done that way than to indicate that we have to impose restrictions; so I hope that he feels that he can restrain it until we conclude with General Wedemeyer.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator from Oregon stated that he didn't intend the motion to apply to General Wedemeyer.

Senator BREWSTER. I think it would be much better if we get through with two rounds, with Wedemeyer, perhaps we won't have to propose the motion.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator can offer that tomorrow, but all Senators are on notice that the Senator from Oregon has served notice that at 10 o'clock tomorrow he will bring up the motion he just made.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator from Washington.

PROCEDURAL QUESTION ON "CHINA LOBBY" INVESTIGATION

Senator CAIN. Mr. Chairman, I should like to raise what I think is a procedural question, and it will take me less than a minute to state it.

On last Friday and Saturday, information was presented to our joint committee concerning the so-called Nationalist China lobby in the United States.

The Secretary of State indicated that the President wished to have this China lobby investigated. As I understood the situation last week, no action was taken by our joint committee to authorize an investigation. Members of the committees seem to feel that any and all lobbies which were related to China and our other allies ought to be investigated.

As I understand it, the China lobby seeks to be of assistance to our friend and ally, Nationalist China. If this lobby is to be investigated by some committee of the Congress, and I would naturally have an interest in the results of such an examination, I would take for granted that the same agency, at the same time, would investigate the counterpart or Communist China lobby which seeks to appease and do business with our enemy, Red China, while betraying and injuring the Republic of China with whom the United States is and has been closely associated for years.

It would be utter nonsense and completely without reason for our committees or any other committee to investigate the Nationalist China lobby without likewise and at the same time investigating the Communist China lobby, if the intention of the administration and of our joint committee and that of the Congress is to secure all of the facts which are involved in the Far East question.

The purpose of my procedural question is to determine if our committee intends to conduct an investigation, and what the scope of that investigation is to be.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain, of course the Chair could not possibly answer any questions as to what these committees intend to do; it would rest in the minds of the 26 members of the committees.

As an individual member of the committees I do not think that this committee should undertake such an investigation. I made that statement on Friday or Saturday, whenever it was we discussed it, and I am of the same opinion still: These committees should not undertake such an investigation. But, these committees, if they desire to call witnesses on that subject, why, I assume would have it within its authority to do so.

That is my own opinion—that an investigation of this kind should be properly conducted by the Foreign Relations Committee, or a subcommittee thereof.

That is the opinion of one member of the committees. I cannot answer as to what is the opinion of the other members.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. May I make a comment on personal privilege?

PERSONAL STATEMENTS ON CHINA LOBBY INVESTIGATION

I want, at the outset of my comment, to completely eliminate the Senator from New Hampshire, Mr. Bridges, from any application of this comment to him, because he was very careful on Saturday to make very clear that his suggestion for the investigation of all lobbies, both the China lobby and others, and his comment in regard to Communist lobbies had no reference to any of his senatorial colleagues.

However, there have been some left-handed comments over the radio and in the press to the effect that there might be some members of this committee that were interested in investigating the China lobby that were not interested in investigating Communist lobbies or the lobbies of other foreign countries that are seeking to influence American public policy.

The junior Senator from Oregon made very clear on the record last Saturday that he wanted all lobbies investigated that may be attempting to influence American foreign policy, and he yields to no one in the Senate of the United States in his opposition to communism in every form. He said Saturday that he thought we ought to continue with our investigation of Communist activities, not only here but he said elsewhere in the world. So let's get that one in the record so there can be no more of the implication on the part of some columnists in this country that those of us that are urging an investigation of China lobbies are the slightest pro-Communist in our philosophy.

I hate communism and everything it stands for, and I want it shown up. I also want shown up any other lobby that may be influencing American foreign policy.

Senator McMahon. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Russell. Senator McMahon.

Senator McMahon. Mr. Chairman, inasmuch as I as well as the Senator from New Hampshire suggested that it might be advantageous to our Government to examine into the operations of the so-called China lobby, I want to associate myself with the views which have just been expressed by the Senator from Oregon as not only being willing but anxious for an investigation of any lobby that is being operated in Washington or New York or anywhere else that seeks to improperly influence the operations of our Government.

I have not been unaware that since this subject has been raised—and I of course exempt from this remark any member of this committee, but I have been very carefully watching the press and I have been much impressed with the immediate springing to arms of certain forces which apparently view with some degree of apprehension an investigation of this operation, and so I just want to say that I presume the executive department will proceed to do its duty.

And as far as I am able to do my duty on any committee upon which I may serve or as a member of the Senate in passing upon the work of any committee which serves in this matter, I shall remain undeterred by the kind of business that I have seen going on in the last few days.

I have purposely not mentioned a single individual's name thus far in my discussion of this matter. I shall not adopt at any point the technique of talking about any particular individual until I have the evidence to back up what I say, because that isn't the way that I operate, but I serve notice now that I shall not be deterred in pursuing a matter that I think needs to be pursued.

Senator **Bridges**. Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Brewster**. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Bridges.

Senator **Bridges**. Mr. Chairman, the distinguished Senator from Connecticut was not here on Saturday when I made my statement, and I think the Senator from Oregon was.

I very clearly outlined, so that there could be no possible reflection in any way on either of these two distinguished gentlemen. The thing, and the only thing that I thought out was that if we are going to start to investigate foreign influence, then I think that all of the influences of these countries that have been successfully or unsuccessfully operating here to bring pressure or influence through individuals or through legal firms or through associations on the United States Government to secure aid in one form or another, those should be included in such an investigation.

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Brewster.

Senator **Brewster**. Mr. Chairman, I think that the time may well be approaching when it would be both interesting and educational and important to the American people to learn how foreign influence operates.

As I understand it, we do have a law which requires registration of agents of foreign governments. I assume that if the executive department knows of any violations of that law, they will and should be vigorously prosecuted.

We may have that confidence, I trust, in the executive department, but I think the broader question of how these influences operate through the medium of the press and other ways might well be very helpful to the American people, but I agree with the chairman that we have a lot of work cut out for us right here, that it had better be a subcommittee of one or the other appropriate committees that should do this job.

Chairman **Russell**. If there is nothing further, gentlemen, on this subject we will stand in recess until 2:30 this afternoon.

(Whereupon at 1:06 p. m., the hearing was recessed to reconvene at 2:30 p. m. this same day.

AFTERNOON SESSION

Present: Senators Russell, Connally, Smith, Hickenlooper, McMahon, Fulbright, Sparkman, Gillette, Brewster, Saltonstall, Johnson, Morse, Knowland, Cain, Stennis, and Long.

Chairman **Russell**. The committees will come to order. Senator Morse, I believe, is first.

Senator **Morse**. At the outset, General, I want to say I admire the forthright way in which you testify, as I have admired throughout your professional career that has fallen within my knowledge the forthright way in which you have served your country.

JUSTIFICATION AND METHOD OF MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

I think you brought out this morning in your testimony some difference of opinion in regard to America's Asiatic policy, and it is along the lines of those differences that I wish to cross-examine you.

I understood this morning that you testified that you have followed with some attention and care the transcript of the hearings up to date.

General WEDEMEYER. That is correct, sir.

Senator MORSE. On the basis of your reading of the testimony in the transcript to date, General, do you share the point of view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as they have testified, that on the basis of the representations made to them and their knowledge of the relationships between General MacArthur and the President of the United States, that they concurred in his recall? Do you share their concurrence?

General WEDEMEYER. I just can't give you a categorical "yes" or "no" to that, because, Senator Morse, there were a lot of data or there is a lot of background in connection with his relief that I think possibly hasn't even been presented to this committee.

In my judgment, when the Commander in Chief loses confidence in or feels that he has a commander in a remote area who is not carrying out his orders, it is incumbent upon that Commander in Chief to relieve him.

Now, the manner in which it is done, sir, is something else, and I think most Americans feel unhappy about the way it was done. I certainly do; because this man was an outstanding leader and had served his country for over 50 years in an outstanding manner.

But there is no doubt in my mind if President Truman had lost confidence in General MacArthur's capacity to carry out orders faithfully to the best of his ability, then he should have been relieved.

Now, it is a moot question, sir, reading the testimony, as to whether or not he did fail to carry out the military orders. In my mind, after reading carefully all of the testimony of the prior witnesses—of course, Senator, General MacArthur states categorically that he never in all his service failed to carry out an order. So that is why I am not able to answer you categorically "yes" or "no."

If there was evidence in your judgment that he failed to carry out an order, I would say relieve the man. I don't care who he is. No one is indispensable.

Senator MORSE. I have said and on numerous occasions that I share the view that the method that was adopted in removing him was an unhappy and an unfortunate one. I thought he could have been called back to the White House where a conference of the Chiefs of Staff and of the top officials of the Government could have been held to work out the misunderstandings that might have developed or that rather had developed, and failing a working out of those misunderstandings, that then it would have been appropriate that some statement by the Government and by General MacArthur should have been issued as to why under those circumstances he should resign. I think he should have been given the opportunity under those circumstances to resign. But that is a matter of procedure.

Now, as to carrying out military orders, I think the testimony shows a remarkable consensus of opinion that he was meticulous in the carrying out of orders—but that there were differences of opinion on policy which obviously developed. I think the record shows that produced a situation in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff as superior commanders, as well as the President of the United States as Commander in Chief felt that they were not getting that sympathetic understanding and cooperation on policy to which they were entitled.

Am I correct in my understanding that if the Commander in Chief for any reason, not necessarily for the reason that the commander is not carrying out his orders, but for any reason such as bad psychological relationship which has developed between the Commander in Chief and the commander so that there is a loss of confidence, that then under those circumstances there can be no reasonable exception to the Commander in Chief removing a commander?

General WEDEMEYER. Are you putting that in the form of a question, sir?

Senator MORSE. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, sir, I agree with that, if the Commander in Chief loses confidence in a subordinate commander, even psychologically, confidence as to his ability or as to his determination, the determination of that subordinate to carry out his orders faithfully.

THEATER COMMANDER'S DISCRETION IN THE FIELD

I would like to say this, Senator. I was in command of the Chinese theater, as you know, the last 2 years of the war. Now, it is this I want to say; that I had a very difficult time to get directions from appropriate authorities in this country. Situations were developing involving political, economic, and psychological matters—and I would send radiogram after radiogram requesting guidance, because, as I said this morning, I think a civilian should formulate and enunciate policy.

Now, a commander is compelled to take action in his theater that actually generates foreign policy in the absence of direction from home. And that is what happened to me when I was in command there. I mean, I had brigands or Chinese Communists that were killing my boys, and I just took the bull by the horns because I could not get appropriate guidance and instructions from home, and I ordered my men to shoot back.

Senator MORSE. I certainly do not think anybody could quarrel with you on the action that you took if that is the experience that you had.

Of course, the question that your comment raises is whether or not it justifies the conclusion that the record in regard to MacArthur was a similar record, and speaking only for myself I would say on the basis of the record to date there is no evidence in this case that shows that he was not fully advised at all times as to what the policy of the Government was.

I do not mean that he was advised the minute after a message from him was received in Washington, but the secret exhibit that is before us setting forth the communications that were transmitted back and forth produced no hole that I have been able to find to date at least in regard to his being replied to in connection with his request for statement of policy.

General WEDEMEYER. The only analogy there, sir, I just pointed out: that a commander does take action sometimes, in the absence of instructions, that does generate policy, and I had to do it.

It was a question of course of MacArthur moving on across the thirty-eighth parallel and then subsequently moving up against that Chinese mass that he was subsequently criticized for. Those kinds of things are developments in a strategic situation; and, in the absence of clear-cut direction from policy makers at home, the military commander sometimes does get into a field that he necessarily shouldn't, but he does get into that field, sir.

Senator MORSE. He has to do those things.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. And should, and I do not think MacArthur is criticized, should be criticized for any discretion that he exercised in regard to military movement, but one of the grounds of criticism of him that has been brought out in this record on which I want to query you for a moment is the ground that relationships developed between MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of State and the President of the United States which resulted in their reaching the conclusion that two voices were speaking America's policy in Asia, one MacArthur's and the other the President of the United States, and sometimes they were not speaking the same policy.

WHAT IF THEATER COMMANDER DISAGREES PUBLICLY WITH POLICY

My question is if a commander in the field enunciates a position on policy that is inconsistent with that of the Commander in Chief and he does not do it through channels but does it through publicity of one kind or another, do you think the Commander in Chief then is justified in taking the position that under our Constitution but one voice should speak officially on American foreign policy in an area of conflict such as in Asia?

General WEDEMEYER. That is a hypothetical question you are asking me, because I only know about the relationship between MacArthur, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the President through the testimony, through hearsay and so forth.

I am not competent to answer definitely that question except as a hypothetical one. I will say this, sir: As I said earlier, if a commander in chief has no longer confidence in his subordinate, he certainly is fully justified in relieving him.

Now, I do not know about the enunciation of a clear-cut policy to MacArthur. I really don't, sir. I think it would be of interest to this committee to find out if he did receive clear-cut directives and guidance from responsible officials back here.

I don't know, sir, whether he did or not.

Senator MORSE. Let us go to one of the incidents on which I understand the President lays great stress, and my understanding is based only on testimony in the record: that when General MacArthur issued what has been referred to as his ultimatum to the Chinese Communist military leaders, which ultimatum stated very clearly that if the surrender terms he was suggesting were not acceptable that they ran the risk of having this war carried on to the mainland of China in connection with the MacArthur program which has been part of this controversy, while at the time he issued the ultimatum he had been notified not of the text of the President's proposals but of the fact that the President was in the midst of negotiating with our allied leaders concerning possible terms of surrender and an armistice—and it is alleged in this record that the statement by MacArthur to the Chinese created an embarrassing situation for the President in his negotiations with the Allies.

My question is in your opinion under those facts and circumstances do you think a commander should have communicated with his commander in chief in advance of offering terms of surrender in the field and containing in his terms of surrender a suggestion as to operations beyond his area in case they did not accept his terms?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; I do. I think the commander subordinate in the field should carry out the instructions or orders of his superiors, sir. I think any military man throughout the military hierarchy would give you an affirmative answer along that line.

MacArthur, Senator Morse, as I stated earlier, sir—I don't know whether you were here this morning.

Senator MORSE. All the time.

General WEDEMEYER. He enjoyed a unique position. He was Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, and I don't know really what his status was vis-à-vis all these other powers. I don't know whether the United States was the executive agent for all these powers, and whether our President had authority to stipulate exactly the procedure with reference to a surrender.

I have so much confidence in MacArthur's integrity, and I think he has been a great public servant, and I can't imagine him getting out of line, Senator Morse, willfully, knowingly, and maliciously.

The best witness, of course, to determine what motivated his offer of surrender terms and the philosophy behind it, the best witness is General Douglas MacArthur.

All General Wedemeyer can do is answer you, sir, and state to you categorically that I think a subordinate must obey his superiors.

Senator MORSE. Well, I want to say for the record, General, that I share your high regard for MacArthur's integrity and patriotism and leadership. We as members of the committee have to look at the record, however, and it would seem that from the record differences did develop between himself and the Commander in Chief, and that mistakes of judgment, such as in connection with the ultimatum did take place, which made it very desirable, it seems to me, that an attempt should be made to try to reconcile those differences without the incident occurring that did occur. But, once they existed, then I think it was necessary to remove him.

I would say about your comment upon the complexity of the nature of his command, the testimony shows that he was functioning as a subordinate of the President who was the agent of the allies in the operations in Korea; and the very complexity of the command that he held would make it, it seems to me, all the more important that he be certain of his instructions before he issued on his own public statements that might be in conflict with his Commander in Chief.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired.

Do you desire to comment on that, General?

General WEDEMEYER. No. I agree with Senator Morse in his statement.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator McMahon?

Senator McMAHON. General, in the first place, I want to say that I am happy to see you again——

General WEDEMEYER. Thank you, sir.

Senator McMAHON. If not here, because this is not a pleasant assignment for any witness, I imagine, or for members of the committee for that matter, but it is an obligation which we are here to perform.

WEDEMEYER'S ASSIGNMENT TO SAN FRANCISCO

General, I was happy to see in your statement you removed any inference that the assignment in San Francisco was one which you yourself did not desire and, indeed, initiate. That is true?

General Wedemeyer. That is correct.

Senator McMahon. And you requested when that place became open that it be assigned to you and General Bradley concurred, or did he initiate it himself, the assignment?

General Wedemeyer. No. He told me that my service with him had been of superior quality, and he was very sorry to lose me on the team, but that he would be happy to give that assignment as a reward for my services. And I accepted it in that light. It was an outstanding assignment.

Senator McMahon. I am glad to hear that, General, because there was some—or, I guess "scuttlebutt" is the right term for it—you had been forced out of the Pentagon and had been ostracized in San Francisco. And I did not think you were the kind of man who would accept ostracism without saying something about it. I am glad we can at least set that part of the record straight, and I am delighted to know that you enjoyed your command.

TELEGRAM OF DECEMBER 1945 ON CHINESE UNITY

General, I have been—I suppose most of us have been—somewhat puzzled about the telegram that you and Admiral Spruance and General MacArthur sent to, I assume, the Pentagon. Did it go to the Pentagon first, the now famous telegram in which it was suggested——

General Wedemeyer. I think I can help all of you out, sir, and you particularly, Senator McMahon. May I do a little reading here, sir?

Senator McMahon. Yes.

General Wedemeyer. On the 30th of November a message was sent to me—I have had this cleared so that I can read it to the members of the committee—I have had it cleared in the Department of Defense.

This message was sent out to me as commanding general of the theater in China.

Senator Saltonstall. Date, please?

General Wedemeyer. November 30, 1945.

I think it would be advisable that I read it, if you——

Chairman Russell. If you wish.

Senator McMahon. If you wish, General.

General Wedemeyer (reading):

> Under consideration by the State Department is a restatement of United States policy which, if approved, will result in a new directive to the commanding general, United States forces, China theater, along the following lines:
>
> The commanding general, United States forces, China theater, after coordination with SCAP—

that was MacArthur—

> will probably be responsible to make necessary arrangements with the Chinese authorities for repatriation of Japanese from the China theater. The United States will furnish assistance in the form of military supplies and advice to the Chinese authorities. The United States Marines—

I had a corps of Marines out there, Senator, under my command, sir—

will probably remain in north China for the time being for the purpose of assisting in the repatriation of Japanese nationals, military and civil, from that area, the duration of such employment to be subject to future directives from the JCS. It is intended that they would be more or less confined in their employment to holding ports or beachheads.

To effect the above and also to assist the Chinese Central Government in reestablishing control of the liberated areas of north China and Manchuria, the United States will furnish transportation for additional Chinese troops. It is emphasized that neither the policy nor the directive given above has yet been approved.

To assist you, 100 Liberty-type ships can be made available to COMGENCHINA at the rate of 50 ships per month. If needed, a greater number may be made available.

Your use of these ships depends upon the following factors:

1. These Liberty ships are now awaiting discharge in AFPAC——

Senator McMahon. General, can I interrupt you for a moment?

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir.

Senator McMahon. Is it quite lengthy?

CIRCUMSTANCES BEHIND TELEGRAM

General Wedemeyer. It is one more page, sir. What I am trying to do is to give the Senators a picture of the thinking back home here, which was primarily a requirement that the theater commander, Wedemeyer, prepare to repatriate 3 million Japanese, and to move Chinese Nationalist troops from the south up to the north in order to facilitate and insure the control of the Chinese Central Government of all the areas, the sovereignty of which was recognized, both at Cairo, reaffirmed at Yalta, and at Potsdam, sir.

Senator Knowland. Mr. Chairman, might I ask for unanimous consent that the general be permitted to read the balance without it being charged to the Senator's time? I think probably with this 15-minute rule he is concerned with it, and I think it is important that the entire message be read into the record.

Chairman Russell. He is entitled to read it as a matter of right, and I have advised him that he is entitled to read it as a matter of right, if it is responsive to a question.

Senator McMahon. I would like to have it, General, and Senator Knowland has caught the point, if it is very long, you see, and I have a number of questions.

General Wedemeyer. I do not want you to lose any of your time.

Senator McMahon. I do not want to close you off, General.

Chairman Russell. The general has read half of it.

Senator McMahon. I did not know it when I interrupted him.

General Wedemeyer. I will read it more quickly. [Reading:]

1. These Liberty ships are now awaiting discharge in AFPAC and their time of availability is contingent upon capability to discharge. This requires selection of ships based on cargo utilization or possible sale. Some of these ships are now loaded with supplies that might well be used by Chinese Army. Particularly pertinent in this connection is ammunition requirements of Chinese Forces. Would you desire to have ammunition dumps or depots established at Chingwangtao, Tientsin, Tsingtao, or Shanghai, by shipment from Philippines or Okinawa direct and thus avoid long air flights of munitions from Yunan.
2. Temporary accommodations for repatriated personnel to be installed by China theater at ports.
3. Comgenchina would be responsible for making necessary arrangements with the Chinese for delivery of personnel to ships.

> 4. Establishment of a procedure with SCAP, "MacArthur," that is, "for rate of reception and grouping of Japanese to provide for proper port of discharge in Japanesehomeland."
>
> 5. Possibility of utilizing either Chinese or Japanese crews to replace United States crews in toto or in part as conditions warrant.
>
> 6. Necessary berthing, servicing, and administrative arrangements for Liberties, including minimum arrangements necessary to make into personnel carriers for Japanese type of passenger.
>
> 7. Possibility of employing LST's now in western Pacific crewed by Japanese.
>
> The above factors suggest the need for immediate conference by addressees of this message.
>
> Request comments of all action addressees to JCS.

And that, gentlemen, is what caused the conference in Tokyo, between MacArthur, Wedemeyer, and Spruance, and we had our subordinates with us, and we considered this proposition of repatriating three million Japanese, and moving the Chinese forces from the coast up to fill the vacua in Manchuria and——

Chairman RUSSELL. Who signed that?

General WEDEMEYER. That was sent to all the addressees, COMGENCHINA, CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific, and MacArthur. Everyone got a copy, and it was sent by the War Chief of Staff, and Chief of Naval Operations.

REFERENCE TO UNIFIED CHINA IN TELEGRAM

Senator McMAHON. Now, General, I quote from your reply, your joint reply, as given in your statement of today:

> It is suggested that the United States assistance to China as outlined above be made available as a basis for negotiation by the American Ambassador to bring together and to effect a compromise between the major opposing groups in order to promote a unified democratic China.

There was nothing in what you read us, General, about promoting a unified democratic China, was there, in that message that you have just read us?

General WEDEMEYER. I don't believe so, sir. May I interject there, sir? The thought was, though, implicit in that massage that we were continuing support of the Chinese Central Government, sir, the Chinese Central Government.

Senator McMAHON. I think that is the theme that runs through it.

General WEDEMEYER. That is right.

Senator McMAHON. When you answered,

> It is suggested that the United States assistance to China—

you meant assistance to the Chinese National Government, headed by Chiang Kai-shek.

General WEDEMEYER. That is right.

Senator McMAHON (reading):

> As outlined above be made available as a basis for negotiation by the American Ambassador to bring together and to effect a compromise between the major opposing groups—

now, who were they?

General WEDEMEYER. The major opposing groups were unquestionably the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.

Senator McMAHON. As you have said, I believe, earlier, in the assistance there was no assistance that was being made available to the Chinese Communists, no material was being furnished the Chinese Communists.

General WEDEMEYER. That is right, sir, not by the Americans.

Senator MCMAHON. That is right.

General WEDEMEYER. There was assistance being made to the Chinese Communists from other sources.

Senator MCMAHON. But I am talking from the United States.

General WEDEMEYER. Not by the Americans, sir; except that medical supply.

Senator MCMAHON. You advocated that our aid be so used, made available as a basis for negotiation by the American Ambassador to bring together and to effect a compromise between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communist forces, because you said those are the major opposing groups.

General WEDEMEYER. That is right, sir.

Senator MCMAHON. And your objectives were to promote a unified democratic China.

General WEDEMEYER. That is right, sir.

Senator MCMAHON. That you agree.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

REASON FOR URGING UNIFICATION AT THAT TIME

Senator MCMAHON. Now, General Marshall, of course, went to China with the ambition at least to accomplish the unification of the country and in order to promote a unified democratic China, did he not?

General WEDEMEYER. That is right.

Senator MCMAHON. And so to that extent, at least, as shown by this telegram, you agreed with the spirit of that mission.

General WEDEMEYER. There is no question about it, sir.

Senator MCMAHON. I see. You did not, however, have any very high hopes for its success.

General WEDEMEYER. Senator McMahon, I didn't feel that you could coalesce Communist forces and the Kuomintang.

As stated this morning, they were just antithetical in their approach and views.

Senator MCMAHON. That is what makes it difficult——

General WEDEMEYER. May I say something there?

The Chinese Communist forces were strategically more favorably disposed in the north of China than were the Chinese Nationalist forces at war's end to reoccupy those vacua that were critical to the continued economy of the country; they were in northeast China, in Chahar, in Jehol, in those Provinces to the northeast, where the main line of communications and your cities were and your ports that were essential to the economy of China. The rice-producing area had been under the control of Japan.

Now, when these vacua occurred, my effort had been to put Chinese Nationalist forces in there so that you could begin to build up the economy of the Nationalist Government. If we did not move these forces up there quickly and did not move them up there without restraint, we would not accomplish that.

Actualy, when we began to move, either by air or by ship, Chinese Nationalist troops to this area—are you listening to me, sir?

Senator MCMAHON. Sure.

General WEDEMEYER. All right, sir. When we began to move up there, obstacles were put in our way by the Chinese Communists. They began to shoot at the transport planes I was flying in there.

Now, if the American Ambassador could sit down with Mao Tse-tung, the Communist leader, and with Chiang Kai-shek and tell him, "Here is what we propose to do, and we Americans are going definitely on continuing our support to the Nationalist Government, and this is the way we are doing it—we would prefer to have the Chinese Communist collaborate and cooperate to maintain peace down there"—I give you my word from the bottom of my heart that is what was in my mind then and I had no other idea, because I can state this, Senator, that I sent back to the Department radios indicating my view that the Communists were determined to get all the power—radio after radio, and I can personally confirm that, and you can see numerous radios from the Department of Defense indicating that while I was in that theater I was concerned about the Communists. But then when fighting the Japanese I did nothing about that. I stayed out of it and concentrated on the military—but after the war, I was thrown into it by the generalissimo's appeal to me for advice and help and also by my own Government's directive.

Senator MCMAHON. General, I believe you said General Chiang Kai-shek's government was unfortunately corrupt and inefficient. I believe you said that.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir, I did, Senator MaMahon. But may I say, sir, I think it is dangerous to overemphasize that—and I believe I did. I believe I made a mistake in 1947 in emphasizing that, because we find corruption in our own Government—and it was inevitable with a government that was down and out economically.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator McMahon.

Senator MCMAHON. Thank you.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, a question of procedure.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I would like to ask unanimous consent that the telegram that General Wedemeyer read to Senator McMahon be put in the record as one without interruptions. I think it would be much easier and clearer to read.

Chairman RUSSELL. Is there objection? The Chair hears none.

TELEGRAM OF NOVEMBER 30, 1945, FROM JCS TO COMMANDER IN FAR EAST

(The document above referred to is as follows:)

Under consideration by the State Department is a restatement of United States policy, which if approved, will result in a new directive to commanding general, United States forces, China theater, along the following lines:

The commanding general, United States forces, China theater, after coordination with SCAP, will probably be responsible to make necessary arrangements with the Chinese authorities for repatriation of Japanese from the China theater. The United States will furnish assistance in the form of military supplies and advice to the Chinese authorities. The United States marines will probably remain in north China for the time being for the purpose of assisting in the repatriation of Japanese nationals, military and civil, from that area, the duration of such employment to be subect to future directives from the JCS. It is intended that they would be more or less confined in their employment to holding ports or beachheads.

To effect the above and also to assist the Chinese Central Government in reestablishing control of the liberated areas of North China and Manchuria, the United States will furnish transportation for additional Chinese troops. It is emphasized that neither the policy nor the directive given above has yet been approved.

To assist you, 100 Liberty-type ships can be made available to COMGENCHINA at the rate of 50 ships per month. If needed, a greater number may be made available.

Your use of these ships depends upon following factors:

1. These Liberty ships are now awaiting discharge in AFPAC and their time of availability is contingent upon capability to discharge. This requires selection of ships based on cargo utilization or possible sale. Some of these ships are now loaded with supplies that might well be used by Chinese Army. Particularly pertinent in this connection is ammunition requirements of Chinese forces. Would you desire to have ammunition dumps or depots established at Chingwangtao, Tientisin, Tsingtao, or Shanghai by shipment from Philippines or Okinawa direct and thus avoid long air flights of munitions from Yunan?
2. Temporary accommodations for repatriated personnel to be installed by China theater at ports.
3. COMGENCHINA would be responsible for making necessary arrangements with the Chinese for delivery of personnel to ships.
4. Establishment of a procedure with SCAP for rate of reception and grouping of Japanese to provide for proper port of discharge in Japanese homeland.
5. Possibility of utilizing either Chinese or Japanese crews to replace United States crews in toto or in part as conditions warrant.
6. Necessary berthing, servicing, and administrative arrangements for Liberties including minimum arrangements necessary to make into personnel carriers for Japanese type of passenger.
7. Possibility of employing LST's now in western Pacific crewed by Japanese.

The above factors suggest the need for immediate conference by addressees of this message.

Requests comments of all action addressees to JCS.

End.

AGREEMENT ON LANGUAGE IN REPLY TELEGRAM, DECEMBER 1945

Chairman CONNALLY. Mr. Chairman, in that connection may I ask one question of the general?

Chairman RUSSELL. Is there objection? The Chair hears none.

Chairman CONNALLY. Did you authorize this telegram purportedly sent by you and Admiral Spruance and General MacArthur?

General WEDEMEYER. The three of us did, sir. We concurred in that radiogram.

Chairman CONNALLY. That is what I wanted to know. I wanted to know if you agreed to that telegram.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. I heard some say that you did not agree to that.

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir, and I read in the newspaper—and this is a little unfair possibly to allude to it. I don't know. Spruance apparently has been asked by correspondents who initiated this idea, Senator Connally, who initiated this idea in the last paragraph here.

Actually an admiral named Barbey initiated the idea. My memory is absolutely clear on it. He initiated this thought here and I agreed to it.

Chairman CONNALLY. The agreement is the important thing.

General WEDEMEYER. I agreed to it, that is right.

Chairman CONNALLY. The initiation of it is not important.

General WEDEMEYER. Only this, sir, that I never went along with any idea of a coalition government, Senator Connally. You have heard me talk before here.

Chairman CONNALLY. But you authorized this telegram.

General WEDEMEYER. I did, and if you interpret that as meaning a coalition government——

Chairman CONNALLY. No, I haven't interpreted it at all. I just wanted to remove any doubt. I understood somebody said you had not authorized it.

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir, I authorized it.

Chairman CONNALLY. One of your subordinates signed it?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir; General Wedemeyer authorized that, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right. Senator Kefauver?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland.

Senator KNOWLAND. General, this morning in your testimony before I arrived back from California I noticed on page 6088 of the transcript a question had been asked you I believe by Senator Bridges as to what possibly you might have done had your advice been asked on this situation in Korea, and you gave an explanation based on the facts that you now have as to steps that you possibly would have taken.

SOVIET POLICY AT OUTBREAK OF KOREAN CONFLICT

In view of that testimony, I would like to ask whether or not you have given any thought to the situation that found the Soviet Union absent from the Security Council in June of last year.

Most of the testimony before this committee now rather clearly indicates that what the North Koreans did was done in conjunction and in cooperation with both the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists. Obviously the Soviet Union must have had advance notice that the North Korean Communists were going to move across the thirty-eighth parallel.

Now had they really wanted to prevent United Nations action, they would have probably had ample time to get Mr. Malik back to the Security Council so that he could veto any action. He wasn't present.

Have you given any thought to whether or not he might have been absent by design rather than by accident for the purpose of getting us deeply involved in Korea?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; I have, and I have discussed that with friends out on the west coast but it was just an unofficial discussion in my home or in some friend's home.

I inclined to that belief and I don't think it is too conjectural because it is a pattern that they follow, a pattern of chicanery, Machiavellian maneuver, and that has been the policy of the Soviet diplomacy. It is not dependable. There is no stability and it is all operating to accomplish their objectives. Their objectives, not world peace.

Senator KNOWLAND. In other words, they would possibly have had two alternatives, either one of which would be highly satisfactory to them. By being away it was almost inevitable that the United Nations would act. Having acted, we would be involved.

If we were involved, they had an opportunity if successful of pushing us out of Korea, in which case they would gain great prestige and we would lose great prestige in the Far East.

If they were not successful in that alternative, if they could tie us down in a prolonged stalemate using our best troops where they were using their second or third team for a prolonged period of time, they would get some advantage out of that alternative as well, is that generally correct?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

CHIANG POPULARITY ON VJ-DAY AND SUBSEQUENTLY

Senator **Knowland.** Now I would like to ask this question, General. In your opinion did the Chinese Nationalist Government enjoy popular support on VJ-day or for a period thereafter in China?

General **Wedemeyer.** In my judgment it did. It was not a government such as one visualizes in Europe or in this country. It was not a strong government, and I repeat more or less what I said this morning to Senator Green I think it was.

China, in my judgment, is not ready for a political and economic structure along the lines of a republic or with a democratic philosophy. The people simply aren't ready for that.

The Generalissimo was popular. He was popular in this country I believe, judging from the periodicals, and he was popular there. I was present at Shanghai when he made his first visit after VJ occurred, and the ovation, the reception was something like that which I experienced in San Francisco when MacArthur came back. It seemed spontaneous, sincere.

Of course the Chinese, contrary maybe to the belief of a lot of people, they are an emotional people and they just gave vent to their approval of that particular leader, but I watched his popularity wane, and it did wane.

There were indications of ineptitude and corruption, maladministration. I always say the danger is, sir, in evaluating and assessing those characteristics of the Government we forget the contributions those people made, the terrific dislocation caused by so many years of war.

I tried awfully hard to be objective in my own analysis of that situation. When I left China after that survey, I took a blast at them good and hard and I was criticized by people back here who are, I think, emotionally wrapped up in this problem.

I have tried to be an American first and consider the employment of China, the China problem, and other problems in the interest of peace in our country. I took a blast at them because I did feel that they were in a position to assimilate the aid I visualized giving them, and I wanted to jolt them and make them make changes in the Government, get more competent leaders, honest men, and better administrators.

I advised the Generalissimo to stop putting military men in civilian jobs, governors of provinces, and so forth, and I advised him to put in northerners in provinces up north, things like that, which I thought were constructive suggestions, all to bring about stability and create a structure where America advisers with military and economic help would come over there and bring about a modicum of stability and stop the advance of communism, because communism was spreading rapidly with the passage of time.

It was, of course, based upon the chaos and the situation, the disillusionment of the people, and so forth and so on, as I say, after many, many years of war. They were at war when I served as a young lieutenant in China. In 1931 they had first struggled with the Japanese, and there was almost continuous struggling for 20 years; 1931—10 years. They were at war almost 10 years before we entered the war, and they were tired out, exhausted, war weary, and many people disillusioned.

HELPING OTHER NATIONS COMBAT COMMUNIST THREAT

Senator KNOWLAND. Of course, General, I suppose all around the periphery of the Soviet Union there are any number of nations we might name, but I would not want to at this time, nations that I have been into in Asia and the Middle East and even in Europe, where there has been the suggestion that they have also had failings of either incompetency or corrruption in the government, but we felt that the basic aim was to keep them from becoming Communist.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. The Congress gave Greece $200 million a year, starting right after VJ-day, to stop the advance of communism. In my judgment the Far East is more important than the Peloponnesos. That is just my personal judgment. Yet we spent about a billion dollars there the last 5 years.

I feel friendly toward the Greeks. They are fine people. But one has to consider the global picture here, and where these influences are going to do the most damage to our national aims or objectives.

We gave $100 million a year to Turkey, a very critical area of strategic importance, during these last 5 years. I think that is fine and necessary.

But in Greece we permitted our advisers to go right into the operational area and insure that those Greek soldiers were employing the material we gave them effectively. I saw it. On two occasions I visited the front there and watched our young officers advising the Greek units. But our boys out in China were not permitted to do that. There was always a little difference, Senator Knowland, in the attitude, as I saw it, as I interpreted it, and I tried to be objective about it, in relation to China and our problems in the east.

You cannot consider one area any more at the exclusion of the other, and there is no such thing in my judgment as a single front, a double front, or a two-front war. It is global. It is concentric. Any area in the world can be a battlefield today. And with increasing reason I say that, too. As time goes on, that will be even increasingly true.

Senator KNOWLAND. I don't underestimate the importance of Greece, and I supported the President in his Greek-Turkish aid program.

General WEDEMEYER. I did not mean to argue——

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes, sir; I know; and I know your own feeling on it. But Greece, the population of Greece only approximates about the population on Formosa today.

General WEDEMEYER. About right; yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. And the historic policy, as I have always understood it, of the United States through both Democratic and Republican administrations has been to have a free and independent China. I have not felt that a Communist China could be a free or independent China.

LIMITATIONS ON UNITED STATES MILITARY ADVISORY GROUPS IN CHINA

Now, I would like to ask: Were the directives issued by the Pentagon to the United States military advisory group in Chungking during and after the war restrictive in nature as to the type of aid that you might give the Republic of China?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, there was no military advisory group in China during the war, sir. I was the Generalissimo's chief of staff and, therefore, his adviser, and then commander of the theater. I had no advisory group.

It was created immediately after the war, and there were restrictions given to that group, sir. They were not permitted to get into operational areas. Any place where the Communists and the Nationalists were disputing an area, our boys were not allowed to get in there.

They were on a very high level, sir. The American Advisory Group gave advice to the highest level general staff in Nanking, and a few were permitted to go to schools—air-force schools, naval schools and ground forces schools—to assist there in the military pedagogy. But there were no American advisers in the areas of operations, military operations.

Now there were military operations going on almost immediately after the war. The Chinese Communist Government or leaders began to redispose their forces, and that posed many problems to Chiang Kai-shek. There I was, his chief of staff and adviser, and also the theater commander, and it posed many embarrassing problems to me because I was continually admonished not to become involved in fratricidal warfare. So I had to be awfully careful, because when I sent my troops to certain areas the Chinese Communits would shoot at them and kill them.

It was really, as I pointed out to Senator Morse a little while ago, rather difficult to operate under the type of policy that I had. I realized that the policy can't always be too specific and take care of a situation. The commander has to use his judgment. But when a commander uses his judgment he generates American policy sometimes. I generated policy by killing Communists.

PROBLEMS IN CHINA AFTER VJ-DAY, PARTICULARLY MANCHURIA

Senator KNOWLAND. I am speaking now of the period—it seems to me there was quite a sharp division between the situation prior to VJ-day and the period subsequently to VJ-day. Now perhaps I draw too clear a line there and more of a line than should be drawn. But it seems to me as long as the Imperial Japan was our enemy in the Pacific that we might very well take every step we could to get everyone that we could sign up to oppose Japanese and help defeat them. But once the Imperial Japan had surrendered, then it seems to me that we are in a little different position on any urging of the Chinese Communists to come into the government of the Republic, and you couldn't then say very well that that was for military necessity in the sense that you could say it in the days prior to August 14. Am I correct in that?

General WEDEMEYER. You are correct in that, sir. It is difficult to delineate too rigidly.

Let me tell you gentlemen this: After the war, just as I knew the war was ending—I could sense that—I heard about messages sent from the Emperor of Japan. He wanted to send Prince Konoye to Moscow to effect some form of armistice. Of course, Moscow, as I understand it, refused to receive this Japanese emissary, and we went ahead and used our atomic weapons, and the war was finally brought to a close.

Now, sensing that, I began to make a recapitulation of the problems that would confront me as a theater commander. I knew I had to go up there and fill up those areas that the Japanese had been occupying with Chinese Nationalist forces. I knew that Manchuria was going to pose an awful problem, because I had been told that Russia was coming into the war, about the 8th of August I believe it was, sir.

The Soviets were going to come into Manchuria, which had always been in my theater prior thereto, and I had bombers going up there constantly on sorties, bombing coke ovens and armament industries, et cetera, ports.

So this posted lots of problems for me. I told the generalissimo in my judgment he did not have the capability of holding Manchuria and concurrently recovering, restoring stability south of the Great Wall, with the means he had available—military, administrators, economic means.

I, therefore, recommended to him that he ask that a guardianship be established over Manchuria, Senator Knowland, so that that would preclude unilateral action on the part of this so-called ally, the Soviet, in that area.

I think the Pauley report will reaffirm that my suspicions were very well founded—namely, that the Soviets, when they got in there, were going to exploit their position and enable the Chinese Communists to take over the area and economically wreck the area, if they could. They did exactly both.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired. Senator Lodge.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Fulbright.

WHAT WOULD CONSTITUTE VICTORY IN KOREA

Senator FULBRIGHT. General, I just have one or two questions. One thing interested me. I believe you said this morning that the truce providing for a cease fire at the thirty-eighth parallel would be a defeat for us. Is that about correct, what you said ?

General WEDEMEYER. I think it would be tantamount to a defeat, sir, psychologically. I will tell you why. Do you want me to develop that?

Senator FULBRIGHT. I was going to—that was the first and what I wished to ask was——

Chairman RUSSELL. If the general wishes to develop that, he has a right to do so. I want to advise you of your rights.

General WEDEMEYER. I want to make sure that I do answer what Senator Fulbright asks.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Does that mean I am not permitted to direct a question?

Chairman RUSSELL. Not at all, but the general said—you had asked him a question, and he indicated he would like to develop it.

Senator FULBRIGHT. All I wanted was to find if my understanding was correct of what he said this morning. I wanted to lay the basis for a question.

Chairman RUSSELL. Proceed.

Senator FULBRIGHT. This was not the question—it was merely the basis.

I understood that is what you said. My question is: What would you consider the minimum that would not be considered a defeat?

In other words, what must we achieve so that it would not be a defeat. What would be the minimum that we must achieve?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, Senator Fulbright, as I understand our purpose in going in there, sir, it was to establish conditions throughout Korea to permit the people to determine how and by whom they would be governed without intimidation, a unified Korea, a democratic Korea.

If we end our military operations on the thirty-eighth parallel we are right back where we started, sir.

Now, I say it is tantamount to psychological defeat because the third team of the Soviet has withstood the first team of the Allies, the best we have got, right over there fighting.

They have suffered tremendous losses in manpower; we have suffered, too; in number not so many, but in quality of our manpower, I think we have lost very heavily. We have lost so many fine young men, our young officers who had been trained at great effort and expense to us.

Senator FULBRIGHT. General, I agree with that. Could you be more specific as to what you would consider the least we should accept?

As I interpret your answer it would mean control of all of Korea, and the exclusion of all Communists from all Korea.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, are you asking me to tell—to suggest now what the policy should be, sir?

Senator FULBRIGHT. No. I was wondering—you stated if I understood correctly, that a truce providing for the restoration of the thirty-eighth parallel as being a dividing line, would not be satisfactory, I took it, in your view, because it would be a defeat.

I wondered what would be the minimum. I am just investigating or trying to probe what, in your mind, would be a satisfactory truce.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, that conclusion, Senator Fulbright, was based on the premise that we really wanted to remove all Reds from Korea and give the Koreans the opportunity, as I indicated earlier, the opportunity to establish a government of free democracy.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you think the Koreans are prepared for a democratic system?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir; no more than the Chinese—probably even less, Senator Fulbright.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What do you mean then when you say an opportunity to create a democracy?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, the same thing that you are talking about, democracy in the application to all of these countries.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I have not been talking about applying democracy to any of them.

General WEDEMEYER. No, but our Government is, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. General, I am not defending everything our Government said about China or Korea. I am just trying to develop what, in your view, being much more familiar with the situation——

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I agree with you, sir, that "democratic" has no application——

WHAT SHOULD BE OUR POLICY

Senator FULBRIGHT. We do not want to go on fighting indefinitely, I take it, so what should be our goal, our minimum goal, that we ought to set that we won't take less than that in the pursuit of this war in Korea? I just wanted your own view.

It is perfectly proper—it is satisfactory to me—if you wish to say exclusion of all Communist Chinese and Russians out of Korea, and a free election for all Korea, if that is what you believe.

I am only asking what you believe; I am not arguing with you at all, General.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, sir, what an Army officer needs is direction as to what you civilians want to accomplish, sir. If you tell me what you want to accomplish, I could help you determine what the military action should be, and I would be happy to do it.

Now, I am going to step out of the realm of an Army officer and tell you this, sir, that in my judgment we ought to get out of Korea; and I would do it because I just don't think that we are going to get anywhere.

We are losing our finest manhood there, and they can continue to pour people into the cauldron; we can, and they can, but we have a stalemate that worries me no end, and what are we accomplishing there.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What would you propose? I mean, what steps would you propose?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, it would be, if necessary—I would fight out; we can do just as we did at Hungnam, we evacuated that way.

If we had to do it under duress, I would be able to do it under a temporary truce or something like that.

But, Senator Fulbright, the thing that concerns me is that we might involve our boys in these various places around the periphery, and we are letting this enemy, this Soviet enemy, more or less determine our action.

I want to take the strategic initiative away from that enemy, and I want the Americans and their allies to take actions in the political, the economic, in the psycho-social and in the military fields at times and places of our choosing, and the kind of actions that we take will be coordinated to accomplish our national aims.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, General, if the truce provided for restoration of the thirty-eighth parallel to them, as the dividing line, and assuming that Korea would have control south of that, that would be a defeat and our evacuation of it as suggested here—it would be much worse than it is, because they could overrun——

General WEDEMEYER. That is right, sir, and let me tell you, sir, earlier I said I would not put any ground forces in Korea, so you can rightfully say they would overrun South Korea if we do not have people to stop them, and I would answer that——

Senator FULBRIGHT. You——

General WEDEMEYER. Is tantamount—excuse me.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I did not mean to interrupt you, General, go ahead.

General WEDEMEYER. That is tantamount to a defeat, in my judgment, but you must take countersteps in other fields. I would break off diplomatic relations with them. I would go into full mobilization.

And I would clearly lay it all before the world—I would lay it before the bar of the whole world, and I would go further; I would go to the real perpetrator of all this, because it is not the Koreans—the crux of this thing is in the Kremlin. And if we continue to permit them to call the tune to which we shall dance, our form of government would be in jeopardy.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Would you break off relations with the Kremlin?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir—and their satellites.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Would you do it now?

General WEDEMEYER. Would I do—what, sir?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Would you do it now?

General WEDEMEYER. I would do it concurrently with the withdrawal. And I would in the psychological field do it now, in order to explain to the world my future actions. "I am going to take the initiative away from these people."

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, would that be tantamount to a declaration of war?

General WEDEMEYER. Not necessarily.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It would not necessarily?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir. You can break off diplomatic relations—well, Senator, it is a calculated risk you would just take.

STRATEGIC VALUE OF FORMOSA AND KOREA

Senator FULBRIGHT. I was interested in the distinction you draw between Formosa and Korea. I believe you said in response to a question this morning that as to Formosa you would prevent its occupation by Communists—I think you said something about doing everything, that the mission was to do everything necessary to accomplish that.

I wonder how you reconcile that with Korea, where you would not put ground forces in, in Korea, only the Air Force and Navy.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, Senator, may I say that for example in World War II we lost little islands—a lot of these little islands to the Japanese, and we lost hundreds of thousands of American boys in reoccupying those islands. If you have a force that is already in place and it is there and can be employed in a specific task, they can do a great deal more toward holding the ground than if you lose it and have to reoccupy later—it takes a much larger force.

Now, there were those who felt that Korea was of strategic significance. I do not happen to share that feeling and I do not think it is necessary for us to make these sacrifices we have to hold Korea. But there are men whom I respect and whose judgment I respect in the military hierarchy who do not agree with me. They think Korea is very important.

The main thing, Senator Fulbright, is that we took a very courageous step in opposing the spread of communism. This was it. This is the time. And I think our President was right in doing that, sir. It was just the way he did it. But I would not, as I said, have put ground power in there. I would have taken punitive action with my Navy and with my Air Force.

Also I would have broken off, I think, diplomatic relations at that time, to——

Senator Sparkman. With Russia, now, you mean?

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir; because that is where all this has its genesis, and we are just fooling ourselves if we don't admit it, and we are making it difficult to properly evaluate what future action we should take, in my judgment.

Senator Fulbright. General, I may be jumping around a little bit here——

General Wedemeyer. That's all right, sir.

MARXISM IN CHINA

Senator Fulbright. I am trying to follow a few of the questions put to you this morning, and what interested me was your familiarity—you stated, I believe, that you had studied Das Kapital, and were familiar with the theory of Marx?

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir; I think I am, sir.

Senator Fulbright. I wonder if you would pursue the thought a little that you touched on, about Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai being confirmed Marxists?

We have been told often that the Chinese were great individualists, and that communism would have no great appeal to them.

Just in retrospect, do you think the doctrine of Marx appeals to these Chinese leaders?

General Wedemeyer. The leaders, sir, that have been carefully indoctrinated over the years, and are thoroughly in accord with the principles, Mao Tse Tung, Chou En-Lai, and also Chu Teh, a prominent military leader.

I felt that those three men had completely accepted the ideals and the political philosophy——

Senator Fulbright. What ideals do you particularly have reference to, in communism?

General Wedemeyer. The subordination of the individual, complete avoidance of any spiritual life—most of the Chinese are Buddhists, lots of them are Moslems, but they do have a spiritual side to their life, and a godless philosophy is accepted by both Chou En-Lai and Mao Tse Tung, and the complete subordination of the individual for the state, and, of course, the regimentation of the economy.

Now, you are so right, when you say the Chinese are individualists——

Senator Fulbright. I don't say that——

General Wedemeyer. You mentioned that.

Senator Fulbright. I have been told that.

General Wedemeyer. That is my judgment on it.

I am not an expert, but I agree with that; and, the Chinese is built around the family, that is where their unity is; they are not nationalistically inclined. It is the family loyalty that is stronger than anything else, and that leads to nepotism, when you discriminate. Each head of a family wants to take care of all the other members of the family, and takes care of them, and that leads, as I say, to nepotism.

But you are right; I agree with the idea expressed that the Chinese do not lend themselves, in a philosophic way, to the ideals or ideas of Marxism.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Thank you, General.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hunt?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain?

Senator CAIN. General Wedemeyer, may I welcome you and compliment you; and by way of welcome, I should like to relate a story.

A couple of years ago I happened to have a conversation with the then Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eisenhower. Being prejudiced about a splendid American, General Ridgeway, I was nibbling a little against my hope that General Ridgeway might be the next Army Chief of Staff, and General Eisenhower, recognizing my purpose but being determined, and properly so, not to tell me what was going to happen, did, however, say this:

"Well," he said, "Matt Ridgeway is one of our outstanding officers, and I think it can be taken for granted that the next Chief of Staff of the Army will come from either Joe Collins, Matt Ridgway, or Al Wedemeyer."

DISCUSSION OF WEDEMEYER REPORT WITH STATE DEPARTMENT

General Wedemeyer, I hold in my hand, sir, the committee print of your report on China and Korea; and I should like to ask you if you ever discussed this China-Korea report with the President of the United States, subsequent to your return from your mission in the Far East?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir.

Senator CAIN. General Wedemeyer, did you ever discuss your report with the Secretary of State, or with representatives of the State Department, subsequent to your return from the Far East?

General WEDEMEYER. Only briefly, with the then Secretary of State Marshall.

Shortly after my return from my mission in the Far East, September 1947, I did discuss the report with Secretary Marshall. He complimented me and the members of my mission for a job well done, as he stated—substantially that—and then he admonished me that I must not repeat what was in that report until I received further instructions.

A few days later, a Mr. Butterworth, of the State Department, visited me in my temporary office in the Pentagon, and he had an extract of my report, and he told me that there were some things in my original report that rather embarrassed the Government, and asked me if I would sign this extract.

I told him that I would look it over and determine what had been extracted; and, after doing that, sir, I refused to sign it, to sign the extract, because it didn't embody the ideas that I thought my mission justified presenting to my Government. Therefore, I refused to sign it.

Senator CAIN. Well, may I ask, General Wedemeyer, if a representative of the State Department requested that you change your report, which you had written at the direction of the President of the United States and the then Secretary of State, Gen. George C Marshall?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

This paper that had been brought to me for signature had been changed. Frankly, I don't recall, any more, the changes. I haven't got the paper. Mr. Butterworth took it back after I indicated clearly, politely, but definitely that I would not sign that extract, and there was nothing more about that.

I was never asked, by the State Department, and I really felt badly about it, to discuss the philosophy behind the recommendations I made concerning China and Korea, by members of the State Department, nor was any particular member of my mission, and I had some very valuable men, fine Americans, who worked hard to help me evolve sound conclusions and recommendations pertaining to that area.

Senator CAIN. May I ask if Mr. Butterworth represented himself to you as being an agent of our State Department and that in that capacity he was asking you to initial a particular exception or extraction from your report?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, he knew that I knew that he was an official in the State Department, sir. I had had some prior contacts with him, both social and official. He knew that I knew that he was an official in the State Department when he brought that extract over to my office in the Pentagon.

Senator CAIN. The Senator from California, who sits on my right, mentioned that in his opinion, Mr. Butterworth at that period was head of the Far Eastern Section of the State Department.

General WEDEMEYER. I believe that is correct, sir.

Senator CAIN. May I ask—and I am only guessing General Wedemeyer—that after you had this conversation with Mr. Butterworth, you went to see the Secretary of State to determine from him perhaps what his wishes in this particular connection might be?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, it worried me, because I was given the impression that Secretary Marshall was interested in my signing this, but I contacted Secretary Marshall and he assured me that if I didn't want to sign this extract, that certainly he didn't want to influence me one way or the other. He was very nice about it.

Senator CAIN. That is to say, General Wedemeyer, that you went to the Secretary——

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir. He was at Lake Success, and I contacted him on the phone, sir.

Senator CAIN. That is to say, you contacted the Secretary of States——

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator CAIN. And told him——

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator CAIN. That the head of the Far Eastern Section of the State Department had asked you to change your report, that you did not wish to change it, you wanted to determine the Secretary's views, and his view was that if you wanted to stand on what you had written and signed, that you should not be coerced into changing it at the request of anybody; is that correct?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; but the word "coerced" is strong, Senator. There was no pressure, and Mr. Butterworth clearly stated that some of the recommendations that I made embarrassed the Government—would embarrass the Government if publicized. I think—I didn't agree with that, sir, but it wasn't up to me to make that determination.

A few days later I received a communication to the effect that that report would be top secret and would not be divulged, and I think the members of my mission did a fine job in keeping quiet about it. I think it was a well-kept secret for many years.

Senator CAIN. It was indeed, sir, and I think Members of the Congress who have been curious in recent years can testify to that.

The chief assignment before this committee, General Wedemeyer, as I understand it, is that we seek to study all of the facts related to the Far Eastern question.

STATE DEPARTMENT SUGGESTIONS ON WEDEMEYER REPORT

With that assignment in mind, I wonder if it would be possible for this committee to determine those portions of your report which Mr. Butterworth, as head of the Far Eastern Section of the State Department, thought might be embarrassing to this Government in order that we can study them and come to our own determination.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, as I recall it, sir, it was that part of my report—and I thought it was very important—pertaining to the establishment of a guardianship in Manchuria and a trusteeship in Korea.

My purpose was to create a buffer—to create a buffer—in those areas, where we would be able to preclude unilateral action on the part of Soviet-inspired or Soviet-controlled or Soviet-supported elements in the Far East.

That buffer would have denied the Soviets the opportunity to penetrate effectively to the south. That idea had been recommended earlier, as I tell you. Right after the war I made that recommendation to Chiang Kai-shek, because I didn't think he had the capability of carrying on in Manchuria; although his sovereignty had been recognized, he didn't have the resources to exercise that sovereignty in Manchuria immediately after the war. My purpose, of course, was to establish a guardianship. I didn't use the word "trusteeship" because I thought guardianship, the connotation of that would not be quite so objectionable to the Chinese.

Now, that in my judgment was the most important element of my report, both for Korea and for Manchuria. I think if the United States had implemented that idea, it would have been a changed picture today in the Far East, the whole situation, in my judgment, would have been different.

Senator CAIN. General—I beg your pardon. Had you completed your answer?

General WEDEMEYER. Not quite, sir.

The State Department, I believe, objected to that, because they said that Russia was a member of the guardianship. Well, the only way I could get Russia out of the guardianship was to fight a war, and I was trying to avoid a war.

I had to accept the fait accompli and include them in the guardianship, but at least I was denying them an opportunity to exploit their position in unilaterally evolving this guardianship in Manchuria and the trusteeship in Korea.

Senator CAIN. General Wedemeyer, some of us occasionally suffer from a lack of patience and would like to conclude our hearings. All of us want to conclude these hearings as soon as we are convinced that all the information and facts are available to us.

But I point out what to me is most provocative, that after almost 6 weeks of hearings, you are now telling us that a portion of your report, which in your opinion you considered to be among its most important facets and recommendations, the State Department or one of its officials sought to delete and remove from being considered by this committee and by the Nation as a whole.

General WEDEMEYER. Now, sir, I say that with a great deal of humility. It is just my judgment. I recognized at that time and still do that there were a lot of problems that were confronting the State Department about which I had no knowledge.

Another thing that I recommended was that these actions should be implemented through the United Nations organization, and I did that because we had just recently been criticized for avoiding or evading the United Nations organization in what we did in Greece and Turkey.

If you recall, we were severely criticized by the Soviet in the United Nations for sidetracking the United Nations and taking unilateral action in Greece and Turkey.

So I don't want my Government to be criticized again for similar action, and I recommended that all of this be implemented through that organization under the ageis, you might say, of the United Nations Organization; and it is in consonance with the Charter of the United Nations, this formation of a trusteeship.

Senator CAIN. You were not only qualified as a witness in your own right, in my judgment, General Wedemeyer, but you have been qualified by references made to you by other witnesses before this committee.

I think that everything you care to say and have to say is of real importance and I am particularly impressed by your recent references to Manchuria and by the solution you sought to impose in that area of the world.

OBJECTIVES IN KOREA

General Wedemeyer, it seems to me—at least, this is my chief concern, which has developed during these hearings—that since Red China entered the war the United Nations have largely given over the power of decision and the choice of area to our enemies.

On repeated instances the United States, acting as the agent or the Unified Command for the United Nations, has advised Russia, Red China, and the world that we are going to continue a limited operation in Korea.

It seems to me that the limitation to which General MacArthur so forthrightly addressed himself is the best evidence anyone needs to have that it is not now nor is it likely to become the determination of the United Nations to defeat our present enemy, Red China, in a military way.

To what extent, General Wedemeyer, would you agree in that matter, sir?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, the only time that what you might call a holding attack is justified, either tactically or strategically, is to improve your position vis-à-vis the enemy.

This morning, Senator Cain, I don't know whether you were present——

Senator CAIN. I was, sir.

General WEDEMEYER. But I prefaced my remarks with the statement that I have been away from the Pentagon and all of the inner councils for 2 years.

I don't perhaps—unquestionably—don't have the information that your Joint Chiefs of Staff and their respective staffs have upon which to base judgments, and I indicated that I never questioned their loyalty to country or to principles.

They have made statements to the effect, according to the testimony, that we are buying time.

Therefore I do not feel competent, Senator Cain, to differ with men who, as I stated earlier, I respect, whose judgment I have sometimes differed with, but I don't question their purposes at all.

Now they say we are buying time, and I think that this committee ought to heed what they say very carefully. They are all very fine, competent men.

Senator CAIN. General Wedemeyer, I understood you, sir, this morning to say that in your opinion that once a theater commander has been given a mission, he necessarily ought to be given the authority to carry that mission out.

General WEDEMEYER. Unrestricted.

Senator CAIN. Did I understand you right?

General WEDEMEYER. That is right, sir.

Senator CAIN. On the 10th day of October 1950, the President said to the country that the mission of General MacArthur was that of repelling aggression and to restore international peace and security in the area as called for by the United Nations. Is that your impression of what the allied nations are doing in Korea, General Wedemeyer, to repel aggression and restore peace to all of Korea?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, of course, at present, Senator Cain, they are the United Nations forces which are attempting to repel the aggression that occurred on and its initiation June 25, 1950.

They are attempting to repel that aggression, and the battle surges back and forth, losses being sustained on both sides, but nothing definitive resulting from these actions, nothing definitive in a military sense. In a psychological sense, the longer this draws out, in my judgment, the more we lose psychologically in the world.

Senator CAIN. I thank you, General.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Tobey?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Sparkman?

WEDEMEYER MEMORANDUM TO STATE DEPARTMENT ON FORMOSA, AUGUST 1949

Senator SPARKMAN. General Wedemeyer, first I want to ask you with reference to this memorandum or whatever it was, that the State Department put out on December 23, 1949, I believe it was——

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; that is the date; yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. You know what it was that I have reference to?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; that is the memorandum.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, as you said in the beginning of your statement this morning, Secretary Acheson, I believe it was, stated that that was put out following a suggestion from you.

I believe, later, in answer to a question put to him by the Chairman of this Joint Committee, Senator Russell, he stated that that suggestion from you was in writing, but I do not believe it has been produced yet.

Do you have a copy of it or, if not, I will ask the chairman to obtain one for us.

General WEDEMEYER. Now, sir, I have a copy here; I don't know whether I am authorized at this time to put it in.

Senator SPARKMAN. You do not know whether it has been declassified or not?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir; I don't. I didn't know whether you were going to ask me for it, but it is true that I signed a memorandum to the Secretary—Assistant Secretary of State for Public Information, or Public—what do they call it?

Senator SPARKMAN. Public Affairs, wasn't it?

General WEDEMEYER. Public Affairs. It is true that I signed it, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. That was to Mr. George V. Allen, was it not, who was then Assistant Secretary of State?

General WEDEMEYER. That was his name, that is correct, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. As I recall, the Secretary of State testified to that effect.

General WEDEMEYER. That was August 26, 1949, just before I was relieved of my assignment in the Department.

Senator SPARKMAN. I do not want, Mr. Chairman, to ask for something that is improper, but I wonder if, subject to our security restrictions that the committee has, that could not be read into the record at this point?

Chairman RUSSELL. In the opinion of the Chair it can be, unless General Wedemeyer has a desire to raise some issue with respect to it.

General WEDEMEYER. I have no objection.

Senator SPARKMAN. As I understood it, his only reluctance was whether or not it was declassified, and I suggested we would leave it up to the censor, anyhow.

Chairman RUSSELL. We have a procedure to protect the classification of it and, as a matter of fact, the committee declassified the document in question, so——

Senator SPARKMAN. We declassified the memorandum; we have not had this letter yet.

Chairman RUSSELL. I understand. Unless General Wedemeyer has some objection to reading it——

General WEDEMEYER. I have no objection.

Senator KNOWLAND. There is no cryptographic communication involved in this?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir. My assistant, Colonel Gilchrist, states that I can read it, and that he will attempt to take care of the declassification with Admiral Davis, so that you can have it as part of your record. Is that all right?

Senator SPARKMAN. I should think that would certainly protect everything.

Chairman RUSSELL. You may proceed.

General **Wedemeyer**. This is a memorandum for George V. Allen, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. The date is August 26, 1949. [Reading:]

> Subject: Current position of the United States with respect to Formosa.
>
> In a memorandum for the executive secretary of the National Security Council the Secretary of State on August 4, 1949, stated that under present circumstances the passage of Formosa under Communist control by external or internal action appears probable—

You remember, gentlemen, earlier this morning that I told you that many communications that I had read in the Department had that statement in it, that the fall of Formosa appears probable.

This is just one reference to it. [Reading:]

> since there appears no certain assurance that Formosa can be denied to Communist control by political and economic measures alone—

and those are the only measures that were authorized, the political and economic.

> Further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on August 16 reaffirmed their previous views that overt United States military action to deny Communist domination of Formosa would not be justified. However, I also note that the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the probabilities of the Formosa situation make it more than ever necessary that every effort be made to forestall any weakening of the over-all United States position with respect to the Philippines, the Ryukyus, and Japan. In Department of the Army consideration of this matter, it appears to be particularly desirable that, should Formosa be lost, this event should have a minimum of ill effects on the governments and peoples of western-oriented nations and particularly those of the Far East. Accordingly, it occurs to me that, if not already instituted, you may desire to consider information measures designed to accomplish this end.
>
> The above suggestion is supplementary to those made from time to time by the Army member of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Staff established in accordance with NSC 4, who has been furnished a copy of this memorandum. I trust you will consider it appropriate for me to bring to your attention such points which may arise in connection with our consideration of matters of the above nature.
>
> A. C. Wedemeyer,
> *Lieutenant General,*
> *General Staff Corps.*

STATE DEPARTMENT INFORMATION PAPER OF DECEMBER 23, 1949

Senator **Sparkman**. Yes. Now, General Wedemeyer, if I recall, the Secretary of State in his testimony relating to this stated that he had informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he did not believe that economic and political measures alone would make it possible to save Formosa from falling; and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed him that no military resources would be available—and I gather that is what you mean there, when you say no overt military aid——

General **Wedemeyer**. I think that it exactly——

Senator **Sparkman**. That is a reasonable interpretation, is it not?

General **Wedemeyer**. I think so; yes.

Senator **Sparkman**. And it was following that exchange of information that that suggestion was put out?

General **Wedemeyer**. That is right, sir, to soften the blow once it fell.

Senator **Sparkman**. Yes. In other words—I have forgotten the language that was used, but it was to slant the news coverage in such a way that it would soften the blow as much as possible on us; is that not it?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. And so as to, shall we say, save face.

General WEDEMEYER. To minimize the loss of prestige.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes. As a matter of fact, I think the Secretary or rather the Department of State used that term when they put it out.

General WEDEMEYER. That I do not know.

Senator SPARKMAN. To save our prestige, the prestige of the United States.

Now, General Wedemeyer, there are a good many things I want to question you about. I will not be able to get them all in in 15 minutes. I want to say I have enjoyed your testimony very much and I have found much in it that has been pleasing to me, because it seems to me you have recognized perhaps as much as any other witness before us, even more, perhaps, the need of action in many different fields. In other words, I think you have presented here to us a picture of the needs of economic, moral, and material aids to many parts of the world—and I want to say that I appreciate that presentation on your part.

There are some things that raise questions in my mind, and about which I am not clear, and I want to ask you about some of those.

PROBLEMS IN CHINA AFTER VJ-DAY

Now, going back to the telegram of December 7, 1945—was that the date of it, the message from you, Admiral Spruance, and——

General WEDEMEYER. December 7, 1945.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. Prompted by a radiogram that I received November 20, 1945, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. That was in reply to a telegram?

General WEDEMEYER. The action that we took, Senator Sparkman, in Tokyo was initiated by the radiogram that we got dated November 20.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. Telling us to get together and determine how we are going to solve these two big problems of repatriation and rearrangements of Chinese Nationalist troops in China, restoring stability in China as rapidly as possible.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes. You three were the three commanders in that general area.

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir. General MacArthur commanded of course in Japan, and I was in command of the China theater.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, what was Admiral Spruance?

General WEDEMEYER. Spruance I think was way back in Honolulu, but he came forward for that conference because so much American shipping was involved, either the shipping and the crews or just the shipping, but he had much to do with it and he was accompanied by Vice Admiral Barbey and some other staff members, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now this was just about 4 months—3 or 4 months—after the war had actually ended, hadn't it?

General WEDEMEYER. That is right.

Senator SPARKMAN. The shooting had actually ended.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. And you were still confronted with the problem of moving vast numbers of Japanese and taking their surrender and so on and so forth.

General WEDEMEYER. That is correct, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. And all during the war as you related and as has been put in evidence heretofore, there was a very determined effort on the part of the United States, particularly under the leadership of our Ambassador, General Pat Hurley, to bring together the great conflicting interests in China. All through the testimony of General Hurley before the Foreign Relations Committee on December 5 and 6, 1945, he tells of the efforts that he had made in order to get the Kuomintang—that was the Chiang Kai-shek group, wasn't it?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; that is the one.

Senator SPARKMAN. And the Communists—that was the Mao-Tze-tung group——

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now were those the two principal groups in China at that time?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; the splinter political parties were insignificant and absolutely impotent. There were no other political parties there. Each of these political parties had its private army.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. Pat Hurley—may I say, sir, my personal knowledge, his emphasis was upon helping me. He was most cooperative with me, helping me get Chinese to fight Japanese regardless of political complextion, and his effort was directed toward getting the armies of the Communists and the armies of the Chinese Nationalist Government coordinated in an effort, a common effort, against the Japanese.

If he delved into amalgamating political forces, sir, I really have no personal knowledge of that.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, I certainly agree that your statement is correct during the war.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; during the war.

Senator SPARKMAN. But from then on he says that he tried his best to carry out this policy. That has been put into the record.

General WEDEMEYER. I have no knowledge of that, sir.

NATIONALIST-COMMUNIST RELATIONS DURING AND AFTER THE WAR

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes. Now, the point I am trying to make is this. During the war it was principally the Communists under the leadership of Mao-Tze-tung and the Nationalists under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, and you did manage to keep them fairly well together during the course of the war. Now following the war——

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir; I don't accept that, Senator Sparkman. I did not manage to keep——

Senator SPARKMAN. Did they fight each other during the war?

General WEDEMEYER. Not much, but I didn't get coordination or cooperation from the Chinese Communists.

Senator SPARKMAN. I was the one that misused terms. I meant that at least they did not fight each other. They fought the common enemy.

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir; there were were no large fights involving the two forces.

Senator SPARKMAN. But now, following the war, they became hostile toward each other, did they not?

General WEDEMEYER. They were hostile toward each other. The Communists started to move, and they got equipment very quickly from the defeated Japanese.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes. Now coming to your telegram, the very last paragraph—and this is what puzzles me. I realize all of this you have asked for above, but it says:

> It is suggested that the United States assistance to China as outlined above be made available as basis for negotiations by the American Ambassador to bring together and effect a compromise between the major opposing groups in order to promote a united, democratic China.

Now were not the two major opposing groups——

General WEDEMEYER. There is no doubt about it.

Senator SPARKMAN. The Nationalists and Communists?

General WEDEMEYER. That is correct, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. And you would not say then that the Communists at that time were only a nebulous group, would you?

General WEDEMEYER. Definitely not.

Senator SPARKMAN. They were a major group, were they not?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. My time is up. I would like to develop this further, and I will do it later.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, your time has expired, Senator.

Senator Stennis?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Flanders?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Long?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Gillette?

Senator GILLETTE. Senator Stennis has just arrived, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, if you——

Senator GILLETTE. I will be willing to defer to him.

Chairman RUSSELL. If you wish to defer to him, all right. Is there any objection on the part of any member of the committee?

The Chair hears none. Senator Stennis is recognized.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Gillette. I will be very brief, Mr. Chairman.

EFFECT OF WITHDRAWING FROM KOREA

General, as I understood you this morning, I was very much impressed by the statement you made about the United Nations and the plea for each nation to be more liberal with the other in their attitude toward their support; and you likened it unto our early days in the Union, even under the Confederation. I think that is a very good illustration.

But I was surprised when you said you thought we ought to now withdraw from Korea.

Do you not think if we withdraw from Korea that would be virtually knocking the legs out from under the United Nations?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir, Senator. I have never suggested anything here in my testimony today, nor will I in any subsequent testimony, nor have I in the past, sir—any action that I suggest of that nature in my judgment should be done under the aegis of the United Nations.

I am confronted here with a group of fine Americans who are interested in getting at the root of our foreign policy and our future actions, and I have some knowledge and experience. I am trying to give you the benefit of that, frankly.

I say that I would get out of Korea; I would break off diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia and her satellites; and I would establish economic blockades around those areas controlled by those categories of countries.

I think that if we continue to fill these vacua created at times and places and choosing of this potential enemy, that we are going to defeat ourselves economically and psychologically. I don't believe we are getting at the real enemy at all. I think we have been unrealistic in our thinking, and I think realism is what would be understood in the Kremlin.

I am not a warmonger at all. I think if we had used our political, our economic, and our psycho-social forces intelligently and in consonance with a real plan, we never would have been in this predicament today.

GLOBAL OBJECTIVES AND INITIATIVES

I saw a very excellent suggestion on the part of Dr. Conant of Harvard the other day, where he suggests that we have a plan similar to the Marshall plan but located in the Far East, in that region, and I think it is an excellent idea, Senator. But it ought to be coordinated with what we are doing in the Middle East and in Latin America. But today, sir, the Soviet makes a move, we make a counter move and generate American policy. I say, let's take the initiative in the field of strategy in the international field and begin to play the tune to which these people will dance.

The world looks to us for that type of leadership, and we have the potentialities.

Now our military experts say—and they are much more knowledgeable than I am here, sir—that we are buying time. If that's the consensus of opinion of our military experts, I yield humbly to their view—that we should buy more time, to continue the struggle in Korea, sir.

Senator STENNIS. Well, when we talk about now supporting these global matters economically, militarily, and all those things are well enough, but you know the problem of translating those into actual programs that we can support with manpower and money and that the American people will support, that is the problem we have here.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. I think the American people, Senator, will follow courageous leadership. I really think if they understand what we are striving to do, I have implicit confidence in the American people.

Senator STENNIS. Well, I think they followed the Marshall plan mighty well.

General WEDEMEYER. They did, sir; they supported it.

Senator STENNIS. I think it is greatly to their credit.

But how far can we go in Asia? That is the problem it seems to me like we have got to decide here.

General WEDEMEYER. That can be determined best by evaluating our objectives in all parts of the world. This is global now. I think you agree we cannot neglect any area now in our considerations, in our strategic considerations.

Senator STENNIS. Well, we would not want to neglect any area, but the question in my mind: How far can we go in just stamping out communism or aggression, or whatever you call it? How far can we go in view of the great part of the burden we have to bear in trying to secure the world?

You said there that you thought it was more important in Asia than it is in the Mediterranean.

General WEDEMEYER. I am sorry, sir.

Senator STENNIS. I believe you said you thought some areas, at least, in Asia were more strategic than they were in the Hellespont. You were talking about Greece and Turkey.

General WEDEMEYER. I am sorry I gave that impression. What I tried to point out was that to the Peloponnesus, to the Greek area, we gave approximately a billion dollars in the last 5 years for rehabilitation of that area and to stop the advance of communism in that particular area, sir.

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. And I just wanted the Senators to draw comparisons in their minds with what you have given in the Far East, with half of the population of the world involved, sir—about a billion two hundred million. When you consider China, India, the Japanese Archipelago, the Philippines, the Melanesian, Micronesian, and Polynesian areas, Malay, you have about one billion two hundred million people who are gradually being oriented toward the Kremlin. And I wonder if we have given a proportionate amount of thought, effort, material, and planning, and thinking to that area.

That is all I am trying to point out, sir—the relative importance sometimes changes through conditions.

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

OBJECTIVES IN KOREA

Well, now, another thing that I understood you to say in talking about a truce for restoration of the general status of the area in Korea at the thirty-eighth parallel: I understood you to say that you would consider that we had lost if we settled on any basis like that; that our mission had not been successful. And you said that we went in Korea in order to permit people to have self-determination in government.

I don't know if that is your words, but that is the note I made here.

Well, now, is that the substance of what you said there—that we went in there so that they could control their own affairs or rule themselves?

General WEDEMEYER. Senator, I am awfully anxious that I not be put in the position——

Senator STENNIS. I don't want to put you in any position except what you say. What I am coming to——

General WEDEMEYER. I want the record clear, Senator; I am not trying to say this is the policy in Korea, but my interpretation of what we are trying to do. I tried to state that we are striving to give these people an opportunity to determine how and by whom they would be governed without any intimidation.

Senator STENNIS. What people is that—North Korea?

General WEDEMEYER. All of Korea, sir. That was my understanding of our objective.

Senator STENNIS. Well, I never had understood we went out to give the North Koreans the power to determine——

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I could be wrong, sir. I thought we were trying to unify Korea, sir, and I have a little support for that view——

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. Because I have seen some papers where the Soviet and the American representatives were meeting constantly in Seoul trying to bring about exactly that condition, sir.

Senator STENNIS. Well, it would be very fine to bring it about. But what I was getting at is, What can we tell the American people we are fighting for here? And I thought it was—it would stop that aggressive move out there, that the United Nations would stop it there, would try to stop it anywhere. But so far as the North Koreans—they already had their choice so far as we could give it to them; they were more or less cut off when the war ended.

I think if we could carry out the mission there, bring the troops to the thirty-eighth parallel, that would be something well worth working on and starting on.

WASTING OUR MANPOWER WITHOUT INJURY TO REAL ENEMY

General WEDEMEYER. Well, sir, my fear on that is this: I don't know exactly what our casualties have amounted to, around 70,000 killed, wounded, missing. Supposing this enemy, this potential enemy, fuses some more of these powder kegs he has created around his periphery.

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. And he were to do that again and again and again in these various areas. A fruitless effort militarily, and still the real enemy is not being damaged, while we are suffering seriously, economically—we are beginning to.

Economically we are beginning to feel pressures, and we are losing—I cannot emphasize it too much, sir—the finest commodity we have, American manhood.

In our lifetime we have seen some countries become rather decadent, and we have seen great empires, historically great empires, gradually disintegrating, and I think you can attribute it primarily to the loss of leadership and manhood.

If we pit our manhood against the manhood of our potential enemy, I say to you, sir, for whatever my military opinion is worth, that we are going to lose.

Senator STENNIS. Finally lose?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. I want American ingenuity, American sincerity—I have faith in my country; I think we are—we have the greatest humanitarian record of any country in history—I want that; I want American ingenuity, I want American technology, to protect the things that I hold dear. I don't want to spill American blood all over the battlefields of Europe and the Far East, sir, indiscriminately, and that is my fear.

There will be lots of Koreas. If I were a planner, an officer in the Kremlin, that is exactly what I would do to you Americans.

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. And it would enable me to accomplish my objectives without a great deal of cost to me. I don't want to be sucked in or drawn into such a situation.

UNITED STATES PURPOSES IN KOREA

Senator STENNIS. Well, I would agree with that, except that I would not want to commit myself to saying that in order to accomplish our purposes or have a successful mission that we would have to go in there and restore all of North Korea to a self-determination basis.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. I would like to know—I don't know, and maybe some gentleman of the committee knows—exactly what we are fighting in Korea for. You say it is to stop the aggression that occurred, that started June 25, sir.

Well, of course, if that were the purpose, we had no business then going north of 38.

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. Which we did, apparently with official recognition and cognizance and approval; so when they went north of 38, my son's regiment, a captain of the infantry, went clear to the Yalu River.

Senator STENNIS. Yes. Well, that is a relative term about stopping aggression; that means stamp out aggression, and destroy aggression.

General WEDEMEYER. I realize that, sir.

Senator STENNIS. But my point is that we do not have to necessarily go to the Yalu to write the terms of a peace.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator STENNIS. If you win it, you can win it at the thirty-eighth.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator STENNIS. I have a great deal of regard for you, General. You have been over there, and you understand the Asiatic problem better than I do by far.

General WEDEMEYER. I am not an expert on the area, sir.

Senator STENNIS. Did you say this morning that you considered Great Britain as our most cooperative ally in the United Nations? Did you say something along that line?

General WEDEMEYER. They are a very fine ally; yes, sir. I think our interests are quite common, and our basic roots—of course, mine were Irish on my mother's side.

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. But I do think they are one of our closest allies; yes, sir.

Senator STENNIS. Based on your experience with them——

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator STENNIS (continuing). And your observation, you think——

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; and there will be efforts made to generate cleavages between us and that ally by Communists, and the effort is going on, and certain things happened in England that I fear are very unfortunate, that jeopardized fine relations between us; but, all in all, I think when the blue chips are down they are a wonderful race of people, and fine allies; yes, sir.

Senator STENNIS. General, I thank you very much.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. I believe that is all.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Gillette?

Senator GILLETTE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the general a few questions.

General Wedemeyer, there are just three or four questions that I want to ask you. You will pardon me, but as I was listening to you this morning there seemed to be some inconsistencies, as I understood your statement. I believe that you spoke of the fact that General Mao and some other Chinese general, whose name I cannot pronounce——

General WEDEMEYER. General Chou.

Senator GILLETTE (continuing). Were sincere Communists.

General WEDEMEYER. I believe that they have accepted the Marxist theory, sir; yes, sir.

STRENGTH OF MARXISM IN CHINA AND KOREA

Senator GILLETTE. You also stated, I believe, that in your opinion the attempts to bring about a coalition between the Communist forces of the north and Chiang's forces were doomed to failure because it was difficult to bring them together, to find the cement to hold them together, as it was to get oil and water to combine; is that what you said?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; in substance that is substantially what I said, Senator Gillette.

Senator GILLETTE. Well, I was just looking at page 7 of your report to the President in which you stated:

> The bulk of the Chinese and Korean people are not disposed to communism and they are not concerned with ideologies. They desire food, shelter, and the opportunity to live in peace.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. Is that statement not inconsistent?

General WEDEMEYER. I am so glad you gave me an opportunity to clarify just exactly that point.

Senator GILLETTE. That is what I want.

General WEDEMEYER. I am happy to get the opportunity, because it is not true only in China, what I am going to say, but it has application in other countries; which are gradually coming under the influence or being affected by the spread of communism.

Science has not only given us greatly improved destructive means on the military side, but science has also improved the means of controlling the thinking, of shaping the thinking of the minds of people.

Through propaganda and through pamphlets and radio and so forth, it is remarkable the way people can be influenced and controlled, Senator Gillette.

I lived in Germany a few years before the war, just immediately before the last war, and I was subjected to this propaganda skillfully—skillfully done, particularly skillful for the masses who don't as a rule think things through, and try to determine motives, and so forth.

Now, in China the people, I mentioned earlier, were war-weary and down and out after so many years of fighting, and terrific dislocations, economic and otherwise.

Here comes a well-organized, fine propaganda supporting it, a movement which appealed to them; and the leaders, their own leaders, had been repudiated skillfully, and I say I even contributed to it, not intentionally, but I did, in my denouncing Chiang Kai-shek as having corrupt people around him, and inept people, and so forth.

I was sincere about it. They were; but I don't think I should have contributed to that symphony of sycophants at that time.

Unfortunately I did it; but when I say that Mao Tze-tung and Chou En-lai and these other Chinese Communist leaders were sincere Communists, I believe that, and I believe, too, that the Chinese people are not susceptible of the basic ideas of Marxism; but, Senator Gillette, they are not susceptible to the basic ideas of democracy either, sir. They don't understand about these various basic philosophies; they really don't, sir.

I have talked to the peasants. They are lovable. They are generous. And they just want to be let alone. They want to be let alone. And it is easy to control people like that. They are docile. They are not belligerent, the Chinese, and it is easy to do it when you can intimidate them, as the Communists can, sir.

Today I get letters from friends in China and they indicate that they are not bothering adults at all. The Chinese Communists are working on the adolescents, they are working on the kids, the children. They are trying to sell them, to indoctrinate them.

But as long as the adult Chinese minds his business and does not create any disorder the Chinese Communists do not bother them. They do not compel them to accept their ideology—but they are working on the children strenuously.

Senator GILLETTE. So it is your conclusion——

General WEDEMEYER. I hope I am not—excuse me—I hope I am not being inconsistent. That is the real situation as I view it. And I hope you do not feel that I am being contradictory or inconsistent.

Senator GILLETTE. Well, I know you are not, intentionally.

General WEDEMEYER. But I can see it does look that way.

Senator GILLETTE. And your conclusion, as I see it now, is that it is possible to find a common denominator and an area under which these people could be cemented together and coalesced.

General WEDEMEYER. Oh, yes—yes, sir. I am sorry if I gave any other impression, either in writing or orally.

Senator GILLETTE. Well, now——

General WEDEMEYER. May I say one thing, Senator Gillette, because I think it is pertinent, before you go on, sir. I am sure that in Russia at one time at least—and I have talked with many people in Russia—the Russian people themselves do not like this present situation that confronts them. But, the younger people are so thoroughly imbued and indoctrinated that it is going to be very difficult with the passage of time to change and to reach an amicable arrangement with them, arrangements where Christian principles and ideals of decency in relationships prevail—it is going to be very difficult.

Senator GILLETTE. Well, thank you, General. Now, I will call attention to another matter that seems to present an inconsistency to me.

NAVAL BLOCKADE AND UNITED NATIONS ACTION

I understood from your testimony this morning that you supported the suggestion of an effective blockade of the Chinese coast.

You also stated and I think I put the words down exactly, that every move taken in this military episode must be through the United Nations. How do you make those two statements—one, that we acting indepedently could effect a blockade——

General WEDEMEYER. I see.

Senator GILLETTE. And your statement that every move must be made under the aegis—you just used the word a little while ago—of the United Nations?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. Were you present when I talked to Senator Green about the United Nations?

Senator GILLETTE. Yes; I was.

General WEDEMEYER. I think we should try to operate, Senator Gillette, through the United Nations Organization. I think that is our hope—some organization of that nature, I repeat that. But there may come a time in our interest where we have to operate alone. And that is what disturbs Senator Green, but in my judgment that time may come, sir.

Here we have a powerful nation able to veto in the Security Council some contemplated action that we think is in America's interest, and, for the time being, Senator Gillette, I just happen to believe that American interests are the interests of all free peoples of the world, and therefore we Americans as long as we are sincere, as long as we are not operating for our own self-aggrandizement, as long as we are sincere in this effort to bring about peaceful solution of problems without the employment of force at all, and at the same time insure that these peple that are recalcitrant—for example, the U. S. S. R.—are punished and are restricted through concerted action on our part. I think that my position is that while we want to operate, that we may have to operate unilaterally, that is, that I would like to have the agreement of friendly peoples and nations but there comes a time perhaps where I would have to operate unilaterally.

Senator GILLETTE. Well, you are speaking about a time that may come.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. You are not speaking about the present time.

General WEDEMEYER. Senator Gillette, I think first we should try to get our friends to recognize that a blockade is necessary, sir; reluctantly but at long last they do have an economic blockade now.

Some Americans suggested that a year ago or 6 months ago, but now only recently we have an economic, an embargo as I understand it, on those countries. It is fine, it is constructive. It took a long time to get it.

Maybe the next thing will be a naval blockade, sir, but I still think it ought to be through, if possible, the United Nations or a similar organization.

CHANGE OF MISSION IN KOREA AFTER CROSSING THIRTY-EIGHTH PARALLEL

Senator GILLETTE. Along the same line that you were discussing, I also noted here that you stated that MacArthur's mission should have been changed after he had penetrated farther north, the farthest north——

General WEDEMEYER. Well, sir, a commander in a theater is given a directive which indicates the objectives that he is expected to attain by the employment of the means given him.

Senator GILLETTE. Will you pardon me. I did not finish my question.

General WEDEMEYER. Oh, I am sorry.

Senator GILLETTE. If his mission should have been changed, my question is by whom.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. I am sorry. It should have been changed by the United Nations, and the United States should have informed him, as I understand it, Senator Gillette, as the executive agent of the United Nations, but I think the United Nations again ought to be consulted, and again though, sir. if we can't get agreement and if there is unnecessary delay or say prohibitive delay in accomplishing our objectives out there, then again I say accept calculated risks and go ahead, because I think the American way is the way for free peoples in this world.

I just have confidence in that statement and in that premise.

Senator GILLETTE. Did I understand you correctly this morning to say that the defeat of communism is an objective of the United Nations?

General WEDEMEYER. If I did, I am not qualified to say that sir I think that is our objective, American objective.

NATURE OF COMMUNISM AND UNITED NATIONS IDEALS

Senator GILLETTE. But we are operating as agents of the United Nations, and of course our objective must coincide with theirs, must it not, at the present time?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. And we as a signatory to the United Nations Charter and as a country that ratified it had in mind its second purpose to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. If we subscribe to that, and we have, would it not be inconsistent if we took a position that we did not like the sort of government that a self-determining nation had selected?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I don't believe that there is such a thing as self-determination in any Communist political country that I know about. If you can indicate to me one country that is operating, a Communist nation, under self-determination, you would enlighten me, Senator Gillette. I don't know of any country where the people have an opportunity to express of their free will how and by whom they be governed.

Senator GILLETTE. Well, that, of course, is a conclusion that we would be making as to whether they have or whether they have not.

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir; I don't think so, sir. I think that examination, objective analysis of the way they operate would prove that statement of mine, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. As for instance take——

General WEDEMEYER. I have tried awfully hard to be objective about communism and I have tried to find what in communism has appealed to people in the world and caused it to be a world threat, and

I have always tried to determine what about communism we might adopt in this country in our social structure to improve the lot of the common man, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. I know that I have and I am just as deeply interested as you are, but I am interested above everything else in the success of a cooperative effort among the nations of the world for world peace as I know that you are.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir .

Senator GILLETTE. And when we have an instrumentality set up for that purpose and we are operating under it, I want us to operate under it until it is proved absolutely defective. It it is ineffective, we could abandon it.

Now let me ask my last question. You stated that we should get out of Korea. I think you stated that two or three times. My two questions are:

FEASIBILITY OF EVACUATING OUR TROOPS FROM KOREA

First, is it militarily feasible to evacuate an army of say 250,000 troops in the face of an enemy that is numerically possibly stronger? Is it militarily feasible to evacuate them, and if it is, how and by whose orders could it be effected?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, of course, it can only be done by agreeing with the United Nations again. We are going back to the authority. All authority emanates, I presume, from that body.

It is militarily feasible. The British evacuated a number of people at Dunkirk, under much greater duress than the Chinese Communists could inject into the picture.

Senator GILLETTE. May I interrupt?

That is only 20 miles across the British Channel. This is a matter of evacuating 250,000 troops to the United States, or to some intermediate point.

General WEDEMEYER. They would be evacuated, I presume, to the Japanese Archipelago, sir. It is not very far.

APPEASEMENT OR CONTAINMENT

By my thought, Senator Gillette, as I tried to develop it was: What worries me is that we became involved in all these little areas around the periphery of the Soviet, and that we expanded our manpower and our matériel with still not a solution in the offing, of the problem that presents itself to the world, and to us, as a leader in the world, a leading nation in the world, as the leading nation of free peoples, I should say, in the world, and I am worried for fear we continue to expend tremendous effort and manpower and matériel in these places that are not decisive, they are nondecisive.

Now, that is the only reason I wanted to express that thought.

Senator GILLETTE. Well, I share that conclusion with you a thousand percent.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. I am perturbed, as every thinking man is perturbed, over a policy of containment——

General WEDEMEYER. That is right, containment or appeasement; either one—containment or appeasement.

Senator GILLETTE. Where the enemy within the perimeter is calling the tune.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. You used that expression.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. And can threaten here and there, and bleed us white by sending troops all over the world.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

That is all.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Flanders?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Long?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Brewster?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. The chairman.

WEDEMEYER RECOMMENDATIONS ON EUROPE

General Wedemeyer, this morning Senator Smith was discussing with you your reasons for asking the assignment to the presidio, to the Sixth Army, I believe it is.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. And you stated that as a result of years of study, that you had made a number of policy recommendations and none of them had been agreed to.

I understood you to say that these recommendations applied to the West, as well as to the East.

What, if any, recommendations other than those contained in the so-called Wedemeyer Report, applying to China or Korea, had you made which had not been approved?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, sir, I believe in using any available forces that we can find in the world to stop the spread of communism.

Pretty soon you all will think that communism is a fetish with me. It is not, but at present it is the greatest threat to our way of life.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think we are all concerned about it.

General WEDEMEYER. So, I believe that Spain should have been recognized. It was finally recognized, but it was after I moved out to the presidio.

I think that Franco offers no danger to our way of life, and we can take care of Franco later on, if necessary; but at the moment he might be very valuable to us.

I recommend that we utilize the Western Germans, sir. If we don't arm them, I am fearful lest the Soviet will be arming them and employing them against us, those kinds of ideas, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. To whom did you make those recommendations?

General WEDEMEYER. On numerous occasions, in various conferences within the Department; but I mentioned, Senator Russell, this morning, that there are a lot of intangibles and imponderables involved in strategy, and who am I to say that what I recommended was correct.

And I didn't feel bitter when I left the Department at all. I don't feel bitter now, in taking my leave from active service.

There is no bitterness or rancor in my heart at all, and the military leaders whom you have, they could be so right in their contentions, or their views—I don't question that at all, sir.

OPPOSITION TO RECOMMENDATIONS

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, it so happens that I believe we agree with you in both those policies, as well as closer communion with Turkey and Greece; but I would like to get as to whom you made these recommendations. Did you make them in a formal way or just in discussion?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, sir, I was taken to meetings—I went to meetings of joint nature—that is, Army, Navy, and Air Force representatives—and I would make those statements orally.

When you are in a military regime, you make a statement and then if it isn't agreed to, you try to develop it, try to sell your idea; but if it isn't sold, you mustn't talk too much about it.

I didn't try to make myself disagreeable around the Department. I have many friends there, Senator Russell, whom I admire and have a feeling of affection for; but I tell you I didn't agree with some of their ideas.

I believe in an air force. I am an Army man. I think we should have undisputed control of the air. I have been an Army man all my life. I don't think we are air-minded enough in this country.

Chairman RUSSELL. I was impressed by your statement on that this morning.

Did you meet with any resistance in the military department of the Government over the advisability of a better understanding on the utilization of Spanish troops in the defense of the free world?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir. Actually, I think the Chiefs of Staff always felt that we should use the Spanish troops. Some of my discussions weren't confined to the Department of Defense, sir.

I would be called in on councils over in the State Department, too.

Chairman RUSSELL. Is the same thing true as to the rearming of Germany? Did you meet any resistance in the military branch of the Government there?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. There was opposition there?

General WEDEMEYER. There was no agreement, I will put it that way. My views were not accepted as sound.

Chairman RUSSELL. I mean within the military.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am not speaking as a policy of government now. I mean in the discussions that you say you had with the military officials of government. Were some of them opposed to the arming of Germany?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; at times I would meet with opposition in the military.

Chairman RUSSELL. I have heard some of the Joint Chiefs testify on other occasions—I believe on the arms to Europe bill and one or two of the Joint Chiefs stated it would be highly desirable to have both Spain and Western Germany prepared to meet any outbreak of aggression on the part of Communist Russia.

So evidently you had some support there.

General WEDEMEYER. I did, sir. I tell you Secretary of Defense Forrestal, whom I considered a wonderful public servant, supported all of the views I expressed to you gentlemen today.

He used to call me in and talk to me a great deal, and he supported them.

Chairman RUSSELL. So the feeling of frustration that you had over those recommendations not being applied as an instrument of national policy would have been shared by others in the Government.

General WEDEMEYER. There is no doubt about it, sir, and I tried to reemphasize that. I stated there was no rancor, no bitterness. I was very happy to get out, because my views just weren't accepted. They weren't only my ideas, however.

SOVIET PROPAGANDA IN CHINA ON THE UNITED STATES

Chairman RUSSELL. You stated here that the Communists had very effective propaganda throughout China, attacking this country as being imperialistic and that we were undertaking—I believe I quote you correctly—to subordinate China to our desires.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. And you thought this had a great deal to do with the defection or lack of will to fight of the Nationalist troops. Is that a correct statement?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I believe, sir, that is part of it. The part that really affected the spirit more than anything of the Chinese troops would be repudiating the leaders, impugning the motives of the generalissimo and the leaders, and trying to undermine the confidence of the people, not only in their leaders, but also in their form of government, under which they had suffered, sir, of course, through the tax laws and the land laws, and so forth.

Chairman RUSSELL. You mean that the Americans were undertaking to undermine——

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir; the Soviet, the Red propaganda was directed toward those objectives—namely, of impugning the motives of the Chinese Nationalist leaders, the Kuomintang leaders, undermining confidence of the Chinese people in general.

Chairman RUSSELL. Then you also mentioned American imperialism.

General WEDEMEYER. I said that the Soviet propaganda at Yenan, Soviet-inspired in my judgment, Soviet-coordinated—the Yenan radio called us American imperialists and denounced our contribution to the war effort and played up that the Soviet had actually won the war in the Far East.

As a matter of fact, Senator Russell, there was a picture disseminated in the China theater while I was still out there showing the peace terms being signed on a Soviet battleship instead of the *Missouri*.

The UNRRA aid that was given by Americans predominantly—most of the money for UNRRA came from the American taxpayers—yet the wheat bags or the other commodities that were sent out there, the labels were changed by the Soviet Communist representatives and it was indicated that this was a gratuitous offering from the mother country, the Soviet, the U. S. S. R.

That happened on numerous occasions, sir. I saw them.

Chairman RUSSELL. You said this morning. I believe, and I quote from it:

> Immediately after the war propaganda from Yenan and Moscow repudiated the American objective in the Far East, calling us imperialists, indicating that our purposes were ulterior. That propaganda, by pamphlets and radio, was continuous and vociferous.

You go on to say that you—

> protested to the American Consul General out there about it, and asked him to protest to the Soviet representative. It stopped for a while and then it continued vehemently and with increased action.

That was when you were stating your reasons for the defection of the Chinese Nationalist troops. The thing that confused me—and I must state that I have been confused with regard to our policies in China and the proper course to pursue there—was the fact that if we had sent in a great many American troops, as you recommended, it seemed to me it would have caused them to have stepped up this Communist propaganda and might have made it all the more effective——

General WEDEMEYER. You are so right, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. In causing defection of the Nationalist troops.

IMPORTANCE OF PROPAGANDA AND MORALE

General WEDEMEYER. You are just as right as you can be, unless we stopped being so inept and so inadequate in the field of propaganda.

No matter how strong we are militarily, we can lose this struggle with communism unless we get busy and actually conduct a dynamic, a coordinated, and an extensive propaganda program of psychological warfare.

The French were not defeated militarily in May 1940. They were dispirited. They didn't fight. They were reputed to have, when I was a student at the German War College just before the war, the Germans thought they had the finest ground armies—the finest army in the world, on the Continent of Europe certainly; but look at how quickly in May of 1940—I think in 39 days they ran right through it.

It was because they had been skillfully propagandized by Goebbels and his propaganda machine.

We have to get into the field, sir, and take the initiative away from the Communists and begin to clarify our position and not permit the Communists to tell the world that we are imperialists; but clarify our position in the world—and we don't have to apologize for that position one iota.

Chairman RUSSELL. General——

General WEDEMEYER. I think, Senator Russell, that is important, sir, that that point, that you make there—there is no use sending military aid over there if it isn't understood why it is there and the Chinese people understand why we are sending it there—not to conquer them, but to assist them in throwing off the yoke of a foreign ideology of life.

CHIANG'S ATTITUDE TOWARD COMMUNISM

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you know whether Chiang Kai-shek ever seriously considered recognizing the Communists as a political party within China?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir; I don't. I don't believe he ever accepted that as a feasible move, sir.

There are people better qualified to answer that. General Marshall is much better qualified to answer that than I am, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. I haven't read all of this white paper, I am sorry to say. It is important and well warrants any Senator's reading some parts of it several times.

I wonder if you are familiar with a radio broadcast by President Chiang Kai-shek on July 7, 1947.

General WEDEMEYER. July 7, sir?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. I don't believe I am, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. You were not in China at that time?

General WEDEMEYER. July 7?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir; I left here July 11, 1947, for China.

Chairman RUSSELL. I was interested. I found this last night, where the General was apparently appealing to the people for unity in the radio broadcast, issued by the National Government Information Office, Nanking, July 7, 1947. It quotes him as saying:

> We have never attempted to castigate communism as a theory or ideal. We continued to hope that the Communists might follow the course of democracy, as the Communists in Great Britain and the United States have done for so many years, by appealing to the electorate for support of their platform. We have been consistent for the past 10 years, and even more so in the last year and a half, in our attitude toward the Communists. We have practiced extreme tolerance and we have made substantial compromises and concessions, in the hope that the Communists would refrain from disrupting national unity, carrying on military regional domination, and undermining the foundation of the nation, and that they would contribute their share in national reconstruction. The Government was willing to give full consideration to their opinions. But no peace talk, no mediation, has succeeded in dissuading the Communists from staging a rebellion. We had no way of appealing to their conscience to give up their destructive policy in the interest of the nation and the people.

It appears on page 751 of the white paper. I have been curious and examined all the witnesses here as to who did express the idea that the Comunists could be recognized as a political party in China.

Perhaps this paper doesn't have all of the record on it. You knew nothing about that?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir; but I think it is always interesting to read an entire paper, sir, and there are some other statements that develop that.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

General WEDEMEYER. There is an expression on the part of a political leader, who was in dire straits, appealing for cooperation.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, of course——

General WEDEMEYER. But he goes on here and he certainly indicates the confusion that has been caused by the Communists.

Chairman RUSSELL. Oh, there is no question about that.

General WEDEMEYER. He castigates them there, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. He denounces them in no uncertain terms. He says that they just won a great battle at some place that you could help me by pronouncing, S-z-e-p-i-n-g-k-a-i. It is on page 750.

They had just won a great battle there where the Nationalist forces had defeated 10 times their numbers of Communists in a battle that raged for 18 days and nights. He charges them with being heir to imperialistic Japan and the Manchukuo puppets, but he does say, if I understood him correctly in this paragraph, that he would be willing to accept them as a political party. I could miscontrue that.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I believe he did say that, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. My time has expired.

Senator Connally?

Chairman CONNALLY. How long do you plan on going ahead?

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, we will give you your 15 minutes, Senator, at least.

Chairman CONNALLY. Thank you.

General Wedemeyer, I am sorry I was not here this morning and I may repeat something that you have already answered. If so, why say so and we will not go over it again.

General WEDEMEYER. All right, sir.

REASONS FOR YALTA AGREEMENTS

Chairman CONNALLY. You stated in your report on China that:

> We facilitated the Soviet program in the Far East by agreeing at the Yalta Conference to Russia reentering into Manchuria and later by withholding aid from the Nationalist Government. There were justifiable reasons for these policies.

Do you still adhere to those views?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. You know in making that statement, again I did not have access to all of the private conversations that our President had, and I didn't have access to all of the developments of our international policies, so I couldn't just state categorically, make a categorical statement as I did there, so I had to quality it.

There must have been reasons because I never questioned the intentions of our leaders at all. That is the reason I did that, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, you make the plain statement though.

General WEDEMEYER. That is right, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. You say:

> There were justifiable reasons for these policies.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; there must have been.

Chairman CONNALLY. So far as the concessions made at Yalta are concerned, it is true, is it not, that we believed—hindsight is sometimes better than foresight—that the entry of Russia into the war would help us defeat Japan and save perhaps hundreds of thousands of American lives?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; that is true, Senator Connally, and your military leaders must have advised the President that it was necessary to bring the Russians in in order to save American lives and to bring about an early victory.

The thing that disturbs me right now as an American is the fact that the Japanese were trying so hard, as I understand it, sir—you could check on this information—trying hard to accomplish an armistice.

They wanted to use Moscow people as their intermediaries and they couldn't get any response to their efforts to stop the war, this before I think we dropped the atomic weapons.

Chairman CONNALLY. And we did not know of that at the time either, did we? We had no knowledge of it?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I think we did, sir, because we had means of knowing what the Japanese were striving to do, that is via the radio, and I think that reports were made to our Government to that effect. I believe I read where Admiral Zacharias or some such name made such a statement.

Chairman CONNALLY. Yes; I know. He made a lot of statements.

General WEDEMEYER. I don't know him at all. That worried me.

THE ATOM BOMB AND YALTA CONFERENCE

Chairman CONNALLY. General, at Yalta we had not gotten the bomb at that time; I mean it had not proven itself, had it?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. General Groves before——

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, I know, but we had not used it on Japan.

General WEDEMEYER. Oh, no, sir; it had not been used.

Chairman CONNALLY. We had been experimenting with it over here and we thought it would work, but we did not know it. I see the Senator shaking his head there, Senator McMahon. He knows more about the bomb than I do because he is chairman of the Atomic Energy Committee.

Senator MCMAHON. With unanimous consent I would say the test of the bomb when we knew it would be successful was on July 16, 1945, at Alamagordo, and that was the first test of the bomb.

Chairman CONNALLY. Was that after or before?

Senator MCMAHON. That was 6 months after Yalta.

Chairman CONNALLY. After the war?

Senator MCMAHON. No—after Yalta.

Chairman CONNALLY. Oh; after Yalta.

General WEDEMEYER. Yalta was, as I remember, February.

Senator CONNALLY. That is what I was getting at, that at Yalta we had not developed the bomb to the point where we knew that it would work; and we felt that it was absolutely necessary to get Russia into the war to defeat Japan, and that was the motivating factor, the motive actuating our people, was it not?

General WEDEMEYER. Oh, no doubt about that, sir. I do not question it at all.

Senator MORSE. Senator, I think that the general was about to say something about General Groves that he did not get to finish, some statement about the bomb.

Chairman CONNALLY. All right, go head.

General WEDEMEYER. I thought I read in some paper somewhere where General Groves went to the President and explained just before he went to Yalta they had successfully completed their test. Now, I think that Senator McMahon and Senator Hickenlooper know more about it.

Chairman CONNALLY. I yield to Senator McMahon.

Senator MCMAHON. I would like to say that in October or November of 1945 at the hearings that were held by a special committee that Senator Vandenberg asked General Groves at some length on the rumor that he had heard that General Groves was sure that the bomb was going to explode, some time before it was actually exploded.

Now, I am relying on my recollection, but I think it is accurate when I say that General Groves denied that completely, and I do not believe that he ever made any statement nor did anyone else that the atomic bomb would in their opinion explode. They might have said, "It looks good, we think it may explode."

Chairman CONNALLY. Reverting just a moment to the overtures to Japan—I was not here but I understand Secretary Acheson testified before this committee that this Government had no knowledge about those efforts; I asked you a little while ago about that.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes.

AMERICAN AID TO CHINA AND CHINESE CORRUPTION

Chairman CONNALLY. All right. Now, you stated in your opinion that we should be—

> withholding unqalified support from a government within which corruption and incompetence was so prevalent that it was losing the support of its own people.

Is it your opinion that the aid we gave the Nationalist Government would have been sufficient had there been less corruption and incompetence in the Nationalist Government?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir. No, sir, we would have had to give them increased aid, Senator. They were just demoralized at the war's end. Economically they were just down and out.

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, I have just understood from General Marshall's report here that he had insisted on Chiang getting rid of these corruptionists in his government but that Chiang would not do it because they had been his political allies and friends from the beginning, 20 years or more, and he would not drop them. Do you know about that?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes; he did have a very strong sense of loyalty to these people who had been working with him, Senator, and it was difficult for those of us who were advising him to have him change—make changes.

DEVELOPMENT OF CRITICISM ON YALTA AGREEMENT

Chairman CONNALLY. Is it not true that there was little or no criticism of the Yalta agreement until after the Russians failed to live up to their share of the bargain, General?

Since we did not know they would refuse to cooperate with us later on, was it not essential for us to try to cooperate with them in 1945?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, of course, I cannot say whether there was criticism of the Yalta agreement——

Chairman CONNALLY. All right.

General WEDEMEYER (continuing). Subsequent to the Russians breaking faith, but I do know this, Senator Connally, of my personal knowledge, that I was embarrassed when the American Ambassador reported the terms of the Yalta agreement, Ambassador Hurley, I think in the middle of June, and told Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek the terms of the Yalta agreement, and as an American I, frankly, am embarrassed, as I sat there, because that Chinese all the way through had been honest in his dealings with me, never guilty of duplicity, so far as I could determine, and had cooperated with me, and there was a man being told something that in my judgment, as an American be, he should have been told at the time the terms of the agreement were made, because we were giving away certain very important rights.

Chairman CONNALLY. I notice in your report referring to Yalta you say:

> The United States had not yet realized that the Soviet Union would fail to cooperate in the accomplishment of world-wide plans for postwar rehabilitation.

General WEDEMEYER. I believe that is true, in 1945. There were some of us who did realize it, though, or felt it, sir, even as early as 1941 I was telling Mr. Harry Hopkins and Mr. Averell Harriman exactly that, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. I see. You agree to that, then?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; I agreed with that.

CHINESE COOPERATION DURING WAR

Chairman CONNALLY. Was it your experience that the Nationalist regime cooperated fully with our military mission in China? Did they accept our advice and carry it out?

You referred in your report to the corrupt officials around the generalissimo. Under the circumstances, was he in a position to carry out the necessary reforms regardless of the pressure we put on him?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, the mission—you mean the military mission, the military advisory group, over there?

Chairman CONNALLY. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. The reports that I received from the head of the mission, who was at that time a Major General Lucas, were that the Chinese were cooperating.

Brigadier General Brink, Francis Brink, also reported to me. They were members of the mission, sir. They were cooperating within the limits of their capabilities. They were striving to get us to do more for them, Senator Connally.

They wanted our men to go out into the field and give them advice in the areas of operations against the Communists, do you see, and they were also trying to get us into the logistical field, but there were restrictions in the directive that precluded sending our boys out into the areas of military operations.

Chairman CONNALLY. Were they trying to get us to go into the fighting?

General WEDEMEYER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. They were?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; just like we sent our boys into the fighting in Greece.

Chairman CONNALLY. That is right; they wanted us to go out there and fight.

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir. Well, to give them advice in the areas of operations, military operations, just as we did in Greece, Senator Connally.

Chairman CONNALLY. All right.

INITIATIVE FOR CHINESE COALITION

During these hearings we have heard some criticism of General Marshall's mission to China. Is it not true that the political groups in China themselves decided to form a coalition government and that

General Marshall was sent to help and find ways and means to accomplish the political objectives that had been agreed upon?

Since they wanted it and believed it could be done, don't you think it was right and proper for us to help them?

General WEDEMEYER. Surely.

Chairman CONNALLY. Had not they decided on a constitutional convention or something of that kind?

General WEDEMEYER. They did; yes, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. And wasn't General Marshall trying to work out that plan——

General WEDEMEYER. That is right.

Chairman CONNALLY (continuing). And put it over?

General WEDEMEYER. That is correct, sir; and he was trying to eliminate political armies, Senator Connally.

He tried to amalgamate the armies. I think there were to be 50 Nationalist divisions and 10 Communist divisions; I forget now the proportion.

Chairman CONNALLY. About five to one, was it not?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. I know of your deep interest in the Far East, of course, General Wedemeyer, and we are all interested in a free and independent China. But I want to know whether, in view of our world commitments, and in view of the difficulties involved in continuing hostilities in China, you think we should take any action in connection with Korea which might get us involved in fighting on the mainland of China?

General WEDEMEYER. I do not, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. You do not?

General WEDEMEYER. I do not think that is the place to fight a decisive war. Again, I mention, Senator Connally, that I don't think that American manpower ought to be pitted against the teeming millions of our potential enemies.

Chairman CONNALLY. I think you are right.

ADEQUACY OF UNITED STATES SUPPORT OF CHINESE NATIONALISTS

Mr. Chairman, it is sometimes said that our far-eastern policy was not evolved in a bipartisan way. I say this to some of our friends who have been pretty critical here in their questioning. They have said that the majority party did not have a share in its development.

I would like to say for the record that some 37 meetings of the Committee on Foreign Relations during 1948, 1949, and 1950 were devoted to a discussion of China, Korea, Formosa, and the Far East, in general, producing no less than 1,481 pages of testimony on that subject.

I think I attended all those meetings. I tried to discover whether we had done everything we could to stem the tide of communism in China. I came to the conclusion that we had done everything we could have done to help the Nationalists with the possible exception of sending American troops to the continent. The American people certainly did not want that.

General Wedemeyer, I would like to have your reaction to this problem. Don't you agree that we did about all we could to keep the

Nationalist regime in power with the possible exception of sending our troops into China?

General **Wedemeyer.** No, sir; I do not, sir.

Chairman **Connally.** Well, what did we fail to do?

General **Wedemeyer.** I think that we could have indicated more firmly our determination to support the existing Government of China, Senator Connally.

In other words, I have emphasized in my testimony today the importance of moral aid.

Also I think that we could have given more material aid.

It is not a question of giving nothing or everything, but it is a——

Chairman **Connally.** I made an error a while ago. I referred to the majority party. I meant the minority party had not been consulted and so on. I would like to correct that.

Chairman **Russell.** Senator Connally, your time has expired.

Senator **Morse.** I don't believe the general finished his statement.

Chairman **Russell.** Yes; you may do that, General.

General **Wedemeyer.** Well, I don't remember exactly. I did say we Americans did not give China all the aid that we might have given, even in a proportionate sense, even taking into consideration other global commitments or possible commitments. But the most important thing that worries me over the years is the fact that we seemed to begrudgingly give our assistance, and it is moral aid that is more important, in my judgment, than the material aid, Senator Connally.

I do not think the people of China felt that their traditional friends, the Americans, were supporting Chiang Kai-shek.

Now I promise you—I have repeated this to you before, sir—I am not obligated to Chiang Kai-shek or to any Chinese or to any group over there, but I wanted to help the Chinese people evolve a peaceful solution to the problems, and at the time I was out there in 1947 he seemed to me to be the best vehicle through which we could use our assistance, sir, both moral and material. I feel if we had gone out there with economic advisers and with military advisers and a limited amount of equipment, intelligently used, that we could have stopped the advance of communism in China.

Chairman **Connally.** I am sorry I can't ask you any more questions, General.

General **Wedemeyer.** I am sorry, too, sir.

Chairman **Connally.** I have been absent. I had to be away.

Chairman **Russell.** Senator Bridges?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell.** Senator Byrd?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell.** Senator Saltonstall?

PRESENT CHINESE SITUATION ON MAINLAND AND FORMOSA

Senator **Saltonstall.** General Wedemeyer, I would just like to ask you a few questions to see if I have received your point of view correctly.

First, you consider Chiang Kai-shek our best bet to support at the present time?

General **Wedemeyer.** I think he still is the best vehicle through which we could direct aid out there; yes, sir.

I hear encouraging reports about the Government of Formosa. I hear that it is very good; the people are happy, or happier; and he is gradually evolving a stable government there. I hear good reports from there from objective sources.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Second, you believe that the Nationalists and the Chinese Communists will never work together.

General WEDEMEYER. I don't think communism will permit, that is, the acceptance of the philosophy of Marxism, will permit the people who are exponents, who are adherents, or who are following that theory of government, will permit them to work with capitalistic countries peacefully. They have got to have complete control; they are determined to have all of the controls, in my judgment.

Senator SALTONSTALL. You said several times that Formosa is important, most important to us, and should not be lost, or should not be passed into hostile hands; is that correct?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. The loss of Formosa, an important segment in the littoral along the Asiatic coast, would jeopardize our position in other important segments.

NO FUTURE KOREAS

Senator SALTONSTALL. You said that we cannot let ourselves be drawn into fights on the periphery of the Soviet; in other words, there can't be other Koreas such as the battle that we are fighting in Korea today. Is that a fair statement?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. I am very much concerned lest we are drawn into these various vacua created by this enemy who wants to go through attrition, through attrition, sir, and through psychological defeats too. If we don't liquidate these situations very effectively, naturally we go down in the estimate of other people. We are looked upon as a powerful nation. If we don't liquidate these third-rate powers quickly, then they wonder about our power; or our determination possibly might even be questioned.

Senator SALTONSTALL. You believe that we never should have gone into Korea with ground troops?

General WEDEMEYER. That is correct, sir. Well, that is a question of time. Right after the war it was necessary to send troops right in there. We sent a corps under General Hodge. But I think after the event of June 25——

Senator SALTONSTALL. That is what I meant.

General WEDEMEYER (continuing). 1950, in my judgment we should not have put ground forces in there, and we should have withdrawn American nationals and allied nationals from that area.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you; that is what I understood.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

RECOMMENDED COURSE OF ACTION IN KOREA

Senator SALTONSTALL. You believe that we should now get out of Korea, and if we do get out of Korea, then we should put on an economic and naval blockade on China; second, that we should cease to recognize Russia; and, third, we should build up our own strength. Is that a fair statement of your position?

General WEDEMEYER. That's a very good summary, sir.

I mentioned, and I again would like to mention, that I am not as competent as your military advisers who are right over here in the Pentagon and thoroughly familiar with developments that might influence my judgment. If I had additional information, I might not recommend that we get out of Korea.

But I have tried to establish a philosophy here this afternoon. We must avoid getting into vacua, into places that the enemy wants us to get into, and fight them under terms that are favorable to them. That is all I am trying to say.

Korea is one of those places, and Korea, to me, is not of strategic importance to us. If we do withdraw now, it is a psychological defeat, but to offset that I say withdraw recognition and show these people that we mean business.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, sir, if those are your positions, as I have asked you the questions and you have, I believe, agreed.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

BREAKING OFF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

Senator SALTONSTALL. There are three questions that I would like to ask you as to their effect:

If we break off with Russia, then what of Russia in the United Nations.

General WEDEMEYER. It is really an anomalous position for Russia.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And for us?

General WEDEMEYER. And for us, too; that is correct, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And it would be, well, perhaps no more unfortunate than Russia's position in the United Nations today, but it certainly would not help make the United Nations a working reality.

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir; but may I say in that connection, Senator Saltonstall, I have often been asked about—if the Russians do not go along with some contemplated action and they withdraw. I say let them withdraw. If they are so recalcitrant that they cannot go along with this family of nations in our effort to solve international problems peacefully, then I say let them withdraw, because that is our objective as I understand it, sir.

ALTERNATIVES IN KOREA

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now the second question: If we get out of Korea, would we not then lose everything that we have been fighting for in Korea?

In other words, isn't it too late, now, to get out of Korea?

General WEDEMEYER. That is a very good question, sir.

I don't know what the alternative is. That is what disturbs me, Senator Saltonstall, I just don't know what the alternative is, if we stay in.

I have thought about it a great deal. In other words, my statement wasn't given just off-the-cuff. If we stay in there, we lose a hell of a lot of our boys, and we are filling a bottomless pit, and apparently these people can continue to pour bodies in there, and we are pouring our boys in there and this could go on for an indefinite time.

Psychologically, we are suffering a defeat. With the passage of time, our inability to liquidate that third-rate power is beginning to take a toll against us.

We can stay on, sir; and we could, say, finally stabilize the situation at 38, but then, Senator Saltonstall, what are we going to do? Are we going to stay on 38 with about 200,000 men?

I don't know—it would be interesting to know what each man is costing us to maintain there. When I was in charge of planning, it cost $4,500 a year per man across the board. It has gone up. That was for World War II.

The per capita for maintaining 200,000 men a year in Korea would run into billions of dollars.

It is what the Soviet would like to have happen there. In other words, we have played into their hands, unfortunately.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Just one final question that is tied in, as I see it, with your position on Korea, and the problem there.

SECURITY ELSEWHERE AND NEED FOR ALLIES

You agree, do you not, that the problems of the Far East are tied in with the problems of Europe, so far as our security is concerned?

General WEDEMEYER. Very definitely, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Therefore, in carrying out our commitments in the Far East, we have got to take into consideration, whether we like them or not, the point of view of the English and the French?

General WEDEMEYER. Absolutely, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So that it is more difficult, that makes it more difficult for us to go it alone in the Far East, or to go it alone anywhere in the world, does it not?

General WEDEMEYER. That is right.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And in looking ahead as to our future policies in the Far East, we have got to take into account not only our position with relation to Russia and the use of our manpower on the periphery of Russia, but we have got to take into account our relations in Europe with the English and the French.

General WEDEMEYER. Absolutely, sir, absolutely.

IMPORTANCE OF AN AIR FORCE

Senator SALTONSTALL. And just a final question. You believe as some of the other witnesses have testified, that we should concentrate a greater strength on our Air Force than we are now doing?

General WEDEMEYER. Sentor Saltonstall, I would tell you gentlemen anything you can do to insure that our country has undisputed control of the air would bring us the greatest security that anything you can do. The Navy ought to be directed to protect our sea lanes, and it ought to work on the submarine menace.

The Air Force ought to insure that we have tactical and strategic air controls, undisputed control. I just can't emphasize it too strongly. In my judgment that's it. The Army would just be required to seize, maintain, and control bases from which we can with increasing effectiveness operate these other two services.

In other words, sir, I would not become embroiled in a large landlocked battle in Europe, nor would I visualize again in a future war controlling, as we have controlled the Germans and the Japanese postwar, controlling Russia.

If we do that, we will wreck ourselves economically, so we have got to visualize what our objective must be if we are going to go to war with Russia, and in my judgment it should be this.

We should determine, we should destroy their war-making potential and convince people through propaganda of our friendly intentions in the process. Any other program in my judgment is going to ruin this great land of ours. That is exactly the way I see it.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now in attempting to summarize for my own purposes and my own thinking your point of view, have I omitted anything in this summary of questions to you?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir; you have made a very fair summary of it, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I thank you, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I am very happy to go on if you want to continue further. I did just call up and made an appointment for half past 5, thinking we were going to adjourn but I can ask Mr. Kalijarvi to call my office if you do not want to adjourn now.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator, if you wish we can recess here, but I understood the Senate was still in session, and if a parent body can stay late, it seems to me that the creature of the Senate might carry on for a little while here.

General WEDEMEYER. Could I say something off the record?

(Discussion off the record.)

Chairman RUSSELL. All right, Senator Smith. Senator, if you really prefer, I do not want to inconvenience you.

Senator SMITH. No, that is all right. I have just sent word that I would be a little delayed.

Chairman RUSSELL. You can only be 15 minutes late at best.

Senator SMITH. Yes. General, when I was questioning you this morning, we were considering the four points that General MacArthur made in his speech to the joint session, and also the four points that were discussed by the Joint Chiefs. We covered the subject of economic blockade, and your views on a naval blockade.

Then in answer to someone else, you spoke about bombing bases in Manchuria. That left only one of the famous four points that had not been discussed, and I would like to get your views on that, and that is this:

"TAKING WRAPS OFF CHINESE NATIONALISTS" IN FORMOSA

> Remove the restrictions on operations of the Chinese Nationalist Forces and give logistic support to those forces that will contribute to effective operations against the common enemy.

In other words, take the wraps off Chiang Kai-shek's forces on Formosa and let those people cooperate with the guerrillas in China with the idea of possibly stirring up difficulties there until perhaps a new government is established in China and the Peiping regime is overthrown.

General WEDEMEYER. I understand your question, sir. Again I just say that there may be information that is available in the Pentagon concerning the ability of our Government to support logistically any undertaking on the part of the Chinese Nationalist forces against the mainland of Asia.

In my judgment from the information that I have, the Chinese Nationalist forces in Formosa are not ready to conduct a major or a significant operation against the mainland of Asia.

They could not give succeeding impulse to the effort and it would be wrong for them to prematurely deploy their forces in that area.

I do think they should be encouraged and if there are restrictions on this form of operation they should be removed. I think they should be encouraged to undertake guerrilla action—widespread guerrilla action to preclude the consolidation of the Communist position in Asia—in China.

And I certainly would use Chinese Nationalist forces in Korea if and when they are appropriately trained and equipped and would give a good account of themselves.

Senator SMITH. Then you favor aid to equip and train——

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Those people in Formosa?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. Earlier, Senator Smith, I stated I would use any forces available to me in the world against this Red scourge that jeopardizes our way of life.

Senator SMITH. General MacArthur suggested if we took the wraps off Formosa then on the mainland it would tend to pull off the pressure of the Communist forces in Korea and I take it you approve that.

General WEDEMEYER. I respect General MacArthur's evaluations and if he made that evaluation, I think it must be a sound one. But I do think it would be wrong for us to visualize a large-scale effort on the part of the Chinese Nationalists in Formosa, because I think it would be premature, in my judgment.

Senator SMITH. I understand because of logistics, you said.

General WEDEMEYER. Logistics is very important, Senator, and——

Senator SMITH. Well, now, I do not understand that—this logistics thing.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, logistics—that assures a steady flow of replacements. That is, bodies that are wounded and killed and missing, and so forth—you have got to have a steady flow of replacements coming up and the wounded going back to the rear; and you have got to have a continued flow or movement of munitions and food and oil, if you are utilizing tanks, if your army is mobile—and so logistics involves that very important problem of supplies—supplies of bodies and matériel to give impetus to your advance, or to your military operations.

Senator SMITH. Does that mean that if we took the wraps off the Nationalists on Formosa and gave them the support recommended that we would be in the pressure ourselves?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir, not necessarily; but I do not recommend giving China anything unless it is supervised by Americans.

Senator SMITH. Yes, I think you recommended that before.

General WEDEMEYER. Oh, consistently, sir.

Senator SMITH. You said it before. I would think from what you testified today that there may be some differences in detail but generally speaking you support the over-all picture that General MacArthur presents.

General WEDEMEYER. I think I do, sir; but I do it with some trepidation because I have confidence in the men over in the Pentagon and they have access to information that might change my views if I were to have access to the same information.

But with the information that I have, the answers I have given to the committee I defend and adhere to.

MILITARY OR POLITICAL COALITION IN KOREA

Senator SMITH. The Secretary of State called our attention to a telegram that you sent and signed with two others and was criticized—and which referred to a unified democratic China and to effecting a compromise, and so on; do I understand you correctly that you have favored right along a military fusion of these different forces in China that you were to get together to oppose a common enemy, the Japanese; but you distinguish that from a political coalition which would bring the two forces into one government in China?

Is that the distinction you have been trying to make, that you would favor the military get-together of these different forces?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, Senator Smith, I found the distinction—I mean, the Communist armies and the Nationalist armies were a fait accompli when I took command of the theater.

What I wanted to do was to get the Communists and implement them against the Japanese, coordinate their efforts with the efforts of the 2 or 3 millions I had in the south. The Communists had 400,000 or 500,000 in their forces, and I wanted to integrate them—not necessarily amalgamate the forces.

But I could not accomplish that because the Communists would not cooperate. And I was a friend to them. I was not arousing their suspicion at all, in the political field. I did not participate in any of the political discussions.

Now after living out there with this problem and observing the operations of the Communists and being somewhat of a student of the Communist penetrations and infiltrations in other areas of the world, I had the conviction that these Communists were not part-timers, but that they were dyed-in-the-wool Communists, or at least their leaders were who were inspiring and controlling them; and I just had the conviction that we were wasting our time in hoping we could amalgamate these. And I determined and I was by directive instructed in subsequent instructions to support the Nationalist Government, which was the Kuomintang Government; and I never deviated from that course, sir.

Senator SMITH. Now let me ask you a further question in that connection. I gathered from your testimony you were pretty close to Ambassador Pat Hurley while he was out there and tried working out problems with him.

COMMENTS ON HURLEY'S LETTER OF RESIGNATION, 1945

I want to read something from his letter to the President dated November 26, 1945, at the time he resigned as Ambassador to China. I want to see how far you agree with him on what is mentioned in that letter, which has caused me great concern. He said this, and I quote from page 582 of the white paper. He said:

> I was assigned to China at a time when statesmen were openly predicting the collapse of the National Government of the Republic of China and the disintegration of the Chinese Army. I was directed by President Roosevelt to prevent the collapse of the Government and to keep the Chinese Army in the war. From both a strategical and diplomatic viewpoint the foregoing constituted our chief objective. The next in importance was the directive to harmonize the relations between the Chinese and American Military Establishments and between the American Embassy in Chungking and the Chinese Government.

And a little further in that same paragraph he says:

> While these objectives had the support of the President—

that is, President Roosevelt—

> and the Secretary of State—

that was Secretary Byrnes probably at that time?

General WEDEMEYER. Secretary Byrnes; yes, sir.

Senator SMITH (reading):

> it is no secret that the American policy in China did not have the support of all the career men in the State Department. The professional Foreign Service men sided with the Chinese Communist armed party and the imperialist bloc of nations whose policy it was to keep China divided against herself. Our professional diplomats continuously advised the Communists that my efforts in preventing the collapse of the National Government did not represent the policy of the United States. These same professionals openly advised the Communist armed party to decline unification of the Chinese Communist Army with the National Army unless the Chinese Communists were given control.

And then later on he says he requested the relief of these "career men." Now can you comment on that? Did we have that difficulty in our own set-up there?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, now, when I took command of the theater I had four political advisers. I inherited those men. They were professional State Department men. They all looked like high-caliber men to me—intelligent, very cooperative.

STATE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL IN CHINA

Their names—Mr. John Davies, Mr. John Emerson, Mr. Raymond Ludden, and Mr. Jack Service.

They were men who spoke the language—the Chinese language—and they had been advising my predecessor, General Stilwell, prior to my arrival there, and he had great confidence in them. I learned this indirectly; I did not talk to General Stilwell about them.

They submitted to me memoranda—memoranda based on their observations and their experience as they traveled around in the China area. Invariably those statements which they submitted to me were very critical of the Nationalist Government and they were rather praising of the Communist regime.

As I have stated here repeatedly, my interest was not political, my interest was carrying out what I thought you people wanted me to do over there—to kill Japanese over there, and bring about a coordinated effort in the military; and it was only as time passed that I became more and more involved in political and economic matters because, as Chief of Staff of the Generalissimo, he kept drawing me into these spheres.

But these men I could not say were Pinko, or were Communists, just because they criticized the Nationalist Government or said good things about the Communists in China.

If one visited Yunan, and the Communist area, and compared it to the chaos that existed in other parts of China, where you had this agrarian economy, the farmers, and the farmer-soldiers, it did appeal to the casual observer; unless you went into the motives of these Communist leaders and analyzed the implications of what they were striving to do, you would be more than favorably impressed with the developments in Yunan than the observations you might make in the province I lived in, Szechuan, and the Chungking area; but I have often been asked if those men—if I felt those men were disloyal.

I never have stated that they were. I never questioned the loyalty of my fellow Americans, Senator Smith; I accept them as being loyal to both country and principle.

Is I indicated in my opening statement, I think it is a terrific accusation or allegation to make against a fellow American. It is difficult for a man to live down, too, once it is made indiscriminately.

I did, however, worry about their operations when the Ambassador, who had been most cooperative with me, Mr. Hurley, reported to me that they were sending reports in that he did not see.

I had a very fine working arrangement with Mr. Hurley. I asked him to please never send any communications back to the States pertaining to the military situation that I didn't have an opportunity to comment on.

I didn't want his sending messages back to the President criticizing me, without giving me an opportunity to say something about it; and I said, "Likewise, Ambassador, I will never send any communication back, pertaining to the political or diplomatic or economic situation, without giving you an opportunity to comment on it.

So he rightfully protested to me that these men were sending communications back, side-stepping or circumventing the American Embassy, and I took care of that by sending, from there on out, copies of all communications that they prepared and submitted to me—a copy to the American Embassy; and I did't comment on any of these communications. I didn't think I was qualified to do it; and they went on into the Department and they commented or discussed ideological, political, and economic problems.

When we came home in February of '45, at the request of President Truman, he saw Mr. Stimson, and those—he got authority to transfer those men from my staff over into the American Embassy, so those four political advisers were removed from my staff, and any political or diplomatic advice I received subsequently, I got, as I think I should have, from the American Ambassador.

Does that answer your question?

Senator SMITH. I did want to get an exposition of this statement of Ambassador Hurley's, so that——

Mr. Chairman, has my time expired?

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator Smith.

Senator Johnson?

Senator JOHNSON. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse?

UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS

Senator MORSE. General Wedemeyer, do you agree with me that the real power and force behind the Communist activities of various satellite countries in the world today, such as the Red Chinese and the Red Koreans, is Soviet Russia?

General WEDEMEYER. I am stupid; I don't follow you, sir. Could he read that back?

Senator MORSE. Read my question back.

(The question was read by the reporter.)

General WEDEMEYER. Completely, sir; yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. Do you agree with me that the American people must face the fact that Russia, through these satellite countries, for some years now has supplied those that will hear, see, and think with ample evidence that she does not appear to have peaceful intentions toward the United States?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes; I agree with that statement; yes, sir. I think that is a conclusion that you would reach, I would say, isn't it?

Senator MORSE. Yes, sir; it is a conclusion of mine.

Genral WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; I agree with that conclusion; yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. I might throw in here very quickly that I have said many times for the past several years that I don't think Russia ever has functioned as an ally of the United States——

General WEDEMEYER. I have read statements you made to that effect.

Senator MORSE. But only as a country that found herself during World War II with common enemies, which is a different thing.

General WEDEMEYER. I have read statements made by you to that effect; yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. Now, General, even though Russia manifests these anything-but-peaceful patterns of behavior toward us, are you of the opinion that it is at all possible to avoid a final show-down with Russia?

General WEDEMEYER. I think—I would like to make this—that is an awfully important question that you have posed. It is a very important question, and I would like to make this clear to you, sir: I think we have to have a show-down with them, but it does not necessarily have to involve military force. The shown-down may come ideologically, and I am a great advocate of phychological warfare.

People shy away from that; they don't like the connotation of that word. I don't care what you call it, sir, but all I want the Americans to do is to convince the people of the world of our sincerity of purpose, and we have failed to do that so far.

I have lived abroad a number of years, and I am confident that we have failed to do that so far.

Senator MORSE. Then it is not your opinion that war with Russia is necessarily inevitable?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir; no, sir; not a military war. We are at war right now economically with Russia.

Senator MORSE. I am speaking of——

General WEDEMEYER. Psychologically we are at war with them.

Senator MORSE. I am referring to an all-out——

General WEDEMEYER. Military.

Senator MORSE. Military engagement.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. A mortal fight to the death between the two countries——

General WEDEMEYER. I don't think it is necessary.

Senator MORSE. Until finally one emerges a victor; you do not think that is inevitable?

General WEDEMEYER. Not inevitable; no, sir.

MOBILIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

Senator MORSE. Is it your opinion, General, that even though we follow your thought of strengthening our position and activities in the field of economic and psychological warfare with Russia, that those two media of combat, without full and adequate military defenses on our part, will never be successful in bringing Russia to an honorable settlement of our differences around some peaceful council table?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, Senator Morse, that is also a good question—you are asking damned good ones—in my judgment, we must insure that the dynamo of democracy is protected, the area where freemen still have the opportunity to express themselves and to take actions without fear of the police state or of punishment.

This is the critical area of the world at this particular time, and we have got to defend that area militarily, and I emphasize that air and the naval forces should be designed to do that without any limitations, sir.

I think the Congress should appropirate funds, and insure that we have undisputed control of the air to provide security of this base of operations for free peoples.

Senator, I think, also concurrent with that program, we must step up our psychological-warfare program and our economic aid should be given not as a charity, but we should help other peoples help themselves.

I think, in giving outright charity, you undermine the moral fiber of people. Now, there are some areas of the world where we have given aid, and those people are economically better off today than they were before the war, sir; and yet in my judgment they are not making a commensurate, a proportionate, contribution in the war in Korea, and I am not going to mention any countries by name, but that is just my statement, sir.

Senator MORSE. Permit me to say that I certainly agree with your observation that we must speed up and intensify and extend our psychological- and economic-warfare tactics, but I want to draw for a moment, because I want to be sure that you have made it as clear as you want to make it in the record, on this matter of our military defenses.

I quite agree that we must do those things necessary to have control of the air and of the sea, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff left me with the impression, as far as their testimony in the record is concerned, that they feel, as I do incidentally, that there should be a much faster movement forward on the part of America in building up all our military defenses because at the present time they feel that we are too vulnerable in many phases of our military defenses, and my question is, Is it your opinion that the American people and the Government, including the Congress, must recognize the need for an all-out military and economic mobilization program to strengthen our defenses?

When I say "economic mobilization," I am not raising a question of a political nature. I mean do you agree with me that the world situation is so serious with the Russian pattern obvious to all, that we had better get ourselves as strong as fast as we possibly can in all branches of defenses?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. You made a statement there and you included the views of the JCS, and nothing I have said I think is contrary to their expressed views and your own affirmation. It is a question of emphasis possibly.

I want to insure insofar as I am concerned, Senator Morse, that we do have a powerful Air Force. We can't be powerful in all three categories, but I do accept that we have got to have powerful ground forces too, but the emphasis in my judgment should be put on air, either naval or the Air Force itself.

I don't care what uniform they wear. I just can't emphasize too strongly that view.

Now economically, too, I think we should prepare for an all-out war. We must lead from strength, sir. I don't suggest that we be belligerent in our attitude toward other nations. I mentioned candor, integrity, enlightened firmness and sympathetic understanding in our contacts with other people including the Russians, sir, because I think the Russian people are amenable to our propaganda, if we could reach them. I think they are just as unhappy with their lot as they can be, sir.

Senator MORSE. I think I understand your testimony, but there is one comment that you make that from your standpoint I want to be sure you are given an opportunity to clarify, because I agree with you we must be just as powerful in the air as it is possible to make ourselves.

That is why I not only supported the 70-group air, but joined with the Senator from Massachusetts, Mr. Lodge, in advocating an Air Force much greater than is recommended in the present budget, but if I understood you correctly, you said that you could not be strong on ground forces.

General WEDEMEYER. I did not mean to say that, sir.

Senator MORSE. I assume you mean that we cannot ever hope to be so strong on the offensive that we can land great land armies elsewhere in the world for purposes of occupying large masses of land.

But you do not mean that we should not be just as strong as far as our land forces are concerned to meet our defensive problems and to meet any offensive problem that we may be called upon to meet in connection with the operation of the other segments of our military?

General WEDEMEYER. You have expressed it much better than I did.

NAVAL BLOCKADE AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator MORSE. Now there is one thing in your testimony today that bothers me very much, and I am not so sure if I understand you correctly, you have necessarily done justice to yourself.

Maybe you have meant what I interpreted your remarks to mean, maybe I misinterpreted your remarks, but I am worried about your testimony in regard to the blockade.

I will tell you what my understanding of your testimony is, and then you correct it if correction is needed. My understanding is that you testified in answer to questions put to you by Senator Smith that you favored a United Nations blockade of China, but if you could not get a United Nations blockade of China, then you would serve notice that we would go it alone and that we would blockade with the American Navy alone.

Then I understood you to imply at least that we would have to make clear to our allies what they have to lose if communism takes them over, and I quite agree with you that they will lose everything that free men should want to keep.

But the evidence in this record is, as I understand it, that at least up to the present time if we tried a naval blockade, we would have to go it alone, that we would not have the support of some of our allies, and in my cross-examination of Admiral Sherman I asked him about that and he left me with the impression that if we did it alone we would run almost an inescapable risk of being at war, because our allies would meet our resistance.

Naval blockade means you sink ships if you have to, and I understood his testimony to be that he could not believe but that Great Britain, for example, would specifically react to our sinking a British ship or that the Russians would specifically react to our sinking a Russian ship, and that the carrying out of a unilateral blockade at this time, if we followed your suggestion of going it alone, would make the beginning of another war almost inescapable.

Now that is my understanding of the record, and I speak only for myself.

My question to you, based upon that understanding, is this: If our allies continue to maintain their present opposition to a naval blockade and we followed your suggestion—which, incidentally, was MacArthur's, because in response to a question I put to him he said he would blockade Port Arthur and Dairen—would you nevertheless insist on a blockade even if that ran the danger of resulting in an armed conflict with Great Britain and other countries?

General WEDEMEYER. I would be very hesistant to do it, sir.

Now, I think your best adviser in that premise, field, or area is Admiral Sherman, not General Wedemeyer. But I have been asked, and I just gave my view, Senator Morse.

Let me qualify that. I am not backstepping one iota.

Senator MORSE. We want it clear for the record.

General WEDEMEYER. You do approve of economic blockade, do you not, sir?

ECONOMIC AND NAVAL BLOCKADES

Senator MORSE. Yes, sir; I do. I approve of it, so long as you have asked me the question—I approve of it so far as unilateral action on our part is concerned, which we have the right to do unilaterally. But I submit there is quite a difference between economic blockade by the United States and naval blockade by the United States.

Chairman RUSSELL. You may proceed, General.

General WEDEMEYER. You do approve of economic blockade upon the part of the United Nations?

Senator MORSE. But I think technically we should be talking about embargo.

General WEDEMEYER. All right; embargo; use that term, sir.

Senator MORSE. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. And the objective there, of course, is to preclude the supply of war materials reaching this potential enemy of ours.

Would you approve, however, of the movement of military forces up and down the coast or some warships or something like that to go up there and kill some American boys in the peninsula of Korea?

Senator MORSE. If we could get the United Nations to impose a naval blockade, I would be all for it. But my question to you is: If we are not in that situation, are we going to do it alone?

General WEDEMEYER. You favor the blockade but want to do it through the aegis of the United Nations, their consent, their participation.

Senator MORSE. I think we will have war if we don't.

General WEDEMEYER. I say to you, sir, if we can't get it, with the bulk of forces in Korea Americans, are we still going to let that deter us to do everything we can to conserve American lives in Korea?

Senator MORSE. That raises a vital question.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. If we are fighting a United Nations operation and our allies would not go with us, then I think we would have to decide whether or not we will follow a naval operation which Sherman, I understood, testified without support of our allies would lead to all-out war.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, sir, if any of the action we have discussed today leads to an all-out war, I say we are in an all-out war. I personally don't believe that it would.

I don't agree with those who say that time is playing in our favor. I think it is playing in the Russian favor, in the Soviet favor. I would like to use the term "Soviet" in lieu of Russian because I think the Russian people would be friendly to us if they had the opportunity.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator Morse.

Gentlemen, it is after six o'clock, and I shall announce the committees to consider the list of witnesses.

I was placed on it by action of the committees. I appoint Senators Connally, George, Byrd, Bridges, Saltonstall, and Wiley members of the committees.

The committees will now stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 6:05 p. m. the committees recessed, to reconvene at 10:03 a. m. Tuesday, June 12, 1951.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

TUESDAY, JUNE 12, 1951

Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:03 a. m., in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), Bridges, Saltonstall, Johnson (Tex.), Morse, Kefauver, Knowland, Cain, Stennis, Flanders, George, Smith (N. J.) Green, Hickenlooper, McMahon, Fulbright, Sparkman, Gillette, and Brewster.

Also present: William H. Darden, clerk, Committee on Armed Services; Verne D. Mudge of the committee staff of the Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; and Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman Russell. The committees will be in order.

Senator Green?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Hickenlooper?

(No response.)

Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, a procedural problem?

Chairman Russell. Yes.

Senator Morse. I am perfectly willing, if it meets with the pleasure of the Chair, to postpone until later in the day action on my motion.

Chairman Russell. Senator, it is obviously impossible for us to take a vote on it right at this time. Suppose we postpone that until just before we recess.

Senator Morse. 12:30.

Chairman Russell. Recess for the morning session.

Senator Morse. 12:30. I have also, may I say, at that time a motion I want to submit upon a proposal for investigation of the China and other lobbies.

Chairman Russell. Very well, sir.

Senator McMahon?

Senator McMahon. Good morning, General.

General Wedemeyer. Good morning, sir.

TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER, UNITED STATES ARMY; ACCOMPANIED BY LT. COL. MALCOLM F. GILCHRIST, JR., STAFF OFFICER—Resumed

Senator McMahon. General, on page 131 of the white paper you made certain reports. On November 20, 1945, you stated in reference to taxes——

Senator KNOWLAND. What page?
Senator MCMAHON. Page 131.

WEDEMEYER REPORTS ON CORRUPTION IN CHINA

Senator MCMAHON (continuing):

> I have recommended to the Generalissimo that he should concentrate his efforts upon establishing control in north China and upon the prompt execution of political and official reforms designed to remove the practice of corruption by officials and to eliminate prohibitive taxes.

Now you went back in 1947 on your mission, and after you reported, after you were there you reported back, and I was particularly interested in two comments that you made in your so-called famous Wedemeyer Report—that for the life of me I cannot see why the administration did not release at the time.

I realize that the recommendation that you made for trusteeship in Manchuria in which the Soviet Union would be included was something that the Government did not want to make known at the time; but I don't see why they didn't make the rest of it known because certainly some of the information that you had in there would have been helpful to me when in 1949 we were considering the China aid bill.

We had the testimony, it is true, of General Barr that things were pretty bad over there. I would have been in better shape if I had your report, which, frankly, General, showed that they were beyond belief and they were so crooked as to be without hope of any constructive action.

Now on page 257 of the white paper I find this:

> President Chiang also renewed his request that the general provide him with a list of names of Chinese with large financial holdings abroad, but General Wedemeyer felt that since the names had been given him in strictest confidence, he would have to refuse.

I ask you now to turn to the bottom of page 760 of the white paper under the title "Corruption." By the way I am reading now from the speech that you made before a joint meeting of the state council and all ministers of the National Government, August 22, 1947.

On the bottom of page 760 I find the following:

> One hears reports on all sides concerning corruption among Government officials, high and low, and also throughout the economic life of the country. With spiraling inflation, the pay of Government officials both in civil service and in military service is wholly inadequate. I am sure that persons who are presently practicing dishonest methods would never consider doing so were it not for the fact that they receive insufficient remuneration to meet the bare necessities of life. Many of them are not trying to acquire vast fortunes, but are just trying to provide a standard of living commensurate with their position. On the other hand, certain rich families, some of whom have relatives in high positions of the Government, have been greatly increasing their fortunes. Nepotism is rife and in my investigations I have found that sons, nephews and brothers of Government officials have been put in positions within the Government, sponsored firms, or in private firms to enable them to make huge profits at the expense of their Government and their people.

LIST OF PRIVATE CHINESE FORTUNES IN THE UNITED STATES

I call your attention to this particularly:

> It would be interesting and revealing if you would conduct an investigation into various large banking organizations and other newly created business organiza-

tions, to ascertain how much money has been made by such organizations and to what individuals or groups of individuals the money has been paid.

Now, for lack of time, I go down into the "National assets and resources" section on the same page and quote:

> There are approximately 10 million Chinese citizens living abroad. These Chinese in many instances are financially able to help their country in this time of dire necessity. Also there are many Chinese here in China who have vast sums of money invested abroad. They should be required to make a complete report on their holdings in securities and capital goods.

To which I say amen.

> It has been conservatively estimated in America that they could raise at least 1 billion United States dollars from these sources. China is far from bankrupt in a financial sense or with regard to material resources. China is practically bankrupt in spiritual resources.

Now, General, I refer again to this statement on page 257 wherein "President Chiang also renewed his request that the General"—meaning yourself—"provide him with a list of names of Chinese with large financial holdings abroad," but since you felt that those names had been given you in strictest confidence, you refused.

Now, General, inasmuch as apparently they have got $1 billion in this country and apparently from your discussion they secured it in very questionable and shady ways, I would ask you if you would give
General WEDEMEYER. In my judgment one of the most effective ways of coping with communism on the part of any government is
to this committee a list of these people.
to insure that the people of that government are protected by the organization and the operation of that government.

Now, communism was penetrating and infiltrating into labor organizations and into education in China. I felt that if a large sum of money could be raised by the Chinese themselves—schools built, conditions improved in the country, particularly for the working classes, the laboring classes, that that would do much to impress the people with sincerity of purpose and with determination to give the people an honest rule and opportunities in the economic field.

So, I talked to various Chinese friends and tried to ascertain where the money was. I heard rumors, Senator McMahon, about holdings of various Chinese. I was never able to put my finger on any particular individual. They were always rumors, suggestions that this family and that family had large holdings abroad.

I did get a list of names, of about 10 names as I recall it, while I was out there as theater commander, toward the end of the war—at the end of the war. And my purpose was to give them to the generalissimo and say, "Couldn't you appeal to these people, to their patriotism and get them to do something for their country?"

Senator McMAHON. And did it——

General WEDEMEYER. May I finish, sir?

Senator McMAHON. Yes, sir.

General WEDEMEYER. You asked me to give you that list.

Senator McMAHON. That is right.

General WEDEMEYER. I have not got that list, sir. I turned it over to a Chinese out there. He is now, I think, the Minister of Defense. And when the Generalissimo asked me for the list, because I had got it in the strictest of confidence and because it would have involved fine, loyal Chinese, I refused to give it to him. It was the only time in my association with him when he was quite angry with me, when I refused to violate that confidence.

Now, my purpose, as I stated, was to raise a large sum of money so we could build schools and so we could do things for the laboring classes of people where communism was spreading so rapidly.

In 1947 Idon't believe I even had the list when the Generalissimo asked me for the names.

Senator McMahon. When who asked you, General?

General Wedemeyer. The Generalissimo, sir, when I was having a conference with him there. The Ambassador was present.

Senator McMahon. Is there any official agency or any official of this Government who has that list?

General Wedemeyer. No, sir; but I can tell you this. The United States Treasury must have some information that would be helpful to this committee along that line concerning the holdings of foreigners in this country.

Senator McMahon. I see. How much time have I got? I learned yesterday that 15 minutes goes pretty fast.

General Wedemeyer. I think I talked too long. I will be careful today that I don't do that.

CONDITIONS IN FORMOSA IN 1947

Senator McMahon. General, I was much interested in your report made in 1947 to the Secretary of State, reading now from page 309. During your mission to China you reported on August 17, 1947, to the Secretary of State as follows:

> Our experience in Formosa is most enlightening. The administration of the former governor, Chen Yi, has alienated the people from the Central Government. Many were forced to feel that conditions under autocratic rule were preferable. The Central Government lost a fine opportunity to indicate to the Chinese people and to the world at large its capability to provide honest and efficient administration. They cannot attribute their failure to the activities of the Communists or of dissident elements. The people anticipated sincerely and enthusiastically deliverance from the Japanese yoke. However, Chen Yi and his henchmen ruthlessly, corruptly, and avariciously imposed their regime upon a happy and amenable population. The army conducted themselves as conquerors. Secret police operated freely to intimidate and to facilitate exploitation by Central Government officials.

And then further on:

> They fear that the Central Government contemplates bleeding their island to support the tottering and corrupt Nanking machine and I think their fears well founded.

That, General, was what you believed in 1947 about the situation in Formosa?

General Wedemeyer. Senator McMahon, it was not only what I believed but it was the result of personal observation. I toured the island when I was out there.

Of course one doesn't qualify as an expert in the week that I was there, but I talked to many people of various social strata and officials and talked to Americans, other foreigners there—I mean other nationals—and those were my convictions, yes, sir, at that time.

I should say, sir, that the provisional governor, Chen Yi, who was appointed there, you may recall yesterday that I recommended to the Generalissimo that he not appoint military men to civilian posts.

Senator McMAHON. That is right.

General WEDEMEYER. And he didn't carry out my recommendation. I attribute it partly to that, sir.

NO IMPROVEMENT IN CHINA BETWEEN 1945 AND 1947

Senator McMAHON. In fact, General, no recommendation that you made in 1945 for cleaning up what was for us a terribly unfortunate situation in graft, corruption, and inefficiency and military incompetence, had apparently been treated at all as you recommended in 1945 when you went back in 1947, because as I read the 1947 report, you were even more critical of the situation that you found there with regard to graft, corruption, and incompetence than you were at the end of the war in 1945; isn't that true?

General WEDEMEYER. Completely, sir. I was depressed when I saw the deterioration that had taken place in the period between 1945 and 1947 and that runs throughout my report.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired.

Senator McMAHON. So, General, we leaned on a pretty weak reed, didn't we?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; but I thought still an important reed that we should not desert entirely. I wouldn't say that we should have just given up entirely, Senator McMahon, any more than we gave up some of our allies in Europe when they were down and out.

Senator McMAHON. We didn't to the tune of 2 or 3 billion dollars, General.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired. Senator Kefauver.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland.

LIMITATION ON ACTIVITIES OF UNITED STATES MILITARY MISSION IN CHINA

Senator KNOWLAND. General, when I ended my questioning yesterday, I had asked you about whether or not there had been any directives or instructions that you knew of issued by either the department, then the War Department, or the State Department to the United States military advisory committee or group that later succeeded you in China concerning the use of American officers.

You were discussing the difference between Greece and China. In Greece we had permitted the Van Fleet mission to send their troops down, I think, to battalion level and perhaps lower to help train and give advice to the combat units that were actually combating communism in Greece; whereas, as I understand it from your testimony and from the facts now before this committee, we had prevented or prohibited the United States officers in China in the postwar period from going down to the levels where they were actually in contact with the Communists.

Do you have any personal information, either from your experience in China or when you later came back to the United States, as to specific instructions we had given to our group in China which would have prevented them from going down to battalion levels, as we did with the Van Fleet mission?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; the directive for the China military advisory group should be available to the committee. It is in the Pentagon, a copy of it.

It did prohibit the sending of American officers—air or ground or naval officers—into areas of combat, into disputed areas, areas that were disputed by the Communist and the Nationalist groups.

There is one statement in extenuation; I mean why the decision may have been made. China was an immense area and they had large forces involved, and it may have involved a tremendous number of American officers and noncommissioned officers had we decided that we should send advisers right down to the battalion level, as we did in Greece, which was an infinitely smaller, in scope, operation.

Senator KNOWLAND. Is it your professional judgment that our operations in Greece, to stop the spread of Communism, and to reestablish the authority of the Greek Government would have been successful, had we not furnished advice down to the level where they were actually up against the Communists in that country?

General WEDEMEYER. It is my judgment that if the Greeks had not had this excellent advice, down through the battalion level, they would not have liqudiated the Communists as they did.

I observed personally the fighting there, and saw our boys right with the battalions, advising the Greek commanders what to do, how to use the equipment, the tactics and techniques of the employment of our weapons and equipment which we were making available to them.

And, likewise, during the war, in my experience with the Chinese, they required similar coaching and advice, sir. They welcomed it; and of course while I was theater commander, I had an organization, I had a nucleus, all the way from the highest echelon right down to the regiment. I had a little group of American officers, and they had a radio, each of them, and they communicated with me and kept me informed so that I had a whole net of control over that vast area, and over those several million Chinese troops.

Until I did that, sir, I got very poor results from my efforts to bring about a coordinated and effective effort on the part of the Chinese troops, sir.

They had courage, and they wanted to do it, but they just didn't have the know-how.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I will address a letter to you today asking that the Department of National Defense send over to us a copy of the basic directive to our military mission in China at that time, so that we may compare it with the directives issued to the Van Fleet mission in Greece.

I am going to officially request, under our procedure, that both documents be made available to the committee.

Chairman RUSSELL. The request will be promptly called to the attention of the Defense Establishment.

Senator KNOWLAND. I would like to ask this, General: In addition to the basic directive that went out to our military mission or advisory group in China, were there any other directives that were issued to them, either modifying that original base directive, by extending the authority or by further limiting the authority?

General WEDEMEYER. I don't know the answer to that question, sir. I had no association with the theater after I was relieved in May, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. I understand that, sir, but then you were back here in the Department of Defense or——

General WEDEMEYER. But not until 1947, sir; not until the winter of 1947, so I was away for some time, and I had no knowledge of that.

Senator KNOWLAND. I see.

RECOMMENDATIONS ON UNITED STATES FORCES FOR MANCHURIA AFTER VJ-DAY

Could you give us any background as to whether or not in the period immediately following VJ-day there had been any suggestions from the theater or otherwise that it might be advisable to temporarily hold Manchuria with United States forces until either a UN—you did not use the word "trusteeship"—but guardianship was set up?

General **Wedemeyer**. Yes, sir. I radioed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff immediately after the war, indicating my view that the Chinese National Government would be unable to restore order south of the Great Wall, and concurrently recover and rehabilitate Manchuria.

I was concerned, as I indicated yesterday, with the intentions and the capabilities of the Soviet in that area. My concern was strongly reinforced by Mr. Ed Pauley's report when he went in there to make a survey concerning the economic rehabilitation of the area, for the President.

Senator **Knowland**. Was it, and is it, your viewpoint that Manchuria is pretty much the key to China, and who holds Manchuria holds a considerable—if not a stranglehold, at least a considerable—edge on the control of China?

General **Wedemeyer**. Manchuria has often been referred to as the Ruhr of the Far East. You have got the industry twins there, coal and iron, and then it is very valuable because of the wheat, the soybean, and grazing possibilities.

It is a vast area. Of course, the Japanese exploited Manchuria very well, and there were industries, machine tooling, and an arsenal located near Mukden. The largest open coal mine, open-pit coal mine, in the world is located just north of Mukden.

But to continue with your former question, sir, I did submit to the authorities a request for seven divisions, American divisions, to be made available to me immediately after the war, and I intended to employ them in Manchuria, again to preclude unilateral action on the part of the Soviet in that area until the situation stabilized.

That request was referred to the Commander of the Far East, General MacArthur, and he was uncertain about the attitude of the Japanese.

When he reoccupied—when he occupied their homeland, it turned out that they were docile and cooperative, but he had no way of knowing that at this time, and he required those divisions in his occupation of Japan; and he refused to make them available to me; and there were no other divisions made available.

I visualized, as I stated, placing those divisions up in the north, placing a barrier there so that I would know what was going on and could influence what was going on.

I would have liked to have been able to take over the arms and the equipment of the defeated Japanese forces, instead of having those arms and equipment available to the Communists; at least, I would have taken them over and made them available to the Chinese Central Government, the Government which my Government recognized at the time, and was supporting as far as I knew.

CHINA AND HER ATTITUDE TOWARD YALTA AGREEMENT

Senator KNOWLAND. There has been some impression given here in the past by the Secretary of State that so far as the Yalta agreement was concerned, that the Chinese National Government was not too unhappy about it. That is so contrary to the information which I have received on several visits to China that I would like you, if you have any light you could throw on the subject, to give your reactions and your views on the Chinese reactions when they first learned of the Yalta agreement.

Now, it is true, as I understand historically, that when the United States underwrote and guaranteed that the Chinese would have to deliver on the agreement, that they sent one of their representatives to Moscow to negotiate a Sino-Soviet agreement; but it seems to me that they had very little choice as a result of the wording in the Yalta agreement. Could you throw any light as to what the reactions of the Republic of China were when they first learned of the Yalta agreement which had been negotiated without their knowledge or consent?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. The terms of the Yalta agreement were made known to me prior to their wider dissemination to the American people.

I received information, either at home here or through official communications. I felt badly about it because it wasn't so much the terms that displeased me as it was the fact that I had been working almost 2 years now with this head of the Chinese Republic and, as far as I knew, he had been straightforward with me, and I thought that my country, along with the Soviet and the British, had taken steps that were contrary to promises made at the Cairo conference, namely, Chiang Kai-shek was told there substantially that the sovereignty of China over Manchuria would be recognized and Formosa would be returned to China. I was present at that Cairo conference, and I am correct about that.

I was not present at the subsequent Tehran conference which occurred about 2 weeks later in Iran, when the Generalissimo Stalin came there and met with Churchill and Roosevelt. I did not attend that conference.

But at that conference, and then apparently at Yalta, it was decided that certain special rights would be given to the Soviet in Manchuria.

Dairen would be declared an open port. Port Arthur would be a naval base and half interest in the operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway would be given to the Soviet.

I knew, at least I was confident, that the Chinese knew nothing about it and I was told to say nothing about it. And, of course, I did not.

I mentioned to you gentlemen yesterday that Ambassador Hurley and I had an arrangement. We always talked things over out there. We had good relations. He was most cooperative.

He called me in the middle of June and said, "I have instructions from the President that I must inform Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek relative to the terms of the Yalta agreement, and I would like you to accompany me." I did accompany him. I did not say anything but I sat there and listened.

Now, as I stated, that was in June. I know that the Generalissimo had almost reverence for President Roosevelt. When President

Roosevelt died I never attended a more dignified and more sincere memorial service in my life than the one that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had for our President in Chungking, China.

There was tremendous admiration on his part for our President and, of course, it was fully justified. We helped China; helped to pull China up by the boot straps when they were down and out—it was fully justified. But, it was there and I think it was sincere.

When Ambassador Hurley through an interpreter told the Generalissimo about the Yalta agreement—and of course it at once became apparent to the Generalissimo that these agreements had been made concerning his territory without consultation with either himself or his representatives—it hurt him deeply.

He did not ask a question. He just was silent for about a minute. And then he asked Ambassador Hurley through the interpreter to please repeat that. He could not believe what he heard. He could not believe that what he had heard was accurate, had been correctly stated. And it was repeated to him. And then he just said that he was terribly disappointed, or words to that effect.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator Knowland.

Senator Lodge?

(No response.)

Senator Fulbright?

(No response.)

Senator Tobey?

(No response.)

Senator Sparkman?

COMPARISON OF MILITARY AID TO CHINA AND GREECE

Senator SPARKMAN. General Wedemeyer, if I understood you correctly, you said a few minutes ago that you thought—correct me if I misunderstood, since I may have misunderstood—that we should have used in China the same type of military aid that we used in Greece. Did I correctly understand that?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, now, the line of questioning was drawing a comparison, Senator Sparkman, between the types of military assistance and advice that we gave in Greece and Turkey.

I was not asked explicitly whether we should or should not; and I did go on to point up the implications, sir, of the magnitude of the problem if we elected to give military aid right down to the battalion level. Do you recall that, sir?

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. That would have been a tremendous military force that we would have been putting out and we were at that time, sir, in 1948, exercising rigid economy in the Military Establishment, reducing the Army continuously. And it was not a question of aid; it was really military advice we were talking about, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes; but that advice went down to the battalion level.

General WEDEMEYER. Battalion level in Greece, Senator Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. In the field.

General WEDEMEYER. That is correct; in the operational areas.

Senator SPARKMAN. What is that?

General WEDEMEYER. In the operational areas, where they were fighting.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, now, am I to understand you to say that you think that is the same type of military advice and assistance we should have given the Nationalist Chinese?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, Senator Sparkman, that is the type of aid we gave during the war against the Japanese; and if we felt that this Communist army in China was supported by the Kremlin, and if we were determined to stop the spread of the Kremlin's, or to thwart the Kremlin's objectives in the world, then we would have to consider carefully giving aid of that nature to the Chinese Nationalists.

Senator SPARKMAN. I believe you have testified that you felt that this was under the direction of the Kremlin, did you not, sir?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. The Communist action.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; I think the Chinese Communist movement, Senator Sparkman, was inspired and supported by the Kremlin; yes, sir.

EXTENT TO WHICH UNITED STATES MIGHT HAVE HELPED CHINA

Senator SPARKMAN. I can't quite reconcile that statement with this statement of yours, to be found on page 813 of the China white paper, and I quote:

> The United States would be subject to serious charges if it were to become involved in any way in actual combat against the Chinese Communists. Although advice indicated above does provide advice indirectly to tactical forces, it should be carried on outside operational areas to prevent the criticism that American personnel are actively engaged in fratricidal warfare.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, wouldn't that—weren't you advising there against advice in the operational areas?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; I was. At that time—this is 1947, now—I hoped, and I still hope, that we can avoid the employment of military force in the solution of our international problems. If we could have given advice up to that area, particularly in the logistical field, it is possible that we could have prevented the debacle that developed in 1947.

But it became apparent, Senator Sparkman, as the situation developed, that we would really have to get in, as we did and as I saw them doing in Greece, get right into the area of combat and help these Chinese tactically and explain to them the technique of the arms we were making available to them.

The situation deteriorated very rapidly. I just testified to Senator McMahon I was so depressed when I saw the change from 1945 to 1947 where the Communists were gradually taking over;and I was quite surprised, because at one time the Nationalists had good spirit during the war. Toward the end of the war they were acquiring an esprit and they were fighting quite well. So, I was surprised at the deterioration that I noted.

And I mentioned yesterday, emphasized, it is more a question of morale than it is matériel, and I think if our boys had been around, Senator Sparkman, in the air or on the ground, if they had just seen American support, some of the subordinate leaders, the lower echelons would have been inspired, too, and felt that we were sincere in our determination to help them; and they were refused advice or assistance, except at this very high echelon command.

In my judgment we could have gone down to lower echelons with our advice and possibly later even gone into some of the operational areas to preclude a debacle, a complete defeat. All the time, in my heart and mind, we were determined to stop the advance of communism.

It wasn't a question of Chinese or Russians or north Chinese. To me it was just a question of establishing a situation out there favorable to the accomplishment of our objective, which I always interpreted as stopping the advance of communism. Everything I did out there was actually motivated by that idea.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, I want to say, General Wedemeyer, that I believe that.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think that is right.

General WEDEMEYER. Senator Sparkman, you can find statements that I made where at one time under a certain set of conditions I might suggest that right now we shouldn't put people in the operational area. Maybe we could go just to that area but no further, and then later on we should go further. I just don't want you to feel that I am being inconsistent.

I have tried to be consistent in my attitude toward this problem as well as other problems and strategy throughout my service.

Senator SPARKMAN. I am glad to hear you say that because I think that is one of the things that the American people ought to understand. We have all changed in our viewpoints as conditions have changed.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Haven't we?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; and it is important that we change with changing conditions. I remember at one time I appeared—if I may digress—before the Foreign Relations Committee and Senator Connally said to me:

> But General Wedemeyer, a year ago you said just the opposite from what you just now said.

And I said:

> Yes, Senator Conally, ; I did say just the opposite. A year ago I didn't have the information, the knowledge that I come to you with today. I believe what I am saying to you is correct. A year ago I thought what I said to you was correct.

DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNISM IN CHINA

Senator SPARKMAN. Now in 1945 the conflict was a fratricidal strife just the same as it was in 1947; wasn't it?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; fratricidal. Of course, the derivation of that word would indicate that that was within this little area, and you know now none of us could prove it back in 1945–46. It was conjectural.

Some of us felt that this movement, this Chinese Communist movement in China, was really inspired, supported, sometimes overtly, sometimes surreptitiously, by the Kremlin, but we all know now that that is where this Chinese Communist movement had its genesis and where it is getting its support.

I don't think there is any doubt about that any more. So, it is no longer, sir, a fratricidal war, even though it involves the Chinese Nationalists. Ethnologically, they are the same people, but ideologically they are different people today. Some of them are fanatic in the belief of communism—some of the leaders with whom I have had contact.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, wasn't that true in 1947?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; but not to such a degree.

Senator SPARKMAN. In other words, it has been progressive?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. From 1945 through 1947 and even up to the present time?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. As a matter of fact, back in those early days a lot of people failed to believe that it was Kremlin-inspired; didn't they?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; right in our own country.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes; right in our own country.

Did you ever discuss this matter with Ambassador Hurley; did you know what his feeling was about that?

COORDINATION OF DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY POLICY IN CHINA DURING WAR

General WEDEMEYER. Senator Sparkman, I didn't discuss very much with him.

I told you, when I took command of the theater, I made up my mind to stay out of the political. I thought my predecessor had gotten into difficulty because he had gotten into the political a little bit; and first, when I went over there, I made up my mind to stay out of all those kinds of businesses, and try to get a coordinated military effort under way.

There were allied forces there—some British and some French, around 3,000,000 Chinese troops—and I had around 100,000 American troops, predominantly in the air.

I had to coordinate that force, to make it effective against the Japanese. So, really, my first year out there, I got into the political questions very little.

Gradually, because of my position, I was in a dual role as Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo, and because he seemed to gradually have more faith in me, or something, he would talk to me about these problems. Then I would talk to the American Ambassador about them, sir, because it was in his field of responsibility, not mine, in the diplomatic or in the political, sir; and I did begin to talk to Ambassador Hurley toward the end of the war.

HURLEY ON SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS IN 1945

Senator SPARKMAN. May I call your attention to a speech that was made on the floor of the House by Congressman Mansfield, of Montana, on December 11, 1945, in which he quoted Ambassador Hurley as follows—he refers to him and then he quoted directly, and I will quote Mansfield's words:

> General Hurley, in discussing the Communists in China, stated there might be some among them who looked to Moscow for guidance, but he thought most of them were just reformers, outs, who wanted to be the ins.

> The only difference between Chinese Communists and Oklahoma Republicans, he says, is that the Oklahoma Republicans are not armed.

Then here is another direct quote from Ambassador Hurley. This is a press release by the way. No; it is a news story on General Hurley's Press Club speech, which, as I recall, General Hurley himself placed in the hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee, and I quote:

> NOVEMBER 29, 1945.
>
> Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, who thinks the American people deserve more information about foreign affairs, yesterday told the story of his 1944 conference with Marshal Stalin in the Kremlin. He said the interview convinced him that, in Stalin's opinion, the Chinese Communists were not Communists at all.
>
> The position of both Marshal Stalin and Foreign Commissar Molotov, Hurley said, was that Russia was not supporting the Chinese Communist Party; that she would support the government and leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and that she desired more harmonious relations with China.
>
> General Hurley said that, when he reported all this to the Chinese leaders in Chungking, they could hardly believe it. Then T. V. Soong, China's Foreign Minister, went to Moscow, and in August there was solemnized a 30-year treaty in which Russia agreed to support Chiang Kai-shek's government and agreed further to get out of Manchuria and recognize China's sovereignty there.
>
> "In all justice to Stalin and Molotov," Hurley said, "I must state that not for one moment while I was in China did they ever break their word with me."

Now, he was simply expressing what a lot of people believed at that time; was he not?

General WEDEMEYER. I think so; yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

INTERPRETATION OF TELEGRAM TO JCS OF DECEMBER 7, 1945

And now I want to go back to this December 7, 1945, telegram that you, General MacArthur, and Admiral Spruance sent back.

I appreciate your explanation of it yesterday, General. However, I want to say this: It seems to me that any person reading that telegram and reading the 12 items that you suggested ought to be done, and then reading the thirteenth paragraph as follows:

> It is suggested that United States assistance to China as outlined above be made available as basis for negotiation by the American Ambassador to bring together and effect a compromise between the major opposing groups in order to promote a united democratic China——

It seems to me that any person would be justified in feeling that that meant what to me it sounds like it says, "to bring together * * * the major opposing groups," which you stated to me yesterday were Chiang Kai-shek's following and the Communists under Mao Tse-tung.

Is my time up?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes; your time has expired, but the general can make any statement he wants.

General WEDEMEYER. Senator Sparkman, I am in complete accord with you. I have read that paragraph over several times; and believe me, I agree with just exactly what you said. In my judgment, the average American reading that paragraph would interpret it to mean that General Wedemeyer agreed that a coalition government or some pressure, assistance, should be brought to bear that should be used as a lever to compel the two major political components over there to get together.

But I certainly had prior to that, and subsequent to it, documentary evidence in the Department to prove to you that in my heart and mind I never believed that a coalition government per se could be established there.

I did want peace in China, because in an atmosphere of war it would be impossible to rehabilitate and to restore a stable economy. But I am in complete accord with your interpretation. I have read that paragraph several times, and objectively and honestly I think your interpretation of the way it is stated there is correct.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hunt?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain?

PORTIONS OF WEDEMEYER REPORT ON CHINA WHICH WERE CONSIDERED "EMBARRASSING"

Senator CAIN. General, on page 6243 of the testimony of yesterday I offered the following question to you:

> I wonder if it would be possible for this committee to determine those portions of your report which Mr. Butterworth of the State Department thought might be embarrassing to this Government in order that we can study them and come to our own determination.

Your response:

> General WEDEMEYER. Well, as I recall it, sir, it was that part of my report, and I thought it was very important, pertaining to the establishment of the guardianship in Manchuria and a trusteeship in Korea.

I want, if I can, General Wedemeyer, to identify accurately that portion of your report which covers this question of a proposed guardianship for Manchuria. I think I find it on pages 2 and 3 of the print of your report which was submitted to this committee.

I would like to read the three paragraphs which I think are in question into the record and merely ask your opinion concerning whether or not I have accurately established the points in controversy.

The quote begins:

> The situation in Manchuria has deteriorated to such a degree that prompt action is necessary to prevent that area from becoming a Soviet satellite. The Chinese Communists may soon gain military control of Manchuria and announce the establishment of a government. Outer Mongolia, already a Soviet satellite, may then recognize Manchuria and conclude a "mutual support agreement" with a de facto Manchurian government of the Chinese Communist. In that event, the Soviet Union might accomplish a mutual-support agreement with Communist-dominated Manchuria, because of her current similar agreement with Outer Mongolia. This would create a difficult situation for China, the United States and the United Nations. Ultimately it could lead to a Communist-dominated China.
>
> The United Nations might take immediate action to bring about cessation of hostilities in Manchuria as a prelude to the establishment of a guardianship or trusteeship. The guardianship might consist of China, Soviet Russia, the United States, Great Britain, and France.
>
> This should be attempted promptly and could be initiated only by China. Should one of the nations refuse to participate in Manchuria guardianship, China might then request the General Assembly of the United Nations to establish a trusteeship, under the provisions of the Charter.
>
> Initially China might interpret guardianship or trusteeship as an infringement upon her sovereignty. But the urgency of the matter should encourage a realistic view of the situation. If these steps are not taken by China, Manchuria may be drawn into the Soviet orbit, despite United States aid, and lost, perhaps permanently, to China.

May I ask, General Wedemeyer, if in your opinion these three paragraphs are those to which Mr. Butterworth took exception following your return to this country?

General WEDEMEYER. Senator, I made no effort to check this in the State Department. I am here on temporary duty and I don't have a staff for research and things like that; so I am no better qualified today than I was yesterday to tell you the paragraphs that were extracted from my report, and I just can't testify as to that, sir.

I do state this very emphatically: That in my judgment if this had been done, we would have precluded the disaster that we now are experiencing in that part of the earth—that part of the world.

Senator CAIN. That is to say that had a guardianship——

General WEDEMEYER. Yes.

Senator CAIN. Been created in Manchuria, there is no reason in your mind to believe that American and allied forces would today be involved in a large-scale war in Korea.

General WEDEMEYER. That is correct, sir, and also I don't believe that Manchuria would be a satellite of the Soviet, which I believe Manchuria is today.

AVAILABILITY OF IMPORTANT REPORTS TO CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC

Senator CAIN. May I ask you, General Wedemeyer, what there might be in the three paragraphs I have just read which ought to have embarrassed our Government in 1947.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I just don't understand it. I think Senator McMahon just stated, too, that he doesn't understand why the entire report wasn't published immediately.

But, of course, I had no authority, and I kept quiet. I was told to keep quiet and I did. But I just didn't understand why the entire thing wasn't published and made available to the American people, but if not to the American people, their representatives in Congress.

I realize that there are recommendations made by public officials from time to time that for public security, the reason of security, we can't make available to everyone, but I do feel that Members of Congress, our representatives here in the legislative body, should be informed of everything that is going on in the international world, international sphere; and in the last war I think information was denied to you Members of Congress, information that you should have had, because it pertained to the security and future well-being of their constituents whom they represented.

Senator CAIN. Well, you are merely——

General WEDEMEYER. Excuse me, sir. You must trust these people. There are Members of Congress here, such as Senator Hickenlooper and Senator McMahon, who had the highest category of classification, top-secret, information during the war, and that was never violated. If we cannot trust Members of Congress concerning plans in the international field, then we should change these Members of Congress. But they are our representatives, and they are the people to whom we turn for laws and for appropriate action.

Senator CAIN. If such reports as you submitted in 1947 are not made available to the Congress and to other branches, executive branches concerned, aside from the particular branch that authorized the report, how are the coordinate branches of the Government going to mutually work together for a solution of a problem which affects not just those of us in the Congress or in the executive branch but every man, woman, and child in America?

I listened with deep interest to what Senator McMahon said. The substance of it was that had your report been made available and had been accessible several years ago to him, his conduct as a Senator would have been substantially different than it was, because he was acting without the necessary information being in front of him, General Wedemeyer.

It just seems to me that we have an instance here—and I am not judging nor do I know those who insisted it be kept from us—but we have an example here where some inadequate action was approved and taken by the Congress because they did not have sufficient information on which to reach the soundest possible judgment, sir.

WEDEMEYER ROLE IN STATE DEPARTMENT INFORMATION PAPER OF DECEMBER 23, 1949, ON FORMOSA

General Wedemeyer, in your statement of yesterday on pages 2 and 3 you make some references to the State Department policy-guidance paper, which was issued on, I think, December 23, 1949, and I want to ask you a few questions about that.

On page 3, General Wedemeyer, you said this:

> In the event that Formosa's fall became a fact, I recommended the employment of the Voice of America and any other means which might minimize the effect upon far-eastern peoples—I repeat "minimize." I had no intention that there should be falsification of the military importance of Formosa or of the policy pertaining to that strategic area. Such employment of psychological warfare is standard procedure among all modern nations and in all fields of strategy.

On page 4409 of the hearings, Secretary of State Acheson testified as follows:

> While we were in this condition which I have just described, the Department of the Army, which was represented on the interdepartmental group which coordinated the information policies, suggested to the Department of State, the suggestion coming from General Wedemeyer, who was Assistant Chief of Staff, to Assistant Secretary Allen, who is in charge of our Voice of America, that it might be very important to use the Voice of America and our international techniques to minimize any damage which might occur to us in event of the fall of Formosa.
>
> The State Department said it was grateful for that suggestion and would go to work on the matter.

The State Department, in fact, designed this policy paper, and following the 23d of December 1949 distributed some 456 copies to missions and to State and military establishments not restricted to the Far East but throughout the world.

> In this policy-guidance paper, it said this:
>
> Formosa has no military significance.
>
> (*a*) It is only approximately 100 miles off the China coast.
>
> (*b*) Other potential objects of Communist aggresion are closer to points on the Chinese mainland than to Formosa.
>
> (*c*) China has never been a sea power and the island is of no special strategic advantage to the Chinese Communist armed forces.

This paper had 40 copies of it distributed in South America; 90 copies in Europe; 40 copies in the Far East; 4 copies in Germany; 60 copies in the Near East; and in Africa.

General Wedemeyer, I want you to recall, as best you can, whether or not after having made that suggestion, if you were the one who actually did make it, to Assistant Secretary Allen, you were ever presented with a draft of this document which discusses military strategy, among other things, before the final paper was printed and distributed on the 23d of December 1949?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir, I wasn't; but the attempt may have been made by Allen to contact me.

I left for my new assignment in the Far West the first week of September and, of course, my recommendation was made the latter part of August.

But I checked up in the office that I had left, that is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, and I learned that that memorandum was not coordinated within my office, so that my views were—whether they were embodied or not was not determined by the State Department.

I can assure you and the gentlemen present that if that mmorandum in draft form had been submitted to me, I would never have accepted that as a correct interpretation of my recommendation to minimize the loss of the fall of Formosa, because all military men recognized that Formosa does have strategic significance. It is an important segment of a line of defense along the Asiatic mainland there.

Senator CAIN. And the only conclusion, General Wedemeyer, that anyone could draw, particularly any military man to whom this policy-guidance paper might have been made available, was that the Military Establishment of which he was a part on its higher echelons had changed their policy and their thinking about the strategic importance of Formosa.

Would that be a fair conclusion, that the ordinary man in your Military Establishment would have received from that policy document, sir?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I just really don't feel qualified to tell you—to answer that question, Senator Cain.

Senator CAIN. Let me ask this question, General——

General WEDEMEYER. The paper was not referred to the Department of the Army, so I never heard any reaction to it, sir.

I have just recently seen it, in the last week.

Senator CAIN. I am laboring this question because of our desire to anticipate the future.

How is it possible for the State Department, and I am not criticizing them in this inquiry, but how is it possible for the State Department to discuss with our American representatives all around the world, military considerations, without those considerations and conclusions having first been cleared by the Military Establishment?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, of course, in order to effect proper coordination, the paper should have been referred to the military for comment.

There is no doubt about that.

Senator CAIN. I thank you, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Gillette?

Senator GILLETTE. Mr. Chairman.

General Wedemeyer, I just want to ask you a couple of questions.

STRENGTH OF NATIONALIST CHINA AS AN ALLY

Yesterday Senator Saltonstall propounded a question to you from which I quote:

> * * * Is it your opinion that we should serve our best interests of security and our responsibilities to obtain a more peaceful world by backing the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek as the Government of China?

And your answer is, General, and this is an excerpt:

> In my judgment, today, Chiang Kai-shek, and his government, is the best vehicle to accomplish what we are striving to do.
>
> I still think he is the man yet remaining who we could use, with all his shortcomings.

Do you adhere to that statement, that answer, today?

General **Wedemeyer.** Yes, sir; I do.

Senator **Gillette.** Again I refer you to the fourth proposal that General MacArthur made in his talk to the Congress:

> Removal of restrictions on the forces of the Republic of China on Formosa, with logistical support to contribute to their effective operation against the Chinese mainland.

Do you support that suggestion?

General **Wedemeyer.** I do, Senator Gillette, with the reservation that I repeatedly stated yesterday, sir. I am away from the Department now and I don't know all of the commitments made all over the world.

China is just one part of our global strategy and I never personally want to forget commitments in the Middle East or in Western Europe, and so forth, sir. I don't know about our ability therefore to give realistic logistic support as visualized by General MacArthur.

Senator **Gillette.** Well, the main purpose of course of my inquiry is this. Do you consider that the Chiang Kai-shek regime is of sufficient reliability to place them in a position of an ally for the forwarding of our interests in that area?

General **Wedemeyer.** Senator Gillette, I do, sir. We are more or less supporting a man named Tito who is an avowed Communist and opponent to everything that you and I stand for in life, but I would use anyone with all of the shortcomings that have been enumerated here, I still would use this man if he appears to be the leader to whom we can turn to get a modicum of assistance.

I don't know of any other leader, Senator Gillette, to whom we can turn in that area at this time. Someone may emerge, and if he did, I promise you if I know about it I would recommend his name to you, but at this time I don't know of any leader to whom we can turn in that area, and we must do something in the area, something constructive now.

EARLY CHINESE ADMINISTRATION OF FORMOSA

Senator Gillette, I hear awfully good reports, very good reports from objective observers concerning the progress that he is making in Formosa with reference to cleaning up the Government, land reforms and so forth, only the past 12-month period.

Senator **Gillette.** Well, in that connection, General, I will quote from your report of August 17, 1947 to the Secretary of State:

> Our experience in Formosa is most enlightening. The administration of the former Governor Chen Yi has alienated the people from the Central Government. Many were forced to feel that conditions under autocratic rule were preferable. The Central Government lost a fine opportunity to indicate to the Chinese people and to the world at large its capability to provide honest and efficient administration. They cannot attribute their failure to the activities of the Communists or of dissident elements. The people anticipated sincerely and enthusiastically deliverance from the Japanese yoke. However, Chen Yi and his henchmen ruthlessy, corruptly, and avariciously imposed their regime

upon a happy and amenable population. The Army conducted themselves as conquerors. Secret police operated freely to intimidate and to facilitate exploitation by Central Government officials.

They fear that the Central Government contemplates bleeding their island to support the tottering and corrupt Nanking machine and I think their fears well founded.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. Senator Gillette, I commented on that a little earlier, sir. I recommended to the generalissimo that he not appoint these generals, these Chinese generals to civilian posts after the war was over as provincial governors, as "shen" magistrates. A "shen" is the district magistrate, and as mayor, sir.

The generalissimo did not accept my recommendation. Chen Yi was a governor of the province of Fukien. Fukien is just opposite Formosa, sir, that province in China just opposite Formosa, and I read a great deal about all these characters and tried to determine as much as I could about their ability as well as about their character, and gave straightforward recommendations to my chief, the generalissimo.

One day this little Chinese general came to me and said, "I am reporting for instructions, General"; and I was astounded, and he said, "I have been appointed Governor of Formosa."

And, sir, I was terribly disappointed, but I sat there and I tried to enumerate just off the cuff quickly, because it was a surprise to me, the things that I thought he should do at once, and the one thing I emphasized was integrity and insure that everything he did was marked with integrity.

And I said: "This will be followed up with written instructions because you have caught me here by surprise, General Chen Yi."

He had a Japanese wife which may have caused the Generalissimo to think in some ways he would be adaptable to this situation because there were a lot of Japs over there. Formosa had been under the control of Japan for a long time.

Anyway, he went over there, sir, and I was proven correct. His administration was very poor. It was rotten, and ruthless in his attitude toward the people.

Then there was another man appointed, a weak character. I don't recall his name. This chap was a civilian, but he didn't do very well either.

Then the next man happened to be a soldier and he has done awfully well, very well, and now they have got a real man. His name is K. C. Wu. He is American educated, went to Oberlin College, and the man has character, he is honest and he is efficient, and you are getting a good government there, sir.

Senator SMITH. May I interrupt to say he got a master's degree and a Ph. D. from Princeton University.

General WEDEMEYER. I didn't know that, sir, but I have the utmost respect and admiration for K. C. Wu, who is presently the Governor of Formosa, and he is anti-Communist, he is not emotional. He is objective and he is intelligent.

Senator GILLETTE. General Wedemeyer, that brings my final question.

General WEDEMEYER. All right, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. Now, for my final question. I recognize, as in your colloquy with Senator Sparkman, that conditions alter one's viewpoint.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

VALUE OF CHINESE NATIONALS AS ALLIES

Senator GILLETTE. That goes without saying. But in the light of what you have said, in the light of your experience that you have had, what is your opinion of the reliability that can be placed on that regime, can sufficient reliability be placed upon it to justify us in associating them with us in an enterprise on which we would use that—on the mainland of China and support them as a military force and depend on their loyalty and their cooperation? Is there sufficient justification for that endorsement of them?

General WEDEMEYER. There is more, in my judgment, Senator Gillette, more justification than there is in the projected support of Tito of Yugoslavia, much more, because these men are avowed opponents of communism. Tito has indicated his determination to adhere to the Marxist theory, but he has just had his own internal little family quarrel with Stalin.

Now, sir, every bit of advice or assistance that I have ever recommended, vis-à-vis China—I have always mentioned, Senator, and you will remember if you read the report that I wrote—American supervision. American supervision. It runs as a thread all through, sir—because I want to insure that you and the people whom you represent in this fine body are sure that their money is being expended for the purposes which they intended, and that they are doing what we had hoped they would do.

Senator GILLETTE. Knowing your record in the past, I have absolute confidence in you. But the confidence you just expressed in the Chiang regime as compared to Tito's is comparative rather than absolute.

General WEDEMEYER. I accept that sir, yes, sir. I am not arbitrary about any statement I make, Senator Gillette.

Senator GILLETTE. Thank you. I think that is all.

UNITED NATIONS OBJECTIVES IN KOREA

General WEDEMEYER. Senator Gillette, yesterday you raised the point, sir—if you still have some time left—about our objective in Korea. I do not know whether it is appropriate for me, Mr. Chairman, to bring it up, but I told you there was some question in my mind as to what we were striving to do; and I picked up a paper that I would have read—the point being that I thought the American and the United Nations motive or objective in Korea was to give these people in all Korea an opportunity to determine how and by whom they would be governed. Now, I did not read that——

Senator GILLETTE. That is right, because the time was lacking yesterday for full answer.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. Now, I would like——

Senator GILLETTE. Mr. Chairman, if I still have some time, I should request——

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I will say that whether you have the time or not, if the witness desires to comment on it, he may do so, on these committees' time.

General WEDEMEYER. What I would like to do, Senator Russell, is just introduce this paper into the evidence and let Senator Gillette read it, if he would like to, and then later on question me about it. But I think it points up definitely the fact that the General Assembly in the United Nations had the same view that I expressed to you yesterday, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. All right.

Chairman RUSSELL. If I am not mistaken, this paper has already been offered for the record.

General WEDEMEYER. I didn't know that, because Senator Gillette didn't know that. I am sorry, I didn't know that, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. I shall check upon that, and if it is already in the record, we won't put it in again.

Senator KNOWLAND. Could we have, for the benefit of the rest of us, the identification? Is that the resolution of October 7, 1950, passed by the United Nations?

Chairman RUSSELL. That is right.

Senator GILLETTE. General Assembly?

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes.

Senator GILLETTE. I don't know if it is in the record, but I shall be glad to have it in the record if it is not.

Chairman RUSSELL. I shall check and see if it is already in the record, and notify you.

Senator GILLETTE. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. I might say, gentlemen—and this is a good good place to call it to your attention—a very able young lieutenant in the Marine Corps, Lieutenant Smith, is one of Admiral Davis' assistants.

He has compiled an outline on somewhat an hour by hour basis of the separate pages of the testimony and what subject is dealt with on those pages. I believe that this compilation would be very helpful to all the members of the committee, and copies are available on the committee table here in case members desire to have them.

I think the lieutenant has done a very good job in this compilation. Senator Stennis.

Senator STENNIS. General Wedemeyer, it seems to me this is a very important point, about the possible future use of these Chinese Nationalist troops on Formosa. You are certainly qualified to speak on that.

POSSIBLE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR NATIONALIST OPERATIONS AGAINST MAINLAND

General MacArthur in his fourth recommendation here in his speech to the Congress made this specific recommendation:

> Fourth. Removal of restrictions on the forces of the Republic of China on Formosa, with logistical support to contribute to their effective operations against the Chinese mainland.

Now, General MacArthur and General Marshall and General Bradley and all the rest of you have advised strongly against troops on the mainland of China—I mean our troops.

I never have been able to understand how you could give this logistical support in carrying these troops from Formosa for operations against the Chinese mainland. I just haven't been able to comprehend that support and that landing without involving our men on the Chinese mainland.

Now, I would appreciate your comment on that, because I feel it would be worthwhile.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. It would be difficult, Senator; you could do this though: You could provide the shipping, let it be manned by Chinese Nationalists. You could provide the munitions.

Senator STENNIS. You mean our ships be manned by Chinese?

General WEDEMEYER. That is correct, the LST's, the landing craft that permit amphibious operations. You could provide munitions, you could provide canned rations, field rations, that men use in combat.

It is the supply of food, ammunition, flowing to the front. Then I mentioned yesterday the steady flow of personnel going up to replace those who are being evacuated or killed. That is logistics. That is all it is.

It is a complex term, but it is simply an army travels on its stomach, and the men have to have food for their guns and that is all it is.

Senator STENNIS. So this recommendation means then that we would just supply the vessels or the bottoms.

General WEDEMEYER. I am not qualified to state what that recommendation of General MacArthur means, sir, and I stated myself earlier this morning that I would have to know what our commitments are all over the world.

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. And make an evaluation here and determine whether or not we could spare, how many ships we could spare, what types of ships we could spare, if any at all.

Senator STENNIS. I understand.

General WEDEMEYER. Yesterday, sir, I emphasized that in my judgment we Americans shouldn't fight large scale operations in China. That is not a critical, decisive, strategic area insofar as I am concerned.

I don't know, I am not qualified to state, whether the Chinese Nationalist forces on Formosa have the capability of conducting successful operations on the mainland.

Senator STENNIS. I understand that, but assuming that they do, the question in my mind is, How far are we going in helping to put them on the mainland?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator STENNIS. That is, without putting our soldiers there with them. That is the thing that is before the public's mind. I said something on the floor of the Senate once, that I thought something ought to be done along that line, but I admit now it is much more involved a matter than I realized then.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. I am not qualified to answer you, sir, not nearly as well qualified.

Senator STENNIS. Just on this question of logistical support, that merely means furnishing the ships to use in transportation, the Formosans were going to man the ships, and we would merely furnish the supplies and medical supplies and food and ammunition and furnish the ships for them to go over and not take any part further; is that your idea of it?

General **Wedemeyer.** That is my presumption, sir. I haven't discussed any of these matters with General MacArthur, who made the recommendation.

Senator **Stennis.** But if we did anything more than what I have outlined it certainly would involve us in fighting on the mainland, would it not?

General **Wedemeyer.** Yes, sir.

Senator **Stennis.** That is, if we sent our ships in there with our sailors and marines or supported them with our soldiers, or tried to land the supplies there ourselves, that would certainly be going into the mainland?

General **Wedemeyer.** Yes, sir.

Senator **Stennis.** And involve us?

General **Wedemeyer.** Yes, sir.

Senator **Stennis.** Thank you very much.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Russell.** Senator Brewster?

CHINESE REACTION TO YALTA AGREEMENT

Senator **Brewster.** I do not know to what extent you had completed your discussion of what I think you expressed as the deep shock, surprise, and disturbance of the generalissimo when Ambassador Hurley informed him of the Yalta agreement. You were answering that, I think, at the conclusion of your interrogation.

There is no question as to how deeply he was disturbed over the revelation that Chinese territory had been disposed of without his knowledge or approval in that Yalta agreement?

General **Wedemeyer.** I felt that he was chagrined and disappointed, and also shocked.

I said nothing, sir. And if my recollection is correct, I left shortly thereafter and did not join in any discussion. I think the Ambassador stayed.

Senator **Brewster.** About what time was that?

General **Wedemeyer.** It was June 15, if my memory serves me correctly; the middle of June.

Senator **Brewster.** 19——

General **Wedemeyer.** June, 15, sir, 19——

Senator **Brewster.** 1945?

General **Wedemeyer.** 1945.

Senator **Brewster.** That was some 5 months after the Yalta agreement in February 1945?

General **Wedemeyer.** Yes, sir.

Senator **Brewster.** And did you have occasion thereafter to discuss the situation with the generalissimo about that agreement?

General **Wedemeyer.** No, sir.

Senator **Brewster.** And were you familiar with the actions which were later taken to implement that understanding by the Chinese when they went to Moscow? Did that come within your purview at all?

General **Wedemeyer.** Only this way, sir: Dr. T. V. Soong came to see me because the generalissimo had ordered him to go to Moscow to discuss the formulation of a Sino-Soviet agreement based upon the Yalta agreement. And he expressed great concern.

Actually T. V. Soong told me he would not sign such an agreement, and he didn't. Wang Shih-chieh, I believe, did. I believe he was Foreign Minister or Deputy Foreign Minister, who signed the Sino-Soviet Pact. I believe I am correct about that, but I am not absolutely certain.

Senator BREWSTER. I think you are right.

General WEDEMEYER. But T. V. Soong stated he would not sign any paper ceding territory whose sovereignty had been recognized.

Senator BREWSTER. Then there is no question in your mind that not only the generalissimo but his advisers in the Government all recognized the tragic consequence of the cession of this territory in Manchuria?

General WEDEMEYER. I couldn't use the term "all," sir, because those are the only personalities that I know about right there—Chiang Kai-shek and T. V. Soong. And I know—I am quite confident that Wang Shih-chieh signed the agreement.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. Although T. V. Soong was sent as China's representative, and normally one would expect the senior man to sign the agreement. He refused to do so.

Senator BREWSTER. Although he did participate in the negotiations?

General WEDEMEYER. That is hearsay on my part, but I believe he did.

Senator BREWSTER. Would you think then that any attempt to say that the Chinese Nationalist Government embraced the agreement for the cessions in Manchuria with any enthusiasm was quite erroneous?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, that is just the antithesis of my own experience with Chinese officials of the highest rank.

Senator BREWSTER. You know of no evidence to indicate that any Chinese officials welcomed this cession of Manchurian territory, is that correct?

General WEDEMEYER. No; that is correct. I can say categorically that is correct.

Senator BREWSTER. As far as your knowledge is concerned they bitterly resented and regretted it?

General WEDEMEYER. As far as I know, that is correct.

JAPANESE SURRENDER OVERTURES DURING WAR

Senator BREWSTER. Did there come to your attention in your activities in the Chinese theater any indications as to the Japanese attitude toward surrender after, let us say, the middle of 1944? There were various rumors——

General WEDEMEYER. I personally saw overtures proffered by the Japanese for surrender submitted to the Chinese Government. The generalissimo showed them to me. I saw two on two different occasions, and the terms of the surrender were very favorable to the Chinese Nationalist Government; and the Generalissimo stated to me that he was going to fight alongside his traditional friends, the Americans, to the end. That is all he said. He didn't comment any further, and he didn't ask me for any comment.

Senator BREWSTER. About what period were those, as far as you can recall?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, the first one, sir, was shortly after I took command of the theater, right after New Year's.

Senator BREWSTER. 1944?

General WEDEMEYER. It was the winter of 1944–45, sir; and we were getting pushed around very badly, and I was really worried as to whether or not I was going to be able to stay in China.

The Japanese were pushing us around very badly, and I even evacuated women from Chungking because I learned that there was going to be a parachute drop in the capital by the Japanese, and I knew it would be a very bad situation, so I evacuated all my nurses, and I had a few Wacs there, to Kunming, from which area I could more easily evacuate them. Everything had to be done by air.

It was right after that that I saw the note. The generalissimo showed me a note, and then about June or May, maybe, a few months later, I saw a note.

INTEGRITY OF CHIANG KAI-SHEK

Now, when you say to me—I would just say, frankly, it is possible these notes may have been planted to impress me; I accept that, knowing the oriental philosophy and cunning. But, honestly, in my contacts with this man for 2 years, he found me to be right on top of the desk and he seemed to be responsive to that kind of treatment.

I was never discourteous, but I was often very firm with him, and I don't believe that he was guilty of chicanery. It may have been. I don't believe that he was.

Senator BREWSTER. Is his reputation not to the contrary even among many of his most severe critics that Chiang, Generalissimo Chiang, is himself an honest man?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, he is a better Christian than a lot of Americans that I know. He worships every day, every morning. He has a period of silence, and he goes and reads the Bible.

He has had it translated into Chinese; he does not speak English or read English.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, you had very intimate and constant contact with him over a considerable period so that you——

General WEDEMEYER. Perhaps, more than any other occidental in the world for 2 years.

Senator BREWSTER (continuing). Had as good an opportunity as any American certainly ever had to form an impression of his character as well as his capacity; and you had no question, as I understand it, as to his integrity of purpose in all of your experience?

General WEDEMEYER. That is correct, sir. I trusted him, and I feel that he was sincere in his desire to really help his people.

There was a period 1927–37—those dates are important, 1927–37—known in China as the golden decade, and it was that period that Chiang Kai-shek was in control; and the same group of men whose unscrupulousness and maladministration that Wedemeyer and others have emphasized subsequently—it was during that period that China enjoyed improved communications, a stabilized economy, and even objective foreigners, Americans who lived there for years, will tell you that Chiang Kai-shek was building schools and helping his people during that period.

Now, you recall the Marco Polo incident. The Japanese are supposed to have attacked the Chinese because they saw that China would be unified and consolidated, and that a nationalist feeling was growing, being generated by, or under Chiang Kai-shek's leadership, and that is the reason they precipitated their attack because they were afraid China would become too integrated and too strong and it would disrupt their idea of an Asia coprosperity plan for the Japanese, that they had always wanted to accomplish, and a strong China would have denied that opportunity to them.

Senator BREWSTER. Are you familiar with the book that he has written on the future of China, as he envisages it?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; I have read that, and many others on that subject.

I have just read an excellent book written by Freda Utley, called the China Story, which is excellent, in my judgment, a very objective résumé of the situation out there, and I would commend it to any of the Senators to read.

Senator BREWSTER. Do you consider that a fair and accurate portrayal of the problem?

General WEDEMEYER. In my limited knowledge of all the data she has got there, I don't retain figures in my mind, Senator Brewster, but I think she has given us a very good portrayal of the situation out there now.

CONSEQUENCES OF UNITED STATES EMBARGO, AUGUST 1946 TO MAY 1947

Senator BREWSTER. Now, one of the matters which was developed in that book was developed elsewhere, is this question of the aid to China, and the consequences of the embargo from August 1946 to May 1947; and then the subsequent difficulties in the supply of ammunition.

Were the shortages of ammunition one of the very critical problems for the National Government?

General WEDEMEYER. They were, sir; but I never would fail to emphasize, in making a statement, or a reply, that it is the moral rather than the material aid that is important to an army, the spirit of the army.

Senator BREWSTER. I think that is very interesting; and you have, I think, in all of your reports and everything, emphasized that—that it was the failure of our moral support of what proved to be the only side that we could use to do business with, that greatly weakened them.

SUPPLIES FLOWING TO CHINESE COMMUNISTS

But, there was a material aspect, also; during the 10 months that we embargoed, under General Marshall's direction, the shipment of arms and ammunition to China—did the Communists also pursue a similar embargo of arms and ammunition to the Chinese Communists?

General WEDEMEYER. Any reply that I would give you would be hearsay, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, I realize that.

General WEDEMEYER. I have heard that supplies were continuously flowing into the area from the Russians—from the Soviet. I would like to stop using the term "Russians" because I think the Russian people would be friends to us.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. From the Soviet is what I mean.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. Many of the plants—the machine tools and the arsenal equipment in Mukden and in Manchuria—many of those were dismantled and removed, I presume to the maritime provinces of the Soviet. If you read the report, that would be strongly confirmed. And then they continued to manufacture Japanese equipment; that is, with the Japanese dies, and send it back, and one would say, "Well, but the Soviet did not supply those arms; that is Japanese equipment that was taken from the Japanese prisoners."

And considering how quickly equipment wears out in combat and particularly considering the maintenance that the Chinese give, from my experience—well, I am confident that many of the Japanese-marked arms that we captured or had evidence of, were pouring back into there from the maritime provinces.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, were not there very vast stores of Japanese equipment already in Manchuria?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir, reputedly so. I did not see it with my own eyes. I saw thousands of rifles when I was in Harbin and Mukden and those areas. But when you say "vast stores," I do not know how vast you mean. Now, sir, I am not qualified to state that there were; but it is reasonable to assume there were. And there was a large army of Japanese there prepared to fight and oppose the entrance of the Soviet in the war.

Senator BREWSTER. So it is almost inevitable to conclude that the Japanese would have had very considerable provision against such eventuality.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; it is reasonable to assume that.

Senator BREWSTER. And also it is reasonable to assume that the Russians or rather the Soviet took that over when they accepted the surrender. Now, as far as you know, to your knowledge, there was no attempt to embargo or restrain the transfer of those to the Chinese Communist forces during the 10 months' period when you were unable to deliver——

General WEDEMEYER. The first order published by SCAP, that is the Supreme Allied Command—General MacArthur—the very first order, No. 1, was that all arms and equipment taken from the defeated enemy would be turned over to the Chinese Nationalist Government, and the Soviet representatives in Manchuria received a similar order because SCAP was designated to settle these arrangements, the arrangements in the surrender terms.

I did, so far as I could—the equipment I took away from the Japanese prisoners I turned over to the Chinese Nationalist Government.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator.

Senator Flanders?

Senator FLANDERS. General, I had to be away yesterday——

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator, pardon me for one statement.

UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION, OCTOBER 7, 1950

Examination of Lieutenant Smith's brief discloses that this resolution of the General Assembly of October 7, 1950, has been discussed several times in the course of the hearings but has not been printed in the record. It is rather short, so we will have it printed in the record at this point.

(The document referred to is as follows:)

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
October 7, 1950.

Fifth session, agenda item 24.

THE PROBLEM OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF KOREA

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its Two hundred and ninety-fourth plenary meeting on October 7, 1950 (adopted on the report of the First Committee (A/1422))

The General Assembly, having regard to its resolutions of November 14, 1947 (112 (II)), of December 12, 1948 (195 (III)), and of October 21, 1949 (293 (IV)),

Having received and considered the report of the United Nations Commission on Korea,

Mindful of the fact that the objectives set forth in the resolutions referred to above have not been fully accomplished and, in particular, that the unification of Korea has not yet been achieved, and that an attempt has been by an armed attack from North Korea to extinguish by force the Government of the Republic of Korea,

Recalling the General Assembly declaration of December 12, 1948, that there has been established a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of Korea reside; that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea,

Having in mind that United Nations armed forces are at present operating in Korea in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council of June 27, 1950, subsequent to its resolution of June 25, 1950, that members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area,

Recalling that the essential objective of the resolutions of the General Assembly referred to above was the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic government of Korea,

1. Recommends that—

(*a*) All appropriate steps be taken to insure conditions of stability throughout Korea;

(*b*) All constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections, under the auspices of the United Nations, for the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic government in the sovereign state of Korea;

(*c*) All sections and representative bodies of the population of Korea, South and North, be invited to cooperate with the organs of the United Nations in the restoration of peace, in the holding of elections, and in the establishment of a unified government;

(*d*) United Nations forces should not remain in any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the objectives specified in subparagraphs (*a*) and (*b*) above;

(*e*) All necessary measures be taken to accomplish the economic rehabilitation of Korea;

2. Resolves that—

(*a*) A Commission consisting of Australia, Chile, Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey, to be known as the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, be established to (i) assume the functions hitherto exercised by the present United Nations Commission in Korea; (ii) represent the United Nations in bringing about the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government of all Korea; (iii) exercise such responsibilities in connection with relief and rehabilitation in Korea as may be determined by the General Assembly after receiving the recommendations of the Economic and Social Council. The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea should proceed to Korea and begin to carry out its functions as soon as possible;

(*b*) Pending the arrival in Korea of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, the governments of the states represented on the Commission should form an interim committee composed of representatives meeting at the seat of the United Nations to consult with and advise the United Nations unified command in the light of the above recommendations; the interim committee should begin to function immediately upon the approval of the present resolution by the General Assembly;

(*c*) The Commission shall render a report to the next regular session of the General Assembly and to any prior special session which might be called to consider the subject matter of the present resolution, and shall render such interim reports as it may deem appropriate to the Secretary-General for transmission to Members;

The General Assembly furthermore, mindful of the fact that at the end of the present hostilities the task of rehabilitating the Korean economy will be of great magnitude—

3. Requests the Economic and Social Council, in consultation with the specialized agencies, to develop plans for relief and rehabilitation on the termination of hostilities and to report to the General Assembly within 3 weeks of the adoption of the present resolution by the General Assembly;

4. Also recommends the Economic and Social Council to expedite the study of long-term measures to promote the economic development and social progress of Korea, and meanwhile to draw the attention of the authorities which decide requests for technical assistance to the urgent and special necessity of affording such assistance to Korea;

5. Expresses its appreciation of the services rendered by the members of the United Nations Commission on Korea in the performance of their important and difficult task;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the Commission with adequate staff and facilities, including technical advisers as required; and authorizes the Secretary-General to pay the expenses and per diem of a representative and alternate from each of the states members of the Commission.

Chairman RUSSELL. You may proceed, Senator Flanders.

Senator FLANDERS. General, I was absent yesterday and have had no opportunity to review the manuscript of the hearings. I am dependent on the New York Times and the Washington Post for my knowledge of what went on yesterday.

FACTORS IN WITHDRAWING FROM KOREA NOW

As I understand it from the press, you suggested a retirement from Korea, is that correct?

General WEDEMEYER. I did that yesterday, sir; yes, sir, and I think I should explain, because you weren't here and there were fragmentary replies to an over-all strategic position that I think you gentlemen are entitled to get from me.

No area of the world can be considered to the exclusion of another area. In my judgment Korea is not an important strategic area for our future security and well-being, and I do not feel that we should pour effort, bodies, and materials into an area which is not important to us strategically.

At the present time I do not forsee a decisive Allied victory. This unfortunate situation may maintain for several months, interminable period, and assuming a conclusion by an armistice at the thirty-eighth parallel, I do not think that we have accomplished our major objective as outlined in the paper that the chairman just referred to, the General Assembly's objectives of establishing a free and democratic Korea.

I also emphasized yesterday in discussing a withdrawal or an armistice on the thirty-eighth parallel, that whatever we do should be done under the aegis of the United Nations. We should strive to get the consent, approval, and cooperation of those nations with whom we are fighting together against the forces of communism.

Now we have commitments in Europe and we may have to make commitments elsewhere, Senator, and my concern is that if we continue to pour our effort into this nonimportant strategic area, this area of Korea, the Korean Peninsula, we will not be able to fulfill commitments of much greater importance to us from a security viewpoint and from an economic viewpoint later on.

Senator FLANDERS. General, the thing that troubles me about withdrawing from Korea is not that we will lose an area of strategic importance but that the United Nations would have lost its first battle.

I am concerned about the United Nations standpoint with regard to Korea, and deeply concerned. At the same time it is difficult to see the way out on our present strategy and forces engaged, just as you have said, but how we can retire from Korea without giving up the United Nations as an instrument of collective security and leaving it simply a debating society is the thing that troubles me.

General WEDEMEYER. I agree with you, sir. Do you recall in 1939 when the British Commonwealth guaranteed the territorial integrity of Poland and Czechoslovakia, just before the Nazis began their move?

And, of course, they never had the capability, Senator Flanders, of carrying that out. They didn't at the time they made the guaranty, nor subsequent thereto. My concern is this.

I think we made a mistake in going in in the first instance, Senator Flanders, with our ground forces anyway. I would like to have retained the strategic initiative as I call it, and utilized our technological advantages to punish these people, but not become deeply involved in a ground struggle.

Now having made a mistake, sir, I recognize the implications of my recommendations, the full implications, and I didn't make that reply off the cuff yesterday. It was after careful study, and I don't want to answer a question by asking you a question, but I don't know the alternative, sir.

I don't know the alternative, and it worries me that we are pouring into this area our precious commodities, our young manhood, and I don't see the end of it.

It is a bottomless pit insofar as I am concerned. Now even if we do effect a truce out there, sir, in that area, we will have to maintain a police force at considerable cost to us, and then let's assume—and I don't think it is unreasonable to make this assumption—that this enemy, this potential enemy generates another explosive situation in Iran or in Berlin or in Austria or in the Balkans someplace. Then we do likewise, and we begin to make these commitments around the periphery without any one of them contributing decisively to the accomplishment of our objective, namely, stopping the advance of communism. We are weakening ourselves terribly in the process.

POSSIBLE RESULTS FROM ELECTIONS IN KOREA AFTER SETTLEMENT

Senator FLANDERS. I would like to ask one other question with regard to Korea which I might expect you to have some thoughts on, not on account of necessarily an intimate knowledge of the critical conditions there, but from a considerable residence in the Far East and your knowledge of human nature in general.

Supposing we cleared Korea of the Chinese forces. Supposing that we held in due time a free election in Korea. Would you have any confidence that in its present condition it would not vote Communist?

General WEDEMEYER. No; I don't have confidence in the capacity of those people to evolve a representative form of government. I think that there should be some strong leader, and let's hope he is benevolent and honest and efficient, and gradually lead these people out of the morass.

Senator FLANDERS. Well, even in Southern Korea, which has been ravished by those who are protecting it, would you expect that to develop any strong love for the United Nations forces?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir. Their country has been ravished, and these simple folk, all they want is food and shelter and peace; and all three of these things have been denied by soldiery. And it does not matter whether it is soldiery from the Allies or from the Communists: these simple folk don't like it.

Senator FLANDERS. Now there has been a proposal made by a Senator who is among those whom I respect most highly—and that is Senator Johnson of Colorado—to the effect that we stop at the thirty-eighth parallel, I presume with that area of maneuver which the military authorities and our Secretary of State speak about as necessary to stabilize at the thirty-eighth parallel, and that we then have a cease-fire, and then have elections.

It would seem to me that having elections under those conditions at that time would almost surely result in a Communist majority.

With the great destruction that has been wreaked by our own forces, I just can't conceive of any love for the anti-Communist point of view under those circumstances.

I do not know as I want to ask your opinion on that, because it is not necessary for you to express it. But I do want to ask your opinion on this because quite strongly yesterday, as I judged from the papers, you emphasized the strength and the effectiveness of psychological and spiritual elements in our contest with the Soviet. And like you, I want to say with the Soviet and not with the Russians, because we can make allies of the Russians.

MONEY FOR REHABILITATION INSTEAD OF FIGHTING IN KOREA

I wonder how this would work: Not to attempt to get far beyond the thirty-eighth parallel, but to state that if the forces against us will withdraw, and we withdraw proportionately under the civilians of a United Nations Commission, that we will put, say, a half of what we are spending on war into rebuilding Korea; and in so doing prepare for a popular election or as near a popular government as we can get in all of Korea.

Now, would that not put us on the offensive so far as the Chinese position is concerned? They would then be in there as people who were preventing the rebuilding of Korea and who were preventnig the stopping of the war so long as they remain.

It seems to me exceedingly important that we should be there as offering salvation to the Korean people and the Chinese as those who are preventing it.

Would not that be a psychological move of great strategic importance if we could do something of that sort?

General **Wedemeyer**. Yes, sir.

Senator Flanders, apparently we are thinking along the same lines. In my judgment we must win the hearts and minds of peoples, and yesterday in a discussion with Senator Green he brought that out.

Some of the things I said might indicate that I am a warmonger. I am not. I don't believe the military has ever solved an international problem, nor will. It just expands, perpetuates, and breeds hate and suspicion.

So anything constructive along the lines that you are talking about that convinces people of our determination to share our good things, but only after they make a proportionate effort and are entitled to that assistance from us—I think that is a marked advance toward peace in the world. An honorable peace. We can have a peace in the world—a dictated peace—but just the type of peace that you and I are thinking about.

Senator **Flanders**. A peace with justice and freedom?

General **Wedemeyer**. Yes, sir. But when you use the word "justice," sir, there are so many contentions of justice, and as Senator Green so aptly pointed out, or somebody did, yesterday, we have different ideas of justice. These other people are sincere, too, some of them.

Senator **Flanders**. Perhaps we had better get away from those definitions.

I want in closing to commend what I got from the news reports as being one of your other points of view that you expressed.

FEAR PSYCHOSIS

I judge that you expressed some surprise at the fear psychosis we seem to be in.

General **Wedemeyer**. I definitely do, sir.

Senator **Flanders**. I am with you there.

General **Wedemeyer**. I have tremendous confidence in the American people, and more maybe than you Senators, I travel the length and breadth of this land and I talked with filling station attendants, to coal miners, to businessmen, to bankers, to farmers, to ranchers; and they are solid—they are solid behind you gentlemen.

All they want is fearless leadership. They want direction, and they will follow you.

Senator **Flanders**. I just want to say that as a result of these hearings, they have convinced me that the fear psychosis finds its center in the State Department and in the Pentagon Building; that is the conclusion I have come to.

General **Wedemeyer**. I don't want to be put in the position of criticizing.

There is one thought Iwant to express. We expend billions on armaments, on military, and we are very penurious about the expenditures we make for the very purposes that Senator Flanders has developed, and for some of the ideas that Senator Green yesterday developed.

In my judgment, we should expend billions, but intelligently and where necessary, supervise in certain areas that need supervision.

I stated yesterday China needs supervision—anything you put there. It should be apportioned out intelligently and in consonance with a global plan and not just some specific area and not as a result of pressure groups.

I read in the paper yesterday that there is going to be an investigation of a China lobby. I am all for it. But there should be an investigation of a British lobby and of a French lobby and of the lobbies of these other countries. We are being influenced in our policies and actions by other peoples of the world; and we should be alert to those lobbies, in my judgment.

I think the Chinese lobby has been very inept compared to the lobbies of other countries.

Senator FLANDERS. Thank you, General.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Long.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chairman.

REASON FOR STATE DEPARTMENT SECRECY ON WEDEMEYER REPORT

General Wedemeyer, you have discussed the time when some representative of the State Department—Mr. Butterworth, I believe—discussed with you your report and sought some alterations or changes in it.

I believe you stated that they dealt with your proposal for a trusteeship or guardianship rather in Manchuria; is that correct?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. I testified to that effect, Mr. Chairman, but I indicated, I am sure, that I was not absolutely certain that that was the part extracted.

I am not absolutely certain about it, sir. It occurred 4 years ago.

Chairman RUSSELL. I direct your attention to page 260 of the so-called white paper on China.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. There it states that the reason why this report was not made public was because of your recommendations that the United Nations place Manchuria under a guardianship of five powers, including the Soviet Union, or in a United States trusteeship.

The report states that was the conviction of the President and the Secretary of State, that any such recommendation, if made public at that time, would be highly offensive to Chinese susceptibilities as an infringement of Chinese sovereignty, and representing the Chinese Government as incapable of governing Chinese territory. It was also believed that it would not doubt be rejected by the Chinese Government as it would in a sense represent at least a partial alienation of Chinese territory to a group of powers, including the Soviet Union.

Does that refresh your recollection as to any part of your discussion with Mr. Butterworth?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir; it frankly doesn't. I have read that though, and I am quite sure that that was the part that was extracted.

Chairman RUSSELL. You do not think that it would have had that effect in China that was feared by the President and the Secretary of State?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, if you recall in my report I stated that it might. I conjectured that, but stated that after all the Chinese should be realistic. They were losing that area, and it was apparent to me that they were going to lose Manchuria. They only held a small finger extending from Shanhaikwan to about 50 miles north of Mukden. When I was out there in 1947 on my mission, and I flew into Mukden, we were completely surrounded by Communist troops at that time.

All the rest of Manchuria was under the control of the Communists, sir, and they, in my judgment at that time, had the capability of capturing all of Formosa, but they wanted Chiang Kai-shek to continue to pour reinforcements into that finger, and thus weaken his position south of the Great Wall.

Senator KNOWLAND. General, you said Formosa; you meant Manchuria.

General WEDEMEYER. I am sorry, I meant Formosa—I'm sorry, Manchuria.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

Now, yesterday, General, in response to a question by Senator Bridges on page 6087, when he asked you what you would have recommended if you had been consulted when the aggression occurred in Korea——

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

COURSES OF ACTION AGAINST COMMUNIST AGGRESSION

Chairman RUSSELL (continuing). You stated that:

> First, I would recommend that we take affirmative action, because, in my judgment we have got to do something affirmative against the Soviet. We have got to indicate to them our determination, and words are not enough; we have got to take action. There would have to be—there must be deeds.

Then, on page 6104—well, I do not have the page here before me—but you stated in another part of your testimony, and I think you were answering Senator Smith, that we were too late, already late, in repelling Communist aggression; that we should have taken action earlier; but you state that you would not employ ground forces in Korea, and would rely upon an economic blockade.

I believe on page 6104 you stated to Senator Smith:

> I definitely believe that we should economically blockade any area where communism is rife. I would not permit the Communists in any area to consolidate against, and to fulfill their promises of power and riches, and strength to the people; I would do everything I could to destroy communism everywhere, and economically, through the economic weapon, we can accomplish a great deal, sir.

I am a little at a loss as to just what kind of action you are referring to that we should take affirmative action on, when you say that we should take affirmative action, and that words are not enough, and we should have action and deeds; and yet you say that we should withdraw from Korea and not become involved in piecemeal resistance to aggression elsewhere.

Would it not be possible under that program of an economic blockade, if it was not effective as you apprehend, that they would pick off states here and there all around the world and we would be standing alone?

General WEDEMEYER. We'd go playing right into their hands, and have these people responsible or dependent upon them for economic help, is that what you mean?

Chairman RUSSELL. No, sir.

What I am worrying about is the Soviet securing economic help all over the world, under your theory that we ought to resist them by a very active and aggressive blockade.

I apprehend that the heart of Soviet communistic power is not very susceptible to economic blockade, as little as any other part of the world. They have about as little trade with the outside world as any similar number of people located anywhere else.

I want to get your views as to just what you had in mind, as to this affirmative action that already should have been taken to stop the spread of communism.

General WEDEMEYER. I will be happy to try to explain that.

In the first instance, I think we Americans are surface-minded. We think in terms of the Army and Navy, and not up in the air with the new weapons that science has given us.

I think that punitive action should have been taken with the Navy and with the Air Force, instead of putting ground forces in Korea.

Now, with reference to the economic blockade, and the ability of the Soviet to provide the means of livelihood for all their satellites, and these areas that she is gradually orienting toward the Kremlin, I think that her problems are compounded and confounded by any effort we make to disrupt her lines of communications, to deny her essential raw materials, for example, rubber and tin from southeast Asia; to prevent coastal shipping, which is in connection with the communications, her limited communications in the Far East, from redistributing supplies.

I mentioned earlier how the Soviet used UNRRA supplies and stated that they were from her, and it is a strong psychological weapon. I don't think the Soviet have the capabilities, Mr. Chairman, to establish a world economy or an economy that would be sound, and that would satisfy all of her satellites, the people around her periphery.

In the first instance, she doesn't have the lines of communications; and in the second instance, she has not developed economically along those lines.

You are correct. Her own economy is quite impregnable. She has raw materials within her own economy that permit her to take care of her own requirements; but when she branches out and begins to assume responsibilities, in an economic sense, for Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria, and the Far East, Korea, and China and so forth, she takes on a problem that she is unable to cope with, in my judgment.

I say this, sir: We should do everything possible to disrupt her efforts to establish a sound economy in any area of the world that she is trying to control or that she does control. Thereby, I would deny raw rubber, and I would deny any oil, which is an important item for commercial or military purposes; I would deny those strategic materials to the areas that the Soviet is attempting to control, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, if they moved into Iran, which is another isolated area, it would be more difficult to fight there than it would be, even in Korea.

General WEDEMEYER. That is correct, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. [Deleted.] As I understand it, where would you draw the line in fighting the Soviet, themselves?

HOW BEST TO FIGHT THE REAL ENEMY, IF NECESSARY

Do you believe in Mr. Hoover's idea of, in effect, abandoning Europe and relying upon the Air Force, which, of course, is of primary importance, and a strong Navy—or, just where would you resist Soviet aggression on the ground, or would you resist it anywhere outside of the United States?

General WEDEMEYER. If we have to fight the Soviet, in the first instance, we must know what we are striving to accomplish. We didn't know in World War I, and we didn't know in World War II. We fought World War I, as I recall it, to "make the world safe for Democracy"; we fought World War II "to protect the four freedoms,"

Now, those are very fine, noble objectives, aims, but they are not tangible aims that a military man can build a strategy around.

We must know, Mr. Chairman, the political, the economic, the psychosocial conditions that you want to create and maintain in the areas of operations, in the areas where we conducted our military operations—in the defeated countries, as it were.

We have never, in our history, established such objectives, and before we fight the Soviet, if we must fight them, I hope we don't have to fight them——

Chairman RUSSELL. I share that hope.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. I think we must clearly understand what kind of conditions we want to create in the Soviet.

Chairman RUSSELL. But wouldn't we——

General WEDEMEYER. Could I finish, sir?

Chairman RUSSELL. I beg pardon.

General WEDEMEYER. Sorry, sir.

Until we project our minds through and determine the kind of conditions that we want to create in the Soviet Russia, no military man can tell you the type of campaign or broad scheme of maneuver that we should undertake; and if you don't know the broad scheme of maneuver and type of military operations that you are going to conduct, then no military man can tell you the type of means that you gentlemen must generate with your funds here, and your labor and machine tools and so forth, whether we should have a certain number of planes and a certain number of ships and a certain number of armored divisions would be contingent upon the broad strategy that is decided and agreed upon—the global strategy.

Now, if we are going to fight the Soviet, if we must fight them——

I say that we must not attempt to conquer and control them as we did the Germans and Japanese. I made that statement yesterday; I still believe it is sound. I think that if we undertake to occupy and control that vast country and that heterogeneous mass of people, there are so many different national groups, conditions, and customs that we are undertaking a problem that is just beyond our ability, capability, and it would wreck us economically in the process.

So my suggestion, sir, is that through psychological means we make clear to all peoples of the world, continuously, what we are trying to do, friendly peoples, neutrals, and potential enemies. I would put tremendous emphasis upon the psychological means, the reaching of hearts and minds of people, telling them what we are trying to do. I can't emphasize that too strongly.

Concurrently, I would take areas from which I could conduct effective air operations; I would maintain areas in close proximity to the heartland, to the war-making potential of my enemy, and maintain those areas, but I would not engage in the land struggle where I would suffer prohibitive losses in manpower.

With our 150,000,000 population and the populations of friendly powers, we would lose if we pit man against man in this struggle against the Communists. We must utilize and exploit our technological skills.

BEST MEANS OF COMBATTING AGGRESSORS

Chairman RUSSELL. Well now, suppose, General, that our psychological warfare—and I am a greater believer in it. I have supported the Voice of America, though I have been disappointed in its operations greatly. I would like to have a blueprint as to just how we would remake the world if we had it in our hands like putty, but even in the absence of that blueprint, wouldn't we be in a rather dangerous position to merely, because psychological warfare had failed and we did not have a complete plan of what we were going to do with Russia when and if we were driven to the necessity of fighting and conquering her, to wait and see all of the rest of the free world gobbled up by communism before we took any steps to implement the vigorous action that you advocate by all the resources at our command?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I don't quite understand why you ask me that question. I am inarticulate or I failed to make my point, sir.

I am just emphasizing psychological warfare. Believe me, I know we have to have military means just as we have to have a police force in one of our own communities to maintain order.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am talking about where we are going to employ it, not the necessity of having it.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. Now we traditionally have never been a country to initiate a war, and it seems to me that if we permit the Soviet to continue to incite these disorders, that jeopardize our security, I think the time is coming where we will just have to draw a line and say, "No more, this is it," and it ought to be done again in the United Nations, and we ought to have the military means, and I again say predominantly air to carry out our plans.

Chairman RUSSELL. You can envision then the necessity of employing something other than the economic blockade to stop Communist aggression?

General WEDEMEYER. Oh definitely, sir, yes, sir, and I did say punitive action with your air and with your navy. I didn't want to become involved in any kind of an action where the enemy fought me under terms of his creation at a time and a place favorable to him, sir, and I think we should avoid doing that.

Now we all make mistakes, and in my judgment it was a mistake to put ground forces in there, but I don't think we should compound that mistake by continued operations there unless we have something in the offing that is going to bring an early resolution of our problem there, something that I don't know about.

I prefaced, Senator Russell, everything I have said about the last 2 years of military and diplomatic or international policy and so forth with the statement that I am not as good a witness as you can get here. I accept that at once.

Your Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of State have more information at their fingertips upon which to base conclusions. I have come here at your invitation and I am giving you my frank views based on the limited information I have, sir.

Chairman Russell. Well, you are a military man of wide experience and great competence, General. Do you think we could drive the aggressor out of Korea with Air and the Navy?

General Wedemeyer. No, sir.

Chairman Russell. Now you stated yesterday something about losing face or suffering a defeat if we quit at the thirty-eighth parallel, and then advocated that we withdraw from Korea completely.

Have you covered that today as fully as you would like in your statements to Senator Flanders and others, or do you desire to——

General Wedemeyer. No, sir. I appreciate your kindness in offering me further opportunity, but unless any of the Senators present want to ask me questions on it, I don't have anything further to say about it, sir.

Chairman Russell. Thank you. Senator Connally?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Wiley?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator George?

INTERPRETATION OF TELEGRAM OF DECEMBER 7, 1945, TO JCS

Senator George. General, I have just one or two questions I would like to ask you about the joint statement that was filed, sent, by yourself, General MacArthur, and Admiral Spruance.

My interpretation of what you say is that if the last sentence is taken entirely out of the context and read, that literally it might be subject to the interpretation that has been put upon it by some people.

General Wedemeyer. I definitely feel that way, Senator George.

Senator George. Yes.

General Wedemeyer. In all honesty I couldn't say anything else, sir.

Senator George. Yes.

General Wedemeyer. But I did emphasize that I had not in my mind in any way a coalition government. I wanted peace over there and some kind of arrangement between the Communists and the Nationalists so that we could rehabilitate the country, sir, and accomplish——

Senator George. Some unification of China?

General Wedemeyer. That is right, sir.

Senator George. And at that time the generalissimo and his forces were the predominant force in China?

General Wedemeyer. That is right, sir.

Senator George. That was the idea?

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir.

Senator George. And does nothing that you said theretofore or nothing that you said after, so far as you know, nothing that was said by General MacArthur or Admiral Spruance would indicate that any of you favored a coalition, formation of a coalition government with the Communists?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir. Of course, that conference occurred in the winter of 1945, but I don't believe the word "coalesce" or "coalition," those words, were ever used in that conference.

Senator GEORGE. You think you three who signed this message think, when it is read in its entirety and in the light of existing conditions, it could not be interpreted as meaning coalition government with the Communists?

General WEDEMEYER. I can only speak for myself, Senator George. And I haven't discussed any of these matters with General MacArthur or Admiral Spruance. I intentionally have discussed nothing with General MacArthur since I learned that I might appear before this committee, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And you said it certainly was not in your mind at all?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir.

BACKGROUND OF STATE DEPARTMENT INFORMATION PAPER DECEMBER 23, 1949

Senator GEORGE. And I believe you made it entirely clear that the December 23, 1949, information message that was sent out by the State Department was not submitted to the military, or at least not submitted to you.

You never saw it after it was formed, put in form?

General WEDEMEYER. I never saw it until about 3 days ago, sir, in my old office in the Pentagon, the office I used to occupy. Colonel Gilchrist, sitting here, brought it in and showed it to me. And he was with me when I was here years ago and he is still on duty there—he is about to leave there—but he said that that memorandum was never submitted to him; and it should have been because he was the officer who had handled those matters for me, sir.

Senator GEORGE. I see. But in December 1949, was it the prevailing view of the military leaders—naval, air, and military—that Formosa would fall? Was that the prevailing view so far as you knew it?

General WEDEMEYER. As far as I know it, sir—I am glad you qualified it—I would say that it was not the prevailing view.

Senator GEORGE. Not the prevailing view?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir. It was certainly not mine, sir.

Senator GEORGE. No further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bridges?

AWARENESS OF COMMUNIST THREAT

Senator BRIDGES. General, at what time in your life or your military career did you become aware of the implications of communism and the threat it was to the world?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, back in the thirties, early thirties, I began to read considerably about communism, and when we recognized the Soviet Union, I believe it was in 1933, and William Bullitt was sent as our first ambassador over there, I was greatly concerned about it.

I studied and read all I could get hold of on labor, labor organizations, and followed the developments in our own country, and noted that it was within our labor structure that communism began to penetrate, and then somewhat in our schools.

My first contact with a great deal of propaganda against the Bolheviki, as the Germans called them, was in Germany when I went to the German War College in 1936.

Then I took more than an ordinary interest in communism and Marxism and read everything I could. I got volumes of Das Capital by Marx; I read Hegel and Nietzsche, and tried to familiarize myself with the workings of this philosophy, the political and economic structure they were trying to promote.

I wondered what adaptation it might have in Europe and in our own country. In 1940 General Marshall brought me into the General Staff as a planner, a strategic planner, and I had frequent conversations with Mr. Harry Hopkins and Mr. Averell Harriman about communism.

I was terribly concerned because we would give them large quantities of supplies and would not require them to tell us how and when they were going to use it, and they wouldn't tell us, they wouldn't cooperate.

That concerned me, because the British also were asking for supplies, and their requirements might have been more urgent, more important to our over-all war picture, and yet I could get no information from the Communists about it; nor could my Government. I would point it out to my superiors and try to get them to get the information.

Both Hopkins and Harriman in my discussions with them, neither of them agreed with me. I feel they didn't accept my theories, my concern. I used to tell them that communism was just as great a threat as nazism, and I certainly was thoroughly familiar with naziism, having lived there for two and a half years in Germany and having been subjected to their propaganda and their totalitarian structure.

When Mr. Harriman was relieved as Ambassador, when he resigned as Ambassador to Moscow, I recall vividly, because it pleased me no end, he came via Shanghai, and the first thing he said when he got off the plane in Shanghai, China, in the spring of 1945—no, 1946—just before I was relieved as theater commander, he said, "Al, you were so right about the Communists."

He had just been Ambassador over there. I just mention that because it ties in with the conversations I had with him earlier.

Whenever I could, whenever it was appropriate, I would talk to my friends in the Congress. I talked with various Senator friends and Congressman friends about the implications of communism.

They were very nice and listened carefully; and that is one of the reasons, Senator Bridges, that I say that he answered Congressman Martin's letter. I think every Army officer has some friend in Congress and confides in him, and talks very frankly with him, too; and if the Congressman has confidence in him and is his friend, the Congressman confides in him. They exchange confidences. They do it all the time, sir, and it is dishonest if we deny it.

But that is just sort of a background of my interest and of my effort to learn a little about the implications of communism. Does that suffice, sir?

Senator BRIDGES. Yes. Now, during World War II did you attend the various world conferences that were held during that period?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. I attended all of them up to and including the Cairo Conference. At that time I was relieved and put under the command of Lord Louis Mountbatten in Southeast Asia.

Senator BRIDGES. But you did go to the early ones?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir, I did; to the ones at Casablanca, Quebec, London and in Washington.

Senator BRIDGES. In what capacity—as an adviser?

General WEDEMEYER. As an adviser to General Marshall.

ASSOCIATION WITH STRATEGIC PLANNING DURING WORLD WAR II

Senator BRIDGES. Were you ever associated with the strategic concept that placed priority on the European theater over the Far East?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir, I was.

Senator BRIDGES. In what way?

General WEDEMEYER. I agreed, in my small way, in my subordinate position. I proposed, in fact, a plan which visualized crossing the English Channel in 1943 to get at the heartland of Germany, to defeat the Germans and Italians as quickly as possible, and to stop the subsidiary operations in the Mediterranean and elsewhere in the world; and concurrently, with respect to the operations in the Pacific, to minimize our effort in the Pacific to more or less holding operations, and put all our emphasis on getting right at the heartland of Germany so that it would be Anglo-American forces that overran Europe and not Slavic forces.

It is my judgment today that if we had done that, that certainly the history of the world, or certainly the history of Europe would have been changed, and that it would have been American and British forces that overran Europe instead of Russian.

Now, there were many, many men with very high repute there that contested that, men for whom I had the greatest respect and admiration; and they said that we could not cross the channel in 1943. Well, I did not agree with them. But it was a matter of judgment and I could have been wrong. We did go across in 1944 very successfully, but in a manner that permitted the Slavic forces, the Soviet forces, the Red Communist forces, to overrun the Baltic and Europe, in lieu of the Anglo-American forces as I had visualized.

Senator BRIDGES. Were you the person who informed Chiang Kai-shek concerning Yalta, that is, the decision or agreement reached to give Soviet Russia special rights in Manchuria and other agreements?

General WEDEMEYER. No, Senator. I was present with Ambassador Hurley when he informed Chiang Kai-shek, and I think it was in the middle of June. I said this morning it was June 15.

Senator BRIDGES. Oh, you covered that.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

USING ORIENTAL TROOPS IN KOREA AGAINST COMMUNISTS

Senator BRIDGES. I beg your pardon. I would like to ask you whether you think that other nations in the Orient should be asked to send troops to Korea to support our United Nations effort there. In other words, what I am getting at is instead of having this a nonoriental force fighting against the Chinese Communists and North Korean Communists, do you think it would be wise and feasible and desirable to get other people more of that racial origin into the fight there on our side of it?

General **Wedemeyer.** Definitely, sir; certainly if we are going to stay in Korea. If we are going to stay there, I definitely think we ought to employ Oriental people who are seeking freedom in our pattern.

JAPANESE REARMAMENT

Senator **Bridges.** Yes. May I ask you: Do you believe in rearmament of the Japanese?

General **Wedemeyer.** Yes. I——

Senator **Bridges.** You believe in that?

General **Wedemeyer.** I believe in rearming the Japanese, with reservations. I would not give them far-reaching offensive capability.

Senator **Bridges.** Yes.

Chairman **Russell.** Senator Bridges, I have just been advised that they are planning a vote almost immediately on the floor of the Senate. Senator Morse had a procedural matter here. Senator?

Senator **Morse.** I am perfectly willing to let it go over until tomorrow morning, in view of the situation.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

Chairman **Russell.** Does anyone have any idea as to what the program is on the floor after the vote on this amendment?

Senator **Brewster.** I asked the leaders just now, and they thought there would be a vote on the Ferguson one in about an hour, and then they were going right ahead, and they thought the rest of it would go pretty fast.

Senator **George.** It would probably move pretty fast.

Chairman **Russell.** Well, in view of the situation, gentlemen, I do not suppose we should undertake to have a session this afternoon. I regret that very much. We will have to recess here until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

General Wedemeyer, we will have to ask you to be back with us. When did you want to leave?

General Wedemeyer had told me something about his plans and I do not know whether you wanted me to say anything about it or not, but he was exceedingly anxious to get away not later than tomorrow?

General **Wedemeyer.** Yes, sir.

Chairman **Russell.** Tomorrow afternoon. He has some engagements on the west coast for the following day, the day after tomorrow.

Senator **Cain.** Mr. Chairman, would it be convenient for the committee, under those circumstances, to accommodate the general and us also to meet tonight?

Chairman **Russell.** It would be perfectly agreeable with me to have an evening meeting if the committee desires.

Senator **Stennis.** Mr. Chairman, I will waive all my time; maybe that will help that much, and maybe others will feel that way and get it down to an hour or two.

Senator **Saltonstall.** I will waive all my time.

Senator GEORGE. I will waive all my time.

Senator BREWSTER. I think we can finish up tomorrow morning.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you desire to make this in the form of a motion?

Senator CAIN. I just wanted to offer the suggestion because I am perfectly willing to abide by any wishes that the chairman and the general may have in mind, although, personally, I have a number of questions yet to offer, and I would like to dispose of them at the general's immediate convenience.

General WEDEMEYER. I made this commitment long before this ever came up at the University of Southern California, and I just feel badly, but I have already alerted them that it is possible that you gentlemen would want me to stay here, and——

Senator CAIN. Well, were it permissible and convenient to meet tonight, those of us who yet have questions could just sit here and labor at our task, and the questions and answers would be available in the record, and the job would be accomplished.

Senator BRIDGES. I think we ought to proceed, Mr. Chairman, with the general—we granted that privilege to Secretary Marshall, and I think that we certainly ought to respect the witness. I am willing to put my time in tonight.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I have another suggestion to make. I have no objection to a meeting tonight, save and except that I made a commitment tonight and it is impossible for me to be here; and I have just 15 more minutes of questioning I want to ask of the general. I suggest possibly we can meet tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock.

Senator BRIDGES. What time do you have to leave?

General WEDEMEYER. That will be all right, sir. If I could get out of here by air tomorrow afternoon, if I could leave tomorrow afternoon by air, that will be all right. I will fly all night.

Chairman RUSSELL. What is your pleasure? Do you prefer to meet this evening or tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock?

Senator KNOWLAND. In view of the general having to leave tomorrow morning at sometime, wouldn't it be well for us to meet this evening and clear up as much as we can? I think everybody would cooperate. I doubt if I would have more than two 15-minute periods to clear up the questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, then——

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, can we have it with the understanding that we meet tonight, and for those of us who can't be here tonight——

Chairman RUSSELL.. The general will be available in the morning.

Senator MORSE. Will be available tomorrow morning for questioning.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I think it is almost impossible for me to be here at night, but I shall confine any questions I have to 15 minutes, not over that.

Senator MORSE. I think we ought to meet at 9 in the morning to make perfectly certain.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, we will stand in recess then until 8 o'clock this evening. We can then determine as to the time of the meeting for tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 12:35 p. m. the hearing was recessed to reconvene at 8 p. m. this same day.)

EVENING SESSION

Present Senators Russell, Bridges, Smith, Green, Johnson, Knowland, Sparkman, Cain, and Brewster.

Chairman Russell. The committees will come to order.

When we recessed at noon, Senator Bridges had not used all of his time. I think he had about 6 minutes left, when we had to leave on account of a vote.

Senator Bridges, you are recognized now.

Senator Bridges. I was asking you whether we should rearm the Japanese.

GERMAN REARMAMENT

I would like to ask you, in view of your long experience with the Germans, how you would feel about rearming the Germans, to make them a part of our defense forces of the free nations?

General Wedemeyer. I would rearm the German.

In my judgment, if we don't rearm them, the Soviets ultimately will.

I think the German people want, very much, the opportunity to fight alongside us, against the forces of oppression. I have lived in Germany when they were under the rule of a dictator, and the German people, by and large, did not enjoy that experience; and I think they would welcome the opportunity, if they would be given a dignified and respectable position alongside other forces of freedom, that they would enthusiastically and effectively contribute to the defense of freedom.

SUPPORT OF TITO IN YUGOSLAVIA

Senator Bridges. How do you feel, General, on our support of Tito?

Should we support Tito, and the Government of Yugoslavia, which he represents, and in doing so, will that contribute to the strength of the free world?

General Wedemeyer. I feel somewhat differently about Tito, in that he epitomizes, to me, an uncertain quantity, and I would operate with him on a quid pro quo basis. If he wants to contribute to the struggle that we are having against the Soviet Communists, I would accept his contribution; but I would do it with my eyes wide open, and aware of the fact that he is an avowed Communist, and that he opposes everything that we stand for.

I would accept his aid, but I would do it very carefully, and I would let him realize that I was doing it carefully.

POSSIBLE TERMS FOR A SETTLEMENT

Senator Bridges. Yes. Assuming that by any chance the Chinese and the North Korean Communists should toss in the sponge now. How in your judgment would that vindicate our present policy—the policy of this country, the administration policy—relative to that area of the world? What will be the reaction from it, an so on?

General Wedemeyer. Well, I hope very much, Senator, that the Chinese Communists do toss in the sponge, to save not only American lives and allied lives but Chinese lives. I hope very much that would come to pass.

It does not, in my judgment, vindicate or justify the strategy that our country adopted.

Senator **Bridges**. Would you have any recommendation as to how the situation should be handled if that should occur?

General **Wedemeyer**. Yes, sir. I would immediately accept the truce and I think I have mentioned before in our relations with any nation, friendly or enemy, that our negotiations with them should be conducted in an atmosphere as devoid of suspicion as possible—with integrity and candor, and stimulating carefully those requirements that we see fit to include in our truce terms so as to preclude chicanery or a return of hostilities, a return under conditions disadvantageous to ourselves.

I am not confident, of course, as the result of our experience with Communist-inspired or Communist-controlled or outright Communist nations, I am confident of their sincerity in negotiating agreements. But I still think that if they would offer us a truce at this time that I would undertake negotiations with them and do everything I possibly could to stop hostilities.

Senator **Bridges**. But you would do it with the idea of protecting ourselves so that we would not be going through a recurrence of this?

General **Wedemeyer**. I think it is most unfortunate, Senator Bridges, that we have followed this insane cycle of first destroying and killing—and then turning around and wooing our enemies, as we woo the Germans and the Japanese today, to get them on our side.

I think that if we are truly civilized we can evolve a means of satisfying these international relations and of ameliorating these frictions that will inevitably occur with increasing population pressures and economic crises.

I think a civilized people must evolve some means of peaceful settlement of differences. And in all my testimony here, I hope that I have not given the impression to the members of this joint committee that I am a warmonger and that I believe in resorting to military force—because that is not my belief and that is not my conviction at all.

Senator **Bridges**. Well, now, General——

General Wedemeyer. But I think we must be realistic, sir. We are dealing with people who are realistic and who at the moment only recognize force as the final arbiter of these international frictions. Therefore, we must have appropriate force and we must be realistic in dealing with them.

Senator **Bridges**. Thank you.

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Smith?

IF WE SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM KOREA NOW

Senator **Smith**. General, I was asked a question today which was based on the headlines in this morning's newspapers. The newspapers this morning said that Gneral Wedemeyer advocates taking our troops out of Korea.

The question that I was asked was, well, if we take our troops out of Korea where does that leave the South Koreans, and whert does it leave the Korean picture; and I think it would be well if you would give us the completion of your idea.

General WEDEMEYER. That is correct—I mean, the question is certainly one that should flow out of the testimony I have given, Senator Smith, and I did not have an opportunity to project the picture, to project my mind.

If we withdraw our troops from Korea, assuming that it is not the result of a truce, but——

Senator SMITH. That is what I meant, of course.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; but if we withdraw them under duress, it is true that Korea will unquestionably be overrun by these forces of aggression; at least, the devastation in South Korea, the destruction of homes and buildings and utilities, and all of these various activities, will stop.

We probably would just take punitive action, if my plan were followed, against the North Koreans, to preclude—I think we ought to harass them and restrict their activities in North Korea, to preclude consolidation of their position there.

Senator SMITH. You mean by air and sea?

General WEDEMEYER. By air and naval force; yes, sir.

There have been so many questions from various facets during the course of this investigation directed to me that I thought I ought to prepare a little statement, and I have done so, and I would be glad to read it to you about how I visualize this situation in Korea. I think it might button up or help you gentlemen understand what I am driving at with reference to the policy that I think we should pursue in Korea, sir, and why we should pursue it. It is just a brief statement. May I read it, Mr. Chairman?

Senator SMITH. I would be glad to have you read it. I would ask the chairman if it would be read against the committee's time, and not my time.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, ordinarily, Senator Smith, it would be read against your time, but if——

Senator BREWSTER. I ask unanimous consent——

Chairman RUSSELL. If there is no objection, the general will be permitted to read that on the committee's time. Doctor Wilcox, you try to keep up with this portion of it.

Senator SMITH. I am very glad indeed to have this, General.

General WEDEMEYER. All right, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. You may proceed, General.

COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA

General WEDEMEYER. I feel, gentlemen, that either we should fight in Korea with a view to a decisive and victorious culmination or we should get out.

I would consider very carefully the military advice from experts available to you in the Pentagon, that we may require some time to prepare for the decisive action that I refer to if we elect to remain in Korea.

However, I would not accept an interminable delay, for we would be expending our resources, both human and material, to a prohibitive degree. This is exactly what the Soviets would have us do.

The cost of such containing tactics would be wholly incommensurate, in my judgment, with the intangible gains that have been suggested to members of this committee.

Under conditions of indefinitely extended containment, we would be playing the game according to the rules of a scheming, unscrupulous group in the Kremlin.

Either we should play this strategic game in Korea to win or at the propitious time take our fine team off the field, mobilize fully our spiritual and material resources in conjunction with friendly nations and set about the task of creating conditions that would enable free peoples to prescribe the rules and select the arenas of conflict in all fields of strategy, including political, economic, psychosocial, and military.

We, along with the free nations, must seize, in my judgment, and maintain the initiative in this unfortunate, but currently unavoidable international struggle which may so strongly influence the destiny of mankind.

Senator SMITH. I appreciate that statement, General. It is a fine statement, but I assume that it means that if we did feel it necessary to get out because we didn't go ahead with a victorious culmination, that we would have to leave the South Korean people to the mercy of the North Koreans and their Communist ally.

General WEDEMEYER. That is correct, sir. That is exactly what happened to the Poles and to Czechoslovakians, whose territorial integrity was guaranteed, if you recall, by the British back in 1939, and the British were unable to do it. My fear is that we may have made a mistake in going in there in the first place, and I just don't like the idea of perpetuating a mistake.

Let's admit that maybe we have not done the right thing. Maybe we have, but in my judgment we haven't, in putting ground forces in.

EFFECT OF ABANDONING KOREA

Senator SMITH. If we with the United Nations had not gone in last June, undoubtedly North Korea would have taken over South Korea within a very short time, and that whole area would have been behind the iron curtain.

General WEDEMEYER. That is correct, sir.

Senator SMITH. And that would have been a terrible let-down to the United Nations, would it not?

General WEDMEYER. Well, it all depends upon the action that you take, sir. Now, as I stated, I would have recommended to my chiefs, if I had been in Washington, that we break off diplomatic relations at that time with the Soviet and satellites. I would have taken punitive action with my air and with my navy.

I would not have put ground forces in there and I would have removed Allied nationals from Korea, and I would have assured the Korean people, North Koreans and South Koreans alike, that it was my determination and purpose to as early as possible free them and give them the opportunity to establish a government of self-determination.

Senator SMITH. You would be speaking then for the United Nations?

General WEDEMEYER. I would do everything, sir, as I stated before, and as Senator Green has emphasized, I would do everything under the aegis of the United Nations, sir. I would hope that the United Nations would support such a policy and such a plan.

Senator SMITH. And if the Chinese Communists had come in to help the North Koreans, you would have applied the economic and naval blockade to the Chinese coast, I assume.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; I would have resorted to any punitive action that I deemed necessary, Senator. I would not have declared a war, but I would have taken those steps that I deemed necessary to insure that I retained the strategic initiative.

Senator SMITH. I am somewhat troubled by the thought that the North Koreans with the backing they had from Russia would have been able to take over South Korea without the Chinest Communists coming in at all, and we would have been limited then to such action as we could have taken with our naval forces and with our air.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. And whether that would have been harassment enough to ultimately bring about the reconquest of all of Korea is a question I am not quite clear on. Of course I am not a military expert.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I think it is understandable that you are concerned about that, sir, but in my judgment we can't fill all these vacua that the enemy is capable of filling around the periphery and I think we should be cautious about filling those vacua that they not have the strategic significance that other vacua have.

I would certainly operate, though, at full blast in the psychological warfare field. I would do everything possible to reach the hearts and minds of people throughout the Far East, and in Europe too, and in the Middle East pertaining to my determination, the United States determination, the United Nations determination to stop aggression.

Now at that particular point in my judgment we were not wise in attempting to stop aggression in that way. I think the President's decision to take affirmative action was excellent, was splendid, and it was needed. I think it gave a great deal of impetus and support and inspiration to those participating nations in the United Nations organization.

I have talked to representatives of some of the nations and they were delighted. I do question the wisdom, however, of the way we did. That is all.

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL MEASURES NEEDED

Senator SMITH. I recall, General, before I went to the Far East in 1949 having had occasion to talk with you. I think it was in the spring of 1949 or in the early summer. You expressed to me then your feeling of the great importance of these measures other than military measures to reach the heart of the world and to sell to the world the American tradition and the American point of view.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. So I can confirm that at this point.

I think at that time you did discuss with me your whole conception of technological advice to these people—the so-called point 4 program—and your feeling that ought to be stressed. I assume you feel the same way now about that.

General **Wedemeyer**. Yes, sir; I do.

I saw an article by Dr. Conant, of Harvard, where he recommended some approach like that, and I think it is sound, and I think the Far East region should be considered. I think the Congress ought to consider possibly such a program for that region to bring about economic stability.

Following economic stability, you usually have political stability, and then your ideological warfare struggle will not be quite so difficult for us. As long as the people are unhappy and starving and without shelter, and so forth, they are going to be very difficult—they are not going to be in a receptive mood, as it were, for our ideas.

YALTA AND ITS EFFECT ON CHINESE SITUATION

Senator **Smith**. Well, now, let's move to another slightly different subject. At Yalta, as I diagnose it, parts of China were given away in return for Russia's entry into the war against Japan; that event led to the ultimate moving in of Russia to Manchuria. In your judgment did those events in the minds of the Chinese people have an effect on Chiang Kai-shek losing face with his own people and feeling that possibly the United States and Great Britain had run out on him at a time of his greatest need? Was that part of the cause of his collapse because his own people just dropped away from him?

General **Wedemeyer**. It could be a contributory cause, but, Senator Smith, I am not qualified to say that it was. I never discussed it with many Chinese. The ones that I discussed it with were—I enumerated this morning to the Senate committee—Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong, and Wang Shih-chieh. Wang Shih-chieh signed the Soong-Molotov agreement, sir, and Soong negotiated it but refused to sign it.

Senator **Smith**. You do not know whether the Sino-Russian agreement then that followed Yalta, whether that was enthusiastically received by Chiang and his group?

General **Wedemeyer**. I know definitely it was not, sir.

Senator **Smith**. It was not.

General **Wedemeyer**. That I do know. But I don't know what the Chinese people's reaction was with reference to that Sino-Soviet Treaty, nor do I know the effect it may have had upon them with reference to their leader, Chiang Kai-shek.

CONDITIONS ON FORMOSA AND RELIABILITY OF CHIANG

Senator **Smith**. Well, now, this morning Senator McMahon asked you some question, quoting from the white paper and some of your statements about the corruption of the Chiang group and those around him?

General **Wedemeyer**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Smith**. And after asking the questions and your admitting those conditions did exist, they were part of the reasons for the collapse and so forth, he made the statement that they were a pretty weak reed to lean on.

General **Wedemeyer**. Senator McMahon made that statement.

Senator **Smith**. Senator McMahon did; yes.

General **Wedemeyer**. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. I don't know whether you acquiesced in that thought or not; and if you did acquiesce in it, what has happened since that made you feel that today Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the people on Formosa are not only not a weak reed but they are probably the best bet we have in the area in the anti-Communist group.

General WEDEMEYER. Senator Smith, I acquiesced that they were a weak reed, but I stated they were in my judgment the strongest reed we had available, and they had been the continuous opponents of communism, and they represented to me anyway the only vehicle through which we might operate in our effort to stop the advance of communism in the Far East.

I felt that with American supervision, we could accomplish something constructive, utilizing Chiang Kai-shek and his people.

I didn't know any other group, Senator Smith, that offered any chance of success.

Senator SMITH. Do you know of any other group now that does?

General WEDEMEYER. I do not, sir. That is why today I suggested that I still felt—some Senator asked me: Do you still feel Chiang Kai-shek is the man through whom we should operate. I am not obligated to him. If I could find another Chinese leader in whom I had confidence and who I could truthfully tell you gentlemen, "here is a man with character and ability, there is the man to put your chips on," I would tell you that; but I don't know any man at this time.

I think Chiang Kai-shek has done a fine job, according to the reports I am getting now from Chinese and American friends, in Formosa.

He is doing a fine job in government—the land reforms, taxes, education, communications, the economy—all of these things are moving forward, helping the people.

So I think that he is still the remaining source or the remaining vehicle through which we might operate to stop the advance of communism.

Senator SMITH. You mentioned that he made a mistake when he first went to Formosa and put a military governor there who antagonized the people.

General WEDEMEYER. In my judgment, he did. He is like other people I could mention, sir. He is tremendously loyal to people who stood by him as he worked up through the political ladder.

Senator SMITH. When I was there, General Chen Cheng was governor, and, while he was a military man, he seemed well liked. Immediately after that K. C. Wu was put in, a civilian, and he has done an outstanding job in bringing native Taiwan people into the government.

General WEDEMEYER. Those are the reports I am receiving.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator Smith. Senator Byrd.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Johnson.

Senator JOHNSON. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Kefauver.

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell.** Senator Knowland.

USE OF NATIONALIST TROOPS

Senator **Knowland.** General, relative to the situation in Korea and the offer on June 30, 4 days after the fighting broke out, the offer by the Republic of China of 33,000 of their best troops to be used in Korea, as you recall, that offer was turned down by the United States and the United Nations for apparently two reasons:

One, that the troops were needed in Formosa; and, secondly, because their use in Korea at that time might have antagonized the Chinese Communists, and might have induced them to come into Korea.

Now, of course that picture changed in November, when the Chinese Communists did come over in force.

Looking at it from the purely military point of view, and assuming for the moment that our policy is to prevent Formosa from falling, would there not be some very material value in accepting the offer of a limited number of troops of the Republic of China?

That would give them combat experience in Korea so that when they did finally go back to Formosa, they would be seasoned troops.

In other words, from a military point of view, isn't it necessary, in order for troops to become seasoned, to have battle experience?

General **Wedemeyer.** Yes, sir; to answer your question, yes, sir.

Senator **Knowland.** Now, I would like to pursue a line of questions that we started this morning.

ALLEGED PRESSURES ON CHIANG TO ASSENT TO A COALITION

Could you indicate to this committee, from your knowledge, when you were in China, or subsequently, what pressures, or, if you want to use some other word that is a better word than "pressure," such as embargo, economic embargo, or the embargo on shipments of arms and ammunition did we place on the Republic of China to encourage them to follow our advices in the Far East?

What I have in mind is—we did place an embargo, for 10 months in 1946, that we would not ship them any more arms or ammunition.

We have already placed in the record here a letter that the State Department had communicated with the War Shipping Administration and had pointed out to them that the ships which were being made available, were being made available on the condition that the government was satisfactory to us, and was a coalition government.

Now, are there any other types of encouragement that we tried to bring to bear on the Republic of China, to follow out that policy?

General **Wedemeyer.** It seems to me that the Congress had appropriated $500 million that was designed to assist China economically and I believe that was held as a lever over the Chinese Government by Secretary Marshall, then the Presidential envoy. I believe that is correct, sir. The documentary evidence I do not have. I have seen documents, though, in the Department—Senator, I cannot prove that statement. That is about the first statement I have made that I have not——

Senator **Knowland.** Well, General, if you are not familiar with it, was set up but was never used. It was held available; I think the white paper mentions that it was made available but actually that particular credit was never used.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I disqualify my statement, because as far as my statement is concerned, it is not knowledge, it is hearsay.

Senator KNOWLAND. All right, sir.

General WEDEMEYER. The Generalissimo was asked to stop the movement of his troops from time to time by Secretary Marshall when he was acting as special envoy in his effort to bring about, to establish peace between the Communists and the Nationalists.

I recall at one occasion both the Nationalist and Communist troops were moving toward a defile. They both wanted to seize that defile in northern China because it would facilitate their getting control there, in a section of Manchuria. And so Marshall asked the Generalissimo to stop, to freeze his troops.

Senator KNOWLAND. Is that the Kalgan Pass?

General WEDEMEYER. It is near there. It is not the Kalgan Pass. I do not recall the Chinese name. It is an unusual name. It is northeast of Kalgan.

And the Generalissimo—I believe his troops complied with General Marshall's request and the—I heard this, again this is hearsay, I was not on the spot—that the Communists took advantage of this freeze and moved their troops quickly through the defile and gained an advantage. But there were claims of unfairness on both sides, and of breach of faith and promise, and so forth.

Senator KNOWLAND. But in the particular instance of which I have also heard, there was an indication at least that had the Nationalist Government closed the pass, there would have been a considerable number of Communist troops who would have been trapped.

General WEDEMEYER. That was the pass, I think, sir, that I referred to.

WEDEMEYER REPORT OF NOVEMBER 10, 1945, TO CHIANG ON WASHINGTON CONFERENCES

Senator KNOWLAND. I would like to call your attention to what formerly was Top Secrete Document No. C–627 of November 10, 1945.

Now, I think we discussed yesterday at least my belief that there is a line of demarcation between actions we took prior to August 14, 1945, when we were engaged in a bitter struggle with Japan, and actions which took place subsequent to that date when the matter of military necessity was not so directly involved.

This particular communication I call your attention to was dated November 10, which is approximately 90 days after VJ-day.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. I call your attention to this document, which is a memo which you brought to the Generalissimo, following your visit to Washington, and your report on the conference with the President and the Secretary of State and the Joint Chiefs, and I read and call your particular attention to this language, and this speaks of the Joint Chiefs:

> They declared plainly American military aid to China will cease immediately if evidence compels the United States Government to believe that any Chinese troops receiving such aid are using it to support any government which th United States cannot accept, to conduct civil war, or for aggressive or coerci purposes.

Now, maybe you can throw some light on it, but as I read it, that rather looks as though we are saying to the Generalissimo and the Republic of China, "We are prepared to give you some help, but you must not use the help that we give you"—now, this is not speaking about American troops being used in the civil war——

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND (continuing). "But you must not use this help we are supplying you to conduct a civil war."

Am I mistaken in my interpretation of that paragraph?

General WEDEMEYER. May I read this here?

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. I might say, for the benefit of all the Senators present, this is a memorandum that I personally prepared, and I am fully responsible for its contents; I accept full responsibility for the statements made in there in that I noted these data as I received instructions from the President, from Secretary Byrnes, and from the JCS, and I had a conference with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and he enumerated these——

Senator KNOWLAND. That is my understanding; you are factually reporting to the Generalissimo what your instructions were from Washington.

General WEDEMEYER. That is correct, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. What I am trying to get at is, can you put any connotation on that paragraph I have read to you other than that he was not to use this equipment that we might send him in the civil war?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; that connotation is clearly there.

ALLEGED PRESSURES ON CHIANG AND THE COMMUNISTS

Senator KNOWLAND. What I am laying the foundation for is this: We obviously at that time were not supplying the Chinese Communists with equipment or with supplies beyond, perhaps, in getting some UNRRA aid then or later, so that any pressures that we brought to bear were upon the government of the Republic of China.

Now, it seems to me that the only way we could have exerted pressure upon the Communist regime in China would have been simultaneously with this, by sending word to Mao Tze-tung and Chou En-lai that "unless you people recognize the supremacy of the government of the Republic we are going to supply Chiang Kai-shek with such aid as he needs, with no restrictions," but all the pressure, so far as I can see, seems to be applied upon the government of the Republic and not upon the Chinese Communists.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, sir, in the first instance, we had no diplomatic connections with the Communist Government. There was not any recognition of a Communist Government per se. We didn't have any—I didn't have any official contacts with Mao Tze-tung, so it would not be incumbent upon our Government, the United States, to send any communication to Mao Tze-tung officially; but we might have told the Ambassador to contact Mao Tze-tung, and inform him that that was the situation. What's his name—Ambassador Hurley from time to time talked to Mao Tze-tung but what his conversations were I don't know; I was not present.

Now, about the Government's attempt there, Senator Knowland, as I interpreted it, we did not want to contribute to continued warfare there and at that time they weren't sure the Commies were going to get all the equipment from the Japanese, and they wanted to restrict or minimize military operations all the way through, and I was not permitted, for example, to pick up a Chinese army at point A and move it to B to facilitate the recovery of an area from the Commies by the Chinese Nationalist forces; I was not authorized to use my aircraft for that purpose.

But in the process of moving them, I did do exactly that. It was inherent in my instructions that I should recover the areas formerly occupied by the Japanese, so I had to move them into areas that were vacant, and that did cause some friction with the Chinese Communists.

Senator **KNOWLAND**. Do you think with this type of——

General **WEDEMEYER**. Incidentally, sir, it improved the position of the Chinese Nationalists vis-à-vis the Chinese Communists too.

Senator **KNOWLAND**. My only question is, which I would like to pin down, is it your military judgment that General Van Fleet could have cleared up the situation in Greece had he been under instructions which would have said in effect that the Greek Government could not have used its equipment in fighting a civil war?

General **WEDEMEYER**. No, sir.

Chairman **RUSSELL**. Senator Green.

CHANCES FOR A COALITION GOVERNMENT OR A UNIFIED DEMOCRATIC CHINA IN 1945

Senator **GREEN**. General Wedemeyer, may I return to a subject which I introduced yesterday, and about the time I reached it, my time limit expired and so I was unable to develop it, and the same thing happened on the same subject to Senator Sparkman today, and the subject was this: The radiogram which you and General MacArthur and Admiral Spruance sent on December 5.

Various references were made to it, and I led up to it by asking you about what you meant by the term "unified, democratic China." I took it up in reference to your conference with General Marshall when he came over to implement that same telegram, and you frankly told him, as I recall, that you thought—I don't know just how you put it—that his mission was in vain, that it was impossible for him or for anybody else for that matter to create a unified China on the one hand, or a democratic China for a long while to come on the other, is that correct?

General **WEDEMEYER**. Well, sir, I don't want to be a nit picker on words, but the word was coalition government, Senator Green, as I recall it, to bring about a coalition government, sir.

Senator **GREEN**. I think the words were "unified, democratic China." Those are the three last words in the radiogram to which everything that preceded it led up.

General **WEDEMEYER**. That is correct.

Senator **GREEN**. That was the snap to the whip.

General **WEDEMEYER**. Senator Green, I am talking about the directive that General Marshall showed me.

Senator **GREEN**. Yes.

General **WEDEMEYER**. As I recall it, I don't recall definitely, sir, but I think it required him to bring about the coalition in China.

Now you are absolutely right that the words "unified, democratic China" are in the last paragraph of that radiogram, and I don't want to be a nit picker about this, sir. I tell you frankly that in my judgment the last paragraph conveys the suggestion that I go along with the idea that a coalition government is possible, was possible in China.

I accept that, but I tell you just as frankly, sir, that I never in my heart and mind the entire time, but with increasing meaning as I served in China, never felt that you could bring about a coalition of the Communist forces with the other forces out there, politically, sir.

I hoped and strove for the amalgamation of the military, to coordinate their military effort against the common enemy, at that time the Japanese, but I never even had any success in that field, sir.

Senator GREEN. Well, my point which I just reached when I asked you the expressions before was whether you gave your opinion to General Marshall as I have just stated it, that you did not believe it was possible to achieve a unified, democratic China.

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir; I did not believe it was possible to bring about a coalition government there, sir.

Senator GREEN. Well, how do you distinguish between the coalition government which you say the directive contained, and the words "unified, democratic China" which your telegram contained?

General WEDEMEYER. I know it is very difficult to understand, and I confess very frankly that that last paragraph I am not very proud of insofar as it conveys my feelings, but I would say this, sir.

The Chinese were not a representative government when I was there, and they are not yet a representative government.

The Chinese Communists had an army. The Nationalist Government had an army, and in my judgment they would neither give up their military force because that was the source of their strength, and I tried to convey to my friend, a man with whom I had served and for whom I had the greatest respect, General Marshall, my innermost thoughts in expressing to him my concern that it was impossible for him to bring about this coalition.

Senator GREEN. Yes. Well, did you or he make any distinction between coalition and unification?

General WEDEMEYER. I don't believe it was discussed, Senator Green. I don't think he developed that subject any further.

Senator GREEN. You must have discussed the subject because that is what he went there for.

General WEDEMEYER. I mean I don't believe he developed that particular subject further. He told me he was going to make the effort, and I assured him of my every support. I made available to him the two ablest officers I had in the China theater of my staff to help him.

SUCCESS OF EFFORT FOR COALITION IN CHINA

Senator GREEN. Now what did you understand by that effort—the effort to bring the Communists and the Nationalists together?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir—to bring all elements together under one leader.

Senator GREEN. Those were the two great elements, were they not?

General WEDEMEYER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Senator GREEN. And so the effort was to bring those together?

General WEDEMEYER. That is correct.

Senator GREEN. And that was what you had in mind also when you sent the telegram December 5, was it not?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, frankly, the wording of that last paragraph would indicate that I had that in my mind. The main thing that this telegram there, sir—and you are giving particular emphasis to the last paragraph—my main job as theater commander out there was to move 3 million Japanese back to the Japanese Archipelago and to move several hundred thousand Chinese Nationalist forces to the north.

Senator GREEN. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. Now really, as China theater commander, that was my task.

Senator GREEN. Well, those were elements in the situation.

General WEDEMEYER. They were the important elements to me, sir.

Senator GREEN. But the main object of the telegram was summed up at the end in that paragraph in which you ended up with the three words, rather dramatically, "unified, democratic China." And as I understand it, your thought when you saw General Marshall and your thought when you sent the telegram was unification of the Communist and Nationalist elements in China. Is that not right?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, sir, I have tried to state it just as clearly as I can. I did hope that we could rehabilitate China in an atmosphere of peace, and the forces that jeopardized that peace were the Communist Party and the Nationalist Party; and anything I could do to help our senior representative out there, General Marshall, Senator Green, I was ready to do it.

Senator GREEN. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. And in that last paragraph it would indicate that I thought there was some chance of doing it.

Senator GREEN. Yes. Now, as a matter of fact, was not that hope increased when they did reach agreement on some points?

General WEDEMEYER. Was not my hope increased or just the general hope?

Senator GREEN. They did reach some agreement on some certain points, did they not?

General WEDEMEYER. They did at times, and then they would break faith with each other.

Senator GREEN. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. And with General Marshall, too; he was disappointed on numerous occasions because they would make promises and both sides would break these promises; and when he left, of course, he said, "Plague on both your houses."

Senator GREEN. Exactly; but you both had in mind the bringing of those two elements together; and at certain times you did bring them together; but then they fell apart again; is that not true?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, General Marshall at times brought them together, sir.

Senator GREEN. Yes. I meant you and General Marshall.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; I was just a subordinate, sir; yes, sir.

Senator GREEN. You played a modest part in it.

Well, that is so much for that.

There are one or two others. My time is running out so I must hurry.

DISPOSITION OF FORMOSA

In all these discussions about Formosa, General—I don't know how this will affect you; it affects me—there has been a great deal of discussion whether Formosa in the end should be given back to Japan or whether it should be given back to China or whether the United States should take it or whether there should be a trusteeship established. Nobody seems to talk about giving Formosa back to the Formosans. What is your idea on that?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, that has some merit, sir; that has some merit.

Senator GREEN. The Formosans are not identical with though they are related to both Chinese and Japanese, are they not?

General WEDEMEYER. Ethnologically; yes, sir.

Senator GREEN. And it is larger than a good many other of the smaller nations of the world if it were established as a separate nation, would it not be?

General WEDEMEYER. It seems to me, sir, we made a promise, we have a commitment there that was made at the Cairo Conference with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the recognized Chinese Nationalist Government, that Formosa would be returned to them.

Ethnologically most of the Formosans are Chinese. Most of the Formosans presently living in the island migrated either from the mainland over, or maybe it was all part of the mainland, I don't know, thousands of years ago, but from the Fukien Province—you will find that most of the Formosans are of Fukienese background.

Senator GREEN. But they consider themselves something distinct, do they not?

General WEDEMEYER. Not all of them.

Senator GREEN. But I mean as a group.

General WEDEMEYER. I couldn't speak intelligently on that. I don't know whether a sufficient number feel that way.

Senator GREEN. Shouldn't that alternative be considered?

General WEDEMEYER. I said I think it is something that merits consideration, but we must not forget the commitment that we made at Cairo.

Senator GREEN. I am not forgetting those, but the question is: What is the China to which that was to be returned?

General WEDEMEYER. It is a China that stuck by us during the war and saved American lives.

Senator GREEN. Or is it the China that represents a great area and a great population on the mainland.

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir; I know, Senator Green, you will agree with me that when someone sticks by us during the war, as this chap did—with all his faults—we do have a genuine debt of gratitude to him.

AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD FORMOSA

Senator GREEN. Am I not right in thinking that our policy, American policy, regardless of these other questions, is not to let Formosa fall into the hands of an enemy?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; that might jeopardize our security.

Senator GREEN. But it doesn't necessarily go to the extent of saying it has got to be returned. It is just that it has to be in friendly hands, and that is enough. It doesn't mean it should be independent or be in ours, but if it is kept out of the hands of an enemy, that would meet our policy as laid down, would it not?

General WEDEMEYER. It might meet yours, but it wouldn't meet General Wedemeyer's, sir. I feel we had a commitment at Cairo, and when I make a commitment, my country makes a commitment, I want to see it carried out.

Senator GREEN. I mean apart from that—I am talking about strategy, the strategic element. Strategically, if it is kept out of enemy hands, it answers our purpose, does it not?

General WEDEMEYER. It is not only military considerations.

Senator GREEN. From a military standpoint, let's discuss that first.

General WEDEMEYER. From a strictly military standpoint, you are absolutely correct, sir.

Senator GREEN. Might not that have been the meaning used in this circular letter which the State Department sent to its representatives?

General WEDEMEYER. It might have been.

I have no way of knowing what they had in mind there, sir.

Senator GREEN. It did not necessarily mean that it had no significance—did not necessarily mean whether it was defensive or offensive. It is a different proposition, is it not?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator GREEN. There is one other question, if I have the time to ask it.

How much time have I?

Chairman RUSSELL. You have about a minute and a half.

UNITED NATIONS AND POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL FROM KOREA

Senator GREEN. That goes to this last point which came up, about this abandonment of Korea.

I can see what your argument is, and have given it due consideration; but assuming America, our country, decided it was our best policy to abandon it; and suppose the other members of the United Nations who are fighting it out with us there, disagreed with us there?

What would be our attitude?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, Senator, as I told you yesterday, there comes a time when I think this country of ours has got to go it alone.

I want the United Nations to operate properly——

Senator GREEN. I believe in the importance of the United Nations, also.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

I think that is something that our responsible leaders, civil and military, should carefully consider and ponder; and it might be necessary to go it alone; but when you realize we have a preponderance of force out there, sir, are we going to permit a few nations that have no contributions at all, either material or human, in this effort, and we are losing lives—I think maybe we should carefully weigh whether or not we should pull out, even though the United Nations doesn't support us.

I would hope that they would support us, and I would make every effort to get their support before I took such a drastic step. It might jeopardize the future of what I believe to be the hope of mankind, a world organization——

Senator GREEN. Not only——

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator.

Is there objection to the Senator's question?

The Chair hears none.

Senator GREEN. Go it alone, but get out alone?

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you get the question, General?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. As I understand the question, sir, we would not only go it alone, but we'd get out alone.

On that particular issue, I believe we'd take unilateral action, probably.

Senator GREEN. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hunt?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain?

Senator CAIN. General Wedemeyer, for a minute or two I should like to lay a foundation for my five or six questions which I wish to offer to you in what has been your capacity as a theater and field commander.

NOTIFICATION TO GENERAL MAC ARTHUR OF PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL ANNOUNCEMENT

General, you were asked yesterday whether you believed that if General MacArthur knew that the President was going to take a particular action he should have withheld his own message to the Chinese Communists about a cease-fire.

Now, I would like to suggest that the record indicates to me that General MacArthur was never told that the President was going to take any action whatsoever with respect to a cease-fire or with respect to negotiations with foreign governments.

General WEDEMEYER. May I interject there, sir?

Senator CAIN. Certainly.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, that is the way I recalled the record, but I did not want or feel that I could contradict a member of this committee.

Senator CAIN. Certainly. Now, I just want to continue this foundation very briefly.

General WEDEMEYER. Excuse me.

Senator CAIN. And see if we are in agreement in whole or in part with some of my colleagues, some of whom have mistakenly assumed and some of the witnesses have assumed that General MacArthur was told in so many words that the President had begun negotiations or was considering negotiations with foreign governments with respect to peace negotiations.

Now, the actual facts are as I understand from this record that the Army Chief of Staff and the Secretary of State have testified that although negotiations were being carried on with our own allies, not a word of this was sent to General MacArthur, concerning these negotiations.

It seems to me it is a matter of proof that the only message in our records here concerning peace negotiations last March is a message dated March 20 which informed General MacArthur that the State Department—and I quote—was "planning a Presidential announcement."

There appears to be no record of any kind that the President adopted the State Department's plan, and no record of any kind that General MacArthur was advised that the State Department's suggestions to the President would be adopted.

Now, against that foundation, General Wedemeyer, my first question. Let me ask you whether you believe that General MacArthur could derive the impression that a message was being sent to foreign governments concerning peace negotiations when not a single phrase or word in the message sent to him speaks of any negotiations with our allies?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir.

Senator CAIN. Now, the second question. Do you think, sir, that the Commander in Chief of the Far East who is also the Supreme Commander in Japan should have been advised that negotiations of this kind had actually been undertaken with foreign governments?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; I do.

Senator CAIN. My third question. Do you not think, sir, that any document which was being submitted to foreign governments concerning the Far Eastern area should also have been submitted to the Supreme Commander in the Far East, whoever he might be?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator CAIN. General Wedemeyer, it has been testified that General MacArthur was not sent the exact text or the terms but he knew there were negotiations going on with foreign governments.

I can find nothing in the record to support this view, and hence I ask you whether this is not a typical example or a fair example, of the difficulties that a field commander sometimes has in knowing what is going on 8,000 miles away from his home government; and I ask you the question, in part because in your appearance of yesterday I think you stated that you had trouble sometimes getting instructions and directives from home.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I definitely did; I often had difficulty in getting direction and made numerous requests for instructions.

Senator CAIN. And you had trouble getting those directives and instructions at a time when you were a theater commander?

General WEDEMEYER. That is correct, sir.

REASONS AND POWERS OF FIELD COMMANDERS FOR SURRENDER DEMANDS

Senator CAIN. General Wedemeyer, yesterday you testified concerning the use of psychological warfare in the Far East, and you spoke strongly in support of psychological warfare, period.

Do you think it was out of order for General MacArthur in his message to the Chinese Red commander, and which I understand was a part of his psychological warfare efforts to say to that Chinese Red commander that if he kept up the fighting he was likely to be severely beaten?

Should he, General MacArthur, have refrained from making any threats to the Chinese Red commander concerning the serious consequences which might befall him if the war was extended and if his troops were defeated?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I think that it was sound procedure if it were a psychological warfare effort; and I believe that General MacArthur made that assertion before this committee.

Senator CAIN. He had indeed sir. It was for that reason that I wanted your view as one who has been a theater commander about the position of another field commander in a situation of this kind.

General Wedemeyer do you believe that there was anything wrong in addressing messages to the enemy commander without first having submitted them to the Department of State back home or do you happen to believe that the field commanders ought to be able to demand the surrender of the enemy without submitting that to the diplomats for their consideration?

General WEDEMEYER. Well that is a question that I think is one that revolves around the relationships between the field commander and his immediate superiors.

I think if I had been the theater commander, Senator Cain, that it was a question of such moment that I would have notified my immediate chiefs back home, the JCS or someone that for psychological reasons, psychological warfare reasons, I proposed to do thus and so, and these may be the developments of that, so that they would not be embarrassed at home.

After all, if they had accepted that surrender and caught the responsible policy shapers and enunciators here off base, it would have been embarrassing to them.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

General Wedemeyer, there have been few restrictions in history on the right or the custom of field commanders to offer armistice terms to the enemy?

General WEDEMEYER. That is right, sir; because usually, Senator Cain, the objectives are clearly enunciated, and the government knows exactly what the commander is about to do all the time, and the objective is clearly outlined or the directive is good.

But, in General MacArthur's instance here, where there are a lot of intangibles involved, his ability to bomb the bases or the areas where the enemy was concentrating, there were a lot of angles to General MacArthur's position that I think rendered it difficult and different from the usual military procedure, sir.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

NATURE AND CHARACTER OF KOREAN WAR

General Wedemeyer, we are becoming very conscious of some of those angles——

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator CAIN (continuing). And some of those difficulties imposed called for a lot of understanding and some reasons which are not understandable on our field commanders in Korea.

May I ask you, with that in mind, if you have ever known, for you are a deep student of military history, of any war in all of history which had so many strange and contradictory and conflicting elements in it as has this war in Korea, which is now going and has been going on for about a year?

General WEDEMEYER. No, there is not even—this is not even called a war; this has not even taken on that title, as I understand it, officially.

Senator CAIN. Well, sir——

General WEDEMEYER. This is the most unusual military situation that I think one could visualize.

Senator CAIN. We are not so much concerned at the minute with what the conflict may be called officially; we want to know what that conflict is, in fact and reality, in hopes that we can help to do something about it.

Will you give us your opinion of how you would characterize the Korean conflict? You have mentioned that it is not officially called a war. What would you refer to it as being in any public address you might make to merely a group of citizens in this country?

General WEDEMEYER. I would call it a war.

Senator CAIN. You have seen much of war, sir. How large a war is this, if there is an answer to an inquiry of that character? Would you call it a large-scale war?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, now of course that is relative.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

General WEDEMEYER. It is the largest scale war in process at the moment, of course, in the world, and because of the improved weapons that we have, casualties are very great, particularly those inflicted against the enemy, according to our military reports. They are very high.

Our own casualty rate hasn't been so very high, partially due I am told to the splendid operation of our medical service. We recover so many of our wounded men now, but we are engaged in a full-fledged war insofar as I am concerned, and I think most military men feel that way too.

POSSIBILITIES OF LIQUIDATING KOREAN WAR

Senator CAIN. General Wedemeyer, in talking about the war, is there any likelihood from your military point of view that the enemy might view what to me would be a most rational thing?

He would decide that his national interest could best be served by withdrawing himself from Korea for the purpose of regrouping and resting and waiting for any of a number of future possibilities up in Manchuria, and if that enemy were to withdraw, which would be on his terms, where would that leave the United Nations, General Wedemeyer?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, we still would not have liquidated the situation. There would still be that dire threat of the return of this enemy. Apparently there is no code of ethics involved, there is no period of strained relations and formal declaration of war.

He would aggress again at a time and a place of his choosing. It would mean that the United Nations would have to continue in my judgment a sizable police force there to cope with any contingency, fill the vacuum as it were.

Senator CAIN. And that might logically continue for an indefinite period of time?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, if I were a planner in the Kremlin, it would continue for a long time.

PRESENT STATUS OF WITNESS

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir. General Wedemeyer, a considerable interest has been shown in your present status, and I do not think the question has been asked. In order to satisfy the interest of everybody, would you relate what your present capacity and status in the Army of the United States is, sir?

General **Wedemeyer.** Yes, sir. I am commanding the Sixth Army with headquarters at the city of San Francisco, and that Army comprises the eight Western States.

I have about 65 to 70,000 men under my command, and I am responsible for the expenditure of $153,000,000 of your funds this year.

Senator **Cain.** Well, may I ask, General Wedemeyer, if as appears to be common acceptance, you have applied for retirement from the Army?

General **Wedemeyer.** Yes, sir.

Senator **Cain.** And if so, when is that to take effect, sir?

General **Wedemeyer.** I submitted my request for retirement effective the 1st of August, sir.

Senator **Cain.** Is your length of service such that you are automatically entitled to retirement on your application for it?

General **Wedemeyer.** Yes, sir, after 30 years an officer can apply for retirement.

Senator **Cain.** I think that satisfies everybody's question on that subject, and I am most grateful to you, sir. I think my time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Russell.** You have about a minute.

Senator **Cain.** I would prefer, sir, to wait my turn.

Chairman **Russell.** Senator Hickenlooper?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell.** Senator McMahon?

(No response).

Chairman **Russell.** Senator Lodge?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell.** Senator Fulbright?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell.** Senator Tobey?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell.** Senator Sparkman?

Senator **Sparkman.** General Wedemeyer, I have missed some of your testimony as I had to leave early this morning to go to another meeting, and I was late getting here tonight. If I ask you anything that you have answered, please just tell me you have and we will not duplicate it.

General **Wedemeyer.** All right, sir.

UNITED STATES POLICY IN A CHANGING WORLD IN ASIA

Senator **Sparkman.** I want to say this to you; that there has been a great deal in your testimony that has been particularly impressive and appealing to me.

I have read your reports, I have read the speeches you have made, the suggestions you have made in 1945, 1947, and different times, and I notice first of all that you were always quite direct and frank in the statements you made and the advice you gave.

And I think there has been something in your advice all along that I have not seen emphasized so well in the advice of others. That is your recognition of the need for economic aid, social and political reforms.

I believe every time you had anything to say about Nationalist China you pointed out those elements, and you pointed them out time after time here before his committee.

One of the things in General MacArthur's speech to the joint session of Congress that impressed me was his reference to that same thing. I want to read briefly, and it will be brief, from his speech and ask you if you agree with this.

> In this situation it becomes vital that our own country orient its policies in consonance with this basic evolutionary condition rather than pursue a course blind to the reality that the colonial era is now past and the Asian peoples covet the right to shape their own free destiny. What they seek now is friendly guidance, understanding, and support, not imperious direction; the dignity of equality, not the shame of subjugation. Their prewar standards of life, pitifully low, is infinitely lower now in the devastation left in war's wake. World ideologies play little part in Asian thinking and are little understood. What the peoples strive for is the opportunity for a little more food in their stomachs, a little better clothing on their backs, a little firmer roof over their heads, and the realization of a normal nationalist urge for political freedom. These political-social conditions have but an indirect bearing upon our own national security, but do form a backdrop to contemporary planning which must be thoughtfully considered if we are to avoid the pitfalls of unrealism.

Do you agree with that statement?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. That is an all-inclusive statement, but I definitely do agree that he has expressed the views that I would not nearly so well express in a lecture I give annually at the National War College on global strategy. I try to emphasize that thought to the students of the National War College every year along that line, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. And you believe that these social, economic, and political conditions are conditions that we must recognize all over the world but particularly in Asia?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I wouldn't say particularly in Asia, sir. I think it varies with changing conditions. Sometimes the emphasis is on economic means, and sometimes on psycho-social means; but I agree that those in my judgment are the three major instruments of international policy, foreign policy—political, economic, psycho-social.

I would like to visualize the military as the last resort. The intelligent and the timely employment of those three important instruments of foreign policy in my judgment might, certainly would minimize and might eliminate the requirement for the employment of military force.

Senator SPARKMAN. I noticed in your various recommendations regarding Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists you were constantly pointing out that he could not defeat the Communists by military alone.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I don't think anyone is going to defeat Communism—I don't like to resort to cliches, but there is a cliche to the effect that bullets will never stop good ideas, but good ideas may stop bullets.

Senator SPARKMAN. And I think you certainly have stressed here also the need for psychological warfare?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you endorse the Voice of America?

General WEDEMEYER. Strongly, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you believe we ought to support it vigorously?

General WEDEMEYER. Oh, yes, sir; I think you ought to. I have appeared before a committee over here once to help Mr. Allen get additional funds when I was on active duty in the Department. I believe very strongly in that activity; yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, you have told us something here about the power of Russian propaganda, and they do propagandize a great deal against us because of what they claim is our American imperialism; do they not?

General WEDEMEYER. What they claim to be American imperialism; yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is what I mean.

General WEDEMEYER. I don't accept that it is.

Senator SPARKMAN. That leads me to the next question, and I want to hear your explanation of this, because it does give me some considerable concern.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF FORMOSA

You said that Formosa was important and you made the distinction between being important and being vital. I think others have made that same distinction.

I think that was recognized in World War II, wasn't it, when Formosa was bypassed?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. And we maintained pretty well our line of communications with Formosa in enemy hands.

General WEDEMEYER. That is right.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, I take it that you mean, then, that we would not like to see Formosa in the hands of a hostile group, but would you go so far as to say that Formosa being in the hands of a hostile group would push us all the way back to our western coast?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. In other words, you mean just what you said when you said——

General WEDEMEYER. May I say—I want to qualify that.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. I know you don't want to give the wrong impression about my testimony.

Senator SPARKMAN. Not at all.

General WEDEMEYER. The loss of Formosa is just the loss of an important segment of a littoral along the Asiatic mainland. That would lead to the loss of subsequent segments, sir.

From the mainland and from Formosa they could begin to operate and neutralize these other areas—Okinawa and down in the Philippines—and they would be astraddle lines of communication.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. I didn't want it to be considered a mortal blow to our country, but I say it would be an important loss militarily to our country, and economically it would be a very serious loss, because it helps the economy of Japan, sir.

Of course, psychologically it would be a loss, because we would have lost that area to an enemy.

Senator SPARKMAN. I agree with you completely in your statement.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF KOREA IN ENEMY HANDS

Senator SPARKMAN. But that makes it difficult for me to understand your willingness to withdraw from Korea, because it seems to me that Korea, jutting out into Japan as it does, it presents the same problem to Japan that Formosa might to Okinawa.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; Korea is a part of a land mass, and you take Bataan Peninsula, the Greek Peloponnesus, and any land mass that has three areas of water. It is not difficult for a numerically superior army to overwhelm you and push you right on down and off the peninsula.

I was worried that a Bataan might develop. In addition to that, sir, reinforcements can be easily brought into Korea by the land, but a sea—where we enjoy overwhelming superiority in the water—a sea expedition, an amphibious operation, would be something else.

For example, as long as the Seventh Fleet, Senator Sparkman, is around Formosa, I am not concerned about an amphibious operation, particularly against Formosa.

Senator SPARKMAN. I'm afaid that you didn't understand the point I was trying to make.

General WEDEMEYER. I'm sorry.

Senator SPARKMAN. You indicated that you thought we ought to pull out of Korea.

I assume that if we did pull out of Korea, that would mean that the Communists would take things over.

Now, I am thinking, with Korea jutting right into Japan, as it does, that that would make Japan vulnerable.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, it does, sir; so does the Greek Peloponnesus, if we lose that and the enemy puts his bases there, and on the island of Crete, it would make our line of communications going through the Mediterranean vulnerable; but, are we going to seize and hold all these potentially vulnerable areas around the world?

Are we going to dissipate our strength in such areas?

UNITED STATES RESPONSIBILITIES TOWARD FORMOSA AND CHARGES OF IMPERIALISM

Senator SPARKMAN. Let me get back to Formosa. That is really what I started out to ask you about.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. I am not so sure just what we can do about Formosa, now.

It is not ours, is it?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. It is left in suspension——

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir. We made a commitment.

Before you came in—you tell me now you want me to develop the same subject?

Senator SPARKMAN. If you already put it in the record, that is all right.

General **Wedemeyer**. I indicated to Senator Green that in my judgment we have a commitment to insure that Formosa goes to the Chinese Nationalist Government, a commitment made at Cairo.

Senator **Sparkman**. Well now, in order to do that, should we land armed forces on Formosa to help hold it, if it becomes necessary?

General **Wedemeyer**. I think our naval forces could hold Formosa, sir; and I think your best advisers on that subject, however, are your military leaders in the Pentagon. They know about the availability of the naval means to do that.

Admiral Sherman would be a much better adviser for you than General Wedemeyer.

Senator **Sparkman**. My thought is that we are walking pretty much of a tight rope.

General **Wedemeyer**. We are, sir.

Senator **Sparkman**. Trying to avoid giving substance to this Russian propaganda charge of American imperialism and yet asserting a right as an individual nation to Formosa—are we not walking a pretty tight rope on that?

General **Wedemeyer**. I think we are; yes, sir.

Senator **Sparkman**. And this propaganda charge of American imperialism is a pretty telling charge among Asiatic people, is it not?

General **Wedemeyer**. Yes, sir. Senator Sparkman, you realize, however, in the Molotov-Soong agreement in August 1945, and prior to that at Potsdam, Generalissimo Stalin agreed to recognize the sovereignty of the then Central Government of China, which is the present Nationalist Government—the sovereignty over Formosa and Manchuria.

Senator **Sparkman**. Yes; that is right. Of course, he did not keep that treaty.

General **Wedemeyer**. Well, he has not kept any treaty unless it was convenient for him to do so.

Senator **Sparkman**. That is right.

General **Wedemeyer**. Yes, sir. But in the propaganda effort that he might make to prove or to sell the world that we are imperialistic, we certainly can refute it; and that is why I say we should be more alert in that field, and be more positive. We do not have to lie. We can tell our story truthfully. But we should tell it vigorously—and repeat it, sir.

Senator **Sparkman**. General Wedemeyer, I have a question I want to ask you and I do not know whether I have time to develop it or not; and if not, perhaps I will on the next round.

JCS AND FIELD COMMANDERS

I know from the repeated statements that you have made here that you recognize the need for orderly Government procedures and orderly military command.

Now, you also recognize, I am sure, that it is the function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to serve as the top military advisers of this Nation. Is that not true?

General **Wedemeyer**. Definitely, sir.

Senator **Sparkman**. And you would recommend to us as Members of Congress, as you have said repeatedly here, that we should listen to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General WEDEMEYER. Definitely. They are your senior military advisers and I have explicit confidence in their integrity and in their loyalty to country and to principles. I do not always agree with their judgment as an individual but I would never question it if I were a Member of Congress. I would rely upon their advice.

Senator SPARKMAN. And in the case of a disagreement between a field commander and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to whom should we as Members of Congress and to whom should the American people look for guidance?

General WEDEMEYER. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, without question, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you. I know my time is up.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes; your time has expired. Senator Stennis?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Flanders?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Long?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Gillette?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Brewster?

Senator BREWSTER. General Wedemeyer, I want to develop a little more the question about the closing paragraph which seems to have been the subject of much discussion around this table.

CONCEPT OF COMMUNISM

What is your concept of communism?

General WEDEMEYER. What is my concept of communism?

Well, communism is a political and an economic philosophy that visualizes subordinating the individual to the state. It is atheistic and it would regiment economy, would deprive individuals of their freedom. It abrogates definitely the dignity of man. It does not accept the spiritual side of life. It places a premium on the bestial qualities of human beings. I could elaborate some more.

Senator BREWSTER. Its foundation is essentially materialistic.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. It takes the mechanistic view of the universe and of man.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. And it is essentially totalitarian in nature?

General WEDEMEYER. The organization to implement these basic philosophies results in a totalitarian structure; yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. And whether or not it is utterly incompatible with our concept of democratic institutions?

General WEDEMEYER. I am sorry, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. And whether or not it is utterly incompatible with our concept of democratic institutions?

General WEDEMEYER. I think it is wholly incompatible, and we have had very clear-cut pronouncements by leaders of the Communist Party in Russia, the, you might call it, citadel of communism in the world today.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. And all of the leaders have very frankly told us that it is incompatible with our way of life and with our capitalistic structure, and so forth.

Senator BREWSTER. Are you familiar with the decisions of the Supreme Court characterizing communism as a conspiracy?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. A conspiracy against the liberty of human beings?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. With our own laws of this country requiring the registration of the agents of any foreign government, and the finding that the Communist representatives in this country are parties to that conspiracy?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

WISDOM OF A COALITION WITH COMMUNISTS

Senator BREWSTER. Then, is it not obvious that the idea of bringing Communists into a democratic regime constitutes a complete contradiction in terms?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; it does, Senator Brewster; but I think what Senator Green was developing there was at a time—this was 1945, and, frankly, at that time none of us and few of us here would be taking quite so freely about the dangers of communism. Communism was a hush-hush subject; not many people were talking frankly about their views of communism in 1945 and 1946.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, in 1946——

General WEDEMEYER. They began to talk about it, sir——

Senator BREWSTER. In 1946, when General Marshall, or December 1945, when General Marshall arrived, you did advise him that it would, in your judgment, be utterly impossible to bring the Communists into a democratic government of China.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. I enjoyed a very close relationship with the general, and I talked to him very confidentially, as I have indicated, and I have talked freely to him about my concern with reference to communism; but I also testified here, sir, that I talked to Harry Hopkins and to Averell Harriman back in 1941 and 1942 about what I believed to be the dangers of communism; there were similar or equal dangers with fascism and nazism.

Senator BREWSTER. What I was seeking to show is that it seems to me entirely possible to rationalize the last paragraph of your letter without assuming that you were suggesting that the Communists should be a part of the Government; that is——

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER (continuing). Communists or communism as we know them or it.

Now, that does not mean that individual Chinese who had been Communists might not give up their communism. We have conspicuous conversions in this country of people who were Communists and have for that very reason become all the more ardent disciples of democracy.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, Senator Brewster, this occurred back, of course, in 1945, and I have made no attempt to deny that paragraph. I couldn't; it is in writing, and Wedemeyer did not delegate authority to staff members. I accept full responsibility for it. But I have made it crystal clear that prior to and subsequent to that event, I am on record as opposing that idea, sir; so it is rather difficult for me to explain to myself, and it is more difficult to explain to Senator Green or Senator Sparkman and others who questioned me about it.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, I was seeking to show——

General WEDEMEYER. I certainly have no intention——

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER (continuing). Of introducing communism into the Chinese Government.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, I was seeking to show that if you had given consideration to the matter it was not at all incompatible with the language which you used.

Apparently, it was—I would not call it an afterthought—but apparently you had concentrated, as you say, on other matters, but if you carefully consider the language, and the matter is carefully thought through, it does not at all require envisaging bringing Communists into the Government when you speak of a united democratic China. In fact, it would be the exclusion of Communists, as we know them in this country, and as we now know them in the world, and as they are judicially defined.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; we have a united democratic America, but that does not include Communists.

Senator BREWSTER. And could not under the current concepts of the Communist activities.

General WEDEMEYER. Under the rulings of the Supreme Court.

Senator BREWSTER. So that it seems to me that while it may not have been in the minds of anyone, the language is not the subject of such serious criticism as has been previously leveled at it here.

EFFECT OF COMMUNIST VICTORY IN CHINA ON "OPEN DOOR" POLICY

Now, the next point is that the policy—I think you pointed out in your survey of the situation in 1947, you started with the traditional policies of America toward China of the open door, and pointed out that it had governed our relations with them to keep China independent for the previous half century since John Hay.

Is there any doubt that as of today that policy seems to have been made inoperative as a result of conditions that now prevail on the Chinese mainland? I mean the operation of the policy, it is no longer a fact that China is a free, independent country as we understand it, is that correct?

General WEDEMEYER. That is my interpretation.

Senator BREWSTER. And you believe that the Russian influence is dominant to the exclusion of the interests of the free world?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; in that area, the mainland of China. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. So that our historic policy of a half century has for the present met with a very decisive defeat?

General WEDEMEYER. In that China area?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. That is correct. Whatever may be responsible, it is a condition that confronts us in that theater, and that Russia has—I believe you prefer the use of the term "Soviet"—succeeded in establishing dominant influence over the area of China on the mainland?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

HISTORICAL INTERESTS IN KOREA

Senator BREWSTER. Historically have the Chinese people or their Government any great interest in Korea as a strategic spot of significance to them?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir. Korea at one time, of course, Korea was a part—and ethnologically again the Koreans are a branch of the same racial stem that the Chinese are, but the Japanese, of course, when they assumed control of Korea they subordinated the Koreans and did not permit them to occupy positions of trust or of importance either in the economic life or in the political life.

For example, on a railroad they wouldn't even permit a Korean to be a yard superintendent or an engineer. They would be the firemen, they would be the laboring class. They subordinated them and humiliated them as much as they could and kept them as the laboring class.

Senator BREWSTER. Is it not also true that Russia has historically had a very great interest in Korea in extending its domain down there even under the period of the czars?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, you have got an excellent port there, sir. It is called Pusan now, I believe. That is a warm-water port that the imperial czar regimes for years, all of these regimes have been interested in the acquiring of a warm-water port not only in the Far East but also in the Middle East. That is an excellent warm-water port.

Senator BREWSTER. The point which I am coming to is that so far as the interests of the Chinese people are concerned, there is no great economic or strategic interest in Korea from their standpoint having ports and having resources. They have the interest in Manchuria because of its industrial potential, but not in Korea.

General WEDEMEYER. That is true. The economy of the area north of the thirty-eighth is a little industry there. South of the thirty-eighth it is essentially agrarian, farming, rice paddies, and so forth, but it is not a productive area.

Senator BREWSTER. So that the point to which I am coming is that the activities of the Chinese Communists in seeking to drive the United Nations forces out of Korea would not historically seem primarily to serve the interests of the Chinese but rather of the Russians who have sought domination of Korea for a very long period, over centuries.

General WEDEMEYER. I think that is a very logical conclusion; yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. And it is possible it will ultimately dawn on the intelligent Chinese, if there are any of them left as a result of purges.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Are you familiar with the Russian effort to divide Korea at the thirty-eighth parallel the first part of this century when they themselves suggested that as a division of their spheres of influence between Russia and Japan, which left the industrial potential of North Korea at the service again of the Russians?

General **Wedemeyer**. Yes, sir. It isn't much, though, Senator Brewster.

Senator **Brewster**. No; but whatever it amounts to.

General **Wedemeyer**. Yes, sir. You do get some hydroelectric power and some fertilizer there, sir.

JAPANESE PEACE OVERTURES BEFORE END OF WORLD WAR II

Senator **Brewster**. You spoke when I was questioning you before about the Japanese overtures to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as to possible peace arrangements and his rebuff of those.

Did there at any time come to your attention reports regarding Japanese overtures for a broader peace with the other allies through the Russians or in other ways?

General **Wedemeyer**. Yes, sir. I have attempted, too, since my participation in this investigation to get some tangible evidence of this, so what I am going to tell you is hearsay until I can look into this more.

I think that we had evidence of messages that were sent from Tokyo to Moscow requesting authority to send Prince Konoye as the Emperor's representative to sue for terms of peace. The Russians of course, the Soviet had not come into the war yet.

I think they came in on August 8, and I think these messages, I think we had the evidence of those messages around May or June, July, right around in there, sir.

And I think that the Senate committee might be able to get that kind of evidence.

Senator **Brewster**. Those were messages from the Japanese to Moscow?

General **Wedemeyer**. From the Japanese Government to Moscow, asking the Moscow Government, with whom they were not at war, of course, to act as intermediary and see what peace terms could be made.

Senator **Brewster**. And what was the military estimate of the situation during the year preceding the final conclusion of hostilities with Japan? Could you summarize that estimate as of perhaps the year before and 6 months before?

General **Wedemeyer**. I am sorry; if I had been retained in my job in the strategic policy group, which was my responsibility, I would have been able to tell you completely.

I left there in September of 1943, sir, to go out and assume duties with Lord Louis Mountbatten in southeast Asia. Therefore, I was not informed about the military appraisal a year or 6 months prior to VJ-day, that is, the Japanese capabilities and so on, their ability to continue the war.

I presume that is what you mean.

Senator **Brewster**. That is right.

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Brewster, your time is up.

LIMITATIONS ON FIELD COMMANDERS IN SURRENDER NEGOTIATIONS

General, it is a little too late to indulge in any historical discussion, but I was rather surprised to hear you tell Senator Cain that rarely, if ever, in history, are restrictions imposed on field commanders to negotiate for cease-fire, armistice, or other terms.

General WEDEMEYER. Senator Russell, I don't believe I said that, sir. Senator Cain asked long questions and I possibly said "Yes" or "No" and gave you that impression.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is exactly the way it was.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. He said "Wasn't it a very rare thing in history to ever impose fixed restrictions on field commanders"——

General WEDEMEYER. If you recall, sir——

Chairman RUSSELL. And two stand out very much in my little knowledge of history—the ones imposed on General Grant, and the great difficulties General Sherman got into, even though he was reading his glory in his Nation's eyes, by overstepping somewhat the ideas of the administration in a cease fire.

General WEDEMEYER. You remember, Senator Russell, I did qualify what I stated on this. It was a matter of the relationship between the Government and the field commander, the relationship between his immediate superiors in the Capital or in the Government. And I accept that the military's job is to defeat an enemy, and I am not quibbling about it one iota. I just don't think that the military should determine the terms of surrender, and I think I made that clear, sir, and I don't think as a rule, except with governmental approval, negotiate the surrender. I believe MacArthur received instructions from his Government with reference to the negotiations for the surrender of Tokyo aboard the *Missouri*.

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, General, I have just a few questions.

CHOICES IN KOREA NOW

You would have advised against going into Korea in the first instance, but once in, you favor the adoption of all of the proposals of General MacArthur—bomb Manchuria, institute a naval blockade on China, to employ Chinese Nationalist troops, and to engage in air reconnaissance over the China coast and over China, all of his suggestions to bring it to a victorious culmination, or to withdraw; is that correct?

General WEDEMEYER. I think that it probably would be necessary to implement the four principal objectives outlined by MacArthur to bring about a victorious culmination. I think that that should be done, if at all possible, as I have emphasized, sir, under the aegis, with the cognizance and approval of the Allies who are fighting in Korea alongside our troops.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir. You have made the position perfectly clear on that—we should exhaust every possible effort to impress the justice of that proposition on our allies and, if not, we should go it alone.

CHOICES IN KOREA IN JUNE 1950

Now you state, though, that in the first instance that you would not have landed any ground troops on Korea, but you would have employed your air and your navy against the aggressors. That, of course, would have been limited to the North Koreans at that time?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you have any idea how long it would have taken to have any effect on them by air and naval action to keep from having an interminable action there in North Korea?

General Wedemeyer. No, I don't, sir. I would just take punitive action against them and try to restrict and harass their efforts.

Chairman Russell. Well, that would have been a rather long drawn out proposition, wouldn't it, General?

General Wedemeyer. It wouldn't have been very costly in either matériel or lives, sir, and it would have permitted me to retain the strategic initiative where I would subsequently possibly make my main effort if and when the situation developed requiring my major forces elsewhere.

Chairman Russell. Of course, that wouldn't have involved us with China at all, because the Red Chinese wouldn't have been in. We would have just been bombing the North Koreans.

General Wedemeyer. That is conjectural. That is possible, sir, that they would not have come in.

Chairman Russell. It wouldn't have been necessary for them to come in. The North Koreans had ample forces there to overrun the South Koreans.

General Wedemeyer. Well, they might have used some of their air, Senator Russell, to assist the North Koreans if we were just restricting our efforts to air, don't you know. They might have employed some of their air, because I don't think the North Koreans had any air.

Chairman Russell. You wouldn't hesitate to attack China air if it had been over North Korea, would you?

General Wedemeyer. No, sir, I wouldn't.

Chairman Russell. That could have led to international complications.

BREAKING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

Now, General, you have spoken several times of severing diplomatic relations with Russia. Do you mean that in the ordinary sense of the term, that we would withdraw our Ambassador from Moscow and all our consular representatives, if we had them there, and give them their papers and tell them to go home?

General Wedemeyer. That is right. I would withdraw all my diplomatic and commercial representatives in Soviet Russia and in her satellites and I would require them to do likewise. I would not declare a war.

Chairman Russell. That wouldn't have hurt them very badly, would it, except perhaps from a psychological standpoint?

General Wedemeyer. I think it would help a great deal, sir, in indicating our intentions to take steps that would stop them from aggressing and also, sir, it wouldn't permit them to maintain this tremendous secret service that now has its web throughout our own country and throughout friendly countries.

That was one of the concerns that I had, Senator, with reference to the recognition of Red China, that all of the commercial attachés and diplomatic representatives of China would be established in Southeast Asia and yet we were doing everything we could to stop the spread of communism down there. Through intimidation the Chinese Nationalists would have to operate through those commercial attachés, and so forth, and gradually we would just facilitate the spreading of communism instead of retarding it.

CHOOSING OUR ARENA OF CONFLICT

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir. You said that would have given notice to them of the other steps we would take.

General WEDEMEYER. It would indicate to them our realization that they were the real enemy. They ought to realize it, our people ought to realize it, that they are the real enemy, and our determination to take the appropriate steps to stop their advance, stop their aggression.

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, you also testified that at that time you would proceed to full mobilization in this country, and as you said very eloquently a few minutes ago, "Set about the task of creating conditions that would enable free peoples to prescribe the rules and select the arenas of conflict in all fields of strategy."

Does that mean that you would get better prepared so that we could fulfill this promise that you would have us give to clear the Communists out of Korea at some later date?

General WEDEMEYER. That is correct, sir; just as the British, I think, when they guaranteed the territorial integrity of Poland; they realized they didn't have the capabilities at the time of fulfilling that promise, but they hoped in the future to remove the Nazis from Poland.

Now, it developed that they didn't, it never materialized. Another totalitarian structure has taken the place of the Nazi, but I think the British were acting in good faith when they gave that promise to the Poles.

Chairman RUSSELL. They went to war, anyhow.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. What I wanted to get at, you said "prescribe the rules and select the arenas of conflict," that did envisage carrying out our promise that we would give the South Koreans that we would see that they were restored, even if it took some time?

General WEDEMEYER. That is correct, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. We would hope that it would not be as long as the Poles have had to wait on the British to make good on their promise.

General WEDEMEYER. Now, when I talk about arenas of conflict in these circles of strategy, I am including political, economic, psychosocial, and military.

Chairman RUSSELL. You included that, I believe, when you read your statement.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

MEASURES AGAINST RUSSIA SHORT OF WAR

Chairman RUSSELL. But do you see much hope of actually moving the Russians out of any place that they now occupy without the use of armed force, General?

General WEDEMEYER. I am hopeful that we can reach the Russian people, because I do not believe they are happy at all. I think there are dissident elements in the U. S. S. R. and also I think there are dissident elements and groups that would be happy to defect in the satellites in the areas contiguous to the U. S. S. R. It would be unfortunate if they prematurely defected; but I think with American ingenuity and organizational ability and with determination and support that one day perhaps we can without actually employing military force or without engaging in a third world war overthrow these tyrants, these—these dictators in these areas, and possibly evolve an international organization that will work. The present United Nations is having difficulty in working because of the recalcitrant attitude of the Soviets.

POSSIBLE EFFECTIVENESS OF WARNING THE ENEMY OF OUR INTENTIONS TO BOMB

Chairman RUSSELL. General, I of course was very anxious to avoid involvement with forces of Red China anywhere on the mainland of Asia. I was one of those who approved at the time the President's decision to take action against the Communists in South Korea. I realized, of course, the tremendous danger of the Chinese coming in a mass, which they threatened to do a number of times before they actually did. But I had an idea at the time that when the Chinese did appear in a mass that would have been when we should withdraw our forces and serve notice to the Chinese we did not intend to fight them on the ground, but that we were going to bomb them from the air constantly unless they withdrew from North Korea. Do you think that would have been in anywise an effective program?

General WEDEMEYER. I think it would have been a very constructive step, yes, sir. I watched the developments there. I had a son there—who is just returning, in rotation, and I was terribly interested in what was going on there. I think that would have been a constructive step and a propitious time to do it, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is, we would have notified them that we would destroy such industry as they have in China wherever it is in China.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. And we would notify them, "We are going to strike your cities about every other day, your industrial plants, wherever they are; and whenever you decide to withdraw from Korea, then we will cease this assault from the air."

General WEDEMEYER. And the reasons stated—you know, I agreed with the President's decision to take constructive steps and to indicate his determination—"This is it. You people have overstepped the line and we are going to do something about it." But it was just the idea of putting in our ground forces in there which in my judgment—which was done—that I did not agree with. Apparently you were not too happy about it or you would not have wanted to withdraw them when the Chinese Reds came into the picture.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I am frank to admit that with my very limited knowledge of the equipment and training of the North Koreans and so on, I was inclined to agree with the authorities who thought that you could stop them with a couple of divisions of our American troops. I did not think that they had that military strength which they displayed.

General WEDEMEYER. And I do not think that any military leader did, either, sir. As a matter of fact, one of the reasons Mr. Spaak of Belgium gave: that he, along with the other European countries, thought we could take on those people and defeat them decisively, and that is one of the reasons he felt we did not need more troops over there. And it made sense to me—I had not thought of it before.

VALUE OF WEDEMEYER'S TESTIMONY

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, General, I have been trying to inform myself some on this China policy. It has been a very confusing situation.

I must say you have maintained more consistency of attitude than any other person I have had dealings with in this thing. I was greatly impressed by your remarks before a joint meeting of the State Council and all Ministers of the National Government in August 1947. Just what did that group consist of?

General WEDEMEYER. I would like to say to the Senators present that I did that very reluctantly. I did not like the role at all. But I was urged by the American Ambassador and by the Generalissimo, and I went there not as a Presidential envoy. I made it crystal clear I went there as a friend of China, of the Chinese people. And I did give them an objective outline of my observations.

The thing consisted of all the members of the executive bodies and they were very venerable gentlemen there, years older than I and I just did not like any part of standing up and telling them what was wrong in their country. I did not want to hurt their finer senses. They had always been very courteous and cooperative.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, General, my time has expired and I cannot go into that with you. But I do wish to do it and I might say that I commended you for your statement. I think it is one of our great weaknesses in this whole field of international relations, especially since we have assumed these grave responsibilities that we have today all over the globe, one of our great weaknesses has been the fear of people to talk frankly.

I think if we had someone with the spirit of Andrew Jackson representing us in all our relations with our allies in all corners of the globe that we would be in a much stronger position than we are in today as the result of the hesitancy of our present representatives to speak frankly to those who are our allies and on whom we in turn depend for aid.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I did make a courteous presentation, but it did hurt them. I felt badly after I had done it.

Chairman RUSSELL. Chairman Connally?

(No response.)

Senator Wiley?

(No response.)

Senator George?

(No response.)

Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, may I ask what you plan for the evening? Are you planning to recess or run along? I am prepared to do whatever you wish.

Chairman RUSSELL. I thought perhaps you might take your 15 minutes and then if the committee wishes, recess until tomorrow morning. Or I will recess now, if you wish.

Senator SMITH. I am ready to go on. I am wondering about the witness.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, he looks fresher than the members of the committee. [Laughter.] I was a little more concerned about the committee members than I was of the witness, General Wedemeyer.

Senator SMITH. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

ADMISSION OF RED CHINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator SMITH. General Wedemeyer, do you feel that what has happened in China is virtually a conquest by Soviet Russia of that country? Where they have become totalitarian and where they are controlled by the Communists in China, you have control by an outside power?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; I do.

Senator SMITH. And if that is true, that you have control by an outside power, then the admission of such a conquered government to the United Nations would seem to be a recognition by us that a country can be conquered by an outside power and that outside power can call the shots as to what sort of government we will recognize in the conquered country.

General WEDEMEYER. I agree, Senator.

Senator SMITH. Well, then, I assume from your answer that you would be definitely opposed to the admission of the Peiping government to the United Nations?

General WEDEMEYER. Definitely, yes, sir; I would be opposed to it, Senator.

Senator SMITH. And you would be opposed to any suggestion that as a settlement of the Korean problem, we admit the Peiping government to the United Nations or we turn over Formosa to the Chinese Communists?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

EFFECT OF DEFEAT OF NATIONALIST CHINA ON FAR EAST

Senator SMITH. Now, General, how far in the Far East would you say have the effects of the defeat of National China been felt?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I think it has caused grave concern through Thailand, Malaya, Indochina, Burma, and in India. Those countries contiguous to China are greatly concerned, and also the Philippines, Japan, all through the Micronesian and Melanesian Islands, the people there are concerned. Not only are they concerned about their security, their military security, but they are also concerned about their economy. Raw materials and potential markets for processed goods are gradually falling under the control of this Soviet-dominated area, with the result that the economy of—the entire economy of—the Far East is being upset, an economy that developed through processes of evolution over many years. So, for economic reasons, military reasons, the control of China by the Communists is causing grave concern among all the peoples of that area.

Senator SMITH. Do you feel then from that statement that peace in the Far East will depend upon one of two things? One, the complete taking over by Soviet Russia of the control of all these far-eastern countries with a superimposition of peace by force. Or two, must there be an eruption from within that will throw Russia out of that area which might be characterized, perhaps, as a counter-revolution in China?

General WEDEMEYER. I think it ought to be a combination of both, sir. I think that the Chinese people will not accept, as has been brought out in the testimony in the past 2 days—the Chinese are individualistic and they will not accept the doctrinaire of Marx, but under compulsion they yield, and they submit at this time.

I mention that the adolescents, the children, in China are being indoctrinated very strongly at this time by masters in that art of impressing communism upon the young people; but the adults are not being disturbed so long as they are orderly.

The passage of time may make it quite difficult for us to repudiate some of the ideas that these young people are learning today from their Chinese mentors, Chinese Communist mentors.

Senator SMITH. Well, is it not true, General, that the people in China who see these dangers, if their heads emerge above the masses, they will get those heads cut off by the present Communist government?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. And there is a very extensive purge going on there that may eliminate any opposition?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; that is true. I don't know how extensive the purge is to which you refer, but, of course, in a police state they can control populations very easily by intimidation and by purging leaders, and so forth.

POSSIBILITY OF A COUNTERREVOLUTION

Senator SMITH. Well, from what you know of China today do you think that Chiang, for example, and his forces on Formosa might be the nucleus of a counterrevolution. If not, then are there any other visible elements, such as the guerillas and whatnot, among whom a counterrevolution could be supported that might do the job that probably will be necessary if we are going to have peace in Asia?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I think both could be utilized. I think Chiang and his forces in Formosa and the guerrillas on the mainland of Asia should be exploited and utilized to do exactly that.

Senator SMITH. You mean you feel that it should be part of our policy to support and foster those anti-Communist movements in that area?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir, I think that the United States should foster and support anti-Communist movements any place in the world, sir.

Senator SMITH. And that would be the kind of support you mentioned before, not putting our ground troops in, not necessarily taking part in any active warfare by us, but giving aid in the form of military support and what you call logistic support?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; military aid in the form of matériel and advice.

Senator SMITH. Do you think that would precipitate our getting into war with Soviet Russia?

General WEDEMEYER. It might, but it is a calculated risk that I would accept.

Senator SMITH. Well, wouldn't you even go further than that and say it is a calculated risk which we probably must accept unless in the long run we are going to abandon Asia to communism?

General WEDEMEYER. In my judgment we must accept that calculated risk; yes, sir.

EFFECT OF KOREA ON OUR PRESTIGE IN THE FAR EAST

Senator SMITH. Now another question along this same line. What effect has the Korean conflict had on our position in the Far East, I mean as far as our prestige is concerned? Has it improved our position or worsened our position?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, prestigewise I think that the people in the Far East are surprised that we did not liquidate the situation there much more quickly.

Senator SMITH. That would mean then if anything——

General WEDEMEYER. I think we have lost prestige in the eyes of the orientals.

UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE FAR EAST

Senator SMITH. Well, now in light of all these conditions, and looking at the Far East as a whole, can you define for us what apparently is our present far eastern policy, if any? I am trying to find the answer to that, and I haven't yet found it?

General WEDEMEYER. I think that the United States policy in the Far East includes continued support and recognition of the Chinese Nationalist Government on Formosa.

Senator SMITH. Do you think it does or it should?

General WEDEMEYER. I think it does, sir.

Senator SMITH. It does today?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. I think that that policy has been limited or has stipulations to preclude the conduct of offensive operations on the part of the Formosan Chinese.

As I understand it, our Government does not want them to undertake such operations at this time for fear of embarrassment in their efforts to bring about a negotiated peace.

I think our policy also includes the establishment of a Korean Government which recognizes no barrier such as the past thirty-eighth parallel barrier that existed before the war, and contemplates giving the Koreans an opportunity to determine how and by whom they will be governed without any compulsions or any intimidations.

I think our policy visualizes giving the Japanese similar opportunities to establish a government along democratic lines of self-determination. I think our policy in the Far East includes the support of our allies, the French, in their effort to stop the advance of communism in French Indochina.

We have sent material aid there to the commander of the troops who are opposing the Communist forces in that area. In the Philippines I believe we are trying to bolster that area economically to stabilize the situation and to assist them in recovering, to rehabilitate their war-torn cities and areas. I think that about covers it.

Senator SMITH. Those are our present policies, as you define them. Wherein, if any, do you differ from those policies as so expressed?

General WEDEMEYER. I don't differ with those policies. I think they are constructive. I have in my discussions with members of this committee stated that in my judgment the assistance that we gave the

Chinese Government, the material assistance, given begrudgingly and in a delayed manner and that the moral assistance, which I laid great stress upon, was almost wholly lacking.

Senator SMITH. But you would say it is never too late to mend our ways. If we can see possibly that we made a great mistake, we could pick up now and give the moral support and backing to these anti-Communist forces—I don't say necessarily Nationalist forces in China—but all the anti-Communist forces in the Far East, which would give us a position there of leadership again, which temporarily at least we seem to have lost.

General WEDEMEYER. That is right, sir; I don't think it is too late at all to accomplish those objectives. When you asked me this question, sir, of course you asked me what my views on the policies were. Of course, the State Department would be the best source. You recognize that.

Senator SMITH. Certainly.

General WEDEMEYER. But those are just my interpretations of the policies gleaned from periodicals and some official papers I have read, public pronouncements by responsible officials.

Senator SMITH. Has my time expired, sir?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Thank you.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, the witness is fresh, some of the members of the committee are a bit worn; but we have Admiral Davis and his staff out there, who will be compelled to work approximately an hour and a half after we recess.

So I think that perhaps we should take a recess.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, just before you do, I would like to have published in the appendix of the record three letters which appeared in the Congressional Record of the Eighty-first Congress, second session, giving a page citation of each.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you care to identify them any further, sir? You have them all here?

Senator KNOWLAND. I have them all here.

Chairman RUSSELL. If you turn them over to the reporter, they will be printed in the appendix of the record.

Senator KNOWLAND. Thank you.

(The documents referred to will be found in the appendix of this record.)

Senator SPARKMAN. May I say something off the record?

Chairman RUSSELL. It is only by unanimous consent. Is there objection?

The Chair hears none.

(Whereupon discussion was had outside the record.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Chairman, if it is proper, I should like to have two resolutions which I offered in the Senate on April 17, 1951, and the statement which accompanied these resolutions made a part of the appendix to the record. One resolution provides for a declaration of existence of a state of war between the North Korean regime, the Chinese Communist regime, and the Government of the United States.

The second resolution provides for the orderly withdrawal of armed forces of the United States from Korea.

Chairman RUSSELL. Without objection, that matter will be printed in the appendix of the record.

(The documents referred to will be found in the appendix of this record.)

General Wedemeyer, in the course of Senator Sparkman's examination when you were referring to the various ways of combating communism you stated that you didn't think "anyone is going to defeat communism—I don't like to resort to cliches, but there is a cliche to the effect that bullets will never stop good ideas, but good ideas will stop bullets."

I am sure you would like to finish that sentence where you said, "I don't think anyone is going to defeat communism."

General WEDEMEYER. Through the employment of force.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is right. And I am also sure you did not intend to leave any inference that communism was a good idea.

General WEDEMEYER. I certainly didn't.

Chairman RUSSELL. It would certainly be contrary to all that you have stated on the remainder of this record during a rather long and exhaustive examination.

Well, gentlemen, if there is nothing further, we will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. I think we can conclude with the general by 1 o'clock tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 10:15 p. m., the committees recessed, to reconvene at 10 a. m. Wednesday, June 13, 1951.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 13, 1951

Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:05 a. m. in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), George Green, McMahon, Sparkman, Gillette, Wiley, Smith of New Jersey, Hickenlooper, Brewster, Johnson of Texas, Kefauver, Hunt, Long, Bridges, Saltonstall, Morse, Knowland, and Cain.

Also present: William H. Darden, clerk, Committee on Armed Services; Verne D. Mudge of the committee staff of the Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; and Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman Russell. The committees will be in order.

Senator Bridges?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Byrd?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Saltonstall?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Johnson?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Morse?

RUSSIANS TURNED OVER JAPANESE ARMAMENTS

Senator Morse. General I want to clear two or three things in your testimony that I am confused about, and ask you some other questions besides. I will take the latter questions first.

You testified the first day that the Russians turned over to the Chinese Communists in Manchuria a large supply of Japanese armaments?

TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER, UNITED STATES ARMY, ACCOMPANIED BY LT. COL. MALCOLM F. GILCHRIST, JR., STAFF OFFICER—Resumed

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir.

Senator Morse. Is it not true that the only Chinese troops that were in Manchuria at that time were the Communist Chinese? The Chiang forces were not in that section of China at all?

General Wedemeyer. That is correct, sir.

There may have been some Chinese Communist forces there, but only small numbers; but there were no Chinese Nationalist forces there.

Senator Morse. Whatever Chinese forces were there, were Communist forces?

General Wedemeyer. That is correct, sir; that is, to the best of my knowledge.

Senator Morse. And the Japanese arms that were turned over to them at that time, were turned over to the only Chinese representatives that were available to turn them over to, they couldn't turn them over to Chiang, who was down in another part of China?

General Wedemeyer. Well, Senator Morse, the Supreme Commander Allied Powers, General MacArthur, published General Order No. 1 to all of the subordinate theater commanders out there, the Russian, Malinovsky, and Wedemeyer, in the China theater, to take the arms and equipment from the Japanese prisoners, the ex-military, and turn that equipment over to representatives of the Chinese Central Government.

Those instructions were explicit, sir. In other words, I couldn't turn it over to any Chinese Communist forces, I, in taking over the equipment from the Japanese, my people were required to turn it over to representatives of the China Central Government.

Now, as you stated and so far as I know, there were no such representatives in Manchuria immediately after the war. They got up there very shortly thereafter, within a few weeks' time; within a few days' time, in fact, because I flew them up there in American planes.

Senator Morse. It had not been our experience anywhere, had it, that after World War II the Russians were inclined to turn over anything to the Allied forces? We had great difficulty with Russia even getting back from her ships that were loaned to her, and Great Britain had great difficulty, I recall, and never did get back an airplane carrier from the Russians.

I cite that only to point out that I do not think anybody should be surprised that the Russians followed in Manchuria the same pattern in regard to equipment that they followed all throughout the zones of Europe, in which they took over a great deal of supplies of the enemy upon surrender following VE-day.

JAPANESE SURRENDER IN MANCHURIA

Now it has been brought out in these hearings, General, that of course the surrender of the Japanese in Manchuria was to the Russians. Is not that because there was not anybody in Manchuria to whom they could surrender with forces enough to enforce the surrender other than the Russians?

General Wedemeyer. No, sir. The Russians came into the war, as I recall it, on August 8, sir, and their forces advanced south, quickly overrunning the Japanese Manchurian force.

Your statement, in my judgment, is correct as far as you went; however, the Russians were directed to receive the surrender by this general order No. 1, and directed to receive the equipment, take over the equipment, and——

Senator MORSE. But my point: We did not have other Allied forces up in Manchuria at the time to take the surrender and enforce it. That is, it does not do much good, does it, to fly—suppose you had flown some American officer in there to take the surrender, you would have to back up the surrender with enforcement. Otherwise, it would have been an empty gesture, and the only forces you had there to enforce the surrender were the Russian forces.

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir. That is the part I did disagree with you about because of my personal experience there, Senator.

Senator MORSE. That is what I wanted to clear up.

General WEDEMEYER. The Japanese were completely cooperative as soon as they got their order to lay down their arms. We had no trouble with them whatsoever, sir. It wasn't necessary—one person could go and take charge of thousands of them. There was no resistance whatsoever; they became docile and cooperative.

Senator MORSE. Well, that is the way it turned out.

General WEDEMEYER. That was my personal experience in the theater, sir, though, throughout.

Senator MORSE. That is the way it turned out. But when you are considering the surrender of a large force of enemy, whether it is Japanese or Germans or Italians, or whoever it might be, laying your plans for the surrender, you always take into account, do you not, the desirability of having a force in being in the area of the surrender that can enforce that surrender in case the enemy should change his mind?

General WEDEMEYER. You are absolutely right; yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. That is the only point I am trying to bring out.

General WEDEMEYER. I agree with that point, sir.

Senator MORSE. And the force in being in Manchuria happened to be a Russian force. I don't like it, but that was the fact; and you don't like it, I assume, but that was the necessity of the moment.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. And so we were in a position where an alleged ally, who never was an ally, I repeat, through the Yalta Conference was brought in at the tail end of this war because there was a fear that we might lose great casualties in Japan if we had to make a landing on Japan. I can understand that fear. But, nevertheless, Russia took advantage of that fear, and she collected plenty of booty, it seems to me, by the terms she exacted from us in Yalta, got into the war at the tail end, was in a position to accept the surrender of the Japanese in Manchuria—which, incidentally, is a piece of territory, as you well know, she for decades and decades has had her designs on both economically and at times territorially—got herself in a position to take the surrender, get possession of these armaments about which you have testified and turn them over to Chinese that were sympathetic with the Russian point of view.

Now, is not that about what happened?

General WEDEMEYER. I agree completely with that statement. I think it is an excellent résumé of the developments there.

STILWELL'S CRITICISM OF CHIANG

Senator MORSE. I have read the Stilwell papers, General, and you think that I am in error in one general conclusion that I drew from the Stilwell papers, and that was that he distrusted Chiang and was not particularly enthusiastic about Chiang's military ability or his administrative ability?

General **Wedemeyer.** I derived the same impression, Senator Morse, from reading the book, the Stilwell Papers, and also from remarks that I personally heard him make concerning Chiang and some of the individuals in Chiang's staff, sir.

And of course when I went to this theater, I was given 24-hour notice by General Marshall when I was out in India that, "You will prepare to go to China and take over command of that theater within 24 hours."

I flew over there. General Stilwell did not remain, and consequently I did not have the advantage of a good discussion with him concerning the problems of the theater. I would have been happy to have had him tell me, "These are the individuals you can trust, Americans and Chinese both. These men I have confidence in, these men I don't have confidence in," but I didn't have that opportunity, and I went over there with fear and trepidation.

I thought myself that I was going to have a great deal of difficulty with Chiang Kai-shek. I have indicated in previous testimony, Senator Morse, that I got along very well with Chiang Kai-shek, and I don't sit here and suggest, sir, that I deserve any credit for doing it.

It may be that he felt that, "Wedemeyer is the last American who will be sent to me and he epitomizes American aid, and if I don't cooperate with him, I get no more American aid."

I accept that as a possibility, although I was straightforward with the man in my dealings, firm with him, and of course doing my utmost to implement Chinese against the common enemy, the Japanese.

Senator **Morse.** Well, I want to say, General, that we may disagree on a question of policy here or there, but irrespective of what disagreement we may have on some policies, I want the record to show that I think you did a remarkably fine job in handling your relations with Chiang. There isn't any question that you stepped into a very difficult situation.

General **Wedemeyer.** Thank you, sir.

Senator **Morse.** And I think you did a remarkably fine job in making such progress as was made with Chiang. However, I think it is true not only from the reading of the Stilwell Papers but upon his return to the United States immediately from the Chinese theater, I spent an evening with him here in Washington during which I listened to his briefing on the Chinese situation as he found it.

He went much further in that briefing than he did even in his papers, and expressed the most serious type of criticism of Chiang and felt that there was no hope for what we were seeking to accomplish in China if we hitched our cart to the Chiang group.

I thought that ought to be brought out in the record because even before you went into China there was a pretty serious tension that had developed or area of at least, shall I say, misunderstandings that had developed in our relations with Chiang.

General Stilwell in that briefing was equally critical of the Communists. He just thought that China was in, as I understood his remarks, for a long pull of civil war, and there was nothing we could do about it. We would just have to wait until China went through what he thought was a period of turmoil and civil war.

TENSIONS BETWEEN MAC ARTHUR AND HIGHER COMMAND

Now the first day of your testimony, General, you pointed out, and I agree, that General MacArthur occupied a very exceptional position in Asia, both as the head of our mission in Japan, as the head of our own military forces, and as the head of the United Nations forces, a position which undoubtedly no other American military officer has ever held.

I inferred from your discussion of that point that you thought the whole MacArthur controversy ought to be looked at somewhat from the standpoint of the special position that MacArthur held under his various commissions and assignments. I do not quarrel with you on that.

I only ask you, however, in view of the grave responsibilities that were placed upon MacArthur—responsibilities in a type of command never heretofore held by any American military officer, do you not think it was exceedingly important under all those circumstances that MacArthur used every posssible precaution and caution that he could, that he thoroughly understood the military and foreign policy of the Government, before he in turn entered into any public discussions of American foreign policy and military policy in Asia?

General WEDEMEYER. I agree that it was important; but I also felt, sir, that he testified to the effect that he made an attempt to insure that he understood the American foreign policy and the desires of the United Nations, and sought guidance and direction from appropriate authorities in the United States and in the United Nations.

Senator MORSE. You do not question——

General WEDEMEYER. His testimony indicated that, sir.

Senator MORSE. You do not question, General, that the record, however, of the hearings shows that irrespective of what his intentions may have been and irrespective of what the intentions of his superiors may have been, the fact is that tensions and misunderstandings did develop between MacArthur and his superiors over the course of the months that the Korean War was on?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, there is evidence in the testimony to indicate tensions were developing; yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator.

Senator GREEN?

(No response.)

Senator Hickenlooper?

WEDEMEYER'S POLITICAL ADVISERS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General Wedemeyer, who were your political advisers either in the State Department or the political section of our Government while you were chief of staff and theater commander in China in 1944 and 1945?

General WEDEMEYER. I had four, Senator: Mr. John Davies, Mr. John Service, Mr. Raymond Ludden, and Mr. John Emerson.

They were asssigned to my staff when I reported to assume command of the China theater.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes; and were they from the State Department?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; they were all Foreign Service officers.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. All Foreign Service officers?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. Experienced, particularly in that area.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. During your tour of duty there as chief of staff to the generalissimo and as theater commander, did you have any contact at all with Owen Lattimore?

General WEDEMEYER. None, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, in reference to these advisers who had been assigned to you during that period, General, would you tell us whether or not they had an attitude which appeared to be one of undermining or disparagement of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Government of China, coupled with an at least seeming support or advocacy of the Communist movement in Northern China?

I am asking you that because we have to make up our minds based upon the testimony and various other things. None of us had first-hand information, and I am trying to put you in that same category, counting on your broad experience of the situation, and I am asking for your conclusions on it.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. Well, I can give you information that is not based entirely upon sensing, either. I had direct information because I received from those four gentlemen written memoranda and oral reports indicating or embodying disparagement against the Central Government.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is the Nationalist Government.

General WEDEMEYER. The Chinese Nationalist Government.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. Very critical of the leader, Chiang Kai-shek, and his assistants, and concurrently favorable reports concerning the conditions in Yenan, which they from time to time would visit, Yenan being the center of the Chinese Communist movement.

Whether or not—you used the term, Senator, "undermined"—and whether or not that was their intention, I couldn't state that was, to undermine the Central Government; but the facts are that the reports I received were very derogatory against the Chinese Nationalist Government.

I did not take those reports too seriously, because I emphasize again, sir, that I felt my major job there was to remain with the military problems and solve them, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Was it your understanding, General, at this time that these advisers of yours were representing the view or the position of the State Department?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They were representatives of the State Department, however.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You did not know that they were not representing the view of the State Department. I want to understand whether you had any affirmative view either way, as to whether or not they were representing the State Department.

General WEDEMEYER. No, I didn't, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I see. From your recollection of that time and the circumstances surrounding the advice you received and things of that sort, was it their position or was it your impression of their position that they were advocating the idea that Russia had interests in Manchuria that should be dealt with in one way or another?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, General, beginning with the period at the close of the Japanese war, let's say roughly around August of 1945, would you say that this country regardless of what agency or organization might have influenced it, would you say that this country, this Nation, followed a policy of diminishing help and encouragement and support to Chiang Kai-shek and the National Government, coupled with a knowledge during that period of time that the Communists were receiving at least consistent if not increasing supplies of munitions and arms and logistical help from Russia?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I think that is a fair statement, sir. I felt as theater commander that there was uncertainty back home here relative to our future policies and actions in the area. I strove to obtain direction from my chiefs.

The period from VJ-day right on up to the present, almost the present time, certainly the first few years after VJ-day, I naturally followed developments in the Far East, because of my associations out there, and sometimes because it was an official duty when I was in the Pentagon.

It seemed to me that any constructive purposes or ideas with reference to that area really had their genesis in Congress, and the opposition to those constructive ideas usually occurred in the State Department.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, General—did you finish?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes.

RECOGNIZING RED CHINESE GOVERNMENT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General, let me ask your opinion on this. If the people's government of China, which is the Communist government of Mao, is recognized as either the de facto or de jure government of China, together with all that recognition means in the nations if we recognize them, would you say that would be a substantial victory for the Communists and Communist movement in China and a defeat of the basic aims of the people of the United States to contain and resist communism.

In other words, would it be a victory for them and a defeat for us if we recognized the Communist Government of China?

General WEDEMEYER. In my judgment, if our country recognizes Red China, the Chinese Red government, as either the de facto or de jure government, it would be tantamount to a refutation of our traditional American friendship for those people.

It also would be an abrogation of treaties that had their initiation at the time of John Hay, and following right through; a complete abrogation of our open door policy and of our cooperative attitude that we have with great credit maintained in that area—great credit, I think, to our policy formulators.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There is one other part of my question, General, on which I would be very happy to get your views. Do you think it would be in fact, a victory for the Communist movement in China?

General WEDEMEYER. It would be a victory for the Communist movement in China, in the Far East, and in the world.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I agree with you very thoroughly.

General Wedemeyer, do you think that in our national interests and in the interests of a free world against a communistic advance in the world, that it is essential that the Nationalist Government of China—and I shall leave out the personality of Chiang Kai-shek, but I refer to the government now represented by Chiang Kai-shek—sit at the peace table in settling the peace treaty with Japan, as the representative of China?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir, I do because that is really in consonance with our past policy of maintaining recognition of the Chinese Nationalist Government which was our ally in the last war.

I don't know, as you expressed it, whether the same personality should be involved or not, but the government that represents opposition to the advance of communism is the government that I would support in the Far East, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

General Wedemeyer, do you believe that in any settlement of the aggression or any settlement of the military action in Korea at this time by way of negotiation for an armistice, that is by way of a settlement of the military situation, you might say, in Korea, do you believe that in those negotiations Nationalist China should have a place along with us? I am not saying to the exclusion of discussing the matter with the enemy on the other side, which is the hostile forces, but so far as those who are settling it, should Nationalist China participate in that?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; I think Nationalist China should participate. Nationalist China is a recognized member of the United Nations and in my judgment that should be effected under the aegis of the United Nations organization, sir, such a truce.

JAPANESE PEACE FEELERS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General, during your tour of duty in this period, from 1944, when you went there, were you reasonably aware, were you convinced, I should say, that the Japanese during that period at any time leading up to or prior to the actual surrender were attempting in various ways to feel out and canvass the ground upon which they might surrender and stop the war? In other words, did you feel that the peace feelers on the part of the Japanese were of some substance?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; but I cannot support that with factual evidence; and I was rather hesitant to tell the committee that it was hearsay, rumor; but the were rife, these rumors in my area to the effect that the Emperor attempted to contact Moscow and receive their permission to send Prince Konoye as his representative to Moscow to bring about and to effect an armistice.

BRINGING RUSSIA IN JAPANESE WAR

Now, the other day I read in the paper, or heard this fine commentator, Merrill, state that people should come before this committee and admit mistakes; and I could not agree with anyone more.

I made a mistake, an error in judgment, strategic judgment there, sir; and when I was home in February, the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, asked me if I thought the Soviet should be brought into the war against Japan—this was in February of '45; and I said "Yes, sir," because it was my conviction then that the Japanese would hole in, in what I called the Shantung industrial crescent and up in Manchuria, where they had industrial effort, and I was afraid the war would go on for a long time, and we would lose a lot of allied lives; whereas, if the Soviet would come in, it would precipitate our final victory.

Then, I was wrong about that, my judgment was wrong.

Now, one could say "Wedemeyer, out there, didn't have information about the destruction of our bombing on the war potential of Japan."

It is true that I didn't; but nevertheless I made a grievous error recommending to my chief that we should do that, when he asked my advice.

I want to emphasize that point, sir, because the thing is—all of us are critical of men who are in the field of strategy and there are so many imponderables and intangibles that we can make errors of the mind, certainly not of the heart, but I was wrong in that particular instance.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Kefauver.

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Chairman. General Wedemeyer, pursuing the answer you were giving Senator Hickenlooper—you then in February 1945 thought that it was important to bring Russia into the war against Japan?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

YALTA AGREEMENT CONCESSIONS

Senator KEFAUVER. Then do I understand that you approved or disapproved of the Yalta Agreement?

General WEDEMEYER. I was not at all involved in the agreement, sir. I had left General Marshall's staff and had been assigned to India with Lord Louis Mountbatten. I knew nothing about the philosophy behind the agreements made at Yalta. After I read them——

Senator KEFAUVER. The purpose of the agreement at Yalta was to bring Russia into the war against Japan and to make certain concessions to effectuate that purpose. Was that the policy that you were in general agreement with?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. As I just indicated, I felt that the Soviet should be brought into the war to share our difficulties in the Far East as well as in the eastern zone, at that time, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. And you felt at that time, before we knew whether the atomic bomb was going to work or not, that certain concession to the Soviet was justified for the purpose of bringing them in?

General WEDEMEYER. I am glad you asked that question. I don't think that we ever should have made any such agreements without the cognizance and approval of the country primarily concerned—China. I think the generalissimo should have been consulted, he should have had representation there, and been given the opportunity to point up the implications of those concessions made to the U. S. S. R. at that time, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. You have been asked at length, I take it, several times about your statement on page 766 of the white paper, your report to the President about China.

I think I should point out at the bottom of that page that you said:

> There were justifiable reasons for these policies.

That is relative to the Yalta Conference.

> In the one case we were concentrating maximum Allied strength again Japanese in order to accelerate crushing defeat and thus save Allied lives.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER.

> And in the other, we were withholding unqualified support from a government within which corruption and incompetence were so prevalent that it was losing the support of its own people. Further, the United States had not yet realized that the Soviet Union would fail to cooperate in the accomplishment of world-wide plans for postwar rehabilitation. Our own participation in those plans has already afforded assistance to other nations and peoples, friends and former foes alike, to a degree unparalleled in humanitarian history.

That would seem to indicate that you felt that the decisions reached at Yalta were justified, and that you felt that way as late as—when was this report, August 1947?

General WEDEMEYER. This was in September of 1947; yes, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. September of 1947?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes.

Senator KEFAUVER. That was how you felt then. Is that how you feel now?

General WEDEMEYER. As I stated, sir, I thought that the Soviet should come in and share the casualties and losses and so forth by being involved in the war aaginst Japan.

Senator KEFAUVER. Then I take it——

General WEDEMEYER. All the provisions, Senator Kefauver, I do not agree to and didn't then, as soon as I learned about them. I thought some of them were most unfortunate because I worried about the projected implications of making Dairen an open port and Port Arthur a naval base, and then half interest in the Chinese Eastern Railway with the Soviet.

Senator Kefauver, you haven't been here, sir, in these meetings, but I have uniformly, consistently told the Senators that I suspected the motives and purposes of the Communists way back before even we entered World War II.

Senator KEFAUVER. Yes. I have been at some of the meetings, and I have read most of your testimony, General Wedemeyer, and others. But you do agree that it is quite a different thing—considering what to do at a particular moment and then years after looking back at what had happened?

INTERPRETING RADIOGRAM OF DECEMBER 7, 1945

General WEDEMEYER. Oh, completely, sir; yes, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. Now, General Wedemeyer, you stated that Secretary Acheson had stated the last part of your telegram of December 7, 1945, out of context. Did you get that straightened out for the record?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I think I have, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. The reason I ask you that is I did not think that he quoted it out of context, because I find in the record of June 9 he read the whole telegram.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I didn't realize that he had.

Senator KEFAUVER. You will find that at page 5917 of the record of June 9.

General WEDEMEYER. I see. The first day I think, he quoted just the last paragraph of that telegram and then the following day I believe what you say is true.

Senator KEFAUVER. I believe it was in answer to a question by Senator Cain in which he put in the whole telegram.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. But General Wedemeyer, what is there in this telegram that would give section 13 a different meaning than what section 13 purports to mean, that is that you favor a joining of the opposing forces in China?

General WEDEMEYER. I stated yesterday, sir, that I felt that when one read that paragraph, that is exactly the meaning that it imparts.

Senator KEFAUVER. Yes, I have your testimony in colloquy with Senator Sparkman, but my question is not only when you read that paragraph, but when you read the 12 preceding paragraphs what is there in the 12 preceding paragraphs that would give a different meaning to the thirteenth paragraph?

General WEDEMEYER. This, sir. I think those preceding 12 paragraphs indicate my interpretation, and apparently concurrence of Spruance and MacArthur, that the repatriation of the approximately 3,000,000 Japanese and the movement of several Chinese Nationalist armies from the southeastern part to the northern part, those steps were approved by our Government in consonance with the policy of our Government to improve or strengthen the position of the recognized Chinese Nationalist Government vis-à-vis that of this Chinese Communist Party which had an armed force.

It seemed to me the whole philosophy behind that policy was to improve the position of the Chinese Central Government, and that is the way I interpreted it, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. But General Wedemeyer—had you finished?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. All right, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. As I read the telegram, the only paragraph that deals with the matter of whether or not the opposing forces should be joined together or compromised is the thirteenth paragraph. The others seem to deal with entirely other matters, that is the others deal with getting the Japanese out and the matter of certain naval operations, Liberty ships.

The only one that I find here that has to do with whether or not they should try to have some reconciliation with the opposing forces seems to be the thirteenth paragraph.

I am not being critical except that looking at things at that time and looking at them now, I suppose many of us would have different opinions.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, sir, I indicated yesterday I could present documentary evidence to prove that in my mind prior to sending this telegram and subsequent, immediately subsequent to sending this telegram I had always felt that we would experience great difficulty, in fact it would probably be impossible to coalesce the Communists and the Nationalist forces in a political sense, in an ideological sense because they were so strongly divergent in their views.

Senator **Kefauver.** General Wedemeyer, the only way one can tell what you had in mind is by what you put in the telegram, and this was a direct telegram asking you what was in your mind.

General **Wedemeyer.** Yes, sir. I am not straddling one iota. I accepted yesterday, and I do now, full responsibility for my share in that radiogram, for the statement embodied in it, but I do think, sir, that sometimes we go along with wording and expressions under duress as we were here.

I had bigger problems; as far as I was concerned, my big problem involved these 3 million Japanese, the repatriation of those men and the movement of these troops which was really, as a theater commander, a tremendous task requiring a great deal of coordination, and actually, sir, I tried to stay out of these political policy matters as much as I could.

I don't recall who introduced the idea of this paragraph. I don't recall it, but I did go along with it and I accept responsibility for it, but I have tried, Senator Kefauver, to indicate to you that if you—and I think you do rightfully—derive from that paragraph the thought that I believed in a coalition government and was trying to establish a policy back here or assist in the establishment of a policy, then I say to you that that does not convey the real feelings or my thoughts in my mind either at that time, before or subsequent thereto, sir.

Senator **Kefauver.** But, General Wedemeyer, in fairness, you would not blame anyone——

General **Wedemeyer.** Not at all.

Senator **Kefauver.** Back here in the United States, for feeling that that was what you thought should be done and in acting upon your recommendations?

General **Wedemeyer.** Not at all, sir. I made that clear yesterday. I tried to, at least.

IS BOMBING MANCHURIAN BASES AN ACT OF WAR

Senator **Kefauver.** Now, General Wedemeyer, about this bombing of bases in Manchuria. What bases do you think ought to be or would be bombed if we went out for that in Manchuria?

General **Wedemeyer.** What bases should be bombed, sir?

Senator **Kefauver.** I supposed you had thought about it; what cities or what supply depots and what bases and what arsenals——

General **Wedemeyer.** Yes, sir; if I occupied General Van Fleet's position, Senator Kefauver, I could answer that question intelligently and immediately. But I cannot answer from this position. I am not acquainted enough with the situation in that area. The military commander there is.

Senator **Kefauver.** Would Mukden, Port Arthur, and Dairen be proper bases to be bombed?

General **Wedemeyer.** I would feel that I am not qualified to answer that question, sir. That is a very important question and should be answered by the military commander on the ground.

Senator KEFAUVER. The thing that bothers me about the scope of bombing these bases is whether or not that is an act of war against the Soviet Union. You think it is?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. Does not the Soviet Union have joint control of the railroad, the Chinese and Manchurian railroad that comes down through Mukden and Port Arthur and branches off to even towns and cities on the Northern Korean border?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, under the Yalta agreement as I understand it, sir, they have joint responsibility for the operation of that Chinese Eastern Railroad; yes, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. Not under the Yalta agreement at this time, but under the treaty between Red China and Soviet Russia of February 1950, they have joint control.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. Of the railroad up to a certain time that has not yet been reached. Do you not feel that bombing of a railroad owned by the Soviet Union might conceivably give them justification to feeling it is an act of war against them?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, it might, sir. That might result in a war. It is a calculated risk that personally I would recommend we accept. Of course, when they shot down this naval bomber over the coast—I think over the North Sea, sir, as I understand it, our investigations prove conclusively that our naval bomber was not over Soviet territory at all. However, it was shot down by Soviet planes and that was tantamount to an act of war or could be interpreted so.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY RELATIVE TO GOING IT ALONE

Senator KEFAUVER. General Wedemeyer, I am concerned about your philosophy. Since we have entered into plans of collective security and collective action, I am concerned about what your program of going it alone would mean to those collective plans. Do you conceive that by going it alone we would lose our allies in our joint effort?

General WEDEMEYER. I qualified that statement, sir. I can't visualize the United States going it alone. I think all free peoples will rally around dynamic, intelligent, and vigorous leadership.

Senator KEFAUVER. What if they do not rally around?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, sir, if you investigate the effort put into World War II, both bodywise and materielwise; if you investigate the effort being put into the Korean War, the same two categories, you will find that by far the United States is making the preponderant effort.

Senator KEFAUVER. Has my time expired?

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired. The last question was after your time had expired, but that was due to the fault of the Chair. Senator McMahon.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Lodge.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Fulbright.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Tobey.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. General Wedemeyer, I am going to ask you just one or two brief questions, because I must get to another committee before 11 o'clock.

PARTICIPANTS IN JAPANESE PEACE TREATY

I was interested in a question propounded to you by Senator Hickenlooper a few minutes ago with reference to the making of the Japanese peace treaty. You know, of course, that one of the main objectives of General MacArthur was that we would have an early peace treaty with Japan, and that Mr. John Foster Dulles for several months now has been working rather energetically to bring that to pass.

If I understood correctly, you said you thought that the Nationalist Government of China ought to sit at the peace table. I think all of us in this room perhaps would agree with that statement; but we know also there are other governments concerned with that peace treaty that are insisting just as strongly that the Communist Government should sit at the peace table.

Now, suppose we came to a stalemate on that question. Would you recommend that we simply not execute the peace treaty or that we go ahead and execute it without either one present, allowing a separate peace treaty to be executed later between Japan and Nationalist China?

General WEDEMEYER. Senator Sparkman, that is a very important question.

Senator SPARKMAN. It is a real problem facing us now.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir, it is; and I don't feel particularly qualified to give you an answer on that, sir. I think the people in the State Department, who are considering all the implications with references to future policies and plans out in the Far East, are better qualified to answer your question.

I have indicated my hope, my sincere hope, that an organization similar to if not the existing United Nations Organization can maintain and can function with increasing effectiveness with reference to international problems.

I would feel very—I would not recommend arbitrary action on the part of my Government in its relation with these other goverments in the United Nations Organization.

One must weigh, in my judgment, carefully the implications of recognizing the Chinese Red government for these countries that take such a strong position pertaining to that question, the economic interests of these countries.

If we are going to function as a family of nations, we have got to make personal sacrifices individually and collectively. I mean by that, that the nations will have to make a sacrifice, material sacrifice, possibly in the field of economy so that it hurts deeply.

They have certain vested interests in that area, and it might jeopardize their economy, but those considerations are really beyond my present capacity to comment intelligently about.

If I had access to all of the information that John Foster Dulles has, and possibly General MacArthur, pertaining to that area, plus the information that I have about the Chinese and the Korean situation, I might be able to give you an intelligent recommendation, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, I want to be certain then that I understand this correctly, because I am dealing with a problem that we are going to be right——

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN (continuing). Squarely up against within the next few weeks probably.

You do not intend then by your answer to Senator Hickenlooper to exclude the possibility, if we are forced to do it, of our entering into a peace treaty with Japan with such other nations as will join us without the representation of either the Chinese, the Nationalist Chinese, or the Communists.

General WEDEMEYER. Senator, I do recommend strongly against recognition of the Chinese Red government.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, now, may I say you understand of course, that England did make the specific request of us that the Chinese Communist government be allowed to sit at the peace table, and that we immediately rejected that idea.

General WEDEMEYER. I understand that, sir; I understand further that they unilaterally, insofar as I have knowledge, recognized the Chinese Red government, and the Chinese Red government has never recognized the British Commonwealth.

They have not returned these diplomatic amenities. I do not think that any ally should undertake unilateral action in the premises, and I was very disappointed.

I spoke in a complimentary way about our British allies the other day, and I was sincere about it. I still think they are wonderful allies and wonderful people, but I was disappointed in that action.

Whatever action we take, or the British take or any of these nations take, should not be unilateral.

The philosophy behind the United Nations, as I understand it, is collective security and concerted action to establish premises for peace, premises that come near to international justice, as nearly as we can interpret international justice, to perpetuate decency in all human relationships; that seems to me the basic idea behind such an international organization.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, assuming——

General WEDEMEYER. Excuse me, Senator.

Senator SPARKMAN. Excuse me; go ahead.

General WEDEMEYER. But one has to be a realist, and we are contending with recalcitrant nations; the fulcrum is the Soviet in the Kremlin, and I suggest—and we have been unable to bring about peaceful or amicable settlement of international frictions, frictions which frequently we know had their genesis in the Kremlin.

Therefore, it seems realistic to me to advance toward the attainment of our aims, the lofty aims, of the United Nations alone, or with those nations that follow our leadership, a leadership which they want very much. That leadership has been foisted upon us—that leadership.

We have that world position of world leadership unsolicited, but we must exercise that leadership, in my judgment, with enlightened firmness, and with humility, but with conviction, sir.

POSSIBILITY OF SEPARATE JAPANESE PEACE TREATY

Senator SPARKMAN. Assuming that we will refuse—and we have refused—and we will refuse to sit down at a peace conference table with Communist China present, and if we assume that the British will not sit down at a peace table with the Nationalist Chinese present; and assuming further, and we are safe in this assumption, that Russia will not be at the peace table either, as she refuses to go along, and assuming that we could get all of the major powers concerned, with the exception of Russia, to sit down at a peace table writing a peace treaty with Japan, with neither of the Chinese governments present, then, what should we do? Should we refuse to enter into that peace conference or should we proceed and work toward a separate later peace treaty between Japan and Nationalist China?

General WEDEMEYER. Senator Sparkman, now I want to preface this remark, because this is entirely within the purview of the State Department, which is responsible for the formulation and enunciation of foreign policy——

Senator SPARKMAN. General, may I put in, right there, that I am going to have to go. I am going to have to go as we have a vote at 11 o'clock; and if you will answer fully, I will read it in the record——

General WEDEMEYER. I would go it alone. I would make a separate peace treaty with Japan, if these circumstances are as you assume they might develop, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland?

PHRASEOLOGY OF DECEMBER 7 RADIOGRAM

Senator KNOWLAND. General Wedemeyer, I think you have very well cleared up the matter about the December 7 telegram; and you stated very frankly that you can see how there might have been that misconception, or wrong interpretation placed upon it; but, that you never had in mind a coalition government in the sense of amalgamating Communists with the Nationalist Government of China, because you felt that that was like mixing oil and water.

Am I correct?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Now, the phraseology of that paragraph 13, in that particular message, mind you, does not include the word "coalition" or "coalesce," it does include the words "unify" and "democratic."

Senator KNOWLAND. And isn't it true, General, that we have, in the normal sense of the word, as you pointed out last night, a unified and democratic Great Britain, without any coalition with communism. As a matter of fact they don't even have a coalition in their executive branch with the Conservatives, who probably represent 50 percent of their people.

We have a unified and democratic America, but we have no coalition, certainly not with the Communists, in our own Government, and not even with the Republicans who, in the last congressional elections, represented roughly 50 percent of the votes; so that it is not necessary to read the word "coalition," in having a unified and democratic government; is that substantially correct?

General WEDEMEYER. That is, in my judgment; yes, sir.

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTORS TO UN FORCES

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, I would like to ask this:

I have been a little concerned, General, by what I read the other day in the papers that the new policy was to be that the individual nations contributing to the UN forces in China should not be individually mentioned. In other words, they should become anonymous, within the United Nations Eighth Army.

Now, I have frankly been concerned with that. I don't approve of that policy.

You have not been in the Department of National Defense recently in the position that you formerly occupied, and you may not be familiar with the figures; and Admiral Davis, if necessary, can take out the figures. But I want to read them to you so we can get brought up to date for the basis of some questions I want to ask you.

[Deleted.]

Now, having that in mind, do you think it is a realistic policy when we have the number of troops that we have engaged in Korea, that on a question such as the question of hot pursuit, which was unanimously recommended by our Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the Secretary of Defense, and according to the testimony before this committee also approved by the President of the United States, that when that was submitted to 6 of the 13 nations that were with us, that it should be vetoed when of those nations 5 had less than one-half of 1 percent of what we had in Korea for their veto? Do you think that is a realistic approach to the situation?

General WEDEMEYER. No; I don't.

I will tell you—if we, you and I, were members of a board of directors or stockholders in a corporation, you owned about 60 percent of the stock and Senator Russell owned 10 and I owned 20 percent. I don't think we should determine the policies and the actions of that corporation. It just doesn't make sense to me.

But I can see the philosophy behind it, sir—the effort being to make the United Nations Organization work, and I like that.

For example, in the three military services—the Army, Navy, and Air Force—in the last war sometimes one service would get a preponderance of the publicity, and there would be tremendous jealousies, and I did my best to insure that the boys who were greasing trucks got the same amount of publicity that some spectacular youngster in the air did flying a pursuit ship. I did my utmost to do that.

Senator KNOWLAND. General, I fully agree with that, and I have supported the United Nations here; but I do feel that if we are going to be realistic, and if we are going to make the UN work, we must make it clear to our associates that if we are going to have a real collective security, they must underscore the word "collective," and each one put in their full share toward the common effort.

That is the only point that I have in mind. And it seems to me if out of 60 members of the UN—6 of them are the Soviet Union and its satellites; that leaves 54—of the 54, up to date my information is there are only 15 who have contributed any armed forces whatsoever; and of those 15 all of them put together have contributed less than 10 percent.

I don't think that the UN as a collective security organization is carrying its fair share of the load, and I think somewhere along the line—I am not at the moment now pinning responsibility—we have either not made clear to them or they have not correctly appraised the situation in realizing that there should be a wider contribution on their part. That is my only point.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I think there could be no question about your point. In my judgment that is a good analysis of the situation.

TESTIMONY OF THE JCS

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, General, yesterday you stated that Congress should give great weight to the testimony of the Joint Chiefs who were the principal military advisers to the Government. Does this not place a great responsibility on the Joint Chiefs that they consistently give their best professional military judgment to the defense needs of the Nation, and doesn't it place a responsibility on them if perchance they water down their best professional military opinion to fit the views of a particular Secretary of Defense—and that is a hypothetical case at the moment—are they not likely to deprive the Congress of the realistic advice needed if Congress is to carry out its constitutional obligation to raise and support armed forces?

Doesn't it become a situation like a doctor, that they must give their best professional military opinion to the Congress as well as to the executive branch of the Government?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; I think that is correct, but you realize, sir, that the man who is selected to be the chief of a service is usually our outstanding leader in character and professional ability, and I think the Congress should respect his views and listen to him very carefully.

I, personally, in my experience over there never had a policy of what you call a symphony of sycophants, and I expressed my views frankly.

I think the character and ability of a man who reaches top place would influence a great deal my categorical answer to your question, sir.

KREMLIN IMPRESSED WITH FORCE

Senator KNOWLAND. On January 1, 1948, General Wedemeyer, the President's Air Policy Commission recommended 70 air groups as a minimum necessary for our national defense.

Yet the administration ignored that recommendation of its own Air Policy Committee and because of large expenditures for grants abroad and the high nondefense spending at home, the program was cut to 40 groups.

Now, despite this fact, the Congress provided funds for 55 groups, which in turn were frozen by Executive order. Now as a military man, do you believe that the realistic men in the Kremlin would have been more impressed by 70 groups in being on we will say the 1st day of June 1950, 24 days before the Korean invasion, than they would have been impressed by a mere report calling for 70 groups?

In other words, would 70 groups in being possibly have prevented the aggression, in your opinion?

General WEDEMEYER. It is possible, yes, sir, because I think the leaders in the Kremlin are today impressed with force. They are very much impressed by force. We have tried to settle problems in the realm of ideas through negotiations and have been unsuccessful.

COORDINATING GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS

Senator KNOWLAND. I would like to ask this, purely from a professional military viewpoint now. You have had a long service and I think are generally recognized as one of the top flight officers in the entire Defense Establishment, and I want to say personally as one Member of the Senate I greatly regret your retirement from our Armed Forces, because I think we are losing one of our top-flight men, but asking your professional judgment, do you believe that in the future as in the past it is essential that there be the fullest cooperation by the State Department with the Military Establishment so that our commitments abroad will not exceed our capabilities of carrying those commitments out?

General WEDEMEYER. Oh, yes, sir; it is imperative. Fifty years ago there were no compelling reasons for our leaders to take a great deal of interest in developments abroad, but today in the military and in the economic fields it is absolutely essential for our well-being and security that we do watch developments and be cognizant of every move even in formerly remote areas like Iran, Korea, and so forth, and there should be carefully coordinated plans, and all of our actions should be carefully coordinated with all departments of the Government.

And today, in my judgment, we are not organized to do that. I don't know of any agency where such important international planning is possible. The National Security Council is set up to do it, but those gentlemen, the President ex officio is the head of it, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and so forth, the members, they are too busy with their primary jobs and there is no organization that I know of or agency performing that highly important coordinating effort, planning and action on the part of our Government in the international field.

Senator KNOWLAND. Did you know, General Wedemeyer, right on that point, that your report on Korea which was not available to the Congress for 4 years and which I think if you had had a crystal ball to look into, the dangers which confronted us in that part of the world could not have been more clearly set forth than in your report on Korea—that that report was never made available to the head of the Central Intelligence Agency, though he testified last year about 30 days after the invasion that the report would have been tremendously helpful to him and he would have liked to have seen a copy of it?

General WEDEMEYER. I did not know that; no, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator .

Senator Gillette?

(No response.)

Senator Brewster?

MILITARY RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE INDIVIDUAL

Senator BREWSTER. General Wedemeyer, I have been much interested in your careful enunciation of your position in regard to the military responsibilities of the individual. We have had it from other witnesses and I think I would like to have your testimony as to at what point, if any, a soldier would be under some obligation to his country to take to the country or to the Congress the differences in judgment which prevail within his military province?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, my code, my conduct since I have been an officer, sir, has been shaped as follows.

I feel a deep sense of loyalty to those immediately above and equally to those under me. After I got into positions where policy-making was involved, I feel that I should be authorized to assume the position that I am serving my country and no individual or no political party insofar as policies are concerned.

Now, in the operational field, a division commander should obey unequivocably an order he gets from a corps commander, his next higher-up, and once he gets a decision and understands it he should carry it out even though he may not agree with it.

But when you get into the realm of policy—and all this controversy centers around the American figure of General MacArthur—when you get on that level I can understand how he felt he was doing his duty in replying to the request for information from a man who represented perhaps 250,000 or 300,000 constituents, American taxpayers.

But as I stated to you, sir, or stated to the committee, the other day, if I had been the officer involved, in the first instance I would have asked Mr. Martin to treat this in confidence, and then I would have sent a copy of my reply and a copy of Mr. Martin's letter to my immediate chiefs and stated to them, "This important Member of Congress is disturbed and confused. I recommend you contact him and try to clarify our policies in that area."

But I would not object any time, Senator Brewster, to any officer in my command writing frankly to any Senator or Congressman. I would not feel he was disloyal to me, as an American. And I am confident that that is going on all the time.

Senator BREWSTER. I understood your position, General, and while I recognize the extent to which this has revolved about General MacArthur, I think there is something that far transcends that, and that is what I am here concerned with in your retirement as deputy chief. You were then in a policy-making division where you were concerned with planning.

At what point would you there feel, if you were summoned before a committee to state your views as to what our wise policy would be, would you feel under any limitations or inhibitions as to stating fully and frankly before a congressional appropriate committee your views as to what our policies should be, even though you occupied the position of deputy chief?

General WEDEMEYER. I would express uninhibited views to any senatorial or congressional committee before which I appeared unless I received explicit instruction from my immediate commander to do otherwise.

Then I would indicate to that committee that I was not permitted by my superior.

Now, the President, in the instance of my report, did state—I received a written memorandum to the effect that I must not divulge the China report, and I adhered to his orders, of course, loyally, and all the members of my mission did. None of us ever quoted anything in that report.

INTERPRETING CHINA WHITE PAPER

Senator BREWSTER. I think that clarifies it to some extent. I want to establish from your report of August 24, 1947, certain statements which I think should be in the record. I won't ask you for any extended comment unless you feel you should.

This is from the white paper on China, page 776. The first sentence reads:

> Since the end of the American mediation effort in January of 1947 the United States has continued to withhold aid to China in the hope that an improvement in the Chinese internal situation would permit the extension of effective aid toward rehabilitation and development of economic stability.

That is a simple statement of fact, which I assume needs no further verification.

At the bottom of the page:

> In view of the continued economic deterioration in National Government areas, it may be said that the American mediation effort has been to the advantage of the Chinese Communists and conversely to the disadvantage of the National Government.

I will not ask you to fix the responsibility. I simply again want to ask you whether or not your judgment still concurs in that statement?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir, under the conditions existing at that time, yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. I am not trying to blame anyone, I just want to establish the result. On the next page, page 777:

> In spite of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 and its related documents, the Soviet Union has hindered the efforts of the Chinese Government to restore its control over Manchuria, has not given the moral support and aid in military supplies and other material resources provided for in these documents and has not permitted the Chinese Government freely to take over the civil administration of Dairen and the Port Arthur area. Rather, the Soviet Union has assisted the Chinese Communists in Manchuria by the timing of the withdrawal of Soviet troops and by making available, either directly or indirectly, large quantities of surrendered Japanese military equipment.

You would not modify or change that statement as of any——

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir; I think that nothing has ever occurred that would cause me to feel that that statement is incorrect and not defensible.

Senator BREWSTER. And, if anything, later developments have lent confirmation to what was undoubtedly going on.

General WEDEMEYER. Some of the developments reaffirmed that statement.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, we come over to your later report and recommendations on page 810. You say:

> The present industrial potential of China is inadequate to support military forces effectively. Hence outside aid in the form of munitions (most urgently ammunition) and technical assistance are essential before any plans of operations can be undertaken with reasonable prospect of success.

On the next page you speak of the lack of motor vehicle parts and how essential they are; that they have 16,000 motor vehicles but without the parts they would be impossible to operate, and you then say, and I quote:

> The United States has unilaterally voided this contract as the required surplus stocks are not available and no legal way for furnishing them exists.

You then go on about the purchase of additional military equipment, and you say:

> Since completion of the 39-division program nearly 2 years ago—

that would be 1945—

> very little has been supplied. Thus, there are many shortages in military equipment which react to the disadvantage of Nationalist military efforts. Without such aid, American equipment purchased during and subsequent to the war is, or soon will be, valueless since maintenance parts will not be available to continue the equipment in use.

And on the next page you speak of the ammunition supplies, page 812:

> In July, the Navy abandoned 335 tons of ammunition in Tsingtao which was recovered by Nationalists. However, Nationalist armies continue to complain of shortages in ammunition of all types and calibers. There will be severe shortages in the near future unless replenishment from foreign source is accomplished. There is an implied moral obligation to assist the Chinese Government to obtain ammunition.

Then, on the next page, 814, you recommend, among other things—you have several recommendations, but I read these two:

> That arrangements be made whereby China can purchase military equipment and supplies (particularly motor maintenance parts) from the United States.
>
> That China be assisted in her efforts to obtain ammunition immediately.

NATIONALIST AMMUNITION SUPPLIES

This emphasis on the shortages of ammunition is a matter which has been quite thoroughly discussed. There has been quite a little discussion about that here.

Do you feel that was an important factor in the difficulties which the Chinese Nationalist Government experienced?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. The availability of ammunition would have, of course, enabled the Chinese Nationalists to operate against the Communists effectively, again provided American advisers were present——

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER (continuing). So that they would utilize that ammunition or any other equipment that we made available in consonance with applied tactics and techniques.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. And I also always recommended American supervision and advice.

Senator BREWSTER. We have heard a great many stories about equipment and matériel, but would it be true that if they lacked the ammunition, all the guns in the world and all the motors in the world and all the tanks in the world would be utterly useless——

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER (continuing). If they did not have the ammunition?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. And that was one of the great problems which the Chinese Nationalists faced?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

RELIEF OF JOHN P. DAVIES

Senator BREWSTER. Now, I want to ask you, General, about Mr. John P. Davies, who was one of the advisers whom I think you inherited——

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. And the circumstances surrounding his return to the United States.

To what extent are you familiar with that?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, of course, the official who relieved him would be your best witness, Ambassador Hurley.

Senator BREWSTER. But as I understand, you were present at some of the discussions which ultimated in his retirement——

General WEDEMEYER. His relief, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. His relief, yes; but I mean, his retirement from your area.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

The Ambassador's house had been bombed. It was about a block away from me, and it was on a steep bank and the bomb missed the house and hit the hill and a boulder rolled into Ambassador Hurley's house——

Senator BREWSTER. I was there.

General WEDEMEYER. And he had to live with me for a time. He was staying with me for about 10 days until the renovation was completed; and Mr. Davies, with whom I had excellent relations, came to see me, sir, at berakfast time, in my own quarters, just before I went to the office, and Ambassador Hurley was there and these two gentlemen engaged in a very heated argument in my presence, in my home.

Senator BREWSTER. And to what extent did this revolve about the attitude of Mr. Davies regarding the State Department policy at that time?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I am recalling now a conversation that occurred several years ago, and I don't remember all of this—these ideas, but I do know that the Ambassador alleged that Mr. Davies had been disloyal to him, the Ambassador, and that he had not supported the Ambassador; and that he had taken actions, written reports, that militated against the accomplishment of Ambassador Hurley's assigned mission in China, namely, to support the Chinese Central Government.

Mr. Hurley accused Mr. Davies of failure to support him or the American policy in that area; and Mr. Davies responded defending his actions and stating categorically that he at no time had intended to be disloyal; that he had given an objective account as he saw it of the prevailing conditions there.

There were recriminatory exchanges. The whole atmosphere was very acrimonious. Mr. Hurley stated that he was going to recommend that Mr. Davies be discharged from the Foreign Service, and Mr. Davies persuaded or asked the Ambassador not to do that; to permit him to remain in the Foreign Service—words to that effect. I believe

Mr. Hurley never did recommend that he be discharged from the Foreign Service.

Of course, again, Mr. Hurley would be your best witness.

Senator **Brewster**. Mr. Chairman, I am going to ask unanimous consent if I may ask one more qeustion which I think will require only brief reply.

Chairman **Russell**. Without objection, the Senator will ask the question.

Senator **Brewster**. The only thing that I wanted to establish right at this point was that up to that time the reports of Mr. Davies were going through military rather than diplomatic channels, so that they did not pass through Ambassador Hurley's office at that time.

General **Wedemeyer**. Yes, sir; that had been the custom, Senator Brewster, when I arrived over there.

Senator **Brewster**. Yes.

General **Wedemeyer**. And I just followed that procedure. But I must tell you that as soon as I began to get shaken down in my area, as it were, I talked to Mr. Hurley, and we made an agreement that we would keep each other informed of everything going on pertaining to respective activities and responsibilities.

Senator **Brewster**. Yes.

General **Wedemeyer**. So I never did anything that I didn't keep Mr. Hurley, our senior American, advised about. And he likewise never made a report to the President that pertained to my responsibilities without giving me an opportunity to comment on it. He didn't necessarily agree with me, but at least he gave me the opportunity to comment.

Now when it was drawn to my attention that these reports were being processed through my headquarters and circumventing—I don't say maliciously—but a copy was not being sent to the Embassy, I took steps to have copies sent immediately to the Embassy.

Senator **Brewster**. Thank you very much.

General **Wedemeyer**. Yes, sir.

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Hunt? Senator Hunt just advised me that he was compelled to attend another committee meeting.

Senator Cain?

WITHDRAWING FROM KOREA

Senator **Cain**. General Wedemeyer, permit me to say that your clarity, sense of fairness, boldness, and convictions have moved me deeply, and I consider these past several days in your company to have been a splendid privilege for myself.

General, in an effort to summarize for additional study the position which you have maintained before us, and which you have maintained and recommended for some time before you came to the committee, I should like to ask you the following 14 questions. If I have understood you correctly, your answers can be exceedingly brief.

Do you believe that Korea is a vacuum in which the Soviet would like to see America involved, and into which the ground strength of America and her allies should not have been committed, and out of which you believe that America and her allies ought to be withdrawn at the earliest practicable time? Is that correct, sir?

General **Wedemeyer.** Yes, sir; I answer that question affirmatively.

Senator **Cain.** Thank you.

General Wedemeyer, you believe that if the United Nations are determined to carry out their Korean mission to crush the aggressors and to restore freedom to all of Korea, that the United Nations must jointly contribute fire power, personnel, material things, and faith sufficient to accomplish that purpose?

General **Wedemeyer.** Yes, sir.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF UN MEMBERS IN KOREA

Senator **Cain.** You believe, sir, that some of the members of the United Nations have not yet evidenced an equality of sacrifice and contribution during the Korean War which began almost a year ago?

General **Wedemeyer.** I think that statement requires qualification.

Senator **Cain.** Would you please address yourself to it, sir?

General **Wedemeyer.** In my judgment many of our allies in Europe never dreamed that we would have so much difficulty in liquidating the foe in Korea, and initially they certainly didn't feel it was necessary to send troops over there. They had other commitments.

For example, the British had commitments in Malaya and the French in Indochina. I think it was some time before it dawned upon them the tenacity and the effectiveness of the foe in Korea.

Senator **Cain.** Well, that is to say, is it not, General Wedemeyer, that up until this time there has not yet been a full recognition by all of the allies with whom we are joined in combat in Korea of the need for making greater sacrifices and contributions to a common cause?

General **Wedemeyer.** I believe it is apparent now that we really have a serious problem, to our allies, and I think that additional contributions will be forthcoming. I am confident that that will occur among our major allies at least.

Senator **Cain.** Thank you, sir.

General Wedemeyer, you believe that ultimate disaster confronts the free world if all of the free members of the United Nations do not join together in fulfilling any common objective or mission?

General **Wedemeyer.** Well, I don't think it is necessary for all of the free nations to join either. I have often heard it stated that we are absolutely dependent upon our allies. I do not agree with that.

A determined America—and we do have friends who will stick by us, I am confident—we can cope with this situation if we have dynamic and intelligent leadership and a plan that coordinates our effort and doesn't dissipate our resources, human and material, to far-flung places in the world that have little or no significance strategically.

MILITARY RESTRICTIONS ON A THEATER COMMANDER

Senator **Cain.** Thank you, sir.

General Wedemeyer, you believe that no military restrictions should be imposed upon a theater commander once a mission has been given to him?

General **Wedemeyer.** That is correct, sir. There should be no restriction because he is responsible for the lives of human beings, and he must conduct his operations with the view to economizing his force, accomplishing his mission with a minimum loss in lives, and he cannot do that with restrictions such as are sometimes imposed, as has been alluded to in this testimony.

Senator CAIN. General Wedemeyer, you believe——

General WEDEMEYER. Excuse me.

Senator CAIN. I beg your pardon.

General WEDEMEYER. If it is found that military operations have to be conducted that would embarrass our Government politically or otherwise, then the mission should be changed. The responsible commander's mission or job should be changed, clearly changed, and then the restrictions will no longer have effect or be applicable.

Senator CAIN. I thank you, sir.

ADVOCATING AUTHORIZATION TO BOMB BASES

General Wedemeyer, you believe that under the Korean mission which was given to General MacArthur, that he ought to have been authorized to destroy the enemy's ability to destroy us by bombing the enemy's supply bases and lines of communication and by using whatever combat-ready Nationalist Chinese are now situated on Formosa?

General WEDEMEYER. I definitely believe that, Senator Cain. Now I had a problem though as China theater commander where I had the Chinese Communists killing my men, and I had to kill Chinese Communists. I gave those instructions out, and in so doing generated United States policy in that area in the absence of instructions, instructions which I tried to get from my people back home here, but they were busy with other problems immediately after the war, so I had to take steps that I thought would be in consonance with the American desires, and I did kill Chinese Communists to protect the lives of American men.

Senator CAIN. And military action in that instance actually molded and firmed up American policy?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

CONCLUDING KOREAN CONFLICT THROUGH ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

Senator CAIN. General Wedemeyer, do you believe that the Korean War can more readily and logically be successfully concluded if every free member of the United Nations agrees to and imposes economic sanctions on our enemy, Red China?

General WEDEMEYER. I do, definitely; yes, sir.

Senator CAIN. General Wedemeyer, do you believe that the free members of the United Nations ought to promptly agree to impose a naval blockade on Red China?

General WEDEMEYER. On China, sir?

Senator CAIN. On Red China. We have——

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; I do. On Red China, I do.

Senator CAIN. We have a naval blockade on Korea at the present time.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

UN DISCUSSION OF BLOCKADE

Senator CAIN. General Wedemeyer, on the testimony offered by the Secretary of State and other witnesses, do you have reason to believe that the question of a United Nations blockade has never been offered by the United States to the United Nations nor discussed officially within the United Nations up to this time?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, of course, my reply is hearsay and based upon my perusal of the testimony, sir.

Senator CAIN. Yes; and against your perusal of the testimony does it happen that you agree with me?

General WEDEMEYER. I do.

Senator CAIN. That there is evidence that the question has not yet been offered to the United Nations?

General WEDEMEYER. I do, sir.

Senator CAIN. General Wedemeyer, from the testimony offered to this committee do you have reason to believe that the United Nations have been slow and some members until very recently have been most reluctant to impose economic sanctions upon our enemy, Red China?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; that is apparent by developments.

QUESTION OF BOMBING BASES

Senator CAIN. General Wedemeyer, you do not believe that if the Allied commander in Korea is permitted to protect the security of his forces by bombing enemy supply and troop installations that world war III must inevitably follow?

General WEDEMEYER. I feel that we are at war now, sir. How much effect such bombing or such action on our part would have toward expanding the war is problematical. I do not think anyone is qualified to determine what is in the minds and hearts of those tyrants in the Kremlin.

In my judgment, when they are ready to go to war they will do it at times and places of their choosing. If the past pattern is any criterion they are not going to be influenced by our action necessarily, unless we compel them to go to war, which such action will not, in my judgment.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

General WEDEMEYER. I think they will pick the time and the place of the conflict; as long as they can implement satellites against us it it is to their advantage to do so and not become involved themselves. And they have taken over about half the population of the world and they are gradually orienting those people in their philosophy—toward the Kremlin.

Senator CAIN. Speaking of America's national interest as well as that of our allies it appears to be your view that the bombing of enemy installations is a calculated risk which America and our allies ought to assume in giving our men in the field every opportunity and chance to live and be successful.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir, I have stated that before. I would like to state I have been asked which bases. I do not feel qualified to state which bases or lines of communication should be bombed. I think the commander in the field, the responsible commander in the area, should determine that.

Senator CAIN. I can thoroughly understand your view, and I personally support it, sir.

Do you believe that if we are to seek a decision in Korea, that it would be better and in fact require the United States to go it alone if after every member of the United Nations has been given a full opportunity to agree to remove the restrictions and impose a naval blockade on Red China, they, by way of argument, would refuse to cooperate?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

NEGOTIATED ARMISTICE ON THIRTY-EIGHTH PARALLEL

Senator CAIN. My last question, sir: You do not believe that freedom and true independence and a lasting settlement in Korea can be achieved for all of Korea by securing a negotiated armistice on or about the thirty-eighth parallel?

General WEDEMEYER. I can't state with conviction—I can't reply with conviction to that, sir. I am so certain that in an atmosphere of peace there is better chance of accomplishing compromises or reaching agreements with enemies, potential enemies, and if a truce could be effected, I would accept that truce in the effort to search areas of understanding, search out areas of understanding, and areas of compromise.

I, therefore, can't categorically state that I would not agree to a truce, but I did make the statement at the initial meeting here with you gentlemen that in my judgment in a psychological sense, the way it will be viewed by the far eastern people, the oriental people, a truce will be tantamount to Allied defeat.

But I still think that we should always meet our enemies half way or more than half way in the effort to bring about a peaceful solution of our problems.

Senator CAIN. That is to say that until the enemy, Red China and North Korea, are willing to cease their fighting and agree to terms which would restore freedom to all of Korea, and independence likewise, that the mission of the free nations involved in Korea is to keep going forward in an effort to crush the aggressor wherever he may be found in Korea.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, if I agreed to that, sir, I might agree to magnifying the vacuum there, increasing the vacuum into which we would pour unlimited human and material resources that might be needed elsewhere in the developing global situation.

For that reason, unless we can foresee a decisive victory, I have suggested that the United Nations forces consider withdrawal of their forces from that area.

Senator CAIN. In these few minutes, sir, I have tried to cover what I thought were the major premises made——

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator CAIN. In your last several days of testimony.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Flanders?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Long?

FIGHTING THE REAL ENEMY IN THE IMPORTANT AREA

Senator LONG. I regret that I have been absent during some of your testimony, General Wedemeyer, and I trust that you will understand if I ask one or two questions which might be repetitious, that have been developed before.

You believe that we would be making a mistake, I take it, to fight in theaters such as Korea or Iran, or possibly Indochina—areas bordering the Soviet Union where, because of the distance from our shores, we might be at a disadvantage, particularly from a logistical point of view, if I understand you correctly.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, sir, I will state it this way, Senator:

In my judgment, we should employ our means in those areas which offer us an opportunity to bring decisive action against the real enemy; and the real enemy is in the Kremlin.

I am not suggesting that we go to war with the Kremlin, or declare war against the Kremlin, and I abhor war and hope that we don't have to go to war with them; but I hope that we are not permitted, we do not permit these potential enemies to maneuver us into unfavorable positions in areas that would not contribute to our strategic security, and I mentioned to you, sir, that Korea was such an area.

I think, in my judgment, that is not an important area, strategically, for the future security of America, or for the allied cause in general.

The other areas you mentioned, sir—you mentioned two other areas, Indochina and Iran, and I would like to not comment about them at this time because I don't feel qualified to do so.

I have not considered all the implications pertaining to those areas, so I don't feel qualified to comment on them.

Senator LONG. It occurred to me that in deciding where we would commit ourselves to defend against aggression, it might be well to carefully estimate the ease with which we could defend certain sections.

For example, the defense of Formosa, in my opinion, would be much easier than the defense of Korea, because our naval power would enable us to prevent landings and shut off supplies in the event hostile landings were made; while, of course, in Korea, we find ourselves unable to prevent supplies from being sent in.

The testimony has been that even if we were to bomb behind the Yalu, that we can still expect supplies to move forward, even against that bombing.

Is your view based partly on this type of consideration that it is easy to defend where your sea power can be more effectively used?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. Our technological advantage, Senator Long, can be exploited. I don't want to fight the enemy under terms of his creation, and manpowerwise we would be at a disadvantage if we continue the type of fighting that we are engaged in now, sir.

I would also like to tell you I have emphasized that I think our President's decision to cope realistically with the situation presented by the aggression of South Korea was absolutely sound and correct and necessary and timely; but it was the way it was done, sir.

I suggest that if I had been asked I would have recommended punitive action, with Navy and Air Forces, sir; but I would not have become embroiled with my ground forces on terrain and under conditions more favorable to that particular enemy.

Senator LONG. Well, of course, if we had not done that, from the psychological point of view, which you have stressed, would not there have been the probability that other nations bordering the Soviet Union would feel that this would mean very little hope in resistance at all, because about all they could expect from the United States would be to send some bombers in to bomb their homeland in the event that it was invaded.

General WEDEMEYER. That is correct, sir; that is a logical deduction, and that is exactly what happened, as I have told the Senators here, in Poland and Czechoslovakia in World War II, when the British guaranteed their territorial integrity; but they did not have the capability of going there on the ground and carrying out their promise to protect their territory, sir; and we have got to accept that, Senator Long.

We cannot be strong everywhere, as you know, and we have got to be careful of the places we do commit our resources.

VIEWS ON A ONE-FRONT OF TWO-FRONT WAR

Senator LONG. It does seems to me that there is something of a basic conflict between the position you take and the position taken by General MacArthur, and I would like for you to comment on this part of his speech, if you would care to. He said this:

> The issues are global and so interlocked that to consider the problems of one sector oblivious to those of another is but to court disaster for the whole.
>
> While Asia is commonly referred to as the gateway to Europe, it is no less true that Europe is the gateway to Asia, and the broad influence of the one cannot fail to have its impact upon the other.
>
> There are those who claim our strength is inadequate to protect on both fronts, that we cannot divide our effort. I can think of no greater expression of defeatism. If a potential enemy can divide his strength on two fronts, it is for us to counter his effort.
>
> The Communist threat is a global one. Its successful advance in one sector threatens the destruction of every other sector. You cannot appease or otherwise surrender to communism in Asia without simultaneously undermining our efforts to halt its advance in Europe.

Now, it is also my understanding that General MacArthur's testimony before this committee was that for you to say that you will not defend a section against Communist aggresison is to simply surrender to the Communists right then and there because they probably will take it without a struggle.

Now, is that in harmony or in conflict with your views on this subject?

General WEDEMEYER. I don't think it is in conflict, sir. I would express it another way.

I think that there is not such a thing any more in modern war as a one-front or two-front war. I think it would be concentric, and any area in the world is a potential battlefield, and in the employment, in the disposition, of my military means, I would be very careful to insure that where I put it would bring the greatest military advantage to me; would enable me, Senator, to neutralize the enemy's war-making capacity, to destroy his war-making potential, to break his will to resist, and the disposition that I would make would be, and I am sure General MacArthur would agree, would always be as a result of careful consideration of those factors.

Now, there are times when you cannot fight and physically help an ally. If the Soviet began to advance westward—we have not yet got a better ally culturally and otherwise than France or than Belgium, but today if it began to advance it would be very embarassing to us in Belgium or Holland. They could advance and probably occupy Denmark or Holland. They have that capability.

I am using that as a hypothetical example, sir, a hypothetical case; but we feel badly about it, and we would like to do something about it.

We would like to get in there and physically occupy and preclude such overrunning of territory of friendly naitons, but we cannot always do that; we don't always have that capability, so it must be an intelligent deployment and also the time element is important when you put a certain force in a certain area, is very important in strategy.

MEETING COMMUNISTS OR FILLING VACUA

Senator Long. Here is a question that I have in mind: If we had not put ground forces in Korea, it would have amounted to a quick and easy victory for the Communists within a period of possible 2 weeks; notwithstanding our air and naval bombardment, they would have taken over Korea—somewhat similarly to what they did in Tibet—and then proceeded to unify it under Communist rule. At that point I doubt that the Korean people would have appreciated our so-called aid if we had continued to bomb their cities after it had all been taken by the Communists.

Now, if our allies who have even less manpower than we have, such as the French and the British, had refused to meet the Communists in the field of battle in Indochina and Malaya, the probabilities are that those areas would be immediately overrun by the Communists, and that the same thing might happen in Burma, possibly in India, possibly in Indonesia—offering us this possibility: Either we take advantage of what technological skill we have and try to kill 50 Communists for every 1 of our Christian boys we lose in doing it, or else that we simply stand back and let them go ahead and take all these areas, and say: "Well, now, sooner or later we are going to have to start a world war because we can't permit this thing to continue to go on."

What is your comment on that?

General Wedemeyer. Well, Senator, let's go back to my example of World War II. Should the British have poured forces into Poland and just lost all of them, or should they wait until they create conditions that would enable them to really effectively accomplish their purpose?

Senator Long. What they actually did was to go to war and start fighting right then and there.

Chairman Russell. Senator, let him answer the question.

Senator Long. Pardon me.

General Wedemeyer. I am sorry.

Now, you say that we do nothing and that would be a victory for the Communists. I don't agree—I didn't mean to give you that impression—I will put it that way—that we do nothing. But I think the air effort would have been a punitive one, punishing, and I accept that the North Koreans would have overrun South Korea and would have set up a satellite government, and would have undertaken to consolidate their position. I accept all that.

But from an over-all strategic viewpoint, in my judgment, we would have retained, Senator, the strategic initiative—what we are going to do next. But now, sir, we are committed in there; we are planted on the ground with about 250,000 or 300,000 fine American boys. And it is going to be difficult to get out of that place. And maybe those boys will be sorely needed elsewhere in the future.

Communism brooks no compromise with the free world. They say that they are not going to live in this world with us; it is impossible for capitalistic and communistic ideology to be in harmony. So we may have some problems in the future.

It is a question, sir, of the amount of effort that you want to make in that particular area. If you deem that area of such importance—and I note that you put psychological stress too, and I like that. But in my judgment if we had at that time, sir, withdrawn all our American nationals, and I hope the Allies would have gone along with us, and take punitive action with air and navy, and then break off diplomatic relations with these people who are causing these international frictions, with the Soviet and with the satellites, and then mobilize and prepare to take appropriate action when and where we deem it necessary. But if we continue to do this—fill vacua that are created by the Soviet strategy—we are going to dissipate our resources in my judgment, and we may defeat ourselves, not militarily, we may permit ourselves to be defeated, not militarily but economically.

CONSEQUENCES OF A LIMITED WAR

Senator Long. It would seem to me that we are confronted with the fact that as much as we dislike to pit American manpower against superior numbers of Communists, that we may be compelled to do it.

We have joined the North Atlantic Pact which is to say that if the Soviet armies attempt to move across Western Europe, we will resist to the very best of our ability. I would assume that we will supply ground soldiers to help in that defense, just as we have already sent six divisions, if it would appear to offer a chance of success.

In that event we would be going to war with Soviet Russia even though she might be able to take Western Europe, notwithstanding all the resistance we could offer.

That would be a world war where you would fight it out to the bitter end. Now short of that, in all of these other areas that you have mentioned we are faced with this situation that if the Soviet continues to advance, we either have to attempt to stop them in a limited war or else in a world war, and I do not see any other possibility other than simply to stand idly by and watch their armies take all these areas where we have not committed ourselves to fight.

General Wedemeyer. Well, the words "limited war" for example, I don't understand what you mean by "limited war." If you were the commander in Korea and you are given a mission of conquering all of Korea for free peoples, for the free nations and establishing a government, a free Korean Government—I think that is our objective there—it is very difficult to limit your operations and still economize, protect the lives of your men and accomplish your objective.

When you start to limit a commander in the field, and give him an objective similar to that which I think the Allied Commander has there, that is to free all of Korea of these Red Communists and create conditions that would permit the people to determine how they be governed, and so forth, set up their own Government, this commander with such a mission is going to have a very difficult time if you place restrictions or limitations and call it a limited war, a police action.

Now he is going to have a very difficult time in accomplishing that objective, but what happens, Senator Long, for an interminable period we pour our boys into this cauldron, and I say to you, sir, our most precious commodity is manpower. When compared to the Soviet manpower, teaming millions and our manpower with allies, bodywise they have a marked advantage, so whenever I can I would like to suggest that you Senators consider the exploitation of our technological advantage, and at times you may have to give up areas, you may have to temporarily almost desert—not desesrt; that is not a good term, but at least not be right in there pitching shoulder to shoulder with an ally, and they must accept that.

If they are realistic they realize that, but I don't think that we need to put our manpower shoulder to shoulder with free peoples to prove conclusively our determination to crush communism or to stop the advance of communism, and to help free peoples help themselves protect their freedoms.

I don't believe it is necessary to do that. Realistic people understand that sometimes we just don't have the capability of putting our forces right in their country and forming a cordon and preventing the invasion of hostile forces, enemy forces.

FOREIGN SERVICE MEN WHO ASSISTED WEDEMEYER

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Long, I am sorry, your time has expired. The chairman?

General Wedemeyer, you have been asked a number of questions about four men who were in the Foreign Service in China at the time that you entered upon your duties there. I do not recall the name of any of them except one I believe named Mr. Davies. I do not know any of them. I am not sure as to just what inference is to be drawn from these questions.

Did you know all four of these men personally?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir, I did.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you see anything or learn anything about them during the time of your association with them that would lead you to believe that they were Communists or fellow travelers who had the sinister purpose of turning China over to the Chinese Communists?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir; quite the contrary. I thought they were very keen, fine men, very affable and intelligent men. Three of them spoke Chinese fluently and one of them spoke Japanese fluently.

The thing that I have testified to, Senator Russell, is that most of their reports that were given to me either written or oral were highly critical of the Central Government of China, that is, Chiang Kai-shek and his government, and very praising of the Communist Government or the Communist activities to the north.

Chairman RUSSELL. Were they any more cirtical of the Chinese Nationalist Government than you were in this address to this council in China there in 1947?

General WEDEMEYER. I do not think they were any more critical.

Chairman RUSSELL. Thank you.

General WEDEMEYER. It was criticism of the same things that I noted in my survey there, but they certainly were more praising of the Communists there—I mean, by the same token I have praised the Communists in their efforts.

Chairman RUSSELL. The next question I want to ask is, just how did they praise the Communists?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, they told me these people were very courageous and effective fighters and they were accomplishing a great deal militarily in the province just east of Yenan, that they were pinning down large number of Japanese troops, reports along that line.

But these reports, Senator, were not confirmed by my observers. I would drop men behind the Jap lines and I had military observers in teams operating up there, and these reports were not confirmed, sir.

There were sporadic thrusts made by the Chinese Communist military forces and their purpose as I analyzed it was to seize supplies from blockhouses established by the Japanese along lines of communication. But as soon as they had attacked those blockhouses and got the supplies therein, they would withdraw. They did not continue the pressure against the enemy which was what I was trying to do, so that we could pin down the Japanese in the north and operate in the south more effectively.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir. They did, however, later demonstrate that they were courageous military fighters, did they not, in their actions against the Chinese Nationalists?

General WEDEMEYER. Definitely. They seemed to be imbued—they were fanatic in many of the actions about which I read. I didn't observe these actions, but they seemed to be fanatic and fought in an inspired way.

COALITION AND UNIFICATION OF CHINA

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, General Wedemeyer, you pointed out specifically that you did not include the word "coalition" in this famous message, I believe of December 1945, that you used the word "unify."

Senator Knowland then asked you if it was necessary to read the word "coalition" into the telegram, and you replied that you didn't think it was.

I have read again the directive to General Marshall, and the President's statement at the time he sent General Marshall there. I am at a loss to know just how this word "coalition government" did get into this discussion about China unless it is synonymous with "unify," because the word "coalition" is not used in any of those papers.

The words "unify," "united," and "unification" are used throughout. Do you know just when the word "coalition" got into this discussion as being synonymous with "unification?"

General WEDEMEYER. I don't know, sir. The word was being used while I was here, sir, as a witness.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

General WEDEMEYER. I didn't introduce it, but then I referred to it—"coalition" and "coalesce"—many times.

Chairman RUSSELL. I had not been able to find either of those words in the directive to General Marshall. Now, I have a few scattering questions that occurred to me.

WISDOM OF USING GROUND TROOPS IN KOREA

General, if you had believed that two American divisions could have thrown back the aggression of the North Koreans in Korea on June 25, 26, and 27, 1950, would you have still advised the President against the employment of ground forces in Korea to resist Communist aggression?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir, I would. I feel that the Soviet will try to maneuver us into commitments that will embarrass us, both militarily—in fact, in all three senses: militarily, psychologically, and economically.

I have stated before that in my judgment, Korea, the peninsula, was not of strategic significance, Senator, to justify that effort that I would have to make in order to hold that area.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your advice would have gone to the use of any ground forces whatever, then, in North Korea?

General WEDEMEYER. That is correct, sir. I was present in the Department when consideration was given to the withdrawal of the corps there, and the Secretary of the Army indicated that we had to economize somewhere, our Army was being reduced for reasons of economy to around six hundred thirty thousand. We had one plus division in Europe, we had four in Japan, and then we had scattered combat units in Alaska and in Trieste——

Chairman RUSSELL. All of them understrength.

General WEDEMEYER. All understrength; yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

General WEDEMEYR. We were trying to economize in consonance with the entire philosophy of the administration at that time.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

General WEDEMEYER. So I with my commanders looked over the situation trying to determine where we could cut and we were all in agreement over in the Department that Korea was not of strategic significance, and we took them out.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendation of the Army and we took our corps out of there, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Everybody approved it, and I believe General MacArthur said, at one time, that his foresight wasn't as good as his hindsight, when he concurred in that recommendation.

RELATIVE STRENGTH OF NATIONALISTS AND COMMUNISTS IN 1947

Now, General, Senator Brewster read a number of extracts from your reports with respect to the ammunition supplies of the Chinese Nationalists. He culled through and read those portions of the recommendations with respect to sending ammunition to the Nationalists

At the time you made that report in 1947, who had the most men, the most arms, and the most ammunition—the Chinese Nationalists or the Chinese Communists?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I think the Nationalists had the most men; and I am not qualified to answer about the most equipment and ammunition, sir.

The Nationalists were asking for additional ammunition and gave me ammunition reports which indicated dire shortages in various areas.

Of course I have no way of knowing what the situation was, equipment-wise, in the Chinese Communist forces. They seemed to have a very good logistical set-up, and plenty of supplies to give them succeeding impulses in their efforts, in their advance south.

Chairman RUSSELL. The reason I asked that question, I read some report, I haven't been able to find it here, which undertook to draw analogies between the number of men the Nationalists had that had rifles, and the number of men the Communists had that had rifles; and also with respect to the ammunition.

Evidently, from your statement, that was not a report that you submitted, but was from some other source?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir.

COMPARISON OF CHINESE SITUATION WITH GREECE AND TURKEY

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, General Wedemeyer, there has been considerable discussion here of having set up a mission in China that was identical with the mission which we established in Greece, when we undertook to combat communism in Greece.

How many men would it have required, officers and enlisted men, from our Army, to have constituted the identical same kind of mission in China, that was established in Greece, when you consider the number of Chinese Nationalists, the problems of training, and restoring morale and advising them in their conflict with the Communists?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

I think it would have taken in the neighborhood of around 10,000 officers and noncommissioned officers, sir; and I think that the advice would even then not have been—the representatives of our Army would not have been able to go clear down to the battalion level. I think they might have reached the regimental level.

Of course it is contingent upon how many divisions of the Chinese Nationalist force you pick out to give supervision to, and——

Chairman RUSSELL. If we put them in, we would have to give them enough to win the war, wouldn't we?

General WEDEMEYER. I think that 10,000 is a reasonable estimate.

That is in one of my reports, Colonel Gilchrist said, of some years back—and of all services, including advisers with the logistical set-up, supply lines, and so forth.

Chairman RUSSELL. And the Air Force and the Navy.

General WEDEMEYER. That is correct, sir.

THE MURDER OF CAPTAIN BIRCH BY CHINESE COMMUNISTS

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, I do not know whether it casts any light on anything that we have here before us, but I was very curious to know why it was when you protested the shooting of Capt. John Birch and demanded the punishment of the perpetrators of that heinous crime and offense that you addressed your first communication to the Generalissimo and insisted that he take punitive steps against these people. Why was that?

General WEDEMEYER. Because, Senator, he was the head of the government that I was ordered to support, and I couldn't recognize Mao Tze-tung and Chou En-lai as having any political significance, and I never did in my contacts, sir; but I did talk to them personally.

I went over and saw them and had a very satisfactory conference with them. Chou En-lai was most cooperative and said that he would do his utmost to determine the events that led up to this boy's murder, and take appropriate action.

Actually, though, sir, I followed that up, and I never did ascertain exactly what they did do, and I did my best to do so.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, the file—and I suppose it is about as thick a personnel file as has been on most any officer in the Army due to all these communications—indicates that you did take it up with the Generalissimo, and you later subsequently testified here that you took it up with the Communists likewise.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. But there was something in the file that indicated that the Communists, through the Generalissimo, had replied——

General WEDEMEYER. They did, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL (continuing). And had given the name of the commander of the unit who was responsible for Captain Birch's death.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. It was confusing to me to see that the relations between the Generalissimo and the Communists were such at that time that you could protest to the Generalissimo and he could take it up with the Communists and get a report back from them even though highly colored, which would undertake to give the details of Captain Birch's death.

General WEDEMEYER. I just raised the Ned when this occurred, sir. That boy was a very fine American boy, and very courageous, and had done good work for me behind the Japanese lines, and he was murdered in cold blood by Communists, as my investigation indicated, as he was returning in compliance with orders that I issued to all my outlying teams; they were all coming back and I was going to assemble them and get a compilation of information to send back to my Government about the Japanese, and the things they had observed.

Now, may I tell you, sir, I had other relations with the Chinese Communists, but I always took it up with the head of the state, the Generalissimo.

For example, Chou En-lai sent me an urgent radio message saying that he had a plague or some illness, large-scale illness, in Yenan, and wanted some medicine, and I thought it was a proper thing to do, and I went to the Generalissimo and recommended that I be permitted to send that medicine there, and I sent 6 tons on one occasion, and 5 tons on another, 11 tons altogether, during a very severe winter out there.

I thought it was the proper thing to do, and he agreed, but I did take it up through the Generalissimo.

Chairman RUSSELL. My curiosity went to how the Generalissimo—what connections he had with the Communists that enabled him to get this information, because just from a casual reading of it it was just as if the Communists were under his command, and they had reported in to him these circumstances.

General Wedemeyer. No, sir; but they were visitors—frankly, they visited Chungking. I had them at home several times, both of them, and they were having conferences with the Generalissimo occasionally, but I think the atmosphere was always rather strained. It did not seem like a sincere friendship at all.

Senator Wiley. What year was that, Senator?

Chairman Russell. 1944. I believe it was 1944, was it not, Senator Knowland?

Senator Knowland. No, it was 1945.

General Wedemeyer. 1945.

Senator Knowland. After VJ-day, in September.

General Wedemeyer. The close of the war.

Chairman Russell. That is right.

The record is very clear that it was 1945, and Captain Birch was the head of a party going down to some airfield and he had radio equipment to report back to the American headquarters as to the condition of the airfield. It was after VJ-day in 1945.

Senator Connally?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Wiley?

Senator Wiley. Mr. Chairman, I have been absent, I might say absent on official business on the so-called O'Conor Crime Committee, and I just returned this morning from Kentucky. So I will not impose a great deal upon the general. I just want to ask a few questions.

EFFECT OF THE MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

I might say, General, that I have read with interest in the newspapers your testimony. I do not remember that I read anywhere that you were asked questions in relation to the MacArthur dismissal.

I might ask whether previous to his recall you were consulted in any way as to justification for it or anything?

General Wedemeyer. No, sir; I wasn't, Senator. I don't believe that I should have been. I am in command of the Sixth Army, and I wouldn't have been knowledgeable about the events which led up to consideration of his recall.

Senator Wiley. Yes. Well, that answers that question.

Now, in view of your large experience in the East, would you mind giving us your judgment as to the effect of his recall on the Japanese people, on our general situation there? How in your judgment might the recall of MacArthur be regarded by the Reds themselves and so forth?

General Wedemeyer. Well, I think that the Japanese respected, admired General MacArthur. I think the Chinese people likewise; that is the Chinese Nationalists.

When a man of his experience and great capacity is so summarily relieved, it does have a strong effect in the Orient because they put so much stress upon face.

I think that the way it was done—I don't question the authority at all of our Commander in Chief to do that. I did think it was unfortunate the way it was done, sir. I think there were other ways that this relief could have been effected without the repercussions that we have all noted.

Senator WILEY. Well, there have been repercussions, have there not, from his recall?

General WEDEMEYER. I think there have been; yes, sir. I think there are manifestations in our country and abroad.

Senator WILEY. And would you consider that in view of his tremendous standing in the Far East and his success in the Far East, that his recall certainly would be interpreted as almost a victory for the Reds psychologically?

General WEDEMEYER. It might be so interpreted.

Senator WILEY. Have you had any information in relation to what the effect at present is in Japan in relation to his recall?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir; only hearsay, Senator.

EFFECTIVENESS OF A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA

Senator WILEY. Do you think, from your knowledge of the Far East and of the Commies, that any agreement that we would make with the Kremlin would be worth the paper it was written on?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, no. Our experience would indicate that it wouldn't be worth the paper it was written on; but I still think, sir, that we should strive to make the effort. Because I can't believe that the Russian people themselves are in a happy position, and some day we may be able to help them remove this yoke of enslavement. I don't think military force is the principal means to accomplish that purpose, sir.

Therefore, what I say must of necessity require continued negotiations, continued attempts to work with these people, to make them see the light, make them see the effect of their program of aggression, aggrandizement.

Senator WILEY. Then you mean that the main effect in negotiations toward a treaty of any kind would be psychological in the sense that it might operate to penetrate the various groups within the Russian orbit, enlighten them as to our intention, and probably create divisions within the orbit itself?

General WEDEMEYER. I think so; yes, sir.

PENETRATING THE IRON CURTAIN

Senator WILEY. Well, I was very much interested in the comment that you made the other day. You said you hoped we could reach the Russian people because "I do not believe they are happy at all. I think there are dissident elements in the U. S. S. R., and I also think there are dissident elements and groups that would be happy to effect this in the satellites, in the areas contiguous to the U. S. S. R.", and so forth.

My question is this, because I have been very much interested in what I call methods of penetration. I have been interested for a long time about penetrating these peoples who have been put under the iron heel of the Kremlin. I would like to get your suggestions as to ways and means of doing that very thing in the Far East and in Russia, from your vast experience.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I am very glad to give you my suggestions, Senator. I am not an expert in the psychological warfare field.

Of course the information I am going to give you now would be of tremendous value if it has any merit at all, would be of tremendous value to a potential enemy, sir, and I presume that it would be expurgated from the record by Admiral Davis. Is that correct, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir, if he thinks it does, and I am quite sure that his views would very likely coincide with yours, General.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, they are mine strongly, sir. I have been worried all the way through this investigation about some of the information that has been disseminated, and I know that Admiral Davis is trying to do a bang-up job, but here I appear as a military man and have without inhibitions at all answered frankly questions, and I see them in the paper. Sometimes I wonder about it. It worries me a little.

Chairman RUSSELL. I can assure you I have shared that worry since this investigation was first proposed.

Senator WILEY. You will have to take this out of your time, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. I will allow you 30 seconds.

Senator WILEY. If you keep going on, you will allow me 1 minute and 30 seconds. Well, all right, go ahead, General.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

General WEDEMEYER. We expend very little money and effort on psychological warfare means in this country. We have permitted the enemy to have the initiative in the field of ideas, in the struggle to control people's hearts and minds even before we entered World War II.

We have done that naively and in some cases, as the result of the Hiss case and similar investigations and trials, in some cases we have done it maliciously.

Our own people have not been informed of the dangers of communism, the implications of communism, and frequently very fine Americans have stated that it was a bugaboo and that those of us who recited the dangers inherent in communism were emotional and were publicity seekers, and so forth, but the real purpose behind communism was diverted in these attributions by certain people in our country.

In my judgment we should with radio, with pamphlets, and with agents reach all people of the world with our story, and we have nothing to apologize for in our country. Explain to them our objectives, our desire to help them help themselves. Explain to them the implications of accepting communism, the Communists promising power and riches, promises that are false, promises that they have neither the intention nor the capability of fulfilling.

Now through those informational means in the psychological warfare field, we can reach people in my judgment behind the iron curtain and all over the world, but those means have got to have monetary support and we have got to have clear thinking, imaginative Americans in charge, and implementing such a program.

I have pointed out previously, sir, that we do expend billions on armament, equipment to destroy, to destroy human beings and their works, but proportionately we spend very little effort and money on this struggle in the field of ideas.

[Deleted.]

It has been the force of ideas and the convictions of men that have made radical changes in the world, and in my judgment if we do not have faith in our ideas and our ideals and if we do not have a program of strong appeal then another nation is going to come along, another people is going to come along with another philosophy which they will advance, these people, with probably greater faith and with stronger appeal, and we are going to suffer ignominious defeat at their hands.

I am not visualizing a future world wherein we just continue as we are now, following the inane cycle of first destroying and then rehabilitating. It does not make sense to me. Civilized people just do not operate that way.

We can find a solution. We must find a solution. But it must be based upon reaching, as I stated, the hearts and minds of people.

Suppose that Senator McMahon and I had an argument. I do not want to oversimplify it, Senator Wiley. But suppose that Senator McMahon and I had an argument and suppose he is much stronger than I physically, and suppose he is unable to convince me on the point he is trying to sell me on, and so he uses force and just beats me up proper. Well, I not only do not accept his idea but I hate him in the process, and it makes it that much more remote that he can ever convince me of the idea he is trying to sell me on. That is an oversimplification but that is a premise on which our country operates all over the world in its contact with all peoples and all nations.

Senator Wiley. I had in mind, General Wedemeyer, the mechanics in the Far East, what with these last wars of the Chinese and Korean peoples.

[Deleted.]

General Wedemeyer. Oh, yes, sir. I would emphasize psychological warfare, Senator Wiley, in the Far East and all areas of the world. The trouble is the connotation of "psychological warfare" to people. It is just like with psychiatry and applied psychology—our American people are not yet attuned to those things, which run toward the controlling or the influencing of the hearts and minds of people—but it has been going on from the beginning of history.

Chairman Russell. I gave you your 1½ minutes, Senator.

Senator Wiley. You have? I could go on for 40. I had put it down to 12:20. Are you sure of your time?

Chairman Russell. I put down 12:15 and I thought that you had had your minute and a half. I think you have had.

Senator Bridges?

Senator Bridges. I pass.

Chairman Russell. Senator Byrd.

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Saltonstall.

(No responsed)

Chairman Russell. Senator Johnson.

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Morse.

PURPOSE OF THE WEDEMEYER REPORTS

Senator MORSE. General Wedemeyer, when you prepared the Wedemeyer report, both on China and Korea, is it your understanding that they were designed for examination and use by the Secretary of State, or was it your idea that they were to be public documents?

General WEDEMEYER. Frankly, Senator Morse, I had given that no thought whatsoever, sir. As I told you, I was sent out there at the instigation of General Marshall, who sent for me immediately after my return from Europe. I wrote my own directive and went out and submitted the report in compliance with that directive, sir.

Senator MORSE. I was just interested in whether you knew of anything in your conferences with General Marshall that would support the conclusion that he was not justified in refusing the publication of these reports, as he has testified to this committee he was responsible for.

He has been asked here who suppressed the report, and he very frankly said, "I take responsibility for that," and went on to say that you were out there as his representative and that he sent you out there—I think also the President's—but that you were sent out there to make a report back to the Secretary of State and for such use as the Secretary of State made of it. That was my understanding of the meaning of his testimony. It is not verbatim from his testimony.

As you know, there have been those that I think have left the implication that he was in some way violating his authority.

I think he would have been if the assignment was clearly an assignment that you were being sent out there to make this investigation for the puropse of submitting a public report to the Congress or to the public generally.

I just wanted to know if there was anything in the record that you thought would justify the conclusion that you were acting in any other capacity than as emissary of the President and the Secretary of State.

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir.

DECISION TO USE GROUND TROOPS IN KOREA

Senator MORSE. I was very much interested in your testimony that you would not have sent ground troops into Korea in the first instance, that you would have used naval and air forces, but you wouldn't have put ground troops in.

That has been a matter that, frankly, has puzzled me very much about the Korean situation. I have never felt that I knew enough about it to justify a firm conclusion that ground troops should or should not have been sent in. I thought I should yield on that point to our military authorities.

Now, it is my understanding that after the naval and air forces were used immediately following June 25, and the mission had been assinged to General MacArthur, that he conducted a personal reconnaissance of the area and after his personal reconnaissance of the area and after his personal inspection, he came back to Tokyo and informed his superiors here in Washington that he believed ground troops should be used.

And under consideration, here in the committee, I think it is a fair summary of the testimony to say that General MacArthur testified that he did make the suggestion that if he was to carry out the mission that was assigned to him, which, at that time, was primarily that of stopping the aggression, but principally of evacuating our nationals, that he was going to need ground forces.

He also testified that he thought it was a correct decision of the President to go back into Korea.

My question to you—I want it perfectly clear in the record, and I respect your judgment about it—my question to you is, Are you aware of the fact that General MacArthur did make that suggestion after his personal reconnaissance on the scene?

General WEDEMEYER. I read over the testimony very carefully. I never discussed this question with the general, personally, and I received the same interpretation you did of his views; and I am aware of the fact that he did feel that it was sound to put ground forces in there.

Most of the military men with whom I have talked, whose judgment I value, agreed that that was a sound thing to do. I just happen to be one who doesn't, and I have told you honestly that I didn't.

Senator MORSE. I am glad you did.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. I also indicated that I could be so wrong.

STATE DEPARTMENT ADVISERS IN CHINA

Senator MORSE. I wasn't here during part of an examination that you may have had in regard to these State Department advisers that were made available to you, and if you have covered this, General, please tell me so, and I won't press for a further answer, of course.

Now, public opinion in this country has been very much disturbed by various charges that the State Department, in the Asiatic desk, and the personnel of that desk, have had people that it is alleged were too sympathetic with communism.

Sometimes it was said that they were soft on communism.

I want to be perfectly sure that I understand your position on that.

Did the State Department advisers, that you said you inherited when you took over your job in China, give you the impression that ideologically they were sympathetic with the doctrine of communism, in contrast to the doctrine of democracy; or, did they simply give you the impression that in view of conditions as they existed in China, they were so critical of Chiang, and some of his policies, that they thought under those circumstances, that the Communists were doing a better job, or the Communists should be encouraged, or the Communists should be recognized?

General WEDEMEYER. Sir, I would never accuse a man of being disloyal to his country unless I had irrefutable evidence. I think it is a most unfortunate and serious allegation that is being made against a lot of people who have liberal ideas, ideas that are not at all in consonance with those espoused by Marx.

I have indicated that their reports were oral and in writing and favored strongly the Yenan regime. I don't call it a government, but the Yenan group, and those reports were extremely critical of the Generalissimo's officials and his operations, sir.

But actually I was an Army man, trying to do a military job, and I didn't get into that very much while they were with me. They left me, as you know, sir, and went to the Embassy under Ambassador Hurley.

I am not dodging the issue. If I thought they were Communist I would tell you. If I thought they were something else, I would tell you, sir.

Senator Morse. I don't think you are dodging. I think you gave me a direct answer, and I appreciate it.

Briefly, will you review for me the capacity in which John Carter Vincent worked for you over there when you first went to China.

General Wedemeyer. He never worked for me, sir. I think he was in charge of the Far Eastern desk, when I was the Far Eastern commander.

Senator Morse. He was in charge of it here?

General Wedemeyer. In Washington.

Senator Morse. While you were in China?

General Wedemeyer. That is correct.

Senator Morse. Have you ever had any differences of opinion with Vincent in your communications back and forth that caused you to believe that he was anti-Chiang and sympathetic toward giving aid to the Chinese Communists, not because of any ideological agreement with them, but because of the fact that they seemed to be taking over China, and that they had better be recognized as doing that?

General Wedemeyer. I had very limited contacts with Mr. John Carter Vincent, and those contacts were social; when I would come home, he and his wife would entertain Mrs. Wedemeyer and me.

NAVAL BLOCKADE—UNILATERAL OR UNITED NATIONS

Senator Morse. Now, help me on this matter of a blockade and I want to be just as fair to you as you certainly have been to me and the other members of the committee.

I am very much disturbed about a blockade in Asiatic waters without United Natitons participation, and I am confused about the course of action you would follow as of now. I am not talking about 6 months from now or a year from now or 2 years from now; I am talking about now.

I would judge from the testimony that is in this record that as of the present there is very little expectation on the part of the officials of our Government that allies, such as the British and the Dutch and the French, will go along with any proposal for a naval blockade. That is point No. 1 I want to make.

Point No. 2 is that I understood General MacArthur to favor a blockade, a unilateral blockade, if necessary, a blockade of Port Arthur, for example.

In my examination of Admiral Sherman, when he testified that he favored a blockade, with respect to a unilateral blockade, he testified, in effect, I think, that he thought that as of now it would be a mistake for us to maintain a unilateral blockade.

He also testified that he would consider a blockade of such a port as Port Arthur, Dairen by us alone as an act of war.

Now, the confusion that I am having with your testimony, I think, revolves around these two points: No. 1, Is it your advice to us and to the country that irrespective of whether Great Britain and the Dutch and the French would go along with us now on a naval blockade, do you think nevertheless we should impose such a blockade?

General WEDEMEYER. I do, sir; but I would exhaust every effort to get them to go along with us, and I am not sure that we have done that, Senator Morse. I am not sure that we have made a genuine effort to point out to them the implications of our continued containment or continued method of solving this problem.

Senator MORSE. I understand that is your point of view, and I think you are probably right that we have probably not exhausted every effort yet.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.; but if after exhausting effort, then I would suggest that we go it alone.

Senator MORSE. That is the point I want to come to.

General WEDEMEYER. I have the highest regard for Sherman, Admiral Sherman, but I don't agree that this would precipitate—I mean it would be an act of war. We are already at war, in my judgment; we are already at war with the Chinese Red government because they are killing our men.

Senator MORSE. Well, this is my interpretation, and I may be wrong——

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE (continuing). But as I interpret his testimony I think he meant to leave the impression with us that the blockade of a port such as Port Arthur and Dairen with Russia's rights therein, would constitute an act of war against Russia.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. So my question is, assuming now hypothetically that in the immediate future, and I think it could be done in the immediate future if we had the will to do it, if it has not already been done, we exhausted all of our efforts to get our allies to go along with us in a naval blockade now, that is in the immediate future, the next 2 or 3 months——

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE (continuing). Your testimony is that you think because the reality of the situation is that we are at war now with the Red Chinese we ought to impose a naval blockade?

General WEDEMEYER. I feel that our failure to do it does inject restrictions or limitations upon a responsible commander who is trying to, as I stated, economize American lives.

Senator MORSE. That brings me to what I consider to be the critical question on this issue.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. From the standpoint of my thinking, if we do that, is it your point of view that we then, from then on, would have to carry on our military operations alone if the Allies did not want to join us in that blockade, and use whatever force is necessary against the shipping of our allies to enforce that blockade?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, you have asked me a hypothetical question. I personally——

Senator MORSE. I hope it always remains hypothetical, General.

General WEDEMEYER. I know it. I just can't believe that our allies would not go along with us when properly approached about this problem. I just can't accept that premise.

Senator MORSE. That is the point I want to cross-examine you about.

General WEDEMEYER. But if that premise is accepted, sir, and if they refuse to cooperate with a nation that has been so wonderful to them in recovery in every sense of the word as a result of the holocaust of the last war—if they don't go along with us, then I say, "We Americans, we go alone."

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time is up, Senator.

Senator MORSE. Could I ask unanimous consent to take a minute or two to finish the discussion at this point in the record? I think it may save a good deal of time in the long run, since we are so near the end of this hearing anyway. I only have a question or two about this point. I would not ask any other questions except on this blockade point now. I will only take a minute.

In fairness to him, I think he ought to finish his point on it.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, gentlemen, you have heard the request for unanimous consent.

Senator SMITH. I would like to ask a question, Mr. Chairman, before that. What is the chairman's plan? In the expectation of a recess at the usual time, I made a luncheon appointment at 1 o'clock. I do not know what the witness' plans are, but a few of us have more questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chair has no particular wishes in the matter, except that we see that General Wedemeyer gets away in accordance with his plans this afternoon.

I am willing to run right on through; let the Senator from New Jersey go and fill his social engagement——

Senator SMITH. It is not social; it is business.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, a business engagement of a social nature—having lunch with people. [Laughter.] And the remainder of us will stay here and carry on the examination, or I am willing to recess for lunch. But I do feel that this committee has a certain obligation to General Wedemeyer to get him away from here this afternoon in accordance with his plans.

Senator GEORGE. I think we should finish.

Chairman RUSSELL. I want to pursue the policy most calculated to accomplish that purpose.

Senator KNOWLAND. If I may suggest, if agreeable to the witness, if we go along without too much delay, we might be able to finish up. Now the general does have an engagement back on the coast. The weather is not too good and he should not cut his flying time too short. I had in mind if we could proceed here for a reasonable period of time, I am inclined to believe that we will be able to finish up.

I ask that unanimous consent be given the Senator from Oregon to have a minute and a half to complete his questions. I think we will save time in doing it.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland, you will not save time on a minute and a half because the question may take that long or the answer may take that long. I think you had better put it up on the number of questions.

Senator Morse?

Senator MORSE. You have all been very kind but I don't think it is a fair request.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator from Oregon.

Senator MORSE. So I will withdraw my request. I do not think it is a fair one.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator from Oregon will proceed, he has already got unanimous consent.

Senator MORSE. I only have a question or two.

Senator McMAHON. I want the Senator to go ahead, but I do want us to recess at 1 o'clock. I understand General Wedemeyer does not go forth until 5 o'clock. I was told that was his plan. Now I have three or four questions I want to ask the general. I will not be reached before 1, and I have an engagement at 1 o'clock I want to keep. Is he not going to be available between 2:30 and 4:30?

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, there are others who have similar predicaments, Senator McMahon. Senator Cain wishes to get away to New York, and other members have various and sundry reasons. So when Senator Morse concludes, I will leave it to the committee as to what action we should take and vote on it.

All right, Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. I will be through right away.

UNILATERAL OR UNITED NATIONS BLOCKADE

General, I just want to press on this hypothesis that you and I were discussing because from the standpoint of my thinking I think it a very critical question.

I hate, as you do, to assume that our allies would let us go it alone. I understand that point of view, but I am not sure it is a safe assumption.

We have got to think of the alternatives. As I understand it, pretty strong representations have been made to us by some foreign ministers against a blockade in Asia. Hypothetical though it is, am I correct in my understanding and your answer to the hypothetical question that if our allies let us down on this naval blockade and we imposed it ourselves unilaterally and they refused to cooperate with us in it, that you would then necessarily have to enforce that blockade against our allies' shipping as well as against Russian shipping and Chinese shipping?

General WEDEMEYER. That is correct. I accept all of those implications; but I must say, because some newspaperman may take this thing out of context, I must emphasize that I cannot accept the premise that they would let us down, and I doubt seriously that that situation will develop.

Senator Morse, in my judgment, I humbly say to you it is a question of survival, and there comes a time, there must come a time, when we and those nations that are sincere in their alliance with our ideals and with our purposes and with our objectives, there comes a time when we must say we are going to stick together through thick and thin.

These hypothetical cases that have been posed to me by this committee, believe me, have been difficult for me, a soldier, to answer, because most people think that I, as a soldier, believe in the employment of force as the solution of problems international, and I do not.

I believe in negotiation and in compromise, compromise that does not involve honor and wherein we can retain our self-respect.

Senator MORSE. I think it is a question of survival, too, General. What I am worried about is whether or not it isn't going to be almost impossible, or, at least, exceedingly more difficult, to survive alone than it will be if we follow a program of negotiation that will keep our allies with us, recognizing we do not like some of the things that they do.

Now, if we follow under my hypothesis the course you suggest, would that not amount, in effect, to our taking unilateral action against the United Nations, and, if it survived at all, would place the other members of the United Nations in a position where a move would be made to declare us an aggressor under the United Nations Charter?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; it could be so interpreted. I gave the example of a corporation, though. There are only two major powers in the world today from a strategic viewpoint, only two, and each of these powers has allies or adherents or satellites. I don't think we have satellites because there is no compulsion. It is a unanimity of purpose.

It is a belief in Christian ideals that welds us together just as it did the example I gave you gentlemen historically the other day, the Franconians, Burgonians, they were welded together. This cohesive element was Christianity that enabled them to units their forces successfully against Attila, the Hun, and today I am confident that these allies, if the situation were presented to them properly and indicate clearly that it is in their interest as well as ours to effect a blockade, I am confident they would go along.

Now I believe this thing has not been thoroughly discussed—I am not confident, I can't be. I am just out here way out on the west coast, sir, and I am not in on the inner sanctum sanctorums, but I think this thing ought to be thoroughly discussed with our allies because they are very fine individuals and they have already made sacrifices of their interests and they must be prepared to do it again.

I don't like the thought of going it alone and I abhor the thought of doing anything that would jeopardize the future of the United Nations or some similar world organization for collective security and for the prevention of widespread war.

EFFECT OF "GOING IT ALONE"

Senator MORSE. Of course, I do not think that the other nations, large or small, who are in the family of free nations of the world would necessarily agree with you that they are in any way satellites of us. They consider themselves independent voting members of the United Nations and would feel that they have the same obligation to carry out the requirements of the Charter as we do; and that if we took an aggressive course of action against their majority will, they woud feel compelled to brand us as an aggressor.

That is one of the things that worry me, about the effect of your suggestion on the United Nations organizations themselves, and that leads to this question.

Do you not think that there is some danger that a go-it-alone policy on the part of the United States with respect to a naval blockade or anything else for that matter within the jurisdiction of the United Nations might have a tendency as far as some of these nations for them to work out the best kind of a compromise relationship with Russia that they could and neutralize themselves and say to us: "All right, go ahead and fight it out with Russia and let us out"?

General WEDEMEYER. Of course, there is that danger. Senator Morse, I want to ask the reporter to read back the first part of your question, because I believe I got a premise you injected—would you please read back that first part?

Chairman RUSSELL. The reporter will read back the Senator's question.

(Whereupon, the record was read as follows:)

> Senator MORSE. Of course, I do not think that the other nations large or small who are in the family of free nations of the world would necessarily agree with you that they are in any way satellites of us.

General WEDEMEYER. Stop right there. Stop right there.

I never meant to imply one iota that these nations who are allied with us in common objectives are satellites. I have made the effort to state that as I talked along, I made an effort and wanted it clear on the part of this record, sir, that I think they are countries allied to us because of common objectives that were enumerated earlier—and the "satellite" term applies to the Soviet, to their compulsory intimidation that compels these nations, these satellites, to join—but not on our part.

Senator MORSE. And I will correct that impression and say that I seek to apply that term by way of your interpretation; and my understanding of your testimony is that you pointed out that the United Nations is divided between those who are satellites, that is dominated by Russia on the one hand——

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. And those other nations whose common interests all come within the orbit of the United States and the other powers that are fighting for freedom; and that it is really their national self-interest that compels them to cling in association with us. That is the point you mean, as I understand it, and I used the word "satellites"—and I should not have. What I meant to imply is this: Is there a danger that some of these nations, both large and small, might say, "Although we have a common interest with you, America, we are not going to permit the fact that we have a common interest to cause you to unilaterally mark out a course of action that you think free nations should follow and then say or leave the impression that since you are the most powerful of all the nations we must necessarily follow you into a battle which we think is a mistake to go into—a battle by way of naval blockade, for example"?

General WEDEMEYER. I agree that point is possible, sir, but I would like to add I can't imagine those same nations reaching agreement with our principal opponent, Soviet Russia. I can't believe they would suddenly trust the Soviet and find areas of agreement with them, particularly based on the record of their experience with that nation since VJ-day.

Senator MORSE. I would like to share that confidence, but when we see some of them actually through Hong Kong and other ports pouring matériel, as they have in recent months, into China, when they know it is going to be used to kill our boys and theirs, I wonder what position they may take on an issue such as this.

General **Wedemeyer**. That is what I mentioned earlier when someone asked me: should we go it alone? Should we continue to feel those nations are sincere in their desire to join us in the common effort to stop the advance of communism when such evidence as you have just enumerated appears before us unrefuted?

Senator **Morse**. I think we first have to exhaust every possible effort to work out an arrangement and get ourselves a lot stronger than we are now before we attempt to enforce a naval blockade.

General **Wedemeyer**. The military experts in the Pentagon, I think, have so advised you, sir, and they are the best experts on that subject.

Senator **Morse**. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

Chairman **Russell**. General Wedemeyer, before I take this matter up with the committee, I think you should be consulted. You have been here as regularly as any member of the committee since putting in your appearance.

Do you prefer to proceed now or would you prefer to take a recess for lunch and come back say at 2 o'clock or 2:30?

General **Wedemeyer**. I will do whatever the committee members desire, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Knowland**. For a poll of the committee, if you want it, I am satisfied that I can finish what questions I have in 15 minutes or less.

Senator **Morse**. I am through, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Long.

Senator **Long**. I am through.

Chairman **Russell**. Senator George.

Senator **George**. I wish to ask two or three questions in view of this blockade discussion. That is all.

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Green——

Senator **Green**. I have a couple of questions. It won't take long.

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Sparkman.

Senator **Sparkman**. I wouldn't insist on it. If we continue, I might have some briefly.

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Smith.

Senator **Smith**. Not to exceed 15 minutes.

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Wiley.

Mr. **Kalijarvi**. Senator Wiley has about 15 minutes.

Chairman **Russell**. What is your pleasure?

Senator **Morse**. Two o'clock.

Senator **Knowland**. I suggest we proceed.

Senator **George**. I suggest we proceed, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Knowland**. I suggest we proceed. We have enough questions here to take care of those who want to go to lunch. The only reason I question adjourning until 2 o'clock is that is an hour from now and with this flying out to the coast in this weather, the general, I am afraid, is going to have an awfully close connection for his problems out there.

Senator **Cain**. Were we to continue, those desirous of having lunch or being required to leave could go ahead and the rest of us could dispose of our remaining questions, and they would be heard immediately once they returned.

Chairman RUSSELL. Can you explain where the Chair and General Wedemeyer would share in that?

Senator CAIN. I was referring to the general, the chairman, and to several Senators who would be constrained to remain with the Chair.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, gentlemen, those who favor proceeding now will please raise their right hands?

(There was a show of hands.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Those who prefer to return at 2 o'clock, please raise their right hands?

(There was a further show of hands.)

Chairman RUSSELL. If that isn't a tie, the Chair doesn't know how to figure it.

Senator GREEN. It is up to the chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think we will proceed for a while, here.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, might I not ask the witness what time he feels he must get away, because if necessary I will waive my questions to suit the convenience of the general.

General WEDEMEYER. The earlier I get away, gentlemen, the more comfortable I will be.

I am in a two-motored plane, flying across to the coast. The weather reports are not favorable. I would say that the latest I would like to leave, flying all night, sitting up, is 5 o'clock.

If I got away earlier, it would be possible to get a little sleep, perhaps.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George?

Senator GEORGE. Mr. Chairman, I wish to ask two or three questions, in view of the discussion about the blockade, and declaration of aggression against us, if we should decide to do something of our own, on our own.

UNITED NATIONS ACTION ON KOREA

I believe that the Chinese came into Korea, in mass, in November?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; that is correct, sir.

Senator GEORGE. It was February 1, was it not, before the United Nations declared those Chinese who came in with guns to be aggressors?

General WEDEMEYER. That is correct, sir.

Senator GEORGE. That is right.

It was actually May 18 before the United Nations declared an economic blockade, agreed to an economic blockade with such qualifications as they inserted in it.

I believe that is correct, is it not?

General WEDEMEYER. That date I am not sure of. The other dates I am sure of, but I know it is approximately correct.

Senator GEORGE. You can take my assurance of that.

It was in May, anyway?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; the latter part of it.

Senator GEORGE. And that led the admiral who testified here before us to say that in his judgment we should try out the economic blockade before we took what he regarded as a final and necessary step, if it came to that, of a naval blockade.

Now, I wish to ask you just two questions.

FACTORS IN A NAVAL BLOCKADE

A naval blockade involves a blockade of the belligerent country's ports, isn't that true?

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator George. And, neutral ports, it involves only the right of search and seizure of contradand entering the enemy's country through those ports?

General Wedemeyer. That is correct, sir.

Senator George. That is correct?

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir.

Senator George. So that if Russia is not an actual belligerent, none of her ports would be blockaded under a naval blockade, isn't that correct, but the right of search and seizure, if we knew that contraband was going through their ports into Communist China, who is at war with us, would exist?

General Wedemeyer. That is correct, sir.

Senator George. That is all I wish to ask you, General.

Chairman Russell. Senator Kefauver?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Knowland?

Senator Knowland. General Wedemeyer, I want to go as rapidly as possible here.

TERMS "COALITION," "UNIFIED," AND "DEMOCRATIC"

The Chairman raised a question a litle earlier as to when this word "coalition" first came into the picture.

It occurs to me that one of our great problems has been the different interpretations for different terms that the Russians placed, for instance, on "democracy" and we placed on "democracy."

For instance, in the Yalta agreement, it is said:

> They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Naz Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

Now, obviously, we had a different interpretation of "democratic means" than Stalin did, when he signed it, because certainly by our interpretation you would not consider that Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, or Hungary had democratic governments in the sense that we would interpret the word "democratic," would you?

General Wedemeyer. No, sir. I think the word "democratic" has been bandied around in more deliberation, more than any word in the English language.

Senator George. Permit me to say good-by, and thank you for coming here.

General Wedemeyer. Thank you, sir.

Senator Knowland. I submit perhaps that is somewhat the same problem we had in this word "unified," a "unified and democratic China," that honestly people might have viewed it in entirely different ways; because I find, on page 574 of the white paper, from Mr. Davies, on November 15, the following paragraph I want to read into the record:

> A coalition Chinese government in which the Communists find a satisfactory place is a solution of this impasse most desirable to us.

So, Mr. Davies, who was one of your advisers apparently thought of a coalition government, and it mentions it at that time.

I also call to your attention a communication under date of October 2 which Mr. Will Clayton, then Under Secretary of State, wrote to Admiral Smith of the Maritime Commission in which he said, among other things, the following:

> It is the desire of the United States Government that these commercial-type vessels be destined for a united and democratic China under a coalition government.

So that at least some people—in this case, Mr. Davies in China, Mr. Clayton in this country—thought that "unified and democratic" meant coalition, even though you and General MacArthur and, perhaps, Admiral Spruance, did not put that connotation upon it. Is that a reasonable viewpoint?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; I think it is.

STATE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL ATTITUDE ON CHINESE COMMUNISTS

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, I also would like to call your attention to the following: I think you mention that you had had an adviser there by the name of Mr. Raymond Ludden?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; I did, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. Some question has been brought up from time to time as to whether anybody in the State Department had ever suggested that the Chinese Communists were agrarian reformers.

I am reading now from a photostatic copy of the Philadelphia Inquirer, Friday morning, March 23, 1945, on page 16, and it is an interview with Mr. Ludden by Mr. Alexander Kendrick under a Washington dateline, March 22. I have the full article here, but the last paragraph reads as follows:

> The slogan of the Chinese peasants in the Communist area is "a full belly, a warm back, and no one kicking us around," but the so-called Communists are agrarian reformers of a mild democratic stripe more than anything else, the American observer asserted.

I think that that is an indication that at least one of the State Department advisers considered the Chinese Communists as agrarian reformers.

I did not know whether you had been familiar with that interview which he had given in 1945.

General WEDEMEYER. No; I was not familiar with it, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, I would like to ask, General, are you familiar with the statement that Mr. Sumner Welles gave to Mr. Earl Browder on October 12, 1942, which was prior to your going to China, I believe, in which Mr. Welles, on behalf of this Government said, and I quote:

> This Government has in fact viewed with skepticism alarmist accounts of the serious menace of communism in China.

Would you not say that that indicated, at least as of the period of 1942 that some of the people in Washington had doubts as to the menace of communism in that area of the world?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

NATURE OF A POLICE ACTION

Senator KNOWLAND. In last night's Washington Star there appeared an article on page A–9 of a speech by Mr. Warren Austin before a Georgetown University class, and in that speech, if he is correctly quoted, appears the following:

> In a police action, which is what a United Nations military operation essentially is, one, the repelling of aggession is precisely the victory that is sought.

I merely would like to ask you the question, since they use the words "police action," in the normal parlance, as we use it in this country, if you have gangsters in an American city who go down and shoot up the bank and kill the guard and the teller, and perhaps an innocent bystander or two, and then withdraw to their lair, whether you would feel from a police point of view it would be a victory if they merely agreed not to do it again, and whether you, under those circumstances, could rely on the gangsters being well-behaved the next time?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir.

DEFENSE MOBILIZATION

Senator KNOWLAND. You are familiar, are you not, General, that since VJ-day we have spent approximately $100 billion on our National Defense Establishment.

I have been a member of the Appropriations Committee, and I think I can say without fear of contradiction that the Congress has appropriated all the funds for national defense requested by our Military Establishment, and in fact, on several occasions has appropriated more than specifically requested.

Is it an unfair question to ask whether you think that $100 billion should supply this country with at least a reasonably good defense establishment?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, there you get into problems of economy. I watched with consternation the spiraling costs of materials and labor when I was in the Department, and it concerned me no end the amount of money that we would get, and the limited amount of security that the American taxpayer was getting for his dollar.

It worried me no end, and the price index, the index, cost of living, of course, influenced Congress and the military to increase the pay emoluments of the personnel, and any equipment that we purchased cost us so much more that in my judgment it is difficult for any military man to state that $100 billion of itself was the amount which should have provided the full security.

If you could expend $100 billion at a fixed cost with regard to personnel and matériel, why, of course, we could do it much better; but in the period that you people so kindly appropriated funds for us, in that short period, there would be tremendous changes in the economic situation, and the money that we visualize for tanks, for example, would buy just perhaps half the number of tanks, and that premise has application throughout so that we really did not get the equipment that we should have had, and was the intent of Congress, perhaps, with this $100 billion.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, I quite agree that inflation has cut down the number of vehicles and equipment that we might buy for that same amount of money. The only point I want to stress is that, to my personal knowledge in the last 5 years that I have been in the Senate, the Congress has made available everything that the Defense Establishment has requested.

You have testified that you believe that we ought to accept the judgments or certainly give great weight to the judgments of our Joint Chiefs who are the chief military advisers of the Government.

With that I certainly have no complaint, but at the same time the Joint Chiefs have a responsibility to the Congress if they believe the national security is jeopardized and they are not getting sufficient funds to carry out the commitments that the political officers of the Government have made for them, then to come to the Congress and say, "You are overdrawing your bank account," so to speak, "You are getting more commitments than we can possibly take care of in the funds allotted. Either cut your commitments or increase the funds that are available so that we can carry them out."

Isn't that a fair assumption?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. Looking at it from the point of view of a Member of Congress?

General WEDEMEYER. Definitely. I am sure the JCS realizes that, feels that responsibility.

THE CHINESE SOLDIER

Senator KNOWLAND. Now I would like to ask this question. You have had great experience in China. Do the Chinese make good soldiers, led, fed, trained, and equipped.

General WEDEMEYER. The equal to any in the world.

Senator KNOWLAND. Certainly the demonstration of the capacity of the Chinese Communist soldiers with equipment has tended to bear out the statement you have just made, and the personal experience you had with the Nationalist soldiers during the World War period would be one of the things that you base your answer on, would it?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now I would like to ask this. Some criticism is made from time to time of the Chinese armies. When I was in Nanking in 1949 I saw a General Pai who was one of the Nationalist commanders then.

General WEDEMEYER. General Pai Chung Hsi.

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes. He told me that in Chinese money the Chinese private gets $1 a month, the corporal $2, sergeant $3, lieutenant $4, a first lieutenant $5, a captain $6, a major $7, lieutenant colonel $8, a colonel $9, and General Ling who was there, who was one of the subordinates of General Pai, got $20, and I believe, though I may be mistaken, that General Pai indicated that he got $30 per month. Do you know whether those figures would be approximately correct?

General WEDEMEYER. I believe they would be approximately correct, sir. The Chinese Army was paid at a pitifully low scale and it was impossible for the Chinese general to support his family. He had to have an outside income from some source.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I would like just to ask unanimous consent to ask one question that will not take over half a minute. Then I will be through.

Chairman RUSSELL. Without objection Senator Knowland will proceed.

THE MURDER OF CAPTAIN BIRCH

Senator KNOWLAND. It is relating to this case of Captain Birch who came from the home State of our chairman and Senator George. The case first came to my attention a year or more ago when a former associate of Captain Birch came into my office and told me the story and I then asked for the file.

We now have the file before these committees. He was killed by the Chinese Communists on the 25th of August 1945. That was after VJ-day, and the Japanese had surrendered. He was on a mission for his Government.

He was shot in cold bold, as you have pointed out. His hands had been tied behind his back. We have pictures in here which indicate that that was so, and then apparently killed in cold blood. I couldn't help but look at the pictures and think of the pictures we have more recently seen in Korea of American soldiers who were taken by the Communists and their hands tied behind their backs and they were shot in cold blood.

Now this report was kept with a high classification on it all of these years. I merely want to ask you—and I know you had nothing to do with the classification when it came back to this country—but don't you think it might have been helpful to the Congress if the members of the Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee could have been told this story of Captain Birch? Because when he went out and he was warned that he might get in trouble, he said, and I quote him directly from the report, he said:

> I don't fear for my own life. What we must do is to find out whether these Communists are to be the friends or enemies of America. And if I must sacrifice my own life to find that out, it will be well worth while.

It rather seems to me that in not making this information available earlier, that to an extent he sacrificed his life in vain, because many of us, or at least many Members of Congress, apparently went along on the idea that the Chinese Reds were only agrarian reformers when, as a matter of fact, by his sacrifice we should have known them for what they were.

I merely ask you whether you don't think it would have been helpful for the Congress to have the facts.

General WEDEMEYER. Oh, I do; yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. That's all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, Senator Cain advised me he would like to catch a train, and he asked me would I be willing to ask unanimous consent that he question the witness now. I will be glad to have him do that if I can follow Senator Cain; he will assume my place and I will assume his place, which I understand would be the order otherwise.

Chairman Russell. Is there objection to reversing the order of Senator Smith and Senator Cain to permit Senator Cain to proceed at the present time?

The Chair hears none. Senator, you will proceed.

Senator Cain. I am very grateful to the Senator from New Jersey.

DISCUSSION OF MARSHALL MISSION TO CHINA

General Wedemeyer, during which month in 1946, if you recall, did you discuss with General Marshall his mission, which, in part, looked toward the amalgamating of the Nationalist and Communist armies of China?

General Wedemeyer. It wasn't in 1946, sir; it was in December of 1945, when he arrived, the day he arrived to assume his responsibilities as special envoy of the President, and to carry out the mission, a copy of which he showed me the first evening of his arrival at Shanghai.

Senator Cain. And during this visit, sir, you expressed to General Marshall as being your opinion that mission was not subject to accomplishment, that it was like mixing oil and water; and it was your view that could not be done. Is that correct, sir?

General Wedemeyer. In substance; yes, sir. It was in just general conversation. We were very good friends, and I was trying to be helpful and indicate to him my reaction, and gave him my frank reaction to what he had been sent out to do.

POSSIBILITY OF AMALGAMATING COMMUNISTS WITH OTHERS

Senator Cain. General Wedemeyer, when the Secretary of State was before us he said that he recognized the Communist leaders in China were Moscow-inspired and Communist-trained, and that he just was among those who did not believe the Chinese Communist was an agrarian reformer. I suggested to him my own thought that if an attempt had been successful to amalgamate these two armies in China, the Communist and the Nationalist, that the Communist leadership within the intended 10 Chinese Communist divisions would have attempted to destroy the greater whole or the national side of the army. And he responded against this expressed fear of mine by saying this:

> So far as your suggestion that this army would have been officered by fanatical Communists who would have overthrown freedom throughout the world, that would have been a problem of the Ministry of War, of the Chinese Government which was being set up.

I continue to be curious. If the Secretary's assumption was that in amalgamating these armies we might have placed the Communists in a position to be of harm to the Nationalists, that that would have been the responsibility of the Ministry of War on the Nationalist side to clear up. My view was that we ought to avoid the trouble in the first place by not attempting to amalgamate those armies.

Would that approximately be your view, General Wedemeyer?

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir; I think we were creating a very difficult situation for anyone to put those men in with the Nationalists, because they would sow these seeds of dissension and mistrust and try to undermine confidence in the Government. They were trained to do it.

Senator CAIN. I thank you, General.

General WEDEMEYER. That is their objective.

Senator CAIN. In this connection, I was made very curious and remain so by a comment offered to me by the Secretary of State, and this is it as it appears on page 5631 of the record. Secretary Acheson said:

> I have already pointed out that the same thing—

amalgamating such diverse forces—

> was done in countries in Western Europe without bringing your bad result about.

Against your experience in Europe and your knowledge of such matters generally, would you tell us in what countries—for I have not been able to find such places—that the United States encouraged amalgamating Communist and national leadership in military forces without any resulting harm, sir. I just didn't know what the Secretary was making reference to.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, of course——

Senator CAIN. Do you know of any country in Western Europe, General Wedemeyer——

General WEDEMEYER. No; I am just running the gamut of the countries in my mind and trying to visualize postwar political and military developments in each, and I don't recall of any country that underwent such an amalgamation.

The political forces were either Communist or they were free countries. That is, it was one or the other.

Senator CAIN. But I know of no instance in which America with reference to Western Europe encouraged Communist and democratic military forces to be amalgamated with or without good or bad results. I just don't know of any instance.

General WEDEMEYER. I don't either, but of course it could have occurred and I wouldn't have had knowledge of it, because I was in the Far East right after the war; but it seems to me I would have picked that up some place, because I read a great deal.

Senator CAIN. To the best of your knowledge, you know of no such instance.

General WEDEMEYER. No; I do not, but I am not a good witness.

Senator CAIN. General, I am most grateful to you for all of your testimony to me and to my colleagues.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith.

MILITARY AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES IN KOREA

Senator SMITH. General Wedemeyer, in the New York Times of June 6 Mr. James Reston has an article in which he raises some points that were in the testimony of Secretary Acheson. Referring to Secretary Acheson, Mr. Reston says:

> He made a clearer statement of United States war aims in Korea than any other official of the executive department has made since the start of the war. He drew a clear distinction between what we would fight for and what he would seek by negotiation, and between our military objectives and our political objectives.

Then Mr. Reston goes on to say:

> The United States has been working toward the political objectives of establishing a free, independent, and democratic Korea——

Chairman RUSSELL. Off the record.

(A discussion was had off the record.)

Senator SMITH. I had started to read extracts from a statement by Mr. James Reston of the New York Times.

General WEDEMEYER. I got it as far as you went, sir.

Senator SMITH. I want to go on reading his statement here, and you will get the point of my question. Mr. Reston says here:

> The United States has been working toward the political objectives of establishing a free, independent, and democratic Korea ever since 1945, Mr. Acheson pointed out, but that is not what our troops went into Korea to achieve. Nor did they go there to unify Korea. They went there to repeal, to throw back, the aggressors and restore peace and security in the area.
>
> What did this mean? Senator H. Alexander Smith, Republican, of New Jersey, wanted to know.

I asked the Secretary at that time what he meant by peace and security in the area. Continuing Mr. Reston's article and quoting Secretary Acheson:

> "If the aggression swould end at the thirty-eighth parallel)," Mr. Acheson replied, "and you had reliable assurances that it would not be resumed, then you could return to a peacetime status, and we would hope gradually to remove the troops from Korea, both Chinese troops and United Nations troops."
>
> "But if we stopped where we began," observed Senator Smith, "might the war not start up all over again? And if we stopped where we began, how could we justify the 141,000 casualties, battle and otherwise, sustained by the United States in Korea?"
>
> "Senator," replied the Secretary of State, "if you accomplish what you started out to do, I don't think that is synonymous with saying you stopped where you began. We started out to do two things: One is repel the armed attack and the other is to restore peace and security in the area. Now, if we do those two things, we have done what we started out to do, and I should think that is success."

Now, my question is whether in your judgment the objectives of the United Nations—take the Korea case—is simply to stop the aggression by halting the North Koreans where they were. Is that their job? Or whether, as you conceive of this thing, with a different objective. I want your judgment on this analysis and apparently this statement on our present policy.

KOREA IN THE GLOBAL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I think that it was very important, and I was happy to note that our President took an affirmative stand with reference to the aggression that occurred in Korea.

Korea is not a political entity. We accepted its geographical division, which developed into a political division actually at the thirty-eighth parallel. We Americans accepted that with the Soviet. And the primary purpose, therefore, in my mind at least, my interpretation of the President's intention, was to stop the advance of communism.

We had examples of continued depredations. We had continued evidence that they had predatory intentions in various areas of the world.

We had experience with them sufficient to justify the conviction that they were not of peaceful intentions, and not cooperative in their relations with the free world. They had certain objectives that strongly diverged from those of the free nations.

With all that background, I felt that our President made a wise and a courageous decision.

I have throughout this investigation, my participation in it, stated that, in my judgment, I would not have undertaken this step that was taken. It was the matter of indicating our intention to the Kremlin that this is it, we are now going to take aggressive, or realistic rather than aggressive, realistic steps, to thwart your unscrupulous ambitions.

The United Nations memorandum, which has been introduced into the evidence, indicates clearly that the United Nations had the desire, has the desire and the intent that Korea will be a unified country, a democratic country.

Senator SMITH. You mean by that both North and South?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, it eliminates this imaginary boundary here of the thirty-eighth parallel—superficial boundary. I accept that, of course, as an objective, but we must be careful in my judgment not to become involved in any area or in any manner that might jeopardize our global picture.

My concern is that we have permitted a very important military operation to develop in a rather unimportant strategic area. So from a strategic viewpoint, from the viewpoint of the strategist, I would say that area was not the place to put a major effort, a major allied effort, a major United Nations effort.

Nevertheless, morally, psychologically we give evidence in some way that we have come to the point where we cannot brook these further aggressions, that we will not tolerate these continued aggressions.

Now, I stated to this committee the other day if we are compelled to go to war—which Heaven forbid—but if we are compelled to go to war against the U. S. S. R., I would oppose in my limited way a broad scheme of maneuver that visualized controlling physically that vast area and those teeming millions in the U. S. S. R. and satellites.

I think it would wreck us economically, it would be an undertaking that would just ruin us. It would compel us to resort to the same regimentation, the same philosophies of living that we are trying to remove elsewhere in the world.

We would have to have a totalitarian structure ourselves. We would have to abrogate the freedoms of our individuals and so forth in order to accomplish such a tremendous task, so I say that our objective should be to blunt the advances of the Communists, to destroy their war-making potential, to minimize and reduce and eliminate their ability to conduct effective offensive operations in any field of strategy against any area of the world.

Offensive operations, sir, include operations in the political, in the economic and the psychosocial fields as well as in the military fields. I want our country to seize the initiative in those fields with the assistance, cognizance, full enthusiastic support of allies, the member nations in our United Nations organization, if at all possible.

Senator SMITH. Well, I believe you would go along with the Secretary's suggestion that we might stop our military operations by an agreement at the thirty-eighth parallel, that the aggression would be stopped there, but as far as unifying Korea was concerned, that could be taken over in the political realm and not necessarily made a military objective.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. I think that is the Secretary's purpose. I am trying to make that clear and see whether you agree with it.

General WEDEMEYER. Earlier one Senator asked me what I thought about a truce at the thirty-eighth parallel and I said I would be glad to see our country consider a truce. Anything that we can do to effect peace, an honorable peace I strongly advocate, sir.

IMPORTANCE OF THE IDEOLOGICAL CONCEPT

Senator SMITH. You spoke yesterday in your testimony—and it interested me very much—you contrasted bullets with ideas.

General WEDEMEYER. I am sorry I did that, sir.

Senator SMITH. Well, I think it was a very fine thing to do. I want to read you a paragraph I happened to run into. This was Pastoral Letter issued by the House of Bishops meeting in El Paso, Tex., January 12, 1951, Pastoral Letter of the Protestant Episcopal Church of America. This paragraph appears:

> Since there is an inner struggle for the soul of our world which crosses all frontiers, we must realize that no final victory can take place on the field of battle. Since ideas are not destroyed by guns, the only way to overcome a false view of life is by the militant preaching and living of a true view of life.

I put that into the record here because it seemed to me it was another expression of the very idea you tried to express yesterday, that you can't kill ideas with bullets. You can't kill ideas by force.

There is a bigger thing to do here in this whole global picture than simply thinking in terms of military supremacy. I want to commend you for bringing that into our thinking here because I think you have made a very strong case for that idea that the ideological approach is after all the fundamental thing we are driving at. Am I correct in my assumption?

General WEDEMEYER. That is my conviction, sir, and I have been talking like this for 10 years. Every conference or every address that I made to the students at the National War College for the past 5 years, and I am scheduled to make one in August of this year, I emphasize the spiritual factors and the political-economic as the proper approach to these international problems.

Senator SMITH. Well, I felt it important to emphasize that because there was some question of what you meant yesterday by your bullets ideas, and I think it was well worth while you said that.

I think it was clarified by the chairman last night on the record, and I think what I read here emphasizes further the thought that I thought at least you were trying to express.

I have one more question, Mr. Chairman, if I have time.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, in view of the paucity of numbers here, we will give you time. Your time has expired. We will give you one more question.

MILITARY MISSION TO FORMOSA

Senator SMITH. This is along a little different line. It has recently been reported that the United States is sending a military advisory group to Formosa—I think it already has been done—to aid the Nationalists in building their strength there if necessary. Do you think that was a desirable move, and do you think it is timely now to do it or do you think it should have been taken before?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, sir, of course, I think way back in 1947—and I still stand on the China report—we should have taken constructive action in an advisory, supervisory role and given material aid, but I am glad that this has been done. I think it is a positive step in the right direction, and certainly if those people aren't worthy of our assistance, it won't take long for these fine Americans in Formosa to evaluate their capabilities and report to their Government and we can withdraw their assistance.

Senator SMITH. But you feel from your observation of the Chinese people that you know there that it should be possible to develop a strong fighting force for the cause of freedom and anticommunism in that area of the world?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I would like to feel that way, sir. I don't know very much about the type of people that are there. I know the senior man and he is a very capable officer, senior Army officer, General Chase.

Senator SMITH. Do you know General Sun Li-jen?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; I know him. He is a VMI graduate and he is capable, a very capable Chinese general, one of the best.

Senator SMITH. Thank you very much, General; I think that is fine.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Flanders?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Long?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Green?

Senator GREEN. General, I know I hoped that our talk would come to a completion yesterday.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

INITIATION OF DECEMBER 5, 1945, TELEGRAM OF MAC ARTHUR, WEDEMEYER, AND SPRUANCE

Senator GREEN. But it was cut short by the time. I had not quite finished asking you about that radiogram of December 5, 1945.

From what you said regarding the words at the end, "unified democratic China," I understand that you say that it did not express your idea of what you had in mind to express; and it occurred to me to ask you whether you had drafted that radiogram or someone else had, and you simply signed it.

General WEDEMEYER. Really, I cannot recall, sir; but I never would refuse to accept responsibility for that radiogram. I accept full responsibility, Senator; also I don't recall the discussion that caused us to put that statement in there, I frankly don't, but I do recall Vice Admiral Barbey, who was an American admiral out there, stating something about using a lever to compel the Nationalist Government to accept what we were striving to do. I recall that, sir.

Senator GREEN. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. And I have racked my mind, but that is all I remember; and I must have accepted that, so I am not one iota withdrawing from responsibility for the statement.

Now, the connotation that you place on it is, I think, reasonable. In fact, I don't see how you could place any other but, I say to you, sir, that my entire record has been one, prior thereto and subsequent thereto, which would indicate that that idea, if you interpret it to mean, as you do and as many others do, rightfully, a coalition government or a coalescing of these strongly opposed political factions, these divergent ideologies, then it does not embody my idea, an idea that I consistently held, sir, and had reaffirming evidence that I was justified in holding.

Senator GREEN. But you three officers signed it, and someone must have composed it?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator GREEN. And I wondered, whether it was you.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I don't think so. I think the way things like that would happen, Senator, you had a lot of data involved in that message, including the number of ships and personnel, and so forth, so your staff officers would work up that kind of data, and coordinate it among themselves, and bring in paragraphs that would ultimately be brought together, and we don't sign messages like that, sir. We just read them all out together, the three of us, and then put our names authenticating them on the message; but we do initial sometimes the original at the top in the corner, indicating that we have read the message.

Senator GREEN. Well, was this plan worked out by General MacArthur, Admiral Spruance, and yourself at a conference?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. We had quite a large conference. I took two or three of my staff officers there; and Spruance arrived with some of his staff; and General MacArthur's staff, of course, were there; and we had quite a large conference, designed to coordinate those two major ideas that I mentioned to you—the repatriation of the 3 million Japanese, and then the movement of those Chinese Nationalist armies north. That required a lot of coordination. I won't go into the details, but it really did.

How that 13 paragraph, which has caused so much discussion, got into that telegram, I am not able to tell you, sir. I just don't know; but I accept responsibility for it.

Senator GREEN. Well, the point is, is that radiogram a composite production?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator GREEN. And no one of the three was entirely responsible.

General WEDEMEYER. Oh, no, sir. Any part of that radiogram, no one person probably could claim that he contributed.

VIEWS OF STATE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL IN CHINA

Senator GREEN. Now, there is one other matter that has come up since I questioned you yesterday, and that is some newspaper commentary on your testimony yesterday. I think it was while I was not here, and I should say, in explanation, that I have been obliged to attend hearings of the Appropriations Committee and the Rules Committee, at the same time that I am supposed to be here, and so I have not been able to attend all of the places I am supposed to be at one time. This is the news item:

> Lieutenant General Wedemeyer told Senators today his four State Department advisers in China in 1944 and 1945 were "very critical" of the Chinese Nationalist Government, but made "favorable" reports on the Communists.

Well, the inference that any reader will draw from that is that you were dissatisfied with them, and they didn't represent your views; and

I could hardly believe that, because you had expressed previously entire confidence in these same men. I would like to have your comment on that news item.

General WEDEMEYER. What occurred there, perhaps some newspaperman took it out of context, perhaps.

You heard me develop that subject, perhaps, this morning, sir, and I was asked whether I thought these men were Communists, or fellow travelers, I think the term was used; but anyway, I stated that I did not believe them to be Communists or fellow travelers, sir; and their interests were as Foreign Service officers in the economic and diplomatic and political field, and very rarely, but occasionally, they would comment on military operations that they observed.

They were constantly out in the field, Senator, and with my authority, full cognizance. They would submit these oral, more often written, memoranda indicating the result of a trip or an observation, or some little tidbit that they had picked up, sir.

Senator GREEN. Well, as long as their comments were objective, that met with your approval, did it not?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, you see, I tell you I put my emphasis, my first interest into the military situation. It wasn't good when I went over there. We were getting booted around by the Japanese, and I wasn't sure that I could hold my area. So I must tell you that I did not pay as much attention to the work of those men as I probably should have as theater commander.

But I never suspected them. I don't suspect people. I accept people to be all right and honest and good Americans until I find them proven otherwise, and I never suspected them. But they were transferred to the Embassy. I wasn't in command of the theater more than probably 6 months, and maybe not that long—I think they were transferred around February or March.

LETTERS ON STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEES IN CHINA

Senator GREEN. May I draw attention to two items which are a matter of public record, and they were printed in the State Department loyalty investigation hearings, Senate Resolution 231, part 2, appendix. The first is at page 1995.

That is a communication from Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, dated November 22, 1944, in regard to Messrs. Davies, Service, and Emmerson. I will quote from the letter.

> As for Messrs. Davies, Service, and Emmerson, who, as you know, are all detailed for duty in China, General Wedemeyer indicates that it is his conviction that unless these three officers are retained, military activities will be hampered. I therefore hope that their assignment to the China theater need not be changed.

General WEDEMEYER. What was the date of that, please, sir?

Senator GREEN. November 22, 1944.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator GREEN. And then at the end he says:

> I am very aware of how great your need is to have as many of your Foreign Service officers as possible returned to regular duty. At the same time, these two theaters (India-Burma and China) have the most unusual political problems confronting them constantly, and your help in the matter is a real necessity.
>
> In view of the above I trust that the request of General Sultan to have Mr. Max Waldo Bishop assigned to the India-Burma theater, and General Wede-

> meyer's desire to retain Messrs. Davies, Service, and Emerson in the China theater can be acceded to.

Now that would seem as though you made very strong protestations.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I don't believe they were too strong, sir. You see when I assumed command of the theater in September of 1944 I didn't come home; I went from New Delhi, Ceylon rather, right over to assume command in China.

What came up, I think, was these men were worried about their status—John Davies, Jack Service, Ludden, and Emmerson—and I told them I would be happy for them to continue on, to continue to function just as they did under General Stilwell, and those representations were forwarded.

The strength of those representations I am not qualified to say, except that I was happy to have any assistance from any American because I was in an awful tight spot when I got over there, and I would not have relieved them.

The situation was brought up by Ambassador Hurley. I would not have relieved them unless I had the conviction that they were guilty of disloyalty or failing to carry out the duties that I prescribed.

Senator GREEN. That was in November?

General WEDEMEYER. That was November 1944, sir.

Senator GREEN. When you had been there only a short time?

General WEDEMEYER. That is right, sir.

Senator GREEN. Now the following May 1945 you, yourself, wrote a letter. The subject was letter of commendation. It was written to the honorable the Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. It was sent from Chungking, China. I quote:

> Mr. John S. Service is highly commended for outstanding aid rendered headquarters, United States Forces, China theater, in advising the commanding general on political matters which have direct and important bearing on the military situation in China.

Then I will omit a long series of different matters in which his service was commended by you.

At the end:

> He prepared valuable analyses of the political situation as it affected the war potential of the Chinese Government and by correlation that of the United States forces in China.
>
> In recognition of his outstanding performance of duty, the commanding general, United States Forces, China theater, expresses to Mr. Service the appreciation of the United States Forces in China.

Signed—

> A. C. Wedemeyer, Lieutenant General, USA, Commanding.

So your first good impressions were confirmed?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes. I have stated, sir, I never had any feeling that there was anything wrong with those men.

Senator GREEN. And so the inferences that people might draw from this news item were unjustified, I take it?

General WEDEMEYER. In my judgment they were.

Senator GREEN. Thank you very much.

General WEDEMEYER. I think the newspaperman took it out of context.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General Wedemeyer, I will try to hurry through with just two or three questions and I hope to finish my first 15 minutes.

POSSIBILITY OF STABLE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA

We have had experience now since near the end of World War II and afterward with the perfidy of the Soviet, their failure to keep their contracts as we understand contracts, and their using of agreements to twist them around for their own personal advancement and so forth.

I am reminded of the old story told about the Indian who said: "White man fool me once; shame on him. White man fool me twice; shame on me."

Now do you think with our experience with the Soviet that we could hope to have anything but frustration and disappointment out of any appeasement settlement which we might make with the Soviet or with the Red Communists in China? In other words, wouldn't we be apt to be fooled a second time if we relied purely on promises and assurances?

General WEDEMEYER. I definitely agree with you, yes. And——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Excuse me.

General WEDEMEYER. That's all right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I was just going to say: Should we not in your opinion learn some lessons out of the past to govern our diplomatic and other activities looking toward a final conclusion of the Korean situation in the future?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

EQUIPMENT OF CHINESE NATIONALISTS IN 1947

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, are you aware, General Wedemeyer—and I say this advisedly because a very, very prominent American official, who was very familiar apparently with the situation in 1946, because he was on the ground in China, has stated before one of these committees—and I will not name him because I think it might have been, perhaps, not in public session.

But this statement has been made: That the Chinese Nationalists in 1946 were, on occasions, the armies were on occasions, sent north with only as little as sometimes two rounds of ammunition per man, and they went into battle on occasions with that shortage of ammunition.

Are you aware that that is true on occasion?

General WEDEMEYER. In a hearsay sense, sir.

When I sent, moved, armies from Southeast China up to North China, I made provisions to insure that each individual had a hundred rounds. But I left there the latter part of April of 1946 and what transpired, what occurred, after that I don't know.

But the generalissimo urgently desired to get as many bodies up there as he could, and I had difficulty in restraining him. I didn't want to send people up there who had not received shots. I had to create innoculation teams to go through these thousands of individuals.

I had to DDT all of them, delouse them; and then I had to get winter equipment for them—parkas and shoepacks and so forth.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. Otherwise he would have suffered tremendous losses.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes. Well, I asked you that question because I assure you that testimony was given—that they were sent north on occasions in 1946 with two rounds of ammunition.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I wouldn't be surprised.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, I haven't time to look for the exact testimony, but this is, I think, very substantially accurate. I will tell you the source of it, and I want to ask you whether you agree with it or not.

STRENGTH OF NATIONALISTS IN 1947

I am quite sure of this date, in May of 1947—Secretary Acheson, in testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, stated substantially this, and I think these are the exact words, with reference to Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist armies in China—stated then flatly that Chiang Kai-shek's armies were not facing defeat, and that the Nationalist Government of China was not facing collapse.

Now, assuming that that is what the testimony was, do you agree that that was the situation in May of 1947?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, if it were, there was a tremendous change between the period of May 1947 and the period of July 1947, when I was out there on my survey.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. You see, it was just a few months later that I began my survey, and I went all over the area, talked to people of all social strata, and political complexion, and so forth, and it does not agree, of course, with my report on the conditions that I found in China, and I stand on that report, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In other words, your opinion at the time you were there in—did you say June of 1947?

General WEDEMEYER. I was there in July and August.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. 1947?

General WEDEMEYER. 1947; yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Was the Nationalist Government on the mainland facing collapse?

General WEDEMEYER. It was deteriorating rapidly, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And that Chiang's armies were facing defeat.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I see.

General WEDEMEYER. And demoralization was present.

LOYALTY OF STATE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL IN CHINA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, with reference to the questions that Senator Green asked you a moment ago about Mr. Service and certain other people in the letter which he read, which was in that investigation referred to, do you know whether or not those letters were written prior to the discovery of the facts in the Amerasia case, the famous o'clock tomorrow morning.

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir; I don't. Whenever anyone works on my staff and does a good job, sufficiently good to attract my attention, I write letters of commendation. I believe in patting a man on the back when he serves me loyally and faithfully and well, and this is not unusual.

As I recall it, this man was entitled to that letter and would have gotten it——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER (continuing). In my judgment at that time; and even today I know nothing about that man that is derogatory, only hearsay.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General——

Senator GREEN. Let the witness finish.

Chairman RUSSELL. Let the witness conclude.

General WEDEMEYER. Only hearsay.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you.

LOSSES OF CHINESE NATIONALISTS DURING WORLD WAR II

Now, one last question that I would like to synthesize in the record. It has been reported that the Chinese Nationalist armies suffered in the operations against Japan and in the war against Japan before the Japanese surrender and before we even got into the war, in excess of 3 million casualties; that is the Nationalist Government of China and their armies.

They fought the Japanese all during the war; they stood with us throughout our war against Japan in China, refused to be defects; they were recognized as the Government of China at the time of the Japanese surrender and were a party to the acceptance of that surrender.

The fact is, is it not, General, that the Chinese Nationalist Government forces suffered more casualties by far than all of the other nations put together that fought the Japanese in World War II; isn't that true?

General WEDEMEYER. That I don't know, sir. I could get that information for you if it is important.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Assuming that they lost some 3 million casualties, isn't that more than all of the other nations, including ourselves, suffered in fighting the Japanese in World War II?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, sir, the Soviet lost a——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am talking about fighting the Japanese.

General WEDEMEYER. Fighting the Japanese—I am sorry.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Not the whole World War.

General WEDEMEYER. Oh, definitely that would be true, if they lost that many, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I am merely quoting from what I believe to be official reports and reliable.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOONER. If that is true, then the sacrifice of life and limb and casualties on the part of the Nationalist Chinese Government, not in treasure but in life and limb in casualties exceeded in numbers the casualties of all of the other nations that fought the Japanese in World War II.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

UNITED STATES OBLIGATIONS TO NATIONALISTS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It occurs to me, General, that from any standpoint of morals, loyalty, any other standpoint that we owe a moral obligation not to abandon the Nationalist Chinese whose sacrifices have been so great, if there is any way in our own interests, in the interests of freedom and peace, to avoid it.

It other words, I think that we could be accused of heinous perfidy if through diplomatic appeasement we should throw down the Nationalists and espouse the cause of the Communist destroyers in China, and give them respectability as a result of their criminal acts.

I just express that as my opinion. I don't know whether you care to express an opinion on that or not.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I am in agreement with those views; yes, sir. I think you will find such statements in my China report of 1947.

Of course, Senator Hickenlooper, the personnel of the government changes, and the complexion of the nature of the government changes, but so far, in my reports, the changes have all been constructive and good.

As I indicated to you all, the reports I get from Formosa are very favorable.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. And believe me, I am being objective about it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, thank you. Had you finished?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you. I shall not pursue any more questions. I want to shorten it as much as I can.

General WEDEMEYER. Thank you, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator McMahon?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Lodge?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Fulbright?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Tobey?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Sparkman?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Gillette?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Brewster?

(No response.)

POSSIBILITY OF AMALGAMATING COMMUNIST ARMIES WITH OTHERS

Chairman RUSSELL. General, I have two questions. They are both so minute that I apologize for asking them at this time of the day when we are all trying to conclude this hearing. But Senator Cain asked you about any government where Communists had been used in the armies and likewise participated in the government, and I believe you stated that you knew nothing about it, that you knew of no instance.

Did you ever hear of the Maquis or however you pronounce those French groups?

General **Wedemeyer**. Oh, yes, sir.

Chairman **Russell**. Many of whom were Communist cells that participated in the liberation of France, and were incorporated into the French Army?

General **Wedemeyer**. I didn't ever associate the Maquis movement at all with the Communist movement, Senator Russell; never.

I never heard them associated with the Communists. After the war some of them were affiliated with Communist-front organizations, but Maquis movement during the war, I had never heard of it as being associated with the Communist movement.

Chairman **Russell**. You had never heard that any of their groups did grow out of cells of Communists or were Communist led?

General **Wedemeyer**. No, sir; but it is reasonable to assume that some of them did—I am sure that some of them did—but I mean it is not commonly recognized that they were a Communist movement, the Maquis.

Chairman **Russell**. I did not mean that all of them were Communists. Many of them were loyal and patriotic Frenchmen.

General **Wedemeyer**. Yes, sir. They did a great job.

Chairman **Russell**. There were many who are not in the de Gaullist as well as the other democratic parties. But the Secretary of State, in answering that question went on to say that the French did recognize Communists; they had them in their legislative bodies, and I know I have read news accounts where great concern was expressed over the fact that there were Communists in the French Army, including the charge that some were officers.

General **Wedemeyer**. Yes, sir; but the French, I think have awakened.

[Deleted.]

Chairman **Russell**. There is just one other thing. I have heard about this battle where the Chinese Nationalists went into it with two rounds of ammunition.

It is not very important, except it intrigues me as an amateur student of history as to what factors, what morale factors, could drive men into battle with just two rounds of ammunition in today's modern warfare? Can you give us the name of that battle?

General **Wedemeyer**. No; I don't know a thing about it, sir. I would never order men into combat with two rounds of ammunition. I never did either, while I commanded the theater.

CHINESE COMMUNIST CASUALTIES, 1946–49

Senator **Brewster**. General, I would like to ask this question: Mao Tse-tung did announce in the New York Times a year or two ago that between 1946 and 1949, in that 3-year period, they had suffered, the Communists, 1,494,000 casualties.

I just want to ask you whether you had any reason to think that was not a correct portrayal of what had happened.

General **Wedemeyer**. What period was that?

Senator **Brewster**. That was from 1946 to 1949, the 3-year period.

General **Wedemeyer**. The Chinese Communists had lost that number?

Senator **Brewster**. Had had that number of casualties.

General **Wedemeyer**. I think probably they did. That is an educated guess.

Senator BREWSTER. That is all.

Chairman RUSSELL. General, you have had quite a session on the stand. Have you any statement you desire to make to the committee before we recess here?

General WEDEMEYER. I do, Mr. Chairman.

PERSONAL STATEMENT OF WITNESS

I would like to thank the members of the committee for the courtesy extended to me while I appeared as a witness.

I want to assure you that I return to the west coast with renewed confidence in this very important legislative body.

I have had many contacts with congressional committees, and uniformly my experience has been favorable; and I return confident that as a result of this exhaustive investigation that you gentlemen are conducting, some constructive steps will be taken to assure that an American policy protecting our heritage will evolve.

I have tried to summarize some of the major premises that I tried to develop as a result of the questions which were addressed to me, and I should like to read to the members of the committee very quickly, these ideas.

Chairman RUSSELL. Take your time.

General WEDEMEYER. While copies of that are being distributed, I want to emphasize that I have tried, throughout this interrogation, to give the members of the committee complete information and assistance within my capabilities.

I have given replies without inhibitions, cognizant of the fact that some of the statements I made are divergent from those expressed by my seniors in the Army; and I submit my views with humility. I realize that possibly more consideration should be given to the views of the experts in the Pentagon.

As the result of the relief of General MacArthur the attention of our people, in fact the world has been focused more sharply than ever upon Korea. Many of us have loved ones and friends struggling in that area as defenders of freedom. This is a grim business and those of us at home have the responsibility to insure that their sacrifices are not in vain.

GLOBAL POLICY APPROACH

All through my testimony I have made an earnest effort to emphasize two points. First, the employment of military force has never, by itself, solved international frictions or problems, and never will. Second, there must be global direction, timely and intelligent guidance concerning our national and international policies, plans and actions, if we Americans are to answer successfully the challenge of the Kremlin. A crudely mechanical approach to these diverse problems cannot yield effective solutions. On the contrary, true solutions to these problems require the application of all four elements of global strategy, namely, the political, the economic, the psychosocial, and the military.

Assuming that we do have national objectives, or aims clearly defined and enunciated, I suggest that we consider the world in terms of its natural geographic regions, for example, Western Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, the Far East, and so forth.

Next, we would establish for those regions complementary and supplementary objectives in the political, economic, and psychosocial fields.

These regional objectives should obviously be in consonance with global objectives and should contribute realistically to their attainment.

For Korea and China, in the Far East region, we would, for example, establish objectives which should be carefully evaluated with respect to our larger, or broader aims, whether in Asia as a whole, or in Western Europe.

In some regions or nations economic influences may present themselves as our primary instrument. In others, political influences will predominate. Still others may pose military problems or a challenge in a psychosocial field.

MAJOR INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POLICY

In my judgment, we must all recognize as our major instruments of national policy these four categories of resources or forces: political, economic, military, and psychosocial, which, as we have seen, together constitute the four elements of global strategy. We must realize that it is not possible to consider any objective as attainable by one single means to the exclusion of other means.

Further, the timing and emphasis will vary in different regions and nations. In order to clarify these four major instruments of national policy, may I consider them briefly in turn:

POLITICAL RESOURCES

First. Political resources include foreign alliances or pacts of mutual benefit to participating nations. An example is the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio de Janeiro) which provides for combined effort on the part of the United States and Latin-American countries for their security and well-being. Another example is the North Atlantic Pact designed to serve as a deterrent to aggressor nations by pledging a unified stand by the 12 participating nations. Such pacts and alliances are realistic political steps toward collective security and should be extended to other regions of the globe.

ECONOMIC RESOURCES

Second. Economic resources include abundant raw material and unsurpassed industrial development in our country, as well as a preeminent position in the financial world. They include mutually beneficial trade agreements with other nations and selective distribution of raw and processed materials to less fortunate peoples to help them help themselves toward a genuine recovery.

We should avoid offering this aid as "charity" for it undermines the moral fiber and in fact is abhorrent to self-respecting peoples. An example of the tremendous force of the economic factor in strategy may be found in World War I. The German armies were not defeated decisively on the battlefields in 1918. The blockade which denied vital materials to the Kaiser's war machine was primarily responsible for Allied victory.

MILITARY RESOURCES

Third. Military resources have in the past been the major instrument of national policy in the development of the principal world powers. Communist leaders recognize the importance of direct employment or the threat, the intimidation of military force. They are concerned about our military potential particularly are they concerned in the field of ultra-destructive weapons.

I have emphasized the conviction that we and our allies must establish undisputed control of the air. Forty years ago I would have recommended undisputed control of the seas and for the same reasons, namely, to exploit the most efficient available means to neutralize and to destroy enemy war-making potential.

The military staffs of the Department of Defense are the proper agencies to determine the strength and composition of the military forces required to accomplish projected tasks.

I should like to add two notes of caution: (1) Those of us in a particular military service are understandably prone to be unduly influenced in our thinking by service loyalties; (2) most Americans, including those in the armed services, are still surface-minded, although we Americans utilize the airplane commercially and militarily more than any other country in the world. We should insure the most effective employment of air power.

It is possible that in the future science may develop a new weapon which may render the skies untenable for airplanes. I hope, then, that military leaders, particularly those in the Air Force, will support as strongly such new weapon as I am supporting air power today. It is not my desire to convey the impression that air power alone will win a future war, but in my judgment it is our most important and powerful single means of imposing our will by military force.

IDEOLOGICAL RESOURCES

Fourth, and perhaps most important, are psychosocial forces. We must reach the hearts and minds of our own people so that they understand what we are striving to do, as well as other peoples of the world clarifying unmistakably American aims and objectives.

Our present trial of strength is not only between massed bodies of men but also between opposing ideals, and therefore the persuasion of the mind in my judgment is as important as a military triumph. The struggle of mankind in the field of ideas, ideals, and ideologies has been going on since the beginning of history. It has manifested itself in many different ways and in varying degrees.

Christianity, the Magna Carta, our own Constitution, the United Nations Charter for example are the embodiments of ideas that have received warm reception or aroused fanatical opposition. There has been a tremendous amount of false information disseminated in the world as to the alleged advantages of communism. People all over the world are told that communism is really the people's revolution and that anyone opposing it is a reactionary or a Fascist or Imperialist. We know that the Kremlin has neither the intention nor the capability of fulfilling its false promises.

I have noted with keen approbation that some of our universities are including the study of communism as a compulsory subject for their students, who should have knowledge of the Red scourge just as doctors must have knowledge of disease.

I do not believe that all of our Government leaders recognize the full importance of the psychological factors. We expend billions on weapons but we are penurious in the expenditure of funds and effort in the field of psychological warfare. We must recognize that we are presently engaged in the struggle for survival and that we shall not attain victory until we come to grips with this problem of eliminating suspicion, hatred, distrust from the hearts and minds of our fellow men.

An excellent example of the important role that psychosocial forces play may be found in World War II. In 1939 the French had the largest and reputedly the most powerful army on the Continent.

However, in May 1940 the German military machine rolled on almost unimpeded—to conquer France in 39 days. This German success can be primarily attributed to the skillful employment of psychosocial forces which the Nazis used to destroy faith and confidence in French leadership as well as to break down the will of the people to resist.

RELATIONSHIP OF COMMITMENTS AND RESOURCES

Two major questions are posed by the testimony that I have given the members of this committee: First, how do we alleviate the immediate situation which includes a war of possible increasing proportions on the peninsula of Korea? And second, what should we do to exercise effectively the world leadership which has been thrust upon us?

In answer to the first question, I suggest humbly that a man who has undertaken commitments to several creditors must either provide the means to satisfy them all or reduce some of these commitments until he has the means to pay.

Our country has undertaken global commitments in Europe, the Far East, and elsewhere. To date our commitment in Korea is proving the most costly. Thus either we should provide the means to fight in Korea to an early, decisive, and victorious culmination or we should get out.

If means are available which could safely prove decisive in Korea we should use them. Should we elect to take decisive action, I would consider carefully advice from the military staffs of the Department of Defense with respect to the decisive action I refer to.

However, I would not accept an extended delay nor a stalemate in that area. For in delay we would be expending resources, human and material, to a prohibitive degree; in stalemate we would simply restore the status quo before June 25, a year ago, and in so doing, release the forces of communism to pursue their aggressions elsewhere or to renew them later again in the same area—Korea.

Either of these latter courses would play directly into Communist hands. The cost of such "containing" tactics would be wholly incommensurate, in my judgment, with the intangible gains that have been suggested by prior witnesses to the members of this committee.

Under conditions of indefinitely extended containment we would be playing the game according to the rules of a scheming, unscrupulous group in the Kremlin.

Either we should play this tragic game in Korea to win, or at the propitious time, take our fine team off the field—mobilize fully our spiritual and material resources in conjunction with friendly nations and set about the task of creating conditions that would enable free peoples to prescribe the rules and select the arenas of conflict in all fields of strategy.

We, along with the free nations, must seize and maintain the initiative in this unfortunate but currently unavoidable international struggle which may be so strongly influence the destiny of mankind.

Concurrently—and I emphasize this is contingent upon the acceptance of the other elements of my strategic concept—I suggest that we withdraw recognition from the U. S. S. R. and her satellites, indicating unmistakably our recognition of the fact that our difficulties in the international field since VJ-day, possibly earlier, have their genesis in those countries.

Also, I suggest that we generate appropriate military forces, with emphasis upon air power, so that we can acquire reasonable security for our homeland, and at the same time render realistic assistance to other free peoples who are doing their share to protect themselves.

ORGANIZING OURSELVES FOR WORLD LEADERSHIP

In answer to the second major question, that of exercising effectively world leadership, I recommend now as I recommended in 1942 and subsequent to that date, that a Government agency be established, organized, and equipped to evolve global plans and actions inherent in world leadership.

Today the members of the National Security Council occupy positions of great individual responsibility which limits the time and effort they can devote to the problem of national survival—which in reality is the most important function of any government.

It appears to me logical to assign planning as a primary function of the National Security Council which is already responsible for the coordination of political, economic, psychosocial, and military factors in the interest of national security. To accomplish this I suggest a planning group under the National Security Council composed of recognized authorities, possibly 100 of them, in political science, economics, history, geopolitics, international law, sociology, physical science, military science, management, labor, finance, communications, and other appropriate fields.

This planning group should have certain operational and full supervisory responsibilities for American global plans. The study of international developments and the evolution of plans to meet them should be undertaken by this group with the advice and assistance of other appropriate government agencies.

KEEPING PUBLIC AND CONGRESS INFORMED

The American people should be kept informed of projected plans and foreign commitments insofar as this is feasible in the interest of national security. The American people's representatives in Congress should unquestionably be given this information.

Several Members of Congress were entrusted with the most highly classified information during World War II, namely, the development of the atomic bomb, and that secret was never divulged by a Member of Congress. I believe it is contemplated in our form of government that either all Amercan citizens or their duly elected representatives in Congress should have full opportunity to consider commitments, national and international, affecting the security and well-being of the Nation, as well as a clear picture of the current international situation.

The situation in which we actually find ouselves today calls to mind a pronouncement by Demosthenes about 350 B. C., which follows:

> Shame on you Athenians * * * for not wishing to understand that in war one must not allow oneself to be at the command of events, but to forestall them. You Athenians are the strongest of all the Greeks. in ships, cavalry, infantry, and revenue, and you do not make the best of them.
>
> You make war against Philip like a barbarian when he wrestles—if he suffers a blow, he immediately puts his hand to it. If he is struck again he puts his hand there too, but he had not the skill or does not think of parrying the blow aimed at him or of evading his antagonist. You, likewise, if you hear that Philip has attacked the Chaerena, you send help there; if he is at Thermopylae, you run there; and if he turns aside you follow him, to right or left, as if you were acting on his orders. Never a fixed plan, never any precautions: You wait for bad news before you act.

I am confident concerning the future of our country. I have faith in the judgment and in the actions of the American people, particularly if they are apprised of the facts. My faith in Congress has always maintained and contacts with you gentlemen the past few days strongly reaffirm confidence in your ability and in your determination to protect American ideals. You have my respect and continued support.

As I travel across the length and breadth of this land, I have discovered that all Americans respond to dynamic and inspiring leadership with faith—faith in the ideals for which our founding fathers stood—faith in honor—faith in a sense of values—faith in God.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

Senator Knowland. Mr. Chairman, I merely want to say that I am sorry that all the members of the committees were not present to hear the closing statement by General Wedemeyer. From the time of our Revolutionary War our Nation has been built by people imbued with faith and not with fear.

I think that General Wedemeyer has come up to the finest and the highest American tradition.

Senator Smith. I am glad, Mr. Chairman, to echo the sentiment of my colleague from California, and I want to express to the general the deep appreciation of the fine and inspiring message he has given us as well as his splendid testimony.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I hope his retirement from the military service does not mean that we are to lose his continued leadership and inspiration in a battle in which all Americans are going to be deeply engaged.

Chairman Russell. Gentlemen, I had intended to examine the general and I served notice that I would with respect to his address before the joint meeting of State Council and All Ministers of the National Government August 22, 1947. I shall not undertake to do so at this hour. I ask to have that statement, which appears on page 758, printed in the appendix of the record.

(The material referred to above is to be found in the appendix of the record.)

Senator **Green**. In adding my commendation to that of my colleagues, I desire to say I think this witness has made a unique record in that he has made friends of all those who questioned him.

General **Wedemeyer**. Thank you, sir.

Chairman **Russell**. I would like to add a word in behalf of myself and the members of the committee who are not here.

I thank you, General, for your appearance before this committee. I, too, regret that all the members of the committee were not present to hear your very fine summation of the points which you have been making before the committee for the past several days.

I am particularly impressed by your complete rejection of any psychosis of fear in the United States to motivate us in any part of our political life, and your firm faith that America can survive whatever might befall us.

We all, I think, want as many allies as it is possible for us to have. We all are praying for peace and hoping that war will never come again; but we have in this country things that are above price.

If, though God forbid, we are called upon to defend them, I would not have the American people lose their own spirit of self-reliance that has carried us through all the dangers which have confronted us until now, and with which I share your belief that it can carry us through the ones which now impend.

You have served all over the globe, sir, during your military career, and in the course of these hearings you have expressed your views candidly, frankly, and fully on questions which affect our national interests that might arise in all parts of the world.

You have painted some new aspects on some of the old issues which we have been handling here. I thank you for your appearance and for your statement, and I share the hope that you will find retirement pleasant, but that it will not cause the Nation to be deprived of your services in the years which lie ahead.

If there is nothing further, gentlemen, we stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 2:42 p. m., the committees recessed to reconvene at 10 a. m. Thursday, June 14, 1951.)